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Secretary Kissinger's Trip to the Middle East [3 of 4]
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266848694
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Secretary Kissinger's Trip to the Middle East [3 of 4]
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National Security Files (Nixon Administration)
Henry A. Kissinger's (HAK) Office Files
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First Israeli
draft
SECRET
November 8, 1973
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL
CONCERNING THE CEASE-FIRE
1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scruplously the cease-fire in
the ground, in the air and on the sea called for by the UN Security
Council. The cease-fire includes all military actions on the part
of both parties and therefore rules out blockade of the Straits of
Bab el Mandeb.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin
immediately to settle the question of "the return to 22 October 73
positions", in the framework of agreement on the disengagement
and separation of forces, under the auspices of the U.N.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supply of food, water, and
medicine. All wounded civilians in town of Suez will be evacuated.
Details to be agreed upon between both sides.
SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military
supply to the East Bank.
Details of the routine to be agreed upon by both sides.
5. Inspection of the non-military supply to the East Bank will be
according to the following procedure:
a. The UN inspection will take peace at the point on the
Cairo-Suez road at which the UN drivers take over the
vehicles carrying the non-military supplies. This point
will be situated near the cease-fire line on the east side
of it. At this point inspection will be carried out by UN
officers with Israeli officers observing.
b. At the Bank of the Canal the unloaded supplies will be
inspected by Israeli officers with UN officers observing.
6. As soon as the UN check-point is established in accordance with
the provisions of para. 5 above there will be an immediate exchange
of all POWs (including all those Israelis and Egyptians held since
1969) with first priority for all wounded POWs.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7 Nov 73 1915
9:15PM local
9024
T
......
ZZ RUEHC RUESOR
DE RUESAD #9024 3111918
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
N 071912Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUESOR/USINT CAIRO FLASH 3666
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0436
BT
CRET TEL AVIV 9024
FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO
I WAS THIRTY MINUTES INTO MEETING WITH PRIMIN
WHE N I RECEIVED WORD YOU SENDING ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS.
HAVE SUSPENDED MEETING AND AWAITING YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.
KEATING
BT
#9024
}
+
$
NNNN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
on STATE
Department of State
/ AMERICA and OBLIGA
AE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM
ACT: AMB
of
INFO: VIP 5 CHRN
0 071700Z NOV 73
SECRET/NODIS/HCHEROKEE
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH Classification 3406
CN: 11431
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4251
BT
SECRET CAIRO 3405
7 NOV 73
NODIS/C H E R OKEE
SECTO 32
NODIS
8:33 PM ++
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO
EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PBOR, IS, EG
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS
REF: CAIRO 3395 (SECTO 29)
1. PLEASE ADD FOLLOWING SENTENCE TO END OF THE PROPOSED LETTER
TO SECRETARY GENERAL WHICH WE SENT TO YOU REFTEL:
2. QTE. 1 ASSUME THAT YOU WILL COORDINATE WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT
AND ISRAEL THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS
AGREEMENT. UNQUOTE.
KISSINGER
BT
#3405
++ ADVANCE ON RECEIPT TO DUTY OFFICER
SECRET/nodis
Clossification
FORM FS-412(H)
4.63
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT or STATE
Department of State
AMERICA GELINO
AE TEL AVIV
ACT: AMB
TELEGRAM
STATES of
INFO: VIP 5 CHRN
SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE
Classification
CN: 11432
7 NOV 73
Z 071810Z NOV 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUEHC/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3487
9:18 PM ++
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4252
BT
SECRET CAIRO 3406
NODIS/CH E R O KEE
NODIS
SECTO 34-
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FROM THE SECRETARY
EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS
1. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THE ONLY
MILITARY MOVEMENT REQUIRED UNDER THE AGREEMENT IS AWAY FROM THE
CHECKPOINTS. THEY MAY START BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD AND THEREFORE
THIS TAKES CARE OF MAJOR GENERAL YARIV'S CONCERN ABOUT CROSS-
COUNTRY MOVEMENTS.
2. IF THE ISRAELIS HAVE TROUBLE WITH THE BLOCKADE AND BELIEVE
IT IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE, YOU MAY ASSURE THEM THAT I HAVE NO
OBJECTION TO A UNILATERAL STATEMENT AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING
OF THE DOCUMENT WHICH MAKES CLEAR THAT THE CEASEFIRE INCLUDES
ALL REPEAT ALL MILITARY ACTIONS ON THE PART OF BOTH PARTIES
AND THEREFORE INCLUDES THE BLOCKADE AT THE STRAITS OF BAB
EL-MANDEB.
KISSINGER
BT
#3406
++ copy to D.O, on receipt,
SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE
Classification
FORM
FS-412(H)
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Departmentof,State
TELEGRAM
it AMERICA
ACT: AMB
or
INFO: vip5
CHRN
SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE
Z 071845Z NOV 73
Classification
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3408
CN: 11439
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4257
BT
7 NOV 73
SECRET CAIRO 3411
11:26 PM
XX
EXDIS
DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS/CHEROKÉEECTO 39
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FROM THE SECRETARY
EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS
NODIS
1. WE AND THE GOE HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS
IN THZATEXT OF THE PROPOSAL:
A. IN PARA NUMBERED TWO FOLLOWING QUOTE SEPARATION OF
FORCES UNQUOTE, ADD QUOTE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN UNQUOTE.
B. IN PARA NUMBERED FIVE T CHANGE QUOTE AN ISRAELI OFFICER
UNQUOTE TO QUOTE ISRAELI OFFICERS UNQUOTE.
C. IN SECTION FIVE AFTER QUOTE NATURE OF THE CARGO UNQUOTE,
ADD QUOTE AT THE BANK OF THE CANAL UNQUOTE.
2. YOU SHOULD PRESENT PROPOSAL TO THE ISRAELIS WITH THESE
MODIFICATIONS.
KISSINGER
BT
#3411
NNNN
SECRET / NODIS / CHEROKEE
Classification
FORM
FS-412(H)
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT or write
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA CELINA
AE TELAVIV
ACT: AMB
TELEGRAM
INFO: VIP5 CHRN
SECRET/NODIS/dHEROKEE
Classification
Z 071920Z NOV 73 ZFF4
CN: 11437
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUEHCR/ANEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3409
7 NOV 73
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4260
BT
SECRET CAIRO 3414
8:11 PM ++
NODIS/CHEROKEE
SECTO 43
NODIS
E.O. 11652 -GDS
TAGS: PBOR, IS, EG
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS
REF: SECTO 34
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FROM THE SECRETARY
1. FURTHER TO PARA TWO OF SECTO 34 RE BLOCKADE, FORMIN FAHMI IN-
FORMS US THAT EGYPTIAN POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS: SINCE BLOCKADE WAS
NEVER DECLARED, IT CANNOT BE FORMALLY LIFTED, BUT ORDERS FOR ITS
RELAXATION HAVE BEEN ISSUED.
KISSINGER 2. YOU MAY USE FOREGOING AS ADDITIONAL POINT TO MAKE WITH GOI.
BT
#3414
NNN
++ ADVANCE IMMEDIATELY TO DUTY OFFICER
SECRET/NODIS/CHERIOKEE
FORM FS-412(H)
Classification
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TATE
SECRET/EX
Classification
UNITED states OF
Department of State
CN: 9030
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
8 NOV 73
LLECT
HARGE TO
1:00 AM
Tel Aviv
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG
SUBJ: Middle East Situation
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
USINT CAIRO FLASH
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
NODIS
AMB
SECRET TLL AVIV 9030
VIP5
AXXXXX NODIS/CHEROKEE
CHRN
FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO
OUTGOING
1. Unless there is some unexpected and unwanted hitch
at the Cabinet meeting at 9:00 a.m. Thussday morning,
along with Amb. Keating and Saunders
we are okay. Finished up here at midnight/after A session
with PM, Allon, Dayan, and Yariv. Full details follow
separate telegram.
that
2. Your telegraphic suggestion that I stress/only Israel
military movement required under agreement is away from
Tel Aviv
checkpoints, your suggestion re unilateral statement by
Israelis on blockade and Fahmi message that order for
blockade relaxation issued, helped turn tide. It was
heavy sledding until then.
3. Last minute word changes adding "under the auspices
of the UN", para 2 almost upset things at last minute,
Lut Dayan helped with suggestion that this could be
DRAFTED BY:
interpreted to
Refere DAT DO assentiall reher same procedure
Asst. Secv. JJ Cisco
11-7-73
Asst. Secv. Sisco
OUTGOING
clearances:
SECRET / NODIS
Classification
FORM
FS-413(H)
58
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Tel Aviv
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
1030
SECRET/NODIS
Page 2 of
Classification
MRN
being followed at present in the talks between the
Egyptian and Israeli military representative. Dayan said
Tel Aviv
Egyptian general keeps saying talks are under UN auspices.
4. PM Meir was at her best, helping to finesse and
colleagues, on
overrule mumber of issues raised particularly by Allon
and Dayan. Best way to summarize meeting is as Prilin
did at end when I asked her what I should report to you.
She said to tell you that she would meet with the
opposition leaders at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow and with the
OUTGOING
full Cabinet at 9:00. She hoped there would be no
difficulties. If so, she would boxxxx overcome them.
She asked me to give you her best and to tell you that
this is 'fantastic achievement."
5. Would caution that we must wait until we hear from
Cabinet meeting about 11:00 a.m. tomorrow before we can
say this formally approved.
Tel Aviv
Krow
KEATING
OUTGOING
SECRET/MODIS
Classification
FORM
4-68
FS-413(H)a
(CONTINU TION SHEET)
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Tel Aviv
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT o>
Department of State
AVIV
AMERICA CELINA
ACT: AMB
TELEGRAM
STATES of
INFO: VIP5 CHRN
SECRET'nedis/CHEROKEE
Classification
CN: 11442
0 0721502 NOV 73 ZFF6
FM SECSIATE WASHDC
8 NOV 73
TO RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO FLASH 5336
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 8290
0042 AM ++
BT
C E C R E T STATE 219826
NODIS/CHEROKEE
NODIS
TOSEC 186
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SCOWCROFT AND EAGLEBURGER
INFO FOR SISCO
LL.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OGEN
REF: SECTO 41 AND SECTO 32
1. WITH REGARD TO REFTELS, WE SUGGEST THAT, IF TIME
PERMITS, WE BE AUTHORIZED TO BRIEF A FEW PEOPLE
ON THE HILL, THE PRC, THE UK, THE FRENCH, AND THE
GERMANS SHORTLY BEFORE THE GOE IS INFORMED OF ISRAELI
AGREEMENT. IF WE WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE EGYPTIANS
ARE INFORMED, WE WILL HAVE LOST CONTROL OF THE PROCESS
AND LEAKS MAY WELL OCCUR BEFORE WE HAVE COVERED THE
APPROPRIATE BASES.
2. RUSH CONCURS.
3. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS. RUSH
BT
#9826
NN
N
N
SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE
Classification
FORM FS-412(H)
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
STATE
SECRET
Classificati on
UNITED
Department of State
CN: 9031
CATE:
STATES of
TELEGRAM
8 NOV 73
ILLECT
CHARGE TO
E.O. 11652: GDS
Tel Aviv
TAGS: PFOR IS XF
1:45 AM
Subject: Middle East Negotiations
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
Amembassy AMMAN
FLASH
USINT CAIRO
VIP5
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC
AMB
SECRET TEL AVIV
9031
NODIS
DCM
кири
POL
CHRN
XXXXXXX
For Fickering and Amb. Brown From Sisco
OUTGOING
NODIS/CHEROKEE
Meir
will
1.
PM expects I záilhave word of final Cabinet
approval of Israeli agreement by
about 11:00 a.m. Israeli time. Dayan is arranging to
helicopter me and party to Allenby Bridge.
