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THE SOVIET UNION
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and a legal "front" for illegal activities as The Roof. This
tration of persons living in Canada who had come origi-
secrecy and the complete independence of the separate net-
nally from portions of Poland and the Ukraine that subse-
works prevented even Gouzenko from having a knowledge
quently had been incorporated into the U. S. S. R. The
of agents employed in other networks. Consequently,
testimony given in the course of the investigation insinu-
his first-hand knowledge of Soviet espionage was limited
ated that the Soviets intended to put pressure on these
to the military network under the direction of the Soviet
persons through threatening the lives of their relatives
Military Attaché.
still in Soviet territory, and that the NKVD was taking
advantage of this registration for improper purposes.
Clandestine Functions of the Networks
As for the Commercial Section of the Embassy, the testi-
mony does not clearly establish any espionage network
The objectives of the military net, headed by Zabotin,
connected with its official functions. However, there is
primarily were in the field of military data and technical
evidence that the office of the Commercial Counsellor and
information related to the armed forces. For example,
the Commercial Delegations were used extensively as
the military net sought such material as the following:
cover for agents of the Military Attaché and the NKVD.
documentary materials on the atomic bomb, technical proc-
It is also known that the Soviets were contemplating a
ess, drawings, and calculations; particulars about the
large-scale postwar expansion of their espionage networks,
"electronshells" information on research in aerial photog-
and that one of the methods to be utilized was the placing
raphy using infra-red rays; dislocation of army, corps,
of agents in the office of the Commercial Attaché. This
and divisions. However, additional assignments in other
office, which previously had consisted of about 50 persons,
fields were given. These included: requirements which a
was to be increased to 97, and a number of the staff had
person living as an "illegal" [entrant] must meet, expedi-
been selected for training at Military Intelligence Head-
ent methods to slip into the country, methods of employ-
quarters in Moscow for assignment to Zabotin's network.
ing counter-espionage, and psychological "political" re-
In fact, in September 1945, after Gouzenko's departure, the
ports on the personnel of various sections of the armed
Soviet Embassy was seeking permission to establish a
forces' headquarters or of various government depart-
large-scale Soviet Trade Mission in Canada, under diplo-
ments and agencies.
matic immunity.
The Political Section of the Embassy was the agency of
The Ambassador appears to have been the only official
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
of the Embassy who was not engaged in espionage work
Soviet Union. This net carried on the Party-organizing
in some capacity, and, as such, was cleared by the Royal
functions among the personnel of the Embassy. In addi-
Commission of any complicity in these activities.
tion, however, it appears that another of its functions was
to exercise direct control of the Communist movement in
Canada. Its director, Goussarov, although only a Second
Character of Agents
Secretary of the Embassy, exercised "authority on the level
Perhaps the most startling single aspect of the entire
of the Ambassador." This is the channel through which
fifth column Soviet network is the uncanny success with
the Canadian Communist Party received its instructions
which the Soviet agents were able to find Canadians who
from Moscow, including not only general political lines
were willing to betray their country and to supply agents
to be taken up in Communist propaganda, but also instruc-
of a foreign Power with secret information to which they
tions on techniques of operation. This section also was
had access in the course of their work-all this, despite
designated as the "Comintern Intelligence System", and in
their oaths of allegiance, of office, and of secrecy.
that capacity it transmitted to Moscow biographical and
Many of the Canadian public servants implicated in
other information on local Communists and sympathizers.
this espionage network were persons with an unusually
Such information could be utilized, among other purposes,
high degree of education. Many were well regarded by
to check up on agents before their employment.
those who worked with them in agencies and departments
The NKVD Section of the Embassy was the representa-
of the public service, as persons of marked ability and
tive of the Moscow NKVD headquarters. It is believed
intelligence.
to have been a much more extensive network than the
They included among others:
military system. Among its functions were to: (1) check
a. A member of the staff of McGill University and a
on Soviet official personnel in order to keep them in line;
valued senior worker with the National Research Council;
(2) organize and operate espionage groups primarily in
a highly respected scientist with an international repu-
the political and economic fields; and (3) report on mem-
lation in chemistry ; a man of very substantial independent
bers of the Communist Party in Canada. Reportedly, it
means.
