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    "title": "National Security Council - Meetings File, 1945-1953: Memoranda for the President: Volumes: II:  January 7, 1949 - July 7, 1950",
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    "ocrText": "NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nDOCUMENT\nThis folder contains copies of the minutes of\nN.S.C. meetings for the period January 7, 1949 to\nJuly 7, 1950\n(Meetings Number 31 - 60)\nSanitized 1-2014\nDUPLICATE SET\na\nFILE LOCATION\nTRUMAN PAPERS - P.S.F.- - SUBJECT FILE\nN.S.C. - MEETINGS\nFOLDER: MEMOS FOR THE PRESIDENT - VOL. II (1/7/49 to 7/7/50)\n[Bax220]\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\nGENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION\nGSA FORM 7122 (7-72)\nGSA DC 73.495\n32\nNCT(PSF/N5C)1485 1485\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC 3/6/12, NLT-PSF-49-2-2-6\nTRUMAN L NARA LIBRARY\nNARA AY Date 5/24/13\nJanuary 27, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a brief summary of the discus-\nsion at the 32nd meeting of the National Security Council.\n1. PROPOSED DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, EUROPEAN COMMAND,\nON IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLANS\n(NSC 39; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: \"Analysis\nof the Implications Involved in the Issuance of the Directive to\nCINCEUR Proposed in NSC 39\", dated January 25, 1949)\nMR. SOUERS gave the background of the proposed directive and\nreferred to the analysis of implications involved in its issuance, pre-\npared by the NSC Staff.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL stated that CINCEUR's current directive\nneeded revision because it was dated August 13, 1947.\nSECRETARY ACHESON stated that the Department of State was in\nentire agreement with the proposed directive. He said that it seemed\nimplicit that CINCEUR would coordinate his plans with the British and\nthe French. This was not stated in the directive, but Secretary Acheson\nfelt it must be implicit.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL said it was understood there would be\nsuch coordination, and MR. DRAPER remarked that staff discussions were\nalready under way with the British and French.\nTHE PRESIDENT inquired if there were any further comments.\nThere were none, and THE PRESIDENT declared the directive approved.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nConcurred in the proposed directive contained in NSC 39 and\nagreed to recommend to the President that he formally approve its is-\nsuance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nNOTE: The proposed directive in NSC 39 subsequently sub-\nmitted to the President for consideration.\n2. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUB-COMMITTEE TO DEAL WITH THE GERMAN QUESTION\nSECRETARY ROYALL referred to a memorandum with respect to\n\"Administrative Arrangements for a Special Committee on Germany and\nPreparation for a Foreign Ministers Meeting\". He said he had written\nthe President on this matter and that he had met the day before with\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthe Secretaries of State and Defense to discuss it. The memorandum\nproposed the establishment of a Senior Committee, composed of the\nSecretary of State as Chairman, the Secretaries of Defense and the\nArmy, and the Economic Cooperation Administrator, to review U. S.\npolicies on the subject prior to their submission to the National\nSecurity Council and the President, if necessary, for final approval.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that the coordination should be done\nthrough the National Security Council.\nSECRETARY ACHESON read a statement proposing the establish-\nment of a sub-committee of the National Security Council to deal with\nthe German question. He stressed the fact that the basic purpose of\nthe sub-committee was to prepare a statement of our policy toward\nGermany for submission through the Council to the President. It should\nundertake a complete review of the German question in the light of our\nobligations and policies in Western Europe. It should not be an op-\nerating committee, he said, but should have as its primary purpose\nthe preparation of the policy restatement. In the course of its work,\nhe said that the sub-committee might also consider certain urgent\nproblems with respect to Germany. Some problems, however, like the\noccupational statute and the tri-zonal agreement, should be incorpor-\nated in or await the final determination of the over-all policy. He\nsaid that the sub-committee might also consider how the policy should\nbe implemented after it had been approved by the President.\nSECRETARY ROYALL said that no matter how carefully drawn\nsuch a restatement might be, it was inevitable that certain questions\nwould be left unanswered. For this reason he felt that the sub-\ncommittee should be continued, to handle such recurring problems.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that if there were such problems they\nshould be brought to the National Security Council and settled.\nSECRETARY ROYALL suggested that it might be helpful to keep\nthe sub-committee alive if further questions of policy arose, even\nthough there might be no ambiguity in the policy restatement.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that he hoped there would be no such\nambiguity.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that he did not wish to take a final\nposition on this matter at present, He warned, however. that he might\nwell recommend, when the sub-committee had completed its primary job,\nthat it be terminated. He referred to Secretary Forrestal's and his\nrecent study in the Hoover Commission of the problems of terminating\nGovernment agencies which had been created for a specific job, once\nthe job had been completed.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\nTRUMAND NARA\nSECRETARY ROYALL then referred to the implementation of a\ndecision to establish such a Sub-committee, including the designation\nof working deputies and appropriate procedures.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that such procedural matters were the\nproper function of the secretariat of the Council and that it would be\nsufficient for Council Members to register their desires with Mr. Souers.\nSECRETARY ROYALL inquired whether there were any personnel on\nthe National Security Council Staff closely enough in touch with current\nGerman problems to staff such a Sub-committee.\nMR. SOUERS said that the National Security Council Staff was\nflexible enough to take care of such an assignment.\nSECRETARY ACHESON and SECRETARY FORRESTAL both suggested that\nMr. Souers could request personnel from the participating departments\nand agencies according to the needs of the Staff.\nSECRETARY ROYALL said that a number of pressing problems called\nfor an immediate meeting for consideration.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that he felt that such arrangements, too,\nshould be the function of the Executive Secretary.\nMR. SOUERS proposed, and it was agreed, that the Secretaries of\nState, Defense, and the Army, and the Economic Cooperation Administrator\nshould meet in the Conference Room of The White House on Friday morning,\nJanuary 28, 1949, at 9 a.m., to consider these matters.\nSECRETARY ROYALL raised the question of the second stage in the\nprocedure, namely, how to obtain the agreement of the British and the\nFrench, once we had agreed among ourselves on a policy. He said that\nthere were only a few differences as between the State and Army Departments\nand between the Army and the Economic Cooperation Administration. Most of\nthe major problems were differences between ourselves and the British and\nthe French.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that that was a question of the total\npolicy itself.\nTHE PRESIDENT agreed with Secretary Acheson.\nMR. SOUERS inquired if the President wished Mr. Hoffman to be\na member of the Sub-committee, the THE PRESIDENT said that he should be.\nThere was some discussion as to whether the Secretary of the\nTreasury should be invited to become a member, but it was agreed that his\nmembership was unnecessary at this time.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nHAME TRUMAND NARA LIBRARY\nTHE PRESIDENT inquired if there were any further comments on\nSecretary Acheson's proposal. There were none, and the President\ndeclared it approved.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nde Agreed to the establishment of a sub-committee to deal with\nthe German question. The sub-committee will consist of the Secretary of\nState, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Economic\nCooperation Administrator and such other members as the President may\ndirect.\nb. The sub-committee will undertake as its principal and pressing\ntask a restatement of our policy toward Germany in the light of our obliga-\ntions and policy in Western Europe for submission through the Council to\nthe President. During its existence, the sub-committee will consider such\nurgent problems concerning Germany as the members might refer to it, but\nit is not proposed that this sub-committee be a permanent operating committee.\nC. Staffing and procedures of the sub-committee will be the\nresponsibility of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\n33\nNLT/P5F/NSC) 1486\nDECLASSIFIED\nFebruary 4, 1949\nTOP SEGRET\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC,3/6/12 NLT-PSF-49-2-3-5\nNARA\nNARA AY\nDate 5/24/13\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at the\n33rd meeting of the National Security Council.\n1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA\n(NSC 34/1)\nSECRETARY ACHESON remarked that the report was general and some-\nwhat obscure in phraseology. In the Department of State he said there\nwas general agreement that, from a strategic point of view, China was an\narea of lower priority, especially since the house appeared to be falling\ndown and there was not much to be done until it had come down.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that China was unlike other countries\nwhere there were usually small nationalist minorities for the communists\nto take over. Historically, a nationalist government had been merely a\nfacade in China, with a rough equilibrium maintained among feudal barons.\nIt is only a fiction that China is called a nation today. Consequently,\nwhen the Government collapses now China would be back where it had been\nmany times before. Before the communists could do anything they would\nhave to create something.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said our historic policy has been to prevent\nthe domination of China by a hostile power. While this policy was open\nto attack on the grounds that it was not positive, Secretary Acheson felt\nthat hasty positive action might commit us to an unpredictable course of\naction.\nSECRETARY SNYDER said that apparently the proposed policy could\nnot be any more definite than it is, in spite of the feeling of dis-\nsatisfaction with it. SECRETARY ACHESON agreed and added that strategic\nplanning could not be undertaken until. it was clear what would be left\nin China.\nMR. HOFFMAN said that ECA needed more specific guidance for day-\nto-day operations. He felt it was better for ECA to be forced out of\nChina by the communists than to leave voluntarily. If we were to stop\nECA aid by our own decision this would afford the opportunity for\ncommunist propaganda to the effect that the only purpose for American aid\nhad been to support the old Nationalist Government.\nMR. HOFFMAN added that, from the course of events inTientsin and\nPeking, it looked as though the communists were getting ready to throw\nout the ECA operations.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAdopted NSC 34/1 without change.\nNOTE: NSC 34/1 subsequently submitted to the President for\nconsideration.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\n2. THE CURRENT POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO FORMOSA\n(NSC 37/2 and NSC 37/1)\nSECRETARY ACHESON read from several recent cables bearing on the\nsubject, by Ambassador Stuart, General Barr, and Consul General Cabot.\nWith reference to the telegrams and to the policy proposed in the report,\nhe said that we may not succeed, through diplomatic and economic measures,\nin preventing the communist infiltration and domination of Formosa.\nSECRETARY ACHESON also read from a recent telegram from the Consul\nGeneral in Formosa, which reported an interview with Governor Chen. This\nmessage indicated the possibility of building up an autonomous movement\namong the Formosans.\nMR. DRAPER read from a recent telegram from General Wedemeyer\nin Tokyo to General Bradley, which reported invitations for General\nWedemeyer to visit Governor Chen and the Generalissimo. SECRETARY\nACHESON noted that Secretary Royall had mentioned such invitations in\nanother cable from Tokyo. Secretary Acheson said he had no considered\njudgment on the matter of General Wedemeyer visiting Formosa, but he felt\nit was bad to involve the Generalissimo in any way with Formosa.\nSECRETARY ACHESON then referred to the views of the Joint Chiefs\nof Staff (NSC 37) in which the strategic importance was emphasized of\ndenying Formosa to the communists. The present report suggested how\nthat might be done, but there was no guarantee that the measures proposed\nwould be any more than 60% effective, at best. Consequently, if the\ndiplomatic and economic measures were not effective, then the question\narose, of the strategic significance of a Formosa in the hands of reds.\nIf the Chinese air force or navy were to succumb to the communists and\nif a Formosan revolution did not succeed, Secretary Acheson felt we should\nface now the exact significance to our security of such an eventuality.\nHe suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should prepare a new\nappreciation of the strategic importance to us of Formosa, which would\nindicate whether we should, if necessary, use military forces to deny\nFormosa to the communists in the event that other measures are not\nsuccessful.\nMR. DRAPER asked what action we should take if the present Formosan\nGovernment invited the U. S. to establish bases there. Mr. Draper's\nfeeling was that, if we had some military force in Formosa, by invitation\nof the government, our position would be better.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that our acceptance of such an offer\nwould have to be based on an appraisal as to whether the Formosan\nGovernment was acting wisely and on the level in making such an offer.\nSecretary Acheson preferred to try to develop a spontaneous independent\nmovement in Formosa which could then lead to an agreement in the UN\nfor a new deal for Formosa. This way, he said, we could get inter-\nnational sanction for U. S. intervention.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN LIB\nNABA\nHAMPS\nMR. HOFFMAN proposed the insertion of a new paragraph at the\nend of the report, which would confirm our present policy of continuing\na vigorous program of aid to Formosa through the most flexible mechanisms\npossible.\nSECRETARY ACHESON stated that the basic problem was not for us to\nobtain bases there but to deny the Island to others. The best means for\nsuch a denial was the establishment of a stable Formosan Government.\nSecretary Acheson supported Mr. Hoffman's proposal as better suited to this\npurpose than the idea of bases.\nMR. BUTTERWORTH cautioned, with respect to the aid program, of\nthe importance of timing in showing our hand.\nMR. DRAPER inquired about the apparent inconsistency of the report,\nin that it proposed on the one hand to stir up a native revolution, and\non the other hand to support a stable Chinese Government.\nSECRETARY ACHESON felt that the proposals were not inconsistent,\nsince we would have to get in touch with local autonomous groups in\nadvance to be prepared in case the government did not turn out well.\nMR. LAY added that in the NSC Staff it had been made clear that these\ntwo courses of action had deliberately been proposed, in the event that\neither one should fail. MR. SOUERS remarked that the support of an\nautonomous movement would be a clandestine operation.\nMR. HOFFMAN remarked that apparently Formosa was one of the\npotential powder kegs in the world, where we needed a strong mission with\na top-flight representative whose judgment would be completely reliable.\nMr. Hoffman said that, while the present aid program to Formosa was only\na few millions, he hesitated to throw more money into such a fluid\nsituation without the day-to-day advice of a strong man on the spot.\nSECRETARY ACHESON agreed, and in response to his query, MR. BUTTERWORTH\nreported that we had in Formosa only a consulate general outside of the\nECA mission.\nMR. DRAPER remarked on the importance of former Formosan trade\nwith Japan and raised the question of restoring these economic ties.\nSECRETARY ACHESON then proposed that the report, including Mr.\nHoffman's new paragraph, be approved as being acceptable in so far as\nit goes, and that it be supplemented by another report based on a\nfurther estimate of the strategic implications by the Joint Chiefs of\nStaff and a report by the Department of State on more specific and\nimmediate steps to be taken.\nSECRETARY SYMINGTON and MR. DRAPER suggested that further action\non the report be deferred until the further studies had been made, and\nraised again the question of bases.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nMART TRUMANTI NARA\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that the present report implies that our\ncourse of action should not include the establishment of bases, but he\nagreed that this question should not be decided by implication. He felt\nit would be more difficult for us to encourage a free government on\nFormosa if we had bases there than if we did not. The main question left\nunanswered, he said, was the estimate by the Joint Chiefs as to the use\nof military measures, if other means failed.\nMR. BUTTERWORTH said it was desirable to get approval of the\npaper in order to authorize the appropriate agency to get in touch with\nFormosans. ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER stated that we could have a revolution\nthere in a week if we wanted it.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Adopted the conclusions in paragraphs 12 and 13 of NSC 37/1\nand a new paragraph proposed by the Economic Cooperation\nAdministrator, for submission to the President as a current\nU. S. position with respect to Formosa.\nb. Agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be requested\nto furnish the Council an estimate of the extent of the\nthreat to U. S. security in the event that diplomatic and\neconomic steps to deny communist domination of Formosa\nprove insufficient, and recommendation as to what, if any,\nmilitary measur should be taken in that event.\nC. Agreed that the Department of State should prepare a state-\nment of specific and immediate steps which the U. S. should\ntake with respect to Formosa.\nd. Directed the NSC Staff to prepare a supplementary report\non Formosa based on the discussion at the. meeting and the\nreports referred to in b. and C. above.\nNOTE: The conclusions adopted under a. above subsequently\ncirculated as NSC 37/2 and submitted to the President\nfor consideration. The actions in b. and C. above\nsubsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense\nand the Secretary of State respectively for\nimplementation.\n3. THE CURRENT POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES RESPECTING DELIVERY OF\nAID TO CHINA\n(NSC 22/3)\nSECRETARY ACHESON reviewed the background of the military aid\nprogram, and reminded the Council that the question had come up in\nNovember, when it had been decided to continue deliveries. From a\nmilitary point of view, he felt that continued deliveries would only\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMANA NARA LIBRARY\nbe a waste. From the political point of view, we would be criticized\nwhether we continued or whether we stopped. There was no good solution,\nhe said, and the Department of State was split down the middle. Some\nfelt that the lesser evil was not to interfere with the program, while\nothers felt that we could not avoid the responsibility for the ultimate\ndisposition of the equipment. He noted Secretary Royall's recent tele-\ngram, which recommended stopping the deliveries.\nMR. HOFFMAN said that, since it had been found wise to stop\nrelief deliveries, it appeared five times more obvious that we should\nstop military deliveries. He felt that military aid could serve no\nuseful purpose and questioned undue sensitiveness to outside opinion in\nthe face of the facts of the situation.\nMR. DRAPER agreed that deliveries should be stopped and diverted\nto more useful quarters.\nMR. KENNEY reported that there were presently two DE's en route\nwith Chinese crews and two more due to sail from Norfolk in March. The\nChinese already possess title to these ships, and it was agreed their\ndelivery should not be affected by any action in the aid program.\nSECRETARY SYMINGTON suggested that current deliveries be routed\nto Okinawa and held there pending resolution of the fluid situation.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL agreed that this could be done again, as it had been\ndone once before.\nSECRETARY ACHESON felt that was the only practical thing to do.\nHe wondered what the effect of such a holding up of deliveries would have\non negotiations between the Nationalist Government and the communists.\nMR. BUTTERWORTH felt that the Nationalist Government had greatly over-\nestimated its bargaining capacity. SECRETARY ACHESON stated that,\naside from indirect effects, this seemed to be the sensible thing to do\nfor reasons of frugality and of possible danger. He suggested that the\nPresident call in Congressional leaders for their advice and explain\nthe reasons for such a suspension.\nMR. DRAPER suggested suspending also delivery of surplus property\nsupplies on the same grounds.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAgreed to recommend to the President that, inasmuch as further\nmilitary aid to China, except for selective shipments, cannot\nbe used effectively and there is the danger that it may fall\ninto the hands of Chinese communists or other interests inim-\nical to the United States, the President advise key members of\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\nCongress that the President considers it to be in the interests\nof national security to suspend further shipments under the\nMilitary Aid Program for China, including suspension of further\ndeliveries to China of undelivered surplus military property\nremaining from the bulk sales arrangement made in 1946, pending\nclarification and review of the situation, meanwhile permitting\nonly such selective shipments as can be properly and effectively\nused.\nNOTE: The above advice subsequently submitted to the President\nfor consideration.\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\n34\nNCT(PSF/N5C)1487\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nTOP SECRET\nAuthority RAC 3/6/12, NLT-PSF-49-2-4-4\nNARA AY\nDate 05/24/13\nFebruary 18, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nTRUMAN UP HARRY NARA\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion\nat the 34th meeting of the National Security Council.\n1. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND YUGOSLAVIA\n(NSC 18/1)\nSECRETARY ACHESON outlined the background and purpose of the\nreport, as described in the \"Discussion\" of NSC 18/1. He said he\nunderstood that the Military Departments were concerned that they\nmight not be consulted in the implementation of the policy, with\nrespect to shipments of munitions or goods for producing munitions.\nHe stated that the Departments of State and Commerce had always\nconsulted the military in such matters, and gave assurances that\nsuch consultations would continue.\nSECRETARY SAWYER remarked that the report was sound, and\nhe would be glad to consult with the military with respect to ship-\nments of munition-producing goods. SECRETARY FORRESTAL and SECRETARY\nROYALL had some misgivings with respect to paragraph 3 of the\n\"Recommendations\", which would authorize the Secretary of State or\nthe Secretary of Commerce to license shipments of munitions to\nYugoslavia without the usual interdepartmental clearances.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he felt that such a procedure should\nbe approved as a policy matter and that the licensing of particular\nitems should of course be discussed with the military, but without\na review of the overall policy with respect to each item that came\nup. He mentioned as the type of shipment that should be permitted\nto Yugoslavia, a cartridge factory which the French had recently\nwished to send there. He added that the Department of State wished\nto give considerable discretion to Ambassador Cannon in Belgrade.\nMR. LAY proposed, and SECRETARY ACHESON agreed, that\nparagraph 3 should be amended to indicate appropriate consultation\nwith the military in the licensing of munitions and munition-\nproducing goods.\nGENERAL EISENHOWER, in response to SECRETARY FORRESTAL's\nquestion, said he felt the report was a good one, but that it\nshould be subject to review in the light of changing intelligence.\nHe said that this might not be an honest defection by Yugoslavia,\nbut merely an extremely subtle trick.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that Ambassador Cannon would, of\ncourse, be continuously consulted on this program, and SECRETARY\nRARK\nFORRESTAL expressed great personal confidence in the Ambassador's\nability.\nSECRETARY ROYALL and SECRETARY SAWYER inquired as to the\nproposed public explanation as to the implementation of this pro-\ngram. Secretary Sawyer said he would prefer not to attempt to\nexplain the implementation as stated in the second paragraph under\nparagraph 9. SECRETARY ACHESON agreed that the paragraph in\nquestion could be deleted.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nConcurred in the recommendations contained in NSC 18/1,\nsubject to amendments in paragraphs 3 and 9 thereof.\nNOTE: NSC 18/1, as amended, subsequently circulated\nas NSC 18/2 and submitted to the President\nfor consideration.\n2. COORDINATION OF POLICY RESPECTING DELIVERY OF AID TO CHINA\n(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, \"Current\nPosition of the United States Respecting Delivery of Aid\nto China, dated February 8, 1949)\nMR. SOUERS read a memorandum by the Secretary of Defense\non the subject, which raised the problems of independent inter-\npretations for implementing the program of military aid to China,\nand recommended that the Secretary of State be designated the\ncoordinator of such implementation.\nSECRETARY ACHESON agreed with the recommendation.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL said there were conflicts of inter-\npretation in the tempo and method of implementing the President's\ndecision.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted a memorandum by the Secretary of Defense on the\nsubject.\nb. Agreed to recommend to the President, with respect to\nthe President's decision concerning the delivery of\nmilitary aid to China, as indicated in the reference\nmemorandum, that the President direct that this\ndecision be implemented by all appropriate Executive\nDepartments and Agencies of the U. S. Government under\nthe coordination of the Secretary of State.\nNOTE: The action in b. above subsequently submitted\nto the President for consideration.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n3. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACETIME PLANNING FOR THE WARTIME CONDUCT\nOF OVERT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE\n(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated\nHAREY NARA\nFebruary 1, 15, and 16, 1949)\nSECRETARY ACHESON reviewed the three alternatives proposed\nby the NSC Staff report and outlined the Department of State's reasons\nfor its position that the planning responsibility should be centered\nin the Department of State. This would not pre-judge the moving of\nthe present psychological warfare organization out of the Department\nof State in time of war according to any general mobilization plan.\nSECRETARY ROYALL was concerned with the responsibility for\npsychological warfare after a war had begun. SECRETARY ACHESON\nassured him that the present decision involved only responsibility\nfor planning for such wartime activity.\nGENERAL EISENHOWER agreed that the Department of State was\nthe proper organization to plan, but he felt that in wartime only an\norganization like the Council itself, which he saw as a defense\ncabinet during time of war, could effectively direct psychological\nwarfare. He emphasized the broad inter-relations of economic and\nintelligence affairs with psychological warfare. It involved, he\nsaid, not only words and leaflets, but material things to distribute.\nIn such R broad sense, he felt that psychological warfare never had\nbeen fully exploited by us.\nMR. SOUERS directed attention to the views of the Director,\nBureau of the Budget, which had been obtained at the direction of\nthe President.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted and discussed the memorandum on the subject by\nthe NSC Staff dated February 1, 1949, in the light of\nthe views of the Director, Bureau of the Budget and\nthe Department of State contained in the memoranda\ndated February 15 and 16, respectively.\nb. Agreed that the organization for the peacetime plan-\nning of overt psychological warfare should be\nestablished within the Depa rtment of State as\nenvisaged in Annex A of the reference memorandum\ndated February 1, 1949.\nc. Directed the NSC Staff to prepare a proposed directive\non the subject pursuant to b. above for consideration\nby the Council.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\n4. REPORT ON ARMY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PACIFIC\nSECRETARY ROYALL gave an oral report on his recent trip\nto Army installations in the Pacific. A summary of this report\nis attached as an Appendix to this memorandum.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted an oral report by the Secretary of the Army on his\nrecent trip to Army installations in the Pacific.\n5. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 2-49)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n6. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of February 14, 1949.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nAPPENDIX\nTRUMAN HAVE NARA SERARA\nREPORT BY SECRETARY ROYALL\non\nARMY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PACIFIC\nSecretary Royall said that, except where living conditions\nwere bad, the morale of all three services was good everywhere he\nvisited, and that unification was working well in the field.\nALASKA\nHe emphasized the military importance of Alaska and the\nAleutian Islands. While Alaska had no value for ground operations\nit would have offensive importance for air operations. Consequently,\nthe main problem was one of defending the air fields. He felt there\nwere not enough military forces in Alaska to protect the air fields\nin the case of a summer attack. Housing facilities were terrible\nand morale was not good, as evidenced by a reenlistment rate of 5%\ncompared with 50% in Europe.\nJAPAN\nTalking over the military situation with the staff in Japan,\nhe said that General MacArthur and General Whitehead (of the Air Force)\nwere agreed that, in the event of war, Okinawa should be held and\nthat we should get rights in Formosa and try to hold it. General\nMacArthur felt that we should hold Japan to protect the Philippines,\nGuam, Hawaii, and the China coast and the Indies. General Whitehead\ndid not feel we should try to hold Japan because the USSR would find\nit difficult to support a war economically in Japan and because an\nenemy-held åpan would be no more of a menace to Okinawa than the\nChina coast. Therefore, General Whitehead felt that we should put\nour military government in Japan on a civil basis and phase out the\nmilitary. Both General MacArthur and General Whitehead agreed that\nJapan would have no value to us as an offensive base, and that Alaska\nand Okinawa would be better. Neither expected the Japanese to fight\noffensively for us.\nSecretary Royall said he was recommending to General Bradley\nthat the military situation in Japan be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs\nof Staff. He said that such a study would be made solely from the\nmilitary point of view, and he realized that there might be psycho-\nlogical reactions if we were to get out of Japan now. He added that\nthe Far Eastern command was currently studying the problem of military\nforces for Japan and had estimated that there were 5 million Japanese\nsoldiers who could be used.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nHARTY TRUMAN NARA\nMost military commanders agreed that the USSR could not\nmount any military operations from Japan.\n(Secretary Sullivan inquired if the problem of economic\nsupport of the Japanese population would bother the Russians.)\nSecretary Royall felt it would. He said that Mr. Dodge and\nGeneral MacArthur were working well together and that Mr. Dodge was\naddressing himself particularly to improvements in the internal\neconomy of Japan.\nThe recent economic directive to General MacArthur, concurred\nin by the Council, had apparently been received by the Japanese with\nmuch less objection than had been expected.\nAs to reparations, Secretary Royall said the uncertainty had\ncreated a serious problem and the delay was costing us a great deal\nsimply to retain reparation material in a state suitable for shipment.\nIn political affairs, the communist foothold had increased\nin the last election from 2½% to 10% of the total, and the communists\nhad increased their membership in the Diet from 4 to 35. Secretary\nRoyall said that, in the light of general trends in the election,\nhowever, there were differing interpretations as to whether communists\nhad actually gained or not.\nHe said that the existence of the military occupation was\nbeginning to pall on the Japanese, particularly in view of the\nenormous staff which SCAP maintained and of the fact that they were\nliving well in the midst of Japanese poverty.\nAssistant Secretary of Labor Gibson had accompanied Secretary\nRoyall, at Secretary Tobin's suggestion, and was working out a program\nwith General MacArthur whereby the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. would send\nrepresentatives to Japan.\nThe provisions of NSC 13/2 were not being adequately imple-\nmented, Secretary Royall said, because of security problems. He said\nthat he was taking up the matter of declassifying certain paragraphs\nwith the Secretary of State.\nCHINA\nWith respect to China, General MacArthur felt that the\ncommunist victory was far from a victory yet. While the moral effect\nmight be bad, General MacArthur felt that the practical effect might\nbe good.\n- 2 -\nTOP FOR SECRET\nTOP SEGRET\nHAVE NARA\nKOREA\nIn Korea, Secretary Royall said the morale of our 8200\ntroops was low and living conditions were bad. President Rhee had\ntold Mr. Royall he was ready to go north and fight, with a little\nmilitary help and advice. President Rhee realized that he could\nnot undertake a war so long as we were in Korea, but if we furnished\nhim with a military mission for a period, then we could withdraw and\nhe would be ready to go with 150,000 Koreans who had fought either with\nthe Japanese or Chinese.\nThe Prime Minister and Minister of War, who was not on very\ngood terms with President Rhee, wanted us to stay in Korea to create\nan army and navy and to increase the Korean army to 150,000. The\nPrime Minister's intelligence, Secretary Royall said, was not particularly\naccurate, since he had estimated that North Koreans had an army of\n150,000, whereas our G-2, from excellent sources, had estimated the\nNorth Korean army at 48,000. Secretary Royall said that General Mac\nArthur favored prompt withdrawal from Korea and he agreed.