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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
I.LIST
LIST OF INVITEES TO MEETING (1p.)
6/10/70
A
Z.MEMO
FROM MELVIN R. LAIRD To THE PRESIDENT (5pp.)
6/5/70
A
IA
Distribution List
6/9/70
A
Memo
FILE LOCATION
H FILES Box H-28 FOLDER 5
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATIONichard Nixon Presidential I ibrary DECI ASSIFIED
NA 14029 (1-98)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
CONTAINS RODEWORD
June 9, 1970
Mr. President:
Attached is your book for tomorrow morning's
9:30 a.m. NSC meeting on the Middle East.
In the attached memorandum, I have drawn
together for you the key issues involved.
Your talking points for the meeting are at the
first tab in the book.
Henry 4 A. Kissinger
Attachments
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958 This Page ONly
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger K
SUBJECT: Mid-East Issues- NSC Meeting Wednesday, June 10
The situation in the Middle East is now the most dangerous we face.
It is difficult to see how the situation in Southeast Asia could produce
a major-power war. It is easy to see a number of ways the situation
in the Mid-East could. Moreover, the question of the U.S. position
there giving way to Soviet predominance is no longer academic. The
decisions to be faced now will have an important effect on how the
situation develops.
Implications of the Soviet Presence in Egypt
The character of the Soviet move in the UAR should not be underrated.
You may hear the argument made (by Defense) that this move was
precipitated by Israeli action or that it is purely defensive and does not
threaten Israel. These arguments do not meet the main point: This is
a unique turn of Soviet policy--never before have the Soviets put their
own forces in combat jeopardy for the sake of a non-Communist govern-
ment.
It is argued that now the Soviets have rescued Nasser both of them may
be prepared to negotiate seriously. This seems doubtful. Having scored
a psychological gain with apparent impunity, it has generally been the
Soviet tactic first to consolidate their gains and then to press forward,
testing the ground as they move.
The problem, therefore, is not simply that the Soviet military presence
may have, at a minimum, limited Israeli military options. The problem
is that the USSR has established a new kind of foothold in the UAR and
the U.S. has a strong interest in preventing its consolidation and expansion.
SECRET/NODIS
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
R76
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
Some Common Perceptions A Critique
You will hear argument over what the U.S. interest requires and
how far the U.S. should go in trying to check the USSR. Some of this
argument rests on assumptions that should be carefully examined.
1.
The Israeli view is that if Israel and the U.S. will only
stand fast, the USSR and the Arabs will decide to negotiate. This
means that the U.S. must give Israel all the equipment it needs and
make no concessions to the USSR.
The problem with this is that the Israelis have not really
offered the Arabs a negotiating position the Arabs could even consider
accepting. So the Arabs feel they have no choice but to fight. Thus
the U.S. is left backing Israel in a war of attrition that seems likely
to lead only to another war -- probably involving the USSR -- without any
negotiating escape to offer Moscow.
2.
The Defense Department view is that all we have to do is
to get the Israelis off the Suez Canal to begin the process of reaching
a settlement and that will prevent further erosion of U.S. influence.
Their argument is that the U.S. has no interest in the Mid-East great
enough to warrant a nuclear showdown with the USSR. The U.S. is
militarily over-extended and has every interest in avoiding involvement
in the Mid-East. Besides, the Arab-Israeli problem is not susceptible
of military solution.
The problems with this view are that: (a) If the U.S. shows
that it does not have enough interest in the Mid-East to warrant a show-
down, then the USSR will never back off. (b) If Israel does not believe
the U.S. will defend its existence against the USSR, Israel will have
no incentive whatsoever to agree to a settlement based on withdrawal
from present lines.
3.
It is also commonly said that the Soviets are acting in the
UAR purely in a defensive capacity and that the U.S., therefore, need
not be concerned because the Soviets will not threaten Israel.
Yet it would be logical for the USSR to extend its influence
as far as possible. The near term Soviet objective in the Middle East
is to destroy Western influence. The main enemy is not Israel but the
West in general and the U.S. in particular. Therefore, it must be as-
sumed that the USSR will do all it can to that end over and above
defending their client.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
4.
It is sometimes argued that the U.S. can only preserve
its position in the Arab world by forcing Israeli withdrawal and
placating the Arabs. The supposition here is that if there is a peace
settlement the Arab radicals will cease to be a threat.
Arab radicalism, however, is not just a product of the
Arab-Israeli impasse. It exploits that impasse for its own ends,
but it has roots of its own and will still be present to attack Western
interests if there is a settlement. Moderate Arabs may fear a Nasser
freed of Sinai preoccupations almost as much as Israel. It is probable
that after a settlement the thrust of Arab radicalism will be against
Arabia and the Persian Gulf.
Considerations of Strategy
The problem is to develop a strategy that will bring into balance the
following elements:
1.
The Israeli quest for security. Israel views its margin
as relatively narrow. Despite its clearcut military superiority on
the present scene, its capacity to survive a long war of attrition is
limited. Israel feels it must have some breadth of options in trying
to cut off a war of attrition or it will feel hemmed in and compelled
to strike out. The problem is to put enough pressure on Israel to
demonstrate that its stand-fast strategy will not work and yet not so
much as to make the Israelis feel in desperation they have lost the
option to move preemptively.
2.
The Arabs have two problems:
The general problem is that Israel is asking Arab
recognition as an entry price to a negotiation in which
Israel will hold out for substantial acquisition of Arab
territory. The Arabs--entirely apart from their
political problems in giving up a principle--do not want
to surrender their most valuable negotiating asset until
they are sure they will get their territory back for it.
The moderates' particular problem is that the radicals
are exploiting anti-Israeli feeling to win the Arab world.
They must have ambivalent feelings about a settlement.
On the one hand, they want an honorable settlement.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
TAB "E"
ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW
INFO:
Amembassy AMMAN
USINT
CAIRO
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN
NEW YORK
STATE
NODIS
DRAFT INSTRUCTION TO AMBASSADOR BEAM IN MOSCOW
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY
1. You should inform the Foreign Ministry immediately
that you expect to receive in the next few days a
message of the highest importance from the Secretary
to Gromyko concerning the Middle East, which you are
instructed to deliver to Gromyko personally. You
therefore will appreciate it if steps are taken to plan
for your appointment with Gromyko on very short notice.
2. When informed by Department to proceed, you should
convey following oral message from Secretary promptly
to Gromyko.
A. BEGIN TEXT. Dear Mr. Minister: The United States
Government has taken note of the repeated assurances
of the Soviet Government that the USSR continues urgently
to desire a peaceful settlement between Israel and its
Arab neighbors in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 242. It has also been noted that the Soviet
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
SECRET/NODIS by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential LibraryleF ASSIFIED of E.O. 12958
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Rtx
SECRET/NODIS
- 4 -
On the other, they cannot look complacently on the
prospect of a Nasser whose forces are no longer tied
down by Israel and are backed by Soviet combat
personnel.
3.
The problem of dealing with the Soviets is to balance
between giving them a sense of the dangers of the present situation
without denying them an escape. They do not want a confrontation
with the U.S., and they will eventually have to help the Arabs get
their territory back if they are to enhance their standing in the
Mid-East. At the same time, they have an interest in controlled
tension and in maintaining as large a military foothold in the area
as they can.
Some Policy Issues
Against the background of the above considerations, it is important
to examine some of the policy issues raised:
1.
Is a political settlement really an alternative to confronting
the USSR, or are the two correlated? The argument has been made
(by Defense) that, since we want to avoid a confrontation with the USSR,
the only alternative is a political settlement.
On the one hand, a settlement is conceivable in which
the radical Arabs are freed to turn their weapons against
the moderates. The Syrians if no longer tied down by Israel
would turn against Jordan and Lebanon; the Iraqis would turn
against the moderates and Iranian interests in the Persian
Gulf; Nasser against the Saudis and the moderates in the Gulf.
Back of this would be a strong Soviet military position in the
UAR. Nasser backed by the Russians would be a potent anti-
Western, anti-moderate force. In other words a settlement
is possible which would enhance rather than check Soviet
opportunity.
On the other hand, some methods of confronting the
Soviets could create a situation in which Soviet influence
expanded while the U.S. position was narrowed. If, for
instance, the U.S. simply backed Israel in a long war of
attrition, Arab reaction against the U.S. would gradually
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 5 -
whittle away at U.S. influence, and the Arabs would
have no one to turn to but the USSR.
The question is not whether we should confront the USSR or
try for a political settlement. The question is how we can confront
the USSR in trying for a political settlement and how we can improve
chances for a political settlement by confronting the USSR.
2.
A second issue is: Is a settlement conceivable through
negotiations between the belligerents? Is any settlement conceivable
that is not imposed?