2. Since there are four of us (Sisco, Saunders and
Amb. Brown should arrange for
two sy) plus baggage, believe/two cars
Tel Aviv
3. To be on safe side suggest cars be at bridge
from 11:00 a.m. on.
4. I then can rejoin Secretary party
in time for/1355 departure,
XXXXX
necall, dre Looves
A
KEATING
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
JSisco
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
11/8/73
269
Mr. Sisco
OUTGOING
CLEARANCES:
SECRET
Classification
FORM FS-413(H)
1-68
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Tel Aviv
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
STATE
SECRET
Classification
UNITED THE STATES OF
Department of State
CN: 9032
INDIO
TELEGRAM
C
8 NOV 73
CHARGE TO
From:
Amembassy TEL AVIV
Tel Aviv
E.0.11652
GDS
2:05 AM
TAGS:
PFOR, IS, EG
Subject:
Middle East Situation - Press Handling
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
USINT CAIRO FLASH
INFO:
SecState WASHDC FLASH
AMB
EXBIX SECRET TEL AVIV
9032
EXDIS
DCM
EXDIS
POL
PM Meir was anxious to put a positive cast on my meeting
OUTGOING
DAO
with her and her Cabinet colleagues. I agreed that PM's
ECO
office could put out short statement that meeting was
held "in a good and constructive spirit." Embassy has been
VIP5
swamped with inquiries. We are making no statement and
N
responding individually to these inquiries that we have
nothing to add to the PM's office statement.
Ar-
Tel Aviv
KEATING
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
USIS:LLefkow:csl
11/7/73
270
Asst.Secy:JSisco
OUTGOING
CLEARANCES:
Classified by L. Lefkow
Subject to GDS of E.0.11652.
Downgraded at 2-yr intervals
and declassified Dec. 31, 1983.
SECRET
Classification
FORM
4 68
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Tel Aviv
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DAPARTMENT
STATE
SECRET/EXDIS
Classificati Pm
UNITED STATES OF
Department of State
TELEGRAM
CN: 9040
(E:
COLLECT
NOV 8, 1973
1259
Tel Aviv
CHARGE TO
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG
SUDJ: Middle East Situation
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
Amembassy AMMAN FLASH
INFO:
SEC STATE WASHDC FLASH
AMB
SECRET TEL AVIV 9040
CHR
EXDIS
EXDIS
K
DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS/CHEROKEE
OUTGOING
FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO
1. PM has asked me to see her again regarding are some
points in the agreement which came up in Cabinet meeting.
therefore
I will, the sufxers, not be able to join you in Arman
but I am making arrangements to fly directly to Riad
to meet you there.
2. I will report to you promptly following my meeting
Tel Aviv
with PM.
A
KEATING
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY
Asst.Secy. JJSisco 41
11=8=73
270
DCH:NAVeliotes
OUTGOING
CLEARANCES:
Classification
FORM
FS-413(M)
68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidentia Library.
Tel AVIV
DECL ASSIFIED This document has been review e pursuanti xecuti e Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Tel AVIV
N".; 3-078KGA981
9 Nov 73 10 28
.....ZZ RUESAD
DE R UE SKG 5960 3121025
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 081020Z NOV 73
FM AMEMRASSY AMMAN
11476
TO RUE SAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 5623
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 99.69
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5960
EXDIS
SECTO 56
FOR SISCO FROM THE SECRETARY
DEPT FOR S/S ONLY
11652: XGDS
IS: PFOR, EG, IS
BJECT: EGYPTIAN ASSURANCES ON BLOCKADE
FAHMI REPEATED TO SECRETARY AGAIN THIS MORNING
REASSURANCE THAT THE BLOCKADE WOULD NOT BE
ENFORCED. HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD ASSURE THAT THERE ARE
NO REPEAT NO ANNOUNCEMENTS OR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THIS
WOULD PUT EGYPTIANS IN AN UNTENABLE POSITION.
ISSINGER
RT
5960
NNNN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/EXDIS
Classification
Department of State
CN 9045
TELEGRAM
8 nov 73
Tel Aviv
CHARGE TO
252 pm
.0.11652:
TAGS:
RIXOXX PFOR, US, IS
SUBJF CT: Meeting with PriMin Meir
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION
USD L RIYAD FLASH
Secstate WASHDC FLASH
AMB
SECRIT T L AVIV 9045
VIF
5
CHR
HANDLE AS NODIS CHF ROKFT
D
OUTGOING
FOR SF CRE TARY FROM SISCO
1. In final wrap up meeting, most of sobat which devoted to
Israeli interpretation of F.gyptian-Israeli agreement, PM
conveyed her and Cabinet approval of document without any word
changes. In order get her to accept, I agreed to informal
US-Israeli memorandum of understanding regarding certain
Tel Aviv
points.
2. Near end of meeting much to surprise of everyone PM
proposed that basic document be changed to reflect nuances of
private informal US-Israeli understanding which I had previously
worked out with G-n Yariv. We dug in our heels and I refused
any change in document, and she finally came around on basis
of a. suggestion that she would wish to put Þer gloss andi/ interpretation
CT.
DEADTING DATE
TEL.EXI.
APPROVED 27,
OUTGOING
JJSISCO:DP
11/8/73
269
JJSISCO
Classified by Asst. Secty Sisco. Subject to
GDS of FO 11652. Automatically Downgraded
T vo Year Intervals, Declassified Dec. 31, 1981
SECRET/EXDIS
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at Richardixon Presidential Library.
Tel Aviv
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/EXDIS
Page 2 of
9045
Classification
MRN
document when she speaks before Knesset.
Tel Aviv
3. We talked about timing and scenario and I said that
we would get a precise message to her on this from you
now that Israeli government approval had been given. She
suggested that 8:30 p.m. local Friday would suit her very
want to
well since she would/speak to Knesset at that time. She
seemed flexible on timing but expressed above preference.
If you have worked out a definite
OUTGOING
my arrival in
timing schedule, I would suggest you not
Riyad but send your views promptly to PM.
4. I would also suggest an immediate brief, oral message
fr m you to °M saying that I have reported to you and that
you appreciate the constructive spirit in which the Israeli
government has approached this rr atter.
Tel Aviv
5. Saunders and I will be taking a C-141
to Riyad as soon as we have filed a full report of the meeting
to you. I am glad the Israeli approval has come in time
for you to use it to the maximum in Riyad.
KE & KBN TING
SISEOX X
OUTGOING
SECRET/FXDIS
Classification
FORM
4-68
FS-413(H)=
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Tel Aviv
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THENT OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CONTROL: 2290Q
RECD:
NOV 8, 1973
1520Z
Z 081414FZ NNNOV 73 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0455
RUESYA/USDEL RIYAD FLASH 006
RUESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA FLASH 627
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 9056
NODIS/CHEROKEE
EXDIS
HANDLE AS NODIS CHEROKEE
SECRETARY FROM SISCO
E. O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, us, IS
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
REF: TEL AVIV 9045
FOLLOWING IS FINAL AGRCD TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING:
BEGIN TEXT: to NOV 73. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT
AND ISRAEL CONCERNING THE CEASEFIRE.
1. EGYPT AND ISRAEL AGREE TO OBSERVE SCRUPUPLOUSLY THE CEASE-
FIRE ON THE GROUND, IN THE AIR AND ON THE SEA, CALLED FOR BY THE
UN SECUIRITY COUNTIL. THE CEASEFIRE INCLUDES ALL MILITARY ACTIONS
ON THE PART OF BOTH, PARTIES AND THEREFORE RULES OAH BLOCKADE OF
THE STRAITS OF BAB-EL-MANDEB.
2. BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THEM WILL BEGIN
IMMEDIATELY TO SETTLE THE QUAUTION OF " THE RETURN TO 22 OCT
1973 POSITIONS," IN THE FRAMEWORK OF AGREEMENT ON THE
DISENGAGEMENT AND SEPARATION OF FORCES, UNDER THE AUSPICES
OF THE U.N.
BH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
SECRET
-2 -TEL AVIV 9056, NOV 8
()
3. THE TOWN OF SUEZ WILL RECEIVE DAILY SUPPLY OF FOOD, WATER
AMK MEDICINE. ALL WOUNDED CIVILIANS IN TOWN OF SUEZ WILL BE
EVACUATED. DETAILS TO BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN BOTH SIDES.
4. THERE SHALL BE ON IMPEDIMENT TO THE MOVEMENT OF NON-
MILITARY SUPPLY TO THE EAST BANK. DETAILS OF THE ROUT INE TO BE
AGREED UPON BY BOTH SIDES.
5. INSPECTION OF THE NON-MILITARY SUPPLY TO THE EAST BANK WILL BE
ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:
A. THE WESTERN CHECKPOINT ON THE CAIRO-SUEZ ROAD WILL
BE MANNED BY UN PERSONNEL. THE VEHICLES CARRYING NON-MILITARY
SUPPLIES AND DRIVEN BY UN DRIVERS WILL BE INSPECTED BY UN OFFICERS
WITH ISRAELI OFFICERS OBSERVING.
AT THE BANK OF THE CANAL THE UNLOADED SUPPLIES WILL BE
SPECTED BY ISRAELI OFFICERS WITH UN OFFICERS OBSERVING.
6. AS SOON AS THE UN CHECKPOINT IS ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PARA 5 ABOVE, THERE WILL BE AN IMMEDIATE
EXCHANGE OF ALL POWS ( NCLUDING ALL THOSE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS
KEATING HELD SINCE 1969), WITH FIRST PRIORITY FOR ALL WOUNDED POWS. END TEXT
BT
'9056
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT the Richard Nixon ORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
agreed final
8 November 1973
SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT
OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND
ISRAEL CONCERNING THE CEASE-FIRE
1. Egypt andIsrael agree to observe scrupulously the
cease-fire on the ground, in the air and on the sea, called
for. by the UN Security Council. The cease-fire includes all
military actions on the part of both parties and therefore
rules out blockade of the Straits of Bab el Mandeb.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin
immediately to settle the question of "the return to 22 October
1973 positions", in the framework of agreement on the disengagement
and separation of forces, under the auspices of the U.N.
3. The town of Suez wil receive daily supply of food, water and
medicine. All wounded civilians in town of Suez will be
evacuated. Details to be agreed upon between both sides.
4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military
supply to the East Bank. Details of the routine to be agreed
upon by both sides.
5. Inspection of the non-military supply to the East Bank will be
according to the following procedure :
SECRET XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
a. The Western check-point on the Cairo-Suez road
will be manned by UN personnel. The vehicles carrying
non-militåry supplies and driven by UN drivers will be
inspected by UN officers with Israeli officers observing.
b. At the Bank of the Canal the unloaded supplies will
be inspected by Israeli officers with UN officers
observing.
6. As soon as the UN check-point is established in accordance
with the provisions of para. 5 above there will be (an
immediate exchange of all POWs (including all those Israelis
and Egyptians held since 1969), with first priority for. all
wounded POWs.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
AVIV
United STATES ,
TELEGRAM
ACT: AMB
or
INFO: XECOCNKXXXM CHRN (D)
SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE
Z 071630Z NOV 73
FM USINT CAIRO
Classification
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3405
CN: 11428
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4247
BT
7 NOV 73
SECRE T CAIRO 3399
7:39 PM +
NODIS/CHEROKEE
SECTO
2/41
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO
NODIS
EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PBOR IS EG
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE WE PROPOSE SENDING TO SECRETARY
GENERAL WALDHEIM IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE
OF PROPOSAL WORKED OUT WITH SADAT. YOU SHOULD INFORM PRIME
MINISTER MEIR.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL:
I HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH PRESIDENT SADAT ON THE FOLLOWING
PROPOSAL, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO HAS JUST ADVISED ME
FROM ISRAEL OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT:
"CTEXT OF PROPOSAL)".
