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    "label": "Memorandum of Conversation [MemCon] Secretary Robert McNamara and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder",
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    "title": "Memorandum of Conversation [MemCon] Secretary Robert McNamara and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6036658",
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        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
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    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
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    "ocrText": "COPY\nSECRET\nMeeting, Tuesday, October 16th\nPresent:\nSecretary McNamara\nGerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister\nDASD Rowen\nHenrich Knappstein, Ambassador\nWilliam Tyler, State\nAlbert Reinkemeyer, Chief Soviet Affairs\nSection, Foreign Office\nMajGen Steinhoff, German Representative\nMilitary Committee\nHerman Kusterer, Interpreter\nMinister Schroeder began by asking Mr. McNamara's impressions on his recent\nvisit to Germany.\nSecretary McNamara said the trip was very brief. He went to lower units to check\non alertness, training, logistics, and their ability to use conventional or\nnuclear weapons. He had found state of readiness of U.S. and FRG units\nexcellent. However, he felt that they seemed far too dependent on nuclears.\nThere is a need for greater emphasis on non-nuclear conflict without depreci-\nating nuclears. The focus on nuclear weapons stems from focus on massive\nSoviet aggression. If such an attack occurred, we must use them early and\nmassively. But it is a weakness in our planning to focus on this case. We\nshould give attention to other contingencies. Lower echelons are of course not\nresponsible. They get this attitude from their seniors.\nThe security procedures at FRG wing were impressive. Both U.S. and FRG\nunits are at a high state of effectiveness.\nMinister Schroeder expressed pleasure at the impression of high alertness.\nOn the basic attitude toward nuclears, if Khrushchev sees this, he would get\nimpression that these people are ready for a nuclear war and this would make\nhim more cautious than he otherwise might be. Certainly sufficient con-\nventional preparations are required. Minister Schroeder then said that the\nmain purpose of his visit was to determine that all Berlin contingencies\nhave been anticipated.\nWould like to discuss a possibility that has been discussed with Mr.\nRusk.\nAssume, for example, that on 1 November a visa required for civilian\ntravel to Berlin. People must apply for visas. These might be issued at\ncheck points. What should be done?\na. Simply accept visas and do nothing. Worst thing to do. He rejects\nthis choice.\nb. Don't accept visas. Regard this as blockage of civilian traffic.\nImplement contingency plans, which relate civilian to military traffic.\nSECRET\nSECRET\nC. Give warning on interzonal trade. If visa requirement is not\ncanceled FRG will take economic countermeasures. Also there will be action\non a NATO level.\nAssume that 1 November approaches. There is an appeal to people not to\ntravel unless essential. Surface traffic is down, air travel up.\nNovember passes by, but visa requirement left on.\nAlternatively, assume Khrushchev signs peace treaty on 1 December to\nbe in force on 1 January. This ends allied rights to Berlin and no rights\nto traffic except by dealing with Pankow. Pankow might say no immediate\nchanges. You can stay in Berlin for six months. But we are issuing new\ndocuments available at checkpoints.\nMinister Schroeder then drew this conclusion: The more we give in on\ncivilian traffic, the worse off we will be on military traffic once having\naccepted a change of procedure on civilian traffic. And what would world\nopinion require in case II (military traffic), the West having acquiesced\nin case I (civilian traffic).\nSecretary McNamara said he would defer to Mr. Rusk's opinion on these\nmatters. However, speaking personally, he feels we cannot allow salami\nslice on civilian access without conditioning Khrushchev on military access.\nHowever, for Khrushchev to think that we might respond with nuclear weapons\nto this provocation is simply incredible.\nMinister Schroeder said he wanted to suggest deficiencies in our con-\ntingency planning.\nSecretary McNamara said that in this case we would be in Phase I of\ncontingency planning and that contingency plans would apply.\nMinister Schroeder said that these are difficult questions: It is hard to\nknow just how to react. If concession is accepted on vital requirement and\nwe try to offset with other countermeasures there would be a major setback.