\nOKINAWA\nSecretary Royall said that all the military commanders were\nagreed that Okinawa was important as a base for air operations.\nGUAM\nSecretary Royall said that Guam is and should be kept a\nNavy show. He felt that the military installations on Guam were too\nlush, with too much rank, and that the Guamanians, since we had set\nthem up for life by reparations payments, would not work at all now.\n(Secretary Sullivan remarked that there was presently a\nmission out to survev Guam.)\nHAWAII\nSecretary Royall said that he sensed the trend that Hawaii\nwas being treated more and more as a part of our continental establish-\nment, and less as an outpost.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\n35\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-5-3\nNCF/PSF/NSC)1488\nTOP SECRET\nHARTY TRUMAN NARA\nMarch 4, 1/49\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 35th meeting of the National Security Council.\n1. UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING TRAD WITH CHINA\n(NSC 41)\nSECRETARY ACHESON summarized the background of the report,\nas stated in the \"Analysis\" of NSC 41.\nSECRETARY FORR*STAL inquired as to the status of our policy\non the shipment of arms.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that on February 8, 1949, the Council\nhad been informed that the President had decided not to suspend or\nterminate shipments of military aid but that no effort should be made\nto expedite deliveries. Secretary Acheson added that, since the\nChinese Government had now asked us to suspend deliveries, our dilemma\nhad been solved.\nSECRETARY SAWYER said that, with respect to the administration\nof the policy proposed in NSC 41, he felt that UK cooperation was very\nimportant. SECRETARY ACHESON agreed and said he thought that the UK\nwould so cooperate.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAdopted NSC 41 without change.\nNOTE: NSC 41 subsequently submitted to the President\nfor consideration.\n2. SUPPLEMENTARY MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO FORMOSA\n(NSC 37/5; NSC 37/3; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsame subject, dated March 3, 1949)\nSECRETARY ACHESON read a statement on the Formosan Problem\nwhich he asked to be circulated to the Council. He complained that the\nJCS estimate (NSC 37/5) had not clearly answered the question as to\nwhether the Joint Chiefs recommended that overt military action should\nbe taken by the United States in Formosa either now or at any time in\nthe future. With reference to the third paragraph on page 2 of NSC 37/3\nhe felt it was obvious that any overt military commitment in Formosa\nwould be unwise at this time.\nDECLASSIFIED IN PART\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC, 3/6/12, NLT-PSF-41-2-5-3\nDate 5/24/13\nTOP\nSECRET\nNARA AY\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-5-3\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-5-3\nTOP SECRET\nWith reference to the same paragraph, SECRETARY FORRESTAL\nsaid the word \"directly\" in the phrase \"directly vital to our national\nHARRY TRUMAN NARA DIARARP\nsecurity\" was important in the distinction drawn by the Joint Chiefs\nbetween Iceland and Formosa. He added that he had asked General\nEisenhower to look into the matter.\nSECRETARY ACH*SON said that he had interpreted the views of\nthe Joint Chiefs to mean that they did not recommend any overt military\ncommitment in Formosa at this time or under any foreseeable circumstances.\nSince he was not certain of this interpretation, however, he felt that\nthe Joint Chiefs should be asked to confirm such an interpretation for\nthe Council. He also questioned the statement by the Joint Chiefs in\nthe first paragraph on page 2 of NSC 37/3 that \"the United States faces\nthe prospect of strategic impotence on the continent of Asia\".\nSECRETARY ROYALL referred to the Joint Chiefs' comments as\nto our many commitments and said that he had recently a sked for a\nsurvey of our commitments in the whole Pacific area. He said he felt\nthere may be serious differences of opinion as to whether Formosa was\nnot more important than Japan, particularly in the light of the im-\nportance of Formosa to the defense of the Philippines and Okinawa.\nSECRETARY ACH SON said that the Council had previously\nrejected and the Department of State did not like the proposal by the\nJoint Chiefs that minor fleet units be stationed at a Formosan port.\nSince we had little chance of success in our Formosan aims under any\ncircumstances, the stationing of fleet units there would reduce what\nlittle chance we did have to practically nothing.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL inquired how the Department of State\nwould feel if the Joint Chiefs recommended direct military action in\nFormosa. SECRETARY ACHFSON said that he thought such action would be\nbad. If the Joint Chiefs were to recommend the occupation of Formosa,\nthen the Department of State would recommend attempting taking over\nthe island under the front of international action, first by under-\nground encouragement of a revolution and then UN action to establish\na trusteeship for the island. Thus, he said, we might avoid Chinese\nresentment over direct U. S. intervention as well as having things go\nto pieces underneath us if we took direct control. He referred to\nthe recent defection to the Communists of the only cruiser in the\nChinese fleet and said that military force would not help against that\nkind of action.\nSECRETARY ACH SON then proposed the adoption of NSC 37/5\nand added that, in implementing that policy, he hoped for disciplined\ncooperation within the Government in such a sensitive operation. He\ncited two examples of the need for restraining evidences of zeal.\nOne was Mr. Lapham's visit to Formosa and his press statement\nemphasizing the importance with which the U. S. views the island.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-5-3\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 : NLT-PSF-49-2-5-3\nSECRET\n25X1\nSTRUMAN HAME LIBRARY\nMR. HOFFMAN remarked that if engineers were to be sent to\nFormosa to implement the program it would be difficult to minimize\nthe appearance of such an official U. S. activity.\nSECRETARY ROYALL felt it would be difficult to discourage\nthe influx of refugees from the mainland.\nSECRETARY ACHESON admitted the difficulties cited by Mr.\nHoffman and Secretar Royall but felt we should attempt to carry out\nthe proposed policies as best we could anyway.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Adopted NSC 37/5 without change.\nb. Noted a statement by the Secretary of State on the\nFormosa problem.\nc. Agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be\nrequested to clarify their estimate of the strategic\nimportance of Formosa, as contained in NSC 37/3, with\nspecific reference to confirmation of the Council's\ninterpretation that this estimate means that overt\nmilitary action by the U. S. in Formosa is not\nrecommended either at this time or under any fore-\nseeable future circumstances.\nNOTE: NSC 37/5 subsequently submitted to the\nPresident for consideration. The state-\nment by the Secretary of State referred\nto in b above subsequently circulated\nfor the information of the Council. The\naction in c above subsequently transmitted\nto the Secretary of Defense for implementa-\ntion.\n3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA\n(NSC 34/2)\nMR. SOUERS pointed out that this paper spelled out how we\nshould \"exploit opportunities\", in accord with the previously approved\nChina paper.\nSECRETARY ROYALL said he wished to state the views of\nGeneral Wedemeyer although he did not agreed with them entirely.\nTOP SECRET\n- 3 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-5-3\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-5-3\nTOP SECRET\nGeneral Wedemeyer felt that the paper was too weak, that there were\nTRUMAN THE NARA DERARA\na number of anit-communists leaders in East China whom we should\nsupport, and that we should support any appreciable resistance\nwhenever we found it.\nSECRETARY ACH*SON remarked that General Wedemeyer proposed\na positive approach, rather than the negative one of paragraph 12.\nSECRETARY ROYALL said General Wedemeyer felt the Chinese\nwould resist with our help. In response to SECRETARY FORRESTAL's\nquestion, SECRETARY ROYALL said such help should be like what we\nhave been giving the Nationalists.\nMR. BUTTERWORTH pointed out that such a course of action\nwould be a decisive change of policy. It would commit us on the\nmainland and would give the Communists a real propagana issue just\nwhen the mass of Chinese wanted peace at any price. General Barr,\nhe said, had reported that the Reds could go anywhere they wanted\non the mainland. He did not see how we could commit this Govern-\nment to help any little anti-communist group. SECRETARY ROYALL\nagreed.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL asked if we had any propaganda medium\nin China. MR. BUTTERNORTH said that we had the U. S. Information\nService, which was being restricted, and the Voice of America.\nMR. HOFFMAN said he felt that NSC 34/2 was our only possible\npolicy at the moment.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAdopted NSC 34/2 without change.\nNOTE: NSC 34/2 subsequently submitted to the President\nfor consideration.\n4. DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET REPATRIATION MISSION\nIN THE U. S. ZONE OF GERMANY\nSECRETARY ROYALL said that the State and War Departments\nhad given General Clay authority to deal with the situation as he\nsaw fit. General Clay thought that cutting off utilities and\nservices for the eight Russians in Frankfort would force them to\nleave for \"technical\" reasons. Apparently this course had not worked,\nand now Secretary Royall was not sure if this had been a wise\ndecision. He felt that if they did not go after the delivery of\nthe State Department note to the Russian government, we should\nmove them out bodily and escort them over the border.\nTOP SECRET\n- 4 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 : NLT-PSF-49-2-5-3\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-5-3\nTOP SECRET\nSECRETARY ACHESON thought that General Clay should be\nHERE TRUMAN LI NARA JBRARP\nallowed to handle the situation, provided he achieves an early\nsolution. If he is not successful in the next few days, however,\nanother course should be taken, since it would become ridiculous\nif such a situation should go on for some weeks.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nDiscussed the subject in the light of a report by the\nSecretary of the Army.\n5. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the NSC Status of Projects as of February 28, 1949.\nTOP SECRET\n- 5 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-5-3\n36\nNLT(PSF/NSC) 1489\nTOP SECRET\nMarch 23, 1949\nTRUMAN LID NARA DIBRARY\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 36th meeting of the National Security Council.\n1. INTERNAL SECURITY\n(NSC 17/3; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject,\ndated November 26, 1948, March 3, and March 21, 1949)\nMR. SOUERS summarized developments since the Council became\nseized of the problem last April. He said that the Director of the\nBureau of the Budget felt that NSC should move ahead by establishing\nthe two committees, but at the same time give consideration to the\nquestions of jurisdiction which Secretary Royall had raised.\nMR. FORD said he had just been called to appear before an\nappropriations committee, but added that Mr. Ladd of the FBI was\nauthorized to speak for the Department of Justice. Before he left,\nMr. Ford said that the Department of Justice disagreed with Secretary\nRoyall's statement, and adhered to the proposal in the March 3\nmemorandum, which should be put into effect as rapidly as possible.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he concurred with the March 3 proposal.\nHe suggested, however, that the NSC representative referred to in\nparagraph 6, should consider the points raised in Secretary Royall's\nmemorandum and make appropriate recommendations to the NSC in connection\ntherewith. SECRETARY SNYDER agreed with this proposal.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL said that Secretary Royall was afraid that\nestablishing the two committees would atrophy action.\nMR. SOUERS remarked that it had to be assumed that the various\nrepresentatives on the committees would have a sense of\nresponsibility and would move forward. While the best solution might\nbe a single committee, or even one man, Mr. Souers said that this was\na government of compromise, and we should move forward since there had\nbeen practically no progress in a year.\nSECRETARY ACHESON suggested that the ICIS should be\nimmediately constituted with Justice as chairman to draft the ICIS\ncharter, instead of using the SANAAC committee, which State chaired.\nThis, he felt, would be in line with the primary responsibility of\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC, 3/6/12 NLJ-PSF-49-2-6-2\nNARA AM Date 5/24/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nJustice in the matter. The ICIS, of course, could recommend a different\npermanent chairman if it wished.\nTRUMANCIO\nSECRETARY ROYALL said his objection to the two committee\nNAME\nproposal was based on three grounds. For one thing, he felt that a\ncommittee would never work as an operating mechanism. For the second\nthing, he felt that approval of this proposal, since it assumed to be\nthe solution of the problem, would have a lethargic effect on further\nprogress. Thirdly, he felt that there was a lack of definition of\nfunctions. For these reasons he felt that the proposal would be a\nbackward, not a forward step; and he therefore opposed it.\nMR. SOUERS noted that the proposed committees would not be\noperational, since the respective departments and agencies would still\nperform their operating functions. MR. LADD said that Justice did not\nconsider the committees operational. He also remarked that the IIC\nhad apparently worked satisfactorily during the last war and he saw\nno reason why it couldn't do so again, especially in view of the\nadditional backing it would now have.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL said that, while he was conscious of\nSecretary Royall's misgivings, he felt that the proposal was a step\nforward, which must be monitored and pushed.\nMR. KENNEY noted that many committees had been effective,\nand agreed that this proposal was an essential first step. SECRETARY\nSNYDER also agreed.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Agreed, subject to a dissent by the Secretary of the\nArmy, to recommend to the President that he approve\na directive along the lines of the understanding\nbetween the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General,\nand the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation\n(contained in the reference memo dated March 3, 1949),\nas amended at the meeting.\nb. Subject to the approval by the President of the above\nrecommendation, directed the NSC Representative on\nInternal Security to arrange for the prompt study of\nthe points outlined by the Secretary of the Army in\nthe reference memorandum dated March 21, 1949, and\nto submit for Council consideration such recommenda-\ntions with respect thereto as are deemed appropriate.\nNOTE: The proposed directive referred to in a above\nsubsequently circulated as NSC 17/4, and\nsubmitted to the President, together with the\ndissent by the Secretary of the Army, for\nconsideration.\n- 2 -\nTOP SEGRET\nTOP SECRET\nWEA\n2. THE POSITION OF THE U. S. WITH RESPECT TO KOREA\n(NSC 8/1)\nSECRETARY ACHESON referred to the comments of the Joint\nChiefs on the paper and said that State accepted all the proposed\nchanges. Since the other members had not all received them, he\nread them to the meeting and added a statement which he wished put\nin the Minutes with respect to the importance of the transfer of\nmilitary equipment.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL asked about the progress of this\nprogram, and MR. MUCCIO replied that the transfer was about 70%\ncomplete. SECRETARY ROYALL suggested that Mr. Muccio consult with\nthe Department of the Army about the completion of this program\nbefore Mr. Muccio left for Korea the next day.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL asked about internal conditions in\nKorea. MR. MUCCIO replied that there had been improvement since the\nuprising last October, but that there were still many question marks\nwhich constituted a calculated risk that had to be taken.\nSECRETARY ROYALL remarked that the paper specified numbers\nfor the Korean Army and Air Force but did not for the Coast Guard.\nHe understood that the figure of 4,000 had been approved for the\ncoast guard and suggested that, if there was no dispute on that\nfigure, it be put in in order to avoid possible later embarrassment.\nMR. MUCCIO said that question had been discussed by the\nJoint Strategic Survey Committee, which had felt that the functions\nof a coast guard were so well understood that there was no need for\ndefinition.\nSECRETARY ACHESON agreed that the number should be inserted.\nMR. HOFFMAN said he approved the paper.\nIn response to SECRETARY FORRESTAL's question, SECRETARY\nROYALL said the withdrawal date was okay, and added that he thought\nthe paper was an excellent solution of a tough problem.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Adopted NSC 8/1 subject to amendment of paragraphs\n2-b-(6), 3-a, 3-c, 3-d, 3-e, 3-f-(1), 3-f-(2), and\n3-f-(3) thereof.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SEGRET\nNASA\nb. Noted the following statement by the Secretary of State:\n\"In approving this Paper in its revised\nform, I wish to emphasize the view, which is\nheld by the Department of State, that the success\nof the policy set forth therein may well be\ndependent upon the adequacy of the transfer of\nmilitary equipment and supplies provided for in\nparagraph 3-d in furnishing the Korean Govern-\nment with effective security forces equipped to\nfill immediately the gap left by the withdrawal\nof U. S. occupation forces and to bridge the\ncritical period until military assistance to be\nprovided under pending legislation begins to\nflow. It is our understanding that this transfer\nis well on its way to completion and that the\nreserves referred to in the subject paragraph as\n\"emergency\" will be adequate to meet the foregoing\ndesideratum.\"\nNOTE: NSC 8/1, as amended, subsequently circulated\nas NSC 8/2 and submitted to the President\nfor consideration.\n3. U. S. OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO GREECE AND TURKEY TO COUNTER\nSOVIET THREATS TO U. S. SECURITY\n(NSC 42)\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that paragraph 36 looked as though\nwe had not examined alternatives in coming to our conclusions on this\nproblem. Accordingly, he proposed to delete the paragraph and insert\nan appropriate sentence in paragraph 33.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he also felt that paragraph 38, on\nairfields in Turkey, should be taken out and made the subject of a\nnew paper. He said that State had originally approved the idea when\nSecretary Symington had first proposed it several months ago, but\nthere had been a number of developments since, including the Atlantic\nPact. He wondered whether it was good now to be making such arrange-\nments with Turkey. He mentioned that Iceland, Norway, and Denmark\nhad all told us that we could not have air bases in their countries.\nHe said there was a danger of the appearance that we were encircling\nthe USSR with a lot of jumping-off places. Therefore, he felt we\nshould take a good look at this matter before asking the President to\nto make a decision on it. He added that, if there was feeling that\nthis matter was inseparable from the rest of the Paper, he was willing\nto hold up the whole Paper.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL asked how soon this reconsideration could\nbe completed. MR. RUSK said there was no reason why it could not be\ndone within the next month and remarked that the same conclusion might\nbe reached at that time.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nDATE TRUMAN LID NARA\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he wished to re-examine this whole\nmatter of peripheral bases, and proposed that the Council approve the\nPaper but refer paragraph 38 to State for re-examination.\nSECRETARY ROYALL said he felt fields were essential there.\nSECRETARY SYMINGTON agreed that the Paper should be approved\nand forwarded, and that the airfield question might be considered\nseparately. SECRETARY SNYDER also agreed.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Adopted NSC 42 subject to the deletion of paragraphs\n27, 28, 36 and 38, and to amendment of paragraph 33.\nb. Agreed that the Department of State should submit for\nCouncil consideration within the next three weeks its\nviews, after re-examination, of the desirability of\nweeking an arrangement with the Turkish Government\nwhich would permit the construction of airfields\nadequate for the operations envisaged in U. S.\nstrategic plans.\nNOTE: NSC 42, as amended, subsequently circulated\nas NSC 42/1 and submitted to the President\nfor consideration. The action in b above\nsubsequently transmitted to the Secretary\nof State for implementation.\n4. AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION\n(NSC 45)\nSECRETARY ACHESON remarked that Secretary Forrestal had spoken\nto him of this matter before and it had been agreed to put it before\nthe Council.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL said that according to Air Force planning\nthese bases were needed. The main question was the unwillingness of the\nBritish to pay for them, since the British wished to use their money\nfor other purposes. He felt that the cost was reasonable and not too\nlarge for the British to bear, since they had a reasonable interest in\nthe bases, too.\nSECRETARY SYMINGTON pointed out the location of the bases.\n(See attached maps).\nGENERAL NORSTAD said our B-29 groups in England were all\nexposed at their present bases. All JCS plans, he said, would require\nat least this number of fields. The present bases did not permit\nadequate defense because of the exposure on the coastal side.\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECRETARY ACHESON commented that apparently there was no\nHART TRUMAN LI NARA LIBRARA\nargument on the merits of the case, and that the only question was,\nwho would pay for them. GENERAL NORSTAD agreed and said that the\nBritish had originally proposed to begin the first year's work on\nthe bases in England, at a cost of $4 million, but their treasury\nhad cracked down on them. The same thing had happened with respect\nto the Suez fields. General Norstad said he had talked with Lord\nTedder only two weeks ago and had got the impression that Lord Tedder\ndid not consider British payment a closed deal. General Norstad said\nthere was greater urgency for the Suez than the English bases, since\nthe British had succeeded in persuading the Egyptian Government to\nmake available certain critical materials. If these materials were\nnot used soon, they might be lost.\nSECRETARY ACHESON agreed that the Council might ask the\nPresident to direct the Department of State to proceed with negotia-\ntions, using either the Atlantic Pact or the Military Assistance\nProgram as the framework.\nMR. SOUERS proposed that the Council:\na. Agree that the development of adequate airfields\nin the United Kingdom and in the Cairo-Suez area,\nrequired for current emergency war plans, is in\nthe interests of national security.\nb. Agree to recommend to the President that the\nDepartment of State be authorized to undertake\nnegotiations with the British Government, on\nthe highest levels necessary, regarding the\nprovision of funds required for the construc-\ntion of such airfields.\nSECRETARY ROYALL said that the Department of the Army\nrecommended that action not be taken on this matter until it had been\napproved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nGENERAL NORSTAD, in reply to a query, said that this matter\nhad not been referred to the Joint Chiefs since normally it was of a\ntype on which decisions were taken by the respective departments. The\nrequirement for bases, he said, was in all JCS plans; and the normal\npractice was for each department to develop the implementation of\nthese plans.\nSECRETARY ROYALL said his staff paper stated there was no\nsound basis now for the need of four bases, and there was the further\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nHAVE TRUMAN L NARA LIBRARY\nquestion of cost involved, particularly, whether the British estimates\nmight be too high.\nHe added that Navy had concurred that the Joint Chiefs should\nbe consulted.\nSECRETARY ACHESON remarked that this was obviously a matter\nfor consideration within the National Military Establishment.\nSECRETARY SYMINGTON said that the discussion supported the\nwisdom of the President's position that there should be one military\nrepresentative on the Council.\nIn reply to Secretary Symington's question, SECRETARY FORRESTAL\nsaid it was obvious that a check should be made with the Joint Chiefs.\nGENERAL NORSTAD said, in extenuation, that this would be a\nnew procedure.\nMR. KENNEY remarked that it was not good to attack the\nquestion of bases piecemeal.\nSECRETARY ROYALL suggested that the paper be approved subject\nto a check with the JCS. MR. KENNEY agreed with this procedure.\nSECRETARY ACHESON proposed that the matter be handled through\nthe NSC Staff.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Agreed that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on\nthis subject should be obtained prior to Council action.\nb. Referred NSC 45 to the NSC Staff for the preparation\nof a report to the Council in the light of the views\nof the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject.\nNOTE: The action in a above subsequently submitted\nto the Secretary of Defense for implementation.\n5. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR\nINTELLIGENCE\n(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated\nJanuary 24, March 2, and March 8, 1949)\nMR. SOUERS reported that there was such a volume of comments\non the Survey Group Report that he felt a meeting should be held shortly\ndevoted solely to this subject. He suggested that the Council might\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMANT\nBABA\ncare to appoint a committee of three, including representatives of the\nNational Military Establishment and the Department of State to point\nup the issues for Council action.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he had found the basic report difficult\nto read and, in addition, had comments by his staff almost twice as long\nas the report. He wondered if the Council could have the analysis of\nthe issues before a meeting.\nMR. SOUERS said there would be great suspicion of such an\nanalysis, but he felt that the papers included a lot of administrative\nmatters which the Council need not concern itself with. He felt the\nCouncil might approve certain concepts and even set up a mechanism to\nwatch over the execution of these concepts. One such issue was the\nquestion of a civilian director.\nMR. ACHESON inquired if the NSC Staff could not prepare the\nanalysis.\nMR. SOUERS replied that the Staff would tie back to the\nrepresentative intelligence chiefs once again, whereas what was needed\nwas a fresh appraisal by two or three good neutral men backed up by\nthe Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in order to avoid\ndepartmental partisan feeling.\nSECRETARY FORRESTAL commented that the Department of Justice\nwould probably add some acid remarks.\nMR. LAY said that the Hoover Commission Reports had made\nrecommendations in intelligence matters, and, in effect, these were also\nbefore the Council for consideration in connection with the present study.\nMR. SOUERS remarked that there had been some informal indica-\ntion that State might undertake such an analysis of the issues.\nSECRETARY ACHESON agreed that the Department of State, with\nthe assistance of the Executive Secretary, could prepare an analysis\npurporting to be its judgment of the main concepts. This could then be\nused more or less as an agenda for a debate on the issues.\nMR. LAY added that there was also a need for a statement of\nrecommended Council actions.\nSECRETARY ACHESON suggested that the Council consider two\nmeetings on the subject: the first to discuss the problems, and the\nsecond to sharpen the issues to decisions.\nHe added that his Hoover Commission experience had shown that\nit was profitable to spend three-fourths of the time on an examination\nof the problem, after which the solution would arise in the remaining\nquarter.\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTHE TRUMAND NARA\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAgreed that the Department of State should prepare, for\nCouncil consi deration at an early meeting, a statement\nof the issues involved in the reference papers on this\nsubject.\nNOTE: The above action subsequently transmitted to the\nSecretary of State for implementation.\n6. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 3-49)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n7. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the status of NSC projects as of March 14, 1949.\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET\n37\nNLT(PSF/NSC) 1490\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC 3/6/12, NLT-PSF-49-2-7-1\nTRUMAND NARA\nNARA AM Date 5/24/13\nTOP SECRET\nApril 8, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 37th meeting of the National Security Council.\nMR. WEBB called the meeting to order and remarked that the\nPresident had asked him to preside in the absence of the Secretary of\nState.\n1. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR\nINTELLIGENCE\n(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated\nJanuary 24, March 2, March 8, and April 4, 1949, respectively)\nMR. WEBB suggested, and the Council agreed, that Admiral\nHillenkoetter should remain during the discussion of the first four points\nin the Department of State's memorandum, but that he should retire during\nthe discussion of point five, with respect to whether the Director of\nCentral Intelligence should be a civilian, after making a statement with\nrespect thereto.\nMR. SOUERS reviewed the action of the Council at its last meeting,\nwhen it was agreed that the Department of State should prepare a statement\nof the issues involved in the reference papers.\nMR. WEBB then proposed that the Council consider whether each\nof the issues was properly stated, and turn to point one, that CIA is\nproperly placed in the Government under the NSC.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON referred to the comment in the Dulles Report,\nthat CIA might be just another intelligence agency, and asked if it was\nintended that the Report be released to the public.\nMR. SOUERS said that the Report contained considerable highly\nclassified information and that he knew of no intent to release it.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON then said that he agreed with the statement\nof the first issue.\nSince there was no other comment on that issue, MR. WEBB turned\nto point two, with respect to the Intelligence Advisory Committee.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he did not agree with the statement of\nthis issue and that he reserved the right to be heard. Although he did\nnot concur now, he said he might later, and that he had the backing of\nthe President to reserve his opinion until he had an opportunity to\nformulate his views. He mentioned that he wished to consider the\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTHE\nproblem in relation to the broad question of peace or war. In response to\nMR. WEBB's suggestion that only an agreement as to the statement of the\nproblem was involved, SECRETARY JOHNSON replied that he wished no implica-\ntions to flow from his remarks and that he did not wish to be stampeded\ninto taking a position.\nMR. FORD said the Attorney General had some doubts about this\npoint, tool\nMR. WEBB then suggested, and the Council agreed, to defer\nconsideration of the second issue until Secretary Johnson had formulated\nhis views. He then turned to point three with respect to the proposal that\nthe Director of the FBI be made a member of the IAC.\nMR. FORD remarked that the Attorney General had not been consulted\nin the drafting of the Dulles Report, and said he would speak briefly on\nthe issue and then file a memorandum by the Department of Justice on the\nwhole Report. He accepted, however, the statement of the issue.\nSince there was no other comment, MR. WEBB then turned to point\nfour, with respect to the integration of secret operations with secret\nintelligence. He suggested that perhaps the Secretaries of State and\nDefense, in seeking an answer to this issue, should follow closely the\nsecret operations work and consult with the Director of Central Intelligence.\nThe Council accepted the statement of the fourth issue, and MR.\nWEBB turned to point five, with respect to the recommendation that the\nDirector of Central Intelligence be a civilian. Mr. Webb remarked that the\nDepartment of State was inclined to feel that a civilian Director was\npreferable, but did not wish to tie the hands of the President in getting\nthe best person available, civilian or military. He suggested that we\nmight have a civilian Deputy Director if the Director was a military man.\nHe then asked Admiral Hillenkoetter to comment on this issue.\nADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he felt that the whole question was\nunnecessary and that the question of a uniform should not enter into the\nselection of a Director. Only the man himself and his qualifications\nshould be considered, he said. If he had any leaning, he said it would\nbe for a military officer. He referred to recent correspondence with\nGeneral Menzies, the British counterpart, in which the General said that\narmy, navy, and air force officers were needed to make an intelligence\norganization work and to keep it removed from politics. He mentioned that\nthe French have a civilian intelligence chief, who has recently been\naccused of furthering the interests of his party. CIA, he said, is\nprimarily a military operation intended to foretell possible attacks on\nour national security and to provide information to beat our enemies in\nthe event of war. If peace could be assured by the United Nations or\nother means, then there would be no need at all for a CIA. He concluded\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthat the Director should be chosen solely as the man to do the job. He\nagreed, however, that the issue was correctly stated.\n(Admiral Hillenkoetter retired at this point)\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he was not sure that the issue was correctly\nstated, because it did not take into account the added issue as to whether\nthe Director of Central Intelligence was to be the permanent chairman of the\nU. S. Communications Intelligence Board.\nMR. WEBB inquired, if the Director were to be chairman of the\nUSCIB, whether he would have to be a military officer.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said that would pre-judge the issue. He added\nthat the Dulles Report recommended that the Director be permanent chairman\nof the USCIB and suggested that Mr. Souers prepare and circulate a re-\nstatement of this issue for consideration by the Council.\nMR. SOUERS referred to the growing stack of papers that had\naccumulated on the whole subject and the difficulty of the Council in dealing\nwith any one or all of the issues which had been raised. Accordingly, he\nsuggested that the Council refer all these papers to the Secretaries of State\nand Defense, as the most interested parties. They, in turn, might designate\nofficers to sift through all the material and prepare specific recommenda-\ntions in appropriate form for Council action.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON thought this was a good suggestion and said he\nwould designate General McNarney to do the job.