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581 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL NSC-U/SM-55G January 27,, 1975 TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of Interior The Under Secretary of Commerce The Under Secretary of Transportation The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality The Director, National Science Foundation The Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration The Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy SUBJECT: United States Policy on Antarctic Mineral Resources Attached are a draft memorandum for the President and the report prepared by the Antarctic Policy Working Group on United States Policy on Antarctic Mineral Resources. Comments and/or con- currence in the report may be telephoned to Mr. Theodore Sellin, Department of State, 632-8997. Agency positions on the options outlined in the memorandum for the President should be provided in writing. All comments' and agency positions should be received by c.o.b. Tuesday, February 4, 1975. Mathan E. sougher Wreatham E. Gathright Staff Director Attachments: As stated CONFIDENTIAL XGDS-3 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: United States Policy on Antarctic Mineral Resources Pursuant to NSDM 263, the enclosed analysis has been prepared concerning what the United States might wish to seek or to avoid in discussions on an internationally agreed approach to any commercial exploration and exploi- tation of Antarctic mineral resources. The mineral resources question is on the agenda of the Eighth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, June 9-20, and will be discussed at a preparatory meeting on February 24-26. This memorandum presents policy options which the Under Secre- taries Committee deem feasible, and also indicates the degree of agencies support for each option. Seven countries assert territorial claims in Antarctica; certain claims overlap and some areas remain unclaimed. The U.S. has not advanced a claim, has refused to recognize others' claims, and has consistently maintained its jurid- ical position on non-recognition of claims. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty largely sets aside the claims issue, pro- vides a beneficial framework for international cooperation in Antarctica, and prohibits military activities on the continent. The Treaty does not refer to exploration and ex- ploitation activities. Questions regarding the continued viability of the Treaty regime will arise if commerical resource operations commence. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -2- Available data and scientific inference indicate that oil and/or gas may be present in the Antarctic continental shelf, although the difficulties and costs of production in Antarctica suggest that commercial exploitation is un- likely at least in the next decade. Hard minerals are present on land, but their commercial exploitation is unlikely in the forseeable future. I. NATURE OF AN INTERNATIONALLY AGREED APPROACH Negotiation of a detailed resource regime is not considered feasible at the present time, but substantial steps can now be taken to develop an internationally agreed decision-making competence to make necessary décisions when and if needed in the future. Two options are presented: OPTION 1 -- The U.S. should seek an agreement which would recognize the right of all nations to undertake mineral resource activity exclusively pursuant to their national legislation. This option is supported by (agencies). OPTION 2 --- The U.S. should seek an agreement recog- nizing the right of the U.S. and others to undertake mineral resource activity in Antarctica, and subject to a special mineral resource arrangement. Resource management, environ- mental and other problems requiring international solutions to achieve U.S. objectives could be resolved through new decision-making procedures which give the U.S. sufficient CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 3 - protection from adverse decisions, and basic agreed princi- ples to constrain and guide decision-making. This option is supported by (agencies). In addition, the option is presented whether the U.S. should first concentrate on prompt resolution of explora- tion issues and basic conditions for exploitation, while pursuing a more comprehensive settlement of exploitation issues. This option is supported by (agencies). II. REGIME APPLICABLE TO OFFSHORE AREAS This section addresses the relationship between a special Antarctic resource regime and the International Seabeds Resource Authority (ISRA) under negotiation in the Law of the Sea Conference. Three options are presented: OPTION A -- The U.S. should seek a special regime for offshore seabed resources in Antarctica which guarantees access for the U.S. and others to the area to which the regime applies. This option is supported by (agencies). OPTION B -- The U.S. should seek the inclusion of offshore mineral resources in Antarctica in the International Seabed Area contemplated in the Law of the Sea negotiations. This option is supported by (agencies). CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -4- OPTION C -- For the time being, the U.S. should preserve the option of applying either the ISRA regime or a special regime to offshore seabed resources in Antarctica. This option is supported by (agencies). III. MORATORIUM POLICY Three options are presented concerning U.S. policy toward commercial mineral resource activities until an internationally agreed approach is achieved. OPTION 1 --- The U.S. should continue its present interim policy: while the U.S. is seeking an internationally agreed approach, it will oppose actions by any other nation directed towards commercial mineral resource exploration and exploitation, and will urge other nations to join in this interim policy. This policy would be kept under continuing review. This option is supported by (agencies). OPTION 2 --- The U.S. should seek agreement among Antarctic Treaty signatories to oppose for two years actions by any nation intended to facilitate drilling in the con- tinental shelf adjacent to Antarctica. This option is supported by (agencies). OPTION 3 --- The U.S. should discontinue its stated policy of voluntary restraint and oppose any formal or informal moratorium on commercial activities in Antarctica. This option is supported by (agencies). CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL Annex B-NSDM 263 Response XGDS (3) PROPOSED ACTION PROGRAM FOR OPENING NEGOTIATIONS ON MINERAL RESOURCES IN THE ANTARCTIC TREATY FORUM The options outlined in the foregoing NSDM 263 response are intended to direct our negotiations toward a final result which achieves the objectives identified in each. The tac- tical question now is how to proceed with the negotiations so as to maximize our ability to achieve our objectives. The selection of any of these options does not necessarily mean that the U.S. negotiators should expressly propose the position for agreement among the twelve Antarctic Treaty parties at this time. The discussion which follows outlines possible U.S. tactics for the initiation of negotiations. A. The Forum - The General Approach The U.S. was the unquestioned leader in developing the Antarctic Treaty, which has proved satisfactory from the point of view of the Consultative Parties. Since then, the degree of international cooperation in Antarctica has been a model for the peaceful and mutually beneficial resolution of international disputes. Our tactics should seek to build upon and preserve whatever good will exists in this forum to the extent this is compatible with our interests and objectives. Because the Antarctic resources question is inscribed on the agenda for the Eighth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) - 2 - June 9-20, substantive discussion will start there, although the Consultative Parties may later decide to convene a special diplomatic conference to deal with the subject. The Antarctic Treaty consultative forum has traditionally seen a notably straightforward and gentlemanly interchange among participants with a substantial dependence on the United States for forthcoming leadership if anything of signifi- cance is to be achieved. However, the formal introduction into the forum of a new and potentially contentious issue suggests that the issue may stimulate a transition toward a tougher negotiating style. A tactical dilemma for the United States could be posed even in the opening phases of the discussions. If previous practice is followed, the U.S. should open the negotiations with a fairly forthright statement of its desires. If, how- ever, a more intractable mood might prevail in the forum, it could be more appropriate to begin the negotiations with a more restrained position to preserve as many negotiating options as possible, at least until it is more readily appar- ent how the resource question is to be handled. Should the U.S. choose the more traditional approach, we could seize the initiative and provide the leadership expected of us by stating our views in general terms to CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) - 3 - open negotiations. The possibilities of moulding a consensus to match our interests might, however, be offset by the risk of relinquishing bargaining chips prematurely. Should the U.S. choose to take the more reticent stance, it is likely that progress in the negotiations would be slower and more drawn out. In this regard, growing interest in Antarctica and increasing attention to the mineral resources issue may add to the difficulties of the negotiation should these be lengthy. There are a number of negotiating steps which should be explored to minimize the effects of this dilemma. For example, other non-claimants with strong resource interest, such as Japan or Belgium, may have very similar substantive objectives to our own and perhaps even more compelling interests. We could explore the possibility of identifying tactical partners and of orchestrating tactics so that our tactical partners advocate positions that are in our interest as well, while the U.S. takes a more restrained position to conserve our leverage. To this end, it may be desirable to consult with a few carefully selected states prior to the June consultative meeting to determine the potential for such an arrangement. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) - 4 - Another approach would be for the U.S. to take a forthcoming position on one or two issues of central importance to us, such as utilizing the Antarctic Treaty structure so long as our interests are served thereby, without foreclosing other alternatives and while taking less forthcoming positions on other issues. In any event, our initial tactical objective should be to get a negotiation moving while preserving our leverage to the greatest extent possible. In pursuing this objective, the U.S. delegation should bear in mind that, in addition to the general good will that exists in the Antarctic forum, other sources of bargaining leverage may include (1) the fear that the U.S. will unilaterally undertake commercial activities in Antarctica; (2) the fear of a United Nations takeover of Antarctica in the form of the Law of the Sea deep seabeds regime for offshore areas, or otherwise. Such leverage as may exist must be used, if at all, with the utmost caution. Nonetheless, the U.S. should not indicate that either even- tuality is inconsistent with our ultimate substantive interests. The degree to which each alternative, including a special Ant- artic regime, furthers our interests, resource and other, rather than any implicit value of one approach or another, is the ultimate criterion. Hence, all approaches as they evolve will have to be examined with the totality of U.S. interests CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) - 5 -- in view. The U.S. delegation should, therefore, not indicate in initial negotiations that the U.S. views its substantive interests as foreclosing either eventuality. B. Objectives of the February 24-26 Preparatory Meeting The preparatory meeting in Oslo in February will be devoted to a discussion of the issues concerning the relation- ship between offshore resources in Antarctica and the Law of the Sea Conference. Representatives are generally expected to discuss the coordination of tactics at the Law of the Sea Conference among the twelve Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, should the issue arise at the LOS Conference. Dis- cussions among the twelve at the October, 1974 preparatory meeting revealed agreement among those who spoke to the issue that the twelve should oppose any move in the Law of the Sea Conference to include offshore resources of Antarctica in the deep seabed regime. The U.S., U.S.S.R., and others did not speak to this issue. Section II of the NSDM 263 Response (pp. 38-46) addresses the substantive issues involved. Whichever option in that analysis is selected, the U.S. delegation to the February preparatory meeting should be authorized to commit the U.S. (1) not to raise the issue of offshore Antarctic resources at the Law of the Sea Conference and (2) to consult promptly CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) - 6 - with the twelve in the event the issue is raised there by others. If the U.S. desires a special Antarctic regime for offshore seabed resources (Option A), our tactical objective at the February meeting should be to leave the impression that the U.S. prefers to work within the Antarctic Consultative framework so long as our interests are adequately protected. If the U.S. prefers to extend the Law of the Sea deep seabed regime (Option B) or no substantive position at this time (Option C), our comments should be limited to avoid giving a clear indication of our position. In any event, the U.S. may wish to support a resolution of the Consultative Parties re- lating to mineral resources. Such a resolution should not entail any legal commitment, but should, in substance: 1. Reaffirm Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty relat- ing to assertion and recognition of claims in the area. 2. Call upon the signatories to seek an internationally agreed approach to mineral resource activities in Antarctica that takes into account the balance of interests, i.e., the conflicting claims positions, in the area. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) - 7 - 3. Resolve that mineral resource exploration and exploitation should be compatible with the Antarctic Treaty principles and programs. 4. Declare that all the signatories should be entitled to engage in mineral resources explo- ration and exploitation in any part of the Treaty area except for those areas specifically designated for other uses. 5. Call upon the signatories to study the environ- mental implications of mineral resource explo- ration and exploitation and to recommend suitable measures. It is not anticipated that such a resolution would be unanimously agreed upon at the February meeting, but it would seem that this approach would be an effective mechanism to signal U.S. interests to the other parties, demonstrate our willingness to continue working with them, and at the same time preserve our negotiating options. C. Objectives at the June Consultative Meeting Among other things, the June Consultative meeting could turn out to be nothing more than a general discussion of the mineral resources issue, or it could mark the beginning of tangible progress toward an internationally agreed approach to the issue. It is impossible to forecast how others will CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Presidental Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) - 8 - approach the meeting and the U.S. Delegation should there- fore have flexibility to respond to the attitudes of others. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) NSDM 263 Response: U.S. Policy On Antarctic Mineral Resources CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Pages 1-9 Introduction Page 1 I. Nature of an Internationally Agreed Approach Page 7 A. U.S. Interests at Stake Page 7 B. The Nature and Economics of Commer- cial Recovery of Antarctic Mineral Resources Page 17 C. Alternative Internationally Agreed Approaches to Antarctic Mineral Resources Page 19 D. Scope of Immediate U.S. Objectives Page 35 II. Regime Applicable to Offshore Seabed Resources Page 38 III. Moratorium Policy Page 47 Annex A. Preliminary Report on Consultations* Annex B. Proposed Action Plan *This Annex, distributed on November 22, 1974, to the members of the USC, is not attached to this draft. It will be included when the final report is submitted. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) NSDM 263 Response: U.S. Policy On Antarctic Mineral Resources Executive Summary NSDM 263 directed the Under Secretaries Committee to analyze what the U.S. might wish to seek or to avoid in discussions on an internationally agreed approach to any commercial exploration and exploitation of Antarc- tic mineral resources, and requested a report on preli- minary consultations and a proposed diplomatic and poli- tical action program. NSDM 263 further provided that it is the objec- tive of the United States to ensure that, if undertaken, commercial exploration and exploitation in Antarctica do not disrupt implementation of the Antarctic Treaty or become a cause for significant international discord; to ensure that any exploitation is compatible with environ- mental considerations and with U.S. obligations under the Treaty; and to gain acceptance of an internationally agreed approach to commercial resource activities which would (a) permit free access to the Antarctic Treaty area; (b) be without prejudice to and appropriately compatible with, U.S. law of the sea interests; (c) provide for the pro- tection of the Antarctic environment; and (d) preserve rights under the Treaty of scientific research. It also provided that while the U.S. is seeking an internationally agreed approach, it should oppose actions by any nation with the purpose of commercial exploration and exploi- tation in Antarctica, and urge other nations to join the U.S. in this interim policy. Introduction: The Eighth Antarctic Consultative Meeting to be held June 9-20 in Oslo, will consider the issue of "Antarctic resources--effects of mineral exploration." A preparatory meeting will discuss the relationship between Antarctica seabed resources and the current Law of the Sea negotia- tions. Seven countries have made territorial claims in Antarctica; certain claims overlap and some areas remain un- claimed. The U.S. has not advanced a claim. Along with the Soviet Union and others, the U.S. has refused to recog- nize the validity of any territorial claim, and has consis- tently sought to protect its juridical position on non- recognition of claims. Reproduced at the Richard CONFI Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -2- Twelve states, including the seven claimant states and the major non-claimants with Antarctic interests (including the U.S., U.S.S.R., and Japan) are signa- tories to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty has lar- gely eliminated disputes arising out of the conflicting claims situation. The Treaty has heretofore provided a useful and mutually beneficial framework for inter- national cooperation in Antarctica, while prohibiting military activities on the continent. The potential for exploitation of mineral resources raises questions regarding the continued viability of the Treaty regime should commercial resource operations commence. In particular, should commercial mineral re- covery occur, it may lead to discord between claimants and non-claimants, or between competing claimants ,over resource ownership. I. Nature of an Internationally Agreed Approach A. U.S. Interests at Stake U.S. interests underlying NSDM 263 may be stated as follows: 1. Preserve the viability of the Antarctic Treaty and, in particular, the underlying arms control, inspec- tion, freedom of scientific research, environmental pro- tection and international cooperation features. 2. Prevent Antarctica from becoming a source of inter- national conflict. 3. Ensure that any resource exploration and exploi- tation is consistent with environmental considerations. 4. Facilitate an increase in the global supply of minerals resources, through (a) Defining property rights to Antarctic mineral resources; (b) Ensuring reasonable conditions of investment consistent with U.S. interests, including en- vironmental protection. 5. Ensure non-discriminatory guaranteed access by the U.S. to all areas to which an Antarctic mineral re- source regime may apply. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -3- 6. Ensure appropriate investment opportunity for U.S. nationals. B. Nature and Economics of Commercial Recovery of Antarctic Mineral Resources An interagency working group on this topic reached the following conclusions: Offshore areas - Available data and scientific infer- ence indicate a good probability that oil and/or gas may be present in the Antarctic continental shelf. U.S. firms have indicated some interest in conducting exploratory work, but none have indicated specific plans to do so. The diffi- culties and costs of production in Antarctica suggest that commercial exploitation is unlikely at least in the next decade. Manganese nodules of the Antarctic seabed have rela- tively low metal content, and do not appear to be of com- mercial interest in the forseeable future. Land areas - Geological theory and scientific findings indicate a strong likelihood that hard minerals, including iron and coal, are present in the Antarctic land mass, but suggest that petroleum is not. Commercial exploitation of hard minerals appears unlikely in the forseeable future. C. Alternative Internationally Agreed Approaches to Antarctic Mineral Resources This section seeks to refine the NSDM 263 directive to seek an "internationally agreed approach." It is concluded that the U.S. should not seek a de- tailed regime establishing detailed rules and regulations governing resource activities at this time. While the U.S. has taken this general approach in the Law of the Sea nego- tiations, the difference in the negotiating forum, the lack of sufficient resources information, and the potential for economic inefficiency that might result from such a de- tailed system make it inappropriate in Antarctica. However, substantial steps can now be taken to de- velop an internationally agreed decision-making competence which could make the necessary detailed decisions when and if needed in the future. Any such procedure should assure to the U.S. sufficient control over resource decisions to protect U.S. interests. Different procedures might be used to make resource policy decisions, and to implement Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executivel Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -4- decisions once made. 1. Competence for Resource Policy Decisions Consideration was given to exclusive reliance on the existing Antarctic Treaty consultative mechanism to make resource policy decisions. This approach was rejected by all agencies for the time being. The consultative process employs the rule of unanimity which may prevent furtherance of U.S. environmental and scientific interests. However, this does not preclude use of the consultative forum for negotiation of a resource regime. OPTION 1: National Legislative Approach The U.S. should seek an agreement which would re- cognize the right of all nations to undertake mineral re- source activity exclusively pursuant to national legis- lation. Such an agreement should require each party to are our teats recognize rights granted by others only when the terms and conditions of the domestic legislation are substan- tially similar to its own legislation. The U.S., under this option, would not rely on "agreed measures" of the Consultative Meetings which would be incompatible with our domestic legislation or would interfere with com- mercial recovery operations conducted pursuant to such legislation. Proponents of Option 1 argue that this approach would avoid potentially burdensome regulation by an international body; would introduce competition among the licensing states, giving each state an incentive to adopt an optimal legislative regime; would create incen- tives for states to seek the optimal level of pollution and scientific activity; would offer the claimants greater benefit from access to all of Antarctica than from access to their claimed areas alone; and would allow bargaining among firms to deal with other problems. Opponents of Option 1 argue that it might be seen as the functional equivalent of unilateral exploitation and would be unacceptable to others; would effectively require claimant states to permit exploitation under foreign legislation in areas they regard as national territory, an equivalent to renunciation of their claims; could lead to serious international discord and set the stage for a "U.N. Takeover" of Antarctica; would lead to "flags of convenience" and inadequate protection of the sensitive Antarctic environment; would lead U.S. firms to seek foreign licenses to the detriment of U.S. environ- Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -5- mental, balance of payments, and energy interests; would not necessarily stabilize property rights; and would not solve resource problems such as the common pool problem nor allow orderly resolution of competing claims to resources. OPTION 2: A New Decision-Making Competence The U.S. should seek an agreement which would recog- nize the right of the U.S. and others to undertake mineral resource activity in Antarctica, subject to a special mineral resource arrangement. Issues such as the mechanism for ac- quiring rights to resources, resolving competing claims, managing the common pool problem, and establishing and enforcing standards to protect the environment would be addressed with sufficient flexibility to avoid problems that may be encountered with the existing consultative mechanism or exclusive reliance on domestic legislation. The U.S. should seek to emphasize reliance on balanced decision-making procedures which give us sufficient pro- tection from adverse decisions, and basic agreed principles which constrain and quide the decision-making procedures. Proponents of Option 2 argue that this approach pro- vides realistic opportunities to avoid resurfacing under- lying conflicts regarding territorial claims; would better stabilize acquisition of property rights and facilitate commercial resource exploration and exploitation; reduces pressures on U.S. firms to operate under foreign legis- lation and flags of convenience; best protects U.S. environ- mental, scientific, strategic, and other interests; and is consistent with the prior U.S. approach to Antarctic policy. Opponents of Option 2 argue that a new decision-making procedure adequate to protect U.S. interests might also have the power to impose discriminatory and potentially burdensome regulations on mineral resource activities; that it may not be possible to change the existing rule of unanimity; and that the U.S. could unwittingly take a position contrary to our interests without more detailed consideration. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -6- 2. Implementing Procedures If Option 2 is selected, a number of alternative pro- cedures to implement resources decisions and policies should be explored. Some alternatives considered here include implementation through the national legislation and prac- tices of the Consultative Parties; implementation through a single Party acting on behalf of the others with rotating responsibility; and creation of an international technical administration. It was concluded that it is premature to decide who should implement resource policy decisions, and that this issue should be kept under review. 3. Compulsory Dispute Settlement It is recommended that the U.S. should seek agree- ment on binding compulsory third party dispute settlement procedures regarding potential mineral resource activities in Antarctica. D. Scope of Immediate U.S. Objectives OPTION: The U.S. should seek first to achieve a prompt resolution of issues related to the exploration phase of development and basic conditions related to the exploitation phase, while pursuing a more comprehensive settle- ment of exploitation issues. Supporters of this option argue that it simplifies further negotiations by concentrating on the most imme- diate problem; that exploration may suggest exploitation is unlikely and that further negotiations are therefore unnecessary and agreement on exploration may be possible without addressing the underlying claims issue. Opponents argue that firms would be less likely to undertake exploration without a stable exploitation re- gime; that firms wouldfacet uncertainties after explora- tion as to when and under what conditions exploitation could proceed; and that negotiation of an exploitation system would be more difficult after the existence and loca- tion of resources is confirmed. II. Regime Applicable to Offshore Seabed Resources This section raises the question of the relationship between an Antarctic mineral resources regime and the International Seabeds Resources Authority (ISRA) under nego- Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. YCDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -7- tiation in the Law of the Sea negotiations. This issue raises highly complex legal problems. Three options are presented: OPTION A: The U.S. should seek a special regime for offshore seabed resources in Ant- arctica which guarantees access for the U.S. and others to the area to which the regime applies Proponents of Option A argue that the LOS deep seabed resource regime will be the product of a highly politicized negotiation, and is not a starting point for Antarctic policy; that ISRA jurisdiction over Antarctic seabed re- side sources would force the claimants to assert vigorously Other side their claims to protect their juridical positions and that a breakdown of the Antarctic Treaty could result; that U.S. passivity on the issue or support for ISRA jurisdic- tion would impair our ability to achieve our objectives in the Antarctic forum; that it may be possible for the U.S. to provoke ISRA to extend its own jurisdiction at a later time if it becomes desirable to do so and the LOS Treaty is ambiguous in this regard; and that freedom of scientific research and preservation of the environment would be better served by a special Antarctic regime. OPTION B: The U.S. should seek the inclusion of offshore mineral resources in Antarctica in the International Seabed Area Proponents of Option B argue that a decision by the LOS Conference that offshore areas of Antarctica are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is tantamount to a global rejection of the territorial claims in Antarctica; that the status of the high seas around Antarctica might be better protected; that freedom of scientific research and preservation of the marine environment are equally important elements of our LOS objectives; and that an LOS deep seabed resource regime might become effective before any special Antarctic regime, thus expediting re- source production. OPTION C: For the time being, the U.S. should pre- serve the option of applying either the ISRA regime or a special regime to off- shore seabed resources in Antarctica Proponents of Option C argue that we do not have sufficient information on the nature of either regime CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -8- to make an intelligent choice at this time; that potential U.S. interests in the commercially attractive and eco- logically sensitive living resources in Antarctic might be compromised by selection of either Option A or B, and that this study has not analyzed how the choice would im- pact on these interests; that our non-resource interests could be adequately protected either way; and that an LOS deep seabeds regime might become effective and needed technologies developed before a special regime is in place, thus expediting resource production. III. Moratorium Policy OPTION 1: The U.S. should continue its present interim policy: during the time the U.S. is seeking an internationally agreed approach, it will oppose actions by any other nation directed towards commercial exploration and exploi- tation of Antarctic mineral resources, and will urge other nations to join in such an interim policy. This policy should be kept under continuing review. Proponents of this option argue that it would dis- courage licensing activities which are prejudicial to U.S. non-recognition of territorial claims; would be subject to change as circumstances warrant in the future; would not necessarily delay prompt initiation of exploratory acti- vities by U.S. firms, since we have no information that such activities are contemplated; would allow the U.S. to oppose others' actions prejudicial to our interests while retaining our own freedom of action; and would increase the likeli- hood that an adequate international approach competent to protect the environment would be in place prior to the ini- tiation of exploration and exploitation. Opponents argue that this policy is potentially self-perpetuating, since the U.S. may find it difficult to retract from the policy during potentially protracted nego- tiations; that it could delay exploration activities to the detriment of our energy resources interests; and that it could deny the U.S. information necessary for the develop- ment of a wise resources policy. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -9- OPTION 2: The U.S. should seek agreement of the Parties at the Eighth Consultative Meeting to Oppose for 2 years actions by any nation intended to facilitate drilling in the continental shelf adjacent to Antarctica. Proponents argue that this policy would be accep- table to the other Parties; could increase our bargaining leverage; would permit preliminary exploration activities; and might discourage environmentally dangerous drilling activities. Opponents argue that this policy might become self- perpetuating; might impair U.S. credibility; might over- play our negotiating leverage; might delay acquisition of resources information necessary for the development of a wise resources policy; and, to the extent explora- tion is productive, might limit chance of an eventual claims settlement. OPTION 3: The United States should discontinue its stated policy of voluntary restraint and oppose any formal or informal moratorium on commercial activities in Antarctica. Proponents argue that this would allow exploration and exploitation to proceed as quickly as market conditions allow; that it would maximize any bargaining leverage de- rived from the potential for unilateral action; that it would prevent a "lock-up" of Antarctic resources at a time when the U.S. is seeking new sources of energy; and that clai- mant states are unlikely to issue exclusive licenses preju- dicial to the U.S. claims position while negotiations are underway. Opponents argue that this policy could ultimately preclude U.S. access to the energy and other resources of Antarctica if unrestrained commercial activity ensues and the Antarctic Treaty structure collapses; could harden the positions of the other Parties, particularly of the claimants in any negotiations; could stimulate the issuing of li- censes to the deteriment of the U.S. position on non- recognition of claims; could permit resources activities to take place with inadequate flag-state environmental safeguards; and could impair U.S. credibility. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive OrderN35264and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) NSDM 263 RESPONSE: U.S. POLICY ON ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCES The President directed in NSDM 263 that the Under Secretaries Committee conduct a prompt analysis of what the United States might wish to seek or to avoid in dis- cussions on an internationally agreed approach to commer- cial exploration for and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources. In addition, the President directed that a report on preliminary consultations authorized by NSDM 263 and a proposed action plan outlining additional poli- tical and diplomatic steps should be submitted before further action is taken. The Report on Preliminary Con- sultations, submitted earlier to the Under Secretaries Committee, is at Annex A. The proposed action plan is at Annex B. I. Introduction The provisional agenda for the Eighth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, to be held June 9-20 in Oslo, Norway, raises the issue of "Antarctic resources -- effects of mineral exploration." This subject was dis- cussed informally at the Sixth and Seventh Consultative Meetings in 1970 and 1972. Discussions at the first preparatory meeting for the Eighth meeting suggest that CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -2- the issue will be dealt with in greater depth than at any previous meeting. A second preparatory meeting will be held February 24-26 to discuss the relationship be- tween offshore seabed resources in Antarctica and the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, which re- sumes in Geneva March 17 - May 10. The potential for exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in the Antarctic raises fundamental questions regarding the continuation of the close inter- national cooperation characteristic of activities under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty itself is silent on the question of resource activities and in the U.S. view, does not prohibit such activities. However, the Treaty largely set aside the difficult and potentially divisive issue of territorial claims in Antarctica -- an issue which resurfaces in any serious discussion of mineral resource development. Seven countries have made territorial claims in Antarctica; certain claims overlap, while some areas re- main unclaimed. The U.S. has not advanced a claim, and along with the Soviet Union and others, has refused to recognize the validity of any territorial claims. In 1948, the U.S. sought unsuccessfully to convene a conference, in part to resolve the problem of claims in Antarctica. Although that effort failed, the claimants CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -3- and other States subsequently agreed that as part of the International Geophysical Year (1958), any nation could conduct scientific research in Antarctica without pre- judice to the jurisdictional and juridical positions of the Parties. In addition to the claimants, the U.S. and four other countries carried out research activities in the Antarctic during the IGY. Then, seeking to build upon the successful IGY experience, the U.S. invited the clai- mants and the other countries conducting research in Antarctica to participate in the conference which produced the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. The Parties and claimants are identified in the follow- ing table: Original Parties Claimant Year of Claim Argentina YES 1942 Australia YES 1933 Belgium NO - Chile YES 1940 France YES 1942 Japan NO - New Zealand YES 1923 Norway YES 1939 South Africa NO - U.S.S.R. NO - CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidentialibrary DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -4- Original Parties Claimant Year of Claim United Kingdom YES 1908 United States NO - The Treaty is open to signature by any member of the United Nations, and six countries have subsequently acceded to it: Czechslovakia, Denmark, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania and the German Democratic Republic. The Treaty establishes a periodic consultative meeting in which the original twelve signatories are entitled to participate. An acceding country may participate only if it "demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there." Presently, only the original twelve are qualified for participation in consultative meetings. In addition to questions regarding the underlying claims situation, the prospect of commercial activity in Antarctica raises questions regarding the continued viability of the Antarctic Treaty, which reflects the basic purposes for which the United States initially pro- posed it. Article I establishes that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. Article II establishes freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica, and Article IV seeks to eliminate controversies arising out of territorial claims asserted in Antarctica by freezing CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -5- the delicate claims situation for the duration of the Treaty (i.e., until at least 1995). Article VI expressly preserves the status of all high seas in the Treaty area. Other provisions establish practical means to accomplish these objectives. They establish rights of inspection in all areas of Antarctica by designated observers to ensure that no military activities take place; broad sharing of scientific data; exchange of scientific personnel; and notification of all expeditions to and within Antarctica to promote the widest cooperation in scientific endeavors; and the creation of a consultative mechanism for considering measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty. Several provisions of the Treaty have served as a precursor to important provisions in other international instruments. For example, the Treaty marked the first formal cooperative endeavor with the Soviet Union, the first agreement to broad inspection rights by the Soviet thion, and the first time all nuclear explosions (including so-called peaceful nuclear explosive devices) were banned. The interest in potential exploitation of mineral resources in Antarctica therefore raises questions re- garding the compatibility of the Treaty regime, including the accommodation of underlying claims, with commercial mineral recovery operations even though commercial Reproduced at the Richard CONFIDENTIAL Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. YGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -6- exploitation is not likely to occur at least in the next decade. Specifically, the issue of territorial claims in Antarctica is raised in importance by the potential for commercial recovery operations. If there are minerals to be recovered in the claimed areas, the claimants are likely to claim them and seek to exclude others. The structure of agreed international access to Antarctica embodied in the Treaty was limited to scientific inves- tigation and inspection to verify that Antarctica is being used for peaceful purposes. This report is limited to questions related to exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in Antarctica. Questions related to exploitation of living resources, such as krill in offshore areas, are outside the scope of the present study. Reproduced at the Richard DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -7- I. Nature of an Internationally Agreed Approach A. U.S. Interests at Stake The Statement of Policy approved in NSDM 263 established the objectives to be pursued by the United States in dis- cussions on Antarctic mineral resources. These objectives are: -- to ensure that any commercial exploration or ex- ploitation does not disrupt implementation of the Antarctic Treaty, and does not become a cause of significant international discord; -- to ensure that any exploitation is compatible with environmental considerations and with U.S. Antarctic Treaty obligations; -- to gain acceptance of the concept of an internationally agreed approach for any commercial exploration and ex- ploitation of Antarctic mineral resources, which -- would permit free access by the U.S. and other nations to all parts of Antarctica, except for areas otherwise reserved; -- would be without prejudice to, and compatible with the U.S. law of the sea interests; -- would preserve rights under the Antarctic Treaty for scientific research; and -- would protect the Antarctic environment. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard CDS Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -8- Accomplishment of these objectives in discussions on establishing an internationally agreed approach requires understanding of the underlying U.S. interests regarding Antarctic mineral resources. These interests may be stated as follows: 1. Preserve the viability of the Antarctic Treaty, and in particular the underlying arms control, inspection, freedom of scientific research, environmental protection, and international cooperation features. The Antarctic Treaty was developed largely at the instigation of, and through the leadership of, the United States. It has provided a viable regime for the orderly and mutually beneficial scientific exploration of Antarctica; for preventing the militarization of Antarctica; and for the protection of the unique Antarctic environment. It has limited the potential for international conflict arising out of the overlapping territorial claims made by certain of the parties, and out of the disputes between claimant and non-claimant states (such as the United States). The Treaty has reduced the potential for new territorial claims. Overall, the Treaty and the activities which have progressed pursuant thereto have been a model of international coopera- tion. The Treaty effectively bans all military activity in Antarctica, except for logistical support for other activities. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -9- This includes the use of nuclear explosives. The inspec- tion features of the Treaty help to assure the compliance of all parties with this important prohibition. The Treaty assures freedom of scientific research, and its provisions for notice and exchange of scientific information assure the maximum dissemination and useful- ness of the scientific information gathered. The scien- tific information gathered to date has been of particular value in obtaining a basic understanding of the geo- physical characteristics of Antarctica (resulting in the discovery of potentially significant mineral resources), of the wealth of marine productivity in Antarctic waters, and of the fundamental climatic influence of the Antarctic on world weather systems. In addition, Antarctica is a unique scientific laboratory because it is an unoccupied continent which remains largely unaffected by man's acti- vities and provides a means of determining man's impact on the world environment, among other things. The Antarctic Treaty, and measures taken in its implementation, have largely worked to the benefit of the United States. The U.S. has a clear interest in assuring its continued peaceful and mutually beneficial implemen- tation. 2. To Prevent Antarctica from Becoming a Source Of International Conflict. The United States has a clear interest in avoiding international conflict arising from mineral resources Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -10- activities, or from any other issue, in Antarctica. A major potential source of discord is the conflicting position of the Antarctic Treaty Parties with regard to claims, and regarding overlapping of claims made by some claimant states. The Antarctic Treaty has helped prevent conflict on claims issues since 1961 by freezing the claims of the Parties, while otherwise accommodating the conflicting juridical positions of claimant and non-claimant states. In pursuing an internationally agreed approach, the United States should therefore seek to avoid any measures which would raise disputes between claimant and non-claimant states, or between states making conflicting claims. The U.S. should pursue measures which contribute to an accommo- dation of conflicting claims positions, consistent with our interests, or which would reduce their significance. In particular, the U.S. should seek measures to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction from arising through any conduct of mineral exploration and exploitation activities under circumstances which could raise unsettled jurisdictional issues. 3. To ensure that any resource exploration and exploitation is consistent with environmental considerations. The Antarctic environment is uniquely productive, fragile, and interrelated with the global ecosystem. A major oil spill on ice or water which remained for a long period would change the insulation, albedo, and thermal Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential ibrary DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 3526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -11- balance properties of contaminated areas. In light of the growing evidence that Antarctic circumpolar currents -- both oceanic and atmospheric -- are driving forces for the world's weather patterns and ocean circulation, that possi- bility is of major global concern. The surface waters of Antarctica are the most pro- ductive in the world. (The Antarctic ocean area, only 1/20th of the surface area of the world's ocean, accounts for 1/5th of the total oceanic production of biologic material.) The deep ocean water of all major oceans (except the Arctic) is formed in the Antarctic. Conse- quently, the fertility of Antarctic water is a major contributing factor to the productivity of commercial fisheries and other ocean-based resources throughout the world. For example, the Humboldt Current, which supports the anchovy and guano industry of Peru and Chile, ori- ginates in and derives its fertility from Antarctic waters. The food chain in the Antarctic is extremely simple, consisting basically of phytoplankton to krill to fish and ocean mammals. Plankotonic animals are much more vulnerable to oil spills than those which swim about. In such a simple ecosystem, the destruction of one member of the food chain can devastate all higher members, which in the case of Antarctica, include the innumerable seabirds, marine mammals, and commercial fish that annually feed in Antarctica and move north into temperate and tropical waters. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -12- In addition to direct toxicity to phytoplankton, an oil spill would also reduce productivity by decreasing the amount of light for photosynthesis beneath the water sur- face. If a spill occurred in the spring or summer plank- ton bloom (the only time commercial activities would be possible in many areas), the effects on higher organisms could be especially severe since the Antarctic growing season is so short. Moreover, cold temperatures would pro- long adverse impacts by greatly retarding the biological degradation of oil. These considerations make it impor- tant to ensure that any measures in the Antarctic do not cause significant harm to the environment. The foregoing interests are operative whether or not mineral resources exploration and exploitation take place. However, in the development of an internationally agreed approach for Antarctic mineral resources, a number of addi- tional U.S. interests are relevant. Certain of these interests underly the present policy objectives of the U.S., ennunciated in NSDM 263, which provides that the inter- nationally agreed approach permit free access by the United States and other states to all parts of Antarctica except those specifically reserved (i.e., "specially protected areas" which are set aside for special controls because of their unusually sensitive ecology and unique scientific value). Although certain of these interests may be closely linked they constitute separate logical points which may CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidentia Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -12- In addition to direct toxicity to phytoplankton, an oil spill would also reduce productivity by decreasing the amount of light for photosynthesis beneath the water sur- face. If a spill occurred in the spring or summer plank- ton bloom (the only time commercial activities would be possible in many areas), the effects on higher organisms could be especially severe since the Antarctic growing season is so short. Moreover, cold temperatures would pro- long adverse impacts by greatly retarding the biological degradation of oil. These considerations make it impor- tant to ensure that any measures in the Antarctic do not cause significant harm to the environment. The foregoing interests are operative whether or not mineral resources exploration and exploitation take place. However, in the development of an internationally agreed approach for Antarctic mineral resources, a number of addi- tional U.S. interests are relevant. Certain of these interests underly the present policy objectives of the U.S., ennunciated in NSDM 263, which provides that the inter- nationally agreed approach permit free access by the United States and other states to all parts of Antarctica except those specifically reserved (i.e., "specially protected areas" which are set aside for special controls because of their unusually sensitive ecology and unique scientific value). Although certain of these interests may be closely linked they constitute separate logical points which may CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidentia Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -13- be served in varying degrees by different conceivable Antarctic resources regimes. 4. Facilitate an increase in the global supply of mineral resources. Given the long-term prospects for rising global de- mand for mineral resources, any new, economically viable source of supply available to the world market should help maintain the flow of needed minerals at reasonable prices. Therefore, consistent with the other United States interests, any resources regime sought by the United States should facilitate to the greatest possible extent an increase in global supply at competitive prices. In addition to the objective of "access" established by NSDM 263, certain other conditions are necessary to facilitate the investment required to further this interest. These include (1) well- defined property rights to potential mineral resources; and (2) reasonable conditions of investment, consistent with U.S. interests, including environmental protection. The U.S. should avoid the creation of a decision-making procedure with competence to impose price or production controls for such reasons asraising prices and restricting output for economic or political purposes. (a) Define property rights to Antarctic resources. Antarctica is presently considered by the United States to be terra nullius, the land of no one. The U.S. does not recognize the validity of any of the seven claims to territory that have been made, has made no claim itself, Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to xecutveIOrdeN13526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -14- and is precluded from doing so while the Antarctic Treaty is in force. Other Parties may not perfect their claims by effective occupation while the Treaty is in force. The result is a legal vacuum. Under the U.S. posi- tion of non-recognition of claims, persons wishing to ex- plore and exploit Antarctic resources could acquire ex- clusive rights as against their fellow nationals under the domestic laws of their State, but these exclusive rights would not be legally effective against nationals of other States unless the other State agreed. From the point of view of the claimant states, the situation is, of course, different. It is reasonable to assume that claimant states would assert the right to confer exclusive rights to explore and exploit mineral resources within their claimed territory; may seek to exclude others; and may seek to enforce these assertions through appro- priate means. As an added and complicating factor, in one potential hydrocarbon area, the Weddell Sea, three claimants have overlapping claims to the adjacent land mass. This uncertain legal situation contributes to an un- attractive investment climate in Antarctica. In light of this situation, the United States should seek, in the development of any internationally agreed approach, conditions which would stabilize the acquisition of property rights for potential investors in mineral exploration and exploitation activities. CONF IDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -15- (b) Ensure reasonable conditions of investment, consistent with U.S. interests, including environmental protection. In addition to providing security and stability of rights to explore and exploit, the United States should seek to ensure that any internationally agreed approach ensures reasonable conditions of investment, consistent with U.S. interests, including environmental protection. It is axiomatic that the heavier the financial and other burdens imposed on potential operators through the workings of the agreed international approach, the higher the cost of doing business becomes. As cost rises, the incentive to invest in Antarctic mineral exploration and exploi- tation decreases in relation to other investment alter- natives. Even an internationally agreed resource system with well-defined property rights may be unattractive if the potential investment and operating requirements imposed through the workings of the internationally agreed approach are high or are uncertain. This point is of particular importance in view of the very high potential costs of Antarctic resources opera- tions, whatever the resource system adopted. Severe climatic conditions, high transportation costs, and the necessity of developing sophisticated and expensive extraction technologies will make Antarctic resources operations very costly. These high costs, coupled with the uncertainties of the nature and extent of Antarctic hydrocarbon and other Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive IDENT Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -16- mineral resources, suggest that the U.S. should seek to minimize any additional financial and other costs that might be required by an internationally agreed approach. 5. Ensure non-discriminatory guaranteed access by the U.S. to all areas to which an Antarctic mineral re- source regime may apply. NSDM 263 directs that the policy of the United States shall be to seek acceptance of an internationally agreed approach which should "permit free access by the U.S. and other nations for exploration purposes to any part of the Antarctic Treaty area, except those areas specifi- cally designated for other uses." " This policy reflects the U.S. interest in assuring that access to any area subject to an internationally agreed approach shall be inter- nationally guaranteed through appropriate measures, and that any mechanism which might be devised for assuring exclusive rights shall operate in a completely non-dis- criminatory fashion. There are two underlying reasons for this. First, the U.S. should avoid foreclosing areas of potential mineral wealth from development by U.S. firms. Second, non-discriminatory access is important to avoid strengthening the validity of territorial claims in the Antarctic. 6. Ensure availability of Antarctic mineral resources to the U.S. market. The U.S. should seek an internationally agreed approach which would ensure that Antarctic mineral production could Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -17- be available to U.S., as well as other markets. This could have an effect on our balance of payments posi- tion and help satisfy our energy needs in the case of hydrocarbons. 7. Ensure appropriate investment opportunity for U.S. nationals. As has been pointed out, the U.S. has an interest in eliminating possible conditions which may make an investment in Antarctic mineral resources exploration and exploitation unattractive. Similarly, the U.S. should ensure that any internationally agreed approach ensures investment oppor- tunities to U.S. nationals on a non-discriminatory basis. B. The Nature and Economics of Commercial Recovery of Antarctic Mineral Resources The Report of the Economic Subpanel of the Antarctic Resources Study Panel outlines the state of present knowledge of the nature of mineral resources pro- duction of these resources. The following conclusions were reached as a result of this study: LAND AREAS: Geological theory and scientific findings indicate a strong likelihood that significant deposits of hard minerals are present in the Antarctic land mass, but a small likelihood that this is true for petroleum. Although hard mineral occurrences have been discovered, the economics of prospecting, extraction and transportation in the land areas are such that no commercial exploita- tion of hard minerals appears likely in the forseeable Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -18- future. Among the mineral occurrences noted, only iron and coal have actually been found in quantity. How- ever, the grade and location of the iron and coal have, to date, made it uneconomical for exploitation even in the case of coal for local use. OFFSHORE AREAS: (1) Manganese nodules -- the metal content of manganese nodules declines progressively with distance from the equator, and those on the Antarctic seabed have significantly less metal content than nodules found else- where. They are therefore considered not to be of commer- cial interest for the forseeable future. (2) Hydrocarbons -- The scientific data so far accumulated as interpreted by geological inference, as well as some seismic data, indicate a good probability that quantities of oil and/or gas may be present in the Antarctic continental shelf. Two core samples in different sites have suggested the possible presence of hydrocarbon deposits. Representatives of some U.S. firms have indi- cated an interest in commercial geophysical exploration, but none have indicated specific plans. However, the combination of water depth, ice conditions, severe weather, transportation costs and short annual working time appear to imply production costs of such magnitude that commercial exploitation on the Antarctic continental shelf is thought to be unlikely in at least the next decade. Reproduced at the Richard NXOF PresidentialTLibr DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Der (3)6 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -19- C. Alternative Internationally Agreed Approaches to Antarctic Mineral Resources. This section seeks to refine the NSDM 263 directive to seek an "internationally agreed approach". There are few precedents for the creation of an internationally agreed approach to mineral resources activities in an international area such as Antarctica. The Law of the Sea negotiations relating to deep ocean mining, the Treaty on Outer Space, the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, and the regime of the high seas are among the few relevant sources of experience. The U.S. experience in the current Law of the Sea negotiations at Caracas in 1974 may be of particular interest. The U.S. sought international agreement at the Caracas session on a detailed regime for the exploration and ex ploitation of seabed resouces beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The chief characteristic of detailed re- gime would be agreement on detailed rules and regulations governing the relevant resource activities as part of the formal agreement among the interested states. The purpose of such an approach would be to set forth authoritatively and as soon as possible, the nature of the resource regime so as to reduce uncertainties that can deter potential investors, to minimize the possibilities of unpredictable or undesirable changes in the system which could render commercial activity unprofitable or leave discretion in a decision-making body that can be used to cartelize the Reproduced at the Richard CONFIDENTIAL Nixon Presidential Liorary DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -20- industry. Such rules and regulations would set forth the mechanism for acquisition of exclusive rights to minerals, the size of the block which could be developed, a mechanism for ensuring diligence, guarantees regarding access to the resources, enforcement provisions, and various other pro- visions. Our espousal of this approach in the Law of the Sea context has been premised in part on a fear that the inter- national organization to be created by that forum would use any discretion to discriminate against U.S. firms or indirectly impose price or production controls on deep ocean mining. These fears, in turn, resulted from the domination of the Law of the Sea forum by developing countries eager to exercise direct and effective control over the "common heritage of mankind" and the strong in- fluence on land-based producers of the minerals found on the deep ocean floor. These factors are not present in the Antarctic forum at this time. This suggests that a detailed regime may not be necessary to protect U.S. interests in Antarctica mineral resource interests. It is also questionable whether it is desirable to attempt to negotiate a detailed resource regime from an economic point of view, since detailed nego- tiations would risk a regime which does not maximize eco- nomic efficiency. Furthermore, an intelligent detailed regime which would permit commercial recovery operations Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONEIDENTIAI CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -21- to occur cannot be developed in the absence of substantial additional information on the nature and economics of Ant- arctic mineral resources. For these reasons, it appears that the U.S. should avoid the negotiation of a detailed international resource regime at this time. The conclusion that development of a detailed regime is not appropriate at this time does not mean that sub- stantial steps cannot be taken towards an internationally agreed approach which would advance U.S. interests. In- stead of attempting to negotiate a detailed resources re- gime, the U.S. could seek an agreement which establishes the processes or mechanisms which will have the competence to make such decisions as are necessary as the need arises and as better information is available. Such agreement should stabilize the legal and political uncertainties, by accommodating the conflicting juridical positions of claimants and non-claimants, through mutually acceptable legal framework for mineral resources activities in Antarctica. It should also assure to the United States sufficient protection in the making of future resource decisions to protect our interests. Exclusive reliance upon the existing consultative mechanism as described in Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty would be one way to assign the competence to make future resource decisions. This mechanism consists of periodic consultative meetings of all of the original signatories Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -22- (i.e., the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France, Japan, Argentina, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Norway and South Africa). States who later accede may become eligible to participate in the meetings if they conduct substantial scien- tific research activity in Antarctica, although none have yet become eligible. "Measures in furtherance" developed at the consutlative meetings are recommended to the re- spective governments. These measures become effective and legally binding when approved by all consultative parties. The Antarctic Treaty consultative mechanism is extant and is a functioning process familiar to the Parties. It provides a forum for the consideration of the relevant issues without additional negotiations to establish another decision-making processs. However, the consultative mechanism as presently structured is not conducive to making some needed re- source management and other decisions. The rule of unani- mity, in particular, appears to be unworkable for at least some decisions. A single state could veto measures the U.S. desires, including international environmental standards and needed resource management decisions. While the U.S. could, on the other hand, veto measures that are not in our interest, the potential for deadlock is high. Thus, exclusive reliance on the existing consultative mecha- nism could lead to international discord and disrupt imple- mentation of the Antarctic Treaty through the resurfacing Reproduced at the Richard DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Ordes 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -23- of claims if resource activities proceed faster than necessary agreed measures are adopted. Accordingly, it is recommended that the U.S. should avoid exclusively relying upon the consultative mechanism as presently con- stituted for future resource decisions. The following options address alternative ways of allocating the basic competence to make resource policy decisions such as the acquisition of rights to resources, resolution of competing claims, managing the common pool problem, environmental protection, accommodation of scien- tific interests if they conflict with resource interests, and prevention of frivolous claims to resources. Considera- tion is then given to alternative measures for the im- plementation of decisions once they are made through the decision-making process. Consideration is given as well to the possible desirability of a compulsory dispute settle- ment mechanism to check abuses of the decision-making pro- cess. The section concludes with consideration of whether to limit our efforts at this stage to resolving issues relating only to the exploration for Antarctic mineral resources, or whether to address both problems relating to both exploration and exploitation. 1. Competence for Resource Policy Decisions. (a) National Legislative Approach An "internationally agreed approach" does not necessarily imply that the U.S. should seek the creation of Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 3526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -24- a powerful international organization which would con- trol mineral resource activities in Antarctica. At a minimum, an "internationally agreed approach" could con- ceivably include control of resource activities exclusively by states with reciprocal recognition of the legitimacy of the respective legislative regimes of the Consultative Parties and others. Revenues generated pursuant to such legislation could be made available to national scien- tific and environmental agencies for projects in Ant- arctica. Option 1: The U.S. should seek an agreement which would recog- nize the right of all nations to undertake mineral re- source activity exclusively pursuant to national legis- lation. Such an agreement should require each party to recognize rights granted by others only when the terms and conditions of the domestic legislation are substan- tially similar to its own legislation. The U.S., under this option, would not rely upon "agreed measure" of the Consultative Meetings which would be incompatible with our domestic legislation or would interfere with commer- cial recovery operations conducted pursuant to such legislation. PROS: -- Would avoid potentially burdensome regulation by an international body by relying exclusively upon Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive-Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -25- national legislation. -- Claimant states would have an incentive to seek greater benefit from access to all of Antarctica than from their claimed areas alone and may be willing to agree to this approach. The proximity of the hard-line claimants to Ant- arctica gives them an incentive to allow access to their claimed territory by others on the basis of others' domestic legislation, because they might benefit most from the refining and consuming stages of development. -- The use of systems of national legislation should produce competition for the licensing of commercial activities, thus encouraging each state to establish commercially viable legislative schemes so that it may take the advantages of being the licensing state. -- Since the U.S. and U.K. would probably be the first to promulgate rules for the protection of the en- vironment and accommodation of science, others would have an incentive to promulgate substantially similar rules so as to gain recognition of their legis- lation by the U.S. and U.K. At the same time, all participating states would have an incentive to seek an "optimal" level of pollution and scien- tific activity since to maintain higher standards than other states have would induce firms to go CONFIDENTIA Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -26- elsewhere for resource rights. -- So-called "flags of convenience" are not a problem but a means of competition among states which re- sults in optimal regulation of an industry. -- Conflicting claims to resources could be re- solved by the market through unitization agree- ments. Operators also have an incentive to handle the common pool problem through bargains struck among themselves. CONS: --- It is unrealistic to expect states with such di- verse resource philosophies as the U.S., U.S.S.R., France, Australia, Chile and Argentina to promul- gate "substantially similar" legislation, leading to non-recognition of rights and international dis- cord. -- Since this will be perceived to be the functional equivalent to unilateral exploitation, the seven claimant states cannot be expected to agree to allow any state to exploit (solely under its own national legislation) in the claimed territories since this would be tantamount to a renunciation of the terri- torial claims. The claimants would not be able to save face with respect to their juridical posi- tions, and international discord might therefore ensue. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential/Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -27- -- The incentive claimant states have to seek greater benefit from access to resources in claimed areas is an argument for any internationally agreed approach and does not distinguish this option from others. -- Benefits which may accrue to hard-line claimants because of their proximity to Antarctica gives them an incentive to agree to any internationally agreed approach and does not distinguish this option from others. -- Exclusive reliance upon incentives is an inaccurate prediction of the political and resource decisions to be made by other states. -- Exclusive reliance upon incentives will not assure protection of all U.S. interests in Antarctica, in- cluding resource, scientific, environmental and political interests. -- Competition among the licensing states would result in: -- U.S. firms operating under foreign legislation in order to avoid stringent U.S. requirements thus depriving the U.S. of an alternative secure source of supply for our energy and other resource needs; -- "Flags of convenience" with low environmental standards and inadequate protection for scien- tific research; and Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -28- -- A risk that foreign legislation will require that profits remain overseas, with resulting harm to our balance of payments position. -- This would not stablize the acquisition of property rights to Antarctic resources because: -- The validity of exclusive rights granted pur- suant to national legislation would depend entirely upon their recognition by other inter- ested states; -- The U.S. could not assert their independent validity as a matter of international law; --- Significant international discord would re- sult if, for example, Chile refused to recognize rights granted by the U.S. in the Chilean claimed territory and accordingly sought to exclude U.S. firms from exercising those rights; and -- Production of Antarctic minerals would there- fore not be facilitated. -- Our experience suggests that it is unrealistic to rely on bargains between firms to manage the common pool problem or resolve conflicting claims to valuable resources. -- The international discord and resurfacing of claims which would result from this policy could set the stage for a "U.N. Takeover" of Antarctica and force Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. XGDS (3) CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -29- the U.S. to seek its objectives in a larger and less favorable forum. -- This would be a major shift in the overall U.S. policy on Antarctica and could undermine the totality of our interests in the region. (b) A New Decision-Making Competence The U.S. could seek an international agreement to create a new decision-making competence tailored to the needs of an Antarctic mineral resources regime. This alter- native contemplates an agreement which would both establish a new decision-making procedure and commit the claimants and non-claimants to the principle of non-discriminatory access to all parts of the continent (except specially protected areas). Such a settlement would have to provide a means for claimants to continue to assert their under- lying claims without interfering with commercial recovery operations while protecting our juridical position as well. OPTION 2: The U.S. should seek an agreement which would recognize the right of the U.S. and others to undertake mineral resource activity in Antarctica subject to a special mineral resource arrangement. Issues such as the mechanism for acquiring rights to the resources, resolving competing claims, managing the common pool problem, and establishing and enforcing standards to protect the environment would be addressed with suffi- cient flexibility to avoid problems that may be en- Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order BEN and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -30- countered with the existing consultative mechanism or exclusive reliance on domestic legislation. The U.S. should seek to avoid the rule of unanimity as the exclu- sive means for decision-making since a single state could veto measures that are in the U.S. interest. The U.S. should seek to emphasize reliance on balanced decision- making procedures which give us sufficient protection from adverse decisions and basic agreed principles which constrain and guide the decision-making procedure. It is the overall protection derived from the relationship between agreed principles and decison-making procedures which should be the criterion. PROS: -- Provides realistic opportunities to avoid resur- facing the underlying conflict between non-claimants and claimants, a necessary condition for avoiding international discord. -- Would better stabilize the acquisition of property rights to resources and thereby facilitate an increase in the global supply of hydrocarbons and, poten- tially, other minerals. -- Reduces pressure on U.S. firms to operate in Ant- arctica under foreign legislation and thereby -- provides better assurance of an alternate secure source of supply of any resources in Antarctica for the United States; -- could strengthen our balance of payments position; Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -31- -- does not encourage the use of "flags of con- venience" to avoid environmental standards and other conditions of exploitation. -- Allows active participation by the U.S. in decisions which affect our interests instead of relying on incentives which may or may not work to the U.S. advantage. -- Is consistent with our general international approach to Antarctica and thus reinforces, rather than de- tracts from, other U.S. objectives served by the Antarctic Treaty. -- Provides flexibility until relevant information becomes available to permit a precise assessment of U.S. interests and realistic specific negotiating possibilities. CONS: -- A decision-making procedure with adequate power to take effective action to protect the environment and accommodate science might also have the power to impose potentially burdensome regulations on mineral resource activities. -- Since it may not be possible to reach agreement within any Antarctic Treaty forum to adopt a voting mechanism other than the rule of unanimity, we might not achieve a balanced arrangement that gives the U.S. sufficient protection. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -32- -- Without a more detailed analysis of the specific details of this approach, we could unwittingly commit ourselves to a position contrary to our interests. 2. Implementing Procedures. If it is decided that resource policy decisions should be made by some new decision-making procedure (Option 2), the question arises of how the resource policy decisions should be implemented. Under a domestic legis- lation system (Option 1), all policy and implementing competence would rest with the respective states. There are at least three alternatives for implementing policy decisions -- (a) respective national administration; (b) rotating national administration; or (c) an international technical commission. The following discussion of im- plementing mechanisms is not intended to authorize any commitment by the U.S. to one or another of these alter- natives. Administration of the resource system by each par- ticipating state would minimize the potential for dis- criminatory treatment of U.S. firms at this level. However, resource decisions could be inconsistently administered with resulting disputes between participating states. Agreed measures could thus be "watered down" by national authorities, with particular harm to our environmental interests in Antarctica. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -33- Secondly, administration of the system could be made the responsibility of a single participating state, acting on behalf of the others, with the responsibility rotating periodically among the participating states. This would hopefully minimize the potential for dis- crimination since each state will be subject to discrimi- nation more often than it will be able to discriminate. It avoids creating an international organization or relying on varying national competences, but lacks continuity and could be inefficient. Finally, an international technical commission could provide continuity, expertise and non-political implementation of resource policies decided by states. However, it is questionable whether such a new inter- national organization is necessary. Furthermore, it could be expensive, unresponsive and uncontrollable. The resolution of this issue depends, in part, upon the characteristics of the resource system to be admin- istered. Moreover, the attitudes of others are of central importance in deciding among the alternatives. Accor- dingly, it is recommended that this issue be kept under review as our policy on Antarctica mineral resources de- velops. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -34- 3. Compulsory Dispute Settlement The question also arises whether the United States should seek some form of compulsory dispute settlement mechanism as part of an overall settlement. The Antarctic Treaty encourages but does not require, the settlement of disputes through third party adjudication. Disputes could arise in the event resource activities proceed regardless of which of the preceding options is selected. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -35- Compulsory third party dispute settlement contemplates a specific international agreement to resolve disputes through the International Court of Justice, arbitration, inquiry or other appropriate judicial procedure, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree. Such an obligation with respect to Antarctic mineral resource activity would help avoid international discord by en- couraging the peaceful settlement of disputes. It would aid in assuring non-discriminatory treatment of all participating states and would promote a stable invest- ment climate by assuring ultimate non-political resolu- tions of disputes. It is recognized that this would be an additional negotiating burden and that the U.S. could be bound by adverse decisions. Nonetheless, it is recommended that the U.S. seek agreement on binding compulsory third party dispute settlement procedures regarding disputes arising from mineral resource activity in Antarctica, provided that any dispute settlement machinery should not have juris- diction to adjudicate the underlying claims situation directly or indirectly. This last proviso is arguably required by Article IV and XI of the Antarctic Treaty. D. Scope of Immediate U.S. Objectives. The U.S. faces a complex and difficult negotiation concerning Antarctic mineral resources. The information needed to resolve the many political, legal, and eco- CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential ibrary DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -36- nomic issues in a manner best suited to protect the full range of U.S. interests is sparse. Commercial exploration of Antarctic mineral resources has not commenced an it is impossible to predict with cer- tainty when, if ever, exploitation will occur. Thus, the attempt to fashion an intelligent re- source regime is handicapped by a lack of data which could be produced by commercial exploration. At the same time, the uncertainties arising from a confused legal and political situation deter firms from explora- tion activities. Stabilization of the situation insofar as the exploration phase of development is concerned would arguably lessen disencentives to exploration and produce the information which is needed to make informed decisions respecting (1) whether an exploitation regime os needed at all, (2) if so, how it should be structured. OPTION The U.S. should first seek to achieve a prompt resolution of issues related to the exploration phase of development and basic conditions related to the exploi- tation phase, while pursuing a more comprehensive settle- ment of exploitation issues. PROS: -- Simplifies the task by focusing our efforts on the most immediate need. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -37- -- Since exploration may lead to the conclusion that exploitation would not be economic, we may avoid a difficult and risky resource negotiation. -- An agreement on exploration may be feasible without addressing the difficult underlying claims issue. CONS: -- Firms would be less likely to commence commercial exploration if a stable exploitation regime is not in place as well. Firms would face uncertainties after completing exploration as to when and under what conditions exploitation could proceed. If substantial mineral resources are confirmed, the negotiation on the exploitation phase will be much more difficult. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon CONFIDENTIAL PresidentialLibrary ECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -38- II. Regime Applicable to Offshore Seabed Resource If mineral exploitation occurs in Antarctica, it is anticipated that it will first occur on the continental margin. The issue for the United States is whether these offshore resources should be included in the international regime for seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction being negotiated in the Law of the Sea Conference (LOS) or whether these resources should be subject to a special regime negotiated within the Antarctic Treaty frame- work.* This issue will be discussed by the Consultative Parties at the February Oslo Precom for the purposes of coordinating strategy, if possible at the Geneva LOS Session. All representatives except the United States indicated a desire to maintain the special competence of the Antarctic Treaty regime south of 60° south latitude, except high seas, as provided in Article VI of the Treaty, at the October Precom as set forth in the Annexed Report. Under international law, an argument can be made for either result insofar as the resources of the continental shelf (i.e. hydrocarbons) are concerned. Since the U.S., U.S.S.R., and other states do not recognize any coastal sovereign on land in Antarctica, it may be argued that no State exercises the "sovereign rights"for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the *The word "regime" does not necessarily imply the creation of a new international organization. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -39- continental shelf addressed in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and recognized in customary international law. It may follow that the offshore seabed resources are in the area beyond national jurisdiction and, therefore, aresubject to the regime of the high seas or any new inter- national seabed regime negotiated as part of the Law of the Sea Treaty. It must be noted that since the U.S. does not recognize "national jurisdiction" in Antarctica, the global consensus to apply the seabeds regime to all seabeds areas "beyond the limits of national jurisdiction" quite literally extends to the seabed of Antarctica and the U.S. could be put in an awkward position in resisting ISRA jurisdiction in offshore areas of Antarctica. On the other hand, it may be argued that these resources appertain to the land mass and may be subject to a special Antarctic regime. The land areas may, in principle, become subject to sovereignty, and the International Court of Justice has said that coastal States exercise rights to continental shelf resources because the shelf is a natural prologation of the continental land mass. The position that we can exploit "Antarctic resources" under a special Antarctic regime constructed by the treaty parties must proceed - not from the widely accepted principles of the International Law of the Sea - but from a position that Antarctica is amenable to something akin to sovereign control by the Treaty nations as against all other States of the world. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential/Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -40- CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) By adopting the position that the twelve Antarctic signatories have legal competence to exclude ISRA, we might weaken our juridical position as against the Antarctic claimants. The claimants could assert that the competence to exclude ISRA is based upon their sovereign jurisdiction over continental shelf resources; the US rejoinder would be based on the rather narrow point that while none of the twelve exercise sovereignty, Antarctica is potentially subject to sovereign jurisdiction. For this reason, the US might need to press for open access to resources as an aspect of agreement among the twelve that the international seabed regime does not extend to Antarctica. On the other hand, an effort to use the threat of an "LOS takeover" to achieve access would present its own tactical disadvantages. The other Antarctic nations may react with hostility to access for the US and may seek to make either of the two regimes less attractive to the US. There is a further question as to the extent of the areas subject to either potential regime, since very large areas of the ice could be argued to be legally subject to either land or sea regimes. CONF IDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -41- The issue here is in part choice between two resources regimes -- the Law of the Sea regime for the international seabed area, which is in process of negotiation with critical issues still to be decided; and a special Antarctic resource regime which remains to be negotiated from the beginning. The Law of the Sea regime has been under negotiation for four years. The international seabed resource system may be primarily oriented toward exploration and exploitation of the manganese nodules of the deep seabed. Since different legal measures may be desirable for commercial recovery of nodules and hydrocarbons, the international seabed resource regime will either contain an agreed framework for later determining the conditions for hydrocarbon development in the international area, if there are any, or the regime for nodule mining will be adapted insofar as possible. Thus, the nature of the international seabed regime as it affects the offshore resources of Antarctica in many ways is as much an unknown as a special regime for Antarctic mineral resources. On the other hand, we are at the beginning of an Antarctic mineral resource negotiation. The alternatives for what the United States should seek or avoid are discussed on Part I. The other Consultative Parties appear to be, in varying degrees, amenable to some form of internationally agreed approach. In the case of some claimant states, it is unclear CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -42- whether this attitude, which is a shift from previous emphasis on their claims, is temporary and due to their fear of a "U.N. takeover" in the form of ISRA jurisdiction to offshore resources in Antarctica, or whether the shift is the more stable product of a desire to preserve the Antarctic Treaty and will last beyond the conclusion of a Law of the Sea Treaty. Each of the following options is presented subject to the NSDM 263 directive that an internationally agreed approach should "be without prejudice to and appropriately compatible with U.S. Law of the Sea interests". OPTION A The U.S. should seek a special regime for offshore seabed resources in Antarctica which guarantees access for the U.S. and others to the Area to which the regime applies. OPTION B The United States should seek the inclusion of off- shore mineral resources in Antarctica in the International Seabed Area. OPTION C For the time being, the U.S. should preserve the options of applying either the ISRA regime or a special regime to offshore seabed resources in Antarctica. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -43- Arguments in Favor of Option A --Deep seabed regime and machinery being negotiated in the LOS Conference will be the product of a long, hard and highly politicized negotiation. This is not a reasonable starting point for an Antarctic mineral resource policy. --From an economic point of view, we are bound to come out better in a resource negotiation among Antarctic nations since producing nations and developing countries will not dominate the forum. -ISRA jurisdiction to the low-water mark would force the claimants to assert vigorously their claims to protect their juridical positions. --ISRA jurisdiction could lead to a breakdown of the Antarctic Treaty with resulting harm to the full range of U.S. interest. --Most Antarctic Treaty signatories strongly fear a "U.N. takeover". U.S. passivity on the issue (Option C) or support for ISRA jurisdiction to the low-water mark (Option B) would meet a hostile reception from these states, could threaten continued cooperation under the Treaty, and would impair our ability to achieve our objectives in the Antarctic community. --If at a later time it becomes apparent that U.S. interests are better served under the Law of the Sea regime, it is possible that we may be able to provoke the ISRA to extend its own jurisdiction to the low-water mark in Antarctica if the LOS Treaty remains ambiguous in this regard. CONF IDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -44- --Strong environmental protection measures, preservation of freedom of scientific research and cooperation in scien- tific research, and preservation of the non-military status of offshore areas covered by the Antarctic Treaty could be protected in an Antarctic resource negotiation. Arguments in Favor of Option B --A decision by the Law of the Sea Conference that off- shore Seabed resources in Antarctica are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and,therefore, subject to the International Seabed regime is tantamount to a global rejection of the territorial claims in Antarctica. --The legal status of the high seas around Antarctica would be better protected. --Freedom of scientific research and ISRA jurisdiction to control pollution from international seabed resource activities are equally important elements of our Law of the Sea position. --An LOS deep seabed regime might become effective and needed technologies developed before a special Antarctic regime is in place, thus expediting resource production. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -45- Arguments in Favor of Option C --We do not have enough information on the nature of the deep seabed regime or, even more so, a special Antarctic regime to make an intelligent choice as to which regime best serves our resource interests. --Potential U.S. interests in the commercially attractive and ecologically sensitive living resources in Antarctica might be compromised by the selecion of either Option A or B. This study has not analyzed how the choice would impact on these interests. --Our non-resource interests could be adequately protected either way so long as the Antarctic Treaty is preserved. --An LOS deep seabed regime might become effective and needed technologies developed before a special Antarctic regime is in place, thus expediting resource production. If Option A above is approved, a further issue arises. The resource jurisdiction of the ISRA could stop at 60° south latitude, thus reserving all areas covered by the Antarctic Treaty to the Antarctic Treaty Regime, or the resource jurisdiction of ISRA could stop at the seaward edge of the continental margin, 200 miles, or whatever the limits of national jurisdiction are in other parts of the world. The status of the water column and non-resource uses of the CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -46- seabed south of 60° would not be affected by either alterna- tive. From a legal point of view, it would be difficult to justify the view that ISRA jurisdiction stops at 60° south latitude unless the Law of the Sea Treaty expressly so pro- vides. To seek such a result, however, would raise the issue of Antarctica in the LOS forum and risk losing control of the negotiation. Moreover, the notion that littoral states can change the legal status of adjacent high seas could weaken our ability to resist such moves in other regions, such as the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace efforts. Accordingly, it is recommended that the U.S. seek the same delimitation between areas of national and international jurisdiction in Antarctica as we seek for other parts of the world. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -47- III. Moratorium Policy The Policy Statement approved by NSDM 263 contains the following with respect to mineral exploration and exploitation activities pending the outcome of a mineral resource negotiation: "During the time the United States is seeking an internationally agreed approach, the United States will oppose actions by any nation with the purpose of commer- cial exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral re- sources and will urge other nations to join the U.S. in such an interim policy." The Policy Statement further directed that this posi- tion be re-evaluated periodically in light of the progress of any negotiations, actions by other countries, and con- tinuing economic and technological assessments to be pro- vided by a subcommittee of the Under Secretaries Committee. Consideration of alternative U.S. policies towards a moratorium raises difficult questions of competing U.S. interests. Alternative moratorium policies may tend to protect U.S. interests in avoiding the surfacing of terri- torial claims and in avoiding international discord, but they may do so at potential cost to other U.S. interests in acquiring necessary resource information and in stimu- lating eventual production of Antarctic resources if that should prove possible. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -48- The United States has opposed a formal moratorium in the past while virtually all other Consultative Parties have supported some form of moratorium. Our position has been based primarily on the belief that a moratorium tends to perpetuate itself and thus delays the development of tech- nologies and information about resources necessary for in- telligent policy decisions. This also could delay the day when resources are available for consumption. In implementation of the NSDM 263 policy, the U.S. team at the October, 1974 preparatory meeting for the Eighth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting stated that the United States continues to be opposed to a moratorium but for the time being as a matter of policy the U.S. will also oppose actions by any nation for the purpose of mineral exploration or exploitation and hopes that others will do the same. It was noted that this policy would be kept under review in light of the actions of other nations as well as other relevant facts. This policy of voluntary restraint was quickly agreed to by all present. At the same time, an interagency working group has continued to develop our economic and technological assessments of U.S. and foreign capabilities. The October preparatory meeting revealed substantial apprehension as to U.S. intentions; it may be that the absence of any substantive U.S. position on mineral resource activities was interpreted by many as confirmation of their fears that we intend to undertake unilateral exploration CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -49- and exploitation activities. The conditional nature of the U.S. policy statement in October, i.e., that we would keep this policy under review in light of the actions of other nations and other relevant facts, keeps the longer- term fear of unilateral action alive. The moratorium issue may come up again at the Eighth Consultative Meeting in June, 1975, or we may wish to raise it. In the past, many Consultative Parties have pressed for a binding moratorium on mineral exploration or exploitation. The United States opposed such a recommendation of the Con- sultative Meeting (which must act unanimously). Several agencies of the United States Government question whether the "voluntary restraint" policy approved by NSDM 263 or any other moratorium policy is in the national interest. Others have carefully considered the desirability of a "time certain moratorium" limited to certain activities, such as two year moratorium on drilling which could only be extended with the express agreement of the United States and all other Consultative Parties. It would probably be a simple matter to achieve agreement on some form of moratorium at the Eighth Consul- tative Meeting should we desire to do so. For differing reasons, a moratorium would serve the interests of other participating states. The claimant states would be relieved of the fear of unilateral exploitation by the U.S. or others in their claimed area; the U.K., Norway, New Zealand, and CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -50- Australia would appear to welcome an international obliga- tion to refuse requests for exploration licenses that they have received; others would welcome a moratorium because it represents a minimal commitment to an internationally agreed approach and would relieve, for a time, fears that uni- lateral mineral resource activities will provoke a re- surfacing of claims and destroy the Antarctic Treaty. A major concern to the United States is the extent to which any moratorium may become a self-perpetuating policy which will remain in effect when it no longer serves U.S. interests. A formal, agreed moratorium which is open-ended as to time is the most susceptible to self-per- petuation. A policy of voluntary restraint (which may be characterized as a moratorium) permits greater flexibility for the United States to change its position in light of changing circumstances. Another possibility affording a measure of flexibility to meet changing circumstances is a time-certain moratorium, explicitly limited as to its dura- tion. Assessment of U.S. moratorium policy also requires appreciation of the anticipated character of any mineral resources exploration in Antarctica. Representatives of some U.S. firms have indicated an interest in commercial geophysical exploration, but none has indicated specific plans. Exploration would consist of two phases (1) seismic, gravity and magnetic testing and, (2) after analysis thereof, CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -51- test drilling. The first phase of exploration would probably take about one year while up to two additional years would be needed to evaluate the data and decide whether to pro- ceed to exploratory test drilling. Exploratory drilling by commercial firms could only occur with present technologies in the shallower areas of the continental shelf. It should also be noted that these latter types of exploration are virtually indistinguishable from scien- tific research, except in termsof the intentions of the explorer, and would be compatible with the Antarctic Treaty's emphasis on promoting scientific research. On the other hand, available evidence indicates that large petroleum spills, from e.g., accidents during exploratory oil dril- ling operations, could have long-term major impacts on the ecosystem, as could operations that introduced new chemicals into the soil, water or atmosphere. The most serious impact would result if alien materials were re- leased into the two major circulation systems -- the oceans and the atmosphere -- or if the existing life pattern were changed, both for resident species and for wide-ranging species of fish and other marine life which rely on the Antarctic during part of their migratory cycle. At the present time, drilling on the Antarctic continental shelf by U.S. firms would be subject to no environmental con- trols other than those imposed voluntarily by the companies. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon-Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -52- OPTION 1: Maintain Present Policy The U.S. should continue its present interim policy. During the time the U.S. is seeking an internationally agreed approach, it will oppose actions by any nation directed towards commercial exploration and exploitation of Ant- arctic mineral resources, and will urge other nations to join in such an interim policy. This policy will be kept under continuing review. PROS: -- Would discourage claimant states from issuing licenses, which would strengthen their juridical positions and pre- judice the U.S. claims position, in the claimed areas. -- This is an interim and conditional policy, which is not necessarily self-perpetuating. The policy can be changed if circumstances so warrant; its interim and con- ditional nature was described at an informal meeting during the October 1974 Preparatory Committee Meeting. -- Would not necessarily delay prompt initiation of ex- ploratory operations by U.S. firms, since our best infor- mation is that U.S. companies have no immediate plans for exploration activities, and we have no basis to forecast when exploration activities will occur. --- This policy allowsus to oppose actions by others, such as the U.K., which may be prejudicial to our interests, while retaining substantial flexibility as to our own policy. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -53- -- Several claimants have been approached by private companies seeking exploration licenses, and this policy provides a basis for the claimants to refuse such re- quests without raising the overall claims issue. -- This policy accurately indicates U.S. interest in an internationally agreed approach, and not unilateral action. However, it does not foreclose subsequent uni- lateral action, and thus preserves any negotiating leverage that the threat of unilateral action may provide. -- This policy reflects voluntary restraint by the U.S., but might be made legally enforceable against poten- tial operators by other Parties, particularly the clai- mants, under their domestic law. -- This policy increases the likelihood that an agreed approach competent to provide adequate environmental pro- tection will be in place prior to initiation of explora- tion and exploitation activities. CONS: -- This policy may be the most potentially self-per- petuating; despite its announced interim character, the U.S. may find it difficult to retract the policy during potentially protracted negotiations in the face of pres- sures to continue it until international agreement is reached. -- In 1972, prior to our present policy, the U.S. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -54- informally discouraged the interest of a U.S. company in undertaking exploratory work; and this policy could further delay exploration activities to the detriment 6f our energy resources interests. -- A moratorium, continued until agreement is reached or otherwise, may deprive the U.S. of resource informa- tion necessary for the development of a wise resource policy. -- As U.S. firms could interpret this policy to be a U.S. Government policy to discourage exploration and ex- ploitation for an indefinite period of time, they might make financial commitments to activities in other areas which would delay eventual exploration and exploitation in Antarctica. -- This policy does not ensure prevention of environ- mental damage resulting from exploration and exploitation activities which may conceivably occur even in the pre- sence of a voluntary restraint policy. OPTION 2: A Voluntary Time Certain Limit on Drilling The U.S. should seek agreement of the parties at the Eighth Consultative Meeting to oppose for 2 years actions by any nation intended to facilitate commercial drilling in the continental shelf adjacent to Antarctica. The U.S. should make clear that any such agreement could not be extended without unanimous agreement of all Consultative Parties. This would be policy of voluntary restraint, not necessarily legally binding on the Parties or their nationals. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -55- PROS: -- While a partial retraction from our stated policy, this policy would probably be acceptable to the Consultative Parties. -- Could increase our bargaining leverage over the existing moratorium policy, since the policy change could be interpreted as an indication that the U.S. is ready to undertake preliminary exploration unilaterally; may therefore encourage early progress in the negotiations. -- Would permit preliminary exploration activities, other than drilling, to begin and could facilitate gathering of resource information necessary for the development of a wise resources policy. -- Since preliminary exploration activities other than drill- ing may require more than two years for completion and evalua- tion, this policy is unlikely to cause delay in acquiring nec- essary resources information. -- Is not necessarily self-perpetuating, since the policy could not be extended beyond two years without the affirmative agreement of the U.S. -- This policy might discourage environmentally hazardous drilling in ecologically sensitive offshore areas, allowing time to better assess environmental risks and to determine what special controls are necessary. CONS: -- This policy may potentially become self-perpetuating; despite its fixed duration, any limitation on drilling may be extended in response to political pressures. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -56- -- A partial retraction from our announced interim policy of voluntary restraint could damage our credibility in the Antarctic community, even though we have made clear the provisional char- acter of our prior policy. -- May be seen as an indication that the U.S. is ready to under- take unilaterally commercial exploitation short of drilling; this could overplay our leverage and produce a backlash, partic- ularly by claimants. -- This policy or its extension could delay acquisition of information necessary for development of a wise resources policy and for any eventual production of hydrocarbons. -- To the extent this policy may facilitate successful explor- ation activities, it may make a comprehensive settlement of claims issues more difficult. -- This policy would not limit the potential for claimants to issue licenses for exploration, to the detriment of the U.S. position on non-recognition of claims. OPTION 3 - No Moratorium The United States should discontinue its stated policy of voluntary restraint and oppose any formal or informal mora- torium on commercial activities in Antarctica. PROS: -- This would allow commercial exploration and exploitation to proceed as quickly as market conditions allow. -- Would maximize any bargaining leverage incentive that the threat of unilateral action may provide. -- Would prevent a "lock-up" of Antarctic resources for an Reproduced at the Richard CONFIDENTIAL Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -56- -- A partial retraction from our announced interim policy of voluntary restraint could damage our credibility in the Antarctic community, even though we have made clear the provisional char- acter of our prior policy. -- May be seen as an indication that the U.S. is ready to under- take unilaterally commercial exploitation short of drilling; this could overplay our leverage and produce a backlash, partic- ularly by claimants. -- This policy or its extension could delay acquisition of information necessary for development of a wise resources policy and for any eventual production of hydrocarbons. -- To the extent this policy may facilitate successful explor- ation activities, it may make a comprehensive settlement of claims issues more difficult. --- This policy would not limit the potential for claimants to issue licenses for exploration, to the detriment of the U.S. position on non-recognition of claims. OPTION 3 - No Moratorium The United States should discontinue its stated policy of voluntary restraint and oppose any formal or informal mora- torium on commercial activities in Antarctica. PROS: -- This would allow commercial exploration and exploitation to proceed as quickly as market conditions allow. -- Would maximize any bargaining leverage incentive that the threat of unilateral action may provide. -- Would prevent a "lock-up" of Antarctic resources for an Reproduced at the Richard CONFIDENTIAL Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) indefinite period of time through -57- continuation of a moratorium at a time when the U.S. is seeking new sources of energy. -- Claimant states are unlikely to issue exclusive licenses prejudicial to the U.S. claims position while negotiations are underway. -- Should commercial exploration be undertaken during the period an internationally agreed approach is under negotiation, this policy could spur a successful negotiated settlement. -- The conceivable range of moratorium policies would probably not be legally binding, and would not ensure restraint by others; other options therefore leave open the possibility of exploratory activities by others which may place the U.S. at a disadvantage. - If the U.S. position on voluntary restraint is not changed at this time, it will be much more difficult to change in the future. Should commercial exploration be undertaken while an inter- nationally agreed solution is being sought, the U.S. will have a more precise understanding of the extent of commercial in- terest in the area, thus allowing us to better formulate a wise resource policy. CONS: -- This policy could ultimately preclude U.S. access to the energy and other resources of Antarctica if unrestrained com- mercial activity ensues and the Antarctic Treaty structure collapses. -- This policy could be perceived as an announcement that the U.S. will exploit unilaterally, and could therefore harden Reproduced at the Richard Nixon CONFIDENTIAI Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) -58- the positions of the Parties so that little meaningful progress could be made on an internationally agreed approach. -- Might overplay our leverage and produce a backlash by claimant states, who might emphasize the need to protect their juridical positions rather than the need for an agreed accommodation. -- Could stimulate claimants to issue licenses, to the detriment of the U.S. policy on non-recognition of claims, or with attendant risks of political discord. -- Would allow environmentally dangerous drilling to take place on the Antarctic continental shelf with sole reliance on flag state controls, if any, for environmental protection. -- To the extent this policy may facilitate successful explor- ation activities, it may make a comprehensive settlement of claims issues more difficult. -- A full retraction of our stated interim policy of voluntary restraint could severely damage our credibility in the Antarctic community. -- Since we have no specific knowledge of plans for commercial mineral resources activities in the near future, we should not expose ourselves to the potential political costs of opposition to an international moratorium; we can move to opposition to a moratorium at some later time of circumstances require. CONFIDENTIAL XGDS (3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOC RECD LOG NBR NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE MO DA MO DA HR ILC 28 14 7500581 Elliot ACTION O FROM: Galtright, kissinger, w / REFERENCE: CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE TO: PRES S/S UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION kissinger COLBY, W OTHER 4/5M25G LOU NO FORN NODIS SCOWCROFT t schlesinger, J C EYES ONLY EXDIS DAVIS CODEWORD SUBJECT: 4/sm 55 G ST EX SEC U.S. Policy on Cintriction TS sensitiv Mineril Resources INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION REC ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO CY ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT FOR MEMO FOR HAK ( ) STAFF SECRETARY usc X MeMo FOR PRES ( ) REPLY FOR FAR EAST ( ) SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA APPROPRIATE ACTION ( ) DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA MEMO TO to USec Com ( * ) EUROPE / CANADA RECOMMENDATIONS ) LATIN AMERICA JOINT memo ( ) UNITED NATIONS REFER TO FOR: ( ) ECONOMIC ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ( ) SCIENTIFIC X CONCURRENCE. ( ) PROGRAM ANALYSIS DUE DATE: 2-4 NSC planning X COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) CONGRESSIONAL 2-7-75 OCEANS POLICY usom 39A Comments provided to Indep NTELLIGENCE state action completed. t NSDm 263 3 D.E. DATE FROM TO CY TO 7/7 C S Comment SUBSEQUENT ACTION required to (OR TAKEN): State 2/7 C Ell ott Commented by please to state SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS DISPATCH CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS: NSC/S DISP INSTR NOTIFY & DATE BY FEB F 1975 BY 6AD SPECIAL DISPOSITION: CRT ID: SA SF CROSS REF W/ 7403324 suspense CY ATTACHED: X FOLDER 2/5m 55 OPEN CLOSE B HP NS WH EP PA DY NBC-74-21 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED°³³-147 ) This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. WH 6607 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL NSC-U/SM-55H October 1, 1975 TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Interior The Under Secretary of Commerce The Under Secretary of Transportation The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality The Director, National Science Foundation The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration SUBJECT: United States Antarctic Policy and Program The Under Secretaries Committee has been requested to undertake a review of our political, economic (including resources), national security and scientific objectives in the Antarctic and to consider appropriate program levels and management arrangements for their attainment. This study should take into account past reviews and policy decisions, and, particularly, any changes in our interests, programs, and agency responsibilities relative to the Antarctic. The terms of reference for this review are contained in the attached memorandum. Addressees are requested to advise Mr. Theodore Sellin, Department of State, 632-8997, of the name of their representative on the working group. CONFIDENTIAL GDS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -2- The review, together with a draft Memorandum for the President, should be available for circulation to the Membership no later than Friday, October 24. hurth E Anthony Wreatham E. Gathright Staff Director Attachment: As stated CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 5516 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 CONFIDENTIAL 7519341 COPIES TO: September 30, 1975 S/P- (ACTIPEMORANDUM FOR NSC-DESK RF-ws CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE SUBJECT: United States Antarctic Policy and Program Guidance for the US policy and programs in the Antarctic was stated in NSDM 71 and NSDM 263. Since this guidance was issued, there has been a growing international interest in the living and non-living resources of the Antarctic, an increase in the level of Antarctic activity on the part of several Antarctic Treaty nations, and a steady increase in US Antarctic Program support costs. In view of these developments, the Under Secretaries Committee, with the assistance of the Antarctic Policy Group, is requested to undertake a review of our political, economic (including resources), national security and scientific objectives in the Antarctic and to consider appropriate program levels and management arrangements for their attainment. This study should take into account past reviews and policy decisions and, particularly, any changes in our interests, programs, and agency responsibilities relative to the Antarctic. The study should, inter alia, address the following: 1. The nature and extent of present and foreseeable future US political, economic, security and scientific interests in the Antarctic Treaty area; 2. US objectives in the Antarctic and under the Antarctic Treaty; 3. The nature of the US presence and an assessment of the activities connected with that presence required to protect and further national interests and rights and achieve national objectives in the Antarctic, together with an estimation of any international and domestic conse- quences of terminating US activities in the Antarctic; 4. The political utility and national security purpose of a military presence in the Antarctic under the terms of Article 1 of the Antarctic Treaty; CONFIDENTIAL/GDS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -2- 5. The makeup and level of the planned and proposed US Antarctic program, its funding and management arrangements. The review should set forth options with respect to US presence, level of activity and funding and management arrangements, together with their advantages and disadvantages, and agency views and recommendations. For the purposes of this review, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee should also include representatives of the Departments of Treasury, Interior, Commerce and Transportation, the National Science Foundation, the Federal Energy Administration, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council on Environmental Quality. The report of the Under Secretaries Committee should be forwarded not later than November 10, 1975, for the President's consideration. Kissinger VII at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOC RECD LOG NBR NSC CORRESPONDLNCE PROFILE MO DA MO DA HR 110 10217 7506607 Ellest INITIAL ACTION gathinght, COLBY, W REFERENCE: CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE kissinger W S/S UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT TO: PRES FROM: kissinger t OTHER LOU NO FORN NODIS SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER, J U/Sm 00554 C EYES ONLY EXDIS S CODEWORD DAVIS ST EX SEC TS SENSITIVE SUBJECT: U/SM-055H Terms of reference for study on US antarctic Policy q proflams INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION REC ACTION required ACTION INFO CY FOR MEMO FOR HAK ( ) ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT MeMo FOR PRES ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR ( ) FAR EAST APPROPRIATE ACTION ( ) SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT MEMO TO ( ) mid EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) europe / CANADA JOINT memo ( ) LATIN america REFER TO FOR: ( ) UNITED NATIONS ( ) ECONOMIC SCIENTIFIC x ANY DUE CONCURRENCE. ACTION DATE: necessary? by plure ( + ) program ANALYSIS x NSC planning X COMMENTS: (INCLUDING 10/12 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) 10-3-75 CONGRESSIONAL OCEANS POLICY action completed by phone. INTELLIGENCE x D.E. undex DATE FROM TO S SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): CY TO 10/3/75 Elliott NSC/S comment above. 