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DINITZ June 4-October 31, 1973 [3 of 3]
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DINITZ June 4-October 31, 1973 [3 of 3]
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Henry A. Kissinger's (HAK) Office Files
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 01-31/5 5pp.
Exempted per see. 1.4 (c)(d) E012958 1tr. AUG 1 2007
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
5
ON EITHER THE
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA
FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122)
LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 3/04)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Divite tile
MEMORANDUM
upstairs
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 11, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
PETER W. RODMAN punk
SUBJECT:
Nigeria May Be About to Break Relations
with Israel
General Gowon has summoned the Israeli Ambassador in Lagos in for
an appointment tomorrow. This is an extraordinary step, since
Gowon rarely sees Ambassadors, and the Israelis are convinced this
is the occasion for a break in diplomatic relations.
The Israelis (Shalev) are asking you personally to intervene with
the Nigerians tonight to try to head this off.
They have heard you have an appointment with Foreign Minister
Arikpo tomorrow, but this will probably be too late. Arikpo is
tonight in New York with their UN delegation.
The Israelis hope you can convince him that such a step, in the
middle of a conflict, by such an important country, is a kind of
interference in the Mideast conflict, and would be damaging to free
world interests.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
[SANITIZED
SANITIZED COPY
3.3(b)(1)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
October 10, 1973
TO:
AMBASSADOR KEATING, TEL AVIV
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR.
1. The Israelis have been giving us here lists of equipment which
they require on priority basis -- aircraft; ordnance, ammunition, and
accessories for aircraft, electronic equipment; and anti-tank weapons
and ammunition
2. The President last night approved furnishing all the requested
consumables on urgent basis, with exception of laser bombs. As for
aircraft, there will be immediate delivery of two F-4s already scheduled
for delivery now, plus three additional, for total of five.
3. The President in addition has given formal assurance of
replacement of all repeat all aircraft and tank losses. Schedule of
delivery is to be worked out here with Defense Department.
4. This Presidential decision was conveyed by me personally to
Ambassador Dinitz last night, who has informed Prime Minister. This
information is for your eyes only.
5. Warm regards and much admiration for your superb effort
and reporting. You seem to invite wars wherever you go but you have
done well.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
PWRGen S:wgh: 10 Oct 73
NLN 01-31/6 AUG 1 2007
SANITIZED COPY
By
of
NARA, Date 50ct 07
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Dinitz f.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATION
WASHINGTON
October 17, 1973
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Henry,
I met with Dinitz at 12:45 and passed on the message regarding ceasefire
linked to Resolution 242. He said he would pass it immediately to the
Prime Minister and get back to us as quickly as possible.
Dinitz said that the Prime Minister had asked him to express to the
President and to you her appreciation and enthusiasm, and that of Israel,
for what the United States is doing. Mrs. Meir says that she is sure the
President is mindful of the political and strategic implications of the U.S.
action but she is not sure that he fully appreciates how much the U.S.
actions have done for the morale of the fighting forces in Israel.
Regarding the military situation, Dinitz said that the force west of the
Canal was still operating and that "several scores¹¹ of tanks were in the
force. He says there is a heavy tank battle on the east bank of the Canal
opposite the Israeli strike force on the west bank. The Israelis hope to
clear this area near Devesoir and are planning to put a pontoon bridge
across the Canal at that point.
The Syrian front is relatively quiet although they anticipate that the Iraqis
are preparing to mount an attack.
Dinitz had several questions regarding resupply. He requested to know
what the delivery policy on F4's over the next few days would be and
also when and how many A4's we were planning to deliver. He reiterated
an urgent need for bridging material, especially in light of the battle
report which he had just presented. He reminded that they had requested
50 helicopters, but said they would take any number they could get in a
hurry. He expressed appreciation for the TOW missiles being provided,
but asked if there were any more available anywhere, either off the
production line or perhaps going to the FRG (in this case, he said that
Golda would ask Willy Brandt to acquiesce in their diversion.) He said
that Israel is attempting to destroy Egyptian armored forces and that the
TOW is urgently needed for that.
Latest cumulative losses: 27F-4, 48 A-4, 11 Mirage, 6 Super-Mystere,
2 helicopters.
Brent
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 01-31/7 app. 2
AUG 1 200
Exempted per sec. 1.4 1(c)(d) E012958 Hr.
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
1
ON EITHER THE
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA
FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122)
LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 3/04)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Ambassador Dinitz Situation Report (as dictated by Larry Eagleburger)
1. There were battles throughout the night in the Suez City area.
At 5:30 a.m. local time the Egyptians announced their acceptance of the
ceasefire; the ceasefire took effect at 7:00 a.m. At that time the Israelis
were in complete control of access routes to the Egyptian third army.
2. Dayan met with Silvaso, the UN TSO Chief to agree upon observation
posts. Silvaso then left to establish the posts.
3. Shortly thereafter a local battle started along the Canal, with the
Egyptians trying to break the siege. One Egyptian force attacked eastward
toward Mitla and succeeded in making moderate advances. The Israelis
then attacked with artillery to block the advance. The Egyptian force is
still some distance from its original attack positions.
4. Around noon local time the Egyptians decided to break out towards
the Canal and northward (at the southern end of Bitter Lake). These attacks
were combined tank, artillery and Air Force operations by the Egyptians.
During the course of the battle the Israelis shot down 15 of the 30 Egyptian
aircraft involved. There were no Israeli losses.