\nMR. SOUERS also suggested that State and Defense consult with\nTreasury and Justice in preparing recommended actions for the Council.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he felt that Justice had a general stake in\nthe whole intelligence problem.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nConsidered the reference papers on the subject and referred\nthem to the Secretaries of State and Defense to prepare, in\nconsultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the\nAttorney General and in the light of the discussion at this\nmeeting, specific recommendations for Council action.\nNOTE: The above action subsequently transmitted to the\nSecretaries of State and Defense.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n2. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nTRUMAN HARRY NARA LIBRARY\nNoted the status of NSC projects as of April 4, 1949.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nNLT(PSF/NSC) 1491 1491\nTOP SECRET\nLIBRARY\nApril 21, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 38th Meeting of the National Security Council.\nTHE PRESIDENT expressed his pleasure at being able to attend\nthe meeting.\n1. CONSTRUCTION OF AIRFIELDS AND STOCKPILING OF AVIATION GASOLINE IN\nTURKEY\n(NSC 36/1)\nMR. SOUERS noted that at its 36th meeting the Council had\nagreed that the Department of State should submit for Council con-\nsideration its views, after re-examination, on the question of airfield\nconstruction in Turkey. NSC 36/1 contained the views of the Department\nof State on this matter, as well as on the question of stockpiling of\naviation gasoline which had been subsequently raised in a memorandum\nfrom the Secretary of Defense.\nAt the request of THE PRESIDENT, Mr. Souers read the conclu-\nsions of NSC 36/1.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said that the National Military Establishment\nstill favored construction of airfields and stockpiling of aviation\ngasoline in Turkey, but concurred in the opposition of the Department of\nState to action at this time. He added that the National Military Est-\nablishment might bring the matter up again at a more appropriate time.\nTHE PRESIDENT said he had talked the question over with the\nSecretary of State and believed that paragraph 5 of the report covered\nthe situation.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nConcurred in the Conclusions contained in the reference\nreport by the Secretary of State on the subject.\n2. JAPANESE REPARATIONS\n(NSC 13/2)\nMR. SOUERS asked whether Secretary Acheson wished to discuss\nthis question.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC, 3/6/17, NLT-PSF-49-2-8-0\nNARA AY Date 5/24/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that the Department of State and the\nNational Military Establishment had agreed on a proposed position which,\nif adopted by the Council and approved by the President, would terminate\ncurrent transfers of reparations under unilateral U. S. directive, and\nleave the reparations question to be finally settled in the Peace Treaty\nwith Japan. He had been ready to submit the proposal to the National\nSecurity Council when he had received from General McCoy, Chairman of\nthe Far Eastern Commission, a suggestion that the new reparations policy\nshould at least be discussed with other governments represented on the\nFar Eastern Commission before adoption by this Government. Secretary\nAcheson said the Department of State might be prepared to go ahead with\nour policy in any case, but he felt that General McCoy's views were en-\ntitled to further consideration before action was taken.\nTHE PRESIDENT said Secretary Acheson was correct in adopting this\nattitude.\nSECRETARY ACHESON added that there was no divergence of views\nbetween the Department of State and the National Military Establishment.\nThe only point causing delay was the question of procedure which he had\njust described.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that in connection with Japanese reparations\nhe was interested in protecting the claims of the Philippines. We could\nno longer do anything for China in this connection because of the Communist\nsuccesses there. But the Philippines had been woefully treated by the\nJapanese and he wanted the latter to remember that they could not deal\nout such treatment and not have to make retribution.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said the only troublesome question was the\none the President had just raised. Our proposal would make no distinction\nbetween claimaint countries now; the matter would be left to Peace Treaty\nsettlement. Because of the position of the communists in China, it might\nbe embarrassing for us unless we stopped reparations on the basis of a\nbroad principle applicable to all.\nTHE PRESIDENT said he felt the proposal outlined by Secretary\nAcheson was on the right track.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON expressed his feeling that the Philippines were\nnot being accorded adequate treatment within the military establishment and\npossibly within the State Department. He said he wished to discuss this\nfurther with Secretary Acheson.\nMR. SOUERS suggested and the Council agreed that the Japanese\nreparations problem might be handled by informal memorandum approval.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of\nState on a proposed U. S. policy with respect to Japanese\nreparations which has been agreed upon by representatives\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nof the Department of State and the National Military\nEstablishment.\nb. Noted that the Secretary of State would submit for\nCouncil consideration a formal report on this subject\nfor incorporation as paragraph 20 of NSC 13/2.\n3. VALUE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nTHE PRESIDENT said that the National Security Council was one\nof the best devices available to him in helping him to make decisions on\nthe basis of coordinated papers. Before the establishment of the National\nSecurity Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, there was a great\nvacuum in obtaining coordinated advice and information on which to base\ndecisions. Without the National Security Council the President would\nhave to confer individually with everyone at the meeting on the questions\nwhich had just been discussed. He said he was anxious to see the National\nSecurity Council continue to operate as it had been operating. He added\nthat when he assumed office during the war there had been no coordinated\nintelligence either; he received reports from various agencies and had\nto try to coordinate these reports himself. The coordination was now\naccomplished by the Central Intelligence Agency.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he had noted a good illustration of such\ncoordination this morning in connection with the problem of national or-\nganization for intelligence. General McNarney had told him that the\ndifferences of views on this matter would be reconciled before the question\ncame before the Council again.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the oral remarks by the President that the reports\nof the National Security Council and the Central Intel-\nligence Agency have proved to be one of the best means\navailable to the President for obtaining coordinated\nadvice as a basis for reaching decisions.\n4. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 4-49)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n5. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of April 18, 1949.\n- 3 - -\nTOP SECRET\n39\nNULT/ASKINSC)1492\nTOP SECRET\nMay 5, 1949\nTRUBALL\nTHEN\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 39th meeting of the National Security Council.\n1. UNDERSTANDINGS ON EXPORT CONTROL IN EAST-WEST TRADE\n(NSC 46)\nSECRETARY ACHESON explained that, under the Foreign Assistance\nAct of 1948 (Section 117), a 1-A list had been drawn up of U. S. exports\nto be embargoed. Thereafter Ambassador Harriman had sought agreement by\nthe OEEC countries to adopt the same list, with differing results as in-\ndicated in NSC 46. The British had agreed to embargo all but 31 of the\n163 items on the 1-A list, and had agreed to include those 31 in a 1-B\nlist, of goods subject to quantitative control. Accordingly, there arose,\nhe said, a question of judgment, in which State and ECA felt that we had\ndone the best we could. Feeling that volunteer agreement was better than\nbludgeoning, he felt we should accept the British list and then agree\nthat the 1-A list should be modified accordingly by those other European\ngovernments which had already accepted all 163 items. As to the items\nthemselves, he said he had no judgment, and added that the NME and the\nDepartment of Commerce possessed the technical information.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he did not subscribe to Secretary\nAcheson's remarks and opposed NSC 46 for the following reasons. He re-\ncalled that, at the first Council meeting he had attended, he had requested\nsufficient advance notice of items appearing on the agenda in order that\nhe might obtain the considered views of the Military Establishment. He\nmentioned that one of the 31 items affected bacteriological warfare and\nadded that our 1-A list had been established by an interdepartmental\ncommittee which represented the best American technical opinion. He\nfelt that some of the British negotiations had been conducted without\nadequate technical advice.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON remarked that if the NSC should approve this\npaper, the National Military Establishment would ask to be heard by the\nPresident as Commander-in-Chief. He requested that no action be taken\nuntil the NME had an opportunity to study the matter in detail. He read\na paper prepared in the NME which stated that the question of removing\nthe 31 items from the 1-A list was one which affected seriously our\nnational security. It also stated that a technical committee had\nrecently reaffirmed the rating of these items in the 1-A list, and\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC,316/12,NIT-PSF-49-2-9-9 RAC,\nNARA AY\nDate 5/24/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\nSUPPLI\nproposed that any ERP countries should be required to document their\nreasons why these items should not be embargoed. As an example,\nmention was made of armor-plate drilling machines.\nSECRETARY ACHESON agreed that more time should be allowed for\nconsideration and added that such a request had never been refused in the\nNational Security Council. He also reminded Secretary Johnson that the\nonly function of the Council was to make recommendations to the President,\nwho was free to accept or reject the advice and to consult others. Split\npapers were quite acceptable, he added, and there was no majority rule.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he wished to give notice now that the\nNME will dissent on this paper.\nSECRETARY ACHESON asked for the views of other Council members.\nSECRETARY SAWYER said the issue was very important and not easy\nto decide. He said that the Advisory Committee on Requirements, under\nthe Secretary of Commerce, had been established to advise on goods in\nshort supply and on goods not to be exported to the USSR or its satellites.\nAs for what constituted strategic items, he said this was a technical\nquestion on which the NME's advice had been the guide. He did not feel\nthe Council should determine whether the 31 items in question were of\nstrategic importance or not. The Council, he said, should determine the\npolicy question of whether we should change the classification of those\n31 critical items because the British did not accept them. He inquired,\nwhether, if the paper were adopted and the British list accepted, this\nwould mean that those 31 items would be open for the U. S. to export also.\nSECRETARY SAWYER then referred to some recent correspondence\nbetween Mr. Hoffman and himself. The correspondence stated that a year\nago, when the controls were put on, U. S. businessmen were not particularly\naffected. Recently, however, U. S. firms were losing business because\nwe were applying restrictions on exports that the Western European\ncountries were not. Thus there was a conflict between our security\ninterests and the interests of our businessmen. On April 15 he had\nwritten Mr. Hoffman that a technical committee of the Advisory Committee\non Requirements had agreed that 2 of the 31 items could be down-graded and\nthat the U. S. could not provide the technical justification to other\ncountries for retaining those 31 items in the 1-A list because highly\nclassified technical intelligence would thus be revealed.\nSECRETARY SAWYER said he had recently requested the technical\ncommittee to review the entire list of 163 1-A items and their classifica-\ntion had been reaffirmed except for two items, with all members of that\ncommittee concurring except State and ECA. The next thing he heard was\nthat the National Security Council had the problem on its agenda. He\nreferred to the negotiating instructions for Ambassador Harriman as quoted\nin NSC 46, which said that important objections to embargo any item on\nthe 1-A list should be documented and submitted to Washington for deter-\nmination. From a procedural point of view he said that the European\ncountries, including the British, should be asked to justify their reasons\nfor not embargoing any item. The documentation could then be considered\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\nby a committee, not necessarily his committee, he said,and a decision\ntaken. In conclusion, he felt that it was unfair for us to tell the\nBritish that they may ship 31 items and at the same time tell U. S.\nbusinessmen that they could not.\nMR. HOFFMAN read the ECA authorization by Congress on this\nmatter, which directed ECA \"to refuse delivery ... to participating\ncountries of commodities which go into the production of any commodity\nfor delivery to any non-participating European country which commodity\nwould be refused export licenses to those countries by the United States\nin the interests of national security.\" The ECA, he said, had gone far\nbeyond that directive as an extra-curricular matter in the interest of\nnational security, by attempting to persuade ERP countries themselves\nnot to export any such goods.\nMR. HOFFMAN explained that the 1-A list comprised items for\nwhich know-how was not available in Soviet countries. That is, an\nordinary lathe could go, but a new high-speed lathe could not. The\n1-B list, he said, was a quantitative control for goods which would be\ndangerous to war potential only if shipped in quantity. That is, five\nDiesel engines might go to Finland, but not 500. He remarked that\ndropping an item from the 1-A to the 1-B list meant only changing it\nfrom a complete embargo to a closely controlled export. He felt it had\nbeen a considerable accomplishment to get the ERP countries to accept\n132 of the 163 items on our 1-A list and felt that there were probably\ndifferences between one military establishment and another on the\nmilitary significance of any particular item.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON remarked that Mr. Hoffman's comments were\nnot to his point, since the Munitions Board had indicated that none of\nthe 31 items should be released.\nSECRETARY ACHESON compared this problem with the Eden-White\npaper on Lend-Lease, under which the UK agreed not to export any of\nour Lend-Lease goods. Then we got involved about sending steel to\nthem and whether the British used our steel in making screwdrivers\nto ship to India. He supported Mr. Hoffman's statement that we were\nnow going far beyond the ECA directive by asking the ERP countries not\nto export anything on the 1-A list.\nSECRETARY ACHESON proposed that the Advisory Committee on\nRequirements be asked to make an appraisal of the 31 items in question\nand submit a study to the NSC, on the basis of which the Council might\ndetermine the policy.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON suggested that ECA continue to try to\nprotect the whole list and that we return to the position that we\nnot be required to tell the British why the 31 items should be embargoed,\n- 3-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nBRARY NEW ABOUA\nbut rather ask them to justify why they should not.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that it was necessary to be realistic\nin thinking that a committee of Americans in Washington could tell the\nBritish what they should do. He said our only approach was persuasion\nalthough he recognized that we could not reveal secrets.\nMR. HOFFMAN emphasized the importance of realizing that the\nBritish had already agreed to embargo 132 items, and that our problem\nwas to get them to embargo more. MR. NITZE added that, to make controls\neffective, a high degree of cooperation was needed. It would not count\nmuch, he added, to get an item on the list if there was not full agree-\nment about it.\nIn response to Secretary Acheson's question, MR. BRUCE said\nthat the embargo on the agreed items was already in effect, and that\nwe had accomplished much more on our first round of negotiations than\nwe had expected.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON suggested, and it was agreed, that he would\ninstruct his technical military advisors to consult with their British\ncounterparts on the significance of the 31 items in question.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Deferred action on the reference report by the\nSecretary of State.\nb. Agreed that the Secretary of Commerce would obtain\nfrom the Advisory Committee on Requirements, and\nsubmit for consideration by the Council, a technical\nappraisal and recommendations with respect to the\nremaining items on the 1-A list which the British\nhad not yet agreed to embargo for export to Eastern\nEurope.\nNOTE: The action in b above subsequently transmitted\nto the Secretary of Commerce for implementation.\n(Secretary Sawyer, Mr. Hoffman, and Mr. Bruce left the\nmeeting at this point.)\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\n2. DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO WESTERN UNION\n(NSC 9/7)\nSECRETARY ACHESON said this proposal was just a minor\nprocedural step.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he disapproved of the proposal and read\nthe views of the NME to the effect that there were still major policy\nmatters on the subject to be considered by the Government. Included\nwere the degree of continuing U. S. participation in Western Union and\nthe relationship of Western Union with the North Atlantic Pact\norganization.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he had assumed that such additional\npolicy matters would be raised separately, but he did not object, as\na procedural matter, to retaining the subject on the list of Council\nprojects.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAgreed to retain this subject on the agenda of the Council\npending consideration of those questions of policy with re-\nspect thereto which have not yet been decided.\n3. THE POSITION OF THE U. S. WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY\n(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated\nApril 28 and 29, 1949, respectively)\nMR. SOUERS said he understood that the policy guidance paper\nunder consideration was intended by the Department of State merely as\nan interim report. He understood that the Department of State would\nprepare a final policy draft on Germany, which the ad hoc German\ncommittee might consider. He inquired if there was any reason to\nbelieve that a special meeting of the Council might be called next\nweek for consideration of this problem prior to the opening of the\nCouncil of Foreign Ministers on May 23 in Paris.\nSECRETARY ACHESON confirmed the understanding that the present\npaper was an interim statement, and added that he would try to have a\nfuller paper on Germany submitted before he left on May 20 for the CFM.\nHe said you could not have a complete policy paper until you saw what\nthe other fellows wanted.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted the Foreign Ministers' Agreements on Germany and\nthe policy guidance paper attached to the reference\nmemoranda.\nb. Noted that the Secretary of State would transmit to the\nCouncil, prior to the forthcoming Council of Foreign\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nMinisters' meeting, a statement of the position which\nthe U. S. intends to take initially with respect to\nTRUMAN LID\nthat meeting.\nLINE\n4. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of May 3, 1949.\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\n40\nTRUNAN NAME HARRY S.\nNLT/PSF/NSC)1493\nTOP SECRET\nMay 18, 1949\nTRUMAN NARA\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 40th meeting of the National Security Council, at which you presided.\n1. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY, PREPARATORY\nTO THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS\n(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: \"The Position of the\nUnited States with Respect to Germany Preparatory to the Sixth Session\nof the Council of Foreign Ministers\", dated May 16, 1949)\nTHE PRESIDENT asked Secretary Acheson to open the discussion\non Germany.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that the War Council, the Secretary of\nDefense, and the President had approved a brief approach to the CFM's\nconsideration of Germany for use with the British and French. He now\nwished to discuss the longer paper by referring to its important features\nand mentioning the points which the NME had raised. He cautioned that\nthe plan as outlined in the paper was not a practical possibility now.\nIt would take two or three years to attain such agreement. Meanwhile,\nhe said, he would not ask that the Council approve this paper, and added\nthat he would request instructions when new issues arose in Paris.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON suggested that Secretary Acheson make clear\nto the President now those issues on which there was some difference of\nopinion in order that the President might have the necessary background\nin the event of necessity for a decision over the telephone to Paris.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that, after the German surrender, \"Germany\"\nhad become only a geographical expression, a word, with no government and\nno state. Sovereignty resided in the four occupying powers, and the Potsdam\nagreements led to the establishment of a quadripartite commission to\ngovern Germany. Potsdam envisaged the economic unity of Germany, the establish-\nment of a provisional government, and the drafting of a peace treaty, all\nof which would lead to the eventual return of sovereignty to a German state.\nAs for reparations, Potsdam did not contemplate saddling the Germans with\na continuing debt, but. assumed that the Russians would be satisfied with\nremovable assets from their zone, and the western allies, likewise from\ntheir zones, with the Russians participating in the latter also on a\nsmaller scale.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC, 3/6/12, NLT-PSF-49-2-10-7\nNARA AY Date 5/24/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nWARA\nTHE PRESIDENT remarked that we had agreed to let the Russians\nparticipate in reparations from the Western Zones in return for food from\nthe Eastern Zones which we had never got.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that the Russians had made it clear that\nPotsdam would not work by breaking off their zone completely, stripping\nit and using the quadripartite machinery to infiltrate into the Western\nZones. Two subsequent CFM sessions had served only for propaganda charges,\nwith Western replies moderate at first, but ending with General Marshall\nblowing up at the last meeting in London.\nAt this juncture, SECRETARY ACHESON continued, the Western Powers\ndecided to work together to establish a provisional government for Western\nGermany. Great progress had been made over the past year, he said, in\nthe economic field, including currency reform, and in the political field\ntowards a Western German government. The Russians had taken the currency\nissue as an excuse for imposing the blockade in Berlin, which had utterly\nfailed as a consequence of the brilliant performance of our airlift.\nIndeed, the airlift had surprised our own allies, as well as the Russians,\nand our counter measures had pinched the Russians severely. Secretary\nAcheson said State thought these factors had led to the lifting of the\nblockade, and that the Russians had insisted on a CFM as a face-saver.\nThe President and General Marshall had previously agreed that the CFM\ncould meet at any time after the blockade had been lifted. Now the\nquestion was what might be expected of this meeting.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said the USSR might propose, at first, as a\npropaganda measure, the removal of all U. S. troops from Germany, thinking\nthat this would put us at a disadvantage in Europe. He did not think it\nwould, but said we would counter by asking whether the USSR had changed\nits position on boundaries and reparations. He felt sure they would not\nhave changed, and said that it would be important to have the real issues\nknown to the world. Then the question would have to be faced, whether we\ncould make any progress.\nSECRETARY ACHESON then said that the Department of State and\nthe National Military Establishment, through many joint meetings, had\nconcluded in the paper under discussion, that the basic concept of this\nCFM meeting was that we should continue to go ahead with the Western\nGerman government, and that any unification of Germany as a whole should\ngrow out of that. He felt that if we were to stop Western German\ndevelopment now, and attempt to get unification at the beginning, we would\nlose the momentum already acquired and greatly discourage the Germans. He\nfelt there would be fewer and less painful difficulties by going ahead\nwith the Western German government than by attempting to unite Germany first.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SEGRET\nRARA\nSECRETARY ACHESON then referred to some of the fundamental\ndifficulties in getting a united Germany. If we were simply to unite\nthe Eastern and Western Zones, there would not be much in that. There\nwas also General Clay's continuing problem of the 8 or 9 million refugees\nfrom the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Eastern areas, all of whom belonged\nsomewhere other than in the Western Zones. Secretary Acheson said there\ncould be no permanent solution for Germany without a resolution of this\nproblem.\nThe most pressing question, he said, was how to create unity\nbetween one part that was free and democratic in our sense, and another\npart run by the Red army and secret police under a one-party system. If\nthe two zones were united on this basis, in effect, we would be telling\nthe Western Germans that they would have to negotiate with the USSR.\nThus, on top of the trials of a weak new West German Government, we would\nbe adding the troubles of negotiating with the Russians.\nUnder these circumstances, SECRETARY ACHESON said, we must do\nseveral things. First, the secret police must be replaced by other,\npossibly UN, police. Secondly, elections should be held, conducted by,\nnot just supervised by, some one other than the USSR. Our bitter\nexperience with the Russians on this score had convinced us of the\nimportance of who conducts the elections, he said. For this reason,\nbefore any negotiations between the Eastern and Western Germans, we\nwould need both a new police force and a new election under proper\nauthority. The UN might serve both as a police force and as the\nconductor of the elections. Thirdly, he stated that we must try to get\nthe Red army to move back so that it is no longer in direct contact with\nthe area, although he felt that this was more than could be asked at the\npresent.\nSECRETARY ACHESON felt that the best we could hope for in\nParis was to set up a procedure whereby successive steps might later be\nagreed. At some time or other, when we had a good West German government\nwith an adequate police force, then we could initiate steps to get the\nSoviet troops back as far as we could. This would be impossible unless\nthere was an equal retirement on both sides. If the Western government\nwas doing well, he thought it would then be advantageous to regroup troops.\nHe said that the Joint Chiefs had studied this problem and concluded that\nno steps toward regrouping should be taken until a strong West German\ngovernment had been established. The Joint Chiefs had a scheme, he said,\nfor regrouping the troop screen just east of the Rhine. General Bradley\nhad estimated six or eight months to carry this out. Consequently,\nSecretary Acheson said, even if the West German government were functioning\nwell today, we would still need six to eight months for the military\nregrouping. The plan would be to put pressure on the Russians to with-\ndraw from Berlin to the northeast corner of their zone, where they could\nhave sea support, and thus permit us to hammer on cutting out their\ncommunication lines through Poland. In this way, he said, we could also\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nease the pressure on Poland.\nSECRETARY ACHESON remarked further that, if the question of\ntroop reductions comes up, the Joint Chiefs were aiming at 60,000 nationals\nfor us. This would mean troops for us, although, for the USSR, such a\nfigure would include non-combat forces. General Bradley thought any\nlower figure for us would be ineffective.\nIn the light of the above, Secretary Acheson summarized that our\nprocedure would be to go ahead with the West German government, and to\nagree on unification on the basis of consolidating the Eastern Zone into\nours. That would take considerable time, and he added that the question\nof regrouping troops thus might not come up at Paris.\nIf the USSR raised the matter of quadripartite machinery, the\nU. S. position paper had an approach for that. The issue of a majority\nvote by the four High Commissioners on the reserved powers was essential,\nhe said. Even then, the French would get a veto.\nIn this connection, he said, there was one point of difference\nbetween the NME and State views. State proposed giving up reserve powers\nover foreign trade and exchange on the grounds that it would be a greater\ndisadvantage to let the Russians get in to this field than for us to get\nout. The NME suggested a modified form of control, but Secretary Acheson\nfelt it was academic to discuss the matter now, since the CFM would\nprobably not even get to the problem, and if it did, the Russians would\nnot agree to a majority vote.\nSECRETARY ACHESON mentioned another point concerning which the\nNME was unhappy. State proposed to abolish zonal boundaries under a\nquadripartite commission, but the NME doubted the wisdom of such a\nmove, since it would then be difficult for any High Commissioner to\nresume the administration of any area. The great difficulty of keeping\nthe zones, Secretary Acheson said, would be that you would lay the\nfoundation for the Soviets to come back into their zone. However, he\nsaid that Mr. Voorhees and he had agreed that it was academic to discuss\nthis problem now, since no agreement could be expected in Paris. By the\ntime we get to such a point, Secretary Acheson said, we would know if\nthe Western German government was good enough to run the country. We\nwould have, he said, at least a year before a decision was necessar.\nIn general, Secretary Acheson thought the Foreign Ministers\nwould feel each other out, make propaganda exchanges, and set up a\ngroup to meet perhaps every six weeks or two months.\nWith respect to the question of Berlin and east-west trade, he\nsaid, our aim there would be for a united city with such control machinery\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nBARA\nas to allow the Germans to run it unless there was a unanimous vote to\nstop them on any matter. We should get a clear corridor to the West and\nthe automobile road might work for this purpose, he said, since all\ncrossings went either under or over it and there would consequently be\nno reason for the Soviets to cross it. He did not think that the\nRussians would bring up the question of evacuating Berlin. In connection\nwith the Berlin problem, Secretary Acheson proposed that the NSC should\nstudy the matter of what U. S. policy should be, assuming that the CFM\ndid not succeed and assuming a united course of action with the British\nand French. Mr. Voorhees and he had agreed that there were three possible\ncourses of action if the Russians reimposed the blockade. First, we\ncould accept it as we did the last time and institute the airlift\nagain together with counter blockade measures. Secondly, we could say\nthat we intended to go through, and use all power necessary even though\nthat might well lead to a global war. Thirdly, we could refuse to be\nstopped by words and try a military police escort, which would stop only\nat a full show of force.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that the first alternative was the only\npossible one unless we wanted war. He wondered if we couldn't get a\nfourth alternative that would work. He asked Secretary Symington to\nkeep the airlift handy.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said the NME was studying the problem now.\nTHE PRESIDENT remarked that we had made the other decision in\nfive minutes, and hoped we would do better now.\nAt Secretary Johnson's request, MR. VOORHEES reported the views\nof the NME. He said that the NME and State had worked closely on all\nthese matters, that relations had been good, and that Secretary Acheson's\nplans for handling the CFM had the full confidence of the NME. He\nwished to comment on only a few minor aspects.\nAs for the regrouping of troops, he said that General Bradley\nfelt the time could not be determined in advance, but only at the time,\nin appropriate stages. General Bradley also felt that adequate German\npolice forces were necessary before we moved our troop screen back to\nthe Rhine.\nWith respect to the majority vote among the 4 High Commissioners,\nMR. VOORHEES said that, since we knew we couldn't get the Russian vote,\nthe French in effect have a veto in order to make three. He felt we must\nretain the position we have won as a sort of majority stockholder with\nthe UK and that it was more important to have a U. S. voice in a four-\nway than in a three-way arrangement.\nOn the matter of removing zonal boundaries, Mr. Voorhees commented\nthat under the Potsdam agreements, such German sovereignty as there was\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nKARA\nresided in the four military governors. Consequently, as long as we\nretained that, we had something to work with in case the German govern-\nment did not pan out.\nTHE PRESIDENT inquired if that problem would not take care of\nitself, if the Western German government worked out all right. MR.\nVOORHEES agreed that it would.\nMR. VOORHEES then turned to the question of the blockade and said\nthat the NME was not anxious to handle it again as it did last year, even\nthough the improvisation brought victory. On the third alternative,\nmentioned by Secretary Acheson, he said that we could only start to push\nthrough if we were prepared to use bayonets. He said General Bradley\nfelt we would look very bad if we started something and then did not carry\nthrough. He mentioned also General Clay's feeling that the Soviets were\nan inferior power. Mr. Voorhees added that he hoped we would take\nadvantage of our opportunity to think things through.\nMR. VOORHEES referred also to the question of export controls\ninto the Eastern Zone and stated that the military needed policy instruc-\ntions on what to do. SECRETARY JOHNSON added that such a decision was\nnot needed today.\nTHE PRESIDENT said he would make the decision when the time\ncame. He again suggested that Secretary Symington keep the airlift handy.