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J. 333305-MONO-State
Galley 428
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
Another doubt which had been felt by the British Chiefs of Staff was
in regard to the closing up to the Rhine on its whole length, which it
was felt would slow up the advance into Germany. This point had
already been cleared up by the explanations given by General Smith
and General Bull. The general impression gained from SCAF 180
was that the southern thrust was regarded to be almost as important
as the northern and that it diverted too much strength from the
latter, both in forces and in the available facilities such as bridging
material. The present situation on the Eastern Front obviously
necessitated the speeding up of operations in the West in order to
engage as many Germans as soon as possible, both to prevent the
withdrawal of forces to the East and to take advantage of such re-
duction in strength as was taking place.
GENERAL SMITH emphasized that the Supreme Commander in-
tended to put into the northern effort every single division which
could be maintained logistically. The plan called for an ultimate
strength of 36 divisions in the northern thrust. There would also
be about ten additional divisions in strategic reserve available to
exploit success. A very strong airborne force would be used for the
northern crossing. It was, however, impossible to overlook the fact
that the northern attack would, of necessity, take place on a narrow
four-divisional front and might bog down. The southern advance
was not intended to compete with the northern attack but must be
of sufficient strength to draw off German forces to protect the im-
portant Frankfurt area and to provide an alternate line of attack if
the main effort failed. He wished to make clear the Supreme Com-
mander's view of the differentiation between the main and secondary
thrusts. Everything that could be put into the main effort would be
put there.
SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he welcomed this explanation. He
had felt that the southern advance might cause the northern attack
to bog down.
GENERAL MARSHALL, in referring to a point previously made by
Field Marshal Brooke as to the necessity of resting and relieving
divisions in the line, agreed that this was vitally important. In
his view the considerations involved in the plan were as follows:
the most favorable spot logistically, that is, in the North; the fact
that it was not safe to rely on one line of advance only; the number
of divisions required to maintain security in the non-active parts of
the line; the assessment of the number of divisions which could be
logistically supported in the northern thrust. He considered it
essential that there should be more than one possible line of advance.
The strategic reserve should be fed into either advance in the light of
how well that advance was succeeding. If extremely heavy casual-
ties were sustained in the northern attack there were the alternatives
of either battling through or switching the weight of attack elsewhere.
It was his view that it was essential to have some other line of advance
to turn to if we bogged down in the North. It was likely that the
Germans would put up a heavy resistance in the North and, with
the aid of jet-propelled reconnaissance aircraft, would assess the
likelihood of our attacking in that area.
SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that after crossing the Rhine the
strength of the main thrust would be reduced by the necessity for
relief and rehabilitation of tired units.
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"ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley 428\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nAnother doubt which had been felt by the British Chiefs of Staff was\nin regard to the closing up to the Rhine on its whole length, which it\nwas felt would slow up the advance into Germany. This point had\nalready been cleared up by the explanations given by General Smith\nand General Bull. The general impression gained from SCAF 180\nwas that the southern thrust was regarded to be almost as important\nas the northern and that it diverted too much strength from the\nlatter, both in forces and in the available facilities such as bridging\nmaterial. The present situation on the Eastern Front obviously\nnecessitated the speeding up of operations in the West in order to\nengage as many Germans as soon as possible, both to prevent the\nwithdrawal of forces to the East and to take advantage of such re-\nduction in strength as was taking place.\nGENERAL SMITH emphasized that the Supreme Commander in-\ntended to put into the northern effort every single division which\ncould be maintained logistically. The plan called for an ultimate\nstrength of 36 divisions in the northern thrust. There would also\nbe about ten additional divisions in strategic reserve available to\nexploit success. A very strong airborne force would be used for the\nnorthern crossing. It was, however, impossible to overlook the fact\nthat the northern attack would, of necessity, take place on a narrow\nfour-divisional front and might bog down. The southern advance\nwas not intended to compete with the northern attack but must be\nof sufficient strength to draw off German forces to protect the im-\nportant Frankfurt area and to provide an alternate line of attack if\nthe main effort failed. He wished to make clear the Supreme Com-\nmander's view of the differentiation between the main and secondary\nthrusts. Everything that could be put into the main effort would be\nput there.\nSIR ALAN BROOKE said that he welcomed this explanation. He\nhad felt that the southern advance might cause the northern attack\nto bog down.\nGENERAL MARSHALL, in referring to a point previously made by\nField Marshal Brooke as to the necessity of resting and relieving\ndivisions in the line, agreed that this was vitally important. In\nhis view the considerations involved in the plan were as follows:\nthe most favorable spot logistically, that is, in the North; the fact\nthat it was not safe to rely on one line of advance only; the number\nof divisions required to maintain security in the non-active parts of\nthe line; the assessment of the number of divisions which could be\nlogistically supported in the northern thrust. He considered it\nessential that there should be more than one possible line of advance.\nThe strategic reserve should be fed into either advance in the light of\nhow well that advance was succeeding. If extremely heavy casual-\nties were sustained in the northern attack there were the alternatives\nof either battling through or switching the weight of attack elsewhere.\nIt was his view that it was essential to have some other line of advance\nto turn to if we bogged down in the North. It was likely that the\nGermans would put up a heavy resistance in the North and, with\nthe aid of jet-propelled reconnaissance aircraft, would assess the\nlikelihood of our attacking in that area.\nSIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that after crossing the Rhine the\nstrength of the main thrust would be reduced by the necessity for\nrelief and rehabilitation of tired units."
}