5. In sum there has been no fighting on the west side of the Canal;
two of the three divisions (Egyptian divisions) on the East Bank are engaged
with Israeli forces eastward; the third division is trying to break out westward
and northward.
6. Dinitz emphasizes that Israeli instructions are that their forces are
to do nothing but block and contain Egyptian forces.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVEL EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
Minister Mordechai Shalev of Israel
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, October 9, 1973
6:10 - 6:35 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
The White House
Secretary Kissinger: On your special requests, the President has approved
the entire list of consumables, that is, ordnance, electronic equipment
everything on the list except laser bombs. The President has agreed
and let me repeat this formally -- that all your aircraft and tank losses
will be replaced. Of the tanks you will be getting, a substantial number
will be M-60's, our newest. As for the planes, for immediate delivery;
you will be getting 5 F-4's, 2 plus 3. For the rest, you will work out a
schedule.
Ambassador Dinitz: It's a question of days, Dr. Kissinger.
Secretary Kissinger: It will be a matter of days. On the anti-tank ammuni-
tion and anti-tank weapons, Schlesinger is all set. You know whom to get
in touch with at Defense. If there is any trouble, contact Scowcroft. This
is everything else on the list, except the laser bombs and aircraft. On
tanks, you will have to work out a schedule.
At the end of the week we can see what is urgent.
Ambassador Dinitz: We will take it all by plane.
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
AUG
1 2007
Reproduced at the Richard NixonPresidental Be Library. NARA, Date 3 Oct. 07
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-2-
Secretary Kissinger: That's agreed. But you have to paint El A1 out. This
is for maximum security.
Ambassador Dinitz: Our people who I just spoke to said General Sumner said
you wouldn't accept our planes even with El Al painted out.
Secretary Kissinger: Oh baloney. You will see a rapid change.
If the need is acute, you'll see a speedup of tanks.
Dinitz: Can you get some through from Europe?
Secretary Kissinger: There is some possibility. We have some at Leghorn.
At the end of the week we can see where we stand. The problem of tanks isn't
what you need in this battle, but the situation after this battle. You have
assurances that you will have replacements. You have the additional assur-
ance that if it should go very badly and there is an emergency, we will get the
tanks in even if we have to do it with American planes.
It is absolutely essential also that Senators and Congressmen don't go around
attacking the President. Ribicoff called me to say there is a story going
around that I kept you from preempting.
Ambassador Dinitz: That's ridiculous.
Secretary Kissinger: That is the story that is going around. They say I kept
you from preempting.
Ambassador Dinitz: I know the source. I'll handle it.
Secretary Kissinger: You don't need to say that something is going on -- we
don't need that -- but just keep people from going around attacking us.
Now what is the military situation?
Ambassador Dinitz: The military situation is more encouraging. On the
Golan Heights, we have pushed the Syrian forces almost off all the Heights,
except at the very edge of the ceasefire line. There are some forces that
are not destroyed. Today we destroyed hundreds of Syrian tanks. The
missile setup of the Syrians was quiet today, most probably a result of air-
strikes yesterday. Also it is possible that they don't want to reveal them-
selves.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
4.20fs]
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET / SE SITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-3-
Secretary Kissinger: From the strike on Damascus?
Ambassador Dinitz: That was strategically important because of direct hits
on the targets I listed to you. About the other casualties, I don't know.
On the Suez front, we are at five to eight kilometers all along the Canal.
Compared to yesterday, this is two to three kilometers nearer.
Today we operated carefully and contact was limited. We took out the tanks
but suffered hits.
In the afternoon, 50 Egyptian tanks began to move south to Abu Rudeis. Our
Air Force liquidated thirty and the rest were finished off by our armor.
So this is encouraging news, and with the new equipment we'll be able to strike.
Secretary Kissinger: OK. You get in touch with our military people. They
shouldn't talk all over the Pentagon.
Ambassador Dinitz: We'll deal with General Sumner, not Noyes.
Secretary Kissinger: Scowcroft is here in my office to coordinate.
Ambassador Dinitz: He was very helpful to us last night.
Secretary Kissinger: I'm glad he's helpful to somebody! [Laughter]
Ambassador Dinitz: I shouldn't tell tales out of school but I tell people that
you only yell at people you trust.
Secretary Kissinger: Only at people I know can do better work. I never
yell at Scowcroft. [Laughter]
OK, can I speak to you alone for five minutes?
[Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Dinitz spoke alone from 6:25 to
6:35 p.m.]
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
[p. 3 of 3]
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Dinitz file
upstaire
THE WHITE HOUSE
URGENT
washington
CONFIDENTIAL
October 9, 1973
shaber called
11:55
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
B
FROM:
PETER W. RODMAN PUB
SUBJECT:
Dinitz Wants Your View of Proposed
Senate Resolution on Arms Aid
Ambassador Dinitz called at 7:05 p.m. and read me the text of a
proposed Senate resolution
on
which he has held up until he has
checked it with you. It has not yet been submitted and will not be
circulated at least until Wednesday morning.
Shalev
He will be reachable tonight for your approval or any suggested
changes.