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Discussed the subject in the light of the paper by the\nSecretary of State contained in the reference memorandum.\nb. Agreed that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination\nwith the Department of State, would prepare for Council\nconsideration a study of possible US courses of action\nin the event that no agreement is reached with the USSR\nregarding Berlin at the forthcoming Council of Foreign\nMinisters meeting and that subsequent therato the\nblockade is reimposed by the USSR.\n2. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE AUSTRIAN\nPEACE TREATY\nSECRETARY ACHESON then turned to the subject of Austria and\nintroduced Mr. Reber, his Deputy for Austria, who had just returned\nfrom London. First, he said there was a procedural question as to\nwhether we should take the initiative to raise the Austrian matter at\nParis. Mr. Reber, he said, felt we should because the Austrians were\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN\nNARA\nextremely unhappy and because we were commited to consider Austria as a\nliberated rather than an enemy country. Therefore, Secretary Acheson\nfelt we should raise the Austrian issue.\nOn the substantive side SECRETARY ACHESON mentioned three\nproblems. The first was a Yugoslav claim for territory, to which we\nand the British and French were opposed.\nTHE PRESIDENT compared the Yugoslav claim with Poland's steal\nof German territory.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said the second problem was a Yugoslav claim\nfor $150 millions in reparations, to which we were opposed.\nTHE PRESIDENT agreed absolutely.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said the third problem concerned German\nassets in Austria. He referred to the Potsdam agreement and said that\nto date the Russians had not been willing to define what they wanted in\nthis category. Consequently, at the last CFM meeting, the French had\nproposed that Austria pay $100 millions in reparations to the USSR to-\ngether with a percentage of oil producing property and prospecting\nrights. In return for this, the French proposed that the Russians\nshould give up all claims. The USSR at first had asked for $200 millions,\nand then backed down to $150 millions. The bargaining area, he said,\nwas very close now and the oil properties and prospecting rights were\nvery clearly German rights that were not in any disputed categories.\nFurthermore, he added, the Russians possessed them all now. He said that,\nin spite of the drawbacks, State would recommend accepting such an agree-\nment, even though it would be said we are paying the bill.\nTHE PRESIDENT agreed that we are.\nSECRETARY ACHESON remarked that the argument could be made that\nthe total burden on the U. S. treasury would be less.\nTHE PRESIDENT suggested that we charge the bill against the\nLend-Lease account which the Russians owe us.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said it was a serious problem to permit the\nholding of a property by one state within another state, but he felt we\nshould swallow hard and accept the bargain. He added that the Austrian\nGovernment would make the payment over a period of seven or eight years\nand that failure to get the installment in any one year would not cancel\nthe agreement but simply nostpone payment.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON agreed with this proposal.\nTHE PRESIDENT inquired if something could be done to open up\nthe lower Danube in this connection. He remarked that the proposed\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nUNITED TRUMAN NARA\nagreement seemed to be as sensible a one as we could come to. He stated\nthat we should not give Yugoslavia any territory. He suggested that we\nscare the Russians by using the Lend-Lease idea as a propaganda move to\nshow how the Russians do not pay their debts. He asked Secretary Acheson\nto write a note to this effect before leaving for the CFM.\nTHE PRESIDENT remarked that he wished he could have the Atlantic\nPact and the Military Assistance Program approved in order to back\nSecretary Acheson during the Paris meeting. SECRETARY ACHESON remarked\nthat, while the President was having his difficulties on the Hill, the\nPresident could think of one man who was facing greater difficulties over\nin Paris.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted an oral report by the Secretary of State on the position\nwhich the Department of State proposes to take in further\nnegotiations regarding the Austrian Peace Treaty.\n3. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 5-49)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence, and a special CIA estimate on\n\"The Soviet Position in Approaching the CFM\".\n4. STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of May 13, 1949.\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nin\nCARADA\nVIAH\nHARRY\nTRIME\nNCT(PSF/NSC) 1494\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMANT\nJune 2, 1949\nN/AA\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 41st meeting of the National Security Council, at which Acting\nSecretary Webb presided at your request in the absence of Secretaries\nAcheson and Johnson.\n1. POSSIBLE U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT THE USSR REIMPOSES\nTHE BERLIN BLOCKADE\n(NSC 24/2)\nMR. WEBB stated that the Department of State regarded the\nsubject paper as one of the best studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nthey had ever seen. He wished to raise a question only with respect\nto two points in paragraph 12 of the \"Appendix\". With respect to the\nstatement that additional economic sanctions should be considered, Mr.\nWebb said he knew of no additional significant sanctions beyond those\nof the counter blockade. As for the reference to taking the strongest\ndiplomatic action, Mr. Webb said further that he knew of no additional\ndiplomatic action that could be taken which might be effective in chang-\ning the Soviet mind.\nAs requested by Mr. Early, MR. VOORHEES explained the genesis\nof the paper and read its recommendations. He remarked further on the\nneed for secrecy with respect to this decision since, if the Soviets\nwere to learn that this was all we contemplated, they might well re-\nimpose the blockade. Therefore, Mr. Voorhees questioned the advisability\nof telling the British and French of our decision.\nMR. WEBB said the paper was being handled with the greatest\nprecautions. As for the British and French he said we were trying to\nget the British and French to bear more of the responsibility together\nwith us in Germany. Therefore, his staff had proposed that the\nrecommendations in the paper, with an amendment to paragraph five, be\napproved and that Secretary Acheson be informed of the Council's action\nso that he might discuss with Bevin and Schuman the seriousness of\na reimposition of the blockade. If they indicated their governments\nwere prepared to take a stronger line, the Department of State would\nwant to bring the question back into the NSC for reconsideration.\nAt Mr. Webb's request, MR. KENNAN said he was impressed with\nMr. Voorhees' remarks. He was inclined to feel that Secretary Acheson\nshould talk with the British and the French only as to our immediate\naction, namely, a warning to the Soviets, but that he should not mention\nthe hypothetical part. Mr. Kennan felt that Secretary Acheson should\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC, 3/6/12, NLT-PSF-49-2-11-6\nNARA AY Date 5/24/13\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN BIARA\nonly explore this area, but not indicate that we had reached a firm\ndecision.\nMR. WEBB stated, and the Council agreed, that the British\nand French should be informed only about paragraph five.\nMR. WEBB then questioned the use of the phrase \"a matter of\nthe gravest concern\" in paragraph five, which in diplomatic usage is\ngenerally taken as the last warning before war. He therefore read an\nalternate paragraph for paragraph five. At his request MR. KENNAN\nexplained that the new language was based on the final note that the\nthree Western Powers wrote when the conversations at Moscow failed\nlast year. Mr. Kennan added that the Department of State felt it was\nbetter to reserve the stronger language for an occasion when we mean\nreal action, and to preserve our flexibility at present.\nSECRETARY SYMINGTON asked if it was felt that the language\nof paragraph five was too strong. MR. WEBB replied that it was not\nbut that the words meant, in diplomatic language, that the next act\nwould be an act of war.\nMR. WEBB remarked further that the JCS paper had been trans-\nmitted to Secretary Acheson, who had made a brief reply in which it\nwas indicated that he would send back additional comments. Since these\nhad not yet been received he asked if the Council could approve the\npaper subject to Secretary Acheson's concurrence, as determined by\nthe Department of State upon receipt of his views. He read from a\ntelegram received this noon, in which Secretary Acheson asked that\nthe Council and the JCS be informed that the delegation had very much\nin mind the need for definite agreements on access to Berlin.\nGENERAL McNARNEY inquired, if in the negotiations for access,\nthe rights to the air corridor were being considered.\nMR. WEBB replied that our stand had been that we had the\nrights, but only wanted to define them more clearly. COLONAL BYROADE\nadded that all the cables SO far concerned only ground, not air matters.\nGENERAL McNARNEY said he felt it would be good not to bring\nup the air question since the Soviets might then think we were concerned\nabout that and try to tie up the air corridors too.\nMR. WEBB said he would be glad to inform Secretary Acheson of\nthese views.\nMR. VOORHEES said we had a clear written agreement on the\nair corridor but not for ground access. MR. KENNAN said that they have\nchallenged our air agreements also. MR. VOORHEES then asked if it would\nnot be a good thing to button down the air agreement too.\nMR. KENNAN said that, by challenging our air agreement, the\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\nRussians were maintaining their position that we were not in Berlin by\nsufferance. He added that Secretary Acheson has clearly made our case\non the basis that our rights in Berlin depend on our victory in the war,\nnot on any written agreements. Secretary Acheson had then added that we\nwanted simply a working agreement on just what this meant.\nGENERAL McNARNEY expressed his personal opinion that it was\nbetter to leave the air question unmentioned. COLONAL BYROADE added\nthat the agreed position papers on access to Berlin had no mention of\nthe air rights.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nConcurred in the recommended action with respect to NSC 24/2\nsubject to:\na. Amendment of paragraph 5 of NSC 24/2 to read as follows:\n\"5. If a satisfactory agreement for access to\nBerlin is not reached at the Council of Foreign\nMinisters, it is recommended that the three\nwestern representatives should make it plain to\nVyshinski that any reimposition of the blockade\nwould re-create a dangerous situation which\nwould constitute a threat to international peace\nand security and that we would have to reserve\nto ourselves full rights to take such measures as\nmight be necessary to maintain in these circum-\nstances our situation in Berlin.\"\nb. Concurrence by the Secretary of State.\n2. INTERIM TERMS OF REFERENCE OF SANACC\n(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 11, 1949)\nMR. WEBB said that both State and the NME had agreed to end\nSANACC, and the only question now was how liquidate it. The Secretary\nof Defense proposed that the Council do it, whereas State proposed that\nState and the NME do it. Mr. Webb remarked that State was ready to do\nit anyway, but merely felt that the two departments could do it together\nwithout bothering the Council.\nGENERAL McNARNEY said it was immaterial who did the liquidation,\nand added that his first thought, in preparing the Secretary of Defense's\nproposal, was to ask SANACC itself to do the job.\nMR. GRAY said he felt there was no need to bother the Council\nwith this matter and that it would be better for SANACC to dissolve\nitself, with the assistance of a representative of the Secretary of\nDefense.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMANI NARA\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAgreed to recommend to the President that the State-Army-\nNavy-Air Force Coordinating Committee be dissolved as of\nJune 30, 1949 and that, in the interim, with the advice\nand assistance of a representative of the Secretary of\nDefense, SANACC conclude or transfer its affairs to other\nexecutive departments and agencies.\nNOTE: The above recommendation subsequently submitted\nto the President for consideration.\n3. STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of Projects as of May 27, 1949.\n4. ANALYSIS OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS AT THE COUNCIL OF\nFOREIGN MINISTERS\nAt Mr. Webb's suggestion, MR. KENNAN gave the following oral\nreport on the subject.\nMr. Kennan said the signal fact of the current\nCFM meeting was that the Russian behaviour was\nan acknowledgment that they recognized their\nweakness in Germany. They had not dared to\ncome out with their Warsaw proposals of a year\nago. Consequently they felt that any change\nin the status quo would be to worsen their\nposition in Germany and Eastern Europe. They\nnow feared a united Germany for they knew\ntheir people in Germany would be licked in an\nopen election throughout the country. For\nthis reason Vyshinski's only proposal had been\nto go back to the original Four-Power Potsdam\ncontrol agreements, on which they knew no agree-\nment was possible. Since the Russians knew\nthis was politically impossible for us, with\nthe development of the Bonn government, the\nquestion then was why did they make such a\nproposal.\nMr. Kennan said he felt personally the only\nanswer was that the Russians wanted to remove\nthe blockade for their own interests and in\nfear of danger, and wanted the CFM as a face-\nsaving device to give the appearance of a quid\npro quo. While Vyshinski was making the most\nof his opportunities, it was apparent that he\n- 4\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nwas not exploiting them to the utmost nor\nusing them for a great propaganda campaign.\nHARRY TRUMAN NA/SA\nThe implication was that the Russians were\nnot too much interested in the present CFM.\nAs for what was really in their minds, Mr.\nKennan said that the best guess of the experts\nin State and CIA was that they were probably\nturning to the Fast where they had revolutionary\npossibilities. Mr. Kennan said they appear to\nhave adopted a containment policy, as we have.\nSECRETARY SYMINGTON asked if the blockade would be reimposed\nand thus the airlift called for again.\nMR. KENNAN replied that he could not see why they would\ndeliberately put on the blockade again. He said the blockade might\nreimpose itself out of the complexities involved in Berlin, what with\nthe currency, the strikes, and other operating difficulties. For an\nindication of the deliberate policy of the Soviet, Mr. Kennan felt\nwe should watch particularly what they did in Vienna also.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the oral remarks on the above subject by Mr. George\nF. Kennan.\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\n42\nNLT(PSF/NSC) 1495\nTOP SECRET\nJune 17, 1949\nNARA\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 42nd meeting of the National Security Council. In the absence\nof Secretary Acheson, Acting Secretary Webb said the President had\nrequested him to preside at the meeting.\n1. APPRAISAL OF U. S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA\n(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated\nJune 2, 1949)\nMR. WEBB gave the background of the paper, which had been\napproved by SANACC after long consideration.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON referred to his personal experience in\nSouth Asia. He emphasized that the present paper concerned only a\npart of Asia, that its reference to military assistance in paragraph\n5 c was too limited in scope, and that collaboration with the British\nshould be only in accord with U. S. interests.\nMR. SOUERS stated that, in accord with a previous request\nwhich Secretary Johnson had made, the National Security Council Staff\nhad already undertaken a project with respect to U. S. policy for the\nwhole of Asia. He suggested that the present paper on South Asia be\nreferred to the Staff for redrafting in the light of the over-all\nstudy.\nAt Mr. Webb's request, MR. SATTERTHWAITE raised the question\nof the geographic limitations of the Asia study. MR. LAY reported that\nthe National Security Council Staff had agreed that the project would\ninclude Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Burma, Nepal, and Ceylon, but\nwould not go beyond those as a western boundary into the Middle East\narea.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted the statement by the Secretary of Defense with\nreference to SANACC 360/14, and the proposed amend-\nments thereto.\nb. Referred SANACC 360/14, together with the amendments\nproposed by the Secretary of Defense, to the National\nSecurity Council Staff for use in the preparation of\nits study on \"United States Policy Toward Asia\"\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC,3/6/12,\nNARA AM Date 5/24/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN NARA LIBRASKA\npursuant to NSC 48, and for re-examination in\nthe light of that study and of the discussion\nat the meeting.\nNOTE: The statement by the Secretary of Defense\nand the amendments to SANACC 360/14 pro-\nposed by him subsequently circulated to\nthe Council for information.\n2. POSSIBLE U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT THE USSR REIMPOSES\nTHE BERLIN BLOCKADE\n(NSC 24/3)\nAt Secretary Johnson's request, MR. VOORHEES referred to\nthe approved policy in NSC 24/3, that no attempt to probe the blockade\nto determine Soviet intentions be made. In view of Secretary Acheson's\nquestions on this score, he said the Joint Chiefs had reexamined the\nmatter and had recommended that a specific directive now be sent to\nthe field, as a supplement to the approved policy decision. He read\nthe proposed directive and recommended that the Council agree to submit\nit to the President for approval.\nMR. WEBB agreed.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Agreed to recommend to the President that he approve\nthe following views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as\na clarification of paragraph 3 ₫ of NSC 24/3:\n\"Traffic to Berlin would not be halted by\nthe Western Powers on a mere administrative\norder or notification by the Soviets that move-\nment would .10t be permitted; vehicles would\ncontinue to attempt to transit the corridor\nuntil confronted by a physical barrier, an\narmed guard, or other evidence of force; and\nwe should make no show of force such as\n'mounting an armed convoy on the highway'\".\nNOTE: The above recommendation subsequently submitted\nto the President for consideration.\n3. DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS\nAt Mr. Webb's request, COL. BYROADE gave the following report:\nToday was expected to be the last meeting of\nthe CFM. There were three issues to be deter-\nmined: Austria, the Berlin strike, and a modus\nvivendi on access to Berlin and east-west trade.\nVyshinski had indicated the possibility of agree-\nment with respect to German assets in Austria,\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\nAustrian reparations to the satellite countries,\nand the border claims of Yugoslavia. On the\nBerlin strike, after an apparent four-way agree-\nment that there would be no reprisals, such\nreprisals were occurring and the three western\npowers had faced Vyshinski with this situation.\nVyshinski had shown surprise and annoyance, and\nhad asked for time to seek instructions. With\nrespect to the modus vivendi, the three powers\nhad presented Vyshinski with a five-point pro-\nposal which provided for consultation in Berlin\nand New York. We had objected to a Vyshinski\ncounter-proposal on access to Berlin because it\ndid not provide a clear guarantee. Vyshinski\ndid not agree to our rights to the autobahn,\nbut appeared to be anxious to reassure us that\nthe blockade would not be reimposed. Colonel\nByroade concluded by remarking that we were\nabout to conclude an agreement that would\nconstitute a greater advance in recognizing\nour rights in Berlin, in the light of Stalin's\nstatement a year ago that we had no rights there.\nReferring to a question that General McNarney\nhad raised at a previous Council meeting,\nhe said there had been no discussion of air rights.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted an oral report on the subject by Colonel Henry A.\nByroade, for the Acting Secretary of State, indicating\nthe possibility that the USSR may be willing to give\nsome form of general assurance that the Berlin blockade\nwill not be reimposed.\n4. POSSIBLE U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT THE USSR REIMPOSES\nTHE BERLIN BLOCKADE\n(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June\n13, 1949; NSC 24/3)\nMR. WEBB referred to two points that Secretary Acheson had\nmade, with respect to the seriousness of the reimposition of the blockade\nand with respect to counter-measures in the event of such a blockade. He\nsaid he had requested discussion of these two points in order to insure\nthat each Council member was aware of Secretary Acheson's thinking,\nalthough he did not believe that either point called for any action by\nthe Council at this time.\nMR. WEBB said there might be some ambiguity in connection with\nSecretary Acheson's remark that the military commanders in the field\nmight be informed as to how perilously close to war a state of the re-\nimposition of the blockade would be. The Department of State considered\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SEGRET\nthat Secretary Acheson had in mind the issuance of a general alert\nwarning at the time the blockade might be reimposed, but did not\nconsider that he was recommending any preliminary message to the field\nat this time.\nMR. WEBB said that the Department did not consider that\nSecretary Acheson implied, if the blockade were reimposed under abrupt\nand hostile-like circumstances, that the issuance of an alert would be\nthe only action which the Government would have to take. A great many\nadditional steps would be required within the Government.\nMR. WEBB said that the Council had already taken the decisions\nin NSC 24/3 that could logically be made in advance of a determination\nof the situation if the blockade was reimposed. Much would depend on\nwhether there was a clear, hostile, and open reimposition, as compared\nwith local disagreements on technical matters, strikes, etc., which might\nresult in a partial but not a clear and all-inclusive blockade.\nMR. WEBB therefore recommended that the Council note the\nextreme seriousness with which the Secretary viewed a reimposition of\nthe blockade, but that action other than that already approved be\ndeferred for decision at the time of the event.\nTurning to the second point, MR. WEBB said that a great deal\nof effort had already been given to the matter of counter-measures and\nthat the findings had been highly disappointing. Therefore, within\nthe Department of State an intensive effort was being made to draft a\nlist of all feasible measures which would adversely affect the USSR on\na world-wide basis. Decision to impose many such measures, which would\naffect many nations, Mr. Webb said could not be made prior to the\ncircumstances following the reimposition of the blockade.\nAt Secretary Johnson's request, MR. VOORHEES said that to\nsend a message to the field containing the phrase \"perilously close to\nwar\" would lead military commanders to take all the necessary steps to\nprotect themselves, and thus would worsen the situation. He mentioned,\nfor example, the removal of dependents from Berlin. He objected to so\nnotifying field commanders and to the Council noting Secretary Acheson's\nviews.\nMR. WEBB repeated that no preliminary message to the field was\ncalled for now and that he recommended only that the Council note\nSecretary Acheson's remark about the seriousness of a reimposition of\nthe blockade.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON asked if the whole thing could be withdrawn\nfrom the record, and it was agreed that there should be no official\nrecord of Council action on this matter nor with respect to the second\npoint, that the Department of State had studies underway concerning\ncounter-measures, pending Secretary Acheson's return.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\n-TOP SEGRET\nAfter further discussion, MR. EARLY inquired if the phrase\nNARA\n\"perilously close to war\" was in or out of the agenda of the meeting.\nHe drew a parallel with the preliminary warnings to Pearl Harbor and\npointed out the importance of the record in the event of an investigation.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said that with this in the record, the\nPresident was put on the spot and suggested that all the papers be recalled.\nMR. WEBB pointed out that in his memorandum to Mr. Souers of\nJune 13 he suggested that this matter be \"discussed\" by the Council, and\nthat, pending such discussion, no action be taken by the various departments.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he still felt the President was in a\ndifficult position, and that we should seek to protect him.\nmight\nMR. SOUERS suggested that the Council disagree with Secretary\nAcheson's statement and refer the matter back to him for clarification.\nIn response to a question as to the date of Secretary Acheson's\ncable, Col. BYROADE said it was dated June 11. He added that the Council\nappeared to be debating what amounted to the personal opinion of Secretary\nAcheson as to the situation if something were to happen.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he thought that there was a connection\nhere with paragraph 5 of NSC 24/3.\nMR. WEBB referred to his initial statement on this matter and\nsaid that with that statement he had cleared the record by making inter-\npretation of Secretary Acheson's views and proposing that no action be\ntaken than that already approved.\nMR. VOORHEES said, speaking as a lawyer, that it is not possible\nto get the matter off the record now. He said the graveness of the phrase\nwas that it constituted a prejudgment of the situation without a correct\nmilitary estimate. He stated that the National Military Establishment did\nnot agree that the reimposition of the blockade would bring us \"perilously\nclose to war\".\nGENERAL McNARNEY remarked that if the orders are carried out\nwhich are now in effect, then we should not be perilously close to war.\nMR. WEBB hesitated to disagree with Secretary Acheson's opinion\nand said that diplomatic actions and circumstances entered into the\npicture as well.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON suggested that the Council attempt an action\nas phrased by General McNarney, to the effect that, if the orders which\nhave been issued are carried out, the Council did not agree with Secretary\nAcheson's views with respect to the reimposition of the blockade.\nMR. WEBB said he could not agree with that.\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECRETARY JOHNSON asked if Mr. Souers could state a proper\nCouncil action. MR. SOUERS suggested that the Council might note the\nState Department's views and the views of the National Military Establish-\nment, and that some one be named to write the statement for each party.\nMR. VOORHEES said that Secretary Acheson, in making his state-\nment about \"perilously close to war\", was apparently assuming, from his\nearlier cables, that we would be attempting some probing action with\narmed convoys. He felt that this might be why the Secretary had expressed\nhis views in this manner.\nCOL. BYROADE said he felt this interpretation reflected a mis-\nunderstanding. From Secretary Acheson's cables, it was clear that he\nwas not considering the perilous nature of any of our actions, for he\nhad indicated repeatedly that he was avoiding any indication of provoca-\ntion. On the contrary, Col. Byroade said that Secretary Acheson's view\nof the seriousness was based on the significance of a deliberate Soviet\nact in reimposing the blockade.\nMR. VOORHEES replied that, so far as the President was concerned,\nsuch interpretation was just as bad. The military establishment did not\nfeel that the mere rèimposition of the blockade would bring us perilously\nclose to war. We had already had nine months of the blockade and had not\nconsidered that in such a serious light.\nMR. WEBB said the experts in State felt that if the blockade\nwas deliberately reimposed by Soviet action, with an indication by other\nactions that this was deliberate, then it was clear that they meant to\nprovoke a war issue. It looked now as if they would not follow such a\ncourse as they were leading towards another CFM and trying to keep open\nother channels of negotiation. However, in the light of this background,\nif they were now to reimpose the blockade, he felt that the nation as a\nwhole would react and that the President felt that way too. Therefore,\nMr. Webb repeated his initial recommendation.\nMR. SOUERS suggested that the Council note the views of the\nmilitary establishment and agree on Mr. Webb's recommendation that any\naction other than that already approved be deferred for decision at the\ntime of the event.\nGENERAL McNARNEY noted that Mr. Webb had just said that the\nreimposition of the blockade was not probable. He added that the mere\nimposition of the blockade now would not bring us perilously close to war.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON then read an action proposed by Mr. Zuckert,\nwhich the Council adopted.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted the seriousness with which the Secretary of State\nviews Soviet reimposition of the Berlin blockade.\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN NARA NUBRABA\nb. In view of the opinion of the National Military\nEstablishment that, with the clarifying instruc-\ntions which will now be issued to the field, the\nmere reimposition of the blockade would not bring\nus perilously close to war, deferred action on\nthe first point in the second paragraph of the\nreference memorandum until the return of the\nSecretary of State.\nC. Noted that the Department of State has initiated\nan extensive study as suggested in the second\npoint in the second paragraph of the reference\nmemorandum.\n5. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 6-49)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n6. STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of June 13, 1949.\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN NARA\nLIBRARY\n43\nNET(PSF/NSC)1496\nTOP SECRET\nJuly 8, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 43rd meeting of the National Security Council. Under Secretary\nEarly attended the meeting in the absence of Secretary Johnson. The\nAttorney General, who had been invited to participate as a member for\nconsideration of the first item, informed the Executive Secretary\nprior to the meeting that he fully approved NSC 50 and requested the\nExecutive Secretary to state his action at the meeting, since he would\nnot be able to attend.\n1. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR\nINTELLIGENCE\n(NSC 50)\nSECRETARY ACHESON explained the background of the report and\npraised the able staff work which it represented.\nMR. SOUERS reported that the Attorney General wished to have\nhis approval of the paper recorded in the minutes.\nIn reponse to Secretary Acheson's request for any queries,\nADMIRAL HILLENKOFITER stated that there was a dilemma in the recommenda-\ntion for a separate administration for an operations division, as\nrecommended in paragraph 6 a (1). He remarked that both the Bureau of\nthe Budget and the Congress last year had questioned duplication in the\nadministration of the Central Intelligence Agency. Consequently, last\nDecember CIA had changed to a single administration for both operational\nand administrative affairs. Separate administration for secret opera-\ntions had not worked well, and he added that OSS had combined them\ntowards the end of its activities. By changing to a single administra-\ntion, CIA had saved 39 jobs or approximately $200,000 and had stopped\nconsiderable fighting for space and personnel.\nGENERAL McNARNEY said that, due to the special nature of the\noperations concerned and the bad effects of any publicity, he felt the\nCouncil should approve the recommendation and that the Director should\nnot attempt to explain this in detail to the Congress, but should state\nthat a separate administration was ordered by the NSC in the interests\nof the security of the special operations. Both the original survey\ngroup and the staff team which had prepared the present paper had agreed\nthat this would be the proper course of action.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he did not know enough of the merits of\nthe issue to have a strong view one way or the other, and suggested that\nthe point be DECLASSIFIED deferred for further study.\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority Z,NLT-PSF-49-2-13-4\nNARA AM Date 5/24/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nMR. SOUERS inquired if it might not be possible to steer an\nin-between course, using only certain people within a single administra-\ntion to handle the special operations.\nSECRETARY GRAY remarked that the present language would be too\ninflexible to permit such a course.\nADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER asked for guidance from the Council as to\nthe proper proportion of military personnel in CIA, in the light of the\nrecommendations in paragraphs 9 and 10.\nMR. SOUERS pointed out that, if the Council approved the paper,\nit would then be in order for the Director to work out this matter in\nconsultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense. GENERAL McNARNEY\nagreed and added that a ratio could not be fixed since the proportion of\nmilitary and other personnel would depend on circumstances.\nSECRETARY ACHESON also agreed with Mr. Souer's interpretation.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nApproved the recommendations by the Secretaries of State\nand Defense in NSC 50, subject to further study and\nrecommendation to the Council by representatives of the\nSecretaries of State and Defense as to the desirability\nof a separate administration for the operations division\nproposed in paragraph 6 a (1) thereof.\nNOTE: The President subsequently informed of the Council's\naction on paragraph 10; the Attorney General invited\nto have the Director, Federal Bureau of Investiga-\ntion assume membership on the Intelligence Advisory\nCommittee, pursuant to paragraph 3; NSCID No. 1, as\namended, issued in revised form as of July 7, 1949;\nand the other approved actions transmitted either to\nthe Director of Central Intelligence, or to the\nDirector of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence\nAdvisory Committee, as appropriate.\n2. FUTURE COURSE OF U. S. ACTION WITH RESPECT TO AUSTRIA.\n(NSC 38/2; NSC 38/1)\nSECRETARY ACHESON recognized the concern of the military as to\nwhether there would be enough time before the withdrawal of occupation\nforces from Austria to create an adequate Austrian army. He reviewed his\nreply to this concern (NSC 38/2), by restating his belief that there would\nbe plenty of time for training an Austrian army since we now have until fall\nTOP SECRET\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\nbefore the Austrian Deputies report on the draft treaty and since the\nWestern Allies had almost agreed on beginning such training now. Only\nMr. Bevin, who was always cautious, was delaying such action, and\nSecretary Acheson felt he would agree soon.