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    "ocrText": "ORIGIN ACTION\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nRM R\nAF\nAIRGRAM\nPOL 27VIETS\nREP\n5\nFOR RM USE ONLY\nARA\nEUR\nFE\nA-285\nSECRET\nNO\nNIA\nCU\nINR\nHANDI ING INDICATOR\n065\n7\nPM\nTO\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nE\nif\n10\n2\nL\nFBO\nAID\nEXDIS\nANALYSIS & RANCH RM/DISTRIBUTION\n136\nAGR\nCOM\nFRB\nFROM\n:\nAmerican Embassy SAIGON\nDATE: November 4, 1965\nINT\nLAB\nTAR\nSUBJECT Professor Kissinger's Visit to Saigon\nTR\nXMB\nAIR\nREF\n:\nARMY\nCIA\nNAVY\nI\nEXDIS\nOSD\nUSIA\nNSA\nDuring his recent visit to Saigon, Professor Henry Kissinger held\nconversations with several influential Vietnamese, both within and\noutside government circles. Memoranda of conversation were prepared\ncovering the more important of these conversations and are attached as\nenclosures to this airgram. Professor Kissinger read and approved\nthese memoranda in draft before his departure.\nThe enclosures are as follows:\n1. Conversation with Major General Pham Xuan Chieu,\nSecretary-General of the Directorate on October 20, 1965\n2. Conversation with Sub-Brigadier General Nguyen Van Chuan,\nCommander First Infantry Division on October 26, 1965\n3. Conversation with Tran Van Do, Foreign Minister on\nNovember 3, 1965\nBy ist NARA, Date 7-11-08\n4. Conversation with Tran Ngoc Ninh, Commissioner for Education\non October 30, 1965\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5\nNLJ 08 08-34\n5. Conversation with Tri Quang on October 27, 1965\n6. Conversation with Former Premier Phan Huy Quat on October 30\n7. Conversation with Former Premier Phan Huy Quat on October 31\nSECRET\nFOR DEPT. USE ONLY\nFORM\nDS- 323\nIn\nOut\n4.62\nDrafted by:\nContents and Classification Approved by:\nPOL: JRBurke: mkm\n11-4-65\nPOL:PCHabib\nClearances:\nper 202\nPage 2\nSECRET\nA-285 Saigon\n8. Conversation with Dang Van Sung, Publisher of Chinh Luan daily\nnewspaper on October 29\n9. Conversation with Tran Quang Thuan, Secretary-General of Van Hanh\nUniversity; Former Minister of Social Welfare on November 2\n10. Conversation with Mai Tho Truyen, President of the Buddhist\nSouthern Studies Association on October 20\n11. Conversation with Tran Van Tuyen, former Deputy Prime Minister,\nQuat Government, on October 23\n12. Conversation with Father Ho Van Vui, Catholic member, Interfaith\nCouncil, Clerical member, Liaison Bureau, Saigon Archdiocese, on\nOctober 20\n13. Resume of Professor Kissinger's visit to DaNang and Hue,\nOctober 25 - 27.\nFor the Ambassador:\nfn\nPhilip C. Habib\nCounselor of Embassy for Political Affairs\nSECRET\nCONFI DENTI AL\nPage 1\nEnclosure 1\nA-285 from Saigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS: Major General Pham Xuan Chieu, Secretary-General of\nthe Directorate\nProfessor Henry Kissinger\nJohn R. Burke, Embassy Officer\nDATE\n: October 20, 1965\nProfessor Kissinger paid a courtesy call today on General Chieu\nat Gia Long Palace. During the course of the conversation, General\nChieu touched on the following topics:\nAdvisory Council. General Chieu said that certain members of the\nDirectorate were extremely wary about the formation of an advisory\ncouncil out of fear that such a body might become a forum in which\ncivilian political elements would attack the military government. This\nfear had been given substance by the experience derived from last week's\nmeeting of province chiefs and provincial council representatives in\nSaigon on October 11 and 12. In Chieu's words, the conference had not\ngone as well as it might have and the members of the Directorate now\nfelt that rather than try and form an advisory council by November 1,\nthe government should proceed more cautiously and examine other means\nof engaging civilian political elements in governmental activity. They\ndid intend to reconvene the representatives of the provincial and\nmunicipal councils every two or three months as a sort of national\nassembly. However, at these meetings the activities of the council\nrepresentatives would be carefully circumscribed. The government is also\nconsidering the early creation of the social and economic council provided\nfor in the Charter of June 19, and in addition the various ministries\nwill be encouraged to form advisory committees of civilian specialists\nto aid them in the planning and execution of their programs.\nGovernmental Policy. General Chieu said that he has been charged\nwith the task of formulating a broad policy declaration for the government.\nFrom his remarks it is obvious that he has no clear idea as yet just\nwhat will be included in this policy statement. He does feel, however,\nthat the government needs to present a \"new doctrine\" to the people which\nwill provide an alternative to Communism. In preparation for this task,\nhe has been talking to a wide variety of people, including out-politicians,\nprofessors, lawyers and others. With some amusement, he admitted that\nthere had been raised eyebrows among his colleagues in Gia Long Palace\nat some of the people he had already called in to consult. Nevertheless,\nhe is proceeding with this project. In response to a question as to\nCONFI DENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPage 2\nEnclosure 1\nA- 285 from Saigon\nwhether or not he would be able to present his formulation at an early\ndate, the General said that it would take some time to finish this\nproject and no promulgation date could be set at this stage.\nThe War Effort. In response to a question, General Chieu said\nthat he felt the war was going much better but that a great deal\nremained to be done. He said that \"next year will be the year of\npacification\" and that the year following i.e., 1967 would be the year\nthat the government could address itself to the task of transferring\ngovernmental control to civilian hands. He said that the government\nis now at work on a specific pacification plan. It has not yet been\ncompleted but the time frame is approximately two years.\nRegional and Religious Differences. In passing, General Chieu\nmade reference to personal and religious differences which had resulted\nin political unrest in the recent past. He said at one stage that these\ndifferences \"didn't exist two years ago\". When pressed to explain\nwhat he meant by this remark, the General said that all of these\ndifferences had been magnified during the Khanh government. The impli-\ncation seemed clear from his remark that he viewed the period of the\nKhanh government as a retrograde step in the recent political history\nof Viet-Nam.\nThe Viet Cong. General Chieu observed at one point in the\nconversation that in his opinion the Viet Cong were still well disciplined\nand unified and totally under the control of the DRV. He said that there\nwere many people, particularly southerners, who felt that regional\ndifferences existed within the Front just as they did in Free South Viet-Nam.\nThe General 1s personally convinced that any such differences are not\nimportant enough to cause the Viet Cong any organizational or administra-\ntive problems. And it was clear that he felt that those southerners\nwho believed that portion of the Front could be detached from the hardened\ncommunist core were being completely unrealistic.\nCOMMENT: After a very cordial 50 minutes of conversation, Professor\nKissinger took his leave. General Chieu accompanied him down stairs to\nthe main entrance of the Gia Long Palace and thanked him for his call\nand asked that they have another conversation before Professor Kissinger\nleaves Viet-Nam. General Chieu stated quite frankly that he hoped to\nobtain quelques éclaircissements from the Professor, and it seemed obvious\nthat he was thinking in terms of the formulation of his policy doctrine.\nPOL:JRBurke:ajo\nCONFI DENTI\nEnclosure 2\nCONFIDENTIAL\nA-285 Saigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nSub-Brigadier General Nguyen Van Chuan\nCommander First Infantry Division.\nProfessor Henry Kissinger\nWalter Lundy, American Consulate, Hue\nJohn Negroponte, Embassy, Saigon.\nTIME:\nOctober 26, 1965\nPLACE:\nConsulate Residence, Hue\n1. During a luncheon given at the Consulate Residence, General Chuan\ngave his views on a number of issues confronting Viet-Nam today.\n2. Chuan said he was particularly concerned by the refugee situation\nand the way it is being handled. He said that in his own tactical area\nevery effort was being made to keep the number of refugees to a minimum\nbut in other parts of the country the problem had been allowed to grow\nbeyond reasonable proportions. Chuan maintained that the GVN could not afford\nto have its cities cluttered up by refugees since they could, and in the end,\nundoubtedly would be used by the VC to foment unrest and insurrection. He\nadded that it horrified him to think of how helpless the GVN would be in\nthe face of widespread disturbances in the cities. He also agreed that a\nflood of refugees might have the bad psychological consequence of giving the\nimpression that the government was retreating.\n3. Chuan went on to say that in his opinion the wisest solution to the\nrefugee problem would be to force potential refugees to stay in their native\nhamlets and villages. While this suggestion might strike some persons as\ninhumane, it would greatly reduce the possibility of urban insurrection.\nMoreover, the anti-Communist spirit of persons living in areas temporarily\ncontrolled by the VC would certainly grow as the inhabitants become more\nexposed to Communist techniques of government. Thus, when these areas are\nfinally liberated by GVN troops, there will be an excellent anti-Communist\nbase with which the GVN will be able to work. Chuan concluded his remarks\nabout refugees by saying that to ask some people to live in VC controlled\nareas for a while longer was not really asking too much since he was\nconfident that a military victory over the Viet Cong could be realized by\nthe end of 1966.\n4. During a subsequent discussion about pacification, Chuan expressed\nthe view that the Diem regime and even the following ones had been overly-\nconcerned with establishing a system of hamlet and villagedefense and paid\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPage 2\nEnclosure 2\nA-285 Saigon\nCONFIDENTIAL\ninsufficient attention to the problem of who actually lived inside these\nareas. Chuan felt that energies devoted to construction of local defense\nsystems could have been equally well spent in the proper screening of\ninhabitants and elimination of subversion. He said he particularly abhored\nthe use of barbed wire which had become such a standard pacification item\nand, in his opinion, one devoid of any real significance.\nSECRET\nAttachment No: 3\nA- 285 from Saigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nParticipants:\nTran Van Do, Foreign Minister\nProfessor Henry Kissinger\nPhilip C. Habib\nTime & Place:\nForeign Ministry, November 3, 1965\n1. Professor Kissinger said that he would like this discussion with\nthe Foreign Minister to be concerned with the considerations that would\narise if Hanoi were at some time to accept current offers to negotiate. He\nasked the Foreign Minister for his views on the problem of negotiations,\nwith particular reference to: (a) which nations might be involved in the\nnegotiations, (b) the 1954 Geneva Accords, (c) problems of a ceasefire,\n(d) timing.