The text follows:
"Whereas Egypt and Syria, having spurned the efforts of the
United States to bring the parties to the current conflict in the
Middle East to the peace table, have instead launched an all-
out attack on Israel using large quantities of the most sophis-
ticated weapons of war that the Soviet Union has supplied to
them,
"Whereas Israel was aware of the possibility of an all-out
attack but held its fire in order to observe the peace,
"And whereas Israel is now valiantly resisting this aggression,
"Therefore be it resolved that it is the sense of the Senate:
"That the United States urgently supply Israel with the mili-
tary materiel that it requires to defend itself against Arab
aggression,
"And that the United States lend its strongest diplomatic support
in the UN and elsewhere to efforts to achieve a negotiated and
genuine peace among the parties in the conflict. 11
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Handed to HAK by
Dinitz
6:40pm 10/8/73
BATTLE REPORT AS OF 3 o'clock October 8, Israel time
( 9 o'clock in the morning Washington time)
(A) The Syrian Front
1. Hostile Air Action.
(a) The Syrians tried to attack Kuneitra in the
course of the night but our planes interfered with
their attack. The bombs that they dropped did not
strike any target and may possibly have fallen into
Syrian areas.
(b) From the early morning until 3 p.m. there
were 12 Syrian attempts to attack our forces and other
targets in the Golan Heights and one in the north of
Israel. In four cases bombs were dropped in our area,
one or
with small results. In two cases the attacks were
a
prevented by our planes.
(c) The type of planes which took part in the
attacks were primarily Suchoi-7 and Migl7. Special
attention should be drawn to an attempt to attack a
control position of ours in the north of the country
by Suchoi.20 planes. This attack was frustrated and
three of the four planes crashed.
(d) In every attack there were eight attacking
some often
planes with 8 Mig 21s accompanying them. In every
the
case, both attacking and accompanying planes were
shot down.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
(e) Since this morning and up until 3 p.m.
over 30 Syrian fighter planes have been lost to the
Syrians; at least 10 of them on the ground.
(f) In the course of the early afternoon
32 Suchoi-7 planes from Iraq arrived in Syria.
2.
Our Air Action.
(a) Our air force did not operate during the
night.
(b) Between 6:35 a.m. and 6:45 a.m. three
radar stations were attacked.
(c) At 7:20 a.m. we attacked five airfields
with good results. Later the Syrians succeeded in
renewing attacks from some of these airfields
apparently by using the taxiing areas.
(d) Since this morning our air force is
operating in assisting our ground forces.
(e) Our losses up to 3 p.m. are two planes
Lowned by missiles and anti-aircraft.
3. Land operations.
(a) During the night the Syrians stabilized their
positions in our area. In the morning they started
two small attacks.
(b) Our forces went over to a successful counter-
attack. AS a result of the fighting that has been going
on up till now some of the Syrian forces has begun to
withdraw
The battle is continuing.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
(B) The Egyptian Front
1. Enemy Air Attacks.
(a) In the night 7-8 October there were no
attacks by the Egyptian Air Force.
(b) At 7:05 a.m. 12 Mig 17s covered by Mig 2ls
attacked our ground forces on the axis Deversoir -
Feerdan. Very little success.
(c) At 8:40 a.m. about 45 planes of various
types attacked objectives in western Sinai. The
main concentration was on the Rafeedim airfield, Hawk
bases and a control unit in the Sinai. In the air
battles we shot down about 15 planes. Since this
attack up until 3 p.m. there were no further Egyptian
air attacks.
(d) Egypt has begun to receive reinforcements
of fighter planes including 6 mirages from Libya
and in the course of the day a squadron of Mig 2ls
is expected from Algeria.
2. Our Air actions.
(a) Our Air Force continued until aftermid-
night in the attacks on the bridges that the Egyptians
put up across the Canal.
(b) Since this morning our air force is assisting
our ground forces.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
(c) Between 9:20 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. our planes
attacked radar stations at five different places in
Egypt.
(d) At 11:40 a.m. our air force attacked some
of the ground-to-air missile batteries in the Port Said
area.
(e) Our losses up to 2 p.m. are four planes
downed by missiles and anti-aircraft
3. Land operations.
(a) During the night there was little activity.
The Egyptian forces which crossed the Canal organized
themselves in defense and continued in the building
of bridges and their repair.
(b) The Egyptian force which has come across
east of the Canal consists of five infantry divisions
and three tank brigades of which two are equipped with
T62 tanks.
(c) At dawn a number of frog missiles were
fired at the Refeedim airfield.
There were no
casualties or damage.
(d) From the early hours of the morning our
forces are counter-attacking. The Egyptians are
trying to stop the counter-attack and among other
things are launching local counter-attacks of their
own.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
Pinitzfile
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 15, 1973
HK
Henry:
Following is miscellaneous intelligence and operational information
from Dinitz.
On the northern front:
Israeli operations are designed to destroy as much as
possible of the Syrian army. They have no intention of trying
to take Damascus. An Iraqi brigade was put out of action today,
with 34 tanks destroyed. The Israelis have now occupied an
area which completes their control of the Golan Heights and
gives them control of the Jordan, Haifa and Damascus Highway.
The Jordanian brigade is not yet engaged. Dinitz says
even if it becomes involved, the Israelis will not attack Jordan
and the bridges will remain open.
Thirty miles west of the Syrian coast is a Soviet destroyer
with heavy SAM armament. The Israelis think it may be going to
provide cover for Soviet ships unloading military supplies in Syrian
ports.
With regard to the use of the 175 artillery, Dinitz says
it is being used only against the Damascus Airport from which
Syrian combat aircraft are attacking Israeli forces. They have
no intention of using it in any other way or of harming civilians.
They periodically must stop shelling the airport to conserve
ammunition, and he says each time they do they are hit by Syrian
aircraft. He urgently requests 1 15 amms
The Egyptian attack on the Sinai front yesterday was very welcome
to the Israelis, and they are only disappointed it was not repeated
again today. Egypt has now transferred its main reserve units to
the east bank of the Canal. Activity there today is primarily
local engagements.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
Dinitz also gave me the Israeli losses in tanks and aircraft.