\nSECRETARY ACHESON then referred to the broader matter of high\npolicy, that our objective is to get Soviet troops out of Austria, which\nwe could not hope to accomplish unless we removed our own as well. He\nfelt there was no question about this objective and added that Premier\nGruber felt it was vital to get all occupational troops out. Therefore,\nSecretary Acheson recommended that the matter be taken off the Council's\nagenda.\nMR. EARLY stated that the military establishment felt it was\neven more urgent than before that a State study be made of the problem,\nand asked General McNarney to explain the military views.\nGENERAL McNARNEY said their main concern was not to take the\nchance of the Austrians coming under Soviet domination. With the Austrian\npolice force of 26,000, infiltrated already by communists, we might well\nhave another Czechoslavakia. He said the military agreed on the basic\nobjective as stated by Secretary Acheson but felt that the means need\nclearer definition. Therefore he suggested the desirability of a State\nstudy of the question of internal security in Austria after our with-\ndrawal, and added that the present plans for a gendarmerie would not\nmeet the requirements.\nGENERAL McNARNEY pointed out that State expected the Soviets\nto object to any formation of an Austrian army before signature of the\ntreaty. He also questioned where the arms for an Austrian army would\ncome from and said that it would take approximately $93,000,000 for an\narmy of 52,000 men.\nSECRETARY ACHESON remarked that at present we have only\n$11,000,000 planned for this purpose plus $50,000,000 in a contingency\nfund, although original estimates for the Military Aid Program had\nincluded $80,000,000. In response to General McNarney's query about\nArticle 33 of the Treaty on the withdrawal of troops, SECRETARY ACHESON\nsaid that the Treaty was deceptive for it would not go into effect until\nit had been ratified. Ratification, of course, could be delayed at our\npleasure.\nGENERAL McNARNEY suggested that our negotiators should try to\nget the Russians to agree now to set up an Austrian army, and that, if\nthey did not so agree, we might want to reopen Article 33 or even termi-\nnate negotiations. He summarized the concern of the military establishment\nby asking that a study be made of possible courses of action so that we\nwould not have to play by ear, and he emphasized particularly the importance\nof determining where the arms would come from and where the money for\nthem could be obtained.\nTOP SECRET\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAND MARA\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that he felt his cable of June 18\nreally outlined our only possibilities. He added that, since it had\nbeen a practice for the Council to have a study prepared if any one\nmember desired it, he agreed that a study should be undertaken and\nsuggested that the NSC Staff, not the Department of State, should draft\nit.\nAt Mr. Early's suggestion, MR. OHLY presented a chart for the\ninformation of the Council which indicated relative Soviet and Allied\nstrengths in Austria and pointed out the vacuum that would be created\nby withdrawal of troops from Austria. Whereas Allied forces in Austria\ntotaled 21,000, the Soviets had 35,000 plus 44,000 on their lines of\ncommunication and an additional 148,000 in the satellite armies of\nCzechoslavakia and Hungary.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nReferred the reference reports to the NSC Staff for use in\nthe preparation of a study of the nature and timing of\npossible courses of action available to the United States\nwith respect to Austria.\n3. POSSIBLE U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT THE USSR REIMPOSES\nTHE BERLIN BLOCKADE.\n(NSC Action No. 227 b; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsame subject, dated June 13, 1949)\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he wished to explain his meaning in the\ntelegram in which he had stated how serious a reimposition of the blockade\nwould be. At Paris he said he had come to believe that the Russians had\nraised the blockade for two reasons: that tension in Germany had increased\nto the point where it was getting almost out of hand for the Russians,\nand that the Russians were losing their propaganda campaign in Germany.\nWhile the counter-blockade had hurt them, he felt that it hurt less than\nwe had originally thought, because it had enabled the Soviets to buy plants\nthat had been closed down in Fastern Germany at fire-sale prices.\nIn Paris the Four Powers had reviewed carefully all the Soviet\nreasons for the blockade. On the currency question it was agreed that\nnothing could be done and we all had to live with it. On the establish-\nment of the Western German government, it had been the same, and the\nRussians had accepted tacitly the decision. On the U. S. position in\nBerlin, Secretary Acheson had made it clear that we were there not by\nagreement or sufferance but by right of conqueror as a result of the\nGerman surrender. While Vyshinski had not accepted this, he had not\ndenied it. Finally, Secretary Acheson said, after talking over all\nthese matters it was agreed that the New York agreements would be\nmaintained.\nNow, SECRETARY ACHESON said, if the blockade were reimposed, it\nwould be infinitely more serious, for the Soviets would understand its\nTOP SECRET\n- 4\nTOP SECRET\nmeaning, since every excuse had been answered and it could only be\nBARA\ninterpreted as a direct hostile action. Furthermore, if they did\nreimpose it, they would not do it only in a half-hearted way as they\ndid last time. He mentioned, for example, that it was a perfectly\nsimple matter to jam our radar, and they certainly would not be so\nstupid as not to do it next time. In short, he said that a reimposition\ncould not be taken as a local measure, but only as part of an over-all\ndesign. Since the Paris meeting, he said the chances are reduced that\nthey will reimpose the blockade, but the seriousness of a reimposition\nis increased. The reimposition would drift into something serious\nbecause we could not support Berlin without the airlift.\nSECRETARY ACHESON also remarked that he did not feel there\nwas anything more we should do at this time but to note the situation\nand to realize that our posture should be such as to take any reimposi-\ntion of the blockade, not as a local matter, but as the most serious\npossible danger. He felt it would mean, Look out, here it comes. He\nthen repeated that he did not think they would reimpose it.\nIn response to Mr. Foley's question, SECRETARY ACHESON said\nthe airlift was operating at about 60 per cent capacity and that the\ntrains were now running.\nSECRETARY GRAY stated that the last instructions to the field,\nas recommended by the Council and approved by the President, were not\nto probe the blockade and added that any further consideration by the\nCouncil should take into consideration the fact that these instructions\nwere the current operating directives.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted the remarks by the Secretary of State with\nreference to the first point in the second para-\ngraph of the enclosure to the reference memorandum,\nincluding his view that no additional action by\nthe Council on that point is required at this time.\nb. Agreed that, if the Berlin blockade is reimposed,\nthe Council will give urgent consideration to all\nfactors involved at the time of such reimposition\nand will then make appropriate recommendations to\nthe President.\n4. STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of July 1, 1949.\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nRARRY S. TRUMANY\n44\nNCT(PSFINSC)1997\nAugust 4, 1949\nNEW\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 44th meeting of the National Security Council.\n1. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR\nINTELLIGENCE.\n(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated\nJuly 25, 1949; NSC 50)\nSECRETARY ACHESON stated that at its last meeting the Council\nhad referred the question of the desirability of a separate administra-\ntion for the operations division of the Central Intelligence Agency\nproposed in NSC 50 to representatives of the Secretaries of State and\nDefense. General McNarney and Mr. Humelsine had submitted a report\nwhich was now before the Council. This report recommended that, in\ngeneral, administrative support for the covert and overt operations of\nthe Central Intelligence Agency should be separate but also recommended\nthat certain administrative functions which could be performed in a\ncentral administrative office without loss of flexibility or security\nof covert activities should be kept concentrated in such a central\noffice.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he believed the difficulties had been\nresolved as a result of the work of the sub-committee. He said he\nexpected that substantial progress would be made within ninety days\nin carrying out these recommendations and wished to have this view\nplaced on record.\nMR. SOUERS indicated that consultations between the Bureau\nof the Budget and the Central Intelligence Agency had worked out a\nbasis for carrying out these recommendations. At the suggestion of\nMr. Souers, it was agreed that the 90-day period referred to by\nSecretary Johnson would be mentioned in the Executive Secretary's\nletter to the Director of Central Intelligence requesting implementa-\ntion of the Council's action.\nADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he expected that the recommendations\nwould be carried out in less than ninety days.\nMR. SOUERS noted that Section 7 of NSC 50 required the Director\nof Central Intelligence to submit to the National Security Council,\nwithin 30 days of the adoption of NSC 50 by the National Security Council,\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC 3/6/12, NLT-PSF-49-2-14-3\nNARA AY Date 06/05/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nHARRY'S\nNARA\nintelligence directives covering (1) the Security of Information on\nIntelligence Sources and Methods and (2) the Avoidance of Publicity\nConcerning the Intelligence Agencies of the U. S. Government. He\nsaid the 30-day period expired today but that it had not yet been\npossible to effect a reconciliation of views with respect to these\ndirectives in the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Mr. Souers\nsuggested that it might be desirable to extend the 30-day period.\nADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he believed the directives\ncould be submitted for consideration by the Council at its next\nmeeting.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Approved the recommendation in the reference memorandum\nin the light of the report by representatives of the\nSecretaries of State and Defense attached thereto.\nb. Directed the Director of Central Intelligence to expedite\nthe implementation of the approved recommendations in\nNSC 50, and particularly to complete the implementation\nof a. above within 90 days.\nC. Noted the report by the Director of Central Intelligence\nthat he had been unable to secure unanimous agreement\nof the Intelligence Advisory Committee to the NSC\nIntelligence Directives which were to be submitted to\nthe Council on August 7 pursuant to paragraph 7 of NSC 50.\nd. Authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to defer\nsubmission of the above-mentioned Directives until the\nnext meeting of the Council.\nNOTE: The actions in a and b above subsequently\ntransmitted to the Director of Central\nIntelligence for implementation.\n,\n2. U. S. POSITION ON THE DISPOSITION OF THE FORMER ITALIAN COLONIES\n(NSC 19/4)\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that this report recommended the\nattitude which this Government should assume in the United Nations\nGeneral Assembly toward the question of the former Italian colonies.\nHe noted, however, that the final disposition of the former Italian\ncolonies would be decided by the majority vote in the General Assembly\nand that the United States position might not be fully agreed to.\nTOP SECRET\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECRETARY JOHNSON proposed amendments in paragraphs 8 and\n22 of the subject report.\nSECRETARY ACHESON concurred in these amendments.\nMR. HALABY said he hoped the matters discussed in this report\nwould be handled with special security precautions.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAdopted NSC 19/4 subject to the amendments in paragraphs\n8 and 22 proposed by the Secretary of Defense.\nNOTE: NSC 19/4, as amended, subsequently issued as\nNSC 19/5 and submitted to the President for\nconsideration.\n3. THE POSITION OF THE U. S. WITH RESPECT TO UNITED STATES AND\nNORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY INTERESTS IN ICELAND\n(NSC 40/1)\nSECRETARY ACHESON said this was a question of vital significance\nto the United States and a very tricky one to handle satisfactorily.\nThe Icelandic police force was a very small one. It might be possible\nfor the communists by concerted action to seize control of the Icelandic\nGovernment. This report outlines the position which the United States\nshould take with respect to the threat of an internal communist\ncoup d'etat in Iceland and directs that certain plans for emergency\naction be made by the National Military Establishment.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said that the conclusions of the paper had\nbeen approved by the planning officers within the National Military\nEstablishment and that he concurred in this approval.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAdopted NSC 40/1 without change.\nNOTE: NSC 40/1 subsequently submitted to the President\nfor consideration.\n4. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN\n(NSC 54)\nMR. SOUERS said he thought it might be useful to explain this\npaper since it was the first of a series of analysis papers by the\nNational Security Council Staff. He said that this paper, which was\noriginated at the request of the Secretary of the Army, is an assess-\nment and appraisal of our present policy toward Iran, together with an\nTOP SECRET\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\nanalysis of possible future developments. It does not arrive at any\nrecommendations for a change in our policy, but rather attempts to\nthink through the implications for our security of future contingencies\nso that, if and when they should arise, it will be quicker and easier\nto arrive at policy decisions. In this way the staff hopes that it\nmay assist the Council to anticipate the future so far as possible.\nHe added that because it is premature to arrive at firm policies con-\ncerning these contingencies, the Council is not asked to approve this\npaper, but merely to discuss it and then to note it after making any\nchanges that the Council considers appropriate.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON commended the Executive Secretary for\ninitiating a series of \"alert\" papers. He indicated that the report\non Iran was being sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for study and\nappropriate recommendation.\nMR. SOUERS said he believed it would be helpful if the Staff\nwould continually assess and review the existing policies.\nSECRETARY ACHESON thought this was an excellent procedure.\nSECRETARY ACHESON proposed the deletion in paragraph 13 a\nof the subject report of the reference to consultation under Article IV\nof the North Atlantic Pact. He said Senators Connally and Vandenberg\nhad stated there would be no consultation under the Pact except on\nNorth Atlantic matters. In view of this statement by the two distinguished\nSenators, it would be advisable not to refer in this report to consulta-\ntions on Iran under the Pact.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted NSC 54, subject to the amendment of paragraph 13 3 as\nproposed by the Secretary of State.\n5. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of July 29, 1949.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON then introduced Major General James H. Burns,\nU.S.A. (Retired), who has recently been appointed Special Consultant on\nPolitico-Military Matters to the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Johnson\nalso indicated that, subject to the approval of the President, he wished\nto have the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and\nGeneral Burns attend the meetings of the National Security Council after\napproval of the amendment to the National Security Act.\nTOP SECRET\n- 4 -\nBARRIS TRUNTAIN\n45\nI\nTOP SECRET\nSeptember 16, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 45th meeting of the National Security Council, at which the\nPresident presided and which the Vice President attended for the first\ntime as a member under the provisions of the National Security Act\nAmendments of 1949. Under Secretaries Webb, Early and Foley attended\nin the absence of their respective Secretaries.\n1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES\n(NSC 47/1)\nMR. WEBB explained the background of the reference report,\nsaid that a number of word changes and other minor changes of sub-\nstance had come up, and proposed that the report be deferred until the\nnext meeting.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Deferred action on the reference report on the subject\nuntil the next Council meeting.\n2. PROPOSED DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. FORCES, AUSTRIA,\nON IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLANS\n(NSC Action No. 175; NSC 39)\nMR. SOUERS asked if the Council would be willing to consider,\nwithout the usual 48-hour notice, a matter raised by the Secretary of\nDefense, which appeared to involve only an interpretation of a previous\npolicy adopted by the Council and approved by the President.\nThe Council agreed and Mr. Souers read a memorandum by the\nSecretary of Defense on the subject in which it was explained that the\nCommanding General, U. S. Forces, Austria (COMGENUSFA), by a reorgani-\nzation of May 23, 1949, was separated from the Commander in Chief,\nEurope (CINCEUR), and was established as a separate. command. Conse-\nquently, the Secretary of Defense had reported, CINCEUR no longer\npossessed the authority to direct COMCENUSFA to implement his emergency\nplans and under existing circumstances COMGENUSFA must await govern-\nmental authority to take such action. The Secretary of Defense had\nstated that the President, upon the recommendation of the National\nSecurity Council, had on January 28, 1949 approved the issuance by the\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC 3/6/12, NLT-PSF-49-215-2\nNARA AY Date 6/5/13.\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN NARA\nJoint Chiefs of Staff of a directive to CINCEUR, (NSC 39) which author-\nized him to implement existing emergency plans in the event of a Soviet\nattack against U. s., British, or French occupation forces in Europe,\nor against their installations or lines of communication, of such a\nnature as to jeopardize the security of U. S. occupation forces in\nEurope.\nMR. SOUERS explained that the Secretary of Defense and the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff had now requested the issuance of a similar\ndirective to COMGENUSFA, and felt that the matter should be considered\nby the Council and submitted to the President because the proposed\ndirective would authorize the implementation of emergency plans without\nactual attack on U. S. forces or installations. MR. SOUERS said he put\nthe matter before the Council only because it appeared to be a simple\nadministrative action for the Council to consider as an interpretation\nof a previous decision.\nMR. WEBB said the State Department had no objection to the\nproposed directive, and concurred fully.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted a statement by the Secretary of Defense that the\nCommander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), no longer possesses\nthe authority to direct the Commanding General, U. S.\nForces, Austria (COMGENUSFA), to implement his emergency\nplans (NSC 39), and that under existing circumstances\nCOMGENUSFA must await governmental authority to take\nsuch action.\nb. Agreed to recommend to the President that he approve\nthe issuance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a direct-\nive to COMGENUSFA on the subject in consonance with\nthe previously approved directive to CINCEUR on imple-\nmentation of emergency plans (NSC 39).\nNOTE: The action contained in b above subsequently\nsubmitted to the President for consideration.\n3. TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS FOR THE UNITED STATES, GREAT\nBRITAIN, AND CANADA\nMR. WEBB said he would report on behalf of the Secretary of\nthe Treasury, who was unable to attend the meeting, and added that he\nwould make only a brief summary, since most of the members already were\nfamiliar with the results of the conference.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nMR. WEBB said that the talks were laid in a background of\nRISURY NARA\ngeneral post-war efforts to build up production in western Europe\nwithout much concern over distribution mechanisms. Consequently, as\nthe world seller's market turned to a buyer's market and as the domin-\nions began to use the sterling credits built up during the War, there\nhad been a severe drain on U. K. resources. These, plus a combination\nof other forces had led to the present British crisis.\nDuring Secretary Snyder's visit to London in the course of\nhis European trip, MR. WEBB said an agreement had been reached to\nhold the Washington talks. The conference had been held in a friendly\nspirit and, with the facts all laid out on the table, Foreign Office\nand Treasury officials of the three countries had for the first time\ngot a broad understanding of all angles of the problem.\nWhile they had not found all the answers, MR. WEBB said the\nconference had reached three definite understandings: (1) that the\nBritish crisis was a common problem for them all; (2) that we can\nhelp the British in the immediate future to stop the drain; and (3)\nthat the British appeared now to be facing up to the problem and were\nready to take steps which would mean reducing the living standard in\nEngland. As for the future, MR. WEBB said that continuous consul-\ntation among the three governments was contemplated for sometime.\nTHE PRESIDENT remarked that this continuous consultation\nwas the most important part of the whole business.\nMR. WEBB added that solutions were bound to appear as all\nfacets of the problem were exposed continuously to the best minds of\nthe three countries. He called attention to one further aspect of the\nsituation, that finance was only one part of the broad cooperation we\nwere getting into with the British and the Canadians. He mentioned\nalso the Atomic Energy discussions, the U.S.-Canadian Defense Board\nand Military Planning under the Atlantic Pact; and said that the net\nresult of all this cooperation would be to bring the U.K. closer to\nus and Canada than to the Continent.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that this was the first time there had\neven been an effort like this.\nMR. WEBB said that the President's Philadelphia speech had\nlaid the foundation for a successful conference.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted an oral report by the Under Secretary of State on\nthe subject.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n4. ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ATLANTIC PACT\nNAME\n(NSC Action No. 211; NSC 57)\nMR. SOUERS reminded the Council that this item was on the\nAgenda only for discussion and that the report by the Department of\nState (NSC 57) was intended only for background information, but not\nfor Council action, as it was still only a draft.\nMR. WEBB said that the initial meeting of the North Atlantic\nCouncil would be concerned only with organizational matters and would\nnot get into military plans or substantive questions. He said the\nfirst matter for agreement was the establishment of a Defense Committee\nwith instructions for it in turn to set up various subordinate commit-\ntees. He emphasized that no command functions were implied, but only\nunified planning. He also spoke of the need for close cooperation be-\ntween military planning and the planning of production-supply matters.\nSince the latter would involve ECA and other operations, MR. WEBB said\nit was planned to establish an economic and financial committee under\nthe Treaty. There was considerable difficulty in establishing such a\ncommittee, he said, and therefore present thinking was to defer this\nsubject until the next meeting of the Council in January or February.\nTHE PRESIDENT said he desired that there should be plenty of\ndiscussion of organization under the Pact throughout the government,\nincluding the Departments of State, Defense and Treasury, and that all\nwould cooperate whole-heartedly as a unit in making the Pact work.\nMR. WEBB introduced Assistant Secretary of State PERKINS\nin charge of matters concerning the Pact in the State Department. MR.\nPERKINS commented on certain variations being considered in the organi-\nzation of the regional planning groups contemplated under the Pact.\nMR. EARLY said that the Department of Defense was mainly\nconcerned that the organization be flexible and that we avoid commit-\nments for any permanent fixed arrangement. He also said he hoped that\nany delay in establishing arrangements for supply would not be inter-\npreted by members of Congress to mean that we are not ready to pro-\nceed with the Military Assistance Program.\nMR. WEBB agreed whole-heartedly on the matter of flexibility,\nand said, with respect to supply, that the intention was to make that\na mutual effort, not just something by means of which we directed the\nflow of assistance at the other end of a pipe line.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Under Secretary\nof State on the subject.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n5. ANTARCTICA\n(NSC 21/1)\nMR. SOUERS explained that the reference report was in the\nnature of a progress report by the Department of State on imple-\nmentation of the previously approved policy with respect to an\nAntarctica agreement.\nTHE PRESIDENT remarked that Chile had been the main lia-\nbility in negotiations to date.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report by the Secretary of State on\nthe subject.\n6. REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT\nTHE PRESIDENT welcomed the Vice President warmly as a\nmember of the Council and said this was the first time in our\nhistory that the Vice President had by law participated in the formu-\nlation of important policies by the Executive Branch. He also said\nthat the Council had been a new mechanism. Formerly, he said, the\nPresident had had to hold separate conferences with all of his\nCabinet Officers on various problems and then work out the answers\nhimself. Now, with the Council in operation, he said that policy\nmatters were thrashed out before they came to him.\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT said that he had not known of the\nintention of Congress to make him a member of the Council, but he\nthought it was a logical step in order that he might know what was\ngoing on. He thought his membership would be very helpful to him\nin the course of his duties on the Hill, and he said he hoped to\nattend as many meetings and help as much as possible.\nMR. SOUERS said that the Vice President's copies of Council\npapers would be kept available for him at all times in the Executive\nSecretary's office.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\n8. Noted the President's welcome of the Vice President as\na member of the Council, and his remark that this was\nthe first time in the history of the U. S. Government\n.\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthat the Vice President was by law participating in\nthe formulation by the Executive Branch of important\ngovernmental policies.\nb. Noted the Vice President's remarks to the effect that\nhe believed his membership on the Council would be of\nreal value to him in the discharge of his duties, and\nthat he proposed to be of the greatest possible assist-\nance to the Council in its activities.\n7. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 9-49)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n8. STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of September 12, 1949.\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN NARA\n46\nNET(PSF/NSC) 1499\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAR NARA\nSeptember 30, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes give a summary of the discussion at the\n46th meeting of the National Security Council, at which Acting Secretary\nWebb presided. The Vice President was absent from the city, as was\nSecretary Snyder. Acting Secretary Foley attended in the latter's\nabsence. Mr. Hoffman and Dr. Nourse also attended.\n1. GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL\nAFFAIRS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1951.\n(NSC 52/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject,\ndated September 28, 1949)\nMR. WEBB reviewed the history of the report which had originated\nwith the President's letter of July 1, 1949 (NSC 52).\nMR. SOUERS invited attention to the position of the Under\nSecretary of the Treasury on page i of the report and to the separate\nmemorandum by Dr. Nourse. He suggested the Council might begin by\nconsidering first the conclusions of the report.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON wished it understood that the figure for\nthe Department of Defense was a dollar amount, which had been agreed\nupon by the President. Thus, he said, even if certain items in the\nmilitary budget were cut by the Bureau of the Budget, the dollar total\nwould still hold.\nMR. SOUERS then read and the Council adopted paragraphs 12,\n13, 14, and 15 a, b, c, and ₫.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON suggested that something should be done on\nestimates for the Military Assistance Program (paragraph 14) since the\nmilitary had offered a concrete estimate on the Hill for a five-year\nprogram with decreasing expenditures each year, whereas Secretary\nAcheson had not taken a position on this matter.\nIn response to SECRETARY JOHNSON'S question, as to the nature\nof the new programs (paragraph 15 e), MR. WEBB mentioned the possibility,\narising from current discussions between the U.S., the U.K., and Canada,\nthat we might become a sort of banker in Southeast Asia in order to\nhelp scale down the U.K.'s sterling debt to India. He suggested there\nmight be other programs like that, for example, in Indonesia.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC, 3/6/12, NLT-PSF-49-2-16-1\nNARA AY Date 6/5/13\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN NARA\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said that the $75 millions in the Defense\nbudget, earmarked for the President's use, might be helpful in this\nconnection. He added that he only wished to be advised before any new\nitem affecting the national security went to the Hill.\nThe Council adopted paragraph 15 e, and Mr. Souers read para-\ngraphs 16 and 17.\nAt MR. WEBB'S request, DR. NOURSE explained his views after\nreferring to the President's query as to the comparative effects of a\nsubstantial deficit for the indefinite future and reduced expenditures\nfor national security and international programs.\nDR. NOURSE said that paragraph 16 expresses confidence that,\nif these programs are carried through, we will be able to reduce our\ncommitments abroad shortly and that the strains on our economy during\nthis period would not produce a domestic collapse. He felt there was\na prospect of demands for high foreign commitments over a longer period\nand he saw greater short term dangers in the strains on our economy of\nincreasing the deficit with its attendant problems. He admitted there\nwas an argument for a managed inflation, but felt that would be no less\na risk than our military and diplomatic risks.\nSpecifically, DR. NOURSE referred to the last phrase in para-\ngraph 16, \"without jeopardy to our national security\" and said he felt\nthat the risks for our domestic economy must be weighed in this connection.\nMR. HOFFMAN said he felt the Council's job was to appraise\nfrom the security point of view the cuts which could be taken; and he\nadded that the Council's recommendation did not mean the President could\nnot cut further.\nDR. NOURSE queried the propriety, in that event, of the\nCouncil's attempting to answer in paragraph 16 the President's question\nof the comparative effects of a deficit and reduced security expenditures.\nWith reference to the phrase in paragraph 16 that Dr. Nourse\nquestioned and to his feeling that foreign expenditures would continue\nat the same high level for a longer period, MR. WEBB commented he had\nalways understood that the ECA program would gradually be reduced, that\nthe Korea and Greek programs would be terminated, and that the defense\ncuts, even from an administrative point of view, could only be made\ngradually.\nDR. NOURSE said that any jeopardy to our domestic industry\nhad also to be considered as jeopardy to our national security.\nMR. WEBB then proposed the deletion of the phrase, \"with the\nprospect that such a level of expenditures, even though it may result\nin an increased deficit at this time, should permit further reductions\nin this politico-military area in the next few years without jeopardy\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA HARRY S.\nto our national security\". MR. LAY pointed out, as the draftsman of\nthe report, that the Council would then be saying that it accepted the\ninevitability of a continuing high level of national security expendi-\ntures with resultant substantial deficits for an indefinite period.\nThus this paragraph would not be consistent with the rest of the paper.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON and MR. WEBB agreed that such was not their\nintent.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON then suggested changing the word order to\nclear up the ambiguity and DR. NOURSE agreed that the meaning of the\nparagraph would then be clear.\nMR. LAY inquired whether, if the Council felt that the over-\nall question of an increase in the deficit was beyond its competence,\nit might wish to delete the reference to an increased deficit in para-\ngraph 16 and add an appropriate sentence to this effect.\nMR. WEBB said, and SECRETARY JOHNSON and MR. HOFFMAN agreed,\nthat the Council members were agreed that a deficit is a serious thing.\nConsequently, he felt the Council should keep in the report its considered\njudgment, from the point of view of national security, that its proposed\nbudget for national security programs was necessary even if it increased\nthe deficit.\nMR. FOLEY said that his views on page i of the report were also\nthose of Secretary Snyder. He hoped it would be understood that some\nof these programs would be considered further by the National Advisory\nCouncil. He was not attempting an analysis of the programs, he said,\nbut was merely voicing a concern over the trend of the deficit.\nMR. WEBB said the Council shared that concern, and suggested\nthat Mr. Foley's and Dr. Nourse's views be presented to the President\nseparately for consideration concurrently with the Council's report.\nThe Council then adopted paragraph 16 as amended and agreed to\nMr. Webb's above suggestion.\nWith respect to paragraph 17, DR. STEELMAN said he did not\nknow where the $500 million figure came from and added that he saw no\nreason to believe that the estimate currently under way will be that\nlow. Therefore, he proposed and the Council agreed to adopt the para-\ngraph as it read.\nThe Council then turned to paragraph 18, and MR. HOFFMAN\nexpressed his concern over the introduction of the dangerous principle\nof giving away surpluses. He felt it would interfere with the normal\noperation of the support program and with normal market operations.