\nBut can one for psychological, military, and political reasons declare this\naction a blockage of access. It will appear to be a small change in procedure.\nIt is possible for the other side to play the game so that instead of a stamp\non an identity card, a driver would have to get a visa.\nAn evaluation of this contingency is needed, including an estimate of\nthe state of world opinion.\nMinister Schroeder has learned that even some Congressmen have traveled\non the surface and accepted visas.\n2\nSECRET\nSECRET\nSecretary McNamara replied that this was mostly a political question. We\nhave the military capability to move the present volume of traffic by air.\nThis presents Soviets with an interesting problem. He said that he, personally,\nwould favor going to air movement at this stage.\nMinister Schroeder replied that then all traffic is by air. There are\nnow 120,000 people a month; this would call for 600,000 more.\nSecretary McNamara said that this could be managed.\nMinister Schroeder argued that goods supplies make air delivery more\ndifficult. And to some extent this step involves blocking oneself.\nSecretary McNamara said take it step by step. 600,000 people is 20,000\na day. 1000 people per hour and 150 people can be carried per plane. This\nmeans only 6 more planes an hour. This would be difficult to manage but we\ncould rearrange aircraft. From his point of view, this is not an insurmount-\nable problem. If we are willing to pay political price of this altemative\nwe have means. As to goods, these also can be handled.\nMinister Schroeder said that we would be blocking ourselves and economic\nmeasures may not bring about change.\nSecretary McNamara replied that he assumed that we would be in Phase I and\nhave a range of political and military measures to adopt at this stage.\nMr. Rowen said that the air movement possibility gives us the choice of\nimmediate or delayed action on other measures.\nMinister Schroeder said that this is a possibility for civilian traffic.\nBut it is not easy for normal goods, including raw materiel. The air\ntransport portion of goods traffic is now a small part of surface goods\ntraffic. Berlin could not have normal life in this circumstance.\nSecretary McNamara said he agreed. But how would visa requirements affect\ngoods traffic?\nAmbassador Knappstein - it affects mostly trucks and barges.\nMinister Schroeder replied that the GDR says that this is our sovereign\nterritory and it issues licenses on goods.\nSecretary McNamara said we could move to rail shipment. It was his under-\nstanding that the FRG already gets permission to move by rail.\nMinister Schroeder said this was quite true. But the number of good\ntrains is quite limited.\nSecretary McNamara said that at least we could keep goods moving by train.\nSECRET\nSECRET\nMinister Schroeder said that he only wanted to show that one needs a clear\nview and to take a clear decision on when land access should be kept open by\nforce.\nSecretary McNamara said he had firm views on this, but that he was not\nspeaking for his government. What were Minister Schroeder's views?\nMinister Schroeder replied that he couldn't commit the FRG. These are\nhard questions and people don't like to face them. Speaking personally, he\nindicated he is rather inclined to take a strict view. Because we either\naccept a defeat or have freedom of action restricted. The Berliners seem to\nfeel that not too much importance should be placed on the paper requirements.\nThere is a difference in outlook here as compared with the FRG. There is\nlittle inclination in having to go to the air. He said that when he returned\nhome he would raise this matter for a free and frank discussion at govern-\nment level. It is useful to get American attitudes.\nSecretary McNamara agreed that we must remain firm to avoid slow erosion.\nThe acceptance of slow erosion is most dangerous because it lays foundation\nfor serious miscalculation by the Soviet Union. This is most dangerous\npossibility.\nMinister Schroeder expressed gratitude for Secretary McNamara's comments.\nThis is not a matter on how to fight but rather dealing correctly with situations\nthat arise beforehand. To return to contingency planning in general. What\nare the deficiencies? And what is the possibility and the conditions for FRG\nparticipation.