\n2. Professor Kissinger made it clear that he was asking these questions\nnot in any official capacity but because he wanted to get clearly in his own\nmind the specific views of the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister dis-\ncussed each of these questions in turn.\n3. As to who would negotiate, he said there were three possibilities.\nThere could be a negotiation in which Hanoi and Peking sat with the govern-\nment of South Vietnam and the U.S. There could be a conference which\nincluded other powers somewhat along the lines of the Geneva Conference. Or,\nfinally, there was a possibility, which he did not take very seriously, there\nmight possibly be negotiations between South Vietnam and North Vietnam alone.\nProfessor Kissinger asked whether or not a Geneva Conference would not compli-\ncate the negotiations because of the pressure for compromises that might come\nfrom such a large body. Do replied that on the surface this would appear true,\nbut it was also possible that having a wider forum would allow for adjustments\nin position by Hanoi that would otherwise be more difficult to bring about.\nHe cited the experience of the previous Geneva Conference in which he believed\nthat the Soviet Union and Communist China had been able to persuade Hanoi to\naccept the division of the country at the 17th parallel despite the fact that\nthe Viet Minh had won a victory and the French wanted to pull out as quickly as\npossible.\n4. Do went on to say that South Vietnam did not consider that a solution\nto the situation here lay in a simple return to the Geneva Accords. Whereas\nthe Geneva Accords had in them certain arrangements which could be the basis\nof an agreement, they were not completely satisfactory. He said there were\nonly two elements of the Geneva Accords which the Government of South Vietnam\nfelt to be useful: (a) the establishment of the 17th parallel as a demarkation\nline; (b) the re-groupment of people on either side of this line. South Viet-\nnam did not sign the Geneva Accords and did not feel bound by them. Most\nimportantly, South Vietnam did not accept the simple statement on re-unification\nthrough elections. Elections in this context were too ill-defined to meet the\nneeds of the situation. At a later point in the discussion, Do said that he\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPage 2\nAttachment No: 3\nA-285 from Saigon\nwould hope that whatever settlement might be achieved the question of re-\nunification would not be provided for specifically. He thought this was\nsomething for the distant future and that for an indefinite time the division\nof South Vietham into two separate states should be maintained. Professor\nKissinger asked if this would be satisfactory in light of Vietnamese national\nfeeling. Do said that it would satisfy all but a minority. The practical\nfacts dictated that unification be postponed until such time as sufficient\nchanges had come about in the whole spirit of North-South relations. Do\nsaid despite references by leading Vietnamese to the need to liberate the\nNorth or unify the country, these were only for propaganda purposes and had\nno practical meaning.\n5. On the question of a ceasefire, Do made it clear that he made a\ndistinction between ceasefire in the North, that is to say, a cessation in\nbombing, and a ceasefire in the South. He said that South Vietnam had to\nretain the right to police its own territory, that a ceasefire in the South\nwhich froze each party in its present position would not be acceptable.\nThis would only permit the Viet Cong to concentrate their hold on the country-\nside and proceed with their plans to take over the whole country. He could\nconceive a cessation of bombing provided that the North would cease its\nactivity in the South. When pressed to clarify this point, he said that the\nGovernment of South Vietnam should have the right to take action against the\nrebels within its borders without hindrance from the North. If the North\nwould withdraw its military units and its aid to the Viet Cong, that could\nbe done. Then one could think of stopping the bombing in the North. He\nbelieved it would be difficult to verify or supervise withdrawal. Professor\nKissinger asked whether there could be some system of international super-\nvision to insure withdrawal and Do repeated his view that this would be very\ndifficult to control.\n6. As to the timing negotiations, Do stated very emphatically that he\nbelieves it would be an unhappy affair if negotiations were to begin at the\npresent time. He said the war was beginning to turn in favor of South Vietnam\nbut the country was not yet properly prepared for negotiations. If all went\nwell, this might be achieved in the minimum of six month's time. Do believed\nthat the Government had to organize its efforts in the countryside particularly\nwith respect to political cadres able to take their place in the villages, re-\nplace the Viet Cong wherever possible, and gain the support and understanding\nof the people. Moreover, political progress at the national level would have\nto have been achieved so that there would be enough continuity in the Govern-\nment for programs and policies to be carried out over a period of time with-\nout constant change. The Government's program would have to operate over a\nsufficient period of time within stable political institutions before the\ncountry would be ready to deal with the situation that would follow the end\nof hostilities.\nPOL: PCHabib: lm\nSECRET\nEnclosure 4\nCONFIDENTIAL\nA- 285 Saigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nTran Ngoc Ninh, Commissioner for Education\nDr. Henry Kissinger\nJames H. Madden, Embassy Officer\nDATE & PLACE:\nOctober 30, 1965 - Ministry of Education\nCommissioner Ninh said the Viet-Nam situation is very complex and\ncontinuing government stability is essential for progress within the\ncountry. Ninh felt the government would not change within the next year,\nalthough pressure groups, including religious groups, might prove trouble-\nsome. Ninh said that if the various religious groups united into some\nform of joint organization, it would be for political purposes rather than\nreligious.\nWhen asked if the generals understood the civilians in the government\nand if they agreed with the civilians on social and economic problems, Ninh\nevaded by saying there were only three generals in the government, and they\nand the civilians came to mutual agreements on social, economic and other\nproblems.\nNinh said government stability was necessary in order to get something\ndone, and a military government is necessary at this point, becuase the\nVietnamese political parties are too fragmented to run a democratic system\nof government. Military province chiefs are also necessary to carry out\nthe military government's orders.\nNinh said there has been little economic progress due to the large\ninflux of Americans which had caused an increase in the cost of living and\nby the machinations of the French--for example, the unwillingness of\nMessageries Maritimes to give up willingly their wharf area in consideration\nof the war effort.\nNinh said the VC are able to tax government teachers in insecure areas\nwhich roughly comprise one-tenth of the population of Viet-Nam. In these\nareas the teachers are paid 500 piasters extra per month by the GVN to\ncover the VC tax which is generally 320 piasters per month. Ninh felt\nsome teachers might pocket the money but this he considers a necessary evil.\nNinh said the entire education system is beset with problems. In\nuniversity education Hue poses the biggest problem. There are not enough\nprofessors there to control the students, and the students are dissatisfied.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nEnclosure 4\nPage 2\nCONF IDENTIAL\nA- 285 Saigon\nThe students feel they have no future before them--this is due to the French\neducation system which provides a general education and no technicians in\na country which vitally needs technicians. By the time they reach university\nlevel many students realize this and feel their education is of little\nvalue.\nThe Saigon students are also dissatisfied. Saigon student leaders are\nradicals engaged in political movements. All religious groups are active\nin influencing the students; this trend manifested itself during the time\nof the Buddhist disturbances and continues today. The students are very\nindividualistic and very suspicious of the government because many govern-\nment officials since the fall of the Diem regime have tried to buy student\nleaders for the government's use. Ninh said students the world over protest\nagainst their government, but in Viet-Nam within the last two years the\nstudents have become a political force. Vietnamese students feel a great\ndesire for an honorable peace in their country, but they are unable to\ndefine what they mean by an \"honorable peace. \"\nNinh felt it would be impossible to arrive at a negotiated agreement\nwith NVN--the Geneva Accords are agreement enough for settling the present\nsituation if the North Vietnamese would choose to follow them. Theoretically\nspeaking, should new negotiations be started, the complete withdrawal of\npolitical commissars, as well as military withdrawal, from SVN, would be\nNinh's precondition to negotiations. The detection of political commissars\nwho had not been withdrawn would be difficult, but possible over a period\nof time. Social and economic revivication of the country would follow\nthe VC withdrawal and subsequent negotiations.\nNinh said that his personal relationshipswith USOM/Education are\nvery good and that American-Vietnamese relations at the provincial level\nare good. Provincial chiefs submit factual reports on school construction,\nthough their reports might not also be correct in other spheres.\nNinh was interested in the idea of pairing off U.S. universities with\nuniversities in Viet-Nam and stated help was needed in all fields. Ninh\nsaid he would be willing to accept U.S. political scientist instructors at\nthe University of Saigon.\nCommissioner Ninh then said he would like to pose some questions to\nDr. Kissinger. Ninh wondered if the government should tolerate civilians\nand \"others\" organizing the students for political purposes. Noting the\nexample of Korea, he observed that this could lead to disastrous results.\nThere is no political tradition in Viet-Nam for political parties to\nfollow, and they will use any means, including the exploitation of students,\nto gain their ends. Dr. Kissinger felt he could not comment on this\nquestion as he did not have sufficient knowledge of this particular issue.\nNinh said that the students are hopelessly split into many factions,\nCONF IDENTIAL\nEnclosure 4\nPage 3\nCONFIDENTIAL\nA- 285 Saigon\nand they therefore speak with many voices. To deal with the student problem,\ntime and government stability are essential.\nCommissioner Ninh stated that current rumors say the U.S. government\nis trying to bring about a civilian government which would be willing to\nnegotiate with the DRV, and that economic pressures are being applied by\nthe U.S. government to bring this change about. Dr. Kissinger said that\nhe was replying in the capacity of a private American citizen who is,\nhowever, conversant with the views of his government, both in Viet-Nam and\nin Washington, and that he could state categorically that these rumors are\ncompletely untrue. Commissioner Ninh said he was also convinced the\nrumors were untrue, and that they were being circulated in order to rally\nopposition to the government.