Ask the Scholar
Page 37 of 95
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
STRATEGIC WEAKNESSES OF THE
SOVIET WAR POTENTIAL
Much of the strength of the Soviet Union lies in its nat-
Industrial Weaknesses
ural terrain and great size. These two factors provide the
U. S. S. R. with vast resources, excellent natural defense
Steel.-The main shortcoming of Soviet heavy industry
features and ample area to support a large population.
is its small steel output, an estimated 15,800,000 tons in
On the other hand, these geographic advantages are off-
1945 (compared with United States production of 90,000,-
set by certain disadvantages: (1) much of this vast terri-
000 tons). Although handicapped by this small steel out-
tory is frigid tundra, marshland, desert or mountain; (2)
put, the Soviets were able to concentrate all production
less than one-eight of the area can be called arable land;
on military needs during World War II, eliminating pro-
and (3) the great distances are a considerable obstacle to
duction for civilian needs almost entirely.
the development of adequate transportation and communi-
Oil.-In 1945, the Soviet Union produced less than 50.-
cations nets essential to a highly developed industrial
000,000 barrels of crude oil (as compared with 1,700,000,000
economy.
in the United States) There are approximately 30
Centuries of incompetent Czarist government left the
known significant refining plants in the Soviet Union.
country poorly developed; and the four years of World
However, this limited number of refineries, in addition
War I, added to the previous abuse of the country's riches,
to the synthetic and refining plants of countries under
resulted in a general economic collapse. After the Revo-
Soviet control, are all situated in the western and southern
lution, recovery was slow, due greatly to the sanguinary
portions of the Soviet sphere; they are geographically,
extremely vulnerable.
purges, in which more than 3,000,000 educated persons
were annihilated to rid the country of Czarist influence
Coal.-The most important source of power in the So-
and culture.
viet Union is coal. Some 60 percent of prewar produc-
tion was in the Don Basin and postwar reconstruction
The "liquidation" of the Kulaks (property-owning
of destroyed mines has restored less than half that out-
farmers) during the Second Five Year Plan, 1933 to 1937,
put. Railroads, the most important single user of coal,
resulted in another 3 millions being sent to concentration
consume approximately 30 percent of coal produced. The
camps and graves. Thus, with monumental economic and
Soviet electricity generating plants are also dependent
social problems still to overcome, the Bolsheviks, in 1935,
upon coal: more than 90 percent of Soviet electricity is
started anew the task of training a fresh generation of
generated by steam turbines rather than by hydroelectric
political, industrial and rural leaders to exploit the capa-
plants.
bilities of the U. S. S. R.
The necessity to transport coal great distances from
Although World War II brought accession of territory
the coal fields to the metallurgical and industrial centers
to the U. S. S. R., these did not offset Soviet economic
further complicates the coal situation. From the Pechora
losses in human life, estimated at 25,000,000, and in in-
coal basin, on the Arctic Circle, to Leningrad is over 1,000
dustry, approximately 25 percent of prewar capacity. In
miles; the Karaganda coal basin in Central Asia, is 1,100
spite of those losses, the Soviet economy, by reducing civil-
miles from Magnitogorsk, in the Urals; and the Kuznets
ian production to the utmost and with some lend-lease as-
Basin, in Western Siberia, is approximately 1,500 miles
sistance, made possible the major offensives of 1943 to
from the Urals.
1945.
Non-ferrous Metals.-Although Soviet output of most
The greatest single weakness in the Soviet economy is
non-ferrous metals sharply increased during the war, the
the great disorganization still prevailing in the former
U. S. R. has been deficient continuously in these strate-
German occupied areas of the country. Even with repara-
gic materials. It was necessary for the U. S. S. R. to
tions and possible imports from the other United Nations,
import 763,000 tons of non-ferrous metals from the United
Soviet economists estimate that reconstruction will take 10
States from October 1941 through March 1945; and in-
years, and will absorb the principal effort of the Soviet
creased use was made of wood and plastics in the con-
economy.
