Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
142104
label
Afghanistan, 1979-1980
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
142104
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Afghanistan, 1979-1980
citationUrl
collections
Office of the Chief of Staff Files
Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files
subjects
Afghanistan
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
142104
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1980-01-01
year
1980
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1979-01-01
year
1979
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
ce8d6136aa5209f8
ocrText
Afghanistan, 1979-80
Folder Citation: Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series:
Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, Folder: Afghanistan, 1979-80;
Container 33
To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Chief_of St
aff.pdf
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
report
Afghanistan
6/79
A
report
Agghanistan sanitized, RAC, 1/19/12
1/80
A
FILE LOCATION
Chief of Staff (Jordan) /Box 7 of #/Afghanistan 79-80
Con fidential File
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12065 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 1-81)
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
CENTRAL THE
National
Foreign
Assessment
THE 1 THE
Center
06410
Thereton
Tribalism Versus Communism
in Afghanistan:
The Cultural Roots of
Instability
An Intelligence Assessment
SANITIZED
Per: Rar Project
Secret
ESDN: NLC- C-47-1-5-1-3
SI 80-10001
BY B NADA,BATE 12/6/11
January 1980
Copy 013
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
25X1
Page
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
INTELLIGE
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
National
Secret
/ S CENTRAL
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Tribalism Versus Communism
in Afghanistan:
The Cultural Roots of
Instability (c)
An Intelligence Assessment
Information as of 16 October 1979 has been used
in preparing the major part of this report.
Information concerning the recent coup is
reflected but does not change the basic judgments.
The author of this paper is
25X1
25X1
Office of Scientific Intelligence. It has
25X1
been coordinated with the Offices of Political Analy-
sis, Geographic and Cartographic Research, and
Central Reference, the Directorate of Operations, and
the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East
and South Asia.
25X1
25X1
Secrer
SI 80-10001
January 1980
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
Tribalism Versus Communism
in Afghanistan:
The Cultural Roots of
Instability (c)
Overview
The execution of Hafizullah Amin and the installation of the more pliable
Babrak Karmal as President of Afghanistan, will not significantly alter the
prospects for prolonged insurgency. Despite increase Soviet aid, the new
regime will be a government under siege, continually attacked by fiercely
independent, but poorly organized, Pashtun tribesmen. (s)
The Communist regime in Afghanistan and the Afghan tribesmen have
been in conflict since the Communist seizure of power in 1978. Although the
tribesmen are not unified, they will continue to keep the countryside in a
state of instability. The regime, despite only a thin layer of public support,
probably will maintain control of the major cities. Indeed, the Soviets and
their puppet regime are likely to face the same long resistance that an earlier
generation experienced when the Soviets required a decade to subdue the
Muslim populations of Central Asia.
For thousands of years, the topography and Afghan cultural mores militated
against the formation of a strong central government and even against a
strong union of the tribes themselves. The only characteristics common to
the tribesmen are martial values, an egalitarian tradition, a theologically
unsophisticated version of Islam, and a distrust for authority. (u)
Successful Afghan monarchs mustered popular support by drawing upon the
people's fears of invasion by a foreign power with an alien religion and bent
tradition to their side through the skillful exploitation of such traditional
values as defense of personal and tribal honor, attachment to religion, and
intense dislike of foreigners. (u)
In contrast, the Communist revolutionaries have tried to overturn tradition
rather than adapt it, to eliminate local autonomy, to destroy the elite class by
confiscating its land, and to undermine the authority of the Muslim religious
establishment. These actions have aroused the resistance of the fiercely
independent Afghans. The present no-win situation-persistent insurgency
and fragile Communist control of urban areas-is expected to continue.
iii
Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
Contents
Page
Overview
iii
Introduction
1
Tribal Politics
I
Bribery and Patronage
3
Cooperation and Co-optation
3
Martial Tradition
3
Religion
4
Xenophobia
5
The Communist Attempt at Control
5
The New Modernizers
6
Afghan Communism
7
Goals and Program
8
Civil War-Communism Versus Tribalism
9
Maps
Topography of Afghanistan
vi
Major Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan
2
V
Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
Figure 1
3-
60
72
:-
75
Secret
U.S.S.R.