TO ASSIST THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS IN RAPID
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREGOING, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR EARLY
NOTIFICATION TO THEM OF THE UN OFFICIAL WHOM YOU WILL DESIGNATE
TO WORK WITH THEM. SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END TEXT.
3. PLEASE FLASH US WHEN ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE HAS BEEN
OBTAINED.
KISSINGER
BT
#339
SECRET /NODIS / CHEROKEE
Clossification
FORM
FS-412(H)
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
TATE
BEGRETXEXRE
Classificati on
CN 9046
UNITED STATES OF
Department of State
8 nov 73
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
=
303 pm
E TO
EO11652: GDS
Tel Aviv
TAGS:
PFOR, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: Press Handling:
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
Secstate WASHDC FLASH
AMB
CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV
9046
DCM
POL
EC
FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO
DAO
VIP-5
OUTGOING
1. At end of meeting PM asked whether I could make very
CHR
brief statement to press expressing optimism. We agreed
USIS
LAB
on the following which I conveyed to the press after I left
the meeting: we have had a useful and constructive
meeting with the Prime Minister and her colleagues.
I am flying to Riyadh to report to the Secretary of State
Tel Aviv
I am optimistic.
2. I took no questions,
KBh
KEATING
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
KBR
AsstSecy:JSiscð:ag
11/8 73
269
AMB: KBKeating
OUTGOING
CLEARANCES:
Classified by Joseph Sisco
Subject to GDS of EO 11652.
Declassified 12/31 79.
CONFIDENTIAL
Clessification
FORM
FS-413(H)
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at QUIGOING Library.
Tel Aviv
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PROPOSAL
1.
Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the ceasefire
called for by the UN Security Council.
2.
Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin
immediately to settle the question of the return to the October 22
positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and
separation of forces.
3.
The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water
and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be
evacuated.
4.
There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military
supplies to the East Bank.
5.
The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez Road will be replaced
by UN checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, an Israeli officer
can participate with the UN to supervise the non-military nature of
the cargo.
6.
As soon as the UN checkpoints are established on the Cairo-Suez
Road, there will be an exchange of all POWs, including wounded.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
WH
OF STATE
COPY 8 OF OF 8 COPIES
Department of State
UNITED OFFICER STATES OF MEDICAL
TELEGRAM
CONTROL: 45580
RECD: 15 NOV, 11PM
0 R 152336Z NOV 73
Scowenft
LL
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHOR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5613
Sanch
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0195
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1665
INFO RUEHCR/ AMEMBASSY PARIS 0085
Samplett
BT
SECRET
- - LONDON 13420
ODIS/CHEROKEE
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO
E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR, XF, FR
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S MIDDLE EAST/EUROPE
TRIP - BRIEFING OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT
- NOVEMBER 14
S
1. I WOULD DESCRIBE MY MEETING (AMBASSADOR IRWIN
PRESENT) WITH JOBERT AND PRIOR SESSION WITH DE COURCEL
AND COLLEAGUES AS A POLITE STAND-OFF. THEY LISTENED
ATTENTIVELY, SPOKE A FEW WORDS OF PRAISE, SOMEWHAT
GRUDINGLY I THOUGHT, FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE SIX-
POINT AGREEMENT, STRESSED THE "AMBIGUITIES" IN THE
AGREEMENT GIVING ME THE IMPRESSION THEY DID NOT EXPECT
MIL REPS DISCUSSIONS TO SUCCEED. THEY SEEMED TOO
PRIDEFUL TO SAY THEY WANT IN AS CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS,
BUT EXPRESSED THIS GINGERLY SAYING SC HAS RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PEACE; EUROPE MUST HAVE A ROLE AS A GUARANTOR AND
CARETAKER OF AREA IN POST-SETTLEMENT PERIOD. THEY DO
NOT FEEL THEY CAN STAND ON SIDELINES. THEY EXPRESSED
SKEPTICISM THAT A FUNDAMENTAL SETTLEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED.
ALL OF THIS WAS DONE COURTEOUSLY, WITH GALLIC UNDERPLAY
AND IRONY. FINALLY, I DID NOT MAKE POINTS YOU SUGGESTED
RE ARAB OIL PRESSURES.
2. AFTER OUR EXTENDED CONVERSATIONS WITH DE COURCEL, I
S
GAVE JOBERT AN ABBREVIATED VERSION OF OUR REPORT. I SAID
WE THOUGHT OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS WAS
BETTER NOW THAN ANY TIME SINCE L967 BECAUSE OBJECTIVE
CONDITIONS IN AREA HAD FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED. OCTOBER
WAR HAD BOLSTERED ARAB SELF-CONFIDENCE AND AT SAME TIME
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECREL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
- 2 - LONDON 13420, 15 NOV '73
HAD BEEN SOBERING EXPERIENCE FOR ISRAEL. WHAT CONCLU-
S
SIONS ISRAEL WOULD DRAW FROM THIS EXPERIENCE REMAINED
TO BE SEEN. WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN CEASEFIRE AND
SIX-POINT AGREEMENT WAS FIRST STEP, BUT ONE COULD NOT
BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC ON THIS BASIS ALONE. WE
RECOGNIZED DIFFICULTY OF PROBLEMS AHEAD. I SAID THERE
HAD BEEN NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT THE VARIOUS PARTIES
HAD CHANGED THEIR BASIC POSITIONS ON AN OVERALL SETTLE-
MENT, AND PAINFUL COMPROMISES WILL BE REQUIRED. EGYPT
WAS STILL TALKING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL TO THE PRE-JUNE 1967
LINES; KING HUSSEIN WAS, AS BEFORE, INTERESTED IN A
PEACE SETTLEMENT AND PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE; SYRIANS
APPEAR SOMEWHAT LESS RIGID IN AFTERMATH OF WAR BUT THERE
WAS STILL NO SIGN THAT THEY COULD CONTEMPLATE COMPRO-
MISE ON TERRITORIAL QUESTION IN GOLAN. IF THERE WAS
DEVELOPMENT WHICH TENDED TO MAKE US HOPEFUL, IT WAS FACT
THAT FOR FIRST TIME PARTIES HAD AGREED TO ENTER NEGO-
TIATIONS, AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION
338.
S
3. JOBERT BROKE IN AT THIS POINT AND ASKED WHETHER I
THOUGHT U.S. HAD SUFFICIENT MEANS OF PRESSURE TO BRING
THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. I SAID
THAT WHATEVER ARABS THOUGHT OF U.S. IN PAST, WE HAD
COME AWAY FROM RECENT TRIP WITH CLEAR IMPRESSION OF
RENEWED CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. RESUMPTION IN PRINCIPLE
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN CAIRO WAS REFLECTION OF
BOTH CAIRO'S AND U.S. BELIEF THAT WE NEEDED HIGH-LEVEL
COMMUNICATIONS AS WE ENTERED NEW STAGE BUT ALSO DECISION
BY EGYPTIANS THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE U.S.
OPPORTUNITY TO BRING OFF PEACE SETTLEMENT. MOREOVER,
ALTERNATIVE FOR THEM WAS NOT ATTRACTIVE. WE ACCEPTED
OPPORTUNITY WHICH PRESENT SITUATION
AFFORDS AND REALIZE THAT IN DOING SO WE WERE EXPECTED
TO PRODUCE RESULTS, BUT THIS WOULD ALSO DEPEND ON PARTIES
THEMSELVES.
4. JOBERT ASKED HOW WE INTENDED TO TACKLE THIS
S
FORMIDABLE TASK. I SAID OUR APPROACH WOULD BE TO TRY
TO REACH (ONCE PEACE CONFERENCE COULD BE CONVENED WHICH
WE HOPED WOULD BE IN DECEMBER) AREAS OF ACCOMMODATION
ON ISSUES INVOLVED IN PEACE SETTLEMENT THROUGH QUIET
DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE PARTIES. THIS WAS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
- 3 - LONDON 13420, 15 NOV '73
FUNDAMENTALLY THE WAY WE HAD GONE ABOUT THE SIX-POINT
AGREEMENT, AND IT SEEMED TO HAVE WORKED. WE WOULD NOT
GO INTO FORTHCOMING PEACE CONFERENCE WITH U.S. PEACE
PLAN. IN EARLIER MEETING, DE COURCEL SAID FRENCH HAD
ALWAYS BEEN SKEPTICAL, THOUGH NOT NEGATIVE, ABOUT POSSI-
BILITY OF PARTIES TALKING TOGETHER, GOF FEELS CONFERENCE
WILL NEED HELP OF U.S., SOVIETS, AND OF OTHERS WHO HAVE
GOOD RELATIONS WITH PARTIES. ALSO, FINAL SETTLEMENT
SHOULD HAVE GUARANTEES NOT ONLY FROM U.S. AND USSR, BUT
FROM OTHERS, SUCH AS FRANCE, WHICH HAS ITS OWN INTERESTS
IN ME, INCLUDING OIL. BECAUSE OF ITS INTERESTS, FRANCE
ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SETTLEMENT AND TO GUARAN-
TEES. FRANCE CANNOT REMAIN IDLE AS IT MAY, IN FACT,
BE MORE VITALLY INTERESTED IN OUTCOME THAN IS U.S.
5. I SAID WE HAD NOT GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT YET TO GUARAN-
TEES, BUT THERE WERE NUMBER OF THEORETICAL OPTIONS.
ON ONE LEVEL, ONE COULD LOOK AT GUARANTEES FROM POINT
OF VIEW OF PARTIES WHO WOULD BE EXCHANGING OBLIGATIONS
S
DIRECTLY WITH EACH OTHER IN A PEACE AGREEMENT. THIS
IS A PRIMARY GUARANTEE. MOREOVER, WHILE ISRAEL HAS
ALWAYS OPPOSED A UN FORCE, UNEF IS NOW ON THE GROUND.
HOW UNEF WORKS OUT WILL HAVE MAJOR IMPACT ON WHAT KIND
OF ROLE UN FORCE CAN PLAY, IF ANY, IN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.
ON ANOTHER LEVEL, THERE IS QUESTION OF INDIVIDUAL COUN-
TRIES WHICH MIGHT GIVE GUARANTEES. I SAID THERE WERE NO
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN USG AND ANYONE ELSE AS TO POSSIBLE
ROLE IN THIS RESPECT. FINALLY, GUARANTEES COULD BE SEEN
ON LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SUCH AS UNSC, WHICH
MIGHT PROVIDE THEM. SUCH GUARANTEES NEED NOT BE
CONSIDERED EXCLUSIVE, BUT RATHER AS MUTUALLY REINFORCING.
IN ANY EVENT, WE WILL BE STUDYING QUESTION OF GUARANTEES
IN DEPTH, WE ARE NOT AT STAGE OF PRACTICAL REALITY ON
THIS ASPECT. WE HAVE DRAWN NO CONCLUSIONS.
6. DE COURCEL SAID USG HAS APPEARED TO WISH TO SOLVE
ME PROBLEM OUTSIDE THE UN OR WITH ONLY UN RUBBER STAMP.
GOF THINKS EXCLUSIVE AUSPICES OF U.S. AND USSR WOULD BE
TOO PRECARIOUS. FRANCE ALSO BELIEVES FUTURE UN
FORCE NEEDS THE KIND OF GUARANTEE WHICH ONLY GREAT POWER
PARTICIPATION CAN PROVIDE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ME
PROBLEM NOT BE SOLVED OUTSIDE UN; SC PERMANENT MEMBERS
HAVE SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY.
