Memorandum No. 2 Immediate Causes of Failure of the Operation ZAPATA

and rain I ! 13 June 1961 Memorandum No. 2 IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF FAILURE OF THE OPERATION ZAPATA SUMMARY 1. The proximate cause of the failure of the ZAPATA Operation was a shortage which developed from the first day of the landing, April 17th, and became increasingly critical until": it `resulted in the surrender of the landing force about 1400 on April 19th. 2. There vere three primary reasons for this shortage of ammunition. The logistical plan for the landing made ample provision for ammunition with the men and in floating reserve. However, upon landing there is evidence that the Cubans vasted their ammunition in excessive firing, displaying the poor annu- nition discipline which is common to troops in their first combat. 3. Far more serious was. the loss of the freighters RIO ESCONDIDO and HOUSTON through air attack at about 0930 on the morning of April 17th. The RIO vas a particular loss as-it had ten days of reserve amminition on board, as vell as other important supplies. The HOUSTON should have been able to lend most of its supplies before being hit, but the unloading was delayed by trouble with the outboard motors of the ships' boats as vell as by the apparent lethargy of c the Fifth Battalion charged with the unloading. 4. The air attack which sunk these ships caused all others in the landing area to put out to sea, as the only available protection in the absence of control of the air, with the order to rendezvous 50 miles off the coast. The freighters ATLANTICO and CARIBE headed south and never stopped until inter- cepted by the U.S. Navy at points 110 miles and 218 miles, respectively, south of Cuba. 5. The CARIBE was 80 far away that its cargo, principally aviation supplies, vas never available for bovement to Blue Beach vhile the fight lasted. The UST