F-4's
Lost
25
Grounded more than a week
7
Total
32
A-4's
Lost
46
Grounded
19
Total
65
Mirage/Mystere
Lost
13
Grounded
8
Total
21
Tanks
Destroyed
250
Repairable (1 to 2 weeks)
200
Repairable (2 to 6 weeks)
150
Repairable (6 to 12 weeks)
100
Repairable (Over 3 months)
8
Expected additional combat losses
200
Expected additional damaged
200
Total actual and expected tanks
1,180
out of action
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
Dinitz also asked that I call to your attention an article in the
New York Times today by Les Gelb, the last paragraph of which
states:
"To date, the Israelis have been
content to let President Nixon and
Secretary of State Kissinger manage
the supply issue and the Russians.
Senate sources confirm that the
Israelis have not yet tried to bring
Congressional pressure to bear on
the Administration. 11
B
Brent Scowcroft
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Handed to ITAK by
Dinitz
6:40pm 6:40 pm 10/8/73
BATTLE REPORT AS OF 3 o'clock October 8, Israel time
( 9 o'clock in the morning Washington time)
(A) The Syrian Front
1. Hostile Air Action.
(a) The Syrians tried to attack Kuneitra in the
course of the night but our planes interfered with
their attack. The bombs that they dropped did not
strike any target and may possibly have fallen into
Syrian areas.
(b) From the early morning until 3 p.m. there
were 12 Syrian attempts to attack our forces and other
targets in the Golan Heights and one in the north of
Israel. In four cases bombs were dropped in our area,
one
with small results. In two cases the attacks were
a
prevented by our planes.
(c) The type of planes which took part in the
attacks were primarily Suchoi-7 and Migl7. Special
attention should be drawn to an attempt to attack a
control position of ours in the north of the country
by Suchoi-20 planes. This attack was frustrated and
three of the four planes crashed.
(d) In every attack there were eight attacking
some ofth
planes with 8 Mig 2ls accompanying them. In every
of the
cases both attacking and accompanying planes were
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIEDSThidocuhentms been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
(e) Since this morning and up until 3 p.m.
over 30 Syrian fighter planes have been lost to the
Syrians; at least 10 of them on the ground.
(f) In the course of the early afternoon
32 Suchoi 7 planes from Iraq arrived in Syria.
2.
Our Air Action.
(a) Our air force did not operate during the
night.
(b) Between 6:35 a.m. and 6:45 a.m. three
radar stations were attacked.
(c) At 7:20 a.m. we attacked five airfields
with good results. Later the Syrians succeeded in
renewing attacks from some of these airfields
apparently by using the taxiing areas.
(d) Since this morning our air force is
operating in assisting our ground forces.
(e) þur losses up to 3p.m. are two pianes
downed by missiles and anti-wreruft
3. Land operations.
(a) During the night the Syrians stabilized their
positions in our area. In the morning they started
two small attacks.
(b) Our forces went over to a successful counter-
attack, AS a result of the fighting that has been going
on up till now some of the Syrian force: has begun to
DECLASSIFIED withdraw This document has been reviewed Da pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced The at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
4
(c) Between 9:20 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. our planes
attacked radar stations at five different places in
Egypt.
(d) At 11:40 a.m. our air force attacked some
of the ground-to-air missile batteries in the Port Said
area.
(e) Our losses up to 3 p.m. are four planes
downed leg missiles and anti aircraft
3. Land operations.
(a) During the night there was little activity.
The Egyptian forces which crossed the Canal organized
themselves in defense and continued in the building
of bridges and their repair.
(b) The Egyptian force which has come across
east of the Canal consists of five infantry divisions
and three tank brigades of which two are equipped with
T62 tanks.
(c) At dawn a number of frog missiles were
fired at the Refeedim airfield. There were no
casualties or damage.
(d) From the early hours of the morning our
forces are counter-attacking.
The Egyptians are
trying to stop the counter-attack and among other
things are launching local counter-attacks of their
own.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
(B) The Eqyptian Front
1. Enemy Air Attacks.
(a) In the night 7-8 October there were no
attacks by the Egyptian Air Force.
(b) At 7:05 a.m. 12 Mig 17s covered by Mig 2ls
attacked our ground forces on the axis Deversoir -
Feerdan. Very little success.
(c) At 8:40 a.m. about 45 planes of various
types attacked objectives in western Sinai. The
main concentration was on the Rafeedim airfield, Hawk
bases and a control unit in the Sinai. In the air
battles we shot down about 15 planes. Since this
attack up until 3 p.m. there were no further Egyptian
air attacks.
(d) Egypt has begun to receive reinforcements
of fighter planes including 6 mirages from Libya
and in the course of the day a squadron of Mig 2ls
is expected from Algeria.
2. Our Air actions.
(a) Our Air Force continued until aftermid-
night in the attacks on the bridges that the Egyptians
put up across the Canal.