SECRET,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRED
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
- 4 - LONDON 13420, 15 NOV '73
7. DE COURCEL ASKED MY VIEWS ABOUT ROLE OF SOVIETS AND
EUROPEANS. I SAID CONFERENCE MODALITIES HAD ONLY BEEN
DISCUSSED IN PRELIMINARY FASHION. WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD
BE LARGELY DETERMINED BY PARTIES' OWN FEELINGS AS TO
WHAT THEY CONSIDERED MOST CONGENIAL FORUM FOR NEGO-
TIATIONS. ISRAELIS HAVE CONSIDERED SC AND UN GENERALLY
AS PARTISAN. USG FEELS CONFERENCE MODALITIES MUST BE
ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. SO FAR, EGYPT, JORDAN AND
ISRAEL HAVE ACCEPTED U.S. AND SOVIET OFFERS OF GOOD
OFFICES. WE UNDERSTOOD VIEW THAT EUROPE HAS ROLE TO
PLAY, AND WE HOPE IT CAN PLAY A SUPPORTIVE ROLE. HE
FELT IT SHOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTED THAT PEACE TALKS MUST BE
ORGANIZED SO AS TO PRODUCE PRACTICAL AND EFFECTIVE
RESULTS, AND IT IS THESE RESULTS WHICH WILL BE TO THE
ULTIMATE BENEFIT OF ALL, INCLUDING EUROPEANS.
8. JOBERT ASKED WHAT WE THOUGHT THE EFFECTS OF THE
ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL WOULD BE. I SAID THAT IT WAS OUR
FEELING THAT WE COULDN'T AFFORD TO WAIT UNTIL ELECTIONS
TO GET PEACE CONFERENCE UNDERWAY. WE RECOGNIZED ⑉⑉ AND
I SAID THAT I THOUGHT ARABS UNDERSTAND THIS THAT THE
PRESENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WITHOUT NEW MANDATE WOULD BE
UNABLE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH REALLY SERIOUS ISSUES
INVOLVED IN PEACE SETTLEMENT UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS. I
SAID BOTH SIDES SEEM TO WANT TO TAKE UP DISENGAGEMENT
AND SEPARATION OF FORCES IN FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IN
PEACE CONFERENCE.
9. DE COURCEL EARLIER HAD COMMENTED THAT DATE OF EARLY
DECEMBER FOR CONVENING OF PEACE CONFERENCE SEEMED
OPTIMISTIC IN VIEW OF HARD LINE PREMIER MEIR REPORTEDLY
TAKING. HE FELT THERE WERE MANY AMBIGUITIES IN SIX-
POINT PROGRAM. HE ASKED HOW WE SAW NEXT STEP AND
WHETHER DISENGAGEMENT LIKELY BE IN PLACE OR WITH EXCHANGE
OF AREAS. HE WONDERED IF THERE WERE MOMENTUM ENOUGH
TO OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY AMBIGUITIES. SISCO
SAID IT WAS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHAT FORM DISENGAGEMENT
MIGHT TAKE. THAT WOULD INITIALLY BE SUBJECT OF TALKS
AT MILITARY LEVEL BUT PROBABLY WOULD NOT GET FAR IN THIS
FORMAT, THEREFORE PROBABLY WOULD CONSTITUTE OPENING
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCHTHRA REPRODUCE iTaE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES and AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
-5 - - LONDON 13420, 15 NOV '73
PHASE AT PEACE TALKS.
S
10. JOBERT ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT ON
BLOCKADE OF BAB EL MANDEB. BECAUSE OF SENSITIVITY THIS
POINT, I GAVE HIM GUARDED REPLY SAYING WE THOUGHT
EGYPTIANS WERE FULLY AWARE OF IMPORTANCE THAT ISRAELIS
ATTACH TO PROPOSITION THAT CEASEFIRE HAD TO BE EFFECTIVE
ON SEA AS WELL AS LAND. JOBERT SMILED AND SAID, "I
UNDERSTAND.'
11. JOBERT ASKED WHETHER WE HAD REALLY COMPREHENSIVE
UNDERSTANDING WITH SOVIETS ON APPROACH TO PEACE SETTLE-
MENT. I SAID ANSWER IS NO. IN MOSCOW U.S. AND SOVIETS
HAD CONCENTRATED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON PRODUCING RESOLU-
TION 338. THERE HAD BEEN SOME GENERAL REFERENCES --
BUT VERY LITTLE -- TO ROLE OF GUARANTEES.
12. JOBERT ASKED ABOUT OUR IMPRESSION OF KING FAISAL'S
PRESENT ATTITUDE ON OIL. THIS GAVE ME OPPORTUNITY TO
GET IN LINE YOU SUGGESTED. I SAID WE BELIEVE HIM TO BE
S
MAN OF GREAT INTEGRITY; HOWEVER, HE WAS ANGUISHED, TORN
BETWEEN CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES. WE HAD MADE CLEAR IN
VARIOUS QUARTERS DURING OUR TRIP THAT U.S. WOULD NOT
BE ABLE TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE THAT ARABS HOPED FOR
ON PEACE SETTLEMENT UNDER SHADOW OF THREAT TO US AND OUR
FRIENDS. USG CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THAT ALL OF US
AVOID GIVING IN TO THESE PRESSURES. WE BELIEVE THAT IF
NO NE OF US GIVES IN TO THREATS, THERE ARE GOOD PROSPECTS.
IN OUR VIEW NUMBER OF ARAB LEADERS UNDERSTAND THIS BASIC
POINT. DE COURCEL INTERJECTED WE KNOW HASSAN UNDER-
STANDS THIS. I SAID OTHERS DO AS WELL. IT WAS OUR
JUDGMENT THAT IF SOME FURTHER PROGRESS COULD BE MADE
THERE WAS GOOD CHANCE FAISAL IN TIME WOULD FIND WAY TO
EASE OIL EMBARGO. WHEN DE COURCEL ASKED IF ARABS COULD
NOT PUT MORE AND MORE PRESSURE THROUGH OIL EMBARGO, I
SAID OF COURSE BUT RISK THEY RUN IS THAT NEGOTIATIONS
CONDUCTED IN SUCH ATMOSPHERE LIKELY TO BE COUNTERPRO-
DUCTIVE AND IT NOT FEASIBLE FOR US TO PLAY EFFECTIVE
ROLE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. US INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE-
MAKING PROCESS IS ESSENTIAL AND BEST CHANCE FOR SUCCESS
IS IF WE ALL STAND TOGETHER. FINALLY, I MADE POINT
TACIFULLY THAT US COULD ONE WAY OR ANOTHER MANAGE UNDER
EMBARGO.
SECRET,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
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*
Department of State
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TELEGRAM
- 6 - LONDON 13420, 15 NOV '73
S
13. I ENDED BY REITERATING OVER WILLINGNESS TO CO N-
EAST PROBLEM.
TINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH GOF AND NATO ALLIES ON MIDDLE
ANNENBERG
NODI
S
20010
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PY 8 OF 8 COPIES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
W/A
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
Scowenft
R 160012Z NOV 73 ZFF-4
LL
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 5616
CONTROL: 4591Q
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0198
RECD: 15 NOVEMBER 73 -
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1668
BT
8 56 PM
SECRET
LONDON 13421
Sand
NODIS/CHEROKEE
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO
Sumplat
E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR, XF, UK
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S MIDDLE EAST/
EUROPEAN VISIT - BRIEFING AT BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE
NOVEMBER 15. PART 1.
1. IN LONDON TODAY WE HAD FAR AND AWAY MOST INFORMATIVE
AND USEFUL EXCHANGE OF OUR TRIP. THAT IS NOT TO SAY WE
AND BRITISH AGREED ON ALL POINTS, BUT DIFFERENCES WERE
S
FRANKLY LAID ON TABLE IN MANNER THAT 1 BELIEVE WILL
CONTRIBUTE TO OUR PURPOSES. BRITISH MADE STRONG CASE
FOR URGENCY IN SETTING DATE FOR PEACE CONFERENCE AS EARLY
AS POSSIBLE ON TWO GROUNDS: (A) ARAB SUMMIT WHICH NOW
SCHEDULED NOVEMBER 26 DURING WHICH BRITISH FEAR (AND I
WOULD AGREE) THERE IS RISK ARABS WILL TAKE POSITIONS
WHICH MAY MAKE CONVENING OF PEACE CONFERENCE MORE
DIFFICULT; AND (B) SYRIANS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF DRIFTING
AWAY FROM SOLIDARITY WITH SADAT IN TERMS OF LATTER'S
COMMITMENT TOHENTER CONFERENCE. BRITISH HAD SEVERAL
INTERESTING THINGS TO REPORT, SO I FELT IT WORTH GIVING
YOU FAIRLY FULL ACCOUNT.
2. SINCE SIR ALEC IS ILL, WE SAW LORD BALNIEL, ACTING
FOREIGN MINISTER, PRECEDED BY MEETING WITH FCO MIDDLE
EAST PROFESSIONALS HEADED BY ASSISTANT UNDER
SECRETARY PARSONS. PARSONS SAID HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED
FAIRLY FULL REPORT FROM BRITISH NATO REP AND OTHER POSTS
ON MY BASIC REPORT, SO HE THOUGHT WE COULD SKIP THAT AND
PROCEED DIRECTLY TO SEVERAL QUESTIONS WHICH BRITISH
WANTED TO POSE. FIRST WAS QUESTION OF LINK BETWEEN TALKS
ENVISAGED UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 OF SIX-POINT AGREEMENT AND
PEACE CONFERENCE. 1 SAID THERE WAS NO REASON TO
SUPPOSE THERE WAS SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT
AND ISRAEL AT THIS TIME ON WHAT DISENGAGEMENT WOULD
MEAN: THERE WAS HOWEVER DESIRE IN BOTH CAIRO AND
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
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Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
2 LONDON 13421
JERUSALEM TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER PROMPTLY. ISRAELIS
HAD ASKED WHY MILITARY REPS COULD NOT TALK ABOUT DIS-
ENGAGEMENT AND WE HAD SAID, NONE OF COURSE. IF THEY
COULD REACH FURTHER AGREEMENT THIS WOULD BE ALL TO GOOD.
BUT PRIVATELY WE ASSUMED AT THAT TIME THAT MILITARY
WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT,
AND THIS THEREFORE WAS LIKELY TO BE FIRST ITEM ON AGENDA
OF PEACE CONFERENCE.
3. PARSONS ASKED ABOUT BLOCKADE AT BAB AL-MANDEB. I
SAID IT WAS TRUE BLOCKADE WAS NOT MENTIONED IN AGREEMENT;
NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS KEEN AWARENESS IN CAIRO OF GREAT
IMPORTANCE ISRAEL ATTACHED TO LIFTING OF BLOCKADE, AND
WE WOULD HAVE TO SEE HOW THINGS WORKED OUT IN PRACTICE.
4. PARSONS ASKED WHETHER WE SAW PROSPECT OF SIMILAR
AGREEMENT ON POW'S WITH SYRIA. I SAID WE HOPED, NOW THAT
EGYPT-ISRAEL POW EXCHANGES HAD APPARENTLY BEGUN, THAT
THIS WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE SYRIAN SIDE. I REVIEWED
S
WITH HIM RECENT EXCHANGE OF PROPOSALS BETWEEN SYRIA AND
ISRAELIS.
5. I SAID THAT, MORE BROADLY, WHILE IT IS CLEAR CAIRO
WANTS US ENGAGED, IT WAS NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHAT SYRIAN
POSITION WAS. SYRIANS HAD SAID IN TALK IN WASHINGTON
THAT THEY WANTED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US. THIS
WOULD BE DONE. I SAID WE HAD OFFERED SYRIANS PROSPECT
OF A VISIT BY ME TO DAMASCUS DURING THIS TRIP, BUT THEY
HAD POLITELY DECLINED INDICATING THIS WAS NOT THE MOMENT.
I INDICATED THAT SOME FUTURE CONTACTS MIGHT PROVE
POSSIBLE.
