Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
266848715
label
WSAG Meeting Jordan & Israel 6/22/70
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
266848715
contentType
document
title
WSAG Meeting Jordan & Israel 6/22/70
citationUrl
collections
National Security Files (Nixon Administration)
Institutional Files
iiifBase
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
266848715
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
url
mediaId
6ec49d9a347977e1
ocrText
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
/
Guthrie to Harg
6/23/70
A
Memo
FILE LOCATION
NSC H-FILES Box H-78 Folder 6
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Reproduced a the Richard Nixon Presidential I ibrary DECI ASSIFIED
NA 14029 (1-98)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
June 20, 1970
TALKING POINTS
1.
If we make an announcement Wednesday on the Israeli aircraft
decision and our diplomatic initiative, we ought to be sure our evacuation
plans and forces are in the best possible position.
- Should the carrier (Roosevelt) and amphibious force be
brought closer to Lebanon? [It has been held within 50 hours
over the weekend. ]
- - Are any airborne elements that might be needed readily
available?
- - Ask that evacuation plans for Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
be reviewed and any problems connected with them raised.
2.
Lebanon intervention. The President in last Wednesday's NSC
on the Mediterranean asked that we look closely at what the U S should
do if President Helou asked for help against aggression. The plan before
us was developed last fall. The main purpose today is (1) to review it
and (2) to decide what more needs to be done to meet the President's
request.
3.
Turning to the Lebanon intervention plan, these questions need
to be asked
- Would the necessary staging bases be available?
- - Can we assume today, as last fall, that the Soviets will not
react militarily?
- Even if we assume the Soviets will not move overtlý, would
the U.S. Navy be prepared, with the naval forces it has available,
to take the risk?
- - Has the position of the fedayeen improved since last fall to the
point where the forces described in the plan could do the job?
Or would they become hopdessly mired in a guerrilla war?
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
- 2 -
4.
What is the consensus? Is this a workable plan- - in purely
technical terms apart from the political question of whether we should
intervene or not?
5.
What are some of the issues in deciding whether the U S
should intervene?
- Would we have the support of allies? Of Arab moderates?
- What would be the costs of not intervening?
- Would intervention enhance the U.S position vis vis the
USSR?
6.
No paper has been prepared on this issue. Suggest that an
ad hoc group--perhaps most of the same people who have worked on
the contingency plan--prepare a paper on the pros and cons of inter-
vention. Then maybe that paper could come to the Special Review
Group. After all, the membership is the same as the senior-level WSAG.
7.
The Jordan paper is quite parallel to the Lebanon paper.
Perhaps the ad hoc group should do a paper on the policy implications
of intervention in Jordan. [The annex to the paper now contains arguments
against intervention. Should the arguments for be added?]
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY council
SECRET/NODIS
June 20, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM
Harold H. Saunders
Richard T. Kennedy
SUBJECT.
WSAG on Lebanon and Jordan- - June 22
There are four items on the agenda. You should be able to dispose of
the first two quickly
1.
Lebanon evacuation plan. The plan [Lebanon Paper - Tab c]
has been reviewed and updated, so that is not the main issue (although
you will want to be sure everybody is satisfied with it).
The main point for discussion is whether to move the
necessary military elements into better position to react if Wednesday's
announcement triggers a reaction in the area. The Roosevelt and the
necessary amphibious force are being held within 50 hours over the
weekend, and airborne elements have been preliminarily readied. It
should be decided Monday whether to move within 24 hours or so.
Recommendation Ask JCS to report on status and feasibility.
2.
Other evacuation plans. There is a possibility that evacuation
from Libya (4, 000), Saudi Arabia (6, 000) and Kuwait might be necessary
as well in the wake of Wednesday's announcement.
Recommendation That you simply instruct that all evacuation plans be
reviewed and any reasonable readiness precautions taken.
3.
Lebanon intervention. This is the main purpose of the meeting.
(We assume it was the President's question at the NSC last Wednesday
which led you to call this meeting.) This deals with the question of the
U S. response if President Helou asks for U.S. assistance in the event
of overt aggression by other Arab states.
SECRET/NODIS
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/3/02
by NARA on the recommendation of RS the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
The full plan is summarized at Tab G under the "Lebanon
Paper" tab. You should begin by reading the analytical summary at the
Tab immediately following this memo.
There are two separate questions
--Is the plan as presented militarily workable?
Can we intervene?
- -Should we intervene if asked?
The contingency planning papers address only the first
question--military feasibility and its assumptions should be questioned
at the meeting.
The hard issue which has to be faced next is whether we
should intervene if asked. The contingency studies have not addressed
that question. State internally has drafted a paper addressing essentially
the pros and cons of a response to a request for our intervention, but
that is not part of this package.