\nHe felt that a real study might be made some day of the whole support\nprogram; but he instinctively feared any \"giveaway\" proposal, and said\nhe would rather hold cotton than soft currency. He said that the\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\nDepartment of Agriculture would be considerably concerned in such a\ntransaction and referred to the problem which would be raised by our\naccepting blocked sterling in the U. S. Even just asking for a study\nof giving away surplus or accepting soft currency for surplus would\nimply to the \"giveaway\" groups that all the bars were down. He\nsuggested that the Defense Establishment might wish to weigh the wisdom\nof such a recommendation to the President.\nDR. NOURSE remarked that in addition to the problem of\naccepting soft currency, the charge of dumping might be raised.\nMR. WEBB said that the proposal tended to transfer the cost\nof programs over to areas of other interests. Since it involved an\nadministrative proposal, a recommendation by the Council might not be\nthe happiest way to handle it. He agreed to accept it if Defense wanted\nit that way.\nMR. FARLY said the idea was advanced only as an economy\nmeasure. MR. VOORHEES referred to the President's request for alterna-\ntive suggestions and cited the case of Japan. There, he said, we could\nlet the Japanese buy in sterling from our surplus, just a wasted asset\nhere, the cotton they need in order to get their idle looms working.\nThe \"giveaway\" idea was not essential to the proposal but merely meant\nthe use of frozen government assets in surplus, he added.\nMR. FOLEY felt that these paragraphs were only suggestions\nand said he would agree to handle them however the Council decided.\nMR. WEBB remarked further that serious budget problems would\nbe involved. He asked if the military might make the proposal\nindependently to the President.\nIn response to MR. EARLY'S question, MR. VOORHEES said\nGeneral MacArthur had had no comment on the proposal.\nIt was then agreed that paragraph 18 would be submitted\nseparately to the President, as an annex by the Secretary of Defense\nin the report.\nAt SECRETARY JOHNSON'S request, MR. OHLY distributed copies\nof a proposed additional paragraph 19 with respect to possible savings\nthrough the coordinated use of all U. S. expenditures abroad and all\nU. S. purchases for foreign use abroad.\nMR. HOFFMAN inquired who would be coordinating what.\nMR. WEBB explained that the proposed paragraph only called\nfor a study by the Bureau of the Budget, as a matter of good govern-\nment. He added that he felt this was more a matter of administration\n4\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNARA\nthan of policy for the Council to consider, since fifty other items\nof good administration could also be introduced into the report.\nMR. OHLY referred to the President's request for alternative\nsuggestions to save money and added that he thought the proposal was\nimportant, even though it might be considered an administrative matter.\nMR. WEBB inquired if any current directives prevented the\npurchase of supplies in Japan.\nMR. VOORHEES explained that within the Military Establishment\nthe GARIOA program had not until recently been adequately tied in with\nmilitary expenditures abroad. For example, in the Okinawa construction\nprogram, Japanese material was now being used instead of U. S. goods;\nand thus a dollar was made to work twice. Mr. Voorhees said he felt\nthis approach could be extended far beyond the Military Establishment.\nMR. HOFFMAN said that ECA had a hard and fast rule to screen\nout of any proposed U. S. purchases for European aid those that could\nbe bought in soft currency areas. He said he would be delighted to\nhave the Defense Establishment join him in fighting about 130 lobbies\ndemanding that all aid goods be bought in the U. S. He warned that\nthe military would be taking on a big fight with the \"Buy America\"\ncrowd and mentioned the difficulties encountered in the stockpiling\nprogram. His only objection to the proposed paragraph, he added, was\nthe implication it carried that such coordination of expenditures\nand purchases was not now being done.\nMR. VOORHEES acknowledged that such coordination was being\neffected in the European ECA operations; but said his concern was\nparticularly with the Pacific area where further coordination between\nprograms within the Defense Department and with other departments was\npossible. He presumed that there might be further coordination of\nforeign and military programs in other areas.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said such a program could be initiated by\nadministrative action without the necessity of congressional approval.\nMR. WEBB, pointing out the broad implications of the proposal,\nsuggested that it, too, be separately submitted by the Secretary of\nDefense to the President, and the Council so agreed.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Considered and discussed the views of the Acting Secretary\nof the Treasury stated on page i of NSC 52/2 and the views\nof the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers stated in\nthe reference memorandum, and agreed that they should be\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nUNITED TRUMAN HARA\nsubmitted concurrently to the President as annexes\nto the reference report.\nb. Agreed that the suggestions by the Secretary of Defense\nin paragraph 18 and a proposed paragraph 19 should also\nbe submitted concurrently to the President as an annex\nto the reference report.\nc. Adopted NSC 52/2 subject to the change in word order at\nthe end of paragraph 16 and the inclusion of the annexes\nreferred to in a. and b. above.\nNOTE: NSC 52/2 as amended and including the annexes\nreferred to in a and b. above subsequently\nissued as NSC 52/3 and submitted to the President\nas a response to his letter of July 1, 1949\n(NSC 52).\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTRIBUTAL LIBRARY NARA\n47\nNLT(PSFINSC) 1500\nTOP SECRET\nOctober 20, 1949\nVISAN\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes give a summary of the discussion at\nthe 47th meeting of the National Security Council, at which Secretary\nAcheson presided. The Vice President, being absent from the city,\ndid not attend. Secretary Snyder was present, and, in the absence of\nMr. Hoffman, Mr. Foster participated in the consideration of Item 1.\nMr. Souers reported that, with the approval of the President, he would\nbe away for several weeks and that Mr. Lay would act as Executive\nSecretary during his absence.\n1. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO FORMOSA\n(NSC 37/8)\nSECRETARY ACHESON said the main point in the paper was the\ncommunication to Chiang Kai-shek after the fall of Canton, which had\nnow taken place.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON proposed that the Council defer action on\nthe paper and refer it to the staff for consideration in connection\nwith the overall Asia paper, unless there were some immediate over-\nriding reasons to the contrary. He felt that the report proposed no\nnew policy beyond that already approved in NSC 37/2. He felt that\nany press release would prejudice our best interests and limit our\npossible future courses of action. He agreed that a communication\nas suggested in the report should be made to Chiang Kai-shek. He\nsuggested a change in the language of the proposed communication in\nparagraph 6.\nGENERAL BRADLEY said we ought not to publicize such a\ncommunication since we might change our mind in the light of the over-\nall Asia policy, which was still under preparation. Whereas the Joint\nChiefs feel we should not go into Formosa now, he said the situation\nmay change.\nMR. FOSTER said he assumed that the ECA program would be\ncontinued in Formosa.\nSECRETARY ACHESON agreed that the report did not go beyond\ncurrent policy and accepted the proposal to eliminate the public\nstatement and to change the language in paragraph 6.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-17-0,3/6/12 RAC\nNARA AY Date 6/27/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nBUBRARY NVR5\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Agreed in principle, as being in consonance with\nexisting policy in NSC 37/2, that the Department\nof State should make diplomatic representations\nto Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (but no public\nstatements) along the lines indicated on pages 6\nand 7 of NSC 37/8, subject to the deletion of the\nfirst sentence and amendment of the second sentence\nto read as follows:\n\"The U. S. Government does not intend to\ncommit any of its armed forces to the de-\nfense of the Island.\"\nb. Referred NSC 37/8, subject to the above references,\nto the NSC staff for use in its study in \"U. S.\nPolicy Toward Asia\" pursuant to NSC 48.\n2. THE AUSTRIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS\n(Progress Report on the subject, dated October 17, 1949)\nSECRETARY ACHESON reviewed the course of negotiations, with\nspecial attention on recent pressure by the Austrian Government. He\nwent over the outstanding unagreed issues-oil, rolling stock, employ-\nment of foreign technicians, and displaced persons--none of which he\nfelt, though bad, should make the difference between having a treaty\nor not. He said he had discussed the problem with the Senate Foreign\nRelations Committee. In conclusion, he said that the continuing\ndivision of Austria might mean we would never have an Austria unless\nwe got it now, and he mentioned our long-standing commitment to have\na treaty. Therefore, he wished to ask the President for authority to\nagree on a treaty, making concessions to the Soviets on the above points\nin return for agreement on foreign technical assistance and on a state-\nment of the amount of the Soviet claim for food, etc.\nAt SECRETARY JOHNSON's request 'IR. VOORHEES outlined General\nKeyes' views, which Mr. Voorhees suggested should be presented to the\nPresident with the comment that, since General Keyes did not concur\nwith the proposed course of action, the Department of Defense also did\nnot concur, although it did not actively oppose such course. General\nKeyes felt that if a treaty was agreed with all concessions granted,\nthe Austrians would not be able to resist Soviet aggression any more\nthan their neighbors had. From the military point of view, General\nKeyes felt that if we were to set up an Austrian army in our own zone,\nthe Soviets would of course do the same thing in their zone. Therefore,\nhe felt we should seek to get the Allied Council to remove its present\nprohibition on the formation of an Austrian army. As for equipment\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nfor an Austrian army, Mr. Voorhees said General Lemnitzer thought the\nNARA\namount necessary could be provided, in the absence of Congressional\nauthority, from the general MAP program; and that the first MAP\nmaterial should be delivered in care of the U. S. Army Forces in\nAustria.\nGENERAL BRADLEY said the Joint Chiefs wanted to see the\noccupation ended because of our militarily untenable position there,\nbut did not think we should make every concession just tc get out,\nespecially in view of the danger of subsequent Soviet control.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON then proposed that action on this current\npaper be deferred until after the staff paper with respect to the\nAustrian army had been approved.\nSECRETARY ACHESON mentioned the necessity for immediate\naction in order to permit the extension of negotiations, and remarked\nthat he agreed with the plan for furnishing military equipment and that\nhe thought the staff paper under preparation considered the means for\ntraining an Austrian army. MR. LAY confirmed the fact that it would.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he was inclined to agree in general\nwith Secretary Acheson. However, he proposed, and SECRETARY ACHESON\nagreed, that the views of the Defense Establishment, including those\nof General Keyes, should be forwarded for the President's information\ntogether with State's Progress Report.\nSECRETARY SNYDER said he felt we would be in a better position\nif we acquiesced to the desires of the Austrian Government in agreeing\nto a treaty. His only concern was whether this might serve as a\nprecedent for other cases.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Considered and discussed the reference progress report\nand agreed that it should be transmitted to the Presi-\ndent together with a written statement embodying the\nviews expressed orally by Under Secretary Voorhees at\nthe meeting.\nb. Directed the NSC staff to complete as a matter of urgency\nits report on the security aspects of the Austrian Treaty,\nbeing prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 232.\nNOTE: The documents referred to in a above subsequently\ntransmitted to the President.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n3.\nBRITISH VIEWS RESPECTING HONG KONG\nNARA\n(NSC 55/1 and 55/2)\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said that the question of Hong Kong was\nprimarily a political matter and that it was up to the British to\ndecide their policy there. He said the Department of Defense was\nconcerned that the British might transfer military forces from other\nareas which are of strategic value to the United States to Hong Kong,\nwhich is not. He felt that United States forces should not be used\nto defend Hong Kong since it has little military or strategic value\nand that any political action on the part of the United States to\nsupport the British should carry absolutely no implication that United\nStates forces will be so used. He recommended that the Council make\na recommendation to the President in this sense.\nSECRETARY ACHESON agreed and said that any United States\nsupport of the British case in the United Nations would not carry\nany commitment of United States forces, especially since the USSR\nwould certainly veto any Security Council action involving employment\nof armed forces under UN auspices.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted and discussed the reference reports.\nb. Agreed to recommend to the President that, in consonance\nwith the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed\nin NSC 55/2, the United States will not provide military\nsupport to the British for the defense of Hong Kong in\nthe event of a Communist military attack, under present\ncircumstances or presently foreseeable circumstances.\nC. Noted the observation by the Secretary of State that the\nabove recommendation would not be affected by U. S.\nmoral support of a British appeal to the United Nations\non this matter, since the USSR would certainly veto any\nSecurity Council action involving employment of armed\nforces under United Nations auspices.\nNOTE: The action in b above subsequently submitted\nto the President for his consideration.\n4. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 10-49)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n5. STATUS OF PROJECTS\nINJURY NARA\nSAM\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of Projects as of October 17, 1949\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nLIBRARY NAME S LINETY\n48\nNLT(PSF/NSC) 1501\nTOP SECRET\nLIBRARY NAPA S\nNovember 17, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 48th meeting of the National Security Council, at which Secretary\nAcheson presided. Mr. Souers reported that the Vice President had in-\nformed him that he would be unable to attend because a very important\nevent, to him, would take place in St. Louis the following day. In\nSecretary Snyder's absence, Mr. Foley attended. Mr. Ford attended for\nthe discussion of the first item in the absence of the Attorney General.\n1. PROGRESS REPORT ON INTERNAL SECURITY\n(NSC Progress Report on the subject dated November 7, 1949)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the subject report by the NSC Representative on\nInternal Security.\n2. FUTURE COURSES OF U. S. ACTION WITH RESPECT TO AUSTRIA\n(NSC 38/3)\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that treaty negotiations had reached a\nstage where we were asking to trade off, for Russian demands on Article\n35 with respect to oil rights, our desires with respect to Article 27\non foreign technicians, Article 42 on UN property rights, and Article\n16 on refugees. He said the Russians appeared to be dragging their\nfeet now, and that if this should delay the treaty further, it would\nclearly be their fault.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he felt that, at the last Council\ndiscussion on Austria, General Bradley had gotten the erroneous impression\nthat Secretary Acheson felt Austria was hopelessly lost whether we had a\ntreaty or not. Secretary Acheson wished to correct that impression and\nsaid he meant to say that our chances of losing Austria would be no greater\nif we had a treaty than if we did not have a treaty. He did feel, however,\nthat the possibilities of disintegration would be greater without a treaty.\nHe felt it should be a major U. S. policy to get a treaty and keep Austria\naligned with the West.\nMR. LAY read, and the Council adopted, proposed Army changes\nin the report.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-18-9, 6/27/13 3/6/12 RAC\nNARA AY\nDate\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nUNIVERSITY\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAdopted the reference report subject to amendments proposed\nby the Secretary of the Army.\nNOTE: NSC 38/3 as amended subsequently circulated as NSC\n38/4 and submitted to the President for consideration.\n3. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USSR AND\nYUGOSLAVIA\n(NSC 18/3)\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he had read the comments of the Joint\nChiefs of Staff on the report and agreed with their proposed changes.\nHe then suggested some additional changes in the paper, with which\nSecretary Johnson agreed.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAdopted the reference report subject to amendments proposed\nby the Department of State and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nNOTE: NSC 18/3 as amended subsequently circulated as NSC\n18/4 and submitted to the President for consideration.\n4. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 11-49)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n5. STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of November 14, 1949.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN MARK NARA LIBRARY\n49\nNCT(P5F/NSC) 1502\nTOP SECRET\nFREA\nDecember 8, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 49th meeting of the National Security Council at which Secretary\nAcheson presided. The Vice President, being absent from the city,\ndid not attend. In the absence of Dr. Steelman and Secretary Snyder,\nMr. Stowe and Mr. Foley attended.\n1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITE STATES IN FASTERN\nEUROPE.\n(NSC 58/1)\nMR. SOUERS read and the Council adopted an additional sentence\nat the end of the second paragraph, which had been agreed to by the NSC\nConsultants.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAdopted the reference report subject to the insertion\nof an additional sentence at the end of paragraph 2,\npage 2.\nNOTE: NSC 58/1 as revised subsequently circulated as\nNSC 58/2 and submitted to the President for\nconsideration.\n2. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1951.\nMR. SOUERS said that it has been the practice of the Council to\napprove the submission by the Central Intelligence Agency of its annual\nbudget estimate to the Bureau of the Budget. He read a proposed letter\nto the Director of Central Intelligence, which the Council approved, in\nwhich it was stated that the Council approved the submission of the current\nestimate with the understanding that the Secretaries of State and Defense\nwould subsequently transmit a statement regarding the expenditures of the\nfunds authorized.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAuthorized the Director of Central Intelligence to submit to\nthe Bureau of the Budget a budget estimate for the Fiscal\nYear 1951.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-P5F-49-2-19-8, 8/31/10\nNARA AY\nDate 6/27/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nWIRK\n3. POLICY DIRECTIVE TO UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY.\n(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated\nNovember 18, 1949)\nSECRETARY ACHESON remarked that this directive, prepared jointly\nby State and Defense, had already been approved by the President, and he\nunderstood that the purpose of having the directive on the agenda was to\nmake it a part of the official Council records, according to the President's\ndesire.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON suggested that, since the directive had received\nthe full agreement of State and Defense, any changes of substance be taken\nup with the Department of Defense.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he would like it understood that Defense\nwould be consulted with respect to all changes in the directive and that\nany substantial changes would be taken up with the Council.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted the subject directive attached to the reference\nmemorandum.\nb. Noted the statement by the Secretary of State that the\nDepartment of Defense would be consulted with respect\nto all changes in the subject directive, and that, if\nthere are any substantial changes, these will be brought\nbefore the National Security Council.\n4. STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of December 6, 1949.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nBARRY\nJanuary 26, 1950\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES\nSUBJECT: Central Intelligence Agency Budget Estimate for\nFiscal Year 1951\nIn the second item of the Memorandum for the Presi-\ndent dated December 8, 1949, with respect to the 49th meeting\nof the National Security Council, it was reported that the\nCouncil approved the submission of the current CIA estimate\n\"with the understanding that the Secretaries of State and\nDefense would subsequently transmit a statement regarding the\nexpenditures of the funds authorized\".\nOn January 26, 1950, Mr. Halaby, alternate Defense\nConsultant, who attended the 49th meeting, stated that the\nDepartment of Defense had consulted with the Department of\nState with reference to the statement referred to above and\nno longer had an interest in making such a statement. Mr.\nHalaby said he felt that the responsibilities and power of\nthe Department of Defense for reviewing the activities of\nthe Central Intelligence Agency were inherent and did not\nrequire further elaboration.\nMr. Sheppard, Office of the Secretary of State,\nconcurred in Mr. Halaby's views expressed above, and added\nthat State was currently preparing a specific report of\ncomment and suggestion with respect to CIA on the basis of\na review of the CIA budget.\nHUGH Hugh D. .S. FARLEY Daily\nAsst. Executive Secretary\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC 8/31/10 NLT-PSF-49-2-19\nNARA So Date 6/27/2013\nTOP SECRET\nI\n50\nNLT\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-20-6, 3/6/12\nTOP SECRET\nNARA Ay\nDate\n6/27/13\nDecember 30, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at the 50th\nmeeting of the National Security Council, at which the President presided.\nThe Vice President, being absent from the city, did not attend. In the\nabsence of Secretary Johnson, Secretary Sawyer, and Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Early,\nMr. Whitney, and Mr. Foster attended.\nTHE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO ASIA\n(NSC 48/1)\nMR. SOUERS said that General Bradley would present orally the views\nof the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 48/1 before distribution of a JCS\npaper on the subject.\nMR. SOUERS then read a memorandum from Mr. Early indicating that, due\nto the limited time available for study, Mr. Early could not take a posi-\ntion on the JCS views prior to their dissemination, and that the JCS and\nthe Department of Defense reserved the right to revise these views if this\nshould be required in the light of subsequent thinking.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that NSC 48/1 incorporated many policies already\nbeing followed but omitted others, such as those relating to a Japanese\npeace treaty, for specific reasons. At his suggestion amendments relative\nto paragraph 46b(2) and 46g(1) of NSC 48/1 were agreed to. Secretary\nAcheson also stated that his concurrence in paragraph 46b(1), relative to\nstrengthening the U. S. military position in Japan, the Ruykyus, and the\nPhilippines was on the understanding that nothing in this paragraph changes\nthe present policy toward Japan as contained in NSC 13/3 or prejudges the\nquestion of a possible Japanese peace treaty.\nSECRETARY ACHESON pointed out that NSC 48/1 contained alternate con-\nclusions concerning Formosa proposed respectively by the Departments of\nState and Defense.\nGENERAL BRADLEY said the Department of Defense version on Formosa was\npreferable from the military point of view since it pointed up the necessity\nof early determination of an overall program for resisting the spread of\ncommunist domination in Asia.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he understood that the JCS were not recommending\nthe commitment of U. S. armed forces for the occupation of Formosa, but\nmerely wished to undertake a moderate program of military advice and assist-\nance for Formosa. He said the Departments of State and Defense were agreed\nthat such a program would not prevent the fall of Formosa, but might at\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSEAL\nbest only lengthen the time remaining before it falls. The essential\nquestion is: what will it cost us to buy some more time and/what we will\nget worth the price?\nSECRETARY ACHESON said the Communists were in complete control of\nChina not primarily because the Nationalists suffered military defeat,\nbut because the National government collapsed. He believed that the\nfactors, including the agrarian revolution, which had produced the\nNationalist collapse and Communist control on the mainland were operating\nin Formosa. He said that the USSR was now on top of the heap in China,\nbut that when the Russian policies of detaching the northern provinces\nand collectivizing agriculture began to reveal themselves, conflict would\neventually develop between China and the USSR. He thought we should seek\nto take advantage of this conflict when it developed and meanwhile avoid\nactions which would deflect Chinese xenophobia from Russia to ourselves.\nU. S. military assistance enabling the Chinese National Government to\ncontinue the fight from Formosa would turn Chinese anti-foreign feeling\nagainst us and also place us in the position of subsidizing attacks on a\ngovernment which will soon be generally recognized. Secretary Acheson\nsaid we must also consider the effect on the rest of Asia, where we wish\nto be on the side of the nationalist movements and to avoid supporting\nreactionary governments. He said Formosa, though important to the U. S.,\nwas not vital. Military assistance with respect to Formosa would buy only\na little time at the risk of losing the influence we have left in Asia.\nGENERAL BRADLEY said that both the State and Defense proposals in\nNSC 48/1 provided for maintaining the present objective of denying Formosa\nto the Communists. The JCS proposed to supplement our present economic\nand political measures by looking into the possibility of modest military\nassistance. However, if for political reasons it was desired to drop\nsupport of the current Nationalist Government, then perhaps the JCS proposal\nwent too far.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that we had now extricated ourselves from the\nChinese civil war and it was important that we not be drawn into it again.\nHe suggested that the Chinese Nationalists could purchase small arms and\nsupplies in the U. S. by using their large gold reserve.\nTHE PRESIDENT said he approved the recommendations of the Secretary\nof State for political reasons.\nIn response to a question by General Bradley, THE PRESIDENT and\nSECR TARY ACHESON indicated that it might be desirable to review the NSC 37\nseries with respect to Formosa.\nAt the suggestion of GENERAL BRADLEY, amendments were agreed to on para-\ngraphs 44, 45, and 46a of NSC 48/1. It was agreed that further amendments\nto the Conclusions of NSC 48/1 should be subsequently agreed upon by the\nDepartments of State and Defense.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nVEHICLE HARRY\nMR. WHITNEY asked whether the policy contained in NSC 48/1 regarding\ntrade with China (paragraph 46g(4)) should be adopted before the coopera-\ntion of other countries exporting to China was obtained. SECRETARY ACHESON\nsaid it was our intention to get such other countries to cooperate with us\nin this policy. Mr. Whitney pointed out, with respect to paragraph 46c(4)\nof NSC 48/1, that treaties have not generally resulted in much capital\ninvestment. It was agreed that the points raised by Mr. Whitney would be\ntaken into account in the implementation of our policy toward Asia.\nJAPANESE PEACE TREATY\nTHE PRESIDENT said he wished to make some remarks on this subject. He\nrecalled that at the time of the Potsdam Conference, the United States,\nBritain, and China had suggested surrender terms to Japan. He said that\nthe USSR did not participate in this action, since it was not then at war\nwith Japan. He added that a few days after the first atomic bomb was\ndropped on Japan, Russia declared war on Japan and concurred in the surrender\nterms already offered to Japan. The President said that the U. S. position\nin Japan was a partnership affair with Britain and China only, and that the\nU. S., Britain, and China could negotiate a peace treaty with Japan whether\nthe USSR participated or not.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nDiscussed the reference report on the subject and adopted the\nConclusions contained therein subject to:\na. Amendments made at the meeting, including the\nadoption of paragraph 46h(1) as proposed by\nthe Department of State.\nb. Further amendments to be subsequently agreed\nupon by the Departments of State and Defense.\nc. An understanding that nothing in paragraph\n46b(1) on page 30 changes the present policy\ntoward Japan as contained in NSC 13/3 or pre-\njudges the question of a possible Japanese\npeace treaty.\nNOTE: The Conclusions in NSC 48/1 as revised\nsubsequently circulated as NSC 48/2 and\nsubmitted to the President for consideration.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nNLT/KFFINSC)1504\nTOP SECRET\nJanuary 24, 1950\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE\nAt the close of the meeting of the National Security Council\non December 29, 1949, the President said that he wished to make\nsome remarks on the subject of the Japanese Peace Treaty. He\nrecalled that, at the time of the Potsdam Conference, the United\nStates, Great Britain and China had drawn up and proposed sur-\nrender terms to Japan. These terms were presented through Sweden.\nIn preparing the U. S. position, the United States Chiefs of Staff\nand the Secretaries of State, War and Navy participated. The\nJapanese accepted the surrender terms. The President then issued\na directive on the occupation forces and got the UK and China to\nconcur. The USSR did not participate in this action, since it was\nnot then at war with Japan. The President then said, a few days\nafter the first atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, Russia declared\nwar on Japan and concurred in the surrender terms already offered\nto Japan.\nThe President said that the U. S. position in Japan was a\npartnership affair with the UK and China and that the peace settle-\nment must be a matter which is satisfactory to the United States and\nthe UK. It may be that we shall want to attempt to negotiate such\na settlement with the Russians, but he had no doubt that the United\nStates and the United Kingdom could negotiate a peace treaty with\nJapan whether the USSR participated or not.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC 3/6/12 NCT-PSF-49-2-20\nNARA So Date 6/27/2013\nG:DeanRusk: akh\nTOP SECRET\n51\nTRUMAN BARA LIBRARY\nRARAT\nNLT/PSFINSC)1505 1505\nTOP SECRET\nHMA\nJanuary 6, 1950\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at the\n51st meeting of the National Security Council at which Under Secretary\nWebb presided. Mr. Webb said he had asked the Vice President to chair\nthe meeting but that the Vice President had declined. The Vice President\nreplied that this was no commitment, but he insisted that the President's\ndesignation of Mr. Webb as chairman be carried out. Mr. Foley, Mr. Whitney,\nMr. Hoffman, and Mr. O'Connell all participated in the consideration of\nItem 1. Secretary Johnson stated that Defense executive ordershad been\nissued charging Mr. Early with responsibility for all Defense matters\nconcerning civil aviation in view of Secretary Johnson's previous business\nconnections with civil aviation. For this reason, Secretary Johnson had\nMr. Early represent him in the Council's consideration of Item 1.\n1. U. S. CIVIL AVIATION POLICY TOWARD THE USSR AND ITS SATELLITES\n(NSC 15/2)\nMR. WEBB reported that Defense had proposed two changes in the\nreport, in which State concurred. He circulated these changes at the meet-\ning and they were adopted.\nMR. O'CONNELL reported that, at the request of the Departments of\nState and Defense, the Air Coordinating Committee had considered the question\nof a change in its satellite policy and had agreed that the situation now\njustified a revision of the previous \"closed door\" policy on a case by case\nbasis. The ACC unanimously agreed to modify its previous policy in accord\nwith the provisions of NSC 15/2. Mr. O'Connell left a letter to this effect\nwith the Executive Secretary.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON inquired if there had been any applications\nfrom satellites to date. MR. FARLY replied that there had been none. MR.\nWEBB added that there was continuous pressure, however.\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT inquired if the policy would be on a reciprocal\nbasis. MR. O'CONNELL said that it was and that it would permit us to trade\nout reciprocal arrangements with a free hand.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted a statement by the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics\nBoard, that the Air Coordinating Committee has con-\nsidered and concurred in the revised policy proposed\nin NSC 15/2.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nTOP SECRET\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-21-5, 3/6/12 RAC\nNARA AY\nDate\n6/27/13\nTOP SECRET\nb. Adopted NSC 15/2 subject to the addition of a new\nparagraph 14 (re-numbering subsequent paragraphs)\nand a revision of paragraph 16 (new 17).\nNOTE: NSC 15/2 as revised subsequently circulated\nas NSC 15/3 and submitted to the President\nfor consideration.\n2. ASSESSMENT AND APPRAISAL OF U. S. OBJECTIVES, COMMITMENTS AND\nRISKS IN RELATION TO MILITARY POWER\n(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated\nDecember 20, 1949)\nMR. SOUERS reported that this memorandum had been cleared by\nthe staffs of the Council members and that it proposed an over-all,\nrather than a piecemeal, approach to the Council's previous direction\nfor the staff to prepare a study assessing and appraising \"the objectives,\ncommitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and\npotential military power, in the interest of national security, for the\npurpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith\".\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nDirected the NSC Staff, with the advice and assistance of\nall appropriate executive departments and agencies, to\nprepare a report for Council consideration assessing and\nappraising the objectives, commitments and risks of the\nUnited States under a continuation of present conditions\nor in the event of war in the near future, in relation to\nour actual and potential military power, in the interest\nof national security, including any recommendations which\nshould be made to the President in connection therewith.\n3. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the Status of NSC Projects as of January 3, 1950.