China
Feyzäbed
Andkhwoy Aqcheh
Margab
Mezár-e Sharif
Conduz
Kholm
Khänabad
36
36
Maymanch
Iran
Salang Pass
Asadabad
Begram Airfield +
Herat
KABUL
Yes Red
Jalelabad
ISLAMABAD
Gardez
Shindand
Afghanistan
Ghazni
Khowst
vi
Farah
-32-
32
Qalet
Oandaher
Manager
Scherf
Pakistan
India
Halmand
Iran
0
150
Boundary representation is
54
Kilometers
68
not necessarily authoritative
526219' 12-79
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
Tribalism Versus Communism
in Afghanistan:
The Cultural Roots of
Instability (c)
Introduction
Afghanistan is a small, extremely poor, landlocked
Afghan during the first five years of life is 40 percent.
country that never has been effectively modernized.
Barely 10 percent of all Afghans are literate. Less than
Because it is divided by high mountain ranges, arid
a million people live in the country's five major cities;
plains, and often unfordable rivers, communications
some 2 million or approximately one-cighth of the
and transportation networks have remained rudimen-
population still are nomadic tribesmen. (U)
tary. (U)
The topography of mountains and desert has tended to
For 200 years, succeeding monarchs have done little
isolate Afghan ethnic groups from one another. In-
more than consolidate their own power for short
deed, some groups have a closer affinity with kindred
periods of time; major attempts at reform and central-
groups across the border than with their fellow
ization have usually failed. The principal Afghan
nationals: Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Tajiks share a
ethnic groups tend to live apart from each other under
similar culture with like people across the Soviet
the hegemony of Pashtun tribesmen, who share martial
border; Persian-speaking people or Farsiwan live
values, an egalitarian tradition, and a distrust of
alongside Iran; Pashtun and Baluchi tribes straddle the
authority. The ideological unity of the country is
border with Pakistan. There are also Mongoloid
provided by a theologically unsophisticated version of
Hazaras, Persian-speaking Qizilbash, Turkic-related
Islam, permeated by tribal ways. (U)
Aimaq, along with other, smaller numbers of peoples
scattered through the country. What unity Afghani-
Afghanistan's 640,000 square kilometers are located in
stan possesses derives from the dominance of Pashtun
a mountainous-desert terrain surrounded by the Soviet
tribesmen, who make up half the population; the use of
Union, Iran, Pakistan, and China. The Hindu Kush
the Persian-related language, Dari, as a lingua franca;
mountain range divides the country in two, and
a shared belief in Islam; and a historical distrust of
subsidiary ranges bisect other localities. There is but
foreigners (figure 2). (u)
one nationwide network of roads linking the principal
cities with Kabul. The major north-south road was
unusable in the winter until 1964, when Soviet
Tribal Politics
engineers constructed a covered road along the 3,400-
meter-high Salang Pass (figure 1). Four-fifths of the
By virtue of their martial tradition and ability.
country is mountainous; the remainder slopes away to
Pashtuns have held sway in Afghanistan since Ahmad
arid plains. Cultivation is limited mainly to irrigated
Shah Durrani established the first Afghan Empire in
valleys. Industrial development, telephone lines, medi-
1747. Ahmad Shah built his regime carefully, using
cal facilities, and educational opportunities are mini-
the mechanisms by which each larger tribe ruled itself,
mal; there are no railroads. (u)
indeed the same systems that guided relations within
subtribes, clans, and family groupings. These same
Most of Afghanistan's estimated 15.5 million
mechanisms, however, also promoted independent
people-the first national census was taken as late as
attitudes among men, egalitarian lifestyles, and a
1979-live a hard life near subsistence level. Ninety
pervasive distrust of authority. Governments and
percent are small farmers, mountain herdsmen, or
Pashtun culture have coexisted uneasily ever since. (U)
both, with average annual per capita incomes so low
and from such primitive sources that they have not
been calculated. The mortality rate for the typical
I
Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan
Figure 2
5
BOUNDARY SEPRESINTATION is
H
$4
12
76
Secret
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
China
B
U.S.S.R.