Recommendation. We suggest that you call for a quick paper
addressing the pros and cons of intervention, and the political costs and
risks to be done by an ad hoc group for presentation to the Special Review
Group. (The membership of the ad hoc group would be the same as the
WSAG Mid-East Group and the Special Review Group membership would
be the same as the WSAG. Using the Special Review Group to address
this question would avoid bureaucratic argument over the role of the WSAG.)
4. Jordan intervention. This is the one item of business left over
from the more active phase of the Jordan crisis ten days ago. It closely
parallels the Lebanon intervention plan except for the increased reliance
on airborne troops. The issues are much the same. The paper is under
the "Jordan Paper" Tab.
Recommendation. Since the assumptions underlying this paper--
and the issues- are much the same as those for the Lebanon paper, we
suggest that you simply make that point and then ask that the same kind of
paper on the policy question be done for Jordan as asked for on Lebanon
above.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
June 20, 1970
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
U.S. INTERVENTION IN LEBANON AGAINST AGGRESSION
Situation.
An overt move of Arab forces (regular, regular in fedayeen
uniform or fedayeen obviously backed by regular forces) into Lebanon.
The distinguishing characteristic of this situation is that the U S. and
the Lebanese Government would be in a position to claim to be acting
against external aggression. The U.S. military plan would be much the
same (though probably with more forces) as for quelling civil war in
Lebanon against covert outside support, but assumptions about inter-
national political reaction (and availability of staging bases) would be
different.
Key Assumptions of this Plan
1.
Bases in NATO countries and/or Cyprus would be available.
[This is judged unlikely if the U S. were intervening to quell a civil
uprising but possible- though not assured in the event of overt
aggression. ]
a.
First priority- Turkey
b.
Second priority--use of UK sovereign base areas in Cyprus
c.
Third priority- Greece and/or Italy
2.
The airbase at Lajes, Azores, would be available as a transit
point.
3.
Responsible Lebanese officials would request U S military
assistance and U S forces would be acting in collaboration with not
against the opposition of--organized Lebanese units.
4.
The USSR would not initiate overt military or naval operations.
5.
Effective UN action is not anticipated.
Comment The above assumptions are critical to the feasibility of the
plan and must be examined in detail. For instance, the attached paper
(page entitled "Limitations if Forward Staging Bases Not Available")
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
- 2 -
concludes "If none of the above bases is available because of the denial
of host governments, deployment of Army and Air Force forces is not
possible" except for the Marine Battalion Landing Team from the Sixth
Fleet. Three central questions should be discussed
1.
Availability of bases
Lajes--probably
Turkey--almost certainly not
Cyprus--very unlikely [It is possible that the UK might allow
their use, but the Cypriot reaction would probably be so sharp as to
jeopardize their sovereign base status.
]
Greece- - [This would be a close decision. If a strong case could
be made that U.S. intervention was principally to block expansion of
Soviet influence, Greece might go along. ]
Italy--about the same as Greece.
If the Azores base only is available, airborne assault is not
feasible. Forces must be landed and fuel must be available in Beirut
It would be 2 days before 1 airborne infantry battalion- a full brigade is
needed for the operation--could be landed and 5.4 days before a tactical
fighter squadron could operate. Use of Greek bases in addition would
cut this time to 4.3 days. A Marine Battalion Landing Team from the
Fleet could be landed to secure the airport.
2.
Soviet reaction. Given the buildup of the Soviet position in the UAR
and in the Mediterranean, can we assume--as we did in writing these plans
last fall. that the Soviets will not react militarily? It is still a question
whether the Soviets would attack U.S forces, but how many risks would
the U.S Navy be prepared to take with the Fleet against Soviet subs?
3.
Fedayeen. The fedayeen opposition may be potentially stronger--
and popular support greater--now than when this plan was written last
fall. Are the forces involved really adequate if they confront not only a
cross-border invasion but a popular uprising as well?
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
- 3 -
The Forces Required
INITIAL
FOLLOW-ON
On CALL
1 Airborne Infantry
1 Airborne Division
As required
Brigade
(-)
and requested
3 Tactical Fighter
2 Tactical Fighter
by COMUSJTF
Squadrons
Squadrons
3 Tactical Airlift
10 KC-135 Aircraft
Squadrons
1 Tactical airlift
1 Reconnaissance
Squadron
Squadron
**Amphibious Task Force
10 KC-135 Aircraft
with 1/3 Marine Divi-
*Amphibious Task Force
sion/Wing Team
with 1/9 Marine Division
*1Attack Carrier Strike
Group
*Sixthflt
**CINCLANT
NOTE.