6. PARSONS SAID ALL OF THIS WAS MOST ENCOURAGING.
THERE WERE SEVERAL POINTS ON WHICH BRITISH WERE ABSOLUTE-
LY CLEAR: HMG WANTED FULL SETTLEMENT; THEY FELT IT WAS
OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO KEEP UP MOMENTUM; SOONER
NEGOTIATIONS COULD START THE BETTER. UNDERSCORING HIS
WORDS, PARSONS SAID HMG WOULD DO NOTHING, HE REPEATED
S
NOTHING, TO IMPEDE START OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHATEVER
MANNER PARTIES COULD AGREE TO. HMG DID NOT CARE ABOUT
AUSPICES; RESULTS WERE WHAT COUNTED. AS TACTICAL
MATTER, HOWEVER, BRITISH WERE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT
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IT MIGHT CAUSE DIFFICULTIES TO TRY TO KEEP UN OUT OF
PROCEEDINGS ALTOGETHER. PRESSURE WOULD GROW FOR INVOLVE-
S
MENT FROM LARGE NON-ALIGNED BODY IN UN AND THIS WOULD BE
FED BY RADICAL ARABS. BRITISH THOUGHT SOLUTION MIGHT
LIE IN USING WALDHEIM AS KIND OF LAY FIGURE WHO WOULD
IN FACT NOT PLAY MUCH OF A ROLE AS NEGOTIATOR. IF HE
WERE AROUND IN THIS COSMETIC FORM, IT MIGHT BE
SUFFICIENT.
7. I SAID I GENERALLY THOUGHT POINT HAD MERIT AND
WOULD REPORT HIS VIEWS. ARRANGING FOR SOME MANNER OF
COSMETIC UN PRESENCE SEEMED SENSIBLE.
8. PARSONS SAID HE WISHED TO PASS ON TO US SOME RECENT
GLEANINGS, MEAGRE AS THEY WERE, OF SYRIAN ATTITUDE.
THEY WERE BEGINNING TO SAY "ALL SC MEMBERS HAVE TO BE
PRESENT AT THE CONFERENCE." PARSONS SAID THIS IDEA
WOULD BE DISASTER IF IT GAINED CURRENCY AMONG ARABS. HE
THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO CONCENTRATE ON DRIVING SYRIANS OFF
THIS POSITION. ALSO, HE SAID, ARAB SUMMIT WAS NOW DUE
TO CONVENE NOVEMBER 26. HE HAD FOREBODINGS ABOUT ITS
LIKELY EFFECT ON CONFERENCE IF DATE AND MODALITIES HAD
NOT BEEN WORKED OUT BY THEN. AT WORST, ARABS GATHERED
TOGETHER COULD WRECK THINGS TOTALLY BY ISSUING L973
EQUIVALENT OF "THREE NO'S" OF L967 KHARTOUM CONFERENCE.
EVEN AT BEST, SUMMIT WAS LIKELY TO HAVE EFFECT OF MAKING
ARAB POSITIONS ON QUESTION OF AUSPICES AND PARTICIPA-
TION MORE RIGID. PARSONS HAD SAID HMG HAD BEEN DOING
ITS BEST TO ARGUE AGAINST SUMMIT WITH ARAB GOVERNMENTS.
9. PARSONS SAID HE THOUGHT SYRIANS PROBABLY WANTED
SETTLEMENT BUT THEY FEARED THEY WOULD BE SOLD DOWN THE
RIVER BY SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL PEACE SETTLEMENT.
THIS MIGHT EXPLAIN WHY THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO HAVE
SECURITY COUNCIL AUSPICES. PARSONS DETECTED SIGN OF
NEW RAPPROACHMENT BETWEEN JORDAN AND SYRIA,
BECAUSE JORDAN ALSO HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT POSSIBLE
SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT. PARSONS
THOUGHT SYRIANS WERE GETTING INTO INCREASINGLY APPREHEN-
SIVE STATE, AND INCREASINGLY PUSHING NEGATIVE POSITIONS.
IF SYRIA WERE REALLY STICKY ABOUT GOING INTO CONFERENCE
IT MIGHT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR SADAT TO GO IN. I
SAID I WAS NOT SO SURE ON THIS POINT, BUT IT WAS WORTH
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THINKING ABOUT. PARSONS SAID WE SHOULD WATCH OUT FOR
SYRIANS. HISTORY SHOWED THAT FOR THE LAST FIFTY YEARS
SYRIA HAD AN ALMOST SPOTLESS RECORD AS SPOILER IN AREA.
10. I SAID THESE COMMENTS WERE MOST INTERESTING SINCE
OUR INFORMATION ABOUT SYRIA WAS VERY MEAGER. IF WE
SUCCEEDED IN GETTING EVERYONE TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE,
LIKELY PROCEDURE WOULD BE TO BREAK UP AT FAIRLY EARLY
STAGE INTO SUBGROUPS, EACH OF WHICH WOULD DISCUSS ONE
OF ASPECTS OF PEACE SETTLEMENT. THIS WOULD POSE
DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR STAGE MANAGERS OF CONFERENCE.
ISRAEL WANTED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN
SETTLEMENT, YET IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP OTHERS IN
PLAY IN SOME MANNER. I GAVE PARSONS RUNDOWN ON LEBANESE
ATTITUDE AND THEN WE GOT INTO DISCUSSION ABOUT
PALESTINIAN ASPECT. QUESTION OF WHO REPRESENTED
S
PALESTINIANS AT CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED
FAIRLY SOON AND UNFORTUNATELY ONE COULD NOT BE OPTIMISTIC
ABOUT EASY SOLUTION. PARSONS AGREED. I SAID WE HAD
IMPRESSION THAT LEBANESE WANTED US TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM
FOR THEM. I SAID I FELT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT ARABS
THEMSELVESET TOGETHER TO TRV TO WORK OUT A COMMON
POSITION ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION QUESTION.
11. PARSONS WONDERED IF ARABS WERE DOING ANYTHING TO
TRY TO BRING ABOUT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN ARAFAI AND
HUSSEIN. THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE ESSENTIAL FOR ANY
COALESCENCE OF PALESTINIAN OPINION ABOUT REPRESENTATION
AT CONFERENCE. I SAID 1 DOUBTED THAT SUCH RECONCILIA-
TION WAS POSSIBLE, AND I WAS NOT AT ALL SURE WE SHOULD -
TRY TO PROMOTE IT. KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE DEEPLY
SUSPICIOUS OF ANY SUCH PRESSURES.
12. PARSONS THEN SET FORTH BRITISH POSITION ON
PALESTINIANS. HMG VIEWED PALESTINIANS AS FALLING INTO
S
THREE CATEGORIES: 1) REFUGEES OF ORIGINAL '48 STRUGGLE,
DISPOSITION OF WHOM SHOULD FALL WITHIN PURVIEW OF UN
RESOLUTION 194 OF 1948 (BUT PARSONS INDICATED THAT
PRACTICAL COMPROMISE WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED BETWEEN THIS
RESOLUTION AND REQUIREMENTS OF PRENT REALITY); 2)
PALESTINIANS LIVING IN GAZA, WHICH BRITISH SAY OUGHT TO
SEGRET
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REVERT TO ARAB CONTROL IN PEACE SETTLEMENT BUT DETAILS OF
PRECISE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE LEFT FOR
NEGOTIATION; AND 3) JORDINIAN WEST BANK RESIDENTS WHOM
BRITISH REGARDED TO BE UNDER JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY
(PARSONS COMMENTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT UK WAS ONE OF
TWO STATES THAT CONSIDER WEST BANK DE JURE PART OF
NOD
JORDAN); AND THEREFORE PALESTINE PROBLEM WITH WEST
BANK SHOULD BE SETTLED BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND HIS
SUBJECTS.
L3 PARSONS SAID THESE WERE BRITISH IDEAS BUT HMG ASN'T
GOING TO RAM THEM DOWN ANYBODY'S THROATS,
END PART ONE
NOTE: NOT SENT TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO AND SEOUL BY OC/T PER
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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*
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Received: Nov., 10, 1973 846 PM
S
0 110018Z NOV 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5149
RUEHCR/USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 002
BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 12979
NODIS/ CHEROKEE
FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, US, MX
SUBJECT: SISCO BRIEFING OF LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER
S
1. SUMMARY: I BRIEFED LEBANESE FONMIN AND KEY
MINISTRY OFFICIALS EVENING NOVEMBER 10 ON PROGRESS TO
DATE AND LIKELY FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. AFTER BRIEFING WE
DINED WITH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. THEY
HAD JUST RETURNED FROM CAIRO WHERE THEY FOUND EGYPTIANS
HAVE "REGAINED CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATES" AND WILLING
N
MAKE CLEAR TO ALL CRITICS, THAT THEY BELIEVE THIS
WILL PRODUCE LONG-AWAITED RESULTS.
LEBANESE REASSURED BY CLARIFICATION OF HOW WE SEE PEACE TALKS
DEVELOPING. THEY WISH PARTICIPATE BUT NOT IN
DISCUSSING DISENGAGEMENT. PRIMARY OBJECTIVES ARE
DEFINITIVE ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR PRESENT BORDERS WITH
ISRAEL AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEM PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE. I URGED THAT THEY SEEK UNIFIED ARAB POSITION
ON LATTER POINT AND THAT THEY CONSULT, CLOSELY WITH
ARAB LEADERS SUCH AS KING HUSSEIN. LEBANESE SEEMED
VERY PLEASED WITH OUR REASSURANCES, AND I TOLD THEM
WE WISHED INTENSIFY CONSULTATIONS AS WE MOVE INTO
S
NEXT PHASE OF SEARCH FOR JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT.
THEY WOULD WELCOME A VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER.
END SUMMARY.
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-2- BEIRUT 12979 Section 1 0f 2 November 10, 1973
S
2. IN TWO- HOUR MEETING AI LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY
NOVEMBER 10, I BRIEFED FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFA AND HIS
TOP ASSISTANTS ON PROGRESS TO DATE. FONMIN AND
PRIME MINISTER (WHO JOINED US LATER FOR DINNER) HAD
JUST RETURNED FROM CAIRO WHERE THEY SAW SADAT AND
OTHER EGYPTIAN LEADERS. THEY DESCRIBED EGYPTIANS AS
NODE
HAVEING "REGAINED CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATES' EFFORTS
TO TRULY SEEK JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST.
FONMIN ALSO EXPRESSED HIS AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S
APPRECIATION FOR YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD,
AS WELL AS THOSE OF USG GENERALLY.
3. I GAVE THEM A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF HOW WE SEE
IMPROVED CHANCES FOR PEACE IN AREA, PARTICULARLY GREATER
REALISM ON BOTH SIDES, AND OUR DETERMINIATION CONTINUE
USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO HELP CONTINUE FORWARD
S
MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, ROAD AHEAD IS DIFFICULT
AND USG WILL NEED ALL SUPPORT IT CAN GET FROM PUBLIC
OPINION IN OUR COUNTRY IF IT IS TO BE ABLE USE ITS
INFLUENCE AS IT MIGHT WISH. IN THIS CONNECTION,
ARAB OIL EMBARGO IS DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD. IT TENDS
TO TURN PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST ARABS AND MAKE IT SEEM
THAT USG BEING BLACKMAILED INTO DOING SOMETHING WHICH
IS ACTUALLY IN ITS OVERALL INTEREST. IN ORDER HELP
EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITH PUBLIC OPINION, ARAB COUNTRIES
LIKE LEBANON WHO UNDERSTAND PROBLEM OF PUBLIC OPINION
SHOULD USE THEIR OWN INFLUENCE WITH OIL-PRODUCING
ARAB STATES TO EASE EMBARGO. FONMIN NOTED THAT
LEBANON NOT AN OIL PRODUCER AND THAT IT WOULD BE
DIFFICULT GET OTHER ARABS GIVE UP USE THIS WEAPON.