Mary
Keid
termer
Mishary
Pyandrh
layzabad
KIRGHIZ
Donduz
"Delah
Marginab
alogad
mind
Bedakhshan
Takhar
Baker
"
26
THE
Digit
Palit Khamici
Iran
Baghian
NHR
indus
N
Kashka
Konarhe
annen
Bagine
Bampan
Dargai
Heral
and
Heratt
LINH girl
Life
Peshawar
Islamabad
India
®
Orung
Rawalpindi
the
newth
That
2
Sarau
thelum
Sialkor
Cherab
37
32
American
Zabol
Lature
0
Haman
RAVI
Sabeu
Fart Sandeman
Dandahar
Destructed ye
Sisten
Naturu
2mb
Chaman
Chahar
Pashtun
Aimak
Tajik
Turkmen
Dusita
Month
Uzbek
Baluchi
Hazara
Zabedan
Pakistan
Surich
NUR
Other group
Bahawalgh
Iran
#
50
no
Dallandia
Unclassified
64
"
77
625310 579
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Sceret
To set up his monarchy, Ahmad Shah had to mobilize
Cooperation and Co-optation
support among his own tribe, the Durrani, and wage
To secure the legitimacy of their dynasties, emperors
war against other strong tribes, such as the Ghilzai and
traditionally have used the decisionmaking procedures
Afridi. To maintain the loyalty of his fellow tribal
of Pashtun society. Even today, at all levels from
chieftains, as well as the allegiance of those he
village to clan to tribe to tribal confederation, male
conquered, he used a combination of bribery or subsidy
representatives from the relevant group are obliged to
and patronage. He consolidated his rule by relying on
participate in jirgas or councils. The jirgas are formed
traditional decisionmaking processes of cooperation
ad hoc as socially divisive issues arise; they sit until a
and co-optation, and by skillfully exploiting Pashtun
consensus or "sense of the meeting" has been reached.
martial values, the tribesmen's attachment to religion,
Representatives are selected on the basis of talent and
and their dislike of foreigners. With varying degrees of
respect rather than age. Moreover, each man's honor,
success, Afghan rulers continued to use the same
as well as that of the family or tribe for which he
techniques until President Mohammad Daoud was
speaks, is committed to enforcing the jirga's decision.
overthrown in 1978. (u)
The style of the jirga is egalitarian: there is no
presiding officer; everyone has a right to speak; and
Bribery and Patronage
decisions must be unanimous. (U)
Ahmad Shah founded his reign with the captured
treasury of the Persian Emperor Nadir Shah, in whose
From Ahmad Shah on, succeeding Afghan kings have
army he served. He used his acquired resources to buy
used the loya jirga, or meeting of tribal chieftains, to
the allegiance of tribal chiefs who had personal
gain support for new policy directions. The strongest of
military followings. As rival tribes were conquered,
the Afghan monarchs, Abdur Rahman, the "Iron
Ahmad Shah included their chiefs in a widening circle
Amir," convened a loya jirga when he set out to
of military collaborators who were personally loyal to
establish a centralized bureaucracy in the 1880s; the
him because he offered them important positions at
reforming Emperor Amanullah used another loya
court in order to keep an eye on them and to provide
jirga in the 1920s to gain a modicum of approval for his
them with means to accumulate wealth in land and tax
modernizing policies; in the 1930s, Nadir Shah called
exemptions. For funds to support allied chieftains and
one to gain approval for a new constitution. The term
personal armies, kings over the next century taxed
was used again in the 1960s to describe Afghanistan's
burgeoning trader groups of Hindus, Sikhs, and Jews
short-lived attempt at a parliamentary body. In the
at the cost of eventually destroying the commercial
traditional jirga, the emperor was only first among
urban bases of the Afghan economy. (u)
equals, and centralized authority was constrained by
locally entrenched interests. (U)
This system of rule diminished the monarchy. Because
each tribal chief retained his own local power base, a
Martial Tradition
chief's loyalty was not automatically kept by an
At the heart of the Pashtun code of Pakhtunwali-
emperor or passed on to his successor, and the rate of
consisting of revenge, hospitality, and the right to
succession was rapid. Of the 26 men who reigned in
asylum-is the martial tradition. Every man must be
Afghanistan after Ahmad Shah, only four died of
strong enough to protect his interests-generally
natural causes. The system persisted through the
defined as gold, women, and land-and each man is
1950s, when Daoud was able to create a centralized
raised to take pride in his fighting ability. Indeed, the
army with the help of Soviet aid. (u)
martial arts are taken so seriously that Pashtun boys do
not play war games, but from a very early age are
trained by their male elders in military skills such as
