Implication of Total or Partial Cessation of US Military Aid Upon the Military Campaign in the Republic of Vietnam.
This report estimates the ability of the Vietnamese army without any further US aid.
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OCR Page 1 of 203
- SENSITIVE
11 September 1963
Subject: Implication of Total or Partial Cessation
of US Military Aid Upon The Military
Campaign in The Republic of Vietnam
Background - The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVNAF)
are in being largely because of the support provided by the
United States Military Aid Program.
The capabilities of the RVNAF have been developed
under US influence and through US material aid and training.
- The operational capabilities of the RVNAF are
dependent upon the continuation of US material, support and
training.
-
The greatest amount of US milicary aid and special
assistance enters the Republic of Vietnam through the Port of
Saigon.
Discussion - Operations are being conducted throughout RVN at
a very high rate due to acceleration of Phase II of the
National Campaign Plan.
- There are 45-50 battalion, or larger size, opera-
tions conducted weekly.
- An average of 3,500 small unit (less than three
companies) activities are conducted weekly.
- Supporting this high rate of ground activity, the
VNAF flies an average of 900 sorties of all types per week.
The US air effort in support totals about 4,000 sorties of all
types per week.
- Vital troop airlift is provided almost entirely
by US special military assistance in the form of Army and
Marine helicopters.
The US Air Force conducts 45% of the total
combat sorties in support of the war effort.
- US air units provide 91% of the helicopter lift
effort and 97% of the heavy transport (fixed wing) combat
logistical support, .C., tonnage lift.
- For detailed eperational information see Tab A.
- A summary of the status of the logistic situation
by class of supply is as follows (based on current rates of
consumption) (See Tabs B, C, D, and E):
Class I Stores (food) are produced in country and could
continue at essentially the present rate, providing the RVN
could provide funds from their own budget.
Class II Consumables (spare parts) are the most critical
element and would have a serious impact on all operations within
60-90 days with some shortages becoming evident almost immediately.
GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
SENSITIVE
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