3. IN DESCRIBING LIKELY FUTURE PROGRESS, I WAS ABLE
CLARIFY LEBANESE CONFUSION OVER NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT
RETURN TO OCTOBER 22 LINES AS PART OF SIX-POINT
AGREEMENT AND DISCUSSION OF DISENGAGEMENT WHICH WILL
S
ALMOST CERTAINLY TAKE UP FIRST WEEKS OF PEACE TALKS.
LEBANESE HAD ASSUMED DISENGAGEMENT TALKS BETWEEN
EGYPT AND ISRAEL LIKELY BE CONCLUDED BY TIME PEACE
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S
TALKS BEGIN NEXT MONTH AND THAT TALKS WOULD THEREFORE
ENTER IMMEDIATELY INTO OTHER ISSUES. UPON HEARING HOW
MANY PROBLEMS WILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED ON DISENGAGEMENT
AND THAT WE AND EGYPTIANS SEE DISENGAGEMENT AS COVERING
MORE THAN MERE OCTOBER 22 LINES, FONMIN SAID THAT
LEBANESE HAD NO DESIRE PARTICIPATE IN THAT PHASE OF
PEACE TALKS. THEY DO WISH TO PARTICIPATE AT APPROPRIATE
EARLY STAGE IN ORDER OBTAIN DEFINITIVE INTERNATIONAL
ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR BOUNDARIES WITH ISRAEL AS SET
FORTH IN 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ON THIS POINT, THEY
ATTACHE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO OUR REPEATED SUPPORT FOR
THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
AND OUR LONG-STANDING SUPPORT OF PRESENT BOUNDARIES,
WITH WHICH ISRAEL IS ALSO IN AGREEMENT.
4. I SAID THAT FROM OUR TALKS WITH EGYPTIANS WE HAD
REACHED TENTATIVE JUDGMENT THAT NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS WOULD BE
TAKEN UP WITH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS ON IMPLEMENTING
SIX POINTS, INCLUDING EXCHANGE OF POWS, COMPLETING UN
FORCE, WORKING OUT CONFERENCE DETAILS. I POINTED OUT
THAT WHILE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS MIGHT TOUCH
UPON QUESTION OF DISENGAGEMENT, REALISTICALLY THIS LIKELY
TO BE PRIME FOCUS OF OPENING PHASES OF CONFERENCE. IT
SEEMED LIKELY THAT QUESTION OF LEBANESE PARTICIPATION
AND THAT OF PALESTINIANS WOULD BE MATTER FOR CONSULTATION
IN FIRST PART OF CONFERENCE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT CAIRO
HAD TOLD LEBANESE THAT CONFERENCE PLANNED FOR FIRST WEEK
IN DECEMBER.
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/ OF STATE
Department of State
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S
0 110018Z NOV 73 ZFF-4
Received: Nov., 10,1973 908PM
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5150
RUEHCR/USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 003
BT
SECRE T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 12979
NODIS/CHEROKEE
FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO
5. FONMIN SAID THAT UNLESS QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY THERE COULD NEVER BE
ANY REAL OR LASTING PEACE IN AREA. LEBANON WOULD
HAVE LIKED TO ABSORB SOME OF 250, 000 PALESTINIANS
LIVING THERE BUT UNABLE TO DO SO FOR ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL REASONS. ANY SETTLEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR
COMPENSATION FOR REFUGEES THAT WOULD BE USED SO AS
TO INDUCE THEM TO RETURN TO TERRITORY OR COUNTRY
S
SET ASIDE FOR THEM. THERE MUST BE SUCH A TERRITORY
OR COUNTRY IF SETTLEMENT IS TO WORK. IN 1971, USG
PROMISED CONSULT GOL ON QUESTION SOLUTION FOR
PALESTINIANS. FONMIN SAID HE ASSUMED THIS STILL
TRUE. I SAID IT CERTAINLY WAS, WE ARE CONSULTING
ON THIS RIGHT NOW, AND WE WILL VERY MUCH APPRECIATE
FRANK AND CONCRETE LEBANESE VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION. WE BELIEVE
N
APPROPRIATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS SHOULD HAVE TALKS ON THIS MATTER
AND TRY TO REACH AGREED POSITION. IT IMPORTANT FOR LEBANON TO
TALK TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS, PARTICULARLY HUSSEIN, SO AS TO-
REACH SENSIBLE POSITION AND NOT ALLOW SOVIETS OR OTHERS
SPLIT ARABS AT CONFERENCE ON SUCH IMPORTANT MATTER. FONMIN SAID
THAT LEBANESE WOULD CONSULT WITH OTHER ARABS AND WITH
PALESTINIANS. HE NOTED THAT PLO ALREADY REPRESENTS
PALESTINIANS IN ARAB LEAGUE. HE URGED THAT USG
CONTINUE USE ITS INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN HELPING
BRIDGE POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN ARAB
STATES FRIENDLY TO US.
S
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-2- - BEIRUT 12979 Section 2 of 2 November 10, 1973
S
6. I CLOSED BY SAYING WE DELIGHED HAVE THIS
N
OCCASION TALK WITH LEBANESE, THAT WE INTEND INTENSIFY
OUR TALKS WITH THEM AS WE MOVE AHEAD IN THIS MOST
SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF MIDDLE EAST HISTORY. FONMIN
EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR OUR VISIT.
7. COMMENT: LEBANESE EXUDED ENTHUSIANSM FOR EFFORTS
OF US, AND SECRETARY'S IN PARTICULAR, IN PAST WEEKS.
THEY STRESSED THAT CONFIDENCE IN THE US HAS BEEN
RESTORED THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. THEY EXPRESSED
FEAR THAT US-USSR AUSPICES WOULD BE A DEVICE FOR
SPRADING OF SOVIET INFLUENCE, AND THEY WERE
REASSURED WHEN I DESCRIBED HOW WE INTEND TO DEAL
S
DIRECTLY WITH THE ARABS, WHILE MAINTAINING OUR
CONSULTATIVE LINKS WITH THE SOVIETS. THEY ARE
ALSO ANXIOUS TO PARTICIPATE AT AN EARLY STAGE OF
THE CONFERENCE BUT WOULD LIKE TO SEE PALESTINIAN
REPRESENTATION RESOLVED BEFOREHAND. ON THIS ISSUE,
THEY FIND THEMSELVES BETWEEN HUSSEIN ON THE ONE
HAND AND THE PLO ON THE OTHER. I STRESSED
THROUGHOUT THEY OUGHT TO CONCERT WITH HUSSEIN AND
DEVELOP A COMMON ARAB POSITION. LEBANESE WANT
A SETTLEMENT, AND THEY WANT IT CLEARLY AND VISIBLY
TO COME UNDER US AUSPICES. IF A TRIP TO DAMASCUS
IS WORKED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR EUROPEAN TRIP,
A STOP HERE IS A MUST.
BUFFUM
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NITED STATES of
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0 122315Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
CONTROL: 34590
TO R UE HCR / USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 12
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8685
RECD: 12 NOVEMBER 73 -
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 6150
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9 16 PM
SECRET BONN 16393
Scoweroft
NODIS/CHEROKEE
MCFARLANE
TO THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, IT
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S MIDDLE EAST/EUROPE TRIP
-
BRIEFING OF THE ITALIANS
1. MY FIRSTSTOP IN ITALY HAS GONE WELL. I HAD TWO
ESSIONS WITH ITALIANS, ONE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THIS
DRNING AND LONG SESSION OVER DINNER WITH FOREIGN
WINISTRY HIERARCHY HEADED BY SECRETARY GENERAL GAJA
AND HEAD OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENT DUCCI LAST NIGHT. IN
ADDITION, I HAD VERY CORDIAL AND USEFUL MEETING AT
VATICAN WITH ARCHBISHOP CASAROLI, WHO IS, AS YOU KNOW,
VATICAN'S DE FACTO FOREIGN MINISTER.
2. AT EACH OF THESE MEETINGS, I SET FORTH OUR POSITION
ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES. I AM REPORTING IT IN
DETAIL SINCE IT WILL BE REPEATED AT EVERY STOP WITH
ONLY NECESSARY LOCAL VARIATION, AND IF YOU HAVE ANY
OBSERVATIONS I WOULD APPRECIATE IT. I SAID I HAD COME
AT YOUR EXPRESSED WISH TO CONVEY TO OUR NATO ALLIES
OUR IMPRESSIONS OF HOW EVENTS HAD UNFOLDED IN RECENT
WEEKS AND TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THEM AS WE NOW MOVE
FROM SITUATION IN WHICH FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF PEACE SETTLE-
MENT WOULD BE ADDRESSED. I SAID I WAS HAPPY TO BE
ABLE TO MAKE ITALY MY FIRST STOP WHICH WAS IN ITSELF
TESTIMONY OF IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO US-ITALIAN
COLLABORATION ON THIS SUBJECT.
3. I SAID AS RESULT OF LATEST WAR OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS
IN MIDDLE EAST APPEAR TO US TO BE MORE FAVORABLE FOR
PEACE SETTLEMENT THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE 1967. NEITHER
SIDE HAD ACHIEVED DECISIVE VICTORY: NOR HAD EITHER
SUFFERED DECISIVE DEFEAT. FOR ISRAEL BUBBLE OF
IVINCIBLE MILITARY POWER HAD BEEN BURS; AT SAME
IME THE ARABS NO LONGER HAD TO FACE PROSPECT OF
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NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEIR HEADS BOWED IN DEFEATIST
SPIRIT. SADAT HAD ACHIEVED MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL
VICTORY WHICH WE BELIEVE NOW MAKES NEGOTIATIONS MORE
OF REALITY.
4. WE WERE STRUCK BY SEVERAL ASPECTS OF NEW SITUATION
THAT HAS EMERGED. IF WARFARE WERE TO RESUME, IT LIKELY
BE WAR OF ATTRITION COSTLY TO BOTH SIDES, BUT PERHAPS
MORE PARTICULARLY ISRAEL. ALSO ISRAEL'S DEPENDENCE
UPON THE US TO WAGE WAR HAD BEEN FULLY DEMONSTRATED.
POURED IN SOME $3 BILLION OF ARMS INTO AREA SINCE
CONFLICT BEGAN, ARABS BELIEVED ONLY US COULD BRING
ABOUT PEACE SETTLEMENT. us HAS DECIDED TO MAKE
ALL-OUT COMMINENT 0 TRY TO REACH FUNDAMENTAL PEACE
SETTLEMENT. US AND SOVIETS HAD SUCCEEDED IN
COLLABORATING TO ACHIEVE CEASEFIRE. IN LAST TEN DAYS
US HAD BROUGHT EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS TO SIX-POINT
AGREEMENT.
5. I THEN MADE SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT SIX-POINT
AGREEMENT. SOME PEOPLE QUESTIONED WHAT SADAT HAD
GAINED FROM IT. AGREEMENT IN FACT REPRESENTED
COMMITMENT FOR SADAT THAT EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY AND
SUEZ CITY WOULD NOT BE STARVED OUT, ALSO UN INSTEAD
OF ISRAELI CHECKPOINTS. FOR ISRAELIS THERE IS NO RE-
QUIREMENT TO RETURN TO OCTOBER 22 POSITIONS, BUT TO
DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITHIN CONEXT OF DISENGAGEMENT;
AND BOTH SIDES GET THEIR POW'S. FURTHERIMORE, THERE
IS NOTHING SAID IN AGREEMENT ABOUT BLOCKADE. MANY
DETAILS OF HOW SIX-POINT AGREEMENT WOULD BE IMPLEMENED
ON GROUND REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT BY MILITARY
REPRESENATIVES OF BOTH SIDES. IN ADDITION IT WOULD
TAKE SOME TIME FOR UNEF TO GET ITS FULL FORCE IN PLACE.