On the one hand, the argument has been made (by State)
that the interests on both sides must be brought together
so a genuine accommodation can be reached. Unless both
sides face up by themselves to the requirements of this
accommodation, there cannot be a settlement that will last.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the problem is
not that the two sides fail to understand each other's
interests but that they understand those interests too well.
The Arabs know the Israelis want territory in a settlement.
The Israelis know that the Arabs will only grudgingly- - and
therefore with some thought of eventual reversal of position--
accept Israel's existence. That is why there is not sufficient
will on either side to reach a settlement.
If the second is at all true, then it remains for outsiders to devise a
situation in which settlement of key issues--withdrawal and the recog-
nition of Israel--is virtually forced on the parties along with security
measures that make the settlement as enforceable as possible. If there
is to be a settlement, it will have to be imposed, regardless of what
facade of negotiation may be erected around it for tactical purposes.
3.
The next issue is: How can Israel's aircraft requests best
be related to the process of achieving a settlement? The two horns of
the dilemma are:
On the one hand, Israel will feel under the greatest
pressure to resist a settlement based on withdrawal if
it feels that it will not have the means to defend itself.
Israelis would judge that their military needs in such a
settlement would at least not diminish because it would
be giving up its improved defensive positions.
SECRET/NDPSuced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 6 -
On the other hand, providing aircraft to Israel now
would jeopardize U.S. ability to work with the Arabs for
a settlement. Moreover, if the Israelis had what they
wanted from the U.S., there would be little incentive to
accede to U.S. pressures for a settlement.
Without some commitment from the U.S. that Israel will have the means
of defense, it is impossible to expect Israel even to consider withdrawal.
The difficulty, therefore, is to combine this assurance with the implied
threat of its withdrawal SO as to produce the Israeli concessions necessary
to peace.
4.
The ultimate issue is: Can the U.S. induce Israel to with-
draw to essentially pre-war borders in the context of a settlement?
--On the one hand, it is possible to argue (as Defense does)
that Israel is so heavily dependent on the U.S. for military
supplies and financial support that it cannot stand up against
the threat of losing them. The other side of this argument
is that nothing shor t of the clear threat of losing them will
move Israel.
On the other hand, it can be argued (as State does) that
the only thing that will change Israel's policy is Israel's
own realization that that policy will not work. The task of
the U.S. is not just to threaten Israel's lifeline; that would
leave Israel with no choice but to stay where it is behind its
most defensible lines. The task of the U.S. is to make clear
that neither Israel nor the U.S. can win in the present
situation but to demonstrate that abundant U.S. support is
possible in a changed situation.
The first approach to Israel should not be the threat of cutting off aid;
Israel needs the assurance of U.S. support. The moment of truth comes
when Israel says it will have to forego U.S. support if the price is with-
drawal. Does the U.S. then cut off aid? The realistic choice at that point--
having made a substantial offer to demonstrate good faith--i is between an
absolutely minimal flow of aid and a very substantial flow and not between
aid and no aid.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 7 -
The Principal Options
The considerations above seem to eliminate the extremes. Backing
Israel without qualification would give the Israeli Cabinet a controlling
voice in setting the conditions for a U.S. -Soviet confrontation. Cutting
ourselves off from Israel would leave Israel no incentive for a political
settlement and would enhance the Soviet position. The two options that
will be advanced at the NSC are:
1.
The Defense Department proposal [a memo from Secretary
Laird is in your briefing book] would involve denial of aircraft to Israel
until Israel had agreed to a phased withdrawal. When Israel's future
aircraft requirements are to be met, they should not be met with more
attack aircraft like the Skyhawks and Phantoms but with fighter-interceptors
more exclusively designed for defense. The Defense proposal would have
us work step by step from a de facto cease-fire to partial Israeli with-
drawal, demilitarization of vacated territories, reopening the Suez
Canal to all nations and the beginning of formal peace negotiations.
The three main conclusions on which Defense bases this position are:
There is no acceptable military solution to the present
impasse. The indigenous belligerents can only fight to a
stand-off. Soviet involvement could lead to a nuclear
confrontation triggered either by a U.S. -Soviet clash or by
Israeli introduction of nuclear weapons in desperation.
The U.S. also has an interest in checking the spread of
Soviet influence. U.S. sale of more attack aircraft now will
contribute to further Soviet success in the Arab world.
The expansion of the U.S. commitment to Israel by
promising or implying that U.S. forces would be used
directly to support Israel under any circumstances is
unacceptable. If Israel surfaces nuclear weapons, the U.S.
cannot afford to be involved.
The problem with this approach--viewed in the light of what is written
above is that it is likely to increase Israeli hysteria and the probability
that Israel would feel compelled to fall back on nuclear weapons or to
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 8 -
strike out, thereby triggering another war. It would provide no incentive
for Israel to reach a settlement. It would encourage the Soviet feeling
that they are achieving their objective, and there would be nothing to
restrain them from further advances. Even if a settlement were achieved
on this basis, it would leave the USSR strong and no sense among the
moderate Arabs that they could depend on the U.S.
2.
The State Department proposal [a memo from Secretary
Rogers is in your briefing book] would involve a limited commitment
of aircraft now pending outcome of a new effort to get negotiations
started along with a clearly implied promise of continuing aircraft
shipments in the fall. To understand this proposal, it is necessary to
look in detail at the steps that would be taken:
Tell Israel that the U.S. is going to make a direct
approach to Nasser urging (a) acceptance of a cease-fire
from July 1 to September 15 and (b) agreement to get indirect
talks started under Jarring. If Nasser responds positively
we would expect a positive Israeli response.
Offer Israel three additional Phantoms each in July and
August; as replacements, earmark four Phantoms and four
Skyhawks per month for delivery starting in September through
year's end. This would be subject to review only if negotiations
between the parties showed signs of success. We would in any
case make contingency plans for delivery sooner if there is a
dramatic shift in the balance; other military requirements
would continue to be met.
- Make a direct approach in Cairo urging (a) a ceasefire and
military standstill [no further fortification on the Canal] from
July 1 to September 15 and (b) agreement to begin indirect
negotiations under Jarring promptly on the basis of a simple
acceptance by both sides of the 1967 UN resolution. Israel
would have to say it is willing to withdraw in accordance
with the resolution and the Arabs would have to state their
willingness to recognize Israel's existence if it withdraws.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 9 -
-Inform Nasser that we are limiting ourselves for the
time being not to go beyond the 50 Phantom and 100
Skyhawk level committed in 1968 and 1966 but that further
deferral of additional sales is only feasible in the context
of a cease-fire and negotiations. [This would be true
because 6 Phantoms from the original contract for 50 are
of a special configuration not to be delivered until 1971,
and 3 have been lost. Original Skyhawk deliveries are not
scheduled for completion before September. ]
- - After Cairo had been approached the USSR would be urged
to support our effort. However, the primary emphasis would
be on direct contacts between Washington, Cairo, Tel Aviv
(and Amman). [Secretary Rogers' memo recognizes that
more must be done to "reflect our resolve to the USSR, 11 but
it recommends only that you direct him and Secretary Laird
to make a high priority study of this aspect.
There are several problems with this approach:
- Above all, the success of any formula on aircraft will
depend on how the Israelis interpret our intent. As the
proposal is now stated, it is difficult to see how it can succeed
whichever way the Israelis read it.
On the one hand, if the Israelis think that they are assured of
only 6 more planes (in effect only 3 more than we promised in
March because 3 would be replacements as promised then) they
will have no incentive to talk about withdrawal. For them even
to contemplate withdrawal would require them to be assured
of the equipment to defend themselves behind less defensible
borders than they have now.
On the other hand, if they think they will get the whole package
if negotiations are going badly (and therefore would not be
seriously jeopardized by the U.S. providing additional planes),
they will have no incentive to make the negotiations go well.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 10 -
Either way, this formulation seems likely to assure the
failure of the diplomatic effort.
- - As for the Soviets, this would seem too little to be of
military consequence and too hesitant to convince them
that the U.S. means to match their escalation to the point
of checking it if necessary. If the Soviets read our March
announcement as uncertain--even though the principle of
replacement was there-they will read this as equally so.
- - The Arab reaction will depend on what policy Nasser
wants to pursue. What he does will depend on whether he
thinks we will really press Israel to withdraw. He will have
serious doubts that we could seriously expect to accomplish
very much with 6 aircraft. In his view, presumably, we
would either have to threaten to cut Israel off or promise
substantial support after withdrawal. He is looking for
decisive U.S. action, not half-way moves. He knows that
the only decisive step that will count is U.S. determination
to press Israel back to essentially pre-war borders.