(b) Since this morning our air force is assisting
our ground forces.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
VIA SPECIAL CHANNEL
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
DELIVER TO PETER RODMAN IN SEALED ENVELOPE
October 5, 1973
TO:
Secretary Kissinger
FROM:
Brent Scowcroft
Minister Shalev called on me at 5:30 p.m. p. and passed
the following informal communication from the Prime Minister:
QUOTE
UNQUOTE
(See attached)
TOP SECRET/SENSTTIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
1. INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN ACCUMULATING OBLIGES US TO TAKE
INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN SYRIA
AND EGYPT, THE BATTLE DEPLOYMENT AND STATE OF ALERT OF THEIR
ARMED FORCES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE INCREASED MILITARY CON-
CENTRATIONS AT THEIR FRONT LINES WITH US, MAY BE MOTIVATED
BY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING TWO POSSIBILITIES:
A. A BONA FIDE ASSESSMENT BY BOTH OR ONE OF THESE COUNTRIES,
FOR WHATEVER REASON, THAT ISRAEL INTENDS TO CARRY OUT
AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST THEM OR AGAINST
ONE OF THEM;
B. THE INTENTION ON THEIR PART - OR ON THE PART OF ONE OF THEM -
TO INITIATE AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST ISRAEL.
2. IN CASE, HOWEVER, THIS DEVELOPMENT STEMS FROM THEIR APPREHEN-
SIONS ABOUT AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION FROM THE SIDE
OF ISRAEL, SUCH APPREHENSIONS ARE COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUND-
ATION. WE WISH TO ASSURE YOU PERSONALLY THAT ISRAEL HAS NO
INTENTION WHATEVER TO INITIATE OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS
AGAINST SYRIA OR EGYPT. WE ARE, ON THE CONTRARY, MOST EAGER
TO CONTRIBUTETOWARDS AN EASING OF THE MILITARY TENSION IN
THE AREA. ON THESE GROUNDS WE WISH, THROUGH YOUR GOOD
OFFICE, TO INFORM THE ARABS AND THE SOVIETS OF OUR ATTITUDE,
WITH THE VIEW OF ALLAYING THEIR SUSPICIONS AND THE AIM OF RESTORING
CALM TO THE AREA.
3. SHOULD SYRIA OR EGYPT INTEND TO LAUNCH OFFENSIVE MILITARY
OPERATIONS, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THEM
IN ADVANCE THAT ISRAEL WILL REACT MILITARILY, WITH FIRMNESS
AND IN GREAT STRENGTH. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO BRING THIS TO THE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ARABS AND SOVIETS THROUGH THE CHANNELS AT
YOUR DISPOSAL.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
10
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 11 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/NODIS
Priorities for shipment as relayed by Senator Jackson
know) (Extent to which this comes from Israelis, I don't t
1. Fifty (50) F-4s (out of a presumed approved
total of 80) required within the next 48 to
72 hours. (When I inquired as to modalities,
it was clear that Jackson's people had not thought
this through, beyond suggesting that Europe would
presumably be the principal source.)
2. Fifty (50) Sky Hawks to be shipped ASAP.
3. Three hundred (300) M-60s--there are Israeli
vessels in Baltimore and Boston which can
accept some portion (perhaps all ?) of these
M-60s. Again, Europe as an alternative quick
source was cited.
4. Thirty (30) CH-53-C helicopters--to be trans-
ported by air.
5. Twenty (2) Cobras--to be transported by air.
6. Ten (10) C-130s--to be transported by air.
TOP SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ARAB ARMIES
Handed C" Den S by
Min. shales, 5 pm,
10/5/73
1. IN THE LAST TEN DAYS THE EGYPTIAN ARMY
HAS REINFORCED ITS DEPLOYMENT IN THE CANAL ZONE.
WITHIN A RANGE OF UP TO 30 KM WEST OF THE CANAL THERE ARE NOW
ABOUT 195 ARTILLERY BATTERIES (INCL. 120 MM MORTARS)
COMPRISING SOME 1100 BARRELS, AS COMPARED WITH THE USUAL
DEPLOYMENT OF 140 BATTERIES (ABOUT 800 BARRELS). IN ADDITION,
PART OF THE TANKS OF THE INFANTRY DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN
ADVANCED TO THE VICINITY OF THE CANAL. CONCENTRATIONS OF
DUG-OUTS FOR VEHICLES AND WATER CROSSING EQUIPMENT IN THIS
AREA HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY OCCUPIED. AT LEAST IN FIVE CONCENTRATIONS
WE HAVE LOCATED, WHAT WITH HIGH PROBABILITY SEEMS TO BE G.S.P.
SELF PROPELLED FERRIES.
ALL ARMS OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY ARE IN A STATE OF HIGH ALERT. THE
INTER SERVICE EXERCISE IS APPARENTLY CONTINUING. ACTIVITY
ШИ
OBSERVED NEAR THE CANAL IS ROUTINE.
2. THE STATE OF ALERT AND THE MOVE INTO EMERGENCY
DISPOSITIONS IN THE SYRIAN ARMY CONTINUES NN THE
FIRST LINE OF DEFENCE (BETWEEN THE CEASE FIRE LINE AND 25 KM
EAST OF IT) 106 ARTILLERY BATTERIES (16-20 BATTERIES MORE THAN
IN PAST EMERGENKY DISPOSITIONS) AND ABOUT 750 TANKS ARE
DEPLOYED. AT THIS STAGE THE DEPLOYMENT IN THE SECOND
LINE OF DEFENCE IS NOT CLEAR TO US, BUT WE ASSESS THAT IT HAS
BEEN OCCUPIED BY PART OF ARMOUR UNITS.
Western Union International, Inc.