was through Pavlov, the director of this section, that the
b. A man occupying a responsible position in the In-
Embassy undertook, during the autumn of 1945, the regis-
dustrial Development Bank, who had had a distinguished
60
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"ocrText": "THE SOVIET UNION\nRESTRICTED\nand a legal \"front\" for illegal activities as The Roof. This\ntration of persons living in Canada who had come origi-\nsecrecy and the complete independence of the separate net-\nnally from portions of Poland and the Ukraine that subse-\nworks prevented even Gouzenko from having a knowledge\nquently had been incorporated into the U. S. S. R. The\nof agents employed in other networks. Consequently,\ntestimony given in the course of the investigation insinu-\nhis first-hand knowledge of Soviet espionage was limited\nated that the Soviets intended to put pressure on these\nto the military network under the direction of the Soviet\npersons through threatening the lives of their relatives\nMilitary Attaché.\nstill in Soviet territory, and that the NKVD was taking\nadvantage of this registration for improper purposes.\nClandestine Functions of the Networks\nAs for the Commercial Section of the Embassy, the testi-\nmony does not clearly establish any espionage network\nThe objectives of the military net, headed by Zabotin,\nconnected with its official functions. However, there is\nprimarily were in the field of military data and technical\nevidence that the office of the Commercial Counsellor and\ninformation related to the armed forces. For example,\nthe Commercial Delegations were used extensively as\nthe military net sought such material as the following:\ncover for agents of the Military Attaché and the NKVD.\ndocumentary materials on the atomic bomb, technical proc-\nIt is also known that the Soviets were contemplating a\ness, drawings, and calculations; particulars about the\nlarge-scale postwar expansion of their espionage networks,\n\"electronshells\" information on research in aerial photog-\nand that one of the methods to be utilized was the placing\nraphy using infra-red rays; dislocation of army, corps,\nof agents in the office of the Commercial Attaché. This\nand divisions. However, additional assignments in other\noffice, which previously had consisted of about 50 persons,\nfields were given. These included: requirements which a\nwas to be increased to 97, and a number of the staff had\nperson living as an \"illegal\" [entrant] must meet, expedi-\nbeen selected for training at Military Intelligence Head-\nent methods to slip into the country, methods of employ-\nquarters in Moscow for assignment to Zabotin's network.\ning counter-espionage, and psychological \"political\" re-\nIn fact, in September 1945, after Gouzenko's departure, the\nports on the personnel of various sections of the armed\nSoviet Embassy was seeking permission to establish a\nforces' headquarters or of various government depart-\nlarge-scale Soviet Trade Mission in Canada, under diplo-\nments and agencies.\nmatic immunity.\nThe Political Section of the Embassy was the agency of\nThe Ambassador appears to have been the only official\nthe Central Committee of the Communist Party of the\nof the Embassy who was not engaged in espionage work\nSoviet Union. This net carried on the Party-organizing\nin some capacity, and, as such, was cleared by the Royal\nfunctions among the personnel of the Embassy. In addi-\nCommission of any complicity in these activities.\ntion, however, it appears that another of its functions was\nto exercise direct control of the Communist movement in\nCanada. Its director, Goussarov, although only a Second\nCharacter of Agents\nSecretary of the Embassy, exercised \"authority on the level\nPerhaps the most startling single aspect of the entire\nof the Ambassador.\" This is the channel through which\nfifth column Soviet network is the uncanny success with\nthe Canadian Communist Party received its instructions\nwhich the Soviet agents were able to find Canadians who\nfrom Moscow, including not only general political lines\nwere willing to betray their country and to supply agents\nto be taken up in Communist propaganda, but also instruc-\nof a foreign Power with secret information to which they\ntions on techniques of operation. This section also was\nhad access in the course of their work-all this, despite\ndesignated as the \"Comintern Intelligence System\", and in\ntheir oaths of allegiance, of office, and of secrecy.\nthat capacity it transmitted to Moscow biographical and\nMany of the Canadian public servants implicated in\nother information on local Communists and sympathizers.\nthis espionage network were persons with an unusually\nSuch information could be utilized, among other purposes,\nhigh degree of education. Many were well regarded by\nto check up on agents before their employment.\nthose who worked with them in agencies and departments\nThe NKVD Section of the Embassy was the representa-\nof the public service, as persons of marked ability and\ntive of the Moscow NKVD headquarters. It is believed\nintelligence.\nto have been a much more extensive network than the\nThey included among others:\nmilitary system. Among its functions were to: (1) check\na. A member of the staff of McGill University and a\non Soviet official personnel in order to keep them in line;\nvalued senior worker with the National Research Council;\n(2) organize and operate espionage groups primarily in\na highly respected scientist with an international repu-\nthe political and economic fields; and (3) report on mem-\nlation in chemistry ; a man of very substantial independent\nbers of the Communist Party in Canada. Reportedly, it\nmeans.\nwas through Pavlov, the director of this section, that the\nb. A man occupying a responsible position in the In-\nEmbassy undertook, during the autumn of 1945, the regis-\ndustrial Development Bank, who had had a distinguished\n60\nRESTRICTED"
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