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you SEGRER
TOP SECRET
DISCUSSION
4. For discussion, see Annex hereto.
1
CONCLUSIONS
5. Under the assumption that the USSR does not employ nuclear
2
weapons, the estimated forces required are:
3
a. When opposed by GDR forces alone. The Joint Chiefs of
4
Staff reaffirm their view that the hypothesis of opposition
5
from GDR forces alone is invalid, and that there is no sub-
6
stantive difference between GDR and Soviet military forces.
7
However, using present active GDR forces as a unit of measure-
8
ment (6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircraft), it is
9
considered that a balanced force of seven divisions supported
10
by four tactical air wings could reopen access to Berlin.
11
This size force is based on the assumption that political
12
limitations restrict military operations to the axis of the
13
Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the air forces to defensive
14
operations only.
15
b. When opposed by readily available USSR and GDR forces
16
in the area of East Germany only. Under such a situation the
17
hostilities could not be limited to the Helmstedt-Berlir
18
corridor alone. Operations would have to be conducted to
19
meet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throughout East Germany 20
with the objective of establishing a defense line on the Oder- 21
Neisse River line. Forces on the order of 50 allied divisions 22
and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be
23
required to achieve this objective.
24
TOP SECRET
JCSM-431-61
22
Appendix B
HODE SBCRE
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"ocrText": "you SEGRER\nTOP SECRET\nDISCUSSION\n4. For discussion, see Annex hereto.\n1\nCONCLUSIONS\n5. Under the assumption that the USSR does not employ nuclear\n2\nweapons, the estimated forces required are:\n3\na. When opposed by GDR forces alone. The Joint Chiefs of\n4\nStaff reaffirm their view that the hypothesis of opposition\n5\nfrom GDR forces alone is invalid, and that there is no sub-\n6\nstantive difference between GDR and Soviet military forces.\n7\nHowever, using present active GDR forces as a unit of measure-\n8\nment (6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircraft), it is\n9\nconsidered that a balanced force of seven divisions supported\n10\nby four tactical air wings could reopen access to Berlin.\n11\nThis size force is based on the assumption that political\n12\nlimitations restrict military operations to the axis of the\n13\nHelmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the air forces to defensive\n14\noperations only.\n15\nb. When opposed by readily available USSR and GDR forces\n16\nin the area of East Germany only. Under such a situation the\n17\nhostilities could not be limited to the Helmstedt-Berlir\n18\ncorridor alone. Operations would have to be conducted to\n19\nmeet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throughout East Germany 20\nwith the objective of establishing a defense line on the Oder- 21\nNeisse River line. Forces on the order of 50 allied divisions 22\nand a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be\n23\nrequired to achieve this objective.\n24\nTOP SECRET\nJCSM-431-61\n22\nAppendix B\nHODE SBCRE"
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