THE SYRIANS HAVE ADVANCED SUKHOI FIGHTER BOMBERS TO
RELATIVELY CLOSE AIRFIELDS IN WHICH THEY WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY STATION
THIS IS TRUE AT LEAST FOR DMEIR AIRFIELD. THE OBSERVED ACTIVITY
ALONG THE CEASE FIRE LINE IS ROUTINGE.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been Reproduced reviewed at pursuant the Richard to Executive Nixon Presidential Order 13526 Library. and has been determined to be declassified.
SOVIET ACTIVITY
3. DURING THE NIGHT OF 4-5 OCT, 11 SOVIET PASSENGER PLANES LANDED
ational Telex
IN DAMASCUS AND CAIRO AIRPORTS. SOME HAVE ALREADY TAKEN OFF
IN THE DIRECTION OF USSR.
4. BETWEEN 2350 HRS ON OCTOBER 4 AND 0330 HRS ON OCTOBER 5,
FIVE IL-18 AEROFLOT PASSENGER PLANES, SENT BY THE SOVIET UNION,
LANDED AT DAMASCUS INTERNATIONL AIR PORT. TWO OF THEM ARE
KNOWN TO HAVE LEFT FROM BUDAPEST. ALL FIVE PLANES TOOK OFF FROM
DAMASCUS LATER ON OCTOBE R 5 AND FLEW NORTH. THE PLANES'
TAIL NUMBERS WERE 75454, 75465, 75516, 75602, 75676.
5. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED
RUSSIAN FAMILIES (WOMEN AND CHILDREN) WERE SEENE COLLECTING
AT DAMASCUS AIRPORT - APPARENTLY FOR EVACUATION FROM SYRIA.
6. ON OCTOBER 5 BETWEEN 0020 HRS. AND 0430 HRS SIX AEROFLOT
PASSENGER PLANES SENT BY THE SOVIET UNION LANDED AT CAIRO AERPORT.
Western Union International, Inc.
OF THESE, FOUR WERE IL-18'S AND TWO IS-62'S. FOUR OF THE SIX
Western Union International, Inc.
PLANES TOOK OFF A FEW HOURS LATTER ( BEGINNIG AT 0770 HRS.)
FLYING IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET UNION. TAIL - NUMBERS OF THE It
-18'S WERE. 74262, 75784, 74261, 75894. THE IL -62 TAIL- NUMBERS
WERE 866 98, 866 99.
7. FIVE SOVIET NAVY VESSELS WERE DUE TO SAIL THIS MORNING FROM
THEIR ANCHORAGE IN ALEXANDRIA.
THEY WERE A KOTLIN CLASS DESTRYER, A RIGA CLASS FRIGATE, A
NOTHER SHIP, A SALVAGE RESCUE VESSEL AND A TUG.
THIS LEANES IN ALEXANDRIA ONE F- CLASS SUBMARINE (APPARENT LY IN DRYO
DOCK) AND SIX AUXILLIARY CRAFT, I.E. ALL COMBAT. SHIPS WERE DUE
TO LEAVE THE PORT. AS REGARDS PORT- SAID, THE INTELLIGENCE
ICICA
MONITORING SHIP KRIM, LWFT YESTERDAY ( OCT 4 TH) AND A POLNOCHNY
International Telex
CLASS LANDING SHIP, THES MORNING (OCT 5TH). REMAINING IN THE PORT
ARE A FRIGATE AND A POLNOCHNY CLASS LANDING SHIP. THE MINESWEEPER/
mai
LAYER AT MAERSA MATRUH IS ALSO ESPECTED TO LEAVE.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE3
8
8. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE ALERT MEASURES BEING TAKEM BY
EGYPT AND SYRIA ARE IN PART CONNECTEDWITH MANOEUVRES (AS
REGARDS EGYPT) AND IN PART DUE TO FEARS OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS BY
ISRAEL.
WE CONSIDER THE OPENIN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
AGAINST ISRAEL BY THE TWO ARMIES AS OF LOW PROBABILITY. THE
POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF SOVIETS BY CIVILIAN PLANE AND THE EXPECTED
DEPARURE OF THE MAJORITY OF SOVIE SHIPS IN ALEXANDRIA AND PORT
Western Union International, Inc.
SAID MAY BE A CONSEQUENCE OF A CRISIS IN XX ZT RELATIONS
WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA OF THE RESULT OF A SOVIET ASSESSMENT THAT
HOSTILITIES MAY BREAK OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 12526 Library. and has been determined to be declassified.
nte
Peter
File
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 30, 1973
Henry:
Dinitz called to inform and ask our views
on an Israeli proposal to sell to India 400
gun barrels for 105 mm guns. The Indians
intend to mount them in their British-made
tanks.
The gun barrels are of Israeli manufacture
but, as a courtesy, Israelis wanted to give
us the opportunity to express our views
before proceeding with the transaction.
No objection
Prefer that the sale not be made
Other
Brent
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
D This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to I
Maximum
Ismeli position
(Dinitz comments
Time 15)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has
General Working Principles
1. There should be agreements between the parties based on Resolution 242
in order to achieve a final peace. Completion of the agreements should at
some stage involve direct negotiations among the parties. An interim
settlement is not precluded.
2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized
boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary
agreement among the parties concerned.
4. Mutual arrangements for security could by agreement include demilitarized
zones and effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation
of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal should be assured to all
nations including Israel. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty
over the Canal.
6. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the
Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the
peace treaties must be based.
7. There must be a just settlement of the refugee problem. In reaching an
agreement containing the provisions laying down the obligations accepted
by the parties towards a settlement of the refugee problem, neither party
shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
General Working Principles
1. There should be agreements between the parties based on Resolution 242
in order to achieve a final peace. Completion of the agreements should at
some stage involve direct negotiations among the parties. An interim
settlement is not precluded.
