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{
    "localId": "6037286",
    "label": "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)",
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{
    "id": "6037286",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037286",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037286",
    "collections": [
        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
        "Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
    ],
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    "naId": 6037286,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 26,
            "logicalDate": "1961-06-26",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1961
        }
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    "seq": 2,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/86/372/6037286/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-16/Memo-For-SecDef-June-26-1961-002.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n4. The conclusions to the three appended studies, which are based\non the assumption that nuclear weapons will not be employed by either\nside, are summarized as follows:\na. Military Measures Worldwide\n(1) The early execution by the United States of the measures\nenumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits\nassumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected\nto influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The\nmilitary actions can be taken only if the necessary political\ndecisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit\nin such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of\ngeneral war.\n(2) The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in\nmost cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied\ncooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest\nin the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the\nFederal Republic of Germany (FRG). United States action alone\nis feasible only to the extent that the Allies will permit the use\nof their national territories and that the action contemplated\ndoes not involve the sovereignty of an Ally. The measures are\ndesigned to be a clear demonstration of US determination and\nleadership which could be expected not only to influence the\nSoviet decision-making process, but also to restore the confidence\nof our Allies in the United States and to obtain their full\ncooperation and support.\n(3) Although a measure of Allied agreement could probably\nbe obtained for the early execution of some of the measures\nenvisaged in Annex C to Appendix A (e.g., increase state of\nreadiness of US forces worldwide, but particularly in Europe),\nit is doubtful that US Allies, in the absence of a clear-cut Soviet-\ninspired Berlin incident, would agree to a rapid and systematic\nbuild-up for limited nonnuclear war in Central Europe together\nwith the risk of general war.\n(4) The execution of the measures envisaged in Annex C to\nAppendix A is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect on\nthe Soviets. There is a possibility, however, that the Soviets\nmight react by taking military counteractions to pre-empt US\n2\nTOP SECRET"
}