7. MOVING TO WHAT HAPPENS IN NEXT PHASE, I POINTED
OUT THAT THIRD PARAGRAPH OF RESOLUTION 338 FOR FIRST
TIME CALLS ON PARTIES TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS. THIS
WAS SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE. IT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY
EGYPTIANS, JORDANIANS AND ISRAELIS; WE COULD NOT BE
SURE ABOUT SYRIANS, BUT WE HOPED TO HAVE FURTHER CO N-
TACT WITH THEM IN FUTURE. TENTATIVE PLAN WAS FOR
NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN WITH CONVENING OF PEACE
CONFERENCE SOMETIME HERE SEEMED
SO TO This Executive and APPROPRIATE be declassified.
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-3- - BONN 16393
VENUE. IN INITIAL PHASE, WE THOUGH CONFERENCE
WOULD BE COMPOSED OF PRINCIPAL COMBATANTS WITH
QUESTION OF LEBANESE PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION
FROM PALESTINIANS TO BE TAKEN UP AI AN APPROPRIATE
EARLY STAGE. UNSYG WOULD OPEN CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH WE
DID NOT ENVISAGE UN PLAYING REAL SUBSTANTIVE ROLE.
CONFERENCE WOULD BE UNDER US-USSR AUSPICES. FIRST
ORDER TO BUSINESS LIKELY TO BE QUESTION OF DISENGAGE-
MENT AND SEPRATION OF FORCE. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT
MILITARY REPS IN THEIR DISCUSSION ON GROUND IN NEXT
FEW WEEKS COULD MAKE PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE, BUT
PROBABILITY WAS THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED
IN FIRST INSTANCE BY PEACE CONFERENCE.
I THEN CAME TO MY MAIN THEME. I SAID WE FRANKLY
COULD NOT ENVISAGE SOLUTION THAT WOULD NOT REQUIRE
US BRINGING ITS INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON ISRAEL. THIS
WOULD INEVITABLY CREATE STRAINS IN US-ISRAELI
RELATIONS. WE WOULD NEED TIME TO MANAGE THIS IN MANNER
THAT WAS LEAST DISRUPTIVE: WE WOULD ALSO NEED MAXIMUM
SUPPORT FROM CONGRESS AND PUBLIC FOR OUR 08 JECTIVES.
WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET THIS SUPPORT UNDER THREAT
OF BLACKMAIL IN FORM OF EMBARGO ON OIL SHIPMENTS TO
US. I HEN TOLD THEM VERY GENERALLY ABOUT YOUR
TALKS IN RIYADH WITH KING FAISAL. I SAID THAT SADAT,
KING HUSSEIN AND HASSAN SEEMED UNDERSTANDING OF THE
COGENCY OF OUR ARGUMENT AND WE HOPED THEY MIGHT USE
THEIR INFLUENCE WITH FAISAL. FAISAL WAS GENUINELY
ANGUISHED MAN. WE COULD NOT REPORT ANY CHANGE IN
HIS POSITION, BUT HE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE WWEIGHING
OUR ARGUMENTS VERY CAREFULLY IN DAYS AHEAD, AND WE
INTEND TO FOLLOW UP OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM.
9. I SAID THIS WAS WHERE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN HELP
CAME IN. THEY COULD STRESS TO ARABS IMPORTANCE OF
THIS CONSIDERATION. WITH THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCENE, THEY COULD POINT OUT VITAL
NECESSITY OF STRENGHIENING HAND OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH
IF PEACE SETTLEMT ACCEPTABLE TO ARABS WAS TO BE
UGHT ABOUT.
BOTH ITALIANS AND VATICAN QUESTIONED ME ABOUT
EUROPEAN ROLE IN PEACE CONFERENCE. ITALIAN FOREIGN
MINISTRY OFFICIALS IN PARTICULAR PRESSED ME HARD
ABOUT THIS LAST document NIGHT has Reproduced at the Richard to Executive Nixon Presidential Order 13526 Library and has been determined to be declassified.
NOT DECLASSIFIED TO BF REPRODUCED This
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
-4- BONN 16393
FRANKLY WAS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY THAT TWO SUPER
POWERS, EACH ACTING ASSIDIOUSLY IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
CLIENTS' INTEREST WOULD SOON REACH SAME IMPASSE THAT
PARTIES THEMSELVES WOULD IF LEFT TO THEMSELVES. WAS
THERE NOT USEFUL ROME EUROPEANS COULD PLAY IN SUCH
SITUATION? IN REPLY, I SAID CAREFUL CONSIDERATION
HAD BEEN GIVEN TO INCLUSION OF OTHERS IN CONFERENCE,
PARTICULARLY QUESTION WHETHER OTHER UN PERMANENT REPS
SHOULD BE PRESENT. CHINA DID NOT SEEM TO SHOW AN
INTEREST IN PARTICIPATION. WITHOUT MAKING VALUE
JUDGMENT, FACT REMAINED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT
EIHER BRITISH OR FRENCH PARTICIPATION, VIEWING
OSITION OF THESE GOVERNMENTS AS TOO PARTISAN TO
LAY USEFUL ROLE. SC ALSO CONSIDERED TOO PARTISAN
BY ISRAEL AS WELL AS LARGE UN GROUP. THAT DID OT
MEAN EUROPE WOULD NOT HAVE USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY, IN-
DEED WE FELT CONTRARY WAS TRUE. BUT WE BELIEVED SUCH
ROLE WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IF IT TOOK FORM NOT OF
PUBLIC DECLARATIONS BUT OF QUIET DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT
FOR OBJECTIVES WHICH US AND OUR NATO ALLIES SHARED.
11. IN DEALING WITH THIS QUESTION, WHICH AROSE IN ALL
THREE SESSIONS, I LAID HEAVY STRESS ON FOLLOWING
POINT: AS RESULT OF WAR AND PARTIES' ACCEPTANCE OF
RESOLUTION 338, WE WERE IN TOTALLY NEW SITUATION.
PARTIES HAD IN FACT AGREED FOR FIRST TIME TO SIT
DOWN AND NEGOTIATE. WHEN WE EXPLORED WITH SADAT WHAT
THIS WOULD MEAN IN PRACTICE, HE WAS QUITE CLEARLY NOT
WORRIED ABOUT PROPSECT OF FACE-TO-FACE TALKS WITH
ISRAEL; WHAT CONCERNED HIM WAS THAT BOTH US AND SOVIET REPS
BE PRESENT AT MEETINGS. PROSPECT OF REAL
NEGOTIATIONS GAVE ALL OF US NEW RESPONSIBILITY TO
APPLY OURSELVES TO PRACTICAL TASK OF HELPING PARTIES
REACH ACCOMMODATION ON THE DIFFICULT ISSUES. WE
RECOGNIZED OUR OWN SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS
REGARD, AND WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCHARGE THEM. FOR
EUROPEANS, MOST USEFUL ROLE WOULD BE QUIET SUPPORT
IN DIPLOMATIC SPHERE FOR SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES WHICH
: WOULD MUTUALLY RECOGNIZE AS NEGOTIATIONS UNFOLDED.
J BOTH ITALIANS AND TO VATICAN, I SAID US WOULD
WELCOME HAVING ANY OF THEIR IDEAS AS TO WHAT WOULD
CONSTITUTE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT. I
SAID WE RECOGNIZED at WeRichard Nixan IMPOS SIBLE FOR
EUBOREANS
This
document
Ras
BeehTreviewe
and
VERINED
to
be
declassified.,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
-5- BONN 16393
KEPT INFORMED ON STEP-BY-STEP BASIS. WE WOULD DO OUR
BEST IN THE FUTURE TO FULFILL THIS REQUIREMENT THROUGHT
INTENSIVE AND CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS.
12. MEETING WITH MORO WENT VERY WELL. HE CONFINED
HIS REMARKS ALMOST ENTIRELY TO ASKING SERIES OF
INTELLIGENT QUESTIONS ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR MAKING
PROGRESS AND WHAT EUROPEAN ROLE MIGHT BE. AT END
HE SAID ITALY WOULD TRY TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE,
AND I BELIEVE HE PERSONALLY MEANS THIS. HE RESPONDED
WELL TO OUR ASSURANCES THAT WE WANTED INTENSIVE
CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM IN FUTURE.
13. AT HOLY SEE, CASAROLI GREETED ME PARTICULARLY
WARMLY AND SAID IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE POPE WAS EXPECTING
VISIT FROM POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER THAT DAY THAT HE
WAS UNABLE TO SEE ME. AS EXPECTED, CASAROLI WAS
PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN OUR IDEAS ON JERUSALEM,
WHICH WE DISCUSSED FOR SOME TIME, AND HE ALSO FOCUSED
ON PALESTINIAN ANGLE. HE SAID VATICAN HAD RECENTLY
REFRAINED FROM ANY PUBLIC REAFFIRMATION OF ITS
POSITION ABOUT INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM.
THIS WAS NOT BECAUSE VATICAN HAD ABANDONED THIS POLICY
BUT RATHER BECAUSE IT DID NOT WISH TO PRECLUDE OTHER
VARIATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE AGREED TO AMONG THE PARTIES,
PROVIDED BASIC PRINCIPLE IS OBSERVED THAT FOREIGN
COMMUNITIES AND RELIGIOUS INTERESTS WOULD "FEEL AT
HOME IN JERUSALEM, AND NOT MERELY AT ISRAEL'S
PREASURE." HE ALSO MENTIONED DESIRABILITY OF SO ME
FORM OF INTERNATIONAL GURATEES FOR WHATEVER STATUS
OF JERUSALEM EMERGED.
14. ON JERUSALEM I TOLD CARASOLL THAT BOTH SIDES
WERE BASICALLY AGREED THAT SUBJECT WAS so COMPLEX
IT SHOULD BE LEFT AS LAST ITEM ON AGENDA. WE THOUGHT
SOMETING COULD BE WORKED OUT IN TIME, BUT THIS WOULD
PROBABLY HAVE TO WAIT FOR PROGRESS TO BE MADE ON
OTHER MORE TRACTABLE ISSUES. WE DID NOT AT THIS
MOMENT HAVE ANY READY-MADE SOLUTION. AS ABSTRACT
EXERCISE, WE COULD DRAW PLAN THAT WOULD LOOK GOOD ON
PAPER, BUT I SAID IMPORTANT THING WAS TO APPROACH
THIS AS WELL AS OTHER PROBLEMS PRAGMATICALLY. CASAROLI
NODDED VIGROUSLY Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant SECRET to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
-6- BONN 16393
15. ON QUESTION OF PALESTINIANS, I TOLD CASAROLI WE
COULD NTO CONCEIVE OF ANY SOLUTION IN MIDDLE EAST
THAT WOULD BE EITHER JUST OR DURABLE THAT DID NOT
MEET LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF PALESTINIANS. BUT
ISSUE WAS EXCEEDINGLY COMPLEX. FIRST ORDER OF
BUSINESS FOR ARABS AND I TOLD BOTH ITALIANS AND VATICAN
I HAD MADE THIS POINT DURING VISIT TO LEBANON,
was FOR ARABS TO ADOPT COMMON POSITION IN THEIR
APPROACH TOWARD PALESTINE PROBLEM. US HAD HARD
ENOUGH TASK WITHOUT TRYING TO GET INTO MIDDLE OF
INTER-ARAB DISPUTES OVER PALESTINE PROBLEM. SOVIETS
ALSO, I SAID, WOULD TEND TO EXPLOIT ISSUE UNLESS
ARABS GET THEIR DUCKS IN ROW. HERE AGAIN, I SAID
BOTH AT ST. PETER'S AND IN ROME, THAT EUROPEANS COULD PLAY USEFUL
DIPLOMATIC ROLE IN QUIETLY TRYING TO URGE
ARABS TO MORE VIABLE POSITIONS ON THESE
VARIOUS ISSUES.