2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized
boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary
agreement among the parties concerned.
4. Mutual arrangements for security could by agreement include demilitarized
zones and effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation
of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal should be assured to all
nations including Israel. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty
over the Canal.
6. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the
Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the
peace treaties must be based.
7. There must be a just settlement of the refugee problem. In reaching an
agreement containing the provisions laying down the obligations accepted
by the parties towards a settlement of the refugee problem, neither party
shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
A
Conformed text
Evening of 28 May 1972
Moscow
General Working Principles
1. The agreement should be comprehensive, covering all parties
and issues. This does not preclude that the implementation occurs in
stages or that some issues are resolved on a priority basis.
2. The agreement should contain provisions for the withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied in 1967.
3. Any border rectifications, which may take place, should result
from voluntary agreement among the parties concerned.
4. Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized
zones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh,
and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate
participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency
and the establishment of peace.
6. Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez
Canal should be assured. This is fully consistent with Egyptian
sovereignty over the Canal.
7. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in
the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on
which the settlement must be based.
8. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a
just basis and in accordance with the appropriate UN decisions.
(Reserved by the US side)
The US position is that completion of the agreements should at some
stage involve negotiations among the signatories.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Givento
Idan
June18
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has
General Working Principles
1.
The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be
embodied in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the
neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict. They
should be based on Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace.
The completion of the agreements should at some stage involve
negotiation between the signatories. Separate agreements on
specific issues are not precluded.
2.
The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and
recognized boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary
agreement between the parties concerned.
4.
Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement include
demilitarized and other security zones; establishment of an international
force including participation of the signatory nations; stationing of such
a force at strategic points; and the most effective international guaran-
tees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the
United States.
5.
Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the
Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which
the peace treaties must be based.
6.
Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the
area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully
consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
7. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just
basis which provides for registering and implementing the choices of
the refugees in ways consistent with national sovereignty and for
compensation.
8. A material breach of the agreement by one of the parties shall entitle
the other to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending its perfor-
mance in whole or in part until the breach is rectified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
General Working Principles
1.
The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be
embodied in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the
neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict. They
should be based on Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace.
The completion of the agreements should at some stage involve
negotiation between the signatories. Separate agreements on
specific issues are not precluded.
2.
The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and
recognized boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary
agreement between the parties concerned.
4.
Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement include
demilitarized and other security zones; establishment of an international
force including participation of the signatory nations; stationing of such
a force at strategic points; and the most effective international guaran-
tees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the
United States.
5. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the
Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which
the peace treaties must be based.
6. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the
area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully
consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
7. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just
basis which provides for registering and implementing the choices of
the refugees in ways consistent with national sovereignty and for
compensation.
8. A material breach of the agreement by one of the parties shall entitle
the other to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending its perfor-
mance in whole or in part until the breach is rectified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION (Outside System)
SECRET/EYES ONLY (XGDS)
June 21, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT:
Principles of an Arab-Israeli Settlement-
Israeli Comments of June 19
Attached are:
- -At Tab A as a working base a draft of the principles which
simply records Dinitz' suggestions of June 19.
--At Tab B is a minimum revision of the May 1972 US-USSR
draft taking Dinitz' June 19 comments into account. Actually,
all but one of his suggestions are incorporated. I have included
the paragraph on freedom of navigation through international
waterways that he suggested dropping. It does not seem incon-
sistent with special arrangements at Sharm al-Shaikh which in
any case are allowed for in an earlier paragraph. And we do not
want to lock ourselves into exclusive Israeli control at Sharm
al-Shaikh.
--At Tab C again for comparison is what the optimum might look
like from our viewpoint. This would differ from the Israeli posi-
tion on one other point in addition to that mentioned in the para-
graph above. This additional point deals with a refugee settlement.
Since our position does not entirely coincide with Israel's, it
seems to me there should be one place where US views are recorded.
I have changed the word "choice" to "interests, 11 however, to move
somewhat toward the Israeli concerns.
XGDS-3
DECLAS-Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH-Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/EYES ONLY (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Attachment A
SECRET (XGDS)
June 21, 1973
General Working Principles
As Revised by Dinitz's Suggestions to Rodman June 19
(Underlined words are Israeli additions; lined-through words are Israeli
deletions.)
1.
The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be embodied
in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighboring Arab
countries directly involved in the conflict. They should be based on
Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace. The completion of the
agreements should at some stage involve negotiation between the sig-
natories. Separate agreements on specific issues are not precluded.
2.
The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recog-
nized boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from volun-
tary agreement between the parties concerned.
4.
Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement between the
parties include demilitarized and other security zones; establishment
of an international force including participation of the signatory nations;
stationing of such a force at strategic points. and-the-most-effective
International guarantees could include with the appropriate participation
of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the
Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which
the peace treaties must be based.
6.
Freedom-of-navigation through- the international waterways in -the-area
should be-assured to-all-nations-including -Israel. This-is fully-con-
sistent -with-Egyptian sovereignty over-the Suez-Canal.
7.
The-preblem-ef the -Palestinian refugees should-be solved-or a just basis
provides-fo registering-and implementing the -choices-e the -rofugee
in ways consistent-with national-severeignty-and-for-cempensation There
must be a just settlement of the refugee problem.
8.