struction of aircraft. In addition, the Soviet munitions
RESTRICTED
71
Page data
- Page
- 37
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 38de291dc1336709
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 7788604
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "7788604",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7788604",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "War Department Report, The Soviet Union",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7788604",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"subjects": [
"Cold War",
"International relations",
"United States-Soviet relations"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/4/7886/7788604/content/presidential-libraries/truman/602191/750715/hst-psf_750715_02-93.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/4/7886/7788604/content/presidential-libraries/truman/602191/750715/hst-psf_750715_02-93.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/4/7886/7788604/content/presidential-libraries/truman/602191/750715/hst-psf_750715_02-93.jpg",
"imageCount": 95,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "7788604",
"label": "War Department Report, The Soviet Union",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7788604"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "7788604",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7788604",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "War Department Report, The Soviet Union",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7788604",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"subjects": [
"Cold War",
"International relations",
"United States-Soviet relations"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/4/7886/7788604/content/presidential-libraries/truman/602191/750715/hst-psf_750715_02-93.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/4/7886/7788604/content/presidential-libraries/truman/602191/750715/hst-psf_750715_02-93.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/4/7886/7788604/content/presidential-libraries/truman/602191/750715/hst-psf_750715_02-93.jpg",
"imageCount": 95,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7788604",
"naId": 7788604,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"logicalDate": "1948-01-01",
"year": 1948
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 37,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/4/7886/7788604/content/presidential-libraries/truman/602191/750715/hst-psf_750715_02-70.jpg",
"mediaId": "38de291dc1336709",
"ocrText": "STRATEGIC WEAKNESSES OF THE\nSOVIET WAR POTENTIAL\nMuch of the strength of the Soviet Union lies in its nat-\nIndustrial Weaknesses\nural terrain and great size. These two factors provide the\nU. S. S. R. with vast resources, excellent natural defense\nSteel.-The main shortcoming of Soviet heavy industry\nfeatures and ample area to support a large population.\nis its small steel output, an estimated 15,800,000 tons in\nOn the other hand, these geographic advantages are off-\n1945 (compared with United States production of 90,000,-\nset by certain disadvantages: (1) much of this vast terri-\n000 tons). Although handicapped by this small steel out-\ntory is frigid tundra, marshland, desert or mountain; (2)\nput, the Soviets were able to concentrate all production\nless than one-eight of the area can be called arable land;\non military needs during World War II, eliminating pro-\nand (3) the great distances are a considerable obstacle to\nduction for civilian needs almost entirely.\nthe development of adequate transportation and communi-\nOil.-In 1945, the Soviet Union produced less than 50.-\ncations nets essential to a highly developed industrial\n000,000 barrels of crude oil (as compared with 1,700,000,000\neconomy.\nin the United States) There are approximately 30\nCenturies of incompetent Czarist government left the\nknown significant refining plants in the Soviet Union.\ncountry poorly developed; and the four years of World\nHowever, this limited number of refineries, in addition\nWar I, added to the previous abuse of the country's riches,\nto the synthetic and refining plants of countries under\nresulted in a general economic collapse. After the Revo-\nSoviet control, are all situated in the western and southern\nlution, recovery was slow, due greatly to the sanguinary\nportions of the Soviet sphere; they are geographically,\nextremely vulnerable.\npurges, in which more than 3,000,000 educated persons\nwere annihilated to rid the country of Czarist influence\nCoal.-The most important source of power in the So-\nand culture.\nviet Union is coal. Some 60 percent of prewar produc-\ntion was in the Don Basin and postwar reconstruction\nThe \"liquidation\" of the Kulaks (property-owning\nof destroyed mines has restored less than half that out-\nfarmers) during the Second Five Year Plan, 1933 to 1937,\nput. Railroads, the most important single user of coal,\nresulted in another 3 millions being sent to concentration\nconsume approximately 30 percent of coal produced. The\ncamps and graves. Thus, with monumental economic and\nSoviet electricity generating plants are also dependent\nsocial problems still to overcome, the Bolsheviks, in 1935,\nupon coal: more than 90 percent of Soviet electricity is\nstarted anew the task of training a fresh generation of\ngenerated by steam turbines rather than by hydroelectric\npolitical, industrial and rural leaders to exploit the capa-\nplants.\nbilities of the U. S. S. R.\nThe necessity to transport coal great distances from\nAlthough World War II brought accession of territory\nthe coal fields to the metallurgical and industrial centers\nto the U. S. S. R., these did not offset Soviet economic\nfurther complicates the coal situation. From the Pechora\nlosses in human life, estimated at 25,000,000, and in in-\ncoal basin, on the Arctic Circle, to Leningrad is over 1,000\ndustry, approximately 25 percent of prewar capacity. In\nmiles; the Karaganda coal basin in Central Asia, is 1,100\nspite of those losses, the Soviet economy, by reducing civil-\nmiles from Magnitogorsk, in the Urals; and the Kuznets\nian production to the utmost and with some lend-lease as-\nBasin, in Western Siberia, is approximately 1,500 miles\nsistance, made possible the major offensives of 1943 to\nfrom the Urals.\n1945.\nNon-ferrous Metals.-Although Soviet output of most\nThe greatest single weakness in the Soviet economy is\nnon-ferrous metals sharply increased during the war, the\nthe great disorganization still prevailing in the former\nU. S. R. has been deficient continuously in these strate-\nGerman occupied areas of the country. Even with repara-\ngic materials. It was necessary for the U. S. S. R. to\ntions and possible imports from the other United Nations,\nimport 763,000 tons of non-ferrous metals from the United\nSoviet economists estimate that reconstruction will take 10\nStates from October 1941 through March 1945; and in-\nyears, and will absorb the principal effort of the Soviet\ncreased use was made of wood and plastics in the con-\neconomy.\nstruction of aircraft. In addition, the Soviet munitions\nRESTRICTED\n71"
}