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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
A
NSSM 202 study - Executive summary
n.d.
A
Report
1
Response to NSSM 202
Report
6/21/74
A
FILE LOCATION
NSC H-FILES Box H-205 Folder 1.
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NA 14029 (1-98)
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER A
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
NITIAL ACTION O
CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
MO
DA
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HR
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6
23
7402628
Grove, B
CIRCLE Kennedy AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
FROM: kissinger, H
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COLBY, W
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schlesinger, J
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DAVIS
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CODEWORD
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SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: u/sm-013c nuclear nonprolifiration treaty re
NSSM. 202 E u/sm-013B
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
1288M 202
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ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
FOR
memo FOR HAK
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STAFF FAR EAST SECRETARY NSC filder
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MEMO FOR PRES
REPLY FOR
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APPROPRIATE ACTION
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA
memo
TO
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RECOMMENDATIONS
LATIN AMERICA
JOINT MeMo
folders
UNITED NATIONS
refer TO
FOR:
ECONOMIC
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
SCIENTIFIC
X
CONCURRENCE. by phone
X
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
X
DUE DATE:
7/2
NSC PLANNING
X
CONGRESSIONAL
comments: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
OCEANS POLICY
NSSM-202
INTELLIGENCE
index
u/sm-013B
X
DATE
FROM
TO
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subsequent ACTION required (OR taken):
CY TO
Davis FYI
DISPATCH
CY RQMTS: see ABOVE PLUS:
MICROFILM 8 FILE RQMTS:
NOTIFY
& DATE
BY
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BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
CRT ID:
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OPEN
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
PA
DY
DECLASSIFIED
NBC-74-21)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been 533-147. determined to be declassified
2628
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET
NSC-U/SM-13C
June 24, 1974
TO:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director, US Information Agency
SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The attached draft Memorandum for the
President and the study which it transmits are
forwarded for your comments and/or concurrence
which may be telephoned to Mr. Jerome Kahan,
Department of State, 632-8980. Your response
is requested by c.o.b. Tuesday, July 2, 1974.
Drand Save.
Brandon Grove, Jr.
Staff Director
Attachments:
As stated
SECRET
GDS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
/
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
24
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET - GDS
May 23, 1974
National Security Study Memorandum 202
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
SUBJECT:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The President has directed a review of U.S. policy concerning the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The study should review present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation
and the NPT in the light of changed conditions since completion of
NSSM 13, and, in particular, in light of India's announcement of its
underground nuclear test. The study should consider the full range
of issues posed by the changed circumstances affecting our posture
toward non-proliferation and the NPT and present options for future
U.S. policy. It also should consider specifically whether the U.S.
should press for renewed support for the treaty by those now party to
it and accession to the treaty by those not yet signators, and if so how
and to what extent. The options should include consideration of public,
congressional and diplomatic posture for the U.S.
The study should take into account the study done in response to NSSM 13
and subsequent work in connection therewith, particularly that in
preparation for the 1975 NPT Review Conference. It also should take
into account the work done in connection with NSSM 195 and the updating
currently underway in connection with NSSM 156.
The President has directed that the study be accomplished by the NSC
Under Secretaries Committee and be forwarded not later than June 12, 1974.
Henry A. Kissinger
CC: The Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
SECRE document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET ASSIFIED
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: National Security Study Memorandum 202:
U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy
In response to NSSM 202, this study reviews the present
U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in particular, in light of the
recent Indian nuclear test. A recently updated NSSM 156
study is a companion paper that focuses on the specific options
and courses open to us in our dealings with India.
The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a con-
sistent and important element of U.S. policy for the entire
nuclear era. Simply put, our strong, repeated, resolve in
support of this objective has been predicated on our belief
that the instability of the world, and the danger of nuclear
war, as well as the problems of arms control would significantly
increase with an unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons.