\nJm\nPOL: JHMadden :mkm 11-2-65\nCONF IDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPage 1 of 3\nEncl #5\nXxx\nA-285\nSaigon\nMemorandum of Conversation\nParticipants: The Venerable Tri Quang, Buddhist Leader\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger, Harvard University\nMr. John D. Negroponte, Amembassy Saigon\nMr. Walter A. Lundy, Amconsulate Hue\nPlace:\nTu Dam Pagoda, Hue\nDate:\nOctober 27, 1965\n1.\nThe appointment with the Venerable Tri Quang was requested so that Dr.\nKissinger could make his acquaintance. Quang said many of his friends had\ntold him of the visiting professor's presence in Hue and that he had hoped they\nwould have a chance to meet.\n2. Attitude Toward the GVN. Quang said he remained basically opposed to\na military government in Vietnam, but if the Buddhists favored immediate overthrow\nof the Ky Government they already would have been out in the streets demonstrating.\nHe wished to emphasize, however, that the present GVN was not responding to the\naspirations of the people. The military leadership was not doing the \"little\nthings\" which the people have the right to expect such as providing compensation\nfor destruction of their property or paying allowances to families on the death\nof sons or husbands serving in the armed forces. Corruption still is widespread.\n3. In response to a question as to what leadership should replace that\nnow in power, Quang said the country should think in terms of a group of civilians\nrather than any one leader which could only mean another tyrannical dictatorship.\nHe acknowledged that he knew people said he seemed to oppose every government\nwhich had been in power, but people must remember that the country had been at\nwar for 20 years. During this long period, Vietnam had never had an effective\ngovernment which the mass of the people could support. They could not be blamed\nfor being disillusioned.\n4. Position of the Buddhists. Quang dwelt at some length on the necessity\nof waging the war against the VC from the political/psychological point of view\nas well as the military. The former aspect of the war must be in civilian hands.\nAlthough they of course want peace in Vietnam more than anything, the Buddhists\nknow little about and are not directly concerned with the military side of the\nstruggle. The task of the Buddhists is to propagate their ideas and philosophy\nwhich will provide invaluable assistance in the ideological struggle against the VC.\n5. Quang brought up the point that he is being criticized by non-Buddhist\nleaders in the country for favoring only a Buddhist solution to Vietnam's problems.\nHe laughed at this accusation. In the Twentieth Century it is rediculous to\nbelieve anyone of intelligence could think the Buddhists would be able to impose\ntheir will on the other religious sects and the political parties. He always\ntook into account the aspirations of non-Buddhists groups in Vietnam. In response\nto a question about the position of Buddhism itself as a political force, however,\nQuang only\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPage 2 of 3\nEncl #5\nXxx\nA\n285\nSaigon\nQuang only said that Buddhists have \"certain channels of communication\" and did\nnot acknowledge any similarity between Buddhism and political organizations.\n6. U. S. Policy in Vietnam. Quang emphasized in some detail the necessity\nof the U.S. clarifying its goals in the war. As he saw it, the Americans have\nthree choices militarily - to confine the war to the South, to extend it to\nNorth Vietnam with the purpose of liberating the whole country from the communists,\nor to extend the war to Red China. The Vietnamese are confused because they are\nunable to understand how far theU.S. is prepared to pursue the struggle. For\nexample, does the U.S. wish to see North Vietnam become an Asian Yugoslavia?\n7. Turning to the question of U.S. policy on negotiations with the North\nVietnamese regime, Quang said he considered it a. mistake for President Johnson\nto have announced his willingness to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict\nwithout attaching prior conditions. Hanoi had spelled out its four points which\nthe U. S. must carry out before negotiations could take place. People think\nwhen the U. S. says negotiations are possible without pre-conditions it is only\nmaking a propaganda play. The U. S. should make clear its stand on negotiations.\nThe two points made by President Johnson in his letter about the Vietnam war to\nthe 17 uncommitted nations should be considered basic (1) that the U.S. is\nwilling to return to the Geneva accords of 1954 and (2) that American aid would\nbe offered to North Vietnam after the VC cease infiltration and military activity\nin the South and free the North from Chinese domination.\n8. Professor Kissinger pointed out the conflict is basically between the\nGVN and the Viet Cong and that the GVN should spell out its own pre-conditions\nfor negotiations. He asked for Quang's own ideas on what prior conditions\nshould be set before sitting down to talk with the Hanoi regime. Quang said\nhe only wanted to stress the importance of the President's two points and that\nthey should be emphasized as primary U.S. objectives in obtaining a peaceful\nsolution to the conflict. *he role of the U. S. is of so much importance in\nthe war because of increased American military power in Vietnam that the GVN\ncould not be e xpected to work out any meaningful pre-conditions to negotiation\non its own The U. S. should do its best to e xplain the truth about the war\nin Vietnam to the other nations of the Free World.\n9. Quang said that in spite of increased U.S. forces in the country,\nhowever, the relationship between the two countries must be that of friends and\nnot in any way resemble the old colonialist system. He cited the recent\ninstitution of military payment certificates in place of dollars for the use\nof U.S. troops in the country as a bad example of a more or less unilateral\nAmerican decision on a matter affecting the internal affairs of Vietnam. While\nhe realized this was a very difficult problem to solve from the American side\nit would have been better if U. S. troops received no dollars at all and could\nonly spend piastres. Certain aspects of Vietnamese domestic policy might not be\nespecially palatable to Americans, but we must realize these are their own affairs\nand be willing on some occasions to make concessions.\n10. Travel Plans. Quang said he would be returning to Saigon on Sunday\nand he\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPage 3 of 3\nEncl #5\n*** A-285 Saigon\nand he hoped to meet Professor Kissinger again in the capital. Puring his\nshort stay in Hue he had been very busy seeing friends and visiting various\nBuddhist groups.\n11. Comment. Quang seemed to make no distinction between pre-conditions\nfor negotiations with Hanoi and pre-conditions for a peaceful settlement in\nVietnam. He could not be persuaded to give any of his own ideas on desirable\npoints which should be included other than approving President Johnson's two\nproposals. He also obviously did not want to drawn out on the Buddhist movement\nas a political organization.\n12. He seemed to be distinguishing between the U. S. role in Vietnam's\nforeign and domestic policy. In the former sphere uang appears willing to\nconcede the dominant role to the U.S., but he obviously remains sensitive about\nany American encroachments on Vietnam's internal affairs.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPage 1\nSECRET\nEnclosure No: 6\nA- 285\nSaigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nParticipants:\nFormer Premier Phan Huy Quat\nProfessor Henry Kissinger\nPhilip C. Habib, Political Counselor\nFrederick W. Flott, First Secretary\nPlace & Date:\nLuncheon at Mr. Habib's residence;\nSaturday, Oct. 30, 1965.\nAfter amenities the conversation turned to a consideration of the various\nmanners in which the war in Vietnam might be concluded. Dr. Quat stated with\nconsiderable force his complete and absolute conviction that the non-communist\nforces in South Vietnam were totally unprepared for a peaceful political con-\nfrontation with the communist minority, which he freely acknowledged to have\nmuch better organization and cadres. He said that even though the day of\npolitical confrontation and negotiation might be far off, it was most important\nthat the GVN start training suitable political cadres for the tasks that would\nawait them when the shooting stopped.\nOn the specific subject of a ceasefire, Dr. Quat seemed to be rather con-\nfused and woolly in his thinking. He made a number of points that would lead\nto the conclusion that a ceasefire would be disastrous, including his point\nabout GVN lack of adequate provincial cadres, but at the end of his remarks\nconcluded that a ceasefire could be accepted under certain unspecified conditions.\nIt seemed that he had given no careful thought to the myriad problems of the\nexact terms of a ceasefire, of freedom of movement of the opposing forces into\nterritories controlled by or contested by the other, etc.\nDr. Quat remarked that a ceasefire would be just that: a ceasefire, and\nnothing more. He added that the GVN already controlled the most populated\nregions of Vietnam and that it was only VC military strength that prevent its\nextending its writ over the rest of the country. Once there was a ceasefire,\nDr. Quat reasoned, the GVN could go anywhere and increase its influence. He\ndid not comment on the acceptability of such conditions to the other side nor\ndid he consider what conditions the VC might try to impose.\nProfessor Kissinger asked what Dr. Quat believed would happen to the VC\nwhen the war was won. Quat replied that he believed that there were, basically,\nthree types of VC. First, there were the hard-core communist cadres. Many of\nthese came from the North. Since the real hard-core cadres were few and precious,\ntheir own principals would doubtlessly recall them to the North when their\nprospects for success in the South disappeared. The very few that would remain\nwould pose no insuperable problem.\nSecondly, there were the VC action agents, the people who carried out\npolitical killings, terrorism and extoritions. These people could be dealt\nwith as brigands and criminals, which most of them were, in fact, by nature.\nThey represented no real political problem.\nSECRET\nPage 2\nSECRET\nEnclosure No: 6\nA- 285 from Saigon\nThe third group, which Dr. Quat suggested included most of the VC, were\nmisguided people who had adhered to the VC out of misguided nationalism or in\nprotest against some real or imagined injustice or condition. Many Vietnamese\nobjected to the Saigon government. Others objected to the American presence\nin Vietnam. Almost all Vietnamese had a subconscious feeling of shame at and\ndisapproval of the 1954 Geneva Accords that divided their country. For any or\nall of these and many other reasons, some people Joined the VC. But if the\nfighting were to cease and the skilled GVN political cadres which Quat hoped\nto see created could go to work on these VC masses, their conversion and inte-\ngration into law-abiding society would follow rather quickly and easily.