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{
    "localId": "7788604",
    "label": "War Department Report, The Soviet Union",
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    "id": "7788604",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "War Department Report, The Soviet Union",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7788604",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Cold War",
        "International relations",
        "United States-Soviet relations"
    ],
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            "logicalDate": "1948-01-01",
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{
    "seq": 32,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/4/7886/7788604/content/presidential-libraries/truman/602191/750715/hst-psf_750715_02-75.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "CONCEPT OF RUSSIAN AIR\nWARFARE\n[Digest of Air Intelligence Division (AC/AS-2) Report]\npolicy to provide adequate striking power and to counter\nBefore and during World War II, the Soviet Air Force\nthe potential danger of a formidable heavy bomber force\nwas designed, organized, and employed for direct and im-\nof any other country.\nmediate support of the ground forces. This concept of the\nWith knowledge of the terrific impact of an aggressive,\nrole of the air force was determined basically by politi-\nscientifically conceived and executed assault, and the pos-\ncal, economic, and territorial circumstances.\nsibility of obtaining a quick decision, it is safe to assume\nSoviet strategy assumed that a Soviet-German war was\nthat primary consideration will be given by the Soviet\ninevitable and imminent. In addition, because of political\nUnion to assault-type weapons. Secondarily, the Soviet\nalignments between the Axis Powers, the U. S. S. R. was\nAir Force will be designed and organized to counter the\nforced to take into consideration that she might have to\nmilitary, naval, and air power of potential opponents, both\nwage war on two fronts-to the West, with Germany; and\nindividually and jointly.\nto the East with Japan, strongly entrenched in Manchuria\nand China.\nConsequently, all action relating to the planning and\nBasic Trends in Russian Air Policy\nimprovement of the Soviet Air Force was attended by a\nIn spite of the many changes that have occurred as a\nsense of urgency. Long-term improvements were ruled\nresult of the war, the Soviet Union still remains pre-\nout of consideration by the speed with which war with\ndominantly a land power. The traditional concept of the\nGermany was seen to be approaching.\nArmy as the most vitally important arm of the services\nWith Germany and Japan conquered, the situation has\nin defense and offense probably will persist in the future:\naltered diametrically. The U. S. S. R. with time now fa-\nit can be assumed, therefore, that the organization and\nvorable, can evolve a new concept of air warfare, which\ndesign of the Soviet Air Force of the future will continue\nwill, in turn, determine the trend of development in air-\nto reflect this concept, albeit modified by air power con-\ncraft and air armament for the Soviet Air Force.\nsiderations. The Soviet Air Force is expected to become\na more nearly balanced force, employing rocket- and jet-\nPostwar Strategy\npropelled aircraft and developing a strong strategic air\narm.\nThe collapse of Germany and Japan produced a situa-\nSoviet military planners realize that the principal\ntion wherein the Soviet Union is promised a protracted res-\nthreat to their operations will come from a strategic bomb-\npite from any formidable and imminent threat of aggres-\ning force. Practical Soviet airmen cannot have escaped\nsion. For the first time in her history, the U. S. S. R. is\nthe conclusion that Germany's defensive force was in-\nfree to reorganize her fighting forces. The U. S. S. R.\ncapable of preventing successful attacks by the strategic\nhas entered a phase in which the probability of aggres-\nair forces of Great Britain and the United States. Con-\nsion by a hostile air power can be minimized. During\nsiderable effort therefore, is being, and will be expended\nthis period, the design, method of employment, and equip-\nto develop an effective defensive fighter force. Such a\nment of the Soviet Air Force can be subjected to the most\nforce will require better interceptor aircraft than the\nradical reconsiderations, and can be remodeled on a long-\nSoviet Air Force has heretofore possessed. Evidence in-\nterm basis, allowing a period of years for attaining maxi-\ndicates that emphasis is being placed on jet aircraft types\nmum operational efficiency. Circumstances no longer\nwhich the Germans had placed in operation and were de-\nforce a hand-to-mouth policy, entailing piecemeal re-\nveloping prior to VE-day. Among these types are models\nequipment and inadequate training.\ncapable of speeds in excess of 550 m. p. h. and of operation\nIn terms of air power, the Soviet Union's present and\nat altitudes up to 43,000 feet.\nfuture strategic situation is conditioned by two factors\nPrediction as to whether the Soviet Union will develop\n(1) the absence of any immediate and considerable threat,\na true strategic bombing force must be based, in part, on\nwith a resultant freedom to reorganize the Soviet armed\nspeculation. The Soviets have long possessed what they\nforces and economic life; and (2) the need to frame an air\ncall a \"long-range bomber force\", but have not used it as\n76"
}