For the sake of illustrating a modification of the State proposal to take
care of some of the above objections, I am attaching a possible "third
option. 11
Conduct of the NSC Meeting
I recommend that you make clear at the end of this meeting that you will
need time to decide and that no action should be taken yet. This is
necessary to maintain your control over timing of any action and to give
you time to consider refinements (or alternatives) to the course of action
proposed. In any case, you should have a final look at a detailed course
of action before implementation begins.
In your briefing book are talking points and the memos from Secretaries
Laird and Rogers. Also, there is a good short CIA paper on the Soviet
impact on the Arab-Israeli balance. A much fuller study has been
completed but this fairly reflects its conclusions.
Attachment: "A Third Option"
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
A THIRD OPTION
The purpose of this illustrative course of action is to show how two
shortcomings in the State proposal might be met: (1) Instead of
dribbling out the aircraft, it offers a large number at once with the
thought of withholding delivery. (2) It addresses the Soviet problem
more directly. This would involve the following:
-Make this approach directly to Nasser: The U.S. is
prepared to press Israel to withdraw essentially to pre-war
borders provided Nasser is willing to commit himself to us
now and in a formal agreement later to specific arrangements
for establishing and enforcing peace. The U.S. is the only
government that can attempt this. To do this the U.S. will
have to provide assistance to Israel; if Nasser asks us to
squeeze Israel and to withhold aid at the same time, he is
asking the impossible. If we can achieve Israeli agreement
to withdraw, we would ask Nasser to have his representative
meet with the Israelis and Jarring to negotiate detailed security
arrangements. The U.S. would take an active part in that
negotiation. The U.S. would expect that, after agreement,
Soviet combat personnel would be withdrawn. In conclusion,
Nasser has an important choice to make: If he uses our provision
of aircraft to Israel as a pretext for encouraging attacks on U.S.
installations elsewhere, then Israel will get the planes without
being pressed to withdraw.
- Make this approach to Israel: (1) The U.S. will prepare
beginning in September to provide another 25 Phantoms and
40 Skyhawks to be added to present deliveries at the present
rates but this must remain secret; the U.S. is prepared to
discuss additional requirements in January 1971; the U.S.
is prepared to discuss a five-year program of economic assistance.
(2) Soviet involvement introduces an element which Israel alone
cannot handle regardless of how much equipment the U.S. supplies.
Since the U.S. is potentially involved, the U.S. must have a voice
in determining the issue on which it becomes involved. The U.S.
cannot base that involvement on Israel's rightto negotiate major
changes in its boundaries. (3) The U.S. therefore wants the
Prime Minister's assurance that Israel will withdraw to pre-war
borders if the Arabs commit themselves to live at peace and
agree to arrangements for enforcing the peace which do not
involve Israeli acquisition of territory. [Discussions on military
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
and economic assistance could proceed, but no deliveries or
disbursements would take place until the Israelis had responded
satisfactorily. U.S. leverage would rest on the statement that
the U.S. cannot go on supporting Israel unless Israel commits
itself to withdraw in a peace settlement and the implied threat
of reducing deliveries to a minimal flow. ]
- Tell the USSR the same thing we tell the UAR. Suspend for
the time being any plans to reduce the size of the Sixth Fleet.
Perhaps reinforce the Sixth Fleet with additional anti-submarine
warfare capability.
Comment: The purpose of this approach would be to face the USSR with
a Vietnam-type involvement against a well-supplied Israel but at the
same time to provide an escape via a settlement. The USSR would have
to weigh the disadvantage of letting the U.S. out of its present box against
the disadvantage of that sort of involvement. The USSR could expect
enough tension to remain for its exploitation even after a settlement.
This approach would have for the U.S. the advantage of going far enough
on the key issues boundaries -- to justify realistic hope for a settlement
while at the same time offering a sizeable enough inducement to Israel to
make an Israeli concession conceivable.
This would seem to combine the best mix of responses to the basic
considerations of strategy described above. It would provide Israel with
a substantial incentive to cooperate while making clear that the U.S.
will not back an Israeli strategy that is likely to produce a U.S. confron-
tation with the USSR. It is a strong enough response, however, to indicate
to the USSR that we mean to stand firm. It would have promise for the
Arabs of U.S. pressure on Israel to withdraw.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
TALKING POINTS
1.
There have been a number of important developments since the
NSC's last consideration of the Middle East:
- Soviet involvement in the UAR.
- Renewed Israeli pressure for aircraft.
- Nasser's peace appeal.
- -Steady escalation in the fighting.
These confirm the judgment many of us have held for some time --
that the Middle East is now the most dangerous situation we face.
The purpose of today's meeting is to review these developments
and to discuss U.S. options for further action.
2. Ask Mr. Helms to brief on the impact of Soviet involvement on
the Arab-Israeli military balance.
3. Ask Dr. Kissinger to describe the issues and options.
4. Ask Secretary Rogers (who may ask Assistant Secretary Sisco)
to present the State Department proposal.
5. Ask Secretary Packard and Admiral Moorer for Defense Department
and JCS comment.
6.
Throughout this discussion, probe for answers to these questions:
- -How can the USSR be made to feel that the continuation
of the present course will be less satisfactory than a
settlement?
- How can reassurance for Israel be combined with
pressure on Israel?
7.
Conclude the meeting by instructing that no further action be taken
until you have had time to reflect on the discussion.
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HAK TALKING POINTS
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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HAK:
Just before you speak, Dick Helms will have briefed on
the implications of the Soviet presence on the military
balance.
Therefore, I have assumed you will want to speak mainly
on the issues.
I have included a critique of the common perceptions, but I am
not sure you want to use this at the meeting. You could just
skip that and pick up with either the "considerations of strategy"
or the issues themselves.
Hal
HHS
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HAK
TALKING POINTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Two proposals have been made in the course of discussions in the
NSC Special Review Group:
--A proposal to deny aircraft to Israel until it agrees
to a phased withdrawal, beginning with a token Israeli
withdrawa! from the Canal to launch negotiations. [Defense]
- A proposal to make a limited commit nent of aircraft
now pending outcome of a new effort to get negotiations
started along with a clearly implied promise of continuing
aircraft slipments in the fall. [State]
Secretaries Rogers and Packard may wish to e: aborate on these later.
What I propose to do now is to describe the issues that have been raised
by these proposal: as they have been discussed at three meetings of the
Special Review Group:
II. SOME COMMON PERCEPTIONS
It may be useful to begin by examining some common perceptions
that have often been stated:
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1.
The Israeli view is that if Israel and the U.S. will only stand fast,
the USSR and the Arabs will decide to negotiate. This means
that the U.S. must give Israel all the equipment it needs and make no con-
cessions to the USSR.
The problem with this is that the Israelis have not really offered the
Arabs a negotiating position the Arabs could even consider accepting.
So the Arabs feel they have no choice but to fight. Thus the U.S. is left
backing Israel in a war of attrition that seems likely to lead only to another
war -- porbably involving the USSR -- without any negotiating escape to
offer Moscow.
2.
Another view discussed is that the U.S. has no interest in the Mid-
East great e hough to warrant a nuclear showdown with the USSR
The problems with this view are that: (a) If the U.S. shows that it does
not have enough interest in the Mid-East to warrant a showdown, then the
USSR will never back off. (b) If Israel does not believe the U.S. will
defend its existence against the USSR, Israel will have no incentive what-
soever to agree to a settlement based on withdraval from present lines.
3.
It is also commonly said that the Soviets are acting in the
UAR purely :n a defensive capacity and that the U.S., therefore,
need not be concerned because the Soviets will not threaten Israel.
Yet it would be logical for the USSR to extend its influence as far
consequen
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as possible. The near term Soviet objective in the Middle East is to
destroy Western influence. The main enemy is not Israel but the West
in general and the U.S. in particular. Therefore, it must be assumed
that the USSR will do all it can to that end -- over and above defending
their client.
4.
It is sometimes argued that the U.S. can only preserve its position
in the Arab world by forcing Israeli withdrawal and placating the
Arabs. The supposition here is that if there is a peace settlement the
Arab radicals will cease to be a threat.
Arab radicalism, however, is not just a product of the Arab-
Israeli impasse. It exploits that impasse for its own ends, but it has
roots of its own and will still be present to attack Western interests if
there is a settlement.
III.
CONSIDERATIONS OF STRATEGY
The problem is to develop a strategy that will bring into balance
the following elemerts:
their
service
perfection
1.
The Israeli cuest for security. Israel vie WS its margin as relatively
narrow. De pite its clearcut military superiority on the present
scene, its capacity 10 survive a long war of attrition is limited. Israel
feels it must have some breadth of options in trying to cut off a war of
attrition or it will feel hemmed in and compelled to strike out. The problem
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is to put enough pressure on Israel to demonstrate that its stand-
fast strategy will not work and yet not so much as to make the
Israelis feel they have lost the option to move preemptively.
2.