16. IN SUM, WE HAVE MADE GOOD START ON OUR EUROPEAN
EXERCISE. BOTH ITALIANS AND VATICAN WANT TO BE
HELPFUL. WE MUST RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, STRONG CONCERN
ABOUT EXCLUSION OF EUROPEANS FROM PEACE CONFERENCE
ROLE AND SOME QUALMS, BECAUSE OF PRACTICE IN PAST,
THAT US WILL NOT LIVE UP TO ITS PROMISES TO CONSULT
WITH THEM FULLY AND ON TIMELY BASIS. WE ARE
OBVIOUSLY GOING TO HEAR MORE OF THESE THEMES IN HE
OTHER CAPITALS.
17. I STRESSED CONFIDENTIALITY OF ABOVE AND UNDER-
SCORED THERE SHOULD BE NO BACKGROUNDING OF PRESS ON
THIS MATTER IN ANY WAY.
18. COMMENT: I RECEIVED YOUR TELEGRAM AND I WILL
AVOID US-EUROPEAN DIFFERENCES ON NATO AND OTHER
EUROPEAN ISSUES AS YOU INDICATE. I WILL ALSO GO
LIGHT ON PEACE CONFERENCE IN NATO. YOU NOTE THAT
I WAS FAIRLY SPECIFIC IN MY BILATERAL HERE -- THE
REASON IS THAT EGYPTIANS HAVE TOLD A PRETTY FULLY
STORY TO THE LEVANESE AND PERHAPS OTHERS, AND I
FIND ITALIANS KNEW THE SPECIFICS EVEN BEFORE OUR
FORMAL MEETING OPENED LAST NIGHT.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixor PIELONBRAND
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH. Senial E.O. Scower
6
WHITE HOUSE
Department of State
UNITED THE STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
'73 NOV 13 PM 8 : 06
SECRET
SCOWCROFT CONTROL: 3812Q
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SECTO 163
E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS
FOR OPERATIONS CENTER: PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM SECRETARY TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO BY FASTEST
AVAILABLE MEANS.
1. QUOTE. I HAVE READ YOUR LONG BRIEFING TO THE ITALIANS.
S
I THINK YOU SHOULD TONE DOWN ANY DESCRIPTION OF OUR
INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL BECAUSE THIS SUBJECT
WILL ONLY LEAK AND CAUSE TROUBLE. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT
YOU DO NOT ASK THE EUROPEANS TO help US BECAUSE THEIR
INTERESTS ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO OURS. I DO NOT
WANT YOU TO REHEARSE TO THEM THE AGREEMENT I MADE WITH
FAISAL. PLEASE CONFINE YOURSELF TO A MATTER OF FACT
DESCRIPTION OF WHERE WE ARE HEADING EVEN IF IT APPEARS
UNIMAGINATIVE. UNQUOTE.
KISSINGER
BT
#1436
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SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
WH. (8)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WHITE HOUSEM
Gen Scorocroft (Dunt
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
'73 NOV 13 PM 8: 06
TELEGRAM
SECRET MC FARLANE
SCOLOCROFT
CONTROL: 3703Q
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NOV 13, 1973
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SECR E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 16428
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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S MIDDLE EAST/EUROPE
TRIP-BRIEFING OF THE GERMANS
S
1. WE HAD EXTENDED, FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS WITH GERMAN
STATE SECRETARY FRANK AND OTHER FOREIGN MINISTRY OF-
FICIALS THIS EVENING AT SCHLOSS GYMNICH GUEST HOUSE
OUTSIDE BONN (FRANK SAID THIS SPLENDID PLACE STILL
OWNED BY METTERNICH FAMILY AND HE SORRY YOU COULD NOT
BE HERE). AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND ALSO PRESENT.
2. I PRESENTED OUR VIEWS IN MUCH THE SAME VEIN AS
DURING OUR CONVERSATIONS IN ROME. FRANK ON WHOLE TOOK
MATURE, CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, ALTHOUGH SHOWING SOME
TOUCHINESS ABOUT MANNER OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH FRG
DURING MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. FRANK ALSO RAISED QUESTION
OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE CONFERENCE, BUT AT
END SAID RESULTS WERE WHAT MATTERED TO FRG, AND PRECISE
MEANS BY WHICH THEY ACHIEVED OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE.
3. FRANK DESCRIBED CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAD LED
EUROPEANS TO JOIN IN EC-9 NOVEMBER 6 DECLARATION. HE
SAID THERE WERE BOUND TO BE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND
S
EUROPEANS IN APPROACH TO MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. EUROPEANS
SAW MIDDLE EAST MAINLY AS REGIONAL PROBLEM, WHICH WAS
DICTATED BY GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND FACT THAT EUROPE
WAS FAR MORE DEPENDENT ON ARAB OIL THAN U.S. GLOBAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF U.S., ON OTHER HAND, INEVITABLY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the-Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
-2-BONN 16428, SECTION 1 OF 2, NOV 13
GAVE U.S. SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE. HOWEVER,
IN FRANK'S VIEW THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT EUROPEAN AND U.S.
ROLES IN SEARCH OF PEACE IN ME COULD NOT BE MUTUALLY
SUPPORTING.
4. FRANK EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR DIFFICULTIES IN
CONSULTING DURING RAPIDLY DEVELOPING CRISES. AT SAME
TIME, HE WAS IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF U.S. PROPOSAL IN
NATO FOR COMBATING SOVIET ACTIONS. NOTING THAT U.S.
HAD SUGGESTED TO ALLIES SUCH MEASURES AS HALTING CSCE,
RETHINKING MBFR AND STOPPING CREDITS TO USSR AND EE'S,
FRANK SAID IN FRG VIEW SUCH MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO BE
CONSIDERED VERY CAREFULLY. FRG DID, HOWEVER, AGREE ON
BASIC POINT ABOUT INDIVISIBILITY OF DETENTE; THE
FUTURE OF DETENTE IN EUROPE COUTHBWUUDGPPGLY BE DE-
TACHED FROM SOVIET POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR ELSEWHERE.
5. I SAID THERE WAS NO SATISFACTORY ANSWER TO
QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS. IN CRISIS SITUATION IT WAS
ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO CONSULT AS RAPIDLY AND FULLY AS
S
ONE WOULD WISH. I OUTLINED FOR him, AS EXAMPLE,
RAPIDITY WITH WHICH MENACING SOVIET NOTE HAD COME UPON
US AFTER CEASEFIRE AND URGENCY WITH WHICH WE FELT WE
HAD TO TAKE ACTION. BUT I SAID U.S. FULLY RECOGNIZED
NEED FOR FULL CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO ALLIES AS PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS UNFOLDED, AND WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE
POSSIBLE. HE INDICATED HE APPRECIATED AND UNDERSTOOD
THIS.
6. FRANK'S ATTITUDE WAS ENTIRELY HELPFUL ON SUBJECT
OF OIL. GERMANY SUBSCRIBED 100 PERCENT TO U.S.
POSITION, WHICH. I HAD OUTLINED, THAT U.S. ABILITY TO
PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE FOR SEARCH FOR PEACE WOULD BE
SEVERELY HAMPERED BY CONTINUATION OF OIL EMBARGO. HE
SAID GERMANY FEELS EXACTLY THE SAME WAY ABOUT BLACK-
MAIL. WHEN EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR HAD RECENTLY EXPRESSED
SATISFACTION TO HIM OVER EUROPEAN NINE-POWER DECLARA-
TION, FRANK SAID HE THANKED HIM BUT QUICKLY ADDED THAT
THIS MANIFESTATION OF EUROPEAN SUPPORT WOULD ABORT IF
PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE TURNED AGAINST THE ARABS
BECAUSE OF OIL SHORTAGES. THEY OBVIOUSLY HOPE FAISAL
WILL MAKE A TURN ABOUT, BUT HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC.
7. ON QUESTION OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN AUSPICES
OF PEACE CONFERENCE, FRANK SAID HE PERSONALLY TOOK
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE XECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CONTROL: 3718Q
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NODIS/CHEROKEE
RELAXED VIEW, BUT HE COULD UNDERSTAND IT THAT FRANCE
AND UK MIGHT BE UPSET. HE WONDERED IF WE HAD ANY CON-
VINCING ARGUMENTS AGAINST THEIR PARTICIPATION. HE DID
NOT THINK THAT IN EFFECT JUST SAYING ISRAEL DIDN'T
WANT THEM WAS SUFFICIENT. I SAID I HOPED THIS WOULD
NOT BECOME MATTER OF NATIONAL AMOUR PROPRE. REALITY
WAS THAT ISRAEL, EGYPT AND OTHER ARABS READY FOR US-
USSR AUSPICES. I WAS NOT MAKING VALUE JUDGMENT, BUT
S
ONE PARTY CLEARLY FELT UK, FRANCE HAD BEEN PARTISAN;
SC MORE SO, AND UN GENERALLY EVEN MORE SO. I SAID WE
WOULD GIVE THIS MATTER FURTHER THOUGHT; QUESTIONS OF
AUSPICES WERE IMPORTANT BUT NONE OF US WOULD WISH TO
AGREE TO PARTICIPATION THAT MIGHT PLACE IN JEOPARDY
ACTUAL HOLDING OF CONFERENCE. AGAIN FRANK SAID HE
UNDERSTOOD.
8. FRANK ASKED HOW WE ENVISAGED SOVIET ROLE AT CON-
FERENCE. I SAID THIS WAS HARD TO PREDICT. IT WAS
STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD MOVE BEYOND NON-
CONFRONTATION TO WILLINGNESS TO PLAY ACTIVE, FULLY
COOPERATIVE ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT PEACE SETTLEMENT.
THIS WOULD BE PUT TO TEST AT PEACE CONFERENCE. OB-
VIOUSLY WE WOULD BE HAVING CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH
SOVIETS BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND THAZ NEITHER
ISRAEL NOR JORDAN, NOR EVEN EGYPTIANS, WERE ENTHUSIAS-
TIC ABOUT ANY PRIMARY SOVIET ROLE. WE WERE AS YET UN-
SURE ABOUT SYRIA'S ATTITUDE. FIRST THREE WERE ALL
LOOKING PRIMARILY TO U.S. TO PLAY LEADING ROLE IN
BRINGING ABOUT SETTLEMENT. FRANK COMMENTED THAT
FROM SITUATION AS WE DESCRIBED IT U.S. LIKELY TO BE
PRINCIPAL ARBITER WITH SOVIETS PLAYING MUCH MORE
LIMITED ROLE. AS FOR EUROPEANS, HE WAS CONVINCED
THAT EUROPE COUD NOT PLAY USEFUL DIRECT ROLE IN NEGOTIATING
SCENARIO GIVEN OVERRIDING RESPONSIBILITY OF SUPER-
POWERS BUI HE D.ID THINK THAT IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
-2 -BONN 16428, SECTION 2 OF 2, NOV 13
S
EUROPE'S ABILITY TO ADOPT COMMON, LIMITED POSITIONS
COULD BE USEFUL ADJUNCT TO OUR EFFORTS. I WHOLE'
HEARTEDLY AGREED, AND AGAIN STRESSED OUR DESIRE TO
CONSULT FULLY WITH GERMANS AS WELL AS TO HAVE ANY OF
THEIR IDEAS ON ELEMENTS OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. I
STRESSED ALSO EUROPE'S ROLE COULD BE SUPPORTIVE IN
QUIET OF DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, RATHER THAN BY PUBLIC
DECLARATIONS. FACT THAT PARTIES WOULD BE AROUND
CONFERENCE TABLE MEANT A CHANGED SITUATION, AND I
HOPED FELT NEED FOR SUBSTANTIVE PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS
WAS THING OF PAST.
9. AGAIN I STRESSED CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR DISCUSSION.
HILLENBRAND
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#6428
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SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.