stalking and the use of arms. These skills are regarded
as personal and not subject to uniform or externally
3
Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
The Pashtun martial tradition, therefore, has played
an ambiguous role in Afghan history, directed as it is
toward parochial loyalties. On the one hand, some
kings have used successfully the popular propensity to
war to get military support from tribal chieftains
against external enemies, as well as to shore up their
dynastics; this was especially true in the 19th century
when the British were encroaching on Afghan terri-
tory. On the other hand, tribal armies have just as
frequently turned against central authority when the
latter appeared to overstep the limits of local auton-
omy. In 1924, the Mangal tribes of Khost Province
rebelled against the imposition of taxes and social
reform by King Amanullah. Rarely, however, have the
tribes been able to coordinate their activities to bring
down authority; 1929 was one of the few times it
occurred, but the tribes' inability to unite after
bringing down the King led to a period of national
anarchy. (U)
Religion
Afghan Islam is a peculiar blend of orthodoxy and
tribal mores. Although officially of the Hanafi school
of the Sunni sect, Afghanistan has been isolated from
the great centers of Islamic learning and has produced
neither great schools nor profound religious philos-
ophers. The majority of religious leaders are local
mullahs, haphazardly trained, who approach their
religion in a simple way. Entrenched in their localities
as teachers, "learned" members of jirgas, and land-
owners through their control of mosque lands, they
A Pashtun tribesman displays
have accommodated the strictures of the Sharia
his treasured rifle.
(religious law) to coexist with the values Pashtun
tribesmen place on their code and local independence.
Consequently, Afghans are passionately attached to
imposed discipline-most youth disdain military ser-
their religion. (u)
vice, and the Army, in fact, is filled with soldiers from
minority groups and draftees. To the Pashtun, the
As with their martial views, the strong religious beliefs
martial arts are to be exercised for personal, family, or
of the tribesmen have worked both for and against
tribal honor, pleasure, and/or gain. So ingrained are
central authority. In some periods, mullahs have raised
these attitudes that today each generation still looks
the cry of jihad (war against the infidel) to aid
forward to a major battle in order to demonstrate its
emperors in fighting external enemies; in other periods,
self-worth and bands of men form a lashkar or war
they have roused the tribes against monarchs who
party. Historically, tribal armies often have taken
seemed to have encroached upon the religious leaders'
arms against each other-sometimes siding with one
local influence. Perhaps Abdur Rahman was the most
or another of the dynastic contenders-and these
successful of all monarchs in coping with the Afghans'
persistent rebellions over time have prevented the
emergence of a strong central authority. (u)
Secret
4
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret-
religious feelings. The Iron Amir attracted the support
Amanullah's fatal errors that alienated his people was
of religious leaders and tribal armies in the 1890s by
to use Soviet planes in putting down the Khost
raising the cry of jihad, conquering Kafiristan,
Rebellion. His successors were careful to keep their
renaming it Nuristan or "Land of Light," and forcibly
distance from foreign powers until Daoud as Prime
converting its inhabitants to Islam. At the same time,
Minister brought Kabul closer to the Soviet Union in
he undercut the autonomy of the mullahs by co-opting
the 1950s. (U)
them into his regime; to control them, he employed
them as teachers, minor administrators, and judges on
In sum, although one subtribe-really one
full pay while cutting off their independent sources of
family-reigned in Afghanistan for over 100 years, the
income. Yet even the Iron Amir was careful not to
longevity of the Mohsiban dynasty depended upon the
interfere with the religiously sanctioned customs of
ability of succeeding monarchs to recognize the limits
everyday life. (u)
placed upon the exercise of power and bend tradition to
their side. The king was no more than the chief tribal
In contrast, his grandson Amanullah overstepped the
leader-and probably not significantly richer than the
limits of custom and incurred the wrath of the mullahs
country's major landowners-using his resources in
when he emancipated women, secularized some legal
the way chieftains used theirs: to cement the loyalty of
codes, and attempted to introduce Western education.