Technical developments and political trends will increase
both the difficulty and the importance of deterring further
nuclear proliferation during the coming decade. Nuclear power
generation is coming into wider use throughout the world and
U.S. dominance as a commercial supplier is diminishing. At
the same time, we are entering a period when political barriers
to non-proliferation appears to be weakening, given movements
toward a multipolar world and the decreasing credibility that
Reproduced at the Richard SSIFIED Nixon residential by Librarybers, National Security Council
8/1/97
Declassified/Released on
under provisions of E.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
UNCLASSIFIED
2
many nations have concerning security guarantees. Finally, as
a result of the Indian nuclear test, other non-nuclear weapons
states will tend to rethink their decisions regarding indepen-
dent nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives programs.
Nonetheless, upon closer examination, a strong case can
be made that policies aimed at deterring further proliferation
can still be effectively pursued. Four key factors support
this judgment:
1. Not all important non-nuclear weapons states have the
necessary capabilities to produce nuclear explosives, and many
nations with an incentive to undertake such programs may not
be able to acquire in the near-term the necessary capacity to
do so.
2. Nuclear materials and equipment essential to the pro-
duction of nuclear weapons are still available only from a
limited number of suppliers who generally oppose proliferation.
3. Political and security disincentives for nuclear weapons
decisions continue to exist in many important non-nuclear states,
and many nations with advanced capabilities may not choose to
exercise the nuclear option for political, security, and legal
reasons.
4. U.S. national security interests can be well served
even with an imperfect and incomplete non-proliferation strategy
which can defer the disadvantages associated with an expanded
number of nuclear powers while seeking to create conditions
UNOI
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
UNCLASSIFIED
3
which ultimately check further spread.
The NSSM 202 study describes a number of technical and
diplomatic measures that can be usefully applied to help
dissuade others from entering the nuclear weapons field. The
study identifies high priority policy actions, important
studies needed to underpin specific policies, and longer-term
U.S. non-proliferation approaches. Based upon the NSSM 202
analysis, the Under Secretaries Committee recommends that you
approve an action program consisting of the following elements:
First, that the U.S. adopt an intensified national policy
designed to inhibit the further spread of independent nuclear
weapons capabilities, with emphasis on obtaining wider adherence
to the NPT but recognizing the necessity of pursuing a non-
proliferation strategy outside the treaty's framework. In this
connection, the U.S. on a priority basis should take immediate
steps to
-- reaffirm at high levels support for the NPT;
urge prompt ratification by nations whose
adherence is crucial to the efficacy of the
treaty; and consult with the Soviet Union in
order to ensure the consistency of our
respective non-proliferation strategies.
-- Aggressively implement NSDM 255 in an attempt
to complement our efforts to increase the
universality of IAEA safeguards applications
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
UNCI
ASSIFIED
SECRET
4
by securing multilateral guidelines on
nuclear export controls; approach the new
French Government at high levels to seek
cooperation in this endeavor; develop a
more stringent approach to agreements on
the provision of nuclear materials and
technology to countries in troubled areas;
and consider as a prominent factor in
impending decisions on U.S. uranium enrich-
ment supply policy the importance to non-
proliferation of the continued availability
of U.S. uranium enrichment services on
attractive terms.
-- Consult with Canada on the question of further
nuclear cooperation with India; persuade other
nuclear suppliers to obtain from India
assurances with respect to non-use of nuclear
export for peaceful nuclear explosives; and
develop a position for use by the Secretary of
State for discussions with India and Pakistan
during the planned late summer visit.
Second, that the Under Secretaries Committee immediately
undertake studies of U.S. PNE policy, security assurances,
and sanctions as issues of special significance for our near-
term non-proliferation efforts.
UNCLASCIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
UNCLASSIFIED
5
Third, that a standing interagency working group on non-
proliferation be established by the Under Secretaries
Committee to: coordinate, review, and report on policy actions
and plans; execute many of the actions identified in this
report; and conduct relevant studies needed to support our
non-proliferation policies.
