Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis
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OCR Page 1 of 38SECRET
I. Foreword
A. The Nature of the Issue
The issue over Berlin, which Khrushchev is now moving
toward a crisis to take place, so he says, toward the end
of 1961, is far more than an issue over that city. It is
broader and deeper than even the German question as a whole.
It has become an issue of resolution between the U.S.A. and
the U.S.S.R., the outcome of which will go far to determine
the confidence of Europe -- indeed, of the world -- in the
United States. It is not too much to say that the whole
position of the United States is in the balance.
Until this conflict of wills is resolved, an attempt
to solve the Berlin issue by negotiation is worse than a
waste of time and energy. It is dangerous. This is so
because what can be accomplished by negotiation depends on
the state of mind of Khrushchev and his colleagues.
At present, Khrushchev has demonstrated that he believes
his will will prevail because the United States and its
allies will not do what is necessary to stop him. He cannot
be persuaded by eloquence or logic, or cajoled by friendliness.
As Sir William Hayter has written, "The only way of changing
/the Russians'/ purpose is to demonstrate that
what
they want to do is not possible."
Until that demonstration is made, no negotiation can
accomplish more than to cover with face-saving devices sub-
mission to Soviet demands.
Once the demonstration has been made, negotiation can
resolve the issue in a number of ways, from face=saving for
a Soviet retreat to mutual concessions on non-vital matters.
Solutions of this nature are outlined in Chapter III, below.
To offer any concessions now, however, will only result
in an appearance of weakness and real impairment of future
negotiating position.
Ambassador Thompson has stated the principal objectives
of the Berlin offensive:
1.
To stabilize the regime in East Germany and
prepare the way for the eventual recognition of
the East German regime;
2.
To
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