\nTOP SECRET\n- 2 -\n25\nNLT/PSF/N5C/1506\nTOP SECRET\nHARRY\nFebruary 2, 1950\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the presentation at\nthe 52nd meeting of the National Security Council at which the President\npresided. The Vice President was unable to attend because of the pressure\nof Senate business. Mr. Foley attended in the absence of Secretary\nSnyder from the city.\nPRESENTATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE\nSECRETARY GRAY introduced Mr. Kullgren, the speaker for the\nArmy Intelligence presentation team.\nMR. KULLGREN gave an oral presentation prepared jointly by the\nArmy, Navy, and Air Force, with the aid of maps and charts, to consider\npossible effects of dropping a limited number of atomic bombs on selected\ntargets in the continental United States.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nHeard a special oral presentation by the Department of Defense.\nNOTE: The President participated in the above Council action.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-22-4, 8/31/10 RAC\nNARA AM\nDate 6/27/13\nTOP SECRET\n53\nNLT(PSP/NSC).507\nTOP SECRET\nTRUBAN\nLISTED\nFebruary 17, 1950\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 53rd meeting of the National Security Council at which Secretary\nAcheson presided. The Vice President and Dr. Steelman were unable to\nattend. Secretary Johnson was accompanied by Lt. General Keyes, Com-\nmanding General, U. S. Forces in Austria, for assistance and advice\nto the Council in its consideration of the second item.\n1. CHEMICAL WARFARE POLICY\n(NSC 62)\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that State agreed with the interim\npolicy proposed in the report.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he understood that the NSRB also\nconcurred, and added that the Defense staff already had undertaken\na broad review of the policy.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nConcurred in the interim policy proposed in the last\nparagraph of the reference report by the Secretary of\nDefense on the subject.\nNOTE: NSC 62 subsequently submitted to the President\nfor consideration.\n2. U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF A BLOCKADE OF VIENNA\n(NSC 63)\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that State agreed with the proposed\ndirective but suggested that an additional paragraph be inserted at\nthe end.\nGENERAL KEYES said he saw no objection to the addition,\nand SECRETARY JOHNSON concurred.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLI-PSF-49-2-23-3, 3/6/12 RAC\nNARA Ay Date 6/27/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nLIBRARY\nTRUMAN U\nNARA\nARRIA\nSECRETARY ACHESON inquired with respect to paragraphs d\nand e, in order to ensure that his interpretation of them was correct.\nHis understanding was, he said, that we would pay no attention to a\npaper notification by the Soviets of a blockade move, that we would\ngo through any barrier put up by the Austrian police, but that we\nwould stop at any Soviet show of force without shooting if protests\nwere unavailing. He inquired if that was the line we drew and if it\nwas practical.\nGENERAL KEYES confirmed this understanding and its practicality,\nand said that was how we are operating now.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that the President sometime ago had\nrequested State to review the Austrian situation and that State would\nhave a report for urgent Council consideration, possibly the following\nweek.\nAt SECRETARY JOHNSON's suggestion GENERAL KEYES reported on\nthe general situation in Austria, and the Council discussed this report\nwith him. A summary is contained in the attached Appendix.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Concurred in the recommendations contained in the\nreference report by the Department of Defense on\nthe subject, with an additional paragraph proposed\nby the Secretary of State.\nb. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Commanding\nGeneral, U. S. Forces in Austria, on the general\nsituation in Austria, with particular reference to\nthe prospects for an Austrian treaty.\nNOTE: The recommendations in NSC 63, as amended,\nsubsequently circulated as NSC 63/1 and\nsubmitted to the President for consideration.\n3. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 2-50)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n4. STATUS OF PROJECTS\nMR. LAY said he understood the Council wished its agenda\nlimited to active items and accordingly, raised two inactive projects\nthat had been carried on the agenda for a year now. The purpose of\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\none, the \"Measures\" project, would appear to be encompassed by the\nCouncil's action last month in directing the Staff to prepare a new\ngeneral report assessing and appraising our objectives, commitments,\nand risks in relation to our military power. Mr. Lay therefore pro-\nposed that the earlier project be referred to the Staff for consideration\nin connection with its current project.\nThe second inactive item, the German Subcommittee, MR. LAY said\nhad apparently served its purpose. He suggested, accordingly, that the\nCouncil might dissolve the Subcommittee, and said that Mr. Byroade of\nState and Mr. Voorhees of Defense agreed.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted the Status of NSC Projects as of February 13, 1950.\nb. Referred the draft report on \"Measures Required to Achieve\nU. S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR\" and related\npapers to the NSC Staff for consideration in connection\nwith its current project on \"Assessment and Appraisal of\nU. S. Objectives, Commitments, and Risks in Relation to\nMilitary Power\".\nc. Agreed that there is no longer a need for the NSC Sub-\ncommittee on Germany and that it should accordingly be\ndissolved.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nAPPENDIX\nReport by Lt. General Keyes, Commanding General,\nU. S. Forces in Austria,\nto the NSC on the Austrian Situation\nGeneral Keyes said that there were many private interests in\nAustria reporting that the Austrians were all anxious for a treaty,\nbut he felt this was not the case. There was no evidence now, he\nsaid, of any Soviet intention to establish a blockade. He could see\nno reason why the Russians would want a treaty in the light of their\npresent situation.\nAs for the Austrian argument that we must get the Soviets out\nbecause the Austrian economy was suffering, General Keyes said the\neconomy had actually been curving steadily upward. Another argument\nfor an early treaty was to relieve occupation costs. If we move our\ntroops out, he said it would cost us about $9 million more to main-\ntain those troops in the U. S. ($7 million more in Germany), and we\nwould have to make dollars available to the Austrian economy to hold\nit at its present level.\nAs for the argument that the treaty would free the Austrians of\nSoviet interference, General Keyes said the treaty would give the\nSoviets oil rights for a maximum of 33 years in key areas around\nVienna and along the borders, where the Russians would have legitmate\nexcuses for their agents.\nHe did not think there was any toughening up by the Russians\nand said that recent reports to that effect had been caused by a\nchange in personalities which has since changed back.\nIn response to Secretary Johnson's question as to our course\nof action, he said that he felt the Austrian question should not be\ndetermined on the basis of a local point of view but only in terms\nof an overall settlement. Whereas our original occupation objectives\nwere almost made, he said the reasons for our being in Austria now\nare entirely different ones.\nSecretary Acheson said he agreed with General Keyes' analysis\nof the Soviet attitude toward a treaty, namely, that they have now\nall they would get, and more, under a treaty. He felt they were\nstalling now in the light of Yugoslavia, Germany, and Eastern Europe,\nand that we should attempt to maneuver them so that if they should\nslip and agree, we should take them up and get the treaty.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSecretary Acheson also agreed that the chances of an Austrian\nsettlement apart from a European one were low, and that impressed\nhim because he saw no chances for an early European settlement.\nHe felt that time was on the side of the USSR and that the allied\nzones in Austria could not possibly be self-sufficient.\nGeneral Keyes felt we should do nothing as a gesture to the\nAustrians because, of course, the Russians would not reciprocate,\nand the situation would then be that the Russians would exert\npressure on the Austrians directly, which they could not resist,\nwhereas now the pressure is on us. Therefore, he felt, we should\nmaintain and keep strong the Allied Control Council.\nIn response to Secretary Acheson's question, General Keyes said\nhis relations with his British and French colleagues were excellent\nand that, after a period when the British attitude apparently was\nto write Austria off, the current attitude was firmer.\nSecretary Gray said he felt General Keyes had done a fine job,\nand Secretary Acheson agreed.\n- 5-\nTOP SECRET\n54\nNLT/PSF/NSC) 1508\nTOP SECRET\nApril 7, 1950\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 54th meeting of the National Security Council at which Secretary\nAcheson presided. The Vice President and Dr. Steelman were unable to\nattend. Mr. Ford attended for the Attorney General in connection with\nthe first item.\n1. PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNAL SECURITY\n(Progress Report by the NSC Representative on Internal Security\non the subject, dated March 17, 1950; NSC 17/4; NSC 17/6)\nSECRETARY ACHESON, SECRETARY SNYDER, and MR. FORD expressed\ntheir pleasure at the encouraging developments described in this second\nProgress Report.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference Progress Report by the NSC Representa-\ntive on Internal Security on the implementation of NSC 17/4\nand NSC 17/6.\nNOTE: The Attorney General participated in this Council\naction.\n2. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE NEAR EAST\n(NSC 65; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject,\ndated April 5, 1950)\nSECRETARY ACHESON read the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nand stated that his strong feelings about paragraph ll-e had come from\nthe great interest by the Congress in the shipment of arms to Egypt by\nthe U. K. In response to repeated Congressional inquiries he said he\nhad attempted to explain that there were two broad considerations in\nthe problem: one, our interests in the security of the area as a whole\nand the consequent necessity of defensive capabilities there; and the\nother, the intra-area hostility between Israel and the Arab states. He\nhad only been able to carry his point about the desirability of shipping\narms for the security of the general area by giving assurances that\nwe were not forgetting the possibility that the intra-area conflict\nmight again flame into war. He could only maintain such a position,\nhe felt, under some such policy guidance as that contained in paragraph\n1l-e.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-24-2,3/6/12RAC\nNARA Ay Date 6/27/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nGENERAL BRADLEY said the military view was to treat both the\nArabs and the Israeli alike. With the paragraph in, he felt there would\ninevitably be favoritism by more liberal export of arms to Israel than\nat present. We should not alienate the Arabs, he said, for in the event\nof operations in the Near East, we would need friendly Arabs all along\nthe Mediterranean for our bases and lines of communication.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said that in effect we would be giving\npriority to Israel in paragraph 11-e.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he did not wish to give priority to\nIsrael, but only to recognize the intra-area problem as well as the\ngeneral security problem for the area as a whole.\nSECRETARIES ACHESON and JOHNSON then drafted appropriate\nlanguage to be added at the end of paragraph 11-c in place of para-\ngraph 11-e.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAdopted the reference report on the subject, subject to\ndeletion of the proposed sub-paragraph 11-e and with an\namendment to sub-paragraph 11-c.\nNOTE: NSC 65 as revised subsequently circulated as\nNSC 65/1 and submitted to the President for\nconsideration.\n3. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the status of NSC Projects as of April 3, 1950.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\n55\nNCT/PSF/NSC) 1509\nTOP SECRET\nApril 21, 1950\nTRUMAN US HAREY HARA DEPART\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 55th meeting of the National Security Council at which Secretary\nAcheson presided. The Vice President did not attend because of his\nabsence from the city. Mr. Foster attended for the first item in Mr.\nHoffman's absence from the city.\n1. UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\n(NSC 68; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject,\ndated April 17, 1950)\nMR. LAY outlined the background of NSC 68 and read the Presi-\ndent's letter of April 12 concerning the report.\nSECRETARY ACHESON read a summary statement prepared in the\nDepartment of State. The statement said that NSC 68 reveals that Soviet\nwar readiness is increasing faster than the readiness of the United\nStates and our allies and that if present trends are continued, U. S.\nsecurity will be menaced in four or five years. NSC 68 concludes that\nthe U. S. must build up its military strength, make more economic and\nmilitary assistance available to our allies, and weaken the Soviet\nworld economically and psychologically.\nMR. FOSTER remarked that emphasis on information programs\nwithin the U. S. might be stronger, assuming that the project goes\nforward. SECRETARY ACHESON suggested this might be brought out in\nthe subsequent statements of programs.\nMR. HARRIMAN said he endorsed the Conclusions of the report.\nMR. LAWTON suggested that, in the programs and estimated costs\nto be prepared, an assessment should also be made of the effect of these\nprograms on the domestic economy.\nSECRETARIES ACHESON and JOHNSON agreed with Mr. Lawton, and\nSecretary Acheson added that those who had prepared the report felt we\nwere in such a serious situation that we should take extraordinary\nmeasures to devote considerably more of our national income to the\ncold war.\nSECRETARY ACHESON then proposed, and the Council agreed that\nno action be taken with respect to NSC 68, since the President had\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-25-1,3/6/12 RAC\nNARA AY Date 6/27/13\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nBABA\nneither approved nor disapproved it, but turn to a consideration of Mr.\nLay's memorandum on procedure.\nMR. LAY read the recommendations contained in his memorandum\nand emphasized the point that the purpose of this proposed reconstitution\nof the NSC Staff was to prepare the programs requested by the President\nin connection with NSC 68 for consideration by the Council and the\nPresident.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON referred to the JCS comments on this proposal,\nwhich the Joint Chiefs were willing to accept as an ad hoc but not a\npermanent staff arrangement. GENERAL BRADLEY inquired whether the new\nstaff would both prepare programs in reply to the President's request and\nbe responsible for the implementation of those programs, or consider its\njob finished once the programs had been submitted. SECRETARY JOHNSON\nadded in this connection that the JCS comments proposed the adoption of\nthe British system, whereby the same committee is used to implement\npolicies that does the planning.\nMR. LAY explained that, in a sense, NSC 68 covers the whole\nfield of the Council's responsibility and that, accordingly, it might be\nfound desirable to retain the staff group which prepares the programs\nunder NSC 68 for subsequent Council staff work, whatever the eventual\ndecision may be with respect to NSC 68.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he felt this project really brought the\nNational Security Council to life by making it function as the American\npublic thinks it functions, and he proposed:\na. That the Council consider at its next meeting\nthe question of a permanent new NSC staff\nunder the Executive Secretary;\nb. That the Council establish an ad hoc committee\nto respond to the President's directive in\nNSC 68; and\n01\nThat the question of implementing the plans and\nprograms developed under NSC 68 be considered\nas a third and separate problem.\nSecretary SNYDER agreed with this proposal and SECRETARY\nACHESON agreed to the establishment of an ad hoc committee as proposed\nby Secretary Johnson and along the lines outlined in Mr. Lay's\nmemorandum.\nMR. FOSTER said he was not sure there was need for concern\nabout Secretary Johnson's third point concerning implementation.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nHARA\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said that, instead of an advisory representa-\ntive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as suggested by Mr. Lay, he was\nthinking of designating both General Bradley and General Burns as his\nrepresentatives on the committee, but wished to consult the Armed Forces\nPolicy Council at its next meeting the following Tuesday.\nSECRETARY ACHESON then took the sense of the meeting as being\nagreed to designate representatives on the ad hoc committee by Tuesday,\nApril 25.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Discussed NSC 68.\nb. Agreed that an ad hoc committee should be constituted\nto prepare a response to the President's directive\ncontained in NSC 68 as a matter of urgency for considera-\ntion by the Council; that the ad hoc committee should\nconsist of senior representatives designated by each\nCouncil member, the Secretary of the Treasury, the\nEconomic Cooperation Administrator, the Director, Bureau\nof the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic\nAdvisers; and that names of these representatives should\nbe transmitted to the Executive Secretary by Tuesday,\nApril 25.\nc. Agreed, pending further study, to defer until the next\nCouncil meeting consideration of the questions of re-\nconstituting the NSC Staff and of coordinating the\nimplementation of the programs proposed in response\nto NSC 68.\nNOTE: The Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting\nEcohomic Cooperation Administrator, the\nDirector, Bureau of the Budget, and the\nActing Chairman, Council of Economic\nAdvisers participated in this Council\naction.\n2. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNISM IN ITALY\n(NSC 67; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated\nApril 19, 1950)\nSECRETARY ACHESON referred to the proposed amendment by the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff in this report, and the Council agreed to adopt\nthat amendment.\nAt SECRETARY JOHNSON's suggestion, GENERAL BRADLEY remarked\nthat the report appeared to go beyond anything that we had done before\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nin proposing to commit armed forces without an appropriate saving clause\nwith respect to consideration at the time of the views of the Joint\nChiefs. If it were understood that the JCS views would be considered\nat the time, he felt that the report would be all right.\nSECRETARY ACHESON referred to language in paragraphs 11 and\n13 which appeared to cover General Bradley's concern, and MR. LAY\nmentioned the fact that this report was substantially a restatement\nof current policy approved by the President in NSC 1/2 and NSC 1/3.\nSECRETARY ACHESON suggested that appropriate language might\nbe written in the Conclusions of the paper to dispel any doubt on\nGeneral Bradley's point.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAdopted the reference report by the Executive Secretary\non the subject, subject to an amendment to paragraph 13\nthereof proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the\nreference memorandum and to a clarification in the\nlanguage of paragraph 11 to be agreed upon by the\nSecretaries of State and Defense.\nNOTE: NSC 67 to be issued in revised form and submitted\nto the President for consideration after agreement\nby the Secretaries of State and Defense on the\nclarification of paragraph 11.\n3. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 4-50)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n4.\nNSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the status of NSC Projects as of April 17, 1950.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nMARY NEW TRUMAN\n56\nNLT(PSF/NSC) 1510\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nDECLASSIFIED\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-26-0, 3/6/12 RAC May 5, 1950\nE. O. NSC 11652, Sec. 3(1:) and 5(D) or (*\nF-31-77\nNARA AY\nDate\n6/27/13\nletter,\nPROJECT NO 77-64\nBy NLT. we P. NARS Date 10-27-77\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 56th meeting of the National Security Council, at which you pre-\nsided for Items 4 and 5, and Secretary Acheson for the other items.\nThe Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the\ncity. Secretary Sawyer and Mr. Hoffman participated in the Council's\nconsideration of the first item.\nSecretary Acheson welcomed Mr. Symington back as a Council\nmember in his new position as Chairman, National Security Resources\nBoard.\n1. EXPORT CONTROLS AND SECURITY POLICY\n(NSC 69)\nSECRETARY SAWYER initiated the discussion by reading a supple-\nmentary statement, which he circulated at the meeting, in support of the\nCommerce proposals. He also referred to several recent cables from our\nmissions in Europe which indicated the desirability of getting agreement\nby our allies on the 1B list.\nSECRETARY ACHESON disagreed with the issue as stated in NSC 69,\nnamely, that a further policy decision was needed with respect to this\nsubject. He said that there was complete agreement on objectives but that\nthe issue was a question of method: whether sanctions and the screening of\naid should be applied or whether we should continue to attempt to reason\nwith our friends. He felt we could not force the 1B list on the European\ncountries by a threat of withholding MAP or ECA assistance, since we are\nasking more cooperation among them all in a broad area of activity. He\nread a recent cable from the U. S. group in London, which stated that if\nwe were to try to dragoon our friends into accepting the 1B list by uni-\nlateral action, we would be seriously jeopardizing our unity aims on\nwhat is essentially a secondary issue. The cable further reported that\nEuropeans felt that an extension of the 1B list gets into economic war-\nfare, for which they are not ready, rather than a security control\nproblem. Secretary Acheson agreed, however, to stress the importance\nof the 1B list.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON supported strongly the Commerce position in\nNSC 69, and said he felt our implementation of existing policy had been\ntoo soft. He read from a Munitions Board report a statement that the U. S.,\nby denying strategic exports to Eastern Europe, had created markets which\nwere then filled by Western European countries with ECA money. The\nmemorandum cited an instance of the export of industrial diamonds from\nI\nSECRET\nBelgium and other instances of ball-bearing exports. Secretary Johnson\nadded that current intelligence reports indicated that the Soviets have\nimportant weaknesses in their industrial program and that the USSR could\nnot get ready for war without these imports from European countries.\nConsequently, he felt we were assisting the USSR in preparing for war\nand added that Communist China should be included in the Soviet orbit\nand that Defense would oppose any shipment of steel to China. He said\nthat the difference between State and Defense on this subject had existed\nsince the late Secretary Forrestal raised the question back in 1947 and\nstated that he fully concurred in NSC 69, with the understanding that\nevery attempt, short of sanctions, should be used in persuading the\nEuropeans to adopt the 1B list.\nGENERAL BRADLEY concurred in Secretary Johnson's remarks.\nMR. HOFFMAN agreed with Secretary Acheson that the issue was\na question of method, and he agreed further with Secretary Johnson that\nanything short of sanctions should be done. He did not feel that\nsanctions would work. On the contrary, he felt that they would be\ndisastrous because export control was a secondary objective when measured\nagainst our primary aim of getting Europe to grow together economically,\nmilitarily, and politically. Furthermore, he said, the real sources for\nmost of the 1B items for Eastern Europe were Sweden, Switzerland, and\nBelgium, where we have little or no power of sanction in any case.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said the policy was and is to secure agree-\nment on the 1B list, that instructions have been so issued, and that\neverybody had been working toward that objective as hard as possible.\nTherefore, he did not understand what the question was.\nSECRETARY SAWYER said that the case could be put more strongly,\nand agreed that the issue was a matter of method.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON proposed that the record show that, whereas\neconomic considerations had been a major factor in the past, security\nconsiderations should now be given primary consideration.\nSECRETARY ACHESON and MR. HOFFMAN both stated that everything\npossible had been done to secure agreement on the 1B list. Mr. Hoffman\nadded that efforts had been directed toward coordinated action by all\ncountries since nothing else would do. He added that, without any new\npolicy and even though his previous responsibilities in negotiations\nhad been transferred to the Department of State, he would support any\nmeasures short of sanctions.\nSECRETARY ACHESON circulated a proposal to the effect that the\nNSC staff should undertake certain studies, that State should continue\nvigorous efforts toward adoption of the 1B list, that for the time being\nU. S. controls should be continued, even though more restrictive than\nthose of European countries, and that the two following steps be taken\nimmediately to further U. S. objectives in this field: (a) the Secretary\n- 2 -\nGEORET\nfor\nBECKET\nof State to emphasize the matter at the forthcoming London meetings and\n(b) that the U. S. representatives stress the importance of our common\nsecurity interests in connection with this matter.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON stated that Defense requested the strengthen-\ning of the execution of current policy on the LA and 1B lists, agreed\nwith the 4 recommendations in NSC 69, and agreed with Secretary Acheson's\nproposal that he emphasize the importance of this matter at the forth-\ncoming meetings in London.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nAgreed that the Secretary of State should take the opportunity\nto emphasize the importance which the United States attaches\nto common action in the field of security export controls at\nforthcoming meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Great\nBritain and France and with the NAT Council.\n2. FUTURE COURSES OF U. S. ACTION WITH RESPECT TO AUSTRIA\n(NSC 38/5; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject,\ndated May 3, 1950)\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said that the Joint Chiefs had recommended\nstrongly against a civilian High Commissioner. In view of the fact that\nthe President favored such a change, however, Secretary Johnson said he\nwould accept the State proposal, subject to a few changes to provide\nfor military security.\nGENERAL BRADLEY said the JCS did not want to upset the applecart\nin Austria nor to give others any impression of a lessening of our interest\nthere.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said if the attempt for a treaty failed, and\nthere was every indication that it would soon, then the applecart would\nalready be upset.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 38/5\ncontained in the reference memorandum on the subject.\nb. Adopted NSC 38/5 with the Department of State version of\nparagraph 20a(4) and an amendment to paragraph 20a(2)\nproposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nNOTE: NSC 38/5 as amended and adopted circulated as\nNSC 38/6 and submitted to the President for\nconsideration.\n- 3 -\nNABA\n3.\nPROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING NSC 68\n(NSC Action No. 289-c; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsame subject, dated April 17 and April 24, 1950)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nDeferred action on this item.\n(The President entered the meeting at this point)\n4.\nFORTHCOMING FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS\nSECRETARY ACHESON made the following report on the subject:\nMr. Bevin's invitation had been vague as to the agenda, and had\nproposed a review of the world situation since the Foreign\nMinisters' meeting last November to see where we had lost to\nthe Soviets, where we had gained, what we might do, and how we\nmight lead the 12 powers in NAT. Secretary Acheson said he\nwished first to go over the situation and cite the primary\ndanger in order to get that accepted as a criterion of policy\nrather than some of the subsidiary ones which the British and\nFrench were pursuing.\nOur view was based on NSC 68, in which Defense had concurred,\nthat the next 3 or 4 years were critical. Therefore, we should\nstrengthen ourselves by 1954 and use that as the sole test of\naction over and above, for example, the British test that they\nshould be free of U. S. aid by 1952. Once agreed on this over-\nall objective, the following main points should be discussed:\n(1) Military Defense of the West. On this we have entoutline\nfor action in the agreement of the defense meetings at the Hague,\nwhich will require economic and financial actions as well as\nmilitary. The present economy of Europe cannot attain the goal\nin four years without assistance, and Germany must be a full and\nvigorous partner in strengthening the general economy. There-\nfore, the Foreign Ministers and the NAT should establish\ncontinuing machinery under the NAT to identify and remove\ndifficulties in thefields of economy, finance, and supply, and\nto exert constant pressure on the implementation of plans in\neach country.\n(2) Economic Build-up of the West. This could be done through\nthe OEEC, and through a group in NAT for countries not members of\nOEEC.\n- 4 -\n(3) Germany. Mr. McCloy believes that our present control\nover Germany is a wasting asset, and that we will not be in a\nposition to influence deeply German destiny beyond the next 18\nmonths. Secretary Acheson said we want the Germans willing and\ndeeply involved partners in the economy of Western Europe. Since\nthe French would not accept any military participation now, that\nsubject would not be discussed. However, the Germans need a\nsecurity guarantee as well as opportunities for economic develop-\nment in order to persuade them to throw in their lot with us.\nMr. Bidault was proposing a grouping of Germany, the U. S.,\nCanada, and other Western powers, which would be considered at\nthe meeting.\n(4) Propaganda. Though a less important point, attempts\nwould be made to coordinate our activities in this field to\nobviate such conflicts as have occurred with respect to Indochina.\n(5) Arms Shipments to the Middle East. This subject would\ncome up at the meeting, and the U. S. position was currently\nunder preparation in the National Security Council.\n(6) Southeast Asia. An attempt would be made to find out\nwhat the French really want there, since they appear to be\nparalyzed in a state of moving neither forward nor backward.\nWhile no commitments of long-term assistance can be made,\ncertain small current programs can be undertaken now with the\nhelp of the President and in the light of current studies by\nState and Defense.\n(7) India. Some consideration should be given to help the\nsituation to mature there.\nIn response to the President's request for comment, MR. HOFFMAN\nsaid he concurred.\nTHE PRESIDENT inquired what the basis was on which Mr. Hoffman\nrecently predicted that the USSR would blow up. He added that he agreed\nwith this belief but wondered what Mr. Hoffman's sources of information\nwere.\nMR. HOFFMAN said he had not indicated a time but that he felt\nthat the dynamics of freedom, provided we maintained our strength, could\nnot fail to come out on top. We have no such internal worries as the\ntremendous slave labor problem in the USSR. In making over a hundred\nspeeches around the country he had felt among the people a need for hope\nthat some day, not necessarily tomorrow, we would win. He has been say-\ning for a long time that any system as evil as the Soviet one carries the\nseeds of destruction. His views, of course, were predicated on the\n- 5 -\nSECRET\nBARA\nbelief that we must stay strong and take care of our military needs.\nSECRETARY SNYDER agreed with Secretary Acheson's outline of\naction.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that the proposed actions should be pursued\nto a conclusion.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State\non the position of the United States regarding the subject\nmeetings.\n5. MAY DAY AND WHITSUNTIDE YOUTH RALLIES IN BERLIN\n(NSC 70; NSC 71)\nAt Secretary Johnson's suggestion, SECRETARY PACE said that,\nbecause of the unusual occurrences of an assembly in Berlin of half a\nmillion people, it was felt in Defense that there was need for a care-\nful plan of action in Berlin, and recognition of the effect in the\nUnited States of our Berlin activities. Therefore, it was felt that\nthe actions planned should be known and approved by the President, and\npossibly discussed with the Congress. The Defense paper indicated the\nmilitary courses of action and the State report, concurring in those,\nhad other steps that are being taken. Mr. Pace's only further comment\nwas to stress the importance of letting our position be known throughout\nthe United States.\nTHE PRESIDENT said he thought the necessary precautions were\nbeing taken.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Noted and discussed the reference reports by the\nSecretaries of State and Defense on the subject.\nb. Noted that the President felt the necessary pre-\ncautions were being taken in anticipation of the\nWhitsuntide Youth Rally in Berlin.\n(The President left the meeting at this point.)\n- 6 -\n10P-SECRET\n6. NSC 26/2\n(Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State on the subject,\nMARY LIBRARY\ndated April 21, 1950)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nDeferred action on this item.\n7. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the status of NSC Projects as of May 1, 1950.\n- 7 -\n57\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9\nNLT/PSF/NSC)1571\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN ID INTRANA\nMay 18, 1950\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 57th meeting of the National Security Council at which Mr. Webb\npresided in Secretary Acheson's absence. The Vice President was absent\nfrom the city, and Mr. Foley attended in Secretary Snyder's absence.\n1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY COLLABORATION\n(NSC 56/13 Momo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject,\ndated May 16, 1950)\nMR. WEBB said that the Department of State accepted the\nchanges proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He remarked on the\nexcellent staff work by State and Defense on this subject and added\nthat the implementation would be difficult. He therefore urged that\nthe cooperation achieved by State and Defense in the formulation of\nthe policy be continued in its implementation.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON agreed with Mr. Webb's remarks and suggested\nthat the Council review this subject some time prior to his anticipated\ntrip to Latin America in the fall.