Acting Chairman
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Tab A 16
Department o, State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 122766
AMBASSADOR TAPE IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATE=
MENT AT JUNE MEETING OF IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS:
"MY GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED ME TO MAKE CLEAR AT THIS
MEETING OF THE BOARD THAT THERE HAS BEEN 1.0 CHANGE
WHATEVER IN THE LONG-STANDING POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLUSIVE DEVICES,
WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS ONE
OF THE MOSY SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE POST-WAR ERA
TO DISARMAMENT AND WORLD PEACE, WE THEREFORE CONTINUE TO
URGE THOSE STATES WHICH HAVE NOT ADHERED TO THE TREATY TO
DO SO,
"I AM ALSO INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE hAS BEEN
NO CHANGE IN-THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT ON MANY OCCASIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF THE
NPT AND WHICH IT REITERATED IN ITS FORMAL INSTRUMENT OF
RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY OF
TLATELOLCO. "THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS, 72
WE SAID IN THAT DOCUMENT, "THAY THE TECHNOLOGY OF MAKING
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IS -
INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE TECHNOLOGY OF MAKING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. R FOR THAT REASON THE UNITED STATES AT THAT TIME
EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO COLLABORATE WITH PARTIES 70
THAT TREATY, AS IT HAD EARLIER TO PARTIES TO THE NPT, IN
CARRYING OUT EXPLOSIONS OF NUCLEAR DEVICES FOR PEACEFUL
PURPOSES UNDER APPROPRYATE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION AND
YN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH A POLICY OF NOT CONTRIBUTING
70 THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITIES.
"GOVERNORS WILL RECALL THAT ON MARCH 1, 1972, THE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE IN THIS BOARD PLACED ON RECORD
THE UNDERSTANDING IMHERENT IN ALL OF OUR BILATERAL AGREE-
MENTS FOR COOPERATION THAT THE. USE OF ANY MATERIAL OR
EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES UNDER SUCH AGREE-
MENTS FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WAS PRECLUDED;
AND THE UNDERSTANDING INHERENT IN THE SAFEGUANDS AGREEMENTS
RELATED TO SUCHECOOPFRATION AGREEMENTS, THAT THE AGENCY
WOULD VERIFY, INTER ALYA, THAT THE SAFEGUARDED MATERIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT or STATE
17
Department of State
PAINTO AMERICA
TELEGRAN
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE ИЗ STATE 122766
WAS NOT USED FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. THE CON
TINUED COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD IS DEPENDENT ON THE ASSUR-
ANCE THAT THESE UNDERSTANDINGS WILL CONTINUE TO BE
RESPECTED IN THE FUTURE. 11 SISCO
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
CONF ID ASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Tab
Interests
PNE ISSUES
Under Article V of the NPT, the NNWS parties are assured that PNE
services will be made available to them by the NWS parties for projects
that are allowable under the LTBT. To date, no NNWS party to the NPT
has requested such services, although some countries (parties and non-
parties) have sought assistance from the U.S. and other NWS on PNE studies.
International meetings have been held periodically by the IAEA to
disseminate and exchange PNE information. These meetings have been
well attended, indicating an interest by many states in keeping abreast
of technical developments in this field. In this regard, it is likely
that most interested countries have a fairly good understanding of the
current status of the U.S. and USSR PNE programs, and the likely range
of costs and benefits associated with the principal PNE applications.
Following are brief descriptions of the PNE interests and activities of
a number of NNWS and NWS.
Non-Nuclear Weapon State Interests
Algeria:
Has commissioned a private engineering firm to
study the possibility of PNE oil storage. The
Soviet Union had previosuly discouraged Algeria
from requesting PNE study assistance from the
IAEA and the NWS.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
19
- 2 -
Argentina:
Contacted the AEC, in 1972, through the Argentina
Embassy, to discuss the possible use of PNE exca-
vation to deepen a harbor on the northern coast
near Buenos Aires. They were told that no off-
hand assessment of the feasibility of such a
project could be made. They offered to provide
additional information to the AEC, but have not
pursued the matter.