\nDr. Quat emphasized the importance of the psychological rejection of the\nGeneva Accords of 1954 by the Vietnamese people of both North and South. Many\nsaw these accords as a betrayal of the Vietnamese nation by the French, as the\nlast foul blow of the colonial period.\nDr. Quat made the point that the communists in North Vietnam will in time\nrecognize that their activities in the South had become counterproductive. He\nremarked that communists, once they achieve power, tend to become more conserva-\ntive and to try desperately to cling onto what they have accomplished. Their\ngoal was to consolidate their seizure of power in the North and to build\nsocialism there. The American air attacks were tearing apart the feeble\neconomic structure of the North, and the Northern leaders' goal of building a\nsocialist society was being seriously compromised. In time they would see the\nlight and end the fighting. Dr. Quat said he believed that the American air\nattacks on the North should be stepped up in scope and intensity in order to\nstimulate this process.\nBy the same token, Dr. Quat said, the ground war in the South must be\nstepped up and prosecuted more effectively before our side considered nego-\ntiating. When our military effort had dashed the last communist hopes of\nvictory, they would make peace. He was not sure how they would do this. Maybe\nthey would simply stop fighting and withdraw or return to normal society. Maybe\nthey would seek a formal peace conference. This would be dangerous indeed for\nour side, as the communists would certainly try to manipulate the conference.\nand the world opinion that watched it to serve their evil purposes. As an\naside Dr. Quat commented that the recent \"Peace in Vietnam\" demonstrations in\nthe United States had been harmful and had probably delayed the day when Hanoi\nwould realize it could not win.\nDr. Quat concluded the conversation by holding forth at some length on\nthe incapacity of the Vietnamese military to govern the country. He acknowledged\nthat at times the Vietnamese seem almost ungovernable. He hoped the military\nwould return to their military tasks and allow the restoration of civilian\ngovernment in Vietnam. He clearly saw a major role for himself when and if this\nhappened.\n707\nPOL: FWFlott: lm\nSTARES\nDECREE\nSECRET\nPage 1\nEnclosure No. 7\nA- 285 from Saigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nParticipants:\nFormer Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat\nProfessor Henry Kissinger\nFrederick W. Flott, First Secretary, Embassy Saigon\nPlace & Date:\nDr. Quat's residence, Sunday afternoon, October 31, 1965.\nThe meeting took place at Dr. Quat's urgent invitation.\nAfter the amenities Professor Kissinger launched the ninety minute conver-\nsation by saying that he had found his conversation with Dr. Quat the day before,\nat Mr. Habib's luncheon, to be one of the most interesting of his talks in Viet-\nnam, and that he would like to return to some of the subjects that had come up\nduring the earlier conversation. Specifically, he said, he would like to talk\nabout what our position should be if the North Vietnamese accepted unconditional\ndiscussions. Between whom and in what forum should these discussions take place?\nQuat began by reiterating his considered opinion that it would be most un-\nfortunate for our side if talks were to begin any time over the next six months.\nIt would be particularly unfortunate if they were to commence over the next\nthree months. The GVN was simply not ready; its cadres were still distinctly\ninferior to those of the VC and its very recent political stability was still\nfar too fragile.\nQuat recognized, however, that it would be almost impossible to refuse to\ngo to the conference table if the enemy proposed talks. The best we could hope\nto do if talks were forced upon us would be to make our conditions for accepting\nthem sufficiently hard that not too much could go awry.\nOn the matter of the forum or the auspices under which the negotiations\nmight take place, Quat said quite flatly that his first preference would be for\nbi-lateral conversations, with minimum of fanfare, between the Governments of\nNorth and South Vietnam. Another approach might be to have conversations be-\ntween South Vietnam and the United States on the one hand, and North Vietnam\nand Communist China on the other. He doubted if any conversations under UN,\nIndian or even British sponsorship could be satisfactory. If the Great Powers\nhad to be involved in the conversations, their involvement should, at the\noutset, at least, be limited to the two Great Powers most directly involved\nin the fighting: the United States and Communist China.\nProfessor Kissinger remarked that probably the most insistent proposal\nof the enemy would be a cessation of our bombings of North Vietnam. He asked\nwhat Dr. Quat would consider to be a suitable quid pro quo for this major con-\ncession. Dr. Quat replied that he would hope we could keep up the bombings,\nand even increase them, until we saw clear evidence that the communist side was\nSECRET\nSECRET\n'age 2\nEnclosure No: 7\n285 from Saigon\nseriously prepared to make peace. If world opinion made this impossible,\nQuat said that he would hope that it could at least be held down to as short\na time as possible. The dynamics of this kind of a war and the disparity of\nthe abilities of the respective political cadres was such that South Vietnam\ncould not accept a suspension of bombings that lasted more than one month.\nIn fact, Quat said, a two-week suspension should be quite enough to allow us\nto see if the communists were really prepared to make peace or not.\nAs for the quid pro quo for stopping air attacks, Dr. Quat thought that\nthe minimum acceptable consideration would be a cessation of military actions\nand movements be all VC units. More desirable, clearly, would be an obliga-\ntion for the North Vietnamese to withdraw their clearly-identifiable PAVN\nunits, such as the 325th PAVN Division, from South Vietnam.\nProfessor Kissinger asked what attitude we should take on inclusion of\nthe NFLSVN in the talks. Quat replied we should be very firm on this, and\nrefuse to agree to anything that would give the Front any governmental status.\nHe would not even agree to inclusion of representatives of the Front in the\nNVN delegation if they came as representatives of the Front; he would agree to\ntheir being present in their individual capacities.\nProfessor Kissinger asked Dr. Quat if he thought the GVN was now in a\nposition to conduct negotiations adequately. Dr. Quat replied that he was the\nfirst to recognize the alarming deficiencies and inadequacies of the Vietna-\nmese government in general and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular.\nAs of now, the Foreign Ministry could certainly not field an adequate team.\nNevertheless, Quat was confident that some solution could be found. There\nwere many able Vietnamese outside of government, and full use could be made of\nAmerican advisers. He recalled that at the time he visited the United Nations,\nduring its consideration of the Cambodian Complaint, he had been impressed by\nhow much the USUN Mission was doing to assist the Vietnamese Observer Delega-\ntion. He had thought at that time of seeking to create a more formalized\nadvisory relationship with his Foreign Ministry. Perhaps more attention should\nbe given to this requirement for advisors at this time.\nProfessor Kissinger asked what Dr. Quat would envisage a postwar GVN's\ndoing with former VC. Quat said that during his recent trip to Korea he had\nlearned to his horror that the South Korean authorities had simply shot all\nformer communists. He would recommend that the GVN be very generous towards\nformer VC. He would not put them in concentration camps, but rather in some\nsort of rehabilitation camps from which they could be released little by little\nwith appropriate safeguards.\nCOMMENT: It seemed fairly clear during this conversation that Dr. Quat\nwas thinking of himself and his political friends as the persons who would\nfinally have the responsibility of executing all that had been discussed. The\nmanner in which he brought up, with only minimal relevancy, his contacts and\ngreat designs allegedly elaborated with the Americans in 1954, suggested that he\nsought to project a statesmanlike and pro-American image of himself and generally\nmake his availability known.\n747\nPOL: FWFlott: lm\nSECRET\nEnclosure 8\nA-285 Saigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS: Dang Van Sung, Publisher of Chinh Luan daily\nProfessor Henry Kissinger\nJohn R. Burke, Embassy Officer\nDATE\n: October 29, 1965\nThis evening Dr. Sung met for an hour with Professor Kissinger.\nThe general discussion which ensued covered the following subjects:\nPresent Government. Dr. Sung clearly has no confidence in nor\nrespect for the military Directorate now controlling the government of\nViet-Nam. He dismisses it as a military junta unrepresentative of\nanything save its members. They hold power because they control the\nmilitary establishment. In Sung's view, some means must be found to\nform a civilian government which will enjoy some broad-base popular\nsupport.\nSung realizes the difficulties in achieving this objective in the\nabsence of any political parties with significant followings. In their\nabsence some other vehicles must be used. He dismisses the sects, not\nbecause they are unrepresentative but rather because he appears to feel\nthat they would furnish a poor base subject as they are to internecine\nwarfare. Sung feels that the labor syndicates may offer some promise\nas political organisms in lieu of parties. He seemed reticent about\nnaming names, but he did observe that there seemed to be some good men\nworking in the labor field who could produce a political organization.\nWhat was needed, in his view, was a rice roots organization.\nAt this point, Sung was politely pressed for personalities. He\nagain refrained from naming anyone, but when the name of Ha Thuc Ky,\nRevolutionary Dai Viet leader, was raised as an individual who, though\nnot a labor leader, seemed to be working hard to organize his party\non the local level, Sung readily agreed that this was true and that the\nsort of organizing activity in which Ky has been engaged is the type\nSung feels the times demand. He added, however, that despite whatever\ngood qualities Ky might possess he did not consider him of suitable\nstature to be a national leader.\nSung emphasized the importance not only for political organizations\nbut for the government itself to organize at the local level. The\ngovernment he declared has not done anything in this direction to date;\nhowever he did approve of the GVN's recent decision to lump together\nunder a single control the many specialized cadres now working on the\npacification problem.\nPage 2\nEnclosure 8\nA- 285 from Saigon\nWar and Negotiations. Sung is optimistic about the progress of\nthe war. Now that American aid is being brought to bear in massive\nquantities he feels that the defeat of the Viet Cong is only a matter\nof time. When the matter of Hanoi's reluctance to come to the conference\ntable was raised, Sung suggested that the bombing of the north be stepped\nup. (Sung is Tonkinese.) Heavier pressure may convince the North\nVietnamese of the unwisdom of their present policies. Sung seemed some-\nwhat fatalistic when asked to evaluate whether heavier pressure might\nor might not broaden the conflict and bring the Chinese in: it may or\nmay not happen but it is a risk that must be taken if the North\nVietnamese are to be brought to any sort of negotiation.