\nMR. SYMINGTON said he approved the paper and added that, al-\nthough it concerns military planning, the completed military plans\nwould have a bearing on civilian mobilization. Therefore, he asked\nto review the military plans when they are completed.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Adopted HSC 56/1 subject to the amendments in paragraph\n17 proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the\nreference memorandum.\nb. Agreed that the Council should discuss the subject of\nNSC 56/1 at a later date prior to the anticipated trip\nof the Secretary of Defense to Latin America.\nc. Noted the statement by the Chairman, National Security\nResources Board, that MSC 56/1 concerns military planning\nand that the Chairmen, MSRB, wishes to review the\ncompleted military plans with respect to their bearing on\ncivilian mobilization.\nNOTE: NSC 56/1 as amended subsequently circulated\nas NSC 56/2 and submitted to the President\nfor consideration.\nDECLASSIFIED IN PART\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9,3/6/12 RAC\nNARA AM\nDate 6/27/13\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9\nTOP SECRET\n2. PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING NSC 68\n(NSC 68, Action No. 2091 Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsame subject, dated April 17 and April 24, 1950)\nMR. LAY reviewed the Commeil's previous discussion of this\nsubject when it had been agreed that there were three parts to the\nproblems (a) the establishment of an ad hoc committee to prepare a\nresponse to NSC 68, (b) the recenstitution of the NSC Staff, regardless\nof the eventual decision respecting MSC 683 and (c) the effective\norganisation of the government to implement USC 68 in the event its\nConclusions are approved. Although the Council had approved the\nestablishment of the ad hee committee, it had deferred action on (b)\nand (c).\nMR. LAY reported that the ad hec committee had, subject to\napproval by the Council, set up a subcommittee under the Chairmenship\nof the Bureau of the Budget to make recomendations with respect to\n(e) above. It was agreed that the ad hee committee should be authorised\naccordingly. With reference to the reconstitution of the NSC Staff, Mr.\nLay said he bad discussed the recommendations contained in his memorandum\nof April 17 with the Council members and their representatives, and there\nappeared to be general agreement in principle with those recommendations,\nalthough there were name differences as to details. He therefore\nsuggested that the Council approve those recommendations in principle\nand thus provide a basis on which he could work out details with representa-\ntives of Council members.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON agreed that the NSC Staff should be strengthened\nbut suggested that, instead of approving the April 17 memorandum in\nprinciple, the Council should establish a special committee to consider\nthe metter in cellaberation with the Executive Secretary and make\nrecommendations thereon. This proposal was adopted and representatives\nwere designated.\nMR. WEEB inquired if a representative of the Treasury Depart-\nment should be included. It was agreed that the special committee should\nbe authorised to invite representatives from other departments and\nagencies as necessary.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nMe Referred the reference asseranda on the subject to a\nSpecial NSC Committee composed of Mr. Humelsine, Mr.\nPass, and Mr. Lanphier to prepare, in collaboration\nwith the Executive Secretary, recommendations for\nconsideration by the Council with respect to the re-\nconstitution and strengthening of the NSC Staff: and\nauthorised this committee to request the assistance\nor representatives of other executive departments and\nagencies as necessary.\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9\nSECRET\nb. Authorised the ad hoe committee on MSC 68, established\nby NSC Action No. 289b, to study and make recommends-\ntions with respect to the organisation of the government\nto implement the Conclusions of NSC 68 in the event\nthese Conclusions are approved.\n3. NSC 26/2\n(Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State on the subject,\ndated April 21, 1950; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsame subject, dated May 9, 1950)\nMR. WEBB said that State, which was responsible for the\nimplementation of ESC 26/2, miched to bring to the Council's attention\nthe fact that mtil October 1, 1950. American oil installations in Saudi-\nArabia will be\nbecause of the decision to\n25X1\nwithdraw the battalion of Marines previously considered available. He\nadded that there would also be a continuing problem without some kind of\nmilitary assistance even after October 1,\n25X1\nHe therefore suggested that the Joint Chiefs be asked to make a study of\nwhat military steps could be taken to assist in the plans being developed\npursuant to WSC 26/2.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON agreed that this gap should be noted and the\nJoint Chiefe requested as to what military steps they contemplate.\nMR. WEBB raised also\n25X1\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said it should be understood that this\n25X1\nRetter proud be included in the study to be requested of the Joint Chiefs.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nas Discussed the reference Progress Report by the Under\nSecretary of State on the subject and the comments\nof the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect therete\ncentained in the reference memorandum.\nb. Requested the Secretary of Defense to obtain the views\nof the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to what military steps\nthey contemplate in support of the plans developed\npursuant to NSC 26/2, in view of their decision with\nrespect to the battalion of Marines referred to in the\nreference memorandum.\nNOTE: The Secretary of Defense subsequently requested\nto obtain the views of the Joint Chiefs of\nStaff as referred to in b above.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9\nLIBRAR\nTOP SECRET\n4. UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\n(WSC 68, RSC Action No. 289)\nMR. SYMINGTON raised this subject, which was not on the agenda,\nand said that the sooner a response was made to the President, the better\nfor U. S. security. He also mentioned the difficulties of MSRB in perform-\ning its functions without a decision on the NSC 68 project.\nMR. WEBB remarked that Secretary Acheson had been finding in\nEurope a stronger recognition of the Russian threat they are facing.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said the project had priority already, and\nadded that it should not be the product of haste.\nMR. LAY reported that the real problem facing the ad hoe\ncommittee was the estimating of costs over a five-year period in accord\nwith the crucial date of 1954 given in NSC 68.\nMR. WEBB said Secretary Acheson's cables emphasised three points:\n(a) that there was an increasing fear in Europe of possible Russian\nnoves; (b) that there was an increasing desire by the Europeans to de\nmore to help themselves; and (c) that Western Germany was responding\nactively to the recent French proposal on coal and steel. All this\nmeant, Mr. Webb felt, that we should be ready to sail with this rising\ntide of readiness for greater cooperation.\nMR. WEBB also said that he had sensed among the White House\nstaff a feeling that the President himself might have to say something\nto the country with respect to the situation as described in NSC 68\nsome time early in June.\nMR. PACE suggested that we should capitalise domestically\non what seems to be happening in Europe as a result of our programs\nin recent years. MR. WEBB agreed that our European programs now appeared\nto be bearing fruit and added that Europeans, too, seen to feel now that\nthey can do the job required of them.\nMR. LAY ventured the guess that the ad hoc committee would not\nbe able to present a response for consideration by the Council before\nmid-June. He raised the question as to whether the Council might wish\nto make an earlier interim response covering immediate programs.that might\nbe proposed during the current session of Congress, such as the recent\nprogram for strengthening the Voice of America.\nMR. SYMINGTON felt that the whole job should be done properly,\nnot in any half-measures. GENERAL BURNS said that the whole military\nestablishment was working on this as a priority project and that the\nmilitary program could not be expected before the middle of June.\n- 4 -\n-TOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 : NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9\nTOP SECRET\nMR. WEBB inentioned that the increased Voice of America program\nhad been based on the President's recent speech. He suggested that the\nPresident might speak to the country early in June using Secretary\nAcheson's report on his meetings in Europe and also using some of the\n\"Analysis\" of NSC 68.\nMR. SYMINGTON agreed that such a proposal would solve the\nimmediate State problems, but not those of the MSRB, which needs a\nlong-range strategic plan from Defense before it can function properly.\nMR. LAY then suggested, and the Council agreed, that, instead\nof an interim report, every attempt should be made to expedite the\nstaff work in connection with NSC 68.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Discussed the problems involved in preparing the response\nto the President's directive contained in NSC 68 in the\nlight of the current situation.\nb. Agreed that the staff work involved in preparing the\nresponse should be expedited.\n5. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION\n(CIA 5-50)\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the reference report on the subject by the Director\nof Central Intelligence.\n6. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the status of NSC Projects as of May 15, 1950.\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/06 NLT-PSF-49-2-27-9\nTRUMANUM\nBARA\nINSTRY\n58\nNCT(PSF/NSC)1512 NCT (PSF/NSC) 1512\nTOP SECRET\nJune 29, 1950\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 58th meeting of the National Security Council at which you presided.\n1. THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST\nTHE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by reading a memorandum of the\nlatest developments with respect to Korea.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that the Council should undertake a resurvey\nof all policy papers affecting the entire perimeter of the USSR.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON remarked that studies in this direction had\nbeen initiated in Defense, and SECRETARY ACHESON added that State and\nDefense were working out together an analysis of where additional Soviet\npushes might be expected.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that a particular study had been made\nby State of what military action should be taken if Soviet forces entered\nKorean hostilities and that this study had been given to Defense. SECRETARY\nJOHNSON said the Joint Chiefs had been asked to prepare an over-all message\ncomprising current orders and that the additional State study mentioned by\nSecretary Acheson should be incorporated in the over-all message.\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT, who entered the meeting at this juncture,\nreported that the Senate had just voted unanimously to extend the draft\nby roll call.\nSECRETARY ACHESON remarked that the President's announcement of\nJune 27 had become an international fact of great consequence. Its effect\nhad been tremendous, he said, but the responsibilities that went with it\nwere equally significant. He said we may find ourselves in trouble in\nKorea. Therefore, he added, what has been done may make it imperative to\naccept full-out war.\nTHE PRESIDENT said his feeling was that we should not back out\nof Korea unless a military situation elsewhere demanded such action.\nSECRETARY ACHESON suggested that, under the circumstances, the\nPresident should have a free choice of action and suggested that the\nDepartment of Defense should review our military capabilities to indicate\nto the President what military means we possessed to meet any eventuality.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-28-8,3/6/12 6/27/13 RAC\nTOP SECRET\nNARA Ay\nDate\nTOP SECRET\nSPARTS\nNARA\nAt Secretary Acheson's suggestion, MR. HARRIMAN reported that,\nprior to the President's accouncement, the Europeans were gravely con-\ncerned that the United States would not meet the challenge in Korea.\nAfter the announcement, however, he said they felt great relief since\nthey believed disaster would be certain otherwise. He added that the\nEuropeans were fully aware of the implications of the statement.\nTHE PRESIDENT remarked that at his recent meetings with Con-\ngressional leaders there had been questions as to whether other UN\nnations would be willing to help. He felt that the British offer of\nnaval assistance would be reassuring in this regard.\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT said he felt the Senators should know of\nthe offer and added that Senator Tydings had questioned the will of the\nNATO countries to help.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that the British offer should be accepted\nand their units put to work. He asked the Secretary of State to inform\nthe Vice President of the exact nature of the offer and asked the Vice\nPresident then to inform the appropriate Senators.\nSECRETARY SNYDER said that a reappraisal of the Treasury\nsituation had been underway since January and was ready, subject to\nsharpening up, for specific application; and that the Treasury Depart-\nment had been working closely with the National Security Resources Board\nin this connection.\nSECRETARY FINLETTER raised the question of air bases in Northern\nKorea and said the Air Force was having difficulty in combating the Red\nKorean planes only when the latter were in the air over South Korea. He\nfelt we could not effectively stop their air operations unless we got at\nthe Red Korean bases themselves.\nTHE PRESIDENT said we might eventually act on this problem\nbut not now.\nGENERAL VANDENBERG said the Red Korean fuel supplies were\nlargely in surface tanks at the air fields.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that needed consideration.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he hoped the line would not be crossed\nby \"accident\". SECRETARY JOHNSON said current orders clearly specified\nstaying inside the 38th parallel.\nSECRETARY FINLETTER mentioned all the difficulty of mutual\nunderstanding between Washington and Tokyo and suggested that General\nVandenberg might make a trip to Tokyo to improve the situation.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTHE PRESIDENT said he felt all the Chiefs should stay in\nWashington at present.\nTRUMAN NARA LIBRARY\nSECRETARY ACHESON inquired as to the possibility of success\nin air operations against armor. GENERAL VANDENBERG replied that planes\ncould knock out tanks if the tanks did not hide in the towns. He added\nthat the terrain was such as to make it difficult to find tanks and\nadded that the problem was the same as with airplanes: if you knocked\none out, another would come in from the Northern bases. He also said\nthat the jet planes from Japan were operating almost at the limit of\ntheir range.\nGENERAL COLLINS commented that the weather had been terrible\nso far, both in the combat area and in the take-off area. He also said\nthat the tanks could hide during the day and move at night, when it was\nhard for planes to get at them.\nSECRETARY PACE reported that particular attention was being\ngiven to the search for any intelligence concerning clear evidence of\nSoviet participation in the Korean fighting. He inquired if there were\nany other special intelligence targets.\nTHE PRESIDENT said that special attention should be given\nSoviet activities in the vicinity of Yugoslavia, especially Bulgaria,\nand in the vicinity of Northern Iran.\nSECRETARY PACE reported that the Department of the Army\nwas readying a system for military briefing on the Hill.\nTHE PRESIDENT said to the Vice President that such briefings\nmust be bi-partisan and asked the Vice President to select appropriate\nindividuals for the briefings.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Reviewed the situation in Korea.\nb. Noted the President's directive that the Council resurvey\nall policies affecting the entire perimeter of the USSR.\nc. Agreed that the Council should prepare for consideration\nby the President recommendations as to the courses of\naction to be followed in the event that Soviet forces\nenter Korean hostilities.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nHARTY TRUMAN NARA LIBRARY\nd. Noted the President's agreement with a suggestion by the\nSecretary of State that the Department of Defense should\nprepare for the information of the Council a review of\nour military capabilities in order to indicate the extent\nof our freedom of choice.\ne. Noted Mr. Harriman's remarks that the Europeans, though\nthey had grave concern prior to the President's announce-\nment that the United States would not meet the challenge,\nfelt great relief afterwards although they were fully\naware of the implications of the statement.\nf. Noted the President's desire that the British offer of\nnaval assistance, when officially received, be accepted;\nand that the Vice President, when advised by the Secretary\nof State of the exact nature of the offer, should inform\nthe appropriate Senators.\ng. Noted the remarks by the Secretary of the Treasury that a\nreappraisal of the Treasury situation had been underway\nsince January and was ready, subject to sharpening up,\nfor specific application; and that the Treasury Department\nhad been working closely with the National Security Resources\nBoard in this connection.\nh. Noted the President's view that the sources of supply in\nNorth Korea should be kept under consideration, but that\nno U. S. attacks should be made across the 38th parallel\nunder current orders.\ni. Noted that special attention will be devoted to obtaining\nintelligence concerning clear evidence of Soviet participa-\ntion in Korean hostilities, and concerning Soviet activities\nin the vicinity of Yugoslavia and Northern Iran.\nNOTE: The NSC Staff has undertaken the projects referred\nto in b. The actions in C. and d. above have been\ntransmitted to the Secretary of Defense; and that\nin f. to the Secretary of State.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMANA THE NASA SERVICE\n59\nNET(PSF/NSC) 1513\nTOP SECRET\nJune 30, 1950\nBIRA\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 59th Meeting of the National Security Council, at which you pre-\nsided. The Vice President, although he did not attend this meeting,\nwas subsequently advised of the significant policy decisions taken,\nby his attendance at your meeting with Congressional leaders today.\n1. THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST\nsecretary JOHNSON read a proposed directive to General\nMacArthur.\nTHE PRESIDENT objected to the last paragraph of this direct-\nive. He stated that he wished to give no implication that we were\nplanning to go to war with Russia under present circumstances. He\nwished to take every step necessary to push the North Koreans back\nbehind the 38th parallel. At the same time he wanted to be sure that\nwe were not so deeply committed in Korea that we could not take care\nof other situations which might develop.\nSECRETARY PACE expressed the belief that we should be very\ncareful in authorizing operations above the 38th parallel, to make\nclear the limitations upon such operations.\nTHE PRESIDENT stated that such operations should be designed\nonly to destroy munitions supplies. He wanted it clearly understood\nthat our operations in Korea were designed to keep the peace in Korea\nand to restore the border.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said that he was in accord with the Air\nForce in desiring to take necessary steps above the border to accomp-\nlish our mission. He did not think that the Air Force should be\nhampered in its tasks by staying rigidly below the 38th parallel.\nHe felt, however, that it was important that caution be taken not to\ngo outside of the borders of Korea. It was his understanding that\nthe targets were generally in the operational area near the 38th\nparallel.\nHe agreed to the proposed commitment of limited ground forces\nsince he felt it would be a disaster if we were pushed out of Korea.\nHe felt that the present proposal, however, is quite different from an\nunlimited commitment to supply all of the ground forces required in\nSouth Korea.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-29-7,31612 RAC\nNARA AM Date 6/27/13\n- 1\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECRETARY ACHESON felt that if Soviet forces in Soviet uni-\nforms intervened in Korea, we should defend our positions and do what\nis necessary to protect ourselves, but report immediately to the Pres-\nident.\nTHE PRESIDENT, referring to the last paragraph, said that a\ndirective to MacArthur along those lines was all right, but that he\ndid not wish to make a statement to that effect.\nIt was agreed, at Secretary Acheson's suggestion, that the\ndetailed wording of the directive be worked out between State and De-\nfense.\nSECRETARY ACHESON then read the Soviet reply to our note on\nKorea, and also a statement by the Chinese Communists. Secretary\nAcheson pointed out that these two communications taken together\nseemed to indicate that the Soviets would not intervene themselves in\nKorea, but might utilize the Chinese Communists. He requested, and\nthe President agreed to, the public release of our note to the USSR\nand the Soviet reply.\nSECRETARY ACHESON reported that India had now accepted the\nsecond Resolution by the UN Security Council. He said that Australia\nhad asked about our attitude toward the use of Australian Air Force\nunits.\nSECRETARY FINLETTER felt that it would be advisable to make\nthe forces as representative as possible of the United Nations and\ntherefore welcome the Australian offer.\nsecretary ACHESON said that New Zealand, Canada, and The\nNetherlands have also made offers of armed force contingents.\nTHE PRESIDENT expressed the desire that all offers by other\nmembers of the United Nations, to place contingents of their armed\nforces under the command of General MacArthur for use in the Korean\nsituation, should be accepted in order that the forces assisting South\nKorea may be truly representative of the United Nations.\nTHE PRESIDENT also stated that he wished a directive issued\nin his name to General MacArthur to make a full and complete report\non the situation in the Far East each day.\nTHE PRESIDENT also cautioned all participants against any\npossible leaks regarding this meeting.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Discussed and amended a proposed directive to General\nMacArthur, and agreed that the final wording should be\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN BARA\nworked out between the Departments of State and Defense\nin the light of the discussion at the meeting.\nb. Noted the Soviet reply to the U. S. note on the Korean\nsituation and the Chinese Communist statement on this\nsituation, both of which were read by the Secretary of\nState.\nc. Noted the President's agreement to the public release,\nby the Department of State, of the U. S. note to the\nUSSR regarding Korea and the Soviet reply.\nd. Noted the President's desire that all offers by other\nmembers of the United Nations to place contingents of\ntheir armed forces under the command of General Mac-\nArthur for use in the Korean situation, should be ac-\ncopted, in order that the forces assisting South\nKorea may be truly representative of the United Nations.\ne. Noted that the President desired a directive issued in\nhis name to General MacArther to make a full and com-\nplete report on the situation in the Far East each day.\nNOTE: The wording of the directive referred to in a above\nsubsequently agreed upon by the Departments of State\nand Defense.\nThe diplomatic notes referred to in c above subse-\nquently were released to the public by the Department\nof State.\nThe directive referred to in e above subsequently to\nbe issued by the Department of Defense.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAND VIABA\n60\nNET(PSF/NSC) 1514\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nTRUMANTI\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-49-2-30-5,316/12RAC July 7, 1950\nNARA AM Date 6/27/13\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe following notes contain a summary of the discussion at\nthe 60th meeting of the National Security Council, at which you presided.\n1. THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST\nTHE PRESIDENT requested General Bradley to make a report on the\nsituation in Korea.\nGENERAL BRADLEY described the present military situation and\nadded that the 25th Division had been alerted and was ready for trans-\nportation from Sasebo.\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT inquired the number of North Korean troops in\noperation, and General BRADLEY replied that the best estimate was 90,000.\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT asked the number of our troops, and GENERAL BRADLEY said\nthere were about 13,000 U. S. troops together with 25,000 South Koreans ac-\ncording to latest reports. He referred to a new bazooka which was being\nsent over, capable of penetrating any tank.\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT asked about prospects over the next two weeks\nand whether we had any chance of equalizing the forces. GENERAL BRADLEY\nsaid all the North Korean columns could not be stopped until the 25th\nDivision had been moved over, which would take another week because of\nshipping shortages.\nSECRETARY MATTHEWS asked about possible additional North Korean\nDivisions that might be brought in. GENERAL BRADLEY said there were two\nmore divisions in North Korea, still uncommitted, plus Korean and Chinese\nCommunist troops in Manchuria.\nSECRETARY SNYDER asked about the size of the North Korean Divisions.\nGENERAL BRADLEY said they were smaller than ours, running about 10,000 men.\nSECRETARY PACE mentioned that an additional factor was the presence\nof some 200,000 Chinese Communist troops on the Northern border about 10\ndays' march away. GENERAL BRADLEY added that it was estimated that there\nwere about 450,000 Communist troops in Manchuria, including 70,000 Koreans.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he would like consultations with Defense on\nthe extent and meaning of the blockade of North Korea. He said there were\nalso questions with respect to current orders for Army and Air commanders\nif the Soviets entered the fighting, which should be revised in terms of the\nblockade. SECRETARY JOHNSON agreed that this SI ould be worked out together.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN NARA\nSECRETARY PACE, speaking for the three Military Secretaries,\nsaid they felt strongly, now that the Soviets had shown their hand in\nKorea, that a decision on the nature of our over-all military posture\nfor the days ahead was an imperative matter.\nTHE PRESIDENT said he was aware of this and had a good picture\nof what was required.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nil\nNoted and discussed a report by General Bradley on\nthe military situation and prospects in Korea.\nb.\nNoted the agreement by the Secretaries of State and\nDefense that the two departments should clarify the\nextent and meaning of the blockade of North Korea.\nof\nNoted the remarks of the Secretary of the Army, speak-\ning for the three Military Secretaries, that a decision\non the nature of our over-all military posture with\nrespect to possible future developments is imperative.\n2. SCHEDULING OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS\nTHE PRESIDENT said he felt the Council should meet every Thursday\nat this time and that important policy recommendations should be cleared\nthrough this staff in order that everybody might have complete information\nas the situation develops. He said it would help him to have Council meet-\nings each Thursday before the regular Cabinet meetings on Friday, especially\nsince we may need some important decisions during the next ten days. Accord-\ningly, he wanted all members kept informed in order that they might give\nhim their best advice.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the President's desire that the Council meet regularly\nevery Thursday for the time being and that all important\nrecommendations relating to the national security be coordinated\nthrough the Council and its Staff for consideration at these\nregular meetings in order that all Council members may be\ncompletely informed.\n3. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SPAIN\n(NSC 72 and NSC 72/1)\nThe President said he had discussed this subject the same morning\nwith the leading U. S. banker and made his position clear.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said he had discussed the subject with Secretary\nAcheson and it had been agreed to defer the subject and have the NSC Consul-\ntants work on the problem.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMAN NARA DEPART\nTHE PRESIDENT said it would take a lot of convincing to make\nhim recognize Franco.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Discussed the subject and deferred further action until\nthe next Council meeting.\nb. Directed the NSC Consultants to study the reference papers\non the subject in preparation for further Council considera-\ntion.\n4. THE REARMAMENT OF WESTERN GERMANY\n(NSC 71 and NSC 71/1)\nSECRETARY JOHNSON suggested that this item also be passed over,\nthat the NSC Consultants work on the problem, and that he discuss it further\nwith Secretary Acheson.\nTHE PRESIDENT asked that Mr. Harriman participate in the Consultants'\nstudy because of his broad European experience. He remarked that we should\nbe careful not to revive the Nazi government but agreed that the question\nof rearming Germany should be reviewed in the Council.\nTHE PRESIDENT felt it was premature to commence rearmament now,\nbut he wanted frank, open discussion in order that conclusions could be\nreached for the best interests of the country. The President added that\nhe thought it was premature to rearm Japan at present, too.\nSECRETARY ACHESON requested that no one say anything about this\nsubject and that nothing should be said that the matter was under considera-\ntion in the Council.\nTHE PRESIDENT agreed and said that he had refused to answer any\nquestions on policy matters at his press conference that morning.\nMR. HARRIMAN remarked that he had found a way of diverting questions\non German rearmament by the response that such a matter was primarily a\nEuropean concern.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\na. Discussed the subject and deferred further action until\nthe next Council meeting.\nb.\nDirected the NSC Consultants with Mr. Harriman's assistance\nto study the reference papers on the subject in preparation\nfor further Council consideration.\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nman\nC. Agreed that nothing should be said publicly on the subject\nand that nothing should be said to indicate that the subject\nwas under consideration in the National Security Council.\n5. THE POINT IV PROGRAM\nMR. HARRIMAN inquired if the President wished to discuss the\nserious situation posed by the current cutbacks in the Point IV Program\nbeing suggested in the Senate.\nTHE PRESIDENT, reviewing the situation, said that our original\nplan had been for $45 million which the Administration had cut to $35 million\nin requesting the appropriation. The House had done nothing to that figure,\nbut current Senate proposals would cut it to fifteen, eleven, or ten million.\nWe have a tentative commitment of $10 million to the UN, he said, and the\nProgram would be sunk if the Senate proceded along their present lines. He\nremarked that those opposing the Program were those always trying for economy;\nbut he said that this would be false economy since the Point IV Program would\nsave us tremendous war expenditures in the long run.\nIn response to a query by the Vice President as to the nature of\nthe testimony, THE PRESIDENT said full facts had been made known. He added\nhe did not understand Senator Hayden's approach.\nTHE PRESIDENT asked that anyone who could help in any way should\ndo so, and said that Mr. Murphy was coordinating this program.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the President's remarks with respect to action in the\nCongress on the Administration's Point IV Program and his\ndesire that all possible assistance be made available to ob-\ntain approval of the total sum of $35 million, such assistance\nto be under the coordination of the Special Counsel to the\nPresident.\n(The President left the meeting at this juncture.)\n6. SUGGESTED ACTION BY THE NSC FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE\nLIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION\n(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 6,\n1950)\nVR. SIMINGTON said that as a member of the Council and an adviser\nto the President, he was very much concerned over the situation. He then\nread a statement which he said he had given careful consideration.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nLIBRARY YOU\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT remarked that Mr. Symington's statement\npointed up the tragic possibilities of the present situation.\nSECRETARY JOHNSON said the statement should be handled as a top\nsecret document and that he would refer it to the three secretaries and the\nJoint Chiefs. He then said in fairness to the Joint Chiefs, that until he\nhad taken office last year and the National Security Act Amendments of 1949\nhad been approved, it had been impossible to get a strategic plan. Now,\nhowever, the JCS was a team, and he wished it understood that Mr. Symington's\nstatement did not reflect on the Joint Chiefs as presently constituted.\nMR. SYMINGTON said the NSRB had no desire to blame anyone, but\nhad only the desire to get a plan.\nGENERAL BRADLEY said there were two types of strategic plans:\none, an emergency plan; and the other, a long-range plan. He felt the\nfirst was more important. An emergency plan, he added, had already been\napproved by the Secretary of Defense and was now in effect. This plan\ncovered two years, but not three in advance. Consequently, he said there\nwas no question of not having a plan at all.\nMR. SYMINGTON said that both the Munitions Board and the NSRB\nfelt they had not gotten enough information from this plan. He added that\nit was not a question of a three- or four-year plan, but rather of knowing\nwhat was needed of U. S. industry within the first nine months of a war.\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT inquired if a two-year emergency plan had\nbeen approved. GENERAL BRADLEY replied that units had been approved by\nthe Secretary of Defense.\nMR. SYMINGTON repeated that it was impossible to operate properly\nunder present conditions without the necessary information.\nGENERAL BRADLEY said that the Joint Chiefs were faced with a\ntremendous volume of paper work and responsibility at present, and that\nfour or five more Chiefs would be needed.\nSECRETARY ACHESON said he would like to see Mr. Symington's\nstatement circulated, and it was agreed that it should be circulated\nwith special security precautions.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted and discussed a statement which the Chairman, NSRB\nread on the subject.\nNOTE: The statement referred to above sbusequently circulated\nto Council members as the enclosure to the reference\nmemorandum of July 6 in accordance with the desire\nexpressed at the meeting.\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSTRUMAN HARTY\n7. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:\nNoted the status of NSC Projects as of July 3, 1950.\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET"
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