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in the rature of contingency operations planning, i.e., "in
the event we suffered defeat and it was physically possible,
we would attempt to break contact and retire to a redoubt
area whre we would initiate guerrilla activities. The
stated ission of the Erigade for which it was organized and
srained was to land by sea and air and fight a conventional
conflict as an organized milicary force. At no time did the
Brigade once organized receive training to fight as a
guerril..a force. To have attempted to conduct such training
would have detracted from the purpose for which the Brigade
was orgunized and would have been detrimental to morale. An
indigenous force of the size of the Brigade cannot be orga-
nized and trained in thetime allocated to concurrently
accomplish both missions (conventional military role and
guerrilla force role) satisfactorily.
4. During the pre-staging briefings of commanders and
key staif officers at the training base in Guatemala (period
25 March to 7 April 1961) the operation plan (less locale and
target late) were briefed to the 2rigada Commander, Deputy
Commander and S-3. Contingency provision in the event of the
defeat of the Brigade involving fragmentation of the unit and
attempts to initiate guerrilla operations were discussed. It
was matually agreed that these contingency plans would be
discussed only down to the leveliof battalion commanders
prior to the landing to avoid defeatist talk and apprehension
concerning success of the operation. These discussions
covered both the aspects of an element or elements of the
Brigade becoming cutoff from the main body and attempting to
break contact with the eneny, and assume guerzilla posture,
as well as the possibility of the Erigade as a whole being
cutoff Frcm the sea as it advanced inland and the possibility
of its assuming a defense in a redoubt area or fragmenting
I
for speciffic as greund guarzilla plans operations. for this eventuality nutually could both be agreed pre-planned the security that no
It was
insofar
actions were concerned due to pro-
visions prohibiting early briefing of any Cuban personnel as
to the specific locale of the landing and the circunstances
surrounding the combat action which might lead to an element
or the :thole of the Brigade to assume such a consingency plan.
Document source description
Supplemental material used in Maxwell Taylor's report on the Bay of Pigs operation.
Page data
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- Source index
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- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 66b4d7c247c04e28
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 193259
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
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"Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917-1963",
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Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
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Document source metadata
{
"id": "193259",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193259",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Annex No. 17 What Briefing if any was given the Brigade or the Brigade's Staff on Going Guerrilla",
"description": "Supplemental material used in Maxwell Taylor's report on the Bay of Pigs operation.",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193259",
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"Papers of John F. Kennedy: Presidential Papers: National Security Files",
"Country Files"
],
"subjects": [
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"Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917-1963",
"Taylor, Maxwell D. (Maxwell Davenport), 1901-1987",
"Memorandums",
"Bay of Pigs Invasion, Cuba, 1961"
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Document source extras
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"logicalDate": "1961-05-31",
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Page context
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"ocrText": "17\n2\nin the rature of contingency operations planning, i.e., \"in\nthe event we suffered defeat and it was physically possible,\nwe would attempt to break contact and retire to a redoubt\narea whre we would initiate guerrilla activities. The\nstated ission of the Erigade for which it was organized and\nsrained was to land by sea and air and fight a conventional\nconflict as an organized milicary force. At no time did the\nBrigade once organized receive training to fight as a\nguerril..a force. To have attempted to conduct such training\nwould have detracted from the purpose for which the Brigade\nwas orgunized and would have been detrimental to morale. An\nindigenous force of the size of the Brigade cannot be orga-\nnized and trained in thetime allocated to concurrently\naccomplish both missions (conventional military role and\nguerrilla force role) satisfactorily.\n4. During the pre-staging briefings of commanders and\nkey staif officers at the training base in Guatemala (period\n25 March to 7 April 1961) the operation plan (less locale and\ntarget late) were briefed to the 2rigada Commander, Deputy\nCommander and S-3. Contingency provision in the event of the\ndefeat of the Brigade involving fragmentation of the unit and\nattempts to initiate guerrilla operations were discussed. It\nwas matually agreed that these contingency plans would be\ndiscussed only down to the leveliof battalion commanders\nprior to the landing to avoid defeatist talk and apprehension\nconcerning success of the operation. These discussions\ncovered both the aspects of an element or elements of the\nBrigade becoming cutoff from the main body and attempting to\nbreak contact with the eneny, and assume guerzilla posture,\nas well as the possibility of the Erigade as a whole being\ncutoff Frcm the sea as it advanced inland and the possibility\nof its assuming a defense in a redoubt area or fragmenting\nI\nfor speciffic as greund guarzilla plans operations. for this eventuality nutually could both be agreed pre-planned the security that no\nIt was\ninsofar\nactions were concerned due to pro-\nvisions prohibiting early briefing of any Cuban personnel as\nto the specific locale of the landing and the circunstances\nsurrounding the combat action which might lead to an element\nor the :thole of the Brigade to assume such a consingency plan."
}