The Arabs have two problems:
-- The general problem is that Israel is asking Arab
recogrition as an entry price to a negotiation in which
Israel will hold out for substantial acquisition of Arab
territory. The Arabs- entirely apart from their political
porblems in giving up a principle- do not want to surrender
their most valuable negotiating asset until they are sure
they will get their territory back for it.
-- The moderates' particular problem is that the radicals
are exploiting anti-Israeli feeling to win the Arab world.
They must have ambivalent feelings about a settlement.
On the one hand, they want an honoi able settlement. On
the other, they cannot look complacently on the prospect
of a Nasser whose forces are no longer tied down by Israel
and are backed by Soviet combat personnel.
3.
The problem of dealing with the Soviets is to balance between
giving them a sense of the dangers of the present situation
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without denying them an escape. They do not want a confrontation
Isaali security settlement t
with the U.S., and they will eventually have to help the Arabs get
their territory back if they are to enhance their standing in the
Mid-East. At the same time, they have an interest in controlled
tension and in maintaining as large a military foothold in the area as
they can.
IV.
SOME POLICY ISSUES Against the background of these considerations,
it is important to look at some of the policy issues raised:
1. Is a politica. settlement really an alternative to facing down the USSR
or are the two correlated?
- -On the one hand, a settlement is conceivable in which the radical
Arabs are freed to turn their weapons against the moderates in Lebanon,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf and the Soviets are left in
place to provide an umbrella for them. in other words, a settlement
is possible which would enhance rather than check Soviet opportunity.
- On the other hand, some methods of facing down the Soviets (such
as simply backing Israel in a longwar) could create a situation in
which Soviet influence expanded while the U.S. position was narrowed.
The question, therefore, seem to be not whe her we should confront
the USSR or try for a political settlement. The question is how we can
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confront the USSR in trying for a political settlement and how we can
improve chances for a political settlement by confronting the USSR.
2.
A second issue is: Is a settlement conceivable through negotiations
between the bellige rents? Is any settlement cor ceivable that is not imposed?
-- On the one hand, the argument has been made that interests on
both sides must be brought together so a genuine accommodation
can be reached. Unless both sides face up by themselves to the
requirements of this accommodation, the re cannot be a settlement
that will last.
- On the other hand, it can be argued that the problem is not
that the two sides fail to understand each other's interests but
that they understand those interests too well. The Arabs know the
Israelis want territory in a settlement. The Israelis know that the
Arabs will only grudgingly-- and therefore with some thought of
eventual rev ersal of position--accept Israel's existence. That is
why there is not sufficient will on either side to reach a settlement.
If the second is at all true, then it remains for outsiders to devise a
situation in which settlement of key issues- withdrawal and the recognition
of Israel- is virtually forced on the parties along with security measures
that make the settlement as enforceable as possible.
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3.
The next issue is: How can Israel's aircraft requests best be
related to the process of achieving a settlement? The two horns of the
dilemma are:
- On the one hand, Israel will feel under the greatest pressure
to resist a settlement based on withdrawal if it feels that it will
not have the means to defend itself. Israelis would judge that
their military needs in such a settlement would at least not
diminish because it would be giving up its improved defensive
positions.
- - On the other hand, providing aircraft to Israel now would
jeopardize U.S. ability to work with the Arabs for a settlement.
Moreover, if the Israelis had what they wanted from the U.S.,
there would be little incentive to accede to U.S. pressures
for a settlement.
4.
The ultimate issue is: Can the U.S. induce Israel to withdraw to
essentially pre-war borders in the context of a settlement?
- On the one hand, it is possible to argue that Israel is SO
heavily dependent on the U.S. for military supplies and financial
support that it cannot stand up against the threat of losing them.
The other side of this argum ent is that nothing short of the clear
threat of losing them will move Israel.
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-- On the other hand, it can be argued that the only thing
that will change Israel's policy is Israel's own realization
that that policy will not work. The task of the U.S. is not
just to threaten Israel's lifeline' that would leave Israel
with no choice but to stay where it is behind its most
defensible lines. The task of the U.S. is to make clear that
neither Israel nor the U.S. can win in the present situation
but to dem onstrate that abundant U.S. support is possible in
a changed situation.
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- a eum ant has been
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 9, 1970
8318
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Next Steps in the Middle East
We have conflicting objectives in the Middle East,
the achievement of which poses dilemmas for the US at
this present juncture. Our purpose is to find a course
of action which: (a) stops the fighting on the principal
fronts, or at least reduces the likelihood of confron-
tation between Israel and the USSR which would increase
the possibility of a more direct US-Soviet confrontation;
(b) offers a fresh and new approach to get negotiations
started between the parties; (c) provides Israel with
sufficient assurance regarding military assistance as an
inducement towards military prudence and political flexi-
bility, without causing a major break with the non-radical
Arab regimes and jeopardizing the chances for success on
the political front; and (d) neither reflects weakness to
nor provokes undue escalation from Moscow.
To this end, the following courses of action are
recommended as a "stop shooting, start talking" American
initiative.
1. Ceasefire. We would propose to Israel and the
UAR, and subsequently to as many other Arab frontline states
as possible, agreement on a publicly declared ceasefire
for a limited period from July 1 to September 15, the
opening day of the UNGA, during which time major efforts
will be made to get the parties to start talks on a political
solution. Under such a ceasefire, Israel would continue
to refrain from deep penetration raids. The UAR (USSR) would
have to refrain from changing the military status quo (by
emplacing SAM's or any other new installations) in a 25-mile
zone on either side of the Suez Canal ceasefire line, and
Israel would be required to observe a standstill on new in-
stallations on the East Bank of the Canal. While concentrating
in the first instance on a UAR-Israeli aspect, we would
also seek to broaden the limited ceasefire to include other
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fronts as well. However, the proposal described below
to get talks started between the parties under Jarring's
auspices, while linked to the ceasefire, can stand on
its own. If Nasser agrees to get talks started on the
basis we are suggesting, we should not permit the pro-
posal to fall on the ground that the ceasefire has not
been accepted. We should make this very clear to the
Israelis when our entire proposal is explained.
2. Negotiations on a Political Solution. We would
make another attempt to start the negotiating process
by means of a new, fresh approach directly with the parties
rather than through either the two- or four-power mechanism.
We would propose to Israel and the UAR (Jordan) that in-
direct negotiations under Jarring's auspices begin promptly,
in accordance with procedures determined by him, on the
basis of the following agreed framework: (a) that they
both accept the UNSC Resolution of November 1967 in all
its parts and will seek to reach agreement on ways of
carrying it out; and (b) that the UAR (Jordan) accept
the principle of a just and lasting peace with Israel,
including recognition on their part of Israel's right
to exist and that Israel accept the principle of with-
drawal from occupied territories in accordance with the
SC resolution of November 22, 1967.
3. Military Assistance for Israel. Your decision
in March to hold in abeyance Israel's request for additional
aircraft was based on the judgment that Israel's quali-
tative superiority compensated amply for its numerical
inferiority in planes. The direct Soviet involvement
in an operational role has injected a new qualitative
capacity and a reinforced quantitative capacity on the
UAR side.
Our intelligence evaluations conclude that the new
Soviet involvement has affected the military balance,
though how much presently and in the future is not entirely
clear. As a minimum, the Soviet presence has reduced the
Israeli qualitative superiority, which in turn connotes a
new Arab-Soviet ability to exhaust the Israelis through
attrition. More importantly, the Soviet presence probably
has rendered Israel's preferred strategy of preemptive attacks
too costly to be tolerable. If the present standoff is
maintained (i.e., Israel staying away from UAR rear areas
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and the Soviets keeping out of the Canal combat zone), the
result will be to restrict Israel's freedom of action in
the air without, however, losing its air superiority over
the Suez sector. If the Soviets decide to challenge the
Israelis in the Suez sector, Israel's air power would be
quickly worn down. Our intelligence prediction is that
Israel, faced with prolonged attrition, would be forced
either to abandon the Canal line or attempt major pre-
emptive strikes.
In short, the intelligence evaluations indicate
that the weight of the Soviet presence has already reduced
the material and psychological advantages previously
enjoyed by the Israelis. Fundamentally, the Arab-Israeli
military balance now depends on Soviet actions and decisions
which have already created a situation in which Israel's
air superiority could be rapidly neutralized.
In the light of the foregoing and your public and
private statements regarding possible additional assistance
to Israel if a change in the balance required, we recommend
Israel be informed quietly and discreetly of the following.