\nAs to how he would like to see the insurgency resolved, Dr. Sung\nexpressed the opinion that a withdrawal of the insurgents and a return\nto the Geneva Accords of 1954 would probably be the best possible\nsolution. He is not certain that it is obtainable. Whatever the solution,\nSung is gloomy about what happens within South Viet-Nam in view of the\nfact that the present government, in his views, lacks any popular base\nor rapport with the people, and there is no immediate prospect that\na stronger, more representative government can be established in the\nnear future.\nPolitical Personalities. During the conversation, Sung made several\npassing references to political personalities. He mentioned his \"cousin\"\nPhan Huy Quat, criticizing him for having given the military the\nopportunity to return to power. He also mentioned Phan Khac Suu and\nTran van Huong, observing that it was not surprising the \"civilian solution\"\nhad failed, served as it was by such people of modest talent and no real\npolitical following.\nPOL:JRBurke:ajo\nEnclosure 9\nCONF IDENTIAL\nA-285 Saigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nTran Quang Thuan - Secretary General of Van Hanh\nUniversity; Former Minister of Social Welfare\nDr. Henry Kissinger\nMelvin H. Levine - Embassy Officer\nDATE & PLACE:\nNovember 2, 1965 - Mr. Levine's Apartment, 80 Ba Huyen\nThanh Quan\nThe meeting was arranged to provide Professor Kissinger with the\nbenefit of Mr. Thuan's thinking. The following points emerged from the\nconversation:\nNeed for Social Revolution\nAsked how he visualized the probable course of events during the next\nfew years, Thuan expressed great pessimism, unless certain things could\nbe accomplished. What was needed, he felt, was a social revolution, although\nhe was frank in acknowledging that this term did not have a precise signi-\nficance, and in many people's minds constituted no more than a vague yearning\nfor justice. As Thuan apparently understood the concept, a social revolution\nwould provide for this kind of justice through the development of greater\nsocial cohesion. Thuan felt that in an underdeveloped country, the\nGovernment was the instrument which must play the major role in instituting\nsuch social changes. The difficulty was that Vietnamese Governments had\nthemselves lacked the requisite internal cohesion, since they had generally\nbeen composed of men who often did not know each other at the outset, so\nthat considerable time was required before any sort of \"team spirit\" could\nbe developed; but Vietnamese Governments had not had this much time.\nFurthermore, governmental leaders generally did not really represent any\ngroup within the population, but were rather chosen on an individual basis.\nGovernments of this sort encouraged the development of three types of atti-\ntudes within the politically aware population: (a) trouble-making, based\non a genuine distaste for the current political authority; (b) withdrawal\nto private concerns and indifference to public matters; and (c) individuals\nwho would serve the Government because they were in effect \"paid off. \" All\nthree such attitudes were useless to a Government in attempting to effect\na social revolution, so that a vicious circle was created which guaranteed\npolitical impotence. Governments were capable of drawing up plans which\non paper appeared ideal, but which were in reality totally impracticable,\nbecause they failed to take into consideration the inadequacy of the govern-\nmental resources (i.e., people) to do the Job.\nCONF IDENTIAL\nEnclosure 9\nPage 2\nCONF IDENTIAL\nA-285\nSaigon\nAsked how it might be possible to get to a situation in which the\nsocial revolution he believed requisite might take place, Thuan believed\nthat currently viable social groups might be encouraged. Asked to identify\nthese, he said he was thinking of all sorts of groups, including sports\nclubs. Of course, the Buddhists constituted a very important social group,\nand he said that the Buddhists were working to improve their team spirit,\nalthough he acknowledged that within the Buddhist movement the same internal\nfragmentation and factionalization was in evidence as appeared elsewhere with-\nin Vietnamese society. Thuan was not explicit as to how he envisaged that\nthe process would develop from encouraging social groups to achieving the\nbroadscale social changes he had in mind.\nAsked if he could identify any Government which might be able to take\nthe steps he believed necessary, Thuan declined to do so. He pointed out\nthat it was difficult to predict how a man would perform before he had\nactually served. As an example, he cited the case of former Prime Minister\nPhan Huy Quat who had appeared beforehand to be an extremely capable man,\nbut who had demonstrated in office that while he possessed dignity and\nadministrative skill, that he nevertheless lacked the drive and decisive-\nness that were requisite to leadership.\nReturning to the question of Buddhist efforts to improve their internal\ncohesiveness, Prof. Kissinger noted that he had gained the impression that\nthe Buddhists were planning to form a national political organization.\nThuan confirmed (with some apparent reluctance) that this was indeed the\nintention, observing that any national organization would have to be\ncentered in Saigon and not in Hue.\nNegotiations with the Communists\nAsked how he visualized an end to the current conflict with the\nCommunists, Thuan said he thought that negotiations might take place,\neither publicly or privately. Public negotiations would be unfortunate\nfor the anti-Communist cause. Had the other side been wiser, they would\naccept the public call for discussions; they would in fact have done so\nmany months ago. Thuan did not understand why they had not done this,\nsince he believed it evident that South Viet-Nam was not now prepared for\nsuch negotiations with the Communists, because of SVN's lack of social\ncohesion. Asked if he thought that SVN might, in the rather near future,\nachieve such cohesion, Thuan did not respond directly, but appeared to be\nhighly skeptical of this prospect.\nAs to negotiations held in secret, Thuan first stated that he thought\nthe United States could do this without Viet-Nam. Professor Kissinger\nstated that he felt very strongly that the US could not do this, that we\ncould not use small countries as pawns in this way, and that any discussions\nwith the other side would have to involve the GVN. Thuan accepted this\nstatement with what appeared to be full tacit agreement. Asked who he\nthought Communist participants in any such discussions should properly\nCONE IDENTIAL\nEnclosure 9\nPage 3\nCONF IDENTIAL\nA-285 Saigon\nbe, Thuan said that he thought that Peking, Hanoi, and the National Libera-\ntion Front should not be regarded as independent entities, but rather as\nelements of a single apparatus. This, however, did not mean that the\nNLF could be accepted as negotiating agents for the others. No GVN could\naccept this, and Thuan personally thought that any such action would be\nmost unwise, since it would serve to legitimize the Front. Asked what\nhe thought a desirable outcome of negotiations would be, Thuan referred\nto public statements on the subject and stated that he thought the goal\nshould be a South Viet-Nam independent of North Viet-Nam and free of the\nviolence of war. Economic ties with the North might be envisaged. Broader\nquestions of reunification of the country could be left to the more distant\nfuture. (COMMENT: There seemed to be the implication here that Thuan was\nnot ruling out the possibility that SVN at some point in the future might\nitself undertake a \"go North\" policy.)\nEducational Policy\nAt the close of the conversation, Thuan volunteered his belief that\nchanges in educational policy were an important element in the social\nrevolution he desired to see come about. He identified three fundamental\nerrors in current educational policy: (a) It rewarded the wrong course\nof action from a national viewpoint. That is, students--who contributed\nnothing to the nation and who lived a life of safety and leisure--had the\nupper positions in society reserved for them, whereas the combatants who\nsuffered and sacrificed were unable to achieve the means of advancement\nand were therefore condemned to lower ranks on the social scale. (b) In\nits current tuition practices, educational policy favored the rich. Thuan\ndesired a system in which tuition was made higher and the money used to\ninstitute a broader scholarship program for the poor. The wealthy could\neasily afford to pay more for their children's education than they were\ndoing. Even at the elementary levels where tuition was free in theory,\nit was often expensive for the poor to support a child in school. Higher\ntuition and broad scholarships could help give children of the poor more\nequal opportunity. (c) The system of education stressed the wrong subjects.\nUniversity education was aimed at producing a group of men trained in\nliterature and the liberal arts, who could do little that was useful.\nThe nation had a great need for technically trained men, who would emerge\nfrom school with badly needed talents, but the current system was not\nproducing them.\nCOMMENT: In this conversation, Thuan was frank in discussing the\nweaknesses of Vietnamese society, and his point about the lack of social\ncohesion here--as well as the need for it--is a very cogent one. As he\nhimself noted, this very weakness would render Vietnamese society highly\nvulnerable to Communist tactics, in the event that public negotiations\nwere to deprive SVN of its ability to employ force against the Communists.\nm2\nPOL: MHLevine :mkm 11-2-65\nCONF IDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPage 1\nEnclosure 10\nA- 285 from Saigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS: Mai Tho Truyen - President of the Buddhist Southern\nStudies Association\nProfessor Henry Kissinger\nMelvin H. Levine, Embassy Officer\nDATE & PLACE: October 20, 1965; Mr. Truyen's Office, Xa Loi Pagoda, Saigon\nDuring the course of a call on Mr. Truyen, he expressed the following\nviews:\nVietnamese Buddhism. Speaking in broad generalities, Vietnamese\nBuddhism could be divided into two categories, one the one hand the great\nmass of individuals who were basically apolitical and who only desired the\nbasic freedoms of life, and, on the other hand, the small number of bonzes\nwho had taken control of the Unified Buddhist Association (UBA) and who\nwere motivated by ambition. Truyen referred to \"four bonzes\" on several\noccasions. These were: Tri Quang, Tam Chau, Thien Minh, and (after\nsome hesitation) Huyen Quang. Truyen felt that Buddhism as a world force,\nas well as Vietnamese Buddhism until the downfall of the Diem regime, was\ntotally alien to political concerns. Asked if Buddhism had not engaged\nin politics during the confrontation with the Diem regime, Truyen stated\nthat the Buddhist leaders had rather served as a focus of practically\nuniversal opposition to the Diem regime, that these leaders had initially\nbeen motivated by a concern to defend the interests of the Buddhist\nreligion but that over the course of time their interests have developed\ninto political concerns. Following the downfall of the Diem regime, the\nBuddhist leaders were regarded as possessing great political force and this\nbelief reinforced their power since their ostensible followers were\nafraid to oppose them. Their power was also reinforced by the support\nthey received from the Vietnamese government which wished UBA support as\nan indication that the government itself had mass support. Such popular\nsupport as the UBA in fact possessed, consisted largely of old women and\nchildren. Intellectuals had separated themselves from the UBA following\nand in fact were largely opposed to it. Buddhist opposition to the UBA\nhad been increased by wide-spread evidences of corruption among the UBA\nleadership. Truyen suggested that American officials might wish to\nsuggest to the UBA leaders that participation in politics was perfectly\nappropriate so long as the political actions were directed toward the\ngeneral good and not merely private gain.