A-material breach-of the agrooment by one- of the parties -shall entitle-the
other to -invoke-the breach-as -a ground-for suspending -its -performance -in-
whole-or-in-part-until-the-breach-is-rectified.-
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Attachment B
SECRET (XGDS)
June 21, 1973
General Working Principles
Minimum Revision of May 1972 US-USSR Draft
Taking Into Account Israeli Comments of June 19, 1973
1.
The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be
embodied in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the
neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict. They
should be based on Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace.
The completion of the agreements should at some stage involve
negotiation between the signatories. Separate agreements on
specific issues are not precluded.
2.
The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recog-
nized boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from vol-
untary agreement between the parties concerned.
4. Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement between the
parties include demilitarized and other security zones; establishment
of an international force including participation of the signatory
nations; stationing of such a force at strategic points; and the most
effective international guarantees which could include the Soviet
Union and the United States.
5. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the
Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which
the peace treaties must be based.
6.
Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the
area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully
consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
7.
There must be a just settlement of the refugee problem.
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Attachment C
SECRET (XGDS)
June 21, 1973
General Working Principles
Optimum Revision of May 1972 US-USSR Draft
Taking Account of Israeli Thoughts of June 19, 1973
1.
The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be embodied
in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighboring Arab
countries directly involved in the conflict. The agreements should be
based on Resolution 242 and should establish a final peace which will
provide the basis for development of normal relations. The obligations
of each side in a state of peace should be specified in the agreements.
Those agreements should be arrived at through a process of negotiation
between the signatories. Negotiation should begin without preconditions
on the basis that no outcome is precluded. Separate arrangements on
specific issues are not precluded.
2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recog-
nized boundaries and for assuring the security of Israel and its
neighbors.
3. Any border changes which may take place should result from voluntary
agreement between the parties concerned.
4.
Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement between the
parties include demilitarized and other security zones, international
forces with participation of the signatories, special arrangements at
strategic points, and the most effective international guarantees
which could include the Soviet Union and the United States.
5.
The agreements should signify recognition of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every state in the area, including
Israel.
6.
Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area
should be assured to all nations including Israel and should be effected
by the agreements. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty
over the Suez Canal. Note: This is included despite the Israeli sug-
gestion to delete it because we do not want to lock ourselves forever
into Israel's keeping Sharm al-Shaikh, which in any case is covered
in paragraph 4.]
7. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis
which provides for registering and implementing the interests of the
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET (XGDS)
- 2 -
refugees in ways consistent with national sovereignty and for
compensation. The interests of the Arab people of Palestine in
political self-expression will be taken into account in the nego-
tiation of the agreements. [Note: This is included despite
Israeli objections with "choices" changed to "interests". It
reflects the most reasonable way of solving the refugee problem-- -
getting Israel's agreement on how many it would take, finding
out what individual refugees want to do and letting Israel screen
those who want to settle in Israel. ]
SECRET (XGDS)
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/10 NLN-HAK-136-1-8-1
CONFIDENTIAL
BIOGRAPHY Simcha Dinitz
Israel
Mr. Dinitz' career has been notable in three respects in
particular: the breadth of his American experience, his long
and close association with Mrs. Meir and the rapidity of his
rise in the Israeli diplomatic service.
Dinitz was born in Tel Aviv in 1929, received his primary
and secondary schooling there, and after a brief stint with
the Israeli Defense Forces came to the United States in 1950.
He attended the University of Cincinnati briefly and then
entered Georgetown University, where he obtained his degrees
as Bachelor of Sciences (1954) and Master of Sciences cum laude
(1957). While in college he worked at the Israeli Embassy in
Washington as night watchman and messenger. On graduation he
entered the Israeli diplomatic service as Information Officer
at the Embassy. In 1968-69 he returned to Washington, serving
as Minister of Information. His only other foreign diplomatic
posting has been in Rome as Minister, 1966-68, though he has
attended various UN General Assembly sessions. Dinitz' wife,
Vivian, is American by birth and two of their three children
were born in the United States.
Dinitz' association with Mrs. Meir began during his first
assignment to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem. Working first
in the Ministry's Information Department, and later as the
Director of the office of the Ministry's Director General (No. 2),
Dinitz became in 1963 Chef de Cabinet and Political Secretary
to then Foreign Minister Meir, serving until Mrs. Meir's
resignation in 1966. He returned to Prime Minister Meir's staff
in mid-1969, again as her Political Secretary. In 1972,
Mrs. Meir named him Director General of the Prime Minister's
office as well. By virtue of these positions and Mrs. Meir's
implicit confidence in him, he is reckoned to be one of the
most influential officials in the Israeli bureaucracy.
Dinitz has risen fast. At 43, after only 15 years in the
diplomatic service, he is his country's nominee for its most
important diplomatic post. Although widely respected for his
State Dept. review completed
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/10 NLN-HAK-136-1-8-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/10 : NLN-HAK-136-1-8-1
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
intelligence and ability, his ascent, not surprisingly, has
aroused adverse reactions in some quarters. It seems clear
that Foreign Minister Eban acceeded to the appointment most
reluctantly. Dinitz, however, would come as Mrs. Meir's
tried and trusted colleague of many years; this is sufficient
recommendation in itself for most Israelis.
Dinitz's personal manner is easy and relaxed, though
one senses an underlying purposefulness and intensity.
His English is excellent.
A thorough search of United States Government sources
reveals no grounds for objection.
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/10 : NLN-HAK-136-1-8-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
25X6
No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/10 : NLN-HAK-136-1-8-1
Denied
Page
No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/10 : NLN-HAK-136-1-8-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.