(a) By the end of June, 44 Phantoms of the 50 will
have been delivered. The other six, which are to be special
reconnaissance models, have not been promised for delivery
until early 1971. We, therefore, will (1) sell and deliver
three additional Phantoms to Israel in July and three
in August bringing the total to 50 (which Soviet and
UAR intelligence will interpret as completion of the
1968 Phantom deal; only 88 Skyhawks have been delivered
of the 100 committed in past contracts. The 12 remaining
will be delivered over the next few months) ; (2) as re-
placements for past and future projected losses, earmark
four Phantoms per month and four additional Skyhawks
per month out of future production for delivery starting
in September through the end of the year. This would be
subject to review, only if negotiations between parties
under Jarring's auspices had started and showed signs of
success; and (3) make contingency plans for immediate
delivery of F-4's and A-4's to Israel out of USAF in-
ventories if there should be a dramatic shift in the balance.
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(b) As part of your decision which I announced on
March 23, we would also inform Israel of our intention
to continue to respond affirmatively to other Israeli
military requests in order to maintain the logistic pipe-
line. We would respond affirmatively to most items in their
latest request--i.e., Hawk ground-to-air missiles, bombs,
tanks, radar, acceleration of spare parts deliveries for
F-4's and A-4's.
(c) A low key announcement would be made which made
clear: (1) that for the next two months, during which we
would make new efforts to launch a "stop fighting, start
talking" proposal, the deliveries of aircraft by the U.S.
to Israel would not bring them beyond levels committed
on the basis of past contracts (not over 50 Phantoms and
100 Skyhawks) ; and (2) that we have made contingent provision
for immediate delivery of additional or replacement aircraft
to Israel if the need arises. As a condition, Israel must
agree to affirm publicly that it is satisfied with the
contingent arrangements made by the U.S., otherwise there
is apt to be a strong reaction in the Congress. The announce-
ment would be made shortly after we have launched our political
initiative through diplomatic channels (see Scenario attached).
We would insist on full cooperation from Israel with respect
to our political proposal.
(d) We would inform Nasser that we are limiting our-
selves for the time being not to go beyond the 50 Phantom
and 100 Skyhawk level committed in the 1968 and 1966
contracts, but that further deferral of sale of additional
aircraft is only feasible in circumstances of a ceasefire
and his agreement to enter discussions under Jarring on
the basis of the new American proposal.
4. U.S. Resolve Vis-a-Vis the USSR. One of our most
serious problems is to reflect resolve and firmness to
the USSR. The diplomatic efforts we have made with them,
to underscore how seriously and how potentially dangerous
their decision is to commit operational personnel in Egypt,
have elicited no visible reaction or clarifications from
the Soviets. There are increasing signs that the Soviets
are prepared to live with and derive the political benefits
from turmoil in the Middle East, and that they are operating
on the assumption that they can press for unilateral
political advantage while we are heavily involved in
Southeast Asia. We believe more must be done privately
in the area, and publicly over the coming weeks to reflect
our resolve to the USSR. I recommend that you direct
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Secretary Laird and me to make a high priority study
of this aspect immediately covering the whole range
of our relations with the USSR. Both political and
contingent military steps should be studied. What do
we do if the Soviets challenge the Israelis in the Suez
area? All of us are agreed this means a "new ballgame",
but precisely what are the options open to us? If Cairo
and Moscow refuse to accept our proposals for a ceasefire
or for the start of negotiations between the parties,
what political and military steps should we take? Should
we break off the Two and Four Power talks rather than
continue giving the present impression that the door
to a political solution is still open? Should we slow
down our efforts to achieve understandings on certain
bilateral matters? In addition to giving Israel more
military help, which in itself is unlikely to deter
the Soviets, can we dramatize efforts to make the Sixth
Fleet more modern and effective, or can we fly routine
patrols between Sixth Fleet carriers and Israel? Are
such steps possible given the atmosphere on the Hill?
How do we begin to educate the American people that
the Middle East is a principal test between the US and
USSR over the next few years?
In the meantime, we are limited largely to diplo-
matic efforts which are not apt to make much impact on
the USSR.
Enclosed is a brief scenario and detailed instruc-
tions required to carry out the recommendations contained
in this paper.
William P. Rogers
Enclosure:
Scenario
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SCENARIO
Step I. Consultations with the Israelis.
A. We would first advise the Israelis of the full
details of our new political initiative to achieve a
ceasefire and to get talks started under Jarring's auspices.
We would also make clear that we do not expect any response
from the Israelis, pending our efforts to get Nasser's
agreement. At the same time, the Israelis would be informed
that we would expect a positive reply from them if Nasser
accepts our proposal. Israel would be informed that
we would regard very seriously any leaks or any other
attempt to sabotage our new peace initiative. Finally,
we would inform the Israelis of our decisions regarding
military assistance.
B. The above would be communicated in two ways:
(a) Secretary Rogers to Ambassador Rabin; and (b) Ambassador
Barbour to Prime Minister Meir.
Attached is the suggested cable which would be
used as guidance. (TAB A).
Step II. Proposal Made Directly to UAR in Cairo.
A. A personal message would be sent to Foreign
Minister Riad by Secretary Rogers incorporating our new
peace proposal. (TAB B).
B. We would provide the suggested text of our peace
proposal to the UAR as a draft report to the Secretary
General which Jarring could use as the new basis for
getting negotiations started between the parties under his
auspices. We would leave it to Jarring to work out the
locus for such talks.
C. In addition, in order to maximize the effect of
our proposal, Bergus would be instructed to see Nasser
to explain the position and make the following points
orally:
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(1) For the ceasefire to be effective, both sides
must agree to a standstill, i.e., no troop movements, new
installations, etc., in the Canal Zone. (2) The Egyptians
should realize the extent of the political concessions
being asked of Israel. (3) The US will remain engaged
and believes there can be no peace without withdrawal and
vice versa. (4) We would be prepared to support extension
of the same procedure to Syria if that country accepted
the November 22 Resolution. (5) The question of aircraft
for Israel is still under review, and we are limiting
ourselves to fulfilling past commitments not
providing Israel at this time with Phantoms beyond the
50 contracted for in the past but the UAR should under-
stand that we cannot hold this position indefinitely
in the absence of a ceasefire and the beginning of active
talks between the parties under Jarring's auspices.
Step III. Similar Proposal Made to Hussein at Same
Time It Is Presented to Nasser.
Hussein would be extremely angry with us if our
peace proposal came to him second hand or after we had
presented it to Nasser. He, therefore, should receive
it at the same time as Nasser. Moreover, regardless of
Hussein's limitations, he might be helpful in encouraging
a positive reaction from Cairo.
A draft instruction to Amman is at TAB C.
Step IV. Seek UK and French Support in Cairo.
We would inform the British and French at the time
of our approach in Cairo and ask that they be prepared
to lend support to our efforts with the parties, if we
judge this desirable in light of our initial exchanges.
A suggested message is attached (TAB D).
Step V. Engaging the Soviets.
Secretary Rogers would call in Dobrynin and Beam
would see Gromyko, about 24 hours after we had presented
the proposals to Nasser and Hussein, to urge them to
support our effort in Cairo (TAB E) However, the primary
emphasis would be on direct contacts between Washington,
Cairo, Amman and Tel Aviv.
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Step VI. SYG Thant would be brought in on the proposal
at an early stage and his help solicited.
Step VII. A short public announcement would be made of
the decisions taken.
Step VIII. Engaging the Moderate Arabs.
We would explain our proposals to Tunisia, Morocco,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait and urge that they urge
Cairo's acceptance. This step would be taken some time
after Cairo has had an opportunity to digest our proposals
so as to avoid giving Nasser the impression a pressure
campaign has been undertaken.
Step IX. Consideration would also be given to the
possibility of enlisting of support of Yahya, Suharto,
Ghandi, Tito, the Shah, Rumor, Ceausescu, Trudeau, and
Thant at some later stage if this proves desirable and
offers some prospect of having a positive influence on
Nasser.
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ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
RE NEXT STEPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
In view of the serious nature of developments in the
Middle East in recent weeks, we have undertaken a thorough
review of all aspects of the problem. We have concluded
that the most immediate and compelling need in the area
is for the parties to stop fighting and start talking.
We are currently taking a number of steps to this end.
As part of the overall review, we have noted in
particular the actions of the Soviet Union. Since the
President's decision in late March to defer the sale of
additional aircraft to Israel, the Soviet Union has in-
stalled SA-3's in the UAR and are operating them with its
own personnel, and its pilots are flying operational
missions. We consider this unprecedented direct Soviet
involvement both serious and potentially dangerous. The
Soviet Union has been made fully aware of our views in
this regard, and the risk of miscalculation on its part.
We have also weighed carefully Israel's most recent
request for the sale of additional aircraft. We have come
to a judgment on this matter in light of three principal
considerations: (a) that the Israelis should be assured
that US support of its existence and security remains firm
as does our intention to provide it with the necessary
deterrent strength it may need; (b) that the overriding
objective in the area in the days ahead is the need for
prudence on the ground by all concerned and fresh efforts
to achieve a stable peace through negotiations under
Jarring's auspices; and (c) the strong desire of the
United States to maintain its friendship with as many
countries in the area as possible who desire our friendship.
