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OCR Page 1 of 6TOP SEGRET
2. Measures should be businesslike, realistic, and
not ballyhooed.
3. From a moderate start, tempo should rise.
4. US should avoid scaring Allies and blocking Soviet
way out.
5. Main preparations for non-nuclear ground action in
Europe.
6. Phased parallel preparations: nuclear, civil
defense, world-wide.
7.
No MRBM development, nuclear aid to France, Cuba,
or Laos.
B. JCS
1. Preparations should emphasize strategic nuclear
strength.
2. Early partial mobilization needed.
3. Allies probably unwilling to make non-nuclear
preparations.
4. US should develop land-based MRBM, give France
nuclear aid, and intervene in Cuba and Laos.
C. Suggested Defense Position
1. Time is required to mobilize and deploy; risky
to be too gradual.
2.
To use non-nuclear ground force in Europe, we
must begin mobilizing some months beforehand.
3. Allies apt to follow US lead.
4. Support Acheson.
IV. Nuclear Aspects of Preparations
A. Acheson
1.
Some strengthening and readying of nuclear forces
should accompany conventional force improvement.
2.
By creating crisis Khrushchev shows existing pattern
of nuclear deterrence not convincing; more of same
helps little.
3.
Absence of nuclear measures could increase Khrushchev
doubts and US vulnerability.
4. Whatever its size, danger of Soviet pre-emption grows,
so some SAC air alert is in order
5.
Political control of US nukes needs tightening.
B. JCS
1.
US preparations should emphasize nuclear measures.
2. US should improve nuclear readiness of Allies.
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