Probable Arab and Soviet Reactions to Possible US Military Moves Against Iran (Mining and Bombing)
This document is an April 21, 1980 memorandum regarding the Probable Arab and Soviet Reactions to Possible US Military Moves Against Iran (Mining and Bombing.)
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OCR Page 1 of 6SECRET/SENSITIVE
#10,037 4
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: PROBABLE ARAB AND SOVIET REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE
US MILITARY MOVES AGAINST IRAN (MINING AND BOMBING)
DATE: 21 APRIL 1980
.
THE PROBLEM
To assess how the Arab states and the Soviet Union
would react to possible US military moves against Iran,
specifically:
--US mining of Iranian ports.
- -US bombing attacks on Iranian targets, involving
the loss of lives.
OVERVIEW OF ARAB REACTIONS
US mining of Iranian ports would stimulate a variety
of largely hostile reactions from Arab states, such as
demands for the use of oil as a political weapon, and
anti-American demonstrations, especially in states with
large Shia Muslim populations.
Bombing attacks would intensify Arab hostility
and increase the likelihood of negative reactions. The
greater the number of Iranian casualties, the worse
the reaction would be.
Arab reaction to the hostage crisis has been am-
bivalent from its inception. Some Arab perceptions
favor the US;
--Unhappiness with Iran's flaunting of diplomatic
norms.
--Dismay over the anarchy in Tehran.
--Fear of the spread of Muslim fundamentalism.
-Fear that events in Iran may present the Soviets
with an opening in the region.
The more dominant perceptions, however, work against the
US;
1
DECLASSIFIED
Per, Rac Project
cecdem
ESDN; NLC- 6-31-4-1-6
BY. C NARA, DATE 7/21/15