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SECRET/NODIS
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In light of these considerations, we have decided that
the deliveries of Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft will continue
for the period of time during which the efforts to get the
parties to stop shooting and start talking will be pursued.
It is not intended that Israel will be provided during this
period with quantities which would bring the total number
of US aircraft in its inventory above the level con-
templated under previous contracts. At the same time, we
have also made specific contingent arrangements to provide
Israel in the future with replacements of aircraft if and
as the need arises.
We have discussed this matter with the Israeli
Government, and it has expressed satisfaction with the
arrangements made.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
TAB "A"
ACTION: Amembassy TELAVIV
INFO:
USINT CAIRO
Amembassy AMMAN
USUN NEW YORK
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy PARIS
STATE
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY
1. You should at earliest opportunity seek appointment
with Prime Minister, noting that you have highly
sensitive matter to discuss, and requesting that
meeting be limited to only you and her. Please inform
Dept. by immediate telegram when appointment set.
2. You should speak to Mrs. Meir along following
lines: BEGIN PRESENTATION. The events of recent
months portend an ever-sharpening devolution in the
Middle East unless all parties concerned make the
most vigorous efforts. Military conflict has intensified
and broadened in scope, and progress toward peace is
at a standstill. We are at a critical point.
3. At the outset I wish to assure you we have had in
the forefront of our concerns as we deal with the area's
problems the vital security interests of Israel, its
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
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by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
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SECRET/NODIS
2
continued life as a free and sovereign nation. These
are and will remain firmly among our primary interests
in the Middle East.
4. We have concluded our study of the situation
produced by the new Soviet military presence in Egypt
and have determined the course of action we will follow.
We wish now to share with you our plan of action.
5. Our approach is two-pronged; to be as responsive
as possible to Israel's arms requests and to undertake
political initiatives which will extricate us from
the present dangerous impasse.
6. Pending the outcome of these political initiatives,
as an interim measure we are prepared (a) to deliver
3 Phantoms in July and 3 in August; (b) as replacements
for past and projected future losses, to earmark
from future production beginning in September 16
additional Phantoms and 16 Skyhawks on a contingency
basis for later sale to Israel if ceasefire and peace
efforts, to be described, are unsuccessful; and (c)
to work out a detailed contingency plan making it
possible to deliver F-4's and A-4's rapidly to Israel
out of U.S. inventories if the situation should require
it. (At this point you should give the Prime Minister
a piece of paper containing the language of this
paragraph.)
SECRET/NODIS
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3
7. We expect that Israel will continue to refrain from
resuming deep penetration raids over Egypt. We believe
the interim measures described must be kept secret,
and we expect Israel to damp down public discussion of
the aircraft issue by making clear it is satisfied
adequate contingency arrangements have been made. We
will keep the question of future aircraft sales
under review and meanwhile count on Israel's co-
operation with respect to publicity and to our
negotiating proposals in the spirit of the request
conveyed to FonMin Eban during his recent visit.
8. As for the political facet of our action, we
present the following for Mrs. Meir's information.
We do not expect any commitment to action by Israel
at this time. We will very shortly put to President
Nasser the following proposals:
(a) that both Israel and the UAR subscribe to a
restoration of the ceasefire;
(b) that Israel and the UAR, on one hand, and Israel
and Jordan on the other, begin discussions under
Jarring according to whatever procedures he recommends
and looking toward implementation of the November 22
Security Council resolution, on the basis of statements
by both sides that they accept that resolution, that
the UAR accepts the principle of a just and lasting
SECRET/NODIS
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4
peace with Israel, including recognition on their
part of Israel's right to exist and that Israel accepts
the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories,
in accordance with Resolution 242. When we say
discussions under Jarring, we have in mind indirectly
at the outset. Identical proposals will be put to
King Hussein.
9. At this point you should hand Mrs. Meir two pieces
of paper, one containing points (a) and (b) above, the
other a draft illustrative report to the United Nations
Secretary General which Ambassador Jarring might use
as a procedural device for convening the parties. The
text of this proposed report follows: BEGIN TEXT.
The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree:
(a) that having accepted Resolution 242, they will
designate representatives to discussions to be held
under my auspices, according to such procedure and at
such places and times as I may recommend, taking into
account as appropriate each side's preference as to
method of procedure.
(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions
is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just
and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual
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5
acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each
other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal,
both in accordance with Resolution 242.
(c) that, to facilitate my task of promoting agree-
ment as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will
strictly observe, effective this date, the ceasefire
resolutions of the Security Council.
10. This is a major effort by the United States to
get the Middle East moving toward peace. It would
demand much of Israel but its ultimate reward would
be beyond value for all of us. We do not ask for an
Israeli reaction at this point. But if Nasser's
answer is positive, we will seek and expect an
affirmative Israeli reply.
11. We are informing Israel now of our moves in the
straightforward spirit we believe should characterize
our relations. We cannot overstress the importance
we attach to discretion in this matter and to avoiding
any actions which could prejudice Nasser's reaction.
There must be an opportunity for movement by both sides
without the glare of publicity. Pending Nasser's
reaction, we urge Mrs. Meir to hold it within the
circle of her closest advisers and particularly not
to make it a matter for full cabinet consideration.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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B
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SECRET/NODIS
TAB "B"
ACTION: USINT CAIRO
INFO:
Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK
STATE
NODIS
Subject: New Initiative on Political Settlement
1. You should request urgent appointment with FM
Riad and deliver following personal message from
Secretary Rogers. Inform Department by Flash message
when appointment is set.
Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:
I have read carefully President Nasser's statement
of May 1 and your subsequent remarks to Mr. Bergus.
Mr. Sisco has also reported fully on his conversations
with President Nasser and you, and we have been giving
serious thought to what can be done about the situation
in the Near East.
I agree with you that the situation is at a critical
point and I think it is in our joint interest that
the United States retain and strengthen friendly ties
with all the peoples and states of the area. We hope
this will prove possible and are prepared to do our
SECRET/NODIS
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under provisions of E.O. 12958
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SECRET/NODIS
2
part. We look to others concerned, and in particular
to your government, which has so important a role to
play, to move with us to seize this opportunity. If
it is lost, we shall all suffer the consequences and
we would regret such an outcome very much indeed. In
this spirit, I urge that your government give the most
careful consideration to the thoughts which I set
forth below.
We are interested in a lasting peace, and we would like
to help the parties achieve it. We have made serious
and practical proposals to that end, and we have
counseled all parties on the need for compromise, and
on the need to create an atmosphere in which peace is
possible. By the latter we mean a reduction of tensions
as well as clarifications of positions to give both
Arabs and Israelis some confidence that the outcome
will preserve their essential interests.
In our view, the most effective way to agree on a
settlement would be for the parties to begin to work
out under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the
detailed steps necessary to carry out SC Resolution
242. Foreign Minister Eban of Israel has recently
said that Israel would be prepared to make important
concessions once talks got started. At the same time,
Egyptian participation in such talks would go far
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3
towards overcoming Israeli doubts that your government
does in fact seek to make peace with it. I understand
the problems that direct negotiations pose for you,
and we have made it clear from the beginning that we
were not proposing such an arrangement be put into
effect at the outset, although, depending on the
progress of discussions, we believe the parties will
find it necessary to meet together at some point if
peace is to be established between them.
With the above thoughts in mind, I put forward the
following proposal for your consideration:
(a) that both Israel and the UAR subscribe to a
restoration of the ceasefire;
(b) that Israel and the UAR, on one hand, and Israel
and Jordan on the other, begin discussions under
Ambassador Jarring according to whatever procedures
he recommends and looking toward implementation of
the November 22 Security Council Resolution, on the
basis of statements by both sides that they accept
that resolution that the UAR accepts the principle
of a just and lasting peace with Israel, including
recognition on its part of Israel's right to exist,
and that Israel accepts the principle of withdrawal
from occupied territories, in accordance with
Resolution 242. I attach a draft illustrative report
SECRET/NODIS
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4
to the Secretary General of the UN which Ambassador
Jarring might use as a procedural device for con-
vening the parties.
If this proposal is acceptable to the UAR we will
undertake to seek Israeli acceptance.
I am sending a similar message to King Hussein.
I look forward to your early reply.
With all best wishes, Sincerely, William P. Rogers
2. Text of proposed report by Jarring to SYG:
The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree:
(a) That having accepted Resolution 242, they will
designate representatives to discussions to be held
under my auspices, according to such procedures and
at such places and times as I may recommend, taking
into account as appropriate each side's preferences
as to method of procedure.