Australia:
Sent a team of four scientists to the U.S. in
1963 to review our PNE activities and recommend
possible Australian use of PNEs. In 1969, at the
request of the Australian Government, the U.S.
agreed to join in a feasibility study of a PNE
harbor at Cape Keraudren in Northwest Australia.
This study was dropped when the industrial sponsor
withdrew because of problems in marketing and
mining the iron ore that was to have been shipped
from the port. Dr. Alan Wilson of the AAEC has
been active in IAEA's PNE meetings, chairing working
group sessions, etc. There are many potential PNE
applications in Australia.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
20
- 3 -
Brazil:
Has assumed a political stance similar to India's
on the question of PNEs. In negotiations of the
Latin America Nuclear Free Zone and the NPT, Erazil
maintained the position that NNWS should have the
freedom to develop "peaceful" nuclear explosives.
Brazil has not contacted the U.S. regarding any
PNE studies. There do appear to be possible uses
for PNE in Brazil, including excavation and oil
shale applications.
Canada:
Has expressed no official interest in the use of
PNE technology. Occasional inquiries to the U.S.
have been made by representatives of private firms,
including a recent inquiry regarding the Athabaska
Tar Sands which reported-likely Provencial Govern-
ment backing for a U.S. Canadian study.
Egypt:
Is initiating a full-scale feasibility study of the
use of PNE to excavate a canal from the Mediterranean
Sea to the Qattara Depression for the purpose of
generating hydroelectric power. Is expected to
request U.S. assistance with the study.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
21
4
Germany:
The West German Reconstruction Loan Bank (analagous
to our Export-Import Bank) is providing $4 million
to Egypt for the Qattara Project study. (The project
was originally conceived by a professor at the
University of Darmstadt who recently completed a
several-year, preliminary engineering study of it.)
Officials of the bank have requested a meeting with
the USAEC to discuss the study and solicit U.S.
participation.
Malagasy Republic:
Contacted the IAEA in 1971 for technical assistance
in evaluating the use of PNE for construction of a
harbor. The U.S., USSR, and France separately agreed
to provide such assistance under IAEA auspices. How-
ever, Malagasy apparently lost interest in the project
and did not utilize the assistance that was offered.
Thailand:
Authorized, in 1972, an economic and engineering
study of a sea-level canal across the Isthmus of
Kra to shorten the trade route around the Malay
Peninsula. Two private U.S. firms were engaged to
perform the study which was to include PNE excava-
tion as a possible construction method. This study
was completed in September 1973, but its findings
have not been publicly reported.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon-Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
22
5 -
Venezuela:
Described a possible PNE project in a paper at
the third IAEA technical panel meeting on PNEs
in December 1972. The project is a canal to
connect the Orinoco and Rio Negro rivers. (U.S.
advice to Venezuela was to consider more closely
conventional construction methods, in view of the
relatively modest excavation requirements of the
project.)
Nuclear Weapon States - Potential PNE Suppliers
U.S. :
Since the late sixties, has concentrated on the
use of deep underground nuclear explosions for
in-situ recovery of natural resources such as
natural gas from tight formations, oil from oil
shale, and copper from deeply buried ore deposits.
Of these, only the first use has been subject to
full-scale testing. Three nuclear, gas stimulation
projects have been conducted with generally satis-
factory results. In the early sixties, U.S.
research focussed on nuclear excavation applications
such as canal and harbor construction. That effort
passed through a successful R&D phase prior to the
Reproduced at the Richard, Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
23
- 6 -
close of the 1964-1970 transisthmian canal studies.
The U.S. has no plans currently for reactivation
and completion of the demonstration phase of the
excavation program.
The U.S., under Article V of the NPT, has offered
to provide PNE services to NNWS Parties on projects
allowed by the LTBT.