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPage 2\nEnclosure 10\nA- 285 from Saigon\nGeneral Situation in Viet-Nam Regarding War. Truyen felt that the\nwar in Viet-Nam could end in only one of two ways, either the communists\nwould agree to sign a peace analogous to the 1954 Geneva Accords or the\nwar would accelerate into a third world war. He did not think the\ncommunists could be defeated within Viet-Nam because they could always\nincrease their effort. In the event the communists in fact signed an\naccord, this would not mean that they accepted total defeat but rather\nthat they had decided to shift their tactics, to accept a setback on\nthe military front and to continue their campaign of political and\npropagandistic subversion. It was very hard to resist them on this level,\nin view of the lack of support of the Government of Viet-Nam by the people.\nGovernment of Viet-Nam. Truyen felt that the present government was\nvery unpopular and could not rally the spiritual support of the population.\nThis had been true of all recent Vietnamese governments. One important\nfactor was the absence of a juridical basis for government. Governments\nin theory emanated directly from the people, but this had not been the\ncase in practice in recent times nor was there presently in existence a\nmechanism by which such a government could be established. Truyen traced\nrecent history in support of this statement. He felt that a basis for\ngovernment could be provided by calling a conference of all major religions\nand having them decide upon a government. This he characterized as \"an\nAsian solution\" in keeping with the Asian mentality. Asked if the\ndifferent religions possessed sufficient internal cohesion to act in such\na way, Truyen responded affirmatively, pointing by way of example to\nthe Council of Religions. Another weakness of the present GVN was its\nfailure to convince the people that it was really concerned with their\nwelfare. Words alone were not enough to convince people, concrete actions\nwere required. This would involve an end to corruption and the achievement\nof genuine social justice at all levels of the social scale. Truyen felt\nthat Americans some times seemed to think that mere material gifts could\nwin the hearts of the people, but this was not the case. Schools and\nhospitals were sometimes built in villages and subsequently the villagers\nmade no effort to protect them from destruction by the communists. In\nother words, material benefits were not enough, the loyalties of the\nvillagers had to be engaged.\nTruyen commented that practically everyone in the South desired\npeace and any government that could provide it for them would, by virtue\nof that fact, become extremely popular. Truyen then qualified this\nstatement to say, not peace at any price, but rather an honorable peace\nthat would provide liberty and independence for the people. He did not\namplify what he meant by this.\nCONFI DENTIAL\nCONFI DENTIAL\nPage 3\nEnclosure 10\nA- 285 from Saigon\nCOMMENT: Truyen's suggestion that a new government be chosen\nby a conference 01 religions represents a thought which other religious\nleaders have expressed on various occasions. The fact that Truyen now\nvoices this idea suggests that he has been talking with other religious\nleaders, a supposition confirmed subsequently by Southern Catholic leader,\nFather Ho Van Vui. The fact that Truyen may well be supporting members\nof the Council of Religions indicates the depth of his own rupture with\nthe UBA, since the UBA and the Council of Religions have also had a recent\ndivorce (Embassy's A 239) and Truyen is thus considering lining up\nwith other UBA antagonists. He made the impression of being more concerned\nwith internal political maneuvering than with war against communists.\nPOL: MHLevine:ajo\nCONFI\nSERIORS\nPage 1\nEnclosure 11\nA- 285 from Saigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS: Tran Van Tuyen, former Deputy Prime Minister,\nQuat Government\nProfessor Henry Kissinger\nJohn R. Burke, Embassy Officer\nDATE\n: October 23, 1965\nA conversation with Maitre Tuyen at his house at 198 Hong Thap Tu\nat 5 p.m. today dealt with the following topics:\nPresent Government. Tuyen feels that the present government\nof General Ky is in serious trouble. He faulted Ky for going out\nof his way to sow regional and other divisions within the populace.\nHe cited Ky's remark that the country must be led by the young\n(those under 35 years of age) as evidence to prove his point. He\nalso referred to the recent command changes within RVNAF (e.g.,\nGeneral Nguyen Huu Co as Deputy Prime Minister and General Cao Van\nVien as Chief, Joint General Staff) as an effort interpreted by some\nto separate southerners from important troop commands in favor of\nnortherners.\nTuyen predicted that the current popular concern with economic\nproblems might provide the pretext for political opponents of the\nregime to attack it successfully. What would cause Ky most of his\ndifficulty here would be the problem of unfulfilled promises. Tuyen\nparticularly specified the promised resumption of full electric\nservice for Saigon in October as one of the more important ones from\nthe point of view of impact on the popular mass. He noted that\nOctober was almost over and the brownouts were continuing and becoming\nmore common than before.\nTuyen expressed his conviction that a coolness had developed\nbetween the Ky government and the United States Mission, and that a\nsense of mutual distrust had developed. He insisted on this point\ndespite our forceful efforts to deny it.\nTo solve the obvious and most immediate economic problems of\nshortages and soaring prices, Tuyen would (if he were in a position\nof authority) use American aid and direct measures to \"dump\" scarce\ncommodities on the market to break the price spiral and convince\nthe people that the government was capable of serving their interests.\nHe recalled the three essentials for a successful government outlined\nSEGRET\nSECRET\nPage 2\nEnclosure 11\nA-285 from Saigon\nby Confucius: enough to eat, enough soldiers to provide security,\nand public confidence. Of the three, he considers the last the most\nimportant and he feels that successive governments since the fall\nof Diem have eroded public confidence in the GVN. This lack of\nconfidence is most dramatically expressed in the weakening of the\npiaster which, in relation to the dollar and to gold, has lost much\nground in the last several days. He drew attention to the fact that\nin Viet-Nam, the poorer classes traditionally buy gold as a hedge\nagainst inflation. Thus the government could stabilize or bring\nabout a lowering of the price of gold, fairly easily since demand was\nlimited. This would result, in Tuyen's opinion, in a dramatic rise\nin public confidence in the government.\nWhen asked to review the political history of Viet-Nam and\nexplain how confidence had been lost, Tuyen went back first to the\nMinh-Tho government. He recalled that Minh and the other generals\nwho had executed the coup labeled what they had wrought a \"revolution\".\nHowever, once having done this, they proceeded to install a government\nof technicians headed by Diem-vice president Nguyen Ngoc Tho who has\nhad a record of collaborating with every successive ruling authority\ndating back to pre-war World War II days. Thus, in Tuyen's opinion,\nthe \"revolution\" was over before it began.\nThe succeeding government, that of General Khanh, was really\na Dai Viet government with Khanh as front man for the party. When\nit came to power, any hopes for a real revolution flickered and\ndied. Khanh, nevertheless, on the basis of his intelligence and\nadroitness was able to balance the components within the government\nand maintain control.\nNeither of the two civilian governments that succeeded Khanh's\nhad effective control of the levers of power. Huong, according to\nTuyen, was strongly influenced by his Minister of Interior Nguyen Luu\nVien who was, after all, Khanh's uncle. Thus despite good intentions\non Huong's part, real power remained with Khanh and the military.\nQuat's government, in which Tuyen served as Deputy Prime\nMinister, was equally hamstrung by the military. As example of this,\nTuyen cited his own case. Quat asked him to join the cabinet and\nhe (Tuyen) posed some conditions: he wanted the Deputy Prime\nMinistership and the Ministry of Interior. Quat was willing but\nKhanh over-ruled; the Minister of Interior must be a southerner.\nTuyen then agreed to accept half-a-loaf. (It is noteworthy, however,\nthat Nguyen Hoa Hiep, who was given the Interior portfolio was\nChairman of the Southern VNQDD Party of which Tuyen was Secretary\nGeneral.)\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPage 3\nEnclosure 11\nA- 285 from Saigon\nAs for the constitutional crisis which eventually led to the\nend of the Quat government and the return of the military to full\npower, Tuyen charges Quat with partial responsibility. He notes\nthat Quat chose to revamp his cabinet while he (Tuyen) was out of\nthe country. He did not wait for Tuyen to return despite the fact\nthat Tuyen might have been very useful in persuading the recalcitrant\nHiep, the focal point of the impasse, to resign as Minister of\nInterior. Tuyen is convinced that Quat forced the show-down with\nChief of State Phan Khac Suu on the assumption that the military\nwould support his side of the argument, remove Suu while leaving\nQuat in place. But here Quat fell into a trap tended by the\nsouthern Dai Viets led by Directorate Chairman Major General\nNguyen Van Thieu. The military moved in, swept the board and resumed\nfull power.\nTuyen faults the United States for having backed without\nquestion each successive government in Viet-Nam while failing to\nprovide them its considerable influence effectively to guide these\ngovernments along the path toward representative government. This\ncould have begun, according to Tuyen, back in the Diem period by\nusing the various persuaders available to the U.S. Each successive\ngovernment was also given too free rein, and each really needed help\nand advice if it were to become strong and effective. Tuyen knows\nall the obvious arguments against a more direct interference by the\nUnited States in the internal affairs of Viet-Nam, but he professes\nto be unconvinced of their importance when weighed against the\nconsequences of our non-intervention.