(b) That the purpose of the aforementioned discussions
is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just
and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual
acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each
other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal,
both in accordance with Resolution 242.
SECRET/NODIS
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5
(c) That, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement
as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will
strictly observe, effective this date, the ceasefire
resolutions of the Security Council.
3. Following are talking points which you should make
orally after presenting above message:
(a) If restored ceasefire is to be effective, both sides
must undertake not to change military situation under
cover of truce. There should be standstill on both
sides, i.e., no major troop movements or introduction
new installations or new elements such as new type
missiles into combat area.
(b) Egyptians should bear in mind that we are asking
Israelis make what they will consider very significant
political concession in agreeing to enter indirect
negotiations on implementation of resolution and in
accepting principle of withdrawal prior to negotiations.
This may seem to Egyptians no more than Israelis should
do, but they should put themselves in Israeli shoes
for a moment and realize that Israelis are taking on
open-ended commitment with no assurance as to results.
Same can be said of Egyptians, but latter hold key to
peace, which gives them important negotiating leverage.
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(c) USG is prepared remain engaged in process once
negotiations begin. We continue maintain there can
be no peace without withdrawal and vice versa.
(d) If Syria agrees to accept Resolution 242, we
would ask that procedure outlined in President's
message be extended to it, i.e., that Syria and
Israel also begin indirect negotiations under Jarring's
auspices to reach agreement on implementation of
resolution.
(e) If queried re U.S. decision on aircraft for Israel,
you should say this matter still under review and
meanwhile we are limiting ourselves not to go beyond
the 50 Phantom and 100 Skyhawk level committed in the
1968 and 1966 contracts. This means that we are not
selling additional aircraft at this time to compensate
for addition of Soviet-manned SA-3's and Soviet pilots.
UAR should understand, however, that it will be
impossible for us to keep aircraft question in abeyance
in absence of ceasefire, standstill on new installations
in Suez Canal area and talks started by parties under
Jarring's auspices.
(f) You should say we hope agreement along such lines
can in time help create favorable climate for restoration
US-UAR relations.
SECRET/NODIS
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(g) You should emphasize the need for an early response,
making due acknowledgment of the time it has taken us
to formulate this initiative but pointing out that a
decision having been taken, it is imperative that we
move quickly if it is to work.
(h) FYI. You should get across, without making threats,
that this may be last opportunity UAR may have on such
matters for long time to come. END FYI.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
C
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
TAB "C"
ACTION:
Amembassy AMMAN
INFO:
USINT CAIRO
USUN NEW YORK
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy TEL AVIV
STATE
NODIS
SUBJECT: New Initiative on Political Settlement
1. Following personal message from Secretary should
be delivered to Foreign Minister Rifa'i on same day
as Secretary's letter is delivered to Fon Min Riad
in Cairo by Bergus. Cairo will advise by flash
message when appointment with Riad set.
His Excellency Abdul Munim al-Rifa'i, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Amman.
Dear Mr. Minister:
Recent developments in the Middle East have convinced
me that we must move quickly to break the current
impasse with regard to a peace settlement, and we
have been giving serious thought to what can be done
about the situation.
That situation is at a critical point and it is in
our mutual interest to achieve a just and lasting
peace. We have made serious and practical proposals
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by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
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to that end, and we have counseled all parties on the
need for compromise, and on the need to create an
atmosphere in which peace is possible. By the latter
we mean a reduction of tensions as well as clarifications
of positions to give both Arabs and Israelis some
confidence that the outcome will preserve their essential
interests.
In our view, the most effective way to agree on a
settlement would be for the parties to begin to work
out together under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the
detailed steps necessary to carry out SC Resolution
242. Foreign Minister Eban of Israel has recently
said that Israel would be prepared to make important
concessions once talks got started. We understand the
problems that direct negotiations pose for the Arabs,
and we have made it clear from the beginning that we
were not proposing such an arrangement be put into effect
at the outset, although, depending on the progress of
discussions, we believe the parties will find it
necessary to meet together at some point if peace is
to be established between them.
With the above considerations in mind, I put forward
the following proposal:
(a) that both Israel and Jordan subscribe to a formal
and public restoration of the ceasefire;
SECRET/NODIS
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3
(b) that Israel and Jordan, on one hand, and Israel
and the UAR on the other, begin discussions under
Jarring according to whatever procedures he recommends
and looking toward implementation of the November 22
Security Council Resolution, on the basis of statements
by both sides that they accept that resolution, that
Jordan accepts the principle of a just and lasting
peace with Israel, including recognition on its part
of Israel's right to exist, and that Israel accepts
the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories,
in accordance with Resolution 242. I attach a draft
illustrative report to the Secretary General of the
UN which Ambassador Jarring might use as a procedural
device for convening the parties.
If this proposal is acceptable to Jordan and the UAR
we will undertake to seek Israeli acceptance.
I am sending a similar message to Foreign Minister
Riad.
I look forward to your early reply.
With all best wishes, Sincerely, William Rogers
2. Text of proposed report by Jarring to SYG:
Jordan (the UAR) and Israel advise me that they agree:
(a) That having accepted Resolution 242, they will
designate representatives to discussions to be held
Reproduced at the Library DECLASSIFIED
Richard
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
4
under my auspices, according to such procedures and
at such places and times as I may recommend, taking
into account as appropriate each side's preferences
as to method of procedure.
(b) That the purpose of the aforementioned discussions
is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just
and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual
acknowledgement by Jordan (the UAR) and Israel of each
other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal both in
accordance with Resolution 242.
(c) That, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement
as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will
strictly observe, effective this date, the ceasefire
resolutions of the Security Council.
3. Following are talking points which you should make
orally after presenting above message:
(a) If restored ceasefire is to be effective, both
sides must undertake not to change the military situation
under cover of truce. There should be standstill on
both sides, i.e., no major troop movements or intro-
duction new type of military equipment into combat
area. As part of the ceasefire, it would be understood
that both parties would refrain from and prevent any
type of military action against one another.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS
5
(b) Jordanians should bear in mind that we are asking
Israelis make what they will consider very significant
political concession in agreeing to enter indirect
negotiations on implementation of resolution and in
accepting principle of withdrawal publicly prior to
negotiations. This may seem to Jordanians no more
than Israelis should do, but they should realize that
Israelis are taking on open-ended commitment with no
assurance as to results. Same can be said of
Jordanians, but Arabs hold key to peace, which gives
them important negotiating leverage.
(c) USG is prepared remain engaged in process once
negotiations begin. We continue maintain there can
be no peace without withdrawal.
(d) If Syria agrees to accept Resolution 242, we
would ask that procedure outlined in Secretary's
message be extended to it, i.e., that Syria also
engage in indirect negotiations under Jarring's
auspices to reach agreement on implementation of
resolution.
(e) If queried re U.S. decision on aircraft for Israel,
you should say this matter still under review and
meanwhile we are limiting ourselves not to go beyond
the 50 Phantom and 100 Skyhawk level committed in the
1968 and 1966 contracts. This means that we are not
Reproduced at the RicharCRizon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS
6
selling additional aircraft at this time to compensate
for addition of Soviet-manned SA-3's and Soviet pilots
in UAR. Jordan should understand, however, that it
will be impossible for us to keep aircraft question
in abeyance in absence of ceasefire, standstill on new
installations and talks started between parties under
Jarring's auspices.
(f) You should emphasize the need for an early response,
making due acknowledgment of the time it has taken us
to formulate this initiative but pointing out that a
decision having been taken, it is imperative that we
move quickly if it is to work.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
D
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS
TAB "D"
ACTION: Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
INFO:
Amembassy AMMAN
USINT
CAIRO
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN
NEW YORK
STATE
NODIS
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY
SUBJECT: New Initiative on a Middle East Political
Settlement
1. You should deliver urgently following message at
highest available level from Secretary to Foreign
Secretary Stewart/Foreign Minister Schumann, indicating
similar message being conveyed to other party. FYI:
Additional paragraph for message to Schumann appears
at end of following text, which otherwise is identical.
END FYI.
2. BEGIN TEXT. Dear Colleague: As you know, we have
been studying since the end of April the new dimension
in the Arab-Israel conflict created by the USSR's
decision to become directly involved with its own
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military personnel in the UAR. Part of our urgent
evaluation of the entire Middle East complex has been
our consideration of Israel's renewed request for
additional aircraft.
We remain convinced that the problem which you and we
face in the Eastern Mediterranean is essentially a
Soviet political rather than military strategy; that
neither Israel nor the neighboring Arab governments
want a new war; and that every avenue toward military
deescalation and movement toward a political solution
must be exhausted for the purpose, inter alia, of
thwarting the Soviet strategy.
Accordingly, the United States is undertaking a new
political initiative directly with Cairo, Tel Aviv,
and Amman. We have taken your views carefully into
account in devising this move.