USSR:
Has a very active PNE program with several
applications in development or use: gas-well
fire control; oil and gas stimulation; gas, oil
and toxic waste storage; deep seismic sounding;
and water resource development using nuclear
excavation. In the last three years, the Soviets
have conducted at least 20 PNE detonations and
appear to have a technical advantage over the U.S.
in all areas except gas stimulation, computer
simulation of PNE effects, and, perhaps, explosive
designs for some applications. Even in recent weeks,
the Soviets appear to be preparing to do additional
work on their proposed nuclear excavation project to
Join the Pechora and Kama Rivers in order to bring
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
24
- 7
Arctic water to the receding Caspian Sea.
The USSR, like the U.S., has offered to assist
NNWS Parties to the NPT by providing explosion
services for PNE projects.
France:
Has performed a number of PNE-related studies and
has indicated a special interest in creating off-
shore oil storage using PNEs. France has indicated
an intention to become a supplier of PNE services
and was the first country to offer to make an
expert available to the Malagasy Republic in
response to their request to the IAEA in 1971.
United Kingdom:
Has a group at Aldermaston who follow PNE develop-
ments in other countries and who perform PNE studies
and analyses. There is some government and private
interest in the U.K. in PNE off-shore oil storage.
However, the U.K. has said that it does not intend
to conduct an active PNE program or to provide PNE
services to other states.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
25
- 8 -
Peoples Republic of China: Has not indicated any interest in PNEs.
India:
India's stated position over the last several
years has been to keep open the possibility
of developing PNEs. The May 18 test was
described as an experiment to study cratering
and cracking effects in rock and as part of an
effort to keep abreast of a technology with
industrial and agricultural uses. In 1970,
at an IAEA meeting on PNEs held in Vienna,
the Indian participant presented a short paper
describing the possible use of PNEs in India
in the mining of non-ferrous metals in a
number of specified locations. Nuclear exca-
vation for water resource projects was not
discussed, but would be another possible PNE
application in India.
It has been reported that India has offered to
assist other nations with PNE projects, but it
is obvious that India is not presently in a
position to be a supplier of actual PNE services.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
7423577
5943
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
UNOL
SECRET
NSC-U/DM-7A
December 4, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy
NSSM 202 directed a review of present U.S. policy
concerning non-proliferation and the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) in light of the Indian nuclear test. A
recently updated NSSM 156 study is a companion paper
that focuses on the specific options open to us in
dealing with India. The policy decisions in NSDM 255
concerning consultations regarding multilateral supplier
controls over transfers of nuclear materials, technology,
and equipment, have been taken into account in this
review.
On the basis of the review done pursuant to NSSM
202, the Under Secretaries Committee, recognizing that
the proliferation problem is at a crucial juncture,
recommends an intensified program to inhibit the further
spread of independent nuclear explosives capabilities.
This program would exploit the common interest of many
key countries in inhibiting proliferation by providing
for concerted action. The U.S. could both support such
action and, where appropriate, catalyze more effective
international coordination.
The Under Secretaries Committee recognizes that
we might only be able to delay further proliferation
however determined our anti-proliferation efforts may
be, but concludes that U.S. national security objectives
can be served even with a non-proliferation strategy
that is only partially effective. It would be desirable
UNCLASSIFIED
8/1/97
Declassified/Released under provisions of E.O. 12958
on
by R. Soubers, National Security Council
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
UNCLASSIFIED
-2-
to defer the disadvantages associated with an expanded
number of nuclear powers as long as possible, while
seeking to create conditions which might ultimately
check such expansion.
In the short run, the most effective approach to
slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons is for the
advanced nuclear industrial states to tighten controls
on weapons-usable material and related production
capabilities. Proliferation can also be limited through
maintaining and making more widely applicable the legal
and political barriers to acquisition of independent
nuclear explosives capabilities. In addition to the
policy actions presented below, a successful non-
proliferation strategy will be affected particularly
by the confidence of non-nuclear weapon states that
their security needs can continue to be met without
recourse to independent nuclear forces. It will also
be affected by perceptions of these states regarding
progress in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms limitations.