\nIf a government enjoying broad-base, popular support is to be\norganized in Viet-Nam within the immediate future, one must use the\nsects in forming it. Political parties (including Tuyen's VNQDD)\ncount for little. They are faction-ridden and too small in terms\nof membership. The religions, however, do offer some promise if\nthey can be molded into some sort of alliance.\nNegotiations to End the Insurgency. The subject of negotiations\nis obviously one which interests Tuyen greatly. He was a member of\nthe GVN delegation to the Geneva Conference in 1954 and he has given\nmuch thought to the question of how the present conflict will be\nended.\nIn answer to a general question regarding contacts between\nindividuals on the communist side and those on the GVN side, Tuyen\ndeclared flatly that there was much contact. When asked whether\nhe was in direct contact with anyone within the Front, he responded\nin the negative. He said that for someone as well known as he was,\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPage 4\nEnclosure 11\nA-285 from Saigon\ndirect contact with the Front would entail dangerous risks. Outside\nof Saigon, however, he was certain that there was much interchange.\nThere was also much contact through third parties in Paris. (He did\nnot exclude the possibility that he might be in contact with Front\nrepresentatives in this fashion, and, in fact, mentioned that friends\nof his had such contact.) In Paris, Vietnamese allied to both sides\nmet freely in order to \"exchange ideas.' There was no effective\nrestriction on this sort of interchange and it was going on all the time.\nAs to the question of negotiation, Tuyen feels that the basic\nnegotiation must be between Hanoi and Saigon. It would be unrealistic\nto exclude the Front, but their participation in any exchange must\nbe ancillary to the DRV and the GVN. In his view, the controlling\npolitical direction of the Front is communist. He does not feel that\nNguyen Huu Tho is a communist. He is convinced that he is an\negocentric nationalist unconverted to communism, but he does not\nfeel that the Front representatives would ever be permitted to engage\nin an independent negotiation. (At this point he digressed to recount\nan anecdote involving Tho. During the Diem period, Tho had been\nexiled to Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen Province. He asked Tuyen to represent him\nand obtain permission for his return to Saigon. Tuyen agreed to\napproach the authorities because he knew Tho well and felt that\nhis exile had been too severe a penalty. In the ensuing legal\nmaneuvering, the authorities showed little inclination to permit\nTho's return and in fact uncovered a new charge of rape. It was after\nthis episode that Tho left the country.)\nConcomitant with any negotiation between the GVN and the DRV,\nTuyen feels there can be a cease fire. In the cease fire, as opposed\nto political negotiations - conditions had to be generated by the Front.\nWhen the objection was raised that a situation would develop wherein\nthe Viet Cong would be left in control of large portions of Viet-Nam\nwhich they could claim as basis for the establishment of a nation,\nTuyen countered by expressing his judgement that the territories\nwhich they actually controlled full time were unconnected pockets.\nIn the \"gray areas\", as part of the cease fire, the government\nadministrative machinery would continue to function and his (Tuyen's)\ncease fire would not permit the establishment of a permanent Viet\nCong machinery along side.\nEventually, according to Tuyen, some sort of government of\nNational Union would have to be established in the south. Presumably\nthis would have to include elements of the Front, not necessarily\nparticipating as representatives of a party, but as political\nindividuals. Tuyen admits that political institutions in the south\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPage 5\nEnclosure 11\nA- 285 from Saigon\nwill have to be much stronger than they are today if the resulting\ngovernment is to be prevented from falling under communist control.\nTuyen feels that it will be \"sometime\" before the GVN is ready\nto negotiate. \"Planning for peace must be as carefully done as\nplanning for war, # according to Tuyen. He laid great stress on\nhis belief that whatever settlement is worked out here in Viet-Nam\nit will be a Vietnamese settlement and should not be measured against\noccidental rules, standards or preconceptions. Tuyen seemed to be\nsaying that the final solution in Viet-Nam might be one not entirely\nacceptable to the United States.\nHanoi: Is it Nationalist or Communist? Tuyen divided the\ncitizens of the DRV into three generations: the old, the middle-aged\nand the young. The influential members of the first two -- Ho, Giap,\nDong, etc. -- are in his view nationalists first and communists\nsecond. The third generation, however, worries Tuyen. The young\npeople who have come to adulthood since the formation of the communist\nstate and have known nothing else are the future leaders and could,\nin Tuyen's opinion, furnish the foundation for the creation of a\nstate closely modeled on Chinese Communist lines.\nPOL:JRBurke:ajo\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPage 1\nEnclosure 12\nA- 285 from Saigon\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS: Father Ho Van Vui, Catholic member, Interfaith Council\nClerical member, Liaison Bureau, Saigon\nArchdiocese\nProfessor Henry Kissinger\nJohn R. Burke, Embassy Officer\nDATE\n: October 20, 1965\nAt lunch today, there was a general discussion of the current\npolitical situation in Viet-Nam. The main points touched on by Father Vui\nare the following:\nCurrent Opposition to the Ky Government. Father Vui stated that the\nstudents and the labor unions were unhappy with the Ky government and\nhe predicted that within the next several weeks these two groups would\nbe putting more and more pressure on the Prime Minister. Their criticism\nwould be directed at the spiraling cost of living throughout the country,\nbut this issue, despite its validity, would merely be the lever used to\nattack the idea of a military government. The implication was that the\nstudents and the unionists felt free to criticize the government on\neconomic grounds but were fearful of trying to mount a frontal campaign\nagainst the idea of a military controlled government.\nWhen asked what form student and unionist opposition might take,\nFather Vui prophesied that they would hold press conferences, circulate\npetitions and perhaps even mount demonstrations against the high cost\nof living and commodity shortages.\nFather Vui then went on to talk about certain other elements\nthat might cause Ky difficulties in the future. He suggested that the\nMandarin Dai Viets and the Vien Hoa Dao (The Buddhist Institute) were very\nactive behind the scenes. The former group was doing its best to isolate\nKy, using their representatives within the government to accomplish their\npurpose, e.g., Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, Bui Diem, and\nMinister of Psychological Warfare, Dinh Trinh Chinh. The Buddhist Institute\nseemed to Vui to be entering into a sort of alliance with Deputy Prime\nMinister of War and Reconstruction, Major General Nguyen Huu Co. Vui\ncharged that the Institute would like to see Co as replacement for\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPage 2\nEnclosure 12\nA- 285 from Saigon\nPrime Minister Ky and he suggested that the recent promotion of Co to\nDeputy Prime Minister and the termination of his function as Chief, Joint\nGeneral Staff, indicated that Ky was aware of these maneuverings and had\n\"kicked Co upstairs. \" Part of this plot to replace Ky with Co would,\naccording to Vui, involve the replacement of Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu\nwith old-time politician Nguyen Xuan Chu, former High National Council\nmember and leader of the out-politician group that helped bring down\nPrime Minister Tran Van Huong.\nAn Ideal Government. Father Vui said that what Viet-Nam required\nat the moment was a \"just\" government which followed a firm policy without\nregard for the partisan desires of special interest groups. He stated\nthe belief that such a government could rally the population and lead\nthe country to victory against the Viet Cong. When the possibility of\nachieving any such a government was questioned, Father Vui said that the\ngovernment of Prime Minister Tran Van Huong had come close to being the\nsort of government he had in mind but that it had been sabotaged by the\nmaneuverings of General Khanh.\nFather Vui cited as an example of the government's weakness its\nattempt to placate various groups by making concessions to them. Father\nVui Is attention was drawn to the fact that in free societies, governmental\nleadership was forced to take into account the desires of minorities\nand special interest groups and that oftentimes governmental decisions\nrepresented a compromise between conflicting points of view. Father Vui\nresponded by saying that the Vietnamese situation at the present moment\nwas \"different\" and that a strong, just government following a firm policy\ncould be established without regard to pressure groups and would succeed.\nFather Vui said that his preference would be for a civilian government\nusing the religious sects as a popular base. He said that his current\nefforts toward promoting religious harmony convinced him that a union of\nthe religions was possible and that they could in turn give their support\nto a civilian government, thus the government would enjoy the support\nof approximately 8,000,000 faithful belonging to the various religions\nrepresented on the Council of Religions. When asked whether or not his\nunion of religions would require the splitting off or suppression of the\nBuddhist Institute, Father Vui replied that the Institute would be isolated\nbut no action need be taken against it. He made passing reference to\nthe fact that he had been in recent, frequent consultation with the\nprominent lay Buddhist leader Mai Tho Truyen, and he suggested that Truyen\nshared his views. Further, he hinted that in the forthcoming biennial\nmeeting of the Unified Buddhist Association, Truyen might assume a position\nof dominance within the association.\nSECRET\nPage 3\nSECRET\nEnclosure 12\nA- 285 from Saigon\nVui was asked about leaders for his ideal government and he suggested\nthat several worthy candidates could be found within the \"old boy's\nassociation\" made up of graduates of the four prominent South Vietnamese\nLycees: Chasseloup-Laubat, Petrus Ky, My Tho and Can Tho. (This association\nhas been meeting on a monthly basis for the past several months. Its\ncurrent president is former Major General Tran Van Don and its membership\nincludes such prominent southerners as Phan Khac Suu and Tran Van Van.)