dependents with rewards, jobs, and tax exemptions; to
As a result, when Nadir Shah captured the throne
exchange favors; and to avoid pushing too hard on the
after Amanullah's overthrow in 1929, he felt com-
independence of subordinates. Underneath the facade
pelled to introduce a constitution that reinstituted the
of modern institutions that kings set up around
primacy of Islamic law, the authority of the mullahs,
themselves, a network of personal relations and con-
and the seclusion of women. Nadir's successors did not
nections kept the country governed in a minimal way.
feel confident enough to initiate reforms again until
A king's writ or authority did not extend far beyond
nearly 30 years later. Female emancipation, for
Kabul and some other urban centers. (u)
example, did not receive official sanction until 1959.
(U)
The Communist Attempt at Control
Xenophobia
Afghanistan's culture, geography, and history have
In 1978, Communist revolutionaries captured the
fostered an intense dislike of foreign interference.
government in Kabul and tried to change the course of
Since ancient times, Afghanistan has been a stamping
Afghan history. Through a disciplined party and
ground for conquerors on their way to other places.
committed members of the military officer corps, the
Afghans have seen their once-great cities and monu-
new leaders have tried to assert totalitarian control.
ments destroyed. Even when Afghanistan withstood
They have attempted to alter the patterns of local
British invasions from India in the 19th century,
tribal life by destroying the elite class through land
emperors used the ever-present threat of encroachment
confiscation, by undermining the authority of the
by a power with an alien religion to gain support,
Muslim religious establishment, and by climinating
heightening the sense of isolation and independence
local autonomy. The Communist leadership is relying
already present among Afghans. These feelings were
upon the support of a comparatively small group of
further sharpened by the Russian Revolution of 1917
young people with modern educations who,
and the Soviet subjugation of the Muslim Khanates to
discomfited by the backwardness of their country,
the north in the 1920s. The demise of their Islamic way
believe that they can make a contribution to national
of life brought many Uzbek and Turkmen refugees to
development. In effect, the Communists and their
Afghanistan. The emigres contributed to Afghan
youthful supporters were an unintended outgrowth of
distrust of the atheistic regime, and one of King
bureaucratic reforms initiated in the 1950s.
5
Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Sceret
Fiercely independent Afghan
tribesman keep the
countryside in a state of
instability.
The New Modernizers
The equilibrium in the system shifted when Daoud, a
Afghan rulers traditionally maintained small bureauc-
cousin of King Mohammad Zahir, served as Prime
racies for the narrow purposes of keeping the peace and
Minister from 1953 to 1963 and as President from
collecting taxes. This was altered somewhat in the
1973 to 1978 after he had successfully overthrown
early 1900s when King Amanullah started to modern-
Zahir. Daoud's inclinations were autocratic, and he
ize the country. Sensing the need to equip bureaucrats
sought to enhance the bureaucracy and officer corps in
with modern skills, he began sending small groups of
order to centralize Afghanistan effectively. More
Afghans to study abroad, as well as setting up a
students were sent abroad, especially to the Soviet
European-like educational system in the country. For
Union; the training of professional officers occurred
most of the 20th century, the educational network
almost entirely under Soviet auspices. The size of the
grew slowly, and there was sufficient expansion in
student body within the country also grew, reducing
government departments to employ the relatively few
employment opportunities proportionately. Daoud's
graduates being produced. Moreover, although the
policies made the Afghan intelligentsia aware of its
most important positions were virtually monopolized
own importance and politicized some of its members.
by relatives of the royal family or sons of the wealthy
More members of the tiny literate class came to
elite, the system offered a fair degree of mobility to
resent-and, perhaps, to be ashamed of-
children of lesser Pashtun families who, by virtue of
Afghanistan's extreme backwardness. They also
their talent or personal connections, obtained a foot-
became antagonistic toward the continued dominance
hold in the modern educational establishment. Because
of the royal family, which they associated with the
their futures were assured and they could for most of
perpetuation of Afghanistan's backwardness and their
their careers lead a comparatively comfortable life in
own growing lack of opportunity and political freedom.