As a series of near-term non-proliferation steps,
it is recommended that:
1. Through consultations with nuclear industrial
states, particularly the U.S.S.R. and France, and a
conference of such states, the U.S. should pursue
coordinated policies designed to:
-- Ensure that international safeguards are
both effective and widely applied to peaceful inter-
national nuclear cooperation by seeking to strengthen
the political, financial, and technical base of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
program, and by requiring that such safeguards be
placed on nuclear material and equipment exported by
these states or material derived from these exports,
at least to the extent indicated by the guidelines
issued by the Zangger (Nuclear Exporters') Committee.
Considerations should also be given to: (a) expanding
these guidelines to cover sensitive nuclear technology
and additional equipment; and (b) developing concerted
policies to secure IAEA safeguards to the maximum
extent possible on peaceful nuclear programs of non-
nuclear weapons states who are not NPT parties.
UNCLASSIFIED
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-- Restrict the spread of independent national
uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing facilities
through: (a) reaching common principles regarding the
supply of sensitive technology, equipment and assistance
in the construction of national facilities; and (b)
encouraging multinational plants (or bilateral plants
involving the U.S.) capable of satisfying future world
demands for reliable and economic commercial services
in these fields. In this connection, non-proliferation
considerations should be factored into U.S. policy
decisions with respect to future availability and supply
of uranium enrichment services.
-- Impose special conditions on nuclear exports
to countries in sensitive regions, such as certain areas
in the Middle East, in order to minimize the accumulation
of plutonium and other special nuclear material. These
conditions would include such provisions as requiring
that reprocessing, storage and fabrication of plutonium
derived from supplied nuclear material or equipment take
place in mutually-agreed facilities outside the country
or region in question. In the case of NPT parties, less
stringent conditions should be arranged, if compatible
with our overall non-proliferation interests.
-- Establish specific physical security stan-
dards to be included as a condition of nuclear cooperation,
and strengthen international efforts to achieve widespread
adoption and maintenance of meaningful physical security
measures on nuclear material. In this connection, the
U.S. should advocate that the IAEA be the forum for draft-
ing a physical security convention.
-- Minimize the risk of indigenous "peaceful"
nuclear explosive (PNE) development in non-nuclear weapons
states not party to the NPT through: (a) seeking agree-
ment by non-NPT parties that they will not in any way
assist any NNWS to develop or acquire PNEs; (b) requiring
explicit confirmation that nuclear material exported, or
derived from the use of exports, will not be used for
any nuclear explosives; and (c) establishing that all
nuclear materials subject to IAEA safeguards may not be
used for any nuclear explosives.
2. In conjunction with other NPT proponents, the
U.S. should intensify efforts in support of the treaty
and in seeking early ratification by key non-nuclear
weapon states, through:
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-- Support for the FRG, UK, and other European
countries in their high-level contacts with the Italian
Government to convey both the importance of early NPT
ratification and the relationships of such ratification
to the ability of NPT parties to continue nuclear sup-
plies to the European Communities.
-- High-level communications with the Japanese
designed to remove any doubt about the continued impor-
tance of such ratification to the U.S. and other NPT
proponents as an essential contribution to international
stability and long-term progress toward nuclear arms
control, and as helping to ensure a maximum role for
Japan in international nuclear commerce and at the NPT
Review Conference in May 1975.
-- Appropriate actions designed to achieve
ratification by other prospective NPT participants, and
encouragement of a common recognition by nations unlikely
to adhere to the treaty in the near-term that the further
spread of independent nuclear explosives capabilities
endangers the security of all states.
-- Development of visible ways, consistent
with the policies set forth in recommendation 1 above,
in which preferential treatment could be given to NPT
parties in such areas as: (a) the availability of com-
mercial nuclear facilities, fuels, and technological
support; (b) potential PNE services; and possibly (c)
credit terms.
