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Of course, it. must be realized that there is the danger of being guilty of the post hoc ergo propter hoe fallacy. We can't say for certainty the changes in foreign policy following upon the the death of President Kennedy were caused and were intended to be caused by his murder and as the fulfillment of a plan to murder him. It is even possible that, had Kennedy lived, the war in Viet Nam might still have been escalated. For it is most difficult to be confident when one deals with counter factual conditionals. Yet we can say the weight of evidence suggests Kennedy would never have escalated the war in the manner of the post-assassination powers, and we must also remember we are dealing not with mathematical ceguations, but with human political ones. Consequently, we can't even expect perfection or certainty. Thus we can say there is certainly reason for concern in the light of the vast changes in foreign policy which were put in motion almost immediately after the assassination. Methodologically our suspicions are reinforced by the con- sideration that not only are changes in foreign policy which have taken place predictable, on the assumption of a sinister plan to murder Kennedy to alter his efforts to end the Cold War, but con- sidering. subsequent political events, one could almost post dict the assassination. This is particularly the case with respect to Vietnam. In Vietnam- What the Military Wants it Gets Vietnam constitutes an especially important area with respect to this behavioral pattern of action where it is not called for and inaction where action is called for. This is so much the case, that critics have regarded the carrying out of the war as irrational or even mad. Yet, no one who carefully studies the history of neg- otiations could possibly assume irrationality. When we deal with the concept of rationality we are dealing with an idea which -73- 43