Kabul-often with the opportunity for foreign study at
Thus, slowly during the Daoud era, leftist viewpoints
the regime's expense, as well-members of the Afghan
came to be taken more seriously. (x)
intelligentsia tended to remain apolitical.
Sceret
6
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Sceret
Afghan Communism
elite among the major Pashtun tribes, who used their
While many in the professional class probably re-
share of family wealth to help Parcham; a number of
mained indifferent, local Communist parties filled a
the Parcham leaders were related to one another. The
political void during Afghanistan's short-lived experi-
Khalq (People) faction, led by author and literary
ment with parliamentary government. From 1964 to
figure Nur Mohammad Taraki, tended to attract its
1973, a Parliament with two houses was formed under
leaders from tribal groups of less stature and wealth.
the sponsorship of King Zahir. The King's choices for
Both groups were allied with Moscow-although the
Prime Minister were ineffectual leaders, almost no
Parcham took a more evolutionary approach toward
legislation was enacted, and political parties were not
revolution than the Khalq, in contrast to a smaller
allowed to exist legally, but elections were held
group of Communists who looked to Beijing for their
throughout the country and the legislature provided a
model. The two factions supported Daoud in 1973
national platform of sorts. (Surveillance, as well as
when he abolished the monarchy; because of his
censorship of political publications, continued through-
pro-Soviet leanings and plans for a more centralized
out the period.)
bureaucracy, the Communists hoped they would have
a greater role in his new regime. (s)
The Communists took advantage of the electoral
opportunity and were virtually the only group to
The Communists' expectations were only partially
present a coherent political viewpoint. In consequence,
fulfilled, and their opportunities for participation in
their speeches were well received by the expanding
the Daoud government diminished over time. By April
body of students in Kabul, who were just beginning to
1978 the Communists felt compelled to act. Mir Akbar
gain a sense of their own political strength; at this time,
Khaibar, a senior Parcham leader, was killed on 17
the first student strikes took place at Kabul University.
April, and the old PDPA-the two factions were
Beyond the capital, Communists-often sent by the
tenuously united again-responded by vociferously
regime to the provinces as punishment for their
lashing out at the regime. When Daoud cracked down
activities in Kabul-found an equally receptive audi-
and ordered the arrest of the PDPA leaders, the
ence among secondary school students in the expand-
Communists in the officer corps and key Kabul
ing provincial educational system. Younger members
regiments turned against Daoud and his allies; all were
of the officer corps who had been trained in the USSR
executed brutally. It quickly became apparent that the
also found the Communist viewpoint congenial. The
Khalq faction was dominant, and the top Parcham
Communists never stopped propagandizing and re-
leaders, including Karmal, were soon exiled-to am-
cruiting among these groups-playing upon their
bassadorships, at first-and the party purged of its
fears, making promises about a better future, and
Parcham members. Taraki was declared President of
appealing to their ideals in an atmosphere that
the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and
continued to be mildly repressive. (C)
Hafizullah Amin was named Vice Prime Minister and,
a few months later, Prime Minister; the Khalq also
Although the Communists were the only political force
retained control of key PDPA positions. (e)
organized in a modern sense, the leadership of the
movement was characterized by factional divisiveness,
The top leadership was composed of staunch
with members lining up with one or another set of
ideologues who quickly took Afghanistan into the
leaders to form two permanent factions. The People's
Soviet camp-a friendship treaty was signed in
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was
December 1978 that linked Moscow intimately to the
founded formally at a secret congress of Afghan
future of the Kabul regime-and decreed a major
Communists in 1963; by 1967 it already had split into
reform program. Taraki, who was deposed and ex-
two factions; the two groups merged again in an uneasy
ecuted under still-mysterious circumstances in Sep-
alliance in 1977. The Parcham (Banner) faction,
tember 1979, was the father figure of the revolution.