-- Taking a more positive stance with respect
to implementing Article V of the NPT, but being pre-
pared to highlight the limitations as well as the
potential benefits of PNEs. * Without prejudging the
scope of the future U.S. indigenous PNE program and
bearing in mind that the U.S. program has been inactive
for several years, this approach would involve: (a)
participating more readily in selected studies of pro-
posed PNE projects; (b) making clear our intention to
meet our Article V obligations; and (c) supporting
IAEA efforts to devise procedures for implementing PNE
services, should such services appear warranted. On
all these issues, consultations with the Soviets should
*This recommendation is presently being reviewed
in the context of a more comprehensive study for the
Verification Panel of U.S. policy regarding inter-
national aspects of PNEs.
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be held in an effort to develop common policies. The
question of PNE services may well be affected by the
outcome of negotiations with the Soviet Union on
Article III of the TTBT. Evolving U.S. PNE service
policy must be carefully coordinated with our test ban
objectives to preclude taking actions that might, in
view of the probable greater exploitation by the Soviet
Union of peaceful nuclear explosives, place the U.S.
in a relatively disadvantageous position with respect
to nuclear weapons development and deployments.
3. Coordinated multilateral approaches should be
developed to ensure that the Indian nuclear explosion
does not hasten further proliferation in Pakistan and
elsewhere, by:
-- Endeavoring to persuade India to place
IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports and not to ex-
port nuclear explosive technology or devices, or assist
others in building national chemical reprocessing plants.
-- Seeking to dissuade India from undermining
the NPT and to defer any further Indian explosive tests,
particularly in the period prior to the Review Conference.
-- Avoiding the implication that India's
status as a world power has been substantially enhanced
as a result of its nuclear test.
-- Seeking to hold India to its peaceful
protestations and to minimize the scope, pace, and mili-
tary dimensions of its nuclear explosive program through
Indian acceptance of such measures as: (a) account-
ability for weapons-usable material; (b) deferral of
further PNE production and limiting it to specified
current needs; and (c) international observation of
PNE tests, recognizing that such observation procedures
would not be expected to constitute a technically
sound basis for distinguishing between PNEs and nuclear
weapons.
-- Seeking Soviet and French cooperation, and
the cooperation of other potential suppliers, in con-
tinuing not to supply India with long-range bombers or
other sophisticated nuclear delivery capabilities.
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4. Appropriate interagency mechanisms should be
established to formulate and oversee future U.S. non-
proliferation policies, support relevant consultations
and negotiations, and conduct necessary policy studies.
-- Prompt study should be undertaken of U.S.
policy on implementing Article V of the NPT and PNE
services generally in a manner consistent with our
test ban objectives.
-- Urgent attention should be paid to further
defining a U.S. policy on preferential treatment for
NPT parties in such areas as fuel supply and technical
assistance.
-- Studies should be made of sanctions as a
deterrent to proliferation, measures which should be
taken to assure the credibility and effectiveness of
IAEA safeguards, the use of financing as a supplementary
vehicle for imposing safeguards conditions on nuclear
exports, and the possibility of multilateral controls
on sophisticated nuclear delivery systems.
-- A series of "country studies" should be
launched to investigate in detail the factors affecting
potential nuclear weapons decisions in key NNWS, the
preferred strategy for deterring such decisions, and
options for the U.S. in the event these states acquire
independent nuclear explosives.
-- The question of how best to handle the
problem of security assurances at the NPT Review Con-
ference should be examined.
-- There should be consideration of further
steps to maintain a strong U.S. public posture against
nuclear proliferation.
Robert S. Ingersoll
Chairman
Attachments:
1. Executive Summary
2. NSSM 202 Study
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5943
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET
December 4, 1974
NSC-U/DM-7A
TO:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director, United States Information
Agency
SUBJECT: US Nuclear Non-Proliferation
The Chairman has forwarded the attached
memorandum to the President. A copy is hereby
provided for your information.
math E: Mathyr
Wreatham E. Gathright
Staff Director
Attachment:
As stated
SECRET
GDS
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