In addition, the following major forces are available for
augmentation from USCINCEUR.
2 Airborne Battalions
Tactical airlift as required
Closure Times
Closure times below assume availability of staging bases and are
computed from the day deployment commences and include the time
necessary to close required support elements.
1st Increment
Closure
Arrival
Complete
Initial Forces
48 hours
13 days
Follow-on Forces
13 days
33 days
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
- 4 -
Feasibility
There are serious judgments to be made as to military feasibility on
the grounds of
-- -limited availability of staging bases,
- -possible fedayeen opposition;
- --possible Soviet harrassment.
Comment These judgments need to be thrashed out at this meeting
because they do not come clear in the papers provided. The first
purpose of the meeting should be to reach some understanding on these
judgments.
The Broader Implications
The question of feasibility will be the first of the judgments that would
enter a decision on whether we should or should not respond affirmatively
to a request to intervene.
Apart from that is a range of political issues
1.
Would the U S. find adequate political support among Arab
moderates and allies?
One of the elements of the 1958 landings was that the U.S. - -
in the wake of contributing to Israeli withdrawal in the 1957 Arab-Israeli
settlement- - was intervening to block extension of Nasserist influence.
A parallel British move took place in Jordan. In short, there was sub-
stantial support among moderates and allies. Today, the U S. would be
intervening to block forces that - in the Arab public eye--are champions
of the Arab cause. The U.S. would be intervening- - in Arab eyes - to
support Israel.
2
Would this move save moderate government in Lebanon?
The immediate answer is that it probably would not in the long
run. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the government would face a
population, much of which would regard it as in collusion with the U.S.
and Israel to put down forces championing the Arab cause.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
- 5 -
The longer run answer is that probably the only development
that can preserve a balanced government in Lebanon is an Arab-Israeli
settlement.
3. Would such a move strengthen the U.S. position vis-a-vis
the USSR?
Some may argue that only a sharp U.S. reaction can give
the Soviets pause for thought about the dangers of confrontation with the
U.S.
The counter argument is that all benefit would be lost if the
U.S either became mired down in a war with Arab guerrillas or withdrew
leaving behind a Lebanese government about to fall.
4. What would be the costs of not intervening?
One cost would be the signal to other moderate governments
that the U S is no longer prepared to intervene to protect its friends.
Another would be the related signal to the USSR. If much of
our credibility with the USSR depends on persuading it that a confrontation
with the U.S is a danger, then this would lead Moscow to believe that
danger is not real.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
/
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7011444
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 22, 1970
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
WSAG Meeting on Middle East
Enclosed is a summary of conclusions for the WSAG meeting of
June 22 on the Middle East.
This summary is being made available to you on an Eyes-Only
basis for your personal use.
Dusans
Jeanne W. Davis
Director
NSC Secretariat
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/2/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
SECRET/NODIS
under provisions of E.O. 12958 RS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING
June 22, 1970
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The WSAG reviewed the status of contingency planning for military-
supported evacuation from Arab nations and for military intervention
in response to possible requests for assistance from friendly Arab
governments threatened with overthrow by outside and/or indigenous
forces. The objective is to be able to provide the NSC a complete
analysis of alternatives and implications in the event the NSC is faced
with a decision on whether to take military action to meet a crisis in
one or more Arab countries.
The WSAG Middle East Working Group will prepare a study setting
forth the pros and cons of military intervention at the invitation of a
friendly Arab government. The study will be a general one dealing with
all countries in which the United States might be asked to take
military action in support of friendly governments (including Lebanon,
Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia). However, the study will identify
special factors applicable only to individual countries. It should
specify what the U.S. can reasonably expect to accomplish within a
given time-frame. The study will be submitted for consideration at
an early meeting of the Special Review Group.
For Libya and Kuwait the WSAG Middle East Working Group will
prepare a chronological listing of steps to be taken and assignment
of responsibilities for action in the event of a crisis. In addition,
the Working Group will insure that the contingency plan for each
country includes an annex specifying the number and location of U.S.
nationals in that country. The JCS will prepare a listing of various
alternative routes for staging troops to the Middle East, with informa-
tion about the time factors involved.
SECRET/NODIS
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON
4/2/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
RS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
2
The WSAG agreed that it would be desirable to hold advance consultations
with the UK to see if British bases on Cyprus might be available for
staging U.S. troops. The State Department is to look further into the
possibility of consulting with the British.
In connection with possible use of Greek facilities, the WSAG agreed
that it was important that the studies and plans being prepared
contain a full assessment of the availability of Greek bases under
various contingencies.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.