headed by flamboyant orator Babrak Karmal (just
Amin, while working in Taraki's shadow, slowly
installed by the Soviets as President), drew many of its
stripped him of his real power. With Taraki's death,
more important members from the old landowning
Amin became President and head of the party, and the
strongman of Afghanistan. Tot
7
Seeret
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
Amin was a ruthless, dedicated man who liked to be
older opposition elements eventually will disappear
firmly in charge. After the coup, he steadily eliminated
from the stage." In the eyes of Afghanistan's new
competitors and rival centers of power, even risking an
rulers, support of party goals by the country's young
extreme reduction of support for the Khalq in the party
people would help the regime survive the upheavals
and military; alleged enemies of the regime were jailed
caused by the its wide-ranging reform programs. (s)
and tortured in ever-larger numbers. With the purging
of Taraki and his closest aides-most of whom had
The PDPA set out to change Afghanistan quickly. To
already been stripped of their power-Amin sur-
symbolize their intent, the party leaders eliminated the
rounded himself with trusted subordinates and placed
time-honored green flag associated with Islam and
members of his family in key military and internal
substituted a red flag of the future. Taraki, in his role
security positions. Like many Afghans, he was
as party elder statesman, decreed the party's major
suspicious and distrustful of the motives of others,
reforms: education was to be secularized and females
including Soviet backers. His absorption in consolidat-
admitted to all schools throughout the country; the
ing his own power and his independence finally cost
estates belonging to lay and religious families were to
him the support of the Soviets. (c)
be confiscated and the land redistributed to peasant
farmers; and the bride price as a regular feature of
Goals and Program
marriage arrangements was to be virtually abolished.
When Amin and Taraki first came to power, they
Amin, the party strongman, sent military
embarked upon a program of modernization, designed,
contingents-some with Soviet advisers-party loyal-
in part, to attract the support of ambitious youth who
ists, and dedicated cadres of young people to the
like themselves had been excluded from power. They
provinces to see that the reforms were enacted. In a
expanded the responsibility of the bureaucracy and
land where "no government has ever tried to govern the
made Pashto, rather than Dari, the language of official
countryside directly," the vast majority of the popula-
business so that their new constituents from humble
tion saw a threat to their way of life. (U)
Pashtun backgrounds would have more opportunities
in the government service. At the university, they
In their efforts to demonstrate their revolutionary
purged the faculty, filled the empty slots with Khalq
authenticity and establish control, the Communists
loyalists, and dramatically increased the size of the
overstepped the limits by which Afghan governments
student body. &
traditionally had legitimated their rule. Although
Amin shared his ruthlessness with past rulers, he
The regime adopted a new language policy (copying
sought-in contrast to his predecessors-to climinate,
that of the Soviet Union), which promoted the
rather than to compromise with, the old elite, to
languages of Afghan minority groups to national
enhance the prestige of the Army over the fighting
status, and created more government places for the
habits of the tribes, and to diminish the stature of
younger generation of the traditionally oppressed
Islam. He ended by affronting the Afghans' pride of
groups. Taraki and Amin also appointed more minor-
national independence by relying on thousands of
ity group members to their first Cabinet than ever
hated Soviet civilian and military advisers. Although it
before. The Khalq launched extensive youth programs
retreated somewhat (to save face and concentrate on
and created a network of organizations among the
fighting. the regime declared that land and educa-
young, propagandized among them, and sent the more
tional reforms had been achieved), the regime brought
promising to the Soviet Union for training. It continues
upon itself tribal wrath and civil war. With the even
to control young Afghans through the party. The
greater dependence of President Karmal upon the
Communist leaders calculated that any short-term
Soviets and his continued commitment to consolidate
lags in bureaucratic efficiency could be made up with
central authority, tribal resistance will persist and
large numbers of Soviet civilian advisers and that "in a
indeed grow. (c)
country where the life expectancy is only forty
the
Secret
8
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
Civil War-Communism Versus Tribalism
attack a passing truck loaded with goods, and then
disappear into a remote, inaccessible gorge. Without
Afghanistan is in a state of insurgency. The govern-
leadership, the tribesmen are far more likely to bring
ment controls major urban areas and main road
Afghanistan to anarchy, rather than to defeat or to
connections-at least by day, in some places-with an
impose their will upon Communist-controlled Kabul.