At the right moment we will need and be very appreciative
of your strong support. In the initial phase, however,
we think it better for the parties to consider our
suggestion quietly and confidentially, without receiving
possible impressions of pressure engendered by the
U.S. During the initial phase, we ask that our approach
be handled very confidentially. As soon as we have a
preliminary idea of the parties' reactions, we shall
advise you and shall want to consult with you.
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Our initiative is as follows. (1) We are proposing to
the UAR, Israel, and Jordan that they promptly begin
discussions under Jarring's auspices, according to
whatever procedures are recommended by him, for the
purpose of the agreed implementation of the November
1967 Security Council resolution;
(2) We are proposing, as a basis for the commencement
of Jarring's efforts, that the UAR, Israel, and Jordan
make identical statements that they (a) accept Resolution
242 and (b) agree that the purpose of the discussions
to be conducted by Jarring is to reach agreement on
the establishment of a just and lasting peace between
them based on (i) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR,
Jordan, and Israel of each other's sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity, and political independence, and
(ii) withdrawal of Israeli forces, both in accordance
with Resolution 242;
(3) We are further proposing, as the basis for Jarring
to begin, that the UAR, Israel, and Jordan subscribe
to a full restoration of the ceasefire;
(4) We are indicating we would be prepared to see all
these arrangements extended to Syria, if Syria accepts
Resolution 242;
(5) The US undertakes, if the UAR accepts this proposal,
to make every effort to secure Israel's acceptance.
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In order to make the ceasefire effective, we are asking
the parties, particularly the UAR, to undertake not
to change the military situation and to avoid troop
movements or new installations (such as new type of
missiles) into the combat area.
For our part, we are indicating to the Egyptians that
the US decision on aircraft for Israel is still under
review and meanwhile we are limiting ourselves not to
go beyond the commitments in the 1966 and 1968 contracts.
This means that we are not selling additional aircraft
at this time to compensate for Soviet-manned SA-3's
and Soviet pilots. We are noting, however, that it
will be impossible for us to keep the aircraft question
in abeyance in the absence of a ceasefire, a standstill
on new installations in the Suez Canal area, and the
start of talks by the parties under Jarring's
auspices.
We believe that our proposal, although difficult for
both sides to accept, is balanced. Israel is asked
to drop its refusal to negotiate matters of major
substance through indirect talks, and also to accept
explicitly the principle of withdrawal before the
commencement of negotiations. The Arabs are asked
to drop their insistence on reference to total Israeli
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withdrawal explicitly to the June 5 lines as part of
Israel's advance acceptance of the principle of with-
drawal, and to acknowledge in advance that the purpose
of talks under Jarring's auspices will be the establish-
ment of peace, based inter alia on acceptance of Israel's
right to exist.
I hope you will find our approach to the parties to be
the correct one and will approve of our readiness to
try to persuade the parties to make the major step needed
of each side to move toward peace. END TEXT.
3. FOR PARIS. Following penultimate para should be
inserted. BEGIN TEXT. I believe, dear colleague,
that France is in a unique position to assist our
effort when the correct moment comes. Of the Western
powers, France today has the best relationship with
the Arabs. Of the Western powers, France has, along
with my country, something urgently desired and
considered necessary by Israel: arms supplies and
military aircraft. I would be most grateful if you
could give the most serious consideration to the means
by which France, in general terms, can help us when
the time comes to persuade the parties and especially
Israel to accept the proposal I have outlined above.
END TEXT.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
6
4. FYI: Approach to UAR, Israel, and Jordan being
made on
You may inform host government
we are outlining our proposal in general terms to
Soviets - omitting information re deferral on aircraft
to Israel - - approximately 24 hours after proposal is
made to UAR, and are requesting Soviet support.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
TAB "E"
ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW
INFO:
Amembassy AMMAN
USINT
CAIRO
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN
NEW YORK
STATE
NODIS
DRAFT INSTRUCTION TO AMBASSADOR BEAM IN MOSCOW
EYES ONLY - FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY
1. You should inform the Foreign Ministry immediately
that you expect to receive in the next few days a
message of the highest importance from the Secretary
to Gromyko concerning the Middle East, which you are
instructed to deliver to Gromyko personally. You
therefore will appreciate it if steps are taken to plan
for your appointment with Gromyko on very short notice.
2. When informed by Department to proceed, you should
convey following oral message from Secretary promptly
to Gromyko.
A. BEGIN TEXT. Dear Mr. Minister: The United States
Government has taken note of the repeated assurances
of the Soviet Government that the USSR continues urgently
to desire a peaceful settlement between Israel and its
Arab neighbors in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 242. It has also been noted that the Soviet
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
SECRET/NODIS
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.DECLASSiPIEDO E.O. 12958
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Rtx
SECRET/NODIS
2
Government has advised that its military support of
the UAR is defensive in purpose, and has called upon
the US Government to refrain from further steps to
strengthen Israel militarily in order to reduce tensions,
stabilize the situation in the area, and increase the
prospects for a peaceful settlement.
B. In view of these stated positions of the Soviet
Government, we assume that the Soviet Government will
welcome and will support the following steps now
being taken by the US:
(1) We are proposing to the UAR, Israel, and Jordan
that they promptly begin discussions under Jarring's
auspices, according to whatever procedures are recom-
mended by him, for the purpose of the agreed implemen-
tation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution;
(2) We are proposing, as a basis for the commencement
of Jarring's efforts, that the UAR, Israel, and Jordan
make identical statements that they (a) accept Resolution
242 and (b) agree that the purpose of the discussions
to be conducted by Jarring is to reach agreement on the
establishment of a just and lasting peace between them
based on (i) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR, Jordan
and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence; and (ii) with-
drawal of Israeli forces, both in accordance with
Resolution 242.
Reproduced at the Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS
3
(3) We are further proposing, as the basis for Jarring
to begin, that the UAR, Israel, and Jordan subscribe
to a full restoration of the ceasefire;
(4) We would be prepared to see all these arrangements
extended to Syria, if Syria accepts Resolution 242;
(5) The US undertakes, if the UAR accepts this proposal,
to make every effort to secure Israel's acceptance.
C. This US approach, in response to President Nasser's
May 1 statement, is designed to reverse current trends
which hold great danger for both Soviet and US interests.
The US initiative will involve serious and difficult
US efforts with the Israelis. We look for a positive
reaction from the USSR as evidence of its intentions
with respect to stabilizing the military situation and
working for a peaceful settlement.
D. The Soviet Government should be left with no doubt
as to the firm determination of the US to keep the
military balance from shifting against Israel if the
political initiative we are proposing fails. END TEXT.
3. If Gromyko raises question of aircraft for Israel
or you consider it would be useful to take initiative,
you may say Israel's request for 125 additional air-
craft remains under review. Meanwhile, we are limiting
ourselves not to go beyond the 50 Phantom and 100
Skyhawk level committed in the 1968 and 1966 contracts.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS
4
Prolonged deferral of decision not possible, however,
in absence of ceasefire, standstill with respect to new
military installations, including no deployment of
SA-3 missiles, on both sides of the ceasefire lines,
and progress on political front.
4. For your information, the US will have already
presented this proposal to the UAR before your con-
versation with Gromyko, after having previously informed
the Israelis of our approach to Cairo. We will also
be briefing British and French, but are reserving
judgment for now on timing of possible approaches to
other governments.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
national SECURITY COUNCIL
washington, D.C. 20506
SECRET/NODIS
June 9, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
Office of the Vice President
Office of the Secretary of State
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of the Director, Emergency Preparedness
SUBJECT:
Next Steps in the Middle East
Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from the Secretary of State
on Next Steps in the Middle East. This paper will serve as the
basis for discussion at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, June 10
at 9:30 a. m.
twpanis
Jeanne W. Davis
Director
Secretariat
Attachment
CC: Office of the Attorney General
Office of the Under Secretary of State
Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
SECRET/NODIS
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Robx
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
1. TYPE OF DOCUMENT: Memo to NSC Members
2. SUBJECT: Next Steps in the Middle East
3. DATE: June 9, 1970
4. CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/NODIS
NO. OF
ADDRESSEE
COPIES
RECIPIENT
TIME
DATE
Vice President (K. Crane)
1
Secretary of State
1
Secretary of Defense
1
Director, OEP
1
Attorney General
1
Janit Kemp
1:44
6/9/70
Under Secretary of State
1
Chairman, JCS
1
Director CIA
1
Capt. Robinson
1
Gen. Haig
1
Dr. Lynn
1
Mr. Osgood
1
Col. Kennedy
1
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
1
Mr. Saunders
1
OL. Hd $2 1 6 wnp
JSN
DISPATCHED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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DEF ENSE MEMO
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
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2
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.