\nSecretary McNamara said that he personally feels that contingency planning\nhas been unrealistic. It should be more detailed. Each country should assume\nthat the events in question are much more likely to occur. If so, there would\nbe more detailed planning. There should be less on the likelihood of these\ncontingencies and more on what to do if they come. Assume, e.g., imposition\nof visa requirements. We should have responses written down. To go back to\na point of Minister Schroeder's, the question is not will the West fight. Of\ncourse it will in certain circumstances. But it must be able to deal with\nsituations that will probably arise.\nSecretary McNamara then turned to the FRG defense budget which he\ndescribed as part of the scene. The FRG defense budget is too low in\nrelation to needs. This leads to an interpretation by Khrushchev that the\nWest is weak. This is only one factor. The U.S. has its problems as does\nFrance.\nMinister Schroeder said that one should look at military expenditures\nover time. The FRG is the only country that has increased its defense budget\nby 1/3 since 1960. Khrushchev is impressed by this. Khrushchev doesn't think\nthat the FRG contribution is a small one. This doesn't mean, however, that it\n4\nSECRET\nSECRET\nshouldn't be increased. International comparison: 4.9% for FRG vs 7%\nfor France and Britain are misleading. The latter include R&D expenditures\nthat benefit civilian economy. All FRG spending is for NATO and all forces\nare assigned to NATO.\nHowever, civil infrastructure and civil defense planning has not reached\nthe stage that it should have. The weakness in the civilian side.\nSecretary McNamara agreed that part of difference is R&D in France and\nUK. But this shouldn't be exaggerated. The U.S. regards R&D as a\ndiversion from the private economy.\nOn manpower, the FRG has .74% of population in defense; U.S. is double\nthis. He added that there should be no misunderstanding. The FRG contri-\nbution has been great. But when FRG has only 1/2 the percent of men as U.S.\nor France, Khrushchev can interpret this as weakness. Especially since NATO\ngoals of FRG are not met. He said that he can understand FRG economic problems\nand civilian demands. But if examined from outside, FRG contribution doesn't\nlook too good.\nMinister Schroeder replied that the FRG is very close to UK in manpower\npercentage and the FRG has national service and UK does not. As for France\nand U.S., France has large part of its army still in Algeria. FRG has a\nsmall area and especially needs a healthy economy. There is a shortage of\ntraining areas. It differs from other countries that also have world-wide\ncommitments.\nMinister Schroeder returned to contingency plans. He agreed that\nSecretary McNamara's judgment was severe and probably right. Yesterday he\nhad the impression that this planning might be done under a general staff -\noperational staff procedure. And that there should be gaming of possibilities.\nMr. Tyler said that 3. war game is now planned.\nSecretary McNamara said that the U.S. does most of our planning on the\nbasis of operational planning.\nMinister Schroeder said that there was no problem for FRG in doing this\ntype of planning on the military and political side. But it lagged in civil\ndefense and emergency planning.\nSecretary McNamara then asked Minister Schroeder how he felt we should\nproceed on MRBM's?\nMinister Schroeder replied that the FRG's attitude was unchanged and\nhad been positive for some time. Mr. McNamara's Athens speech was very much\nto the point and he agreed. He expressed doubt about attacking only military\ntargets, but said that this was a minor point.\n5\nSECRET\nSECRET\nHe added that it would be best if only U.S. had nuclears, but that\nunlikely to happen again. Next best, only U.S. and Soviet Union. Fact\nthat France and UK have nuclears makes it cumbersome and awkward and dis-\nturbing. This was his opinion. But France and UK have some nuclear capa-\nbility. This is a problem. This also an obstacle to an MRBM force. The\nFRG is prepared to cooperate in the MRBM project. It regrets that France\nand UK are so negative - for obvious reasons.\nIn Europe there is some speculation that after UK has entered the\nCommon Market there will be a better chance to deal with the nuclear problem.\nThis prospect is vague, but he wouldn't exclude it.\nSecretary McNamara said that the MRBM is under development and not being\ndelayed by these discussions. However, if NATO wants to proceed it should\nrecognize the costs of the force and its relation to the costs of other needed\nforces.\nMinister Schroeder said that this is a long term problem and the point is\na political and psychological one rather than a military. That's why the FRG\nfavors the force.\n6\nSECRET"
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