Army and party thinned out by purges and defections,
and supported by increasing amounts of Soviet advis-
ers and aid. Throughout most of the countryside there
The Soviets saw that Amin's greatest threat was a
is armed resistance to the regime's will, and military
sapping of his regime from within. His Communist
incursions occur from refugee bases in Pakistan. (c)
party and military forces had been ruthlessly purged
and repurged so that only those personally loyal to him
But tribal society is responding to a modern,
dominated, and the cities-after revolts in Herat,
well-organized threat in traditional terms. The tribes
Jalalabad, and the capital itself-were controlled
are fighting as they have fought for centuries: inde-
through somewhat totalitarian means. In addition to
pendently, locally, and with a minimum of leadership.
the civil war in the countryside, Amin faced the dual
Prominent oldtime leaders have sought refuge in
challenge of growing defections from the government
Peshawar in Pakistan, where they remain poorly
and Army, and increasing public apathy and resent-
organized and disunited. Drawn mainly from the old
ment. The Soviets are trying to recoup the situation
elite of tribal chieftains, landowners, and prominent
with a new President, but Karmal's government will
religious families, they appear unable to come together
also remain isolated in a traditional environment, with
without a strong figure having the political skill to
no resources other than its own determination and vast
contain their mutual competitiveness. Former King
amounts of Soviet aid.
Zahir remains aloof in Rome; there appears to be no
one on the scene with the adeptness of his father,
There will probably be a lull in the fighting during the
Nadir, who assiduously cultivated supporters from
hard Afghan winter; when the snows come, ground
among the old elite during Afghanistan's last period of
movement will be difficult in the mountainous, arid
upheaval in 1929. Today, anyone from this old upper
terrain, and the tribal fighters might lack sufficient
class-with its associations to Daoud and the old
food and shelter in their mountain hideouts. Further-
regime-probably would have little appeal to the
more, the exhausted population will need food-
relatively small but crucial group of young people who
farmers fought, rather than planted, this past spring-
have acquired the modern skills necessary to run a
and the Karmal regime can supply urban and provin-
bureaucracy and wish to avoid the appearance of
cial centers by means of aid delivered by Soviet planes.
moving backward in time. (s)
During the lull, it will need to shore up military and
urban bases in preparation for the renewal of insur-
Within Afghanistan, local tribal groupings have taken
gency in the spring. So long as the population responds
up arms to regain their time-honored autonomy and
to his government in traditionally fragmented
throw off controls that began even under Daoud. The
ways-and there is no indication that it is responding
fighting men are joined not into a disciplined cohesive
otherwise-Karmal has a good chance of hanging on
force but rather into spontaneous formations of small,
with continued Soviet assistance. (c)
local lashkars (war parties), with members motivated
not only by political and religious reasons but also by
The Communists, however, have paid a high price for
the exhilaration of a call to arms, the chance to even
attempting to overturn-rather than compromise
some old personal scores, and sheer banditry. (A recent
with-tradition. Like a politically isolated colonial
European captive never saw groups larger than 10 to
20 fighting men.) In the mountainous terrain of rural
Afghanistan, it is easy enough to take up a
village-made Enfield rifle, besiege a military outpost or
9
Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
power, Karmal now rules in a state of siege, albeit in
his own society, heading a party that now is character-
ized by fear and internal distrust, limited to hegemony
in cities, and dependent for the very long term on
external military and civilian aid. As long as the
fighting continues, Afghanistan will not be ruled very
much differently than it was in the past-the writ, or
authority, of the government will not run far beyond
urban areas, and the government's plans for reform
will take second place to its efforts to secure control of
the country. (s)
Secret
10
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
Sources of Copyrighted Photographs
Page 4: Associated Press
Page 6: New York Times News Service
11
Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3
Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/29 : NLC-47-1-5-1-3