\nRegarding the Ky government, Father Vui said that he considered Ky\nto be a man of good will but that he was insulated by bad advisors. He\ndid concede that the Ky government might be able to endure for a time but\nonly if these bad elements were purged. As for names, he indicted Bui Diem,\nMinister of Public Works Ngo Trong Anh, Tran Ngoc Ninh, Tran Ngoc Lieng,\nPsyWar Minister Chinh as people who must go if the government is to succeed.\nThe individuals named are all, according to Vui, the servants of Phan Huy\nQuat's Dai Viet party and or of the Buddhist Institute.\nThe Viet Cong. Father Vui said that the countryside was largely\nin the control of the Viet Cong. He said that the situation had improved\nsomewhat in recent weeks thanks to the introduction of American combat\ntroops. It was still grave, however, because even those areas where the\nAmerican troops had had some success, the government on its part, had not\nbeen able to carry out an efficient pacification program.\nDespite recent setbacks, Father Vui still sees the Viet Cong as a\nstrong unified threat, he feels also that the American forces must keep\nup the pressure and carry the brunt of the struggle. He considered ARVN\nto be incapable of beating the Viet Cong. When asked how long he thought\nthe American forces must stay, he said that in his view, they must remain\nuntil the government has been able to organize a pacification effort\ncapable of holding the territory which American troops had freed from\ncommunist control.\nWhen questioned about the anatomy of the Viet Cong, Father Vui said\nthat in his view it was unquestionably under the direct control of Hanoi.\nHe expressed the belief that there were southerners within the movement\nwho were not hardened communists and who could live in the south as\npeaceful citizens at some future time but for the moment it was impractical\nto consider detaching them from Hanoi. He stated that he had abandoned\nearlier efforts to try and detach a segment of southerners from the Front.\nHe said that there were some Catholics within the VC forces but he declared\nflatly that there were no priests with the Viet Cong. There were priests\ncontinuing to minister to the faithful in Viet Cong controlled areas, but\nthese individuals had not become committed to the Viet Cong cause.\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPage 4\nEnclosure 12\nA- 285 from Saigon\nThe End of the War. Father Vui was asked for his impressions as\nto how the insurgency with the Viet Cong might end. He said that it would\nundoubtedly end by negotiations of some sort. He was asked whether or\nnot these negotiations should be with the Front, with Hanoi, or with a\ndelegation representing Hanoi containing Front elements. Vui replied\nthat he felt the negotiations must be with Hanoi because the Front is\nthe creature of Hanoi. He stated that it would be useless to attempt\nto treat with the Front alone. When asked why, he stated that it might\nbe possible to negotiate some sort of arrangement with the Front but this\nwould not involve Hanoi. The GVN would therefore be forced to enter into a\nsecond negotiation with Hanoi while at the same time being obliged to\nhonor the conditions of whatever settlement had been hammered out with\nthe Front.\nAs for the timing of any negotiation, Vui felt that they could not\nbe undertaken for sometime to come. The government of South Viet-Nam\nwas much too weak and the power relationships too unfavorable at the\npresent time.\nOn taking his leave, Father Vui expressed unhappiness that he,\na priest, was involved in politics, but circumstances require it.\nAt the direction of the Archbishop, he is engaged in identifying and\ndeveloping lay leaders who presumably will take over as the directors\nof Catholic political action.\nCOMMENT: Vui is obviously anti-Communist but the struggle against\nthe communists is of secondary importance to him. His main preoccupation\nis with political maneuvering in Saigon.\nPOL:JRBurke:ajo\nSECRET\nCONFIDENTIAL\nEnclosure #13\nPage #1, A-285\nfrom Saigon\nResume of Professor Kissinger's Visit to\nDanang and Hue - October 25-27\nIntroduction\n1. Professor Henry Kissinger, accompanied by the reporting officer,\nvisited the cities of Danang and Hue from October 25 to 27. During these\nthree days Mr. Kissinger met with numerous civilian and military leaders\nand had the opportunity to hear their views on Viet-Nam's present predicament.\n2. Among the highlights of Mr. Kissinger's visit was a luncheon at\nDanang on October 26 hosted by First Corps Commander Brigadier General Nguyen\nChanh Thi and attended by a number of key personalities, including the commanders\nof the First and Second Division and four of the five Province Chiefs of I\nCorps. The Hue visit included an informal dinner with ten members of the Hue\nUniversity Faculties and a call on the Venerable Tri Quang as well as other\nreligious leaders, both Catholic and Buddhist.\n3. The purpose of this airgram is to summarize views expressed to\nMr. Kissinger by the various Vietnamese personalities encountered. The two\nmost frequently discussed topics were the progress and eventual outcome of\nthe war and the present domestic political situation. Therefore this report\nconfines itself to what was said on these two topics.\nProgress and Eventual Outcome of the War\n4. There seemed to be a concensus that the military situation in the\nI Corps area is better than it was six months ago. As was to be expected,\nopinions varied widely on how much improvement had actually taken place.\nGeneral Thi and First Division commander General Chuan seemed particularly\noptimistic claiming that the VC now operate in only remote areas and rarely\ndare descend from the foothills into the plains to harass the population.\nThe Province Chief of Quang Ngai expressed similar sentiments. In one con-\nversation, General Chuan predicted that the VC would be defeated by the end\nof 1966. (Some of General Chuan's remarks will be reported in a seperate\nmemorandum.)\n5. Others were not quite so encouraged by recent developments. The\nProvince Chief of Quang Nam felt that the military situation in his province\nwas about as tough as it ever had been. The Police Chief of Thua Thien Province\nfelt that despite recent military victories the VC' S grip over the countryside\nhad not yet been significantly diminished. Many of the Buddhist-oriented\nintellectuals in Hue expressed the view that military victories in themselves,\nwhile not meaningless, must be supplemented by GVN activity to alleviate\nsuffering in the countryside. This is not being done and until it is the\nGVN will not have a meaningful political base which can resist VC influence.\nThe Venerable Tri Quang also expressed this opinion. (Mr. Kissinger's\nconversation with Tri Quang is reported separately .)\nCONFIDENTIAL\nEnclosure #13\nPage #2, A- 285\nfrom Saigon\n6. In expressing views about the eventual outcome of the war, many\npersons interviewed by Mr. Kissinger criticized the U.S. for not making\nits war aims in Viet-Nam entirely clear. General Chuan, for example, said\nhe assumed that the U.S. was not using strategic bombers over North Viet-Nam\nbecause we wanted to leave the door open for negotiations, but he wasn't\nsure.\n7. Several intellectuals and Buddhist leaders in Hue, most notably\nHoang Van Giau and Tri Quang, said that the eventual outcome of the war\ncannot be predicted without a better knowledge of U.S. intentions. Does\nthe U.S. want to return to the conditions of the Geneva Convention of 1954?\nDoes it want to liberate North Viet-Nam? Or does it want to take the conflict\nto its real source, e.g., Communist China? Quang commented that despite several\nspeeches by President Johnson on the subject of Viet-Nam, he (Quang) felt that\nout policy was still not sufficiently clear. Quang said he would personally\nfavor a return to the conditions of 1954 first, leaving considerations of\nunification, liberation, etc., to some future date.\n8. With respect to the prospect of negotiations or a ceasefire, a\nfairly common argument advanced was that the GVN infrastructure in the country-\nside is still too weak to prevent a political takeover by the VC in the event\nof a ceasefire. The Rector of Hue University, Bui Tuong Huan, said that it\nwould take at least two more years of building a GVN political base in rural\nareas before it could risk negotiating or a ceasefire. Several Hue University\nprofessors as well as Tri Quang commented that thepresent GVN has no right to\nspeak for the Vietnamese people on matters of such importance since it does\nnot have a broad popular base. Bui Tuong Huan questioned the government's\nlegitimacy and hence its right to wage war or make peace.\nPresent Political Situation\n9. A number of non-official personalities told Mr. Kissinger that in\ntheir opinion the present GVN is incapable of coping with the complicated\nproblems it faces. A frequent comment was that the GVN has done little to\nalleviate the misery and suffering of the people. Another complaint was that\nthe government is not a representative one. Several persons, including Bui\nTuong Huan, proposed that some sort of formula for representative government\nbe established. Huan felt that a representative government in power for two\nyears or so could take the harsh measures necessary to bring the war to a\nsuccessful conclusion whereas the present government could not.\n10. Though quite a few persons complained about the present government,\nnone said that they had any specific persons in mind as suitable alternates\nto the country's present leaders. Several said that it was not a question of\npersonalities but of the system. Tri Quang commented that to think in terms\nof a few individuals would be to \"encourage dictatorship.\"\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nEnclosure #13\nPage #3, A- 285\nfrom Saigon\n11. In discussions about the present domestic situation, the U. S.\ngovernment was not always spared criticism. Several of the Hue professors\nvoiced their familiar complaint that the U.S. was not doing enough to assure\nthat its aid reaches people in the countryside. Others questioned the wisdom\nof our supporting a military government. Tri Quang said he thought there was\na dangerous similarity between our support for the present GVN and our support\nfor military governments in Korea and Thailand.\n12. Despite these criticisms and expressions of discontent, none of the\npersons to whom Mr. Kissinger spoke gave the impression that Hue would be the\nscene of overt anti-GVN activity in the near future. Moreover, attitudes\nexpressed towards the U.S. seemed to indicate a reconciliation of the military\nneed for massive U.S. presence with the understandable desire for Vietnamese\nindependence. Most persons spoke in terms of making the best use of our\npresence rather than questioning its desirability. Tri Quang summed up his\nattitude towards both the GVN and U.S. presence in Viet-Nam by saying, \"If\nwe had found either of them really objectionable we would have been in the\nstreets a long time ago.\"\n13. The sentiments expressed to Mr. Kissinger and the reporting officer\nby Buddhist leaders in Hue gave the impression of a lack of commitment to the\nGVN cause while at the same time avoiding an attitude of \"peac.e at any price.\"\nThe dilemma posed by a longing for peace and a simultaneous desire not to\nlive under communist rule undoubtedly explains the imprecise and sometimes\ncontradictory reasoning frequently advanced by these leaders."
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