10/3 C see Elient SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS DISPATCH CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: NSC/S DISP INSTR BY OCT5 MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: 5 BY NOTIFY & DATE 1975 SPECIAL DISPOSITION: CROSS REF W/ 7505516, NSOM0263 P OPEN CRT ID: MACE SA $F HP NS CLOSE EP suspense CY ATTACHED: FOLDER: PA DY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED, NSC 75-22 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 7379 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL NSC-U/SM-55I Novmeber 5, 1975 TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Director of Central Intelligence The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Interior The Under Secretary of Commerce The Under Secretary of Transportation The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality The Director, National Science Foundation The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration SUBJECT: United States Policy and Program for Antarctica Attached for your comment and/or concurrence are a report and draft Memorandum for the President on the above subject. Editorial and minor sub- stantive changes may be telephoned to Mr. Theodore Sellin, Department of State, 632-8997. Members of the Committee are requested to address comments on the options or major substantive changes to the Chairman in writing. Your response is requested by c.o.b. Wednesday, November 12, 1975. menth E. Mather Wreatham E. Gathright Staff Director Attachments: As stated CONFIDENTIAL XGDS-3 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DRAFT NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL NSC-U/DM- MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: United States Policy and Program for Antarctica NSC Memorandum of October 1, 1975 requested the Under Secretaries Committee, with the assistance of the Antarctic Policy Group, to review U.S. political, economic (including resource), national security, and scientific objectives in Antarctica and to consider appropriate program levels and management arrangements to attain their achievement. The requirement for the review stems from a growing interest in living and non-living resources of the Antarctic, an increase in the level of Antarctic activity by other Antarctic Treaty nations and a steady increase in U.S. Antarctic Program support costs. This memorandum presents the results of the review, which is attached, together with options and agency comments. A policy to maintain an "active and influential" presence in Antarctica was called for in a 1970 NSC Study, is also set forth in NSDMs 71 and 263 (annexed to CONFIDENTIAL XGDS 3 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -2- the review) and is deemed to remain valid today. This policy to maintain an "active and influential" U.S. presence in Antarctica was reaffirmed in a directive of yours as recently as May 20, 1975. All agencies involved in the current review concur that probable future developments in the Antarctic require that such a presence be sustained if U.S. interests are not to be seriously harmed. The review states the following principal findings: 1. The Antarctic Treaty has admirably served U.S. political, scientific, environmental and security interests in the Antarctic Region. It can also help protect our possible future resource interests in the area through the establishment of a satisfactory resource regime. The Treaty Parties, various other countries in the United Nations General Assembly and Law of the Sea forum, U.S. and foreign industry and environmental groups, have shown an increasing interest in Antarctic resources and the consequences of their possible exploration and exploitation. Their efforts to influence an Antarctic resource regime will place increasing strains on the Treaty system. The strength of the Treaty will be directly related to the level of the U.S. presence in Antarctica and thus to the leadership role of the U.S. among Treaty nations. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -3- 2. The U.S. negotiating position in discussions with other Antarctic Treaty parties on an international Antarctic resource regime, which are expected to begin in the near future, will be seriously eroded if the level of U.S. activity, and corresponding U.S. presence and influence, declines appreciably. 3. The Soviet Union has increased its Antarctic activity and thus its role in Antarctic affairs and will, if present trends continue, replace the U.S. as the preeminent nation on the Continent. 4. The Antarctic Treaty prohibits measures of a military nature and nuclear testing in Antarctica, except that military personnel and equipment can be used to support scientific research. The Treaty allows inspection to verify compliance with the disarmanent aspects of the Treaty. While the Soviet Union does not exercise its right to inspect, the United States does so on a regular basis. This right is an important precedent and its exercise requires the capability to reach all foreign stations in the Antarctic. 5. While prohibited military activities by U.S. or the Soviet Union in the Antarctic are considered unlikely, it is desirable that the military continue to provide support for the U.S. Antarctic program. This military support provides unparalleled flexibility of operations in Antarctica and CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -4- underscores the importance the U.S. attaches to the Antarctic. 6. Scientific research continues to the principal expression of U.S. interest in Antarctica. At present two coastal stations and two inland stations, one of which is located at the South Pole, are utilized for the United States Antarctic Research Program. The extent and location of research activities, including the siting of a station at the South Pole, are determined not only by scientific consideration but also by legal and political considerations to protect and advance the totality of U.S. interests in Antarctica. 7. If current funding levels are not increased, rising. program costs will force a dimunition of U.S. activity in Antarctica. 8. Present budget and management arrangements are unsatisfactory and have led to increasing difficulties which can result in reduced U.S. activity in Antarctica. 9. If funding levels are such as to require the U.S. to withdraw from the South Pole and other inland stations, there would be an inducement for others, particularly the Soviet Union, to occupy the prestigious South Pole location, perhaps even utilizing parts of the U.S. facilities. The group conducting the review was asked to develop options on levels of funding and options for management arrangements for the U.S. Antarctic program. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -5- Five options are set forth on levels of activity in Antarctica ranging in costs from #3.5 million to $60 million. All agencies agree that the U.S. should maintain a presence at least at the present level of $45 million - Level III. As reflected in subsequent discussion of agency com- ments, several agencies believe that the U.S. level of activity in Antarctica should be increased. This view is held, in part, because some resource assessment and environmental appraisal can be conducted at Level III, but significant resource assessment and environmental appraisal takes place only at Levels IV and V. If Level I is selected as the appropriate level of U.S. activity in Antarctica, administration and funding problems will be inconsequential and no further decision is required. Under Level II, Department of Defense (DOD) involvement would not be so significant as to require decisions clarifying administrative and budgetary arrangements. Should it be concluded that either Level III, IV, or V is appropriate to protect and advance U.S. interests, decisions with respect to management and funding problems are required. With respect to management options, the group considered alternational arrangementsincluding those set forth in the. 1970 NSC Study, and concluded that the following three options represent viable alternatives at this time: CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -6- Option 1. National Science Foundation (NSF) is assigned the sole responsibility to manage and budget for all U.S. Antarctic activities, and for overall national program manage- ment. Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Trans- portation (DOT) are required to provide requested support on a cost reimbursable basis and to assure the continuing availability of essential components and the ability to augment them. This option closely correlates to the present arrange- ment. Several problems that are at the core of the current management and budget dilemma, which in turn was the genesis of this review, would remain. They are: a) The size of the Antarctic Program costs in relation to the basic science mission and total budget of the NSF; b) The requirement for a small civilian agency to justify the budget for opera- tional Navy units; and c) The separation of responsibility to provide funding from the authority to exercise control over operations and safety. Successful implementation of this option might require a separate appropriation from Congress, and would require a revision of previous decisions on manage- ment arrangements. Option 2. DOD and DOT are responsible for funding and manage- ment of respective logistic support components and operations while NSF is responsible for funding and managing the science program. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -7- Under this option, DOT would fund and manage all ice- breaker support and associated operations as identified. DOD would have the assigned mission to provide and to manage and budget for all other logistics. NSF would have similar responsibility for science. Each agency's assigned mission responsibility would be reflected in appropriate budget line items requiring corres- sponding management and cost justification. Overall program management is jointly conducted by a subgroup of the APG* made up of representatives of the three assigned agencies. Option 3. NSF is responsible for funding and managing the science program and NSF is required to fund and manage a portion of the logistic support. DOT is responsible for fund- ing and managing icebreaker support and associated operation as identified. DOD will have the assigned mission for the remainder. Suboptions are: Suboption A - NSF will fund all costs for operation of DOD units while deployed in the Antarctic Program and DOD will fund all other costs except those assigned to bot. This suboption is a logical division of the program in that DOD would determine all criteria for manning levels, train- ing, and operations of DOD units while not deployed to Antarctica. *Antarctic Policy Group CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -8- Suboption B - NSF would reimburse DOD for logistics directly in support of specific scientific projects. This suboption would tie NSF reimbursement only to logistic costs directly in support of specific scientific projects. Suboption C - NSF would reimburse DOD for all costs by the Naval Support Force, Antarctica organization, and DOD would fully fund all operations and training by the air support squadron. This suboption offers an organizational division that is consonant with the full time management of Antarctic program functions performed by the staff of the Naval Support Force. Because the line dividing costs in any of the suboptions under Option 3 cannot be clear and unambiguous, selection of option 3 would require an additional elaboration by OMB of the precise definition of the costs chargeable to NSF, DOD, and DOT. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL U.S. Policy And Program for Antarctica Contents Page I. Introduction 1 A. Policy Guidance 2 B. The Antarctic Resources Question 2 II. U.S. Presence in Relation to the Activities of Others 4 A. Military Implications of Antarctica 4 B. The U.S. Antarctic Program 5 1. Objectives of the United States 6 Antarctic Research Program (USARP) 2. The Current U.S. Antarctic Program 7 C. Other Aspects of the U.S. Presence 8 D. The Antarctic Programs of Other 8 Treaty Nations E. International Interest in Antarctica 9 F. Activities of Non-Consultative Parties 10 to the Treaty and Non-Parties III. Level of Activity and Arrangement for 12 Management and Funding for a U.S. Antarctic Program A. Options for Program Levels for U.S. 12 Antarctic Operations B. Management Options 25 Appendices: A. Juridical Positions of the Antarctic Treaty Parties B. U.S. Interests and Objectives in Antarctica C. OMB Circular A-51 (Revised) D. Recent Antarctic Program Trends of Antarctic Treaty Nations Annexes: 1. NSDM 71 2. NSDM 263 3. NSC Memorandum of May 20, 1975 4. Summary of 1970 NSC Study - U.S. Program in Antarctica CONFIDENTIAL XGDS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL U.S. Policy And Program For Antarctica NSC Memorandum of October 1 requested the Under Secretaries Committee, with the assistance of the Antarctic Policy Group to review U.S. political, economic security and scientific objec- tives in the Antarctic and to consider appropriate program levels and management arrangements for their attainment. The Memorandum called for presentation of options with respect to U.S. presence and level of activity in Antarctica and the necessary funding and management arrangements, together with their advantages and disadvantages and each agency's views and recommendations thereon. The review takes place in the context of the steady rise in support costs which calls into question the U.S. Antarctic program at a time of growing national and international interest in the resources of the Antarctic and of increased levels of activ- ity by other Antarctic treaty nations. I. Introduction Maintenance of the Antarctic Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty system is a basic U.S. policy objective. The Treaty and the consultative mechanism it created have been the instrumentsthrough which the United States has sought the satisfaction of its political, security, environmental, scientific, and economic objectives in Antarctica. Similarly, the preservation of our position that Antarctica is not subject to the sovereignty of any state is necessary for the protection of U.S. interests. It is only so long as Antarctica remains an international area that the United States will be free to pursue its national interests there. (See Appendix A) The Treaty offers a sound and very successful framework for pursuing political, security, scien- tific and environmental interests. The Treaty, however, did not address the question of a legal framework for the potential commercial exploitation of Antarctic resources. As the United States and other Antarctic nations have begun to define their economic interests in Antarctic resources, and signs appear that the United Nations may take an interest, the issue of an international legal regime for resource activities becomes linked to the con- tinued viability of all other U.S. interests and CONFIDENTIAL XGDS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -2- objectives, and especially the basic objective of maintenance of the Treaty. A. Policy Guidance General policy guidance for U.S. activities in Antarctica is contained in two NSDM's--No. 71 of 1970 and No. 263 of 1974. In NSDM 71 the President decided that the Antarctic presence should continued at a level which maintains an "active and influential" presence in Antarctica and which is responsive to U.S. scientific, economic and political objectives. An "active and in- fluential" presence in Antarctica has in the past been determined to be, among other things, year-round manning of both coastal and inland stations on the Continent. NSDM 263 reiterated the policy and added that the United States be prepared to augment such a presence as appro- priate. The policy directives in NSDM 263 were recently reaffirmed in an NSC Memorandum to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee dated May 20, 1975. The nature of an "active and influential" presence in Antarctica, thus, is limited to the achievement of U.S. interests in Antarctica. U.S. interests and objec- tives have been identified in above directives and are summarized in Appendix B. An "active and influential" presence in Antarctic is not anend in itself but a means of achieving U.S. objectives in Antarctica. The basic purpose of this review is to reassess this concept in light of recent developments affecting U.S. interests. These recent developments fall into three categories: national and international attention to the potential of Antarctic resources and possible legal regimes for their exploitation; the level of U.S. presence and activities in Antarctica relative to those of other interested nations; and the costs associated with con- tinuing U.S. activities at this or higher levels. B. The Antarctic Resources Question In a world increasingly short of energy and food, the possibility that Antarctica and the Southern Ocean may offer hydrocarbon and protein resources in commer- cially exploitable quantities has gained the attention of the Antarctic Treaty partners and other nations. In fact, the resource question has become one of the most important and possibly divisive issues for the future of the Antarctic Treaty system, and a major component in the policies of Treaty Parties. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -3- Data on the resource potential in Antarctica are limited and the full extent of that potential is yet to be established. Based on scientific studies of the geological origins of Antarctica and some geophysical surveys undertaken there, it is believed that there are hydrocarbon deposits in areas of the Antarctic con- tinental shelf which may become commercially exploitable. In addition, the Southern Ocean surrounding the Antarctic continent has the highest biological productivity of any marine area of the world. It supports a large stand- ing crop of krill, a small shrimp like crustacean, as well as stocks of squid, fish, whales, seals and marine birds. The level of U.S. presence and activity in Antarc- tica bears upon our ability to further evaluate our resource interests there. It directly affects our capa- city to determine and assess both the living and non- living resource potential of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean and the impact upon the Antarctic environment of possible resource exploitation. The extent and geographic dispersion of U.S. presence in Antarctica is also closely linked to the intensity with which we are perceived to maintain our juridical position on territorial claims and access to resources and, therefore, to our political and nego- tiating position in resolving the resource question. It is U.S. policy to seek an international arrangement for dealing with any commercial exploration and exploita- tion of Antarctic mineral resources. The development of such an arrangement, an issue which could not be resolved when the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated, will be an extremely difficult and delicate task. U.S. ability to achieve an acceptable resource regime is a function of our commitment to a full and active program in the Antarctic. For instance, it is likely that any significant reduction in our presence would limit our ability to influence the resource negotiation to our advantage. With regard to living resources, growing interest in krill and other living resource stocks in the Antarc- tic clearly signal that international arrangements will be needed to provide for rational management and conser- vation. Even if the U.S. never engages in actual exploi- tation of such stocks, we will need to protect our inter- ests in preservation of the unique ecosystem of the region. For this reason, and in order to protect our juridical position in the Treaty area, it is in U.S. interest to participate fully in development and imple- mentation of any such international arrangements. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -4- II. U.S. Presence in Relation to the Activities of Others A. Military Implications of Antarctic The history of the Antarctic has been unique in an almost total lack of military operations there other than those associated with logistic functions is support of national scientific programs. Increasing budgetary constrain and a narrowing of U.S. defense interests to areas of significant strategic importance makes it unlikely that the Antarctic continent will develop as a locus for U.S. military activity, either of a research and development nature or an operational nature. In the foreseeable future its inhospitable climate for both man and equipment and the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty are formidable constraints on the use of the Treaty area for U.S. offensive military operations. These considerations may not apply to Argentina. Nonetheless, the military feature of our logistic support is a traditional and accepted means of making the U.S. presence felt. It gives the U.S. a logistic flexibility and reach in the area which is presently unequalled by other countries and establishes U.S. ascendancy on the Continent in a manner which no other support capa- bility could ensure. An in-place military component, even though unarmed and modest as it is, clearly provides operational capability which no other country has should the Antarctic become the scene or object of discord. The U.S. military presence in Antarctica also serves the political purpose of maintaining U.S. lever- age on other countries to seek solutions to Antarctic problems in the context of the Treaty framework, ensur- ing that U.S. interests are accommodated in arriving at these solutions, and contributing to the ability of the U.S. to take a dominant leadership role in Antarctic affairs. If economically recoverable petroleum (or other minerals) should be found on the Antarctic continent or in Antarctic waters, the U.S. would insist on a right of access. However, if an international approach cannot be agreed upon, the U.S. could elect to exploit unilaterally since we believe it to be our legal right CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -5- to do so. If U.S. military is in the proximity in credible numbers, albeit unarmed and in a science support role, the likelihood of harassment of our commercial operations by claimant nations could be significantly diminished. On the other hand, the removal of the U.S. military presence could signal reduced U.S. interest in Antarctica and could result in an erosion of our effective role in Antarctic affairs. Such an action could, therefore, be counterproductive to the full range of U.S. interests. Moreover, once terminated, any reestablishment of U.S. military presence, even though for science support, might be seen as a ruse by the U.S. to introduce a military force as a guarantor for commercial operations to follow. This could cause major political problems for the U.S. B. The U.S. Antarctic Program NSDM 71 established the National Science Foundation as the agency responsible for funding and management of the U.S. Antarctic Program, and for the maintenance of the "active and influential" presence. The resulting OMB Circular A-51 (revised) details the responsibilities of NSF to include funding of logistic support activities except where such services are funded by the Departments of Defense or Transportation or other agencies. NSF is further authorized to draw on logistic support capabili- ties of government agencies on a mutually agreed reim- bursement or non-reimbursement basis or to use commer- cial or other capabilities if they are most cost effective. (See Appendix C.) The cost of NSF's activities in Antarctica will rise from approximately $30 million in FY 1976 to $45 million in FY 1977. Of this, about 90 percent will be for logistical support to maintain the U.S. presence. Under present budgeting practices, spiraling logistics costs threaten to force significant curtailment of the U.S. Antarctic Research Program (USARP), a course of events which would result in a significant reduction or absence of a viable U.S. presence on the Continent. This U.S. presence in Antarctica centers on the National Science Foundation's scientific research program at the present time. The extent and location of these scientific research activities are only determined in CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -6- part by scientific considerations. The opening of a station at the South Pole at a construction cost of $6 million was not justified by scientific considera- tions alone. Other relevant factors included the pres- tige and leadership of manning a year-round station at the South Pole where six of the seven territorial claims meet. 1. Objectives of the United States Antarctic Research Program (USARP) The objective of the United States Antarctic Research Program (USARP), the science component of the U.S. program is to support the research necessary to acquire a full understanding of the complex and inter- related characteristics of this polar continent and their interrelationship with the rest of the world. The Antarctic is geographically isolated but it is now known to be geologically similar to other southern hemisphere continents and to have an extremely important influence and interaction with the global atmospheric and oceanic systems. The accumulation of ice contains a record of the earth's past climate, and the isolation of the continent provides a natural laboratory for the sutdy of variation in atmospheric composition and dis- tribution of pollutants. The exploration phase of research was followed by a broad assessment of biological, geological, meteoro- logical, glaciological, and atmospheric components of the Antarctic environment. We are now entering a phase of research directed toward analysis of specific pro- blems in the various disciplines. The survey of the seas around Antarctica continues. These research efforts to date have provided basic data essential to solving special scientific problems as they relate to the Antarctic specifically and to the understanding of the role of the Antarctic in the total earth environment. NSF is charged with the responsibility for all aspects of developing and implementing an integrated U.S. program for Antarctica. Resource assessment and environmental appraisal will continue to be a component of the long range program. The assessment of resources has just begun. The necessity to increase our knowledge of these resources is recognized and will be an essential element of USARP in the coming years. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -7- The Antarctic environment is unique. The possibility of resource development and exploitation requires a care- ful analysis of the effects of such activity on this environment. An assessment of these possible environ- mental effects is acknowledged as a necessary component of the continuing U.S. program in Antarctica. Underlying these objectives and related to the NSF responsibility of managing a national program in Antarc- tica, are the policy objectives and our responsibilities for international cooperation and information exchange. In this regard, the exchange program for scientists in Antarctica takes on special significance. The summer and winter placement of U.S. scientists at stations of other countries, including Soviet stations, not only greatly enhances the scientific cooperation called for by the Antarctic Treaty, but provides an informal but no less effective on-going means of verification of Treaty compliance by others. Likewise, foreign scien- tists at U.S. stations perform the same function. 2. The Current U.S. Antarctic Program The United States operates four year-round stations in Antarctica. McMurdo, the logistic hub for support of all other stations except Palmer, is the largest with an average summer population of 800 and a winter popu- lation of less than 50. Pole and Palmer Stations are smaller, each having a winter population of 20 or less. Siple Station is a very compact remote installation with a winter population of only 5. It has been operated in the summer since 1969 and became a year-round station in 1973. In addition to the stations, there are two research ships; the R/V Hero, operated as part of the Antarctic Peninsula and Palmer Station program, and the Islas Orcadas (formerly USNS Eltanin) now operated by the Argentine Navy on which the U.S. program is allocated 100 days per year for oceanographic research in the Southern Ocean. Other research vessels from the academic fleet have operated south of 60°S, particularly in the Drake Passage area. During the austral summer, field camps may be established at verious locations or. the continent to support research activities. Air support consists of five ski-equipped LC-130 aircraft (only 3 are currently operational) and 7 UHIN helicopters. Movement to and from the continent is by Military Airlift Command charter flight (C-141 or com- mercial charter). In addition, during the past three CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -8- seasons, Twin Otter aircraft, either chartered from civilian operators or operated by the British Antarctic Survey, have been used on the Ross Ice Shelf. Icebreaker support has consisted of two icebreakers deployed south of 60°S for about 75 days each year and have been utilized to open the channel through the sea ice to McMurdo and for scientific work. Two cargo ships, one dry cargo (USNS Pvt. John R. Towle) and one tanker (USNS Maumee) visit McMurdo each year. C. Other Aspects of the U.S. Presence U.S. presence is augmented by periodic inspections under ACDA auspices in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty. The U.S. has carried out four inspection tours of bases maintained in Antarctica by other Treaty parties. The purpose of inspections is to verify that the activities of other Treaty parties are carried out in full compliance with Treaty terms, and in particular that such activities are for peaceful purposes and that no weaponry testing, military manuevers or any other such military activity takes place within the Treaty area. Article VII, like several other of the Treaty terms, has become a precedent for certain arms control agreements which similarly provide for verification, e.g. the Outer Space Treaty and the Seabed Treaty. A reduction of the U.S. presence would inhibit capabilities for inspections, especially those of inland stations. A removal of the U.S. presence, and specifically the abandonment of U.S. stations, would have other nega- tive aspects of a geopolitical consequence. Were the U.S., for example, to close the new and prestigious South Pole station, there is reason to believe that the Soviet Union and possibly others, would seriously contemplate taking it over, and the U.S. would have no legal means to prevent it. Additionally, if any claim- ant nation, such as UK, France or Argentina, were to replace the U.S. at the South Pole station it would have the effect of reinforcing its claim, with attendant neg- ative political consequences for U.S. interests. D. The Antarctic Programs of the Other Treaty Nations Nine other Treaty nations regularly conduct research CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -9- at permanent stations, in the field, and from ships within the Treaty area. Most of these national programs have not changes appreciably in size during the last decade. The exception is the Soviet Union, whose strong long-term upward trend in the scale of their program activity contrasts sharply with this overall picture. The USSR seems to have been the first country to have committed program resources in recognition of the eco- nomic potential of Antarctica. (See Appendix D.) The Antarctic programs of most of the other Treaty nations have been subject to close management and budge- tary review during the last several years. Partly in response to this pressure, several -- and possibly all -- national programs have increasingly been justified on the basis of immediate and potential economic bene- fits to be derived. At the same time there has been a growing worldwide awareness of the area's potential living and mineral resources. Taken together, these factors have caused a detectable shift in Antarctic pro- gram priorities, and they may have prevented a deemphasis of Antarctic research. There is no evidence that any country has yet con- ducted mineral exploration with purely commercial intent. Geological research has been basically scientific in nature, although several countries note that their goal is to lay the groundwork for future economic resource surveys. This later theme seems to be more prevalent in the last several years. The most dramatic increase in reconnaissance geological surveys occurred in the 1971-72 Soviet expedition when a four-year field program was begun in the Australian claimed territory. This field program is being transferred to an area within the Argentine and British claims during the present summer season. Although there has been no commercial mineral activity, several countries, including the U.S. have received inquiries from petroleum and mining firms seeking infor- mation on the Antarctic legal situation or actual licenses to operate within Antarctica. In all cases this commercial interest was reportedly discouraged. E. International Interest in Antarctica Antarctica is increasingly gaining the attention of international organizations and countries which have not hitherto demonstrated an active interest in the area. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -10- This interest is stimulated by interlinked concerns about the environment, resources, and, to some extent, desires to internationalize the Antarctic for broader political reasons. At the current session of the of the UNGA, for example, the stage was set for an ini- tiative next year by Sri Lanka for a resolution extend- ing UN jurisdiction to Antarctica. Such a move by the UN could tacitly recognize the territorial claims to the detriment of the U.S. position on the continent. The twelve Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties have long opposed any UN involvement in Antarctica, in part because of the potential for disruption of the delicate balance of political and juridical positions of the twelve. 1975 also saw the inscription, for the first time, of an item on Antarctica in the United Nations's Environ- mental Program's (UNEP) planned activities. The reaction of the Treaty signatories was uniformly negative. The item was removed. A UK aide memoire to all treaty signatory capitals, expressing a view held in many of those capitals, characterized the UNEP plans as either "ignorant meddling or a conscious attempt by the UNEP Secretariat to usurp the functions and responsibilities of all those nations who are active in, and knowledgable about, the area, who are signatories to the Antarctic Treaty." F. Activities of Non-Consultative Parties to the Treaty and Non-Parties Seven countries have acceded to the Antarctic Treaty since it was signed on December 1, 1959. They are: Poland (1969) ; Czechoslovakia (1962) ; Denmark (1965) ; Netherlands (1967) ; Romania (1971) ; German Democratic Republic (1974) ; and Brazil (1975) None has conducted the substantial scientific activity in Antarctica to qualify it for consultative status under Article IX, para 2 of the Treaty, i.e. the right to participate in the periodic Consultative meetings, although nationals of all or most have participated in expeditions of various of the twelve treaty signatories. Of the seven, only Brazil--whose accession appears to have been keyed to an effort to participate in the 1975 Eighth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, may be seriously consider- ing a science program which would give it consultative status. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL Brazil's accession is of significance primarily because its membership in the treaty presumably puts to rest the apprehensions of other Treaty parties, particularly Chile, Argentina and the UK, that Brazil might assert a territorial claim in Antarctica, since such action is prohibited by the Treaty. pnisoqqo Non-party activity in the Treaty Area has so far been limited to the field of living marine resources. The Federal Republic of Germany is deploying a research vessel to Antarctica this year to survey krill and other marine living resources and there are indications that South Korea is interested as well. Broadening of the membership in the treaty has the obvious advantage of widening international accept- ance of its regime as a legitimate and viable instru- ment. 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CONFIDENTIAL -12- III. Level of Activity and Arrangement for Management and Funding for a U.S. Antarctic Program There is disagreement among concerned agencies which focuses on the overall funding and management of the U.S. Antarctic Program and the role of agencies involved. The opposing contention may be stated in brief as: (1) In the absence of a formally assigned military mission in the Antarctic, DOD antarctic logistic support components and their operations exist only to support the NSF program and their total costs must be reimbursed on a year round basis; and (2) NSDM-71 and OMB Circular A-51 (revised) assign mission responsibility to DOD as well as to other agencies for joint conduct of a national program for Antarctica, and that DOD therefore has an associated funding responsibility such as budgeting the costs of assuring the continuing availability of essential support components. It is essential that there be a conclusive resolution of this question, for it may be foreseen that in the absence of an assigned DOD mission to provide and manage logistic operations in Antarctica these functions will probably be forced by budget and management realities to be retrenched and civilian- ized, and that this change will be irreversable. Further, the question must be resolved within the context of the desired administrative arrangement and level of activities of the U.S. program in Antarctica. Therefore, descriptions of alternative activity Levels and management system are presented below, with Management Options presented in the subsequent Section IV. A. Options for Program Levels for U.S. Antarctic Operations The level of U.S. activity in the Antarctic during the years since the 1970 study, as expressed by the scientific program, has fluctuated as it reacted to budgetary levels. The support costs for the United States Program in Antarctica are basically fixed costs that are affected only slightly by an increased science program activity. Conversely, if there are budget cuts or restrictions it is the science program activity that is cut the most as the fixed costs, the logistics, cannot be greatly reduced. In the 1970 study, seven levels of activity were considered. The price tag on these varied from $7.0 million to $42.0 million (expressed in 1970 dollars). The level recommended was Level V, CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -13- or a continuation of the then existing level of activity. The cost attached to this level of activity consisted of components funded at that time by NSF, DOD, and DOT. For the purposes of this study, five levels of activity have been considered. Level III of this study equates to Level V of the 1970 study and to FY 75 level of activity. The costs are given in FY 77 dollars as identified by the agencies involved (NSF, DOD, and DOT). Level I ($3.5 million) can be accomplished with DOT and civilian contractor support of the NSF science activities. This level involves no year round manned stations, no heavy- lift aircraft, little if any international science cooperation, and no ability to inspect inland stations of other countries. noo Level II ($23.5 million) adds two year round coastal stations and helicopter support at McMurdo. DOD support for the McMurdo operation is desirable but not essential. At this level, science activities could be expanded some but they would be limited in geographical scope. Little, if any, resource assessment, either of living resources or mineral resources, would be possible. No ability to inspect inland stations of other countries. Little if any international exchange possible. Level III ($45.0 million) relates to the average level of U.S. activity the past five years (see discussion, page and includes two coastal and two inland stations manned year round). Token resource assessment is possible under present guidelines which call for a balanced science program. Heavylift aircraft capability is essential to support the inland stations and requires a logistical support base at McMurdo, New Zealand, etc. International exchange and cooperation at present level. Level IV ($53.0 million) requires the same logistic base as Level III but provides funding for maximum utilization of that base by the science activity. A leased research vessel, suitable for polar work, is added and could be utilized for resource assessment on the continental shelves and in the seas around Antarctica (both living and mineral resources). A greatly increased international exchange program would be possible. Level V ($60.0 million) increases the logistic base by adding additional air elements and a new station. At this level a concentrated effort on resource assessment in addition to the CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -14- balanced science program would be possible. A network of automatic stations would be deployed at preselected sites on the Continent. At Levels III, IV, or V DOD participation in operation and management of the logistic system is essential. This is true from an operational and cost-efficiency point of view. (In section II.A. above the national interest value and political utility of military presence were discussed.) There are certainly some elements of the logistics program that could be contracted to civilian sources, in addition to the contractor operations which already exist. However, the time constraints imposed by this study have precluded the opportunity to obtain realistic estimates of cost for this mode of operation. There are some vital elements, such as the intra-continental (ski LC-130) airlift and ice- strengthened supply ships, that are uniquely a DOD capability. bebasqxe ed blood seitivijos 11 [soldqstpoep to III Isvel .2.0 bennsm basini bns bas ai themasesss (Балот B sentIeblug at S ($22) VI Isvel to tud III Isvel A teds bestItu bluoo bns bebbs at eIdstive ni bits Istranismos Isignim pnivil bruots 8592 bluow үӏјбетр A V 6 CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -15- LEVEL I TOKEN PRESENCE Costs (Thousands of dollars) ; a) Science $ 1,100 b) Support 2,350 Total $ 3,450 Major Elements: USCG Icebreaker for 90 days R/S Hero for year round operations Program: One USCG icebreaker would deploy below 60° south latitude for a 90 day period each austral summer. Approximately 10 scientists deploy with the icebreaker to conduct a small multidiscipline marine and terrestrial science program. Helicopters and small boats would allow landings at research sites in the coastal areas of Antarctica. Inspection of foreign stations, to verify treaty compliance, could be conducted as required. The R/S Hero will operate in her present mode on a year round basis, but without the resources normally available to her at Palmer Station. Significant Impacts: Abandonment of all stations. Would evidence greatly reduced U.S. interests in Antarctica. Possible takeover by Soviet Union and other countries of U.S. assets. No scientific support for resource assessment. Minimal marine and terrestrial research projects at coastal locations. No inter-continental or intra-continental airlift. Limited inspection capability at foreign coastal stations only. Very limited international cooperation, if any. No significant environmental monitoring CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -16- LEVEL II MARGINAL PRESENCE Costs (Thousands of dollars) ; a) Science $ 3,000 b) Support 20,500 Total $23,500 Major Elements: McMurdo Station Palmer Station 2 USCG Icebreakers for 90 days each R/S Hero UHIN Helicopters at McMurdo Charter cargo ships and/or charter aircraft Program: At this level we can maintain two coastal stations on a year round basis and conduct a productive, but geographically confined science program during the austral summer season. McMurdo Station and Palmer Station would operate year round at the current winterover level. The notable addition at this level would be the UHIN helicopter support at McMurdo for a four to five month period during the austral summer. As many as 125 scientific personnel could participate in a variety of field projects in and around McMurdo, at Palmer Station, and aboard the icebreakers and the R/S Hero. Transportation of personnel and supplies would be accomplished using a mixture of charter ships and aircraft for intercontinental transport. Significant Impacts Appearance of substantially reduced U.S. interests in Antarctica. Possible takeover by the Soviet Union or others of South Pole station. No significant scientific support for resource assessment. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -17- -81- Productive, but geographically confined research 111 program, at coastal locations only. No intra-continental airlift. 10 No inland stations. Limited inspection capability at foreign coastal stations only. Opportunities for international cooperation increased over Level I but still limited. NO winter over exchange scientist. No significant environmental appraisal. 10[5M объльмом 26 9109 elqi2 појјвја eyső De IOT S OISH г\я 1x2 081-01 2 MIHU a (bessel) 1930 niwT I disconts bas agida refied) (aysb 001) esbsoro asiaI berbaud 00S juods wolls IIiw Isvel sinT 3 J5 doisseer bieit combract of enstoindost bas ИIHU 108598 Isiteus 9dd patrub blett to объшмом Sauois bns ni ebivorq neo 780 1950 niwT beasel S brts sisuotis 081-0J bris wy bavoxs aetie bleit 35 bleit con- ni ins ,alesd bruor 159Y B по ass oreH з\я to S Jioqque USD remis9 d.t.iw from with nt adostorg bris эліташ .Temmus Isrjaus 900 palaub slvenineq утельл cottox to S wolls IIiw fevel aidT asíal GAS to molisiego edj of noillim Hed эпо beau x IIIw smit to eyst 001 enT .asbsox0 35 bemis enitem of fA- edj to nottelgmoo BJOSQMI Inspitimpia At .8.0 At epnedo on Dosimil CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -18- LEVEL III ACTIVE RESENCE Costs (Thousands of dollars) : a) Science $ 100 41 100 b) Support Total $45 100 Major Elements: McMurdo Station South Pole Station Siple Station Palmer Station 2 Icebreakers for 90 days each R/S Hero 5 LC-130 Ski Aircraft 5 UHIN Helicopters 1 Twin Otter (Leased) Charter cargo ships and charter aircraft Islas Orcadas (100 days) Program: This level will allow about 200 hundred scientists and technicians to conduct field research at c variety of field sites during the austral summer seasor UHIN helicopters can provide support in and around weMurdo and LC-130 aircraft and a leased Twin Otter car support field research at remote field sites around the continent. R/S Hero can operate on a year round basis, and in con- sort with Palmer Station, can support a variet: of marine and terrestrial research projects in the Antarctic Peninsula during the austral summer. This level will allow a contribution of approx:mately one half million dollars to the operation of the Islas Orcadas. The 100 days of research time will be used to support multidisciplinary marine research a:med at completion of the circum-Antarctic Survey. Significant Impacts Reflects no change in U.S. interests in Antarctica. : Limited scientific support for resource assessment. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL MOO -19--0S- Productive multidiscipline research program at two coastal and two inland stations, at a number of field locations and aboard two ocean research platforms augmented by an icebreaker research platform. Compares to FY 75 program level. Inter-continental and intra-continental airlift FY 75 level. Four (4) permanent stations (2 inland). Inspection capability at foreign coastal and inland stations. International cooperation greatly increased over Level II. Winter over exchange scientist program possible. No substantive environmental appraisal. S 2\я 1x2 a siefqooileH ИIHU 2 (beased) I (beased) I bris oilijnsios wolls Iltw Ievel aidT to III level ISVO yjivijos to yd Jroqque eldsItsvs beasel 5 025 toods 065 Isvel JB mexporq edT 903 bleit rs E bns Ifiw Isrjavs stomer ¡III Isvel ni 86 grit risum ed Illw paigqsm Бля paianes Iliw 85915 befoeleserq to olmatea S bas al beasef srit bas seitificst to paibszpqu 9113 beecong wen to S to CONFIDENTIAL to Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -20- LEVEL IV EXPANDED PRESENCE Costs (Thousands of dollars): a) Science $ 9,000 b) Support 44,000 Total $53,000 Major Elements: McMurdo Station South Pole Station Siple Station Palmer Station 2 USCG Icebreakers for 90 days each R/S Hero 5 LC-130 Ski aircraft 5 UHIN Helicopters 1 Twin Otter (Leased) 1 Research Ship (Leased) Charter cargo ships and charter aircraft Islas Orcadas (100 days) Program: This level will allow for an increase in scientific activity over Level III by the maximum utilization of available support resources complemented by the use of a leased research ship. The program at this level can support about 250 scientists and technicians in the field during the austral summer season. The field activities will be much the same as in Level III, but airborne remote sensing and mapping will be substantially increased, and a marine seismic survey of preselected areas will commence using the leased survey ship. In addition, the upgrading of existing facilities and the design of new facilities will proceed. Significant Impacts Reflects a slight increase in overall U.S. interests in Antarctica and Antarctic resources. Research program increased over Level III by maximum utilization of available support capability. Upgrading of existing facilities and design of new facilities will occur. Reproduced at the Richard Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL СОИ -21- Inter-continental and intra-continental airlift will increase to accommodate increase in number of scientific personnel. Inspection capability at foreign coastal and inland stations. 000 International cooperation increased over Level III. Increased capability for environmental appraisal. 000 Leased research ship will allow seismic surveys for resource assessment. хојьм OBIUMOM sloq 2007 elqi2 19ml69 WSN aysb 00 020 S OISH 2\я ixa a NIHU a atwT S (Jaempus Isnosse2) JISTOTIS E-q I (beased) qirls I jisuonis brus aqide OPISO (eysb 001) esbaot0 86/81 10169891 10 појальqхе 9dd 107 wolls Iliw Isvel eidT bejsoljeldgoa to grit bas seltivijos 889825 vísjsupebs of бехіпрэт palanea stomer 9dd to [sitnejoq nssso bas -pie seseroni fliw patqqsm brus palanea entodriA 1510q W9A IS to noijourjanoo рліблеч 917 , ievel ains Js consumos IIIw doldw gide STOM beyoíqme ed Iliw emrolisiq beasef eldsItsvs to .VI Isvel J5 asds yIevianejxe Illw seitilios] to pnibsxpqw edT wen 6 bns OBTOMOM ts ad Iliw ad IIIw notista edd driw bebasqxe sd His vullidegeo enolisiego TIS sdT dismonis beqqiupe-ixe owd to basdown 1.0.9) ts beosiq Bennsmnu to A CONFIDENTIAL bejoelessiq Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -22- LEADING PRESENCE LEVEL V Costs (Thousands of dollars): a) Science $ 11,000 b) Support 49,000 Total $ 60,000 Major Elements: McMurdo Station South Pole Station Siple Station Palmer Station New Station 2 USCG Icebreakers for 90 days each R/S Hero 5 LC-130 ski aircraft 5 UHIN Helicopters 2 Twin Otters 1 P-3 aircraft (Seasonal augment) 1 Research Ship (Leased) Charter cargo ships and charter aircraft Islas Orcadas (100 days) Program: This level will allow for the expansion of research activities and the commencement of sophisticated remote sensing surveys required to adequately assess the earth and ocean resource potential of the antarctic. Airborne remote sensing and mapping will increase sig- nificantly. Pending construction of a new polar survey ship which will commence at this level, the utilization of available leased platforms will be employed more extensively than at Level IV. The upgrading of facilities will continue. New research laboratories will be constructed at McMurdo, and a new research station will be started. The air operations capability will be expanded with the purchase of two intermediate ski-equipped aircraft (e.g., Twin Otters). A network of unmanned observatories will be placed at preselected sites throughout Antarctica. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -23-AS- .2.U ЗѴӀТАИЯЗТЈА Significant Impacts Reflects substantial increase in U.S. interests regarding all aspects of Antarctica. обтимом Significant increase in resource assessment. Research program further expanded over Levels III and IV by increase in remote sensing and mapping activities. Inter-continental and intra-continental airlift increased over Level IV to accommodate increase in airborne remote sensing program. Four (4) permanent stations (2 inland) Start well design/construction of a new inland station. Inspection capability at foreign coastal and inland stations. Significant increase in environmental appraisal. X X X X 2019H MIHU X X niwT (beased) ASTOTIA E-g (beased) bas aqida asbsonO 86121 (beased) well (I) (S) JAITMEGIAMOO Reproduced at the Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -24- ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM LEVELS FOR U.S. ANTARCTIC OPERATIONS LEVEL I LEVEL II LEVEL III LEVEL IV LEVEL V McMurdo X X X X South Pole X X x Siple X X X Palmer X X X X New Station X (1) Icebreakers X X X X X R/S Hero X X X X X LC- 130s X X X UHIN Helos X X X X Twin Otter X X X (Leased) Twin Otter X P-3 Aircraft X (2) (Leased) Charter cargo X X X X ships and aircraft Islas Orcadas X X X Research Ship X X (Leased) New Research X (1) Ship (1) Start design and procurement/construction. (2) Aircraft augment for remote sensing CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -25- B. Management Options Under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, all signatories including those with territorial claims agreed that any other signatory could utilize any portion of the Antarctic Treaty area for scientific purposes. While the Treaty does not prohibit other activities in the Treaty area, except for nuclear weapons, the territorial claimants are not bound by the Treaty to accept presence for activities other than science. Therefore, to the extent that U.S. interests in Antarctica require a presence, the justification for such presence is the conduct of scientific investigations. The 1970 study considered six alternative management plans: Management/Funding Plans From the 1970 NSC Study Plan A - Pre-1972 arrangements; DOD management and budgeting of logistics, NSF for science. Plan B - Same except DOD support costs fully reimbursed by NSF. Plan C - NSF assigned overall program management and funding drawing on other agencies' support on a mutually acceptable reimburs- able or nonreimbursable basis. (selected for decision in 1971). Plan D - Transfer budget and funding for logistics to another (third) agency. Plan E - NSF fund both science and logistics using commercial sources. Plan F - Establish an Antarctic Commission to administer the total program. Plan C was selected as the best alternative at that time. The implementation of this Plan required revision of OMB Circular A-51. NSF was to budget for both science and support programs to support university and federal agency research programs, to draw upon other government agencies for logistic support on a mutually acceptable reimbursable or nonreimburs- able basis, and to use commercial support when cost effective. Reproduced at the Richard CONFIDENTIAL Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -26- NSF and DOD do not agree on the interpretation of NSDM 71 and 263 and on the intent of OMB Circular A-51 (Revised) The option selected in the 1970 study, Plan C, was a realistic and workable funding arrangement. However, over time, the practice has evolved into what essentially was Plan B. The 1970 decision was interpreted by OMB Circular A-51 (Revised) and required reimbursement for direct support costs previously identified in DOD budgets as Deep Freeze. However, since that time, indirect costs of support not previously indentified by DOD as being part of the Deep Freeze budget have been transferred to the NSF budget. Thus, all costs including such items as the off-season costs of personnel and rotation and training, costs of supporting the air base where the support squadron is homeported, etc., are being transferred to NSF. This transfer of all costs direct and indirect, associated with DOD logistic support for the U.S. Antarctic Program is justified by DOD on the basis that there is no DOD mission in Antarctica and, absent a directive to provide support, DOD assets committed to the U.S. Program will be eliminated. In addition, DOD considers that it is under constraints placed by the House Appropriations Committee not to use DOD funds for the Antarctic Program (See Attachment Plan C and the enabling OMB Circular involved an initial budget base transfer of $19.3 million from DOD to NSF. In the ensuing years, additional support elements have been identified by DOD and approved by OMB as fully reimbursable by NSF. In FY 76, an addition of $3.5 million was made, and for FY 77, an addi- tional $5.1 million will be transferred. In the meantime, the original $19.3 million has increased because of inflation to about $26.0 million despite significant reduction in the support services provided by DOD. The result of these events has been that the budget responsibility for the total U.S. program in Ant- arctica has become a disproportionate part of the budget for NSF. As a result of the shift in funding arrangements, NSF, a small civilian agency, finds itself in the anomalous position of being totally responsible for the budget justification and funding for Navy units. While the present arrangements are unsatisfactory, nevertheless it is apparent that the capability to sustain and to be pre- pared to augment an active and influential presence in Ant- arctica requires the depth and flexibility of DOD resources. While it might be possible to restructure a portion of this level of capability and base it on commercial services, such restructuring would result in an unnecessary duplication of an already available national resource. The withdrawal of the DOD elements would have a detrimental effect on the U.S. presence in Antarctica. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -27- The analysis and definition of six alternative management plans (Plans A through F) as presented in the 1970 review failed to foresee several crucial eventualities. First, the "mutually agreeable reimbursable or nonreimbursable" basis for NSF use of essential support components from other agencies has evolved to the extreme of full reimburse- ment to DOD. Clearly this was not the intent of the recom- mendation made by the 1970 study. This has caused an untenable management anomaly in which a small civilian agency is totally responsible for budget justification and funding for an operational Navy squadron; a squadron that is required to respond to the administrative and operational control of a military chain of command. At the same time, it would be equally infeasible for the NSF to fully function in the role of operational and adminis- trative authority over a military unit. For example, this would have NSF prescribing the mission and tasks for the squadron and establishing criteria for manning training, employment, etc. While these elements are the justification for funding, they are inseparable from the military purview. It should be noted that this full reimbursement situation is exactly that defined as Plan B in the 1970 study; a plan rejected in the report of that study. Options If Level I is selected as the appropriate level of U.S. activity in Antarctica, administration and funding problems will be inconsequential and no further decision is required. Under Level II, DOD involvement would not be so significant as to require decisions clarifying administrative and budgetary arrangements. Should it be concluded that either Level III, IV, or V is appropriate to protect and advance U.S. interests, decisions with respect to management and funding problems are required. There are three options: NSF serves as the sole budgetary source of funds for all U.S. activities in Antarctica, funding for all antarctic support activities is borne by DOD and DOT, or DOD and DOT are required to bear a portion of the costs. Option 1. NSF is assigned the sole responsibility to manage and budget for all U.S. antarctic activities, and for overall national program management. DOD and DOT are required to provide CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -28- requested support on a cost reimbursable basis and to assure the continuing availability of essential components and the ability to augment them. Civilian contractors could be used when cost effective. (At Level III: NSF $45.0M, DOD $0.0M, DOT $0.0M; at Level IV: NSF $53.0M, DOD $0.0M, DOT $0.0M). Discussion: This option involves several problems that are at the core of the current management and budget dilemma, which in turn was the genesis of the current review. They are: a) The size of the Antarctic Program costs in relation to the basic science mission and total budget of the NSF; b) The require- ment for a small civilian agency to justify the budget for operational Navy units; and c) The separation of responsibi- lity to provide funding from the authority to exercise con- trol over operations and safety. It may be possible for the budget problem to be resolved by use of a separate appropriation that could be the subject of special oversight by appropriate entities of the Congress, OMB, and the National Science Foundation. With respect to the other problems it is important to review the previous decision on management arrangements and the sub- sequent developments. Moreover, this difficulty can be expected to lead to a further diminished role and possible exclusion of DOD participation, as indicated by the trend since 1971. Meanwhile, the capa- bility to sustain and to be prepared to augment an active and influential presence in Antarctica requires the depth and flexibility of DOD resources in logistics, management, and related functions. Option 2. DOD and DOT are responsible for full funding and management of respective logistic support components and operations while NSF is responsible for funding and managing the science pro- gram. Overall program management is jointly conducted by a subgroup of the Antarctic Policy Group made up of representatives of the three assigned agencies. (At Level III: NSF $5.0M, DOD $38.5M, DOT $1.5M; at Level IV: NSF $9.0M, DOD $42.5M, DOT $1.5M). CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -29- Discussion: Under this option, DOT would fund and manage all icebreaker support and associated operations as identified. DOD would have the assigned mission to provide and to manage and budget for all other logistics. NSF would have similar responsibility for science. The budget problem would be solved under this option as each agency would have an assigned mission responsibility reflected in appropriate budget line items and requiring corresponding management and cost justification. The program management subgroup of the APG would be composed of NSF, DOD, and DOT representatives. In order to assure continuity in the overall program and to continue to manifest scientific research as the principal public and international expression of U.S. interest in the Antarctic, NSF will chair this management subgroup. Option 3. NSF is responsible to fund and manage the science program. In addition, NSF is required to fund and manage a portion of the logistic support, DOT is responsible to fund and manage icebreaker support and associated operations as identified, and DOD will have the assigned mission to fund and manage the remainder of logistic support. Suboption A. - NSF will fund all costs for operation of DOD and DOT units while deployed in the Antarctic Program and DOD will fund all other costs, except those assigned to DOT. (At Level III: NSF $34.5M, DOD $9.0M, DOT $1.5M; at Level IV: NSF $42.5M, DOD $9.0M, DOT $1.5M). Suboption B. - NSF would reimburse DOD only for logistics directly in support of specific scientific projects. (At Level III: NSF $6.1M, DOD $37.4M, DOT $1.5M; at Level IV: NSF $10.1M, DOD $41.4M, DOT $1.5M). Suboption C. - NSF would reimburse DOD for all costs by the Naval Support Force, Antarctica organization, and DOD would fully fund all operations and training by Antarctic Development Squadron Six (VXE-6). CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -30- (At Level III: NSF $32.7M, DOD $10.8M, DOT $1.5M; at Level IV: NSF $40.2M, DOD $11.3M, DOT $1.5M). DILE Discussion: As in all the other options, the APG would provide policy direction. The APG subgroup for exercise of program manage- ment would also be appropriate under this option and it would be chaired by the NSF. Suboption A is a logical division of the program in that DOD would determine all criteria for manning levels, training, and operations of DOD units while not deployed to Antarctica. Program costs reimbursed by NSF would be only those for deployed operations in Antarctica. Suboption B would tie NSF reimbursement only to logistics costs directly in support of specific science projects. Suboption C offers an organizational division that is consonant with the full time management of antarctic program functions performed by the staff of the Naval Support Force. Another variation could be generated by interchanging the two units in suboption C. Because the line dividing costs in any of the suboptions under option 3 cannot be clear and unambiguous, selection of option 3 would require an additional elaboration by OMB of the precise definition of the costs chargeable to NSF and to DOD. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Appendix A CONFIDENTIAL JURIDICAL POSITIONS OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY PARTIES to Seven countries had made territorial claims in Antarctica prior to signature of the Antarctic Treaty. These were Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the U.K. The claims of three of these countries, Argentina, Chile and the U.K., overlap and conflict in certain portions of Antarctica. The United States has not recognized claims of territorial sovereignty asserted by any country over any portion of Antarctica. At the same time, the United States has not made a claim itself, and has consistently reserved all its basic historic rights in Antarctica. All states with territorial claims in Antarctica, as well as the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan Belgium and South Africa, constitute the twelve signatory parties to the Antarctic Treaty. Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty sets aside the claims issue in the interest of international cooperation for the duration of the Treaty, or until 1995. Thus, for the purposes of activities under the Treaty, disputes and interna- tional discord which would otherwise result from the incompatible juridical positions of the interested states are avoided. For other activities, such as exploitation of mineral resources and the marine living resources of the Southern Ocean, it can be expected that the States concerned would react to such activities in accordance with their respective juridical positions on territorial claims, i.e., would seek to exclude others from conducting such activities in their claimed territory and adjacent maritime zones of coastal State competence. The Antarctic Treaty is thus the framework within which the U.S. and others pursue their national interests in the Antarctic. Article I establishes that Antarctica will be used for peaceful purposes and prohibits any measures of a military nature, including establishing bases, conducting military maneuvers, weapons tests, or nuclear explosions of any kind, although the use of mili- tary personnel for logistical support and other peaceful purposes is permitted. Articles II and III establish freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and encourage international cooperation in the conduct thereof. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. A CONFIDENTIAL 2. Other provisions preserve the status of high seas around Antarctica, prohibit the dumping of nuclear waste within the Treaty area, establish the right of each Consultative Party to carry out inspections in all parts of the continent to verify compliance with, inter alia, the demilitarization provisions of Article I, and establish a consultative mechanism through which the twelve original signatory parties recommend measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty, including environmental protection measures. to emisio bestmposes Joa and 893532 betinu 9dT ISVO уль yd үјпріэтэvог Ístrojinst betinu ,9mlj этъа 9dj JA .soljotajná to подлод YM6 and bris mislo 5 9bsm don asd 293512 ni ejdpiz oiasd 831 IIs beviered ni emisio djiw 893638 IIA nsqst ,noinu telvo8 and bettnu and 86 Ilew as yTojBapia gviewj 9dj ,BOITTA 20071 Бля muiple8 edd to VI . 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Appendix B CONFIDENTIAL U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN ANTARCTICA Existing directives on U.S. Antarctic Policy provide adequate expression of U.S. interests in Antarctica applic- able to the present and foreseeable future. These interests are summarized below under three headings: political and security, environmental and scientific, and economic. 1. Political and Security -- Ensure that activities in Antarctica serve peaceful purposes only; -- Prevent Antarctica from becoming a scene or object of international discord; -- Continue the model of cooperative and harmonious international relations which has developed among interested states in relation to Antarctica. -- Continue the demilitarized and nuclear explo- sion free status of Antarctica, including the ban on weapons tests and the guaranteee of full inspection rights established by the Antarctic Treaty; --- Ensure continued U.S. access to all areas of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean for peaceful purposes, and, conversely, prevent any other state from denying such access to the U.S. or its nationals on the basis of terri- torial claims or otherwise; -- Preserve any basis of a U.S. claim to terri- torial sovereignty that existed prior to the entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty. 2. Environmental and Scientific -- Protect and maintain the sensitive and unique Antarctic environment, including the treaty prohibition on depositing nuclear waste in the Treaty area. --Increase understanding of the role Antarctica scientific processes play in phenomena of global signifi- cance, including geological, geophysical, meteorological and oceanographic processes. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 2. -- Increase scientific understanding of global processes, the nature of which can be illuminated by evidence available in Antarctica as, for example, global dispersal patterns of man-introduced pollutants, and magnetospheric data. Continue freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperative dissemination of data gathered, in accordance with the Treaty. -- Increase base-line data and information on marine and terrestial areas included within the Antarctic Treaty. 3. Economic A. Living Resources --- Increase knowledge of the living resource potential of Antarctica. -- Preserve U.S. access to living resources, should we choose to commercially exploit certain species. -- Conserve and preserve the marine birds, marine mammals and fisheries stocks of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. -- Participate in the development and imple- mentation of management schemes for living resources, whether or not the United States engages in their commer- cial exploitation. B. Non-Living Resources -- Increase knowledge of the non-living resource potential of Antarctica. -- Ensure non-discriminatory access by the United States to all areas of Antarctica except those areas specifically designated for other uses. -- Ensure that any mineral resource explora- tion and exploitation is consistent with environmental considerations. -- Facilitate an increase in the global supply of resources, through: CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 3. (i) defining property rights to Antarctica mineral resources. (ii) ensuring reasonable conditions of investment consistent with U.S. interests, including environmental protection. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Appendix C EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503 CIRCULAR NO. A-51 Revised TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS SUBJECT: Planning and conduct of the United States program in Antarctica 1. Purpose. This Circular provides the basis for the planning, funding, management, and conduct of the United States program for Antarctica. This revised Circular replaces and rescinds Circular No. A-51, dated August 3, 1960. 2. Assignment of responsibility. a. The Antarctic Policy Group shall continue to serve as the policv quidance DOGV for The TOTALITY OI U.S. acrivi- ties under the Antarctic Treaty. The Antarctic Policy Group will review each year's operations plan for Antarctica on a schedule coordinated with the budget cycle. Antarctic Policy Group membership shall consist of the Secretary of State (Chairman) ; the Director of the National Science Foundation; the Secretary of Defense; or their designees, and representatives of such other agencies as may be invited by the Chairman to participate on an ad hoc basis. The Interagency Antarctic Committee shall serve as a coordinating organization for the Antarctic Policy Group. Committee membership shall include representatives of all agencies having significant interests or program activities in Antarctica, as determined by the Policy Group. The Antarctic Policy Group may establish such additional subsidiary committees as may be necessary to facilitate the work of the Group. b. The National Science Foundation shall: (1) Be responsible for all aspects of developing and implementing an integrated U.S. program for Antarctica, except for responsibilities specifically assigned to other agencies by this Circular or by the Antarctic Policy Group. (2) Fund the entire U.S. program in Antarctica, including logistic support activities, except where such Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 2 services are funded by the Department of Defense or the Department of Transportation in accordance with the pro- visions of C. and d. below, or by other agencies as determined by the Office of Management and Budget. (3) Continue to fund university or other non-Federal research programs and all Federal agency scientific programs insofar as they pertain to Antarctica. (4) Draw upon the logistic support capabilities of government agencies on a mutually agreed reimbursement or non-reimbursement basis, or use commercial or other support and management capabilities where these are determined to be cost effective. (5) Designate a Senior United States Representative in Antarctica. (6) Serve as the clearinghouse and source of infor- mantion regarding the existence and location of Antarctic records. files, documents. and mans maintained within the various executive agencies and non-governmental organizations. (7) In consultation with the Department of State, coordinate and arrange for the conduct of cooperative scientific programs with other nations participating in Antarctica research under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty. C. The Department of Defense shall: (1) Plan and carry out logistic support requested by the National Science Foundation, and such other programs and functions as may be requested by the Foundation or the Antarctic Policy Group, and in this connection assure the continuing availability, on a mutually acceptable reimburse- ment or non-reimbursement basis, of essential logistic support components. (2) Fund and procure all aircraft required to provide the logistic support or perform other programs or functions requested pursuant to paragraph C. (1). Procure other essential logistic support components for the U.S. program for Antarctica on a mutually acceptable reimburse- ment or non-reimbursement basis. (3) Through the Commander of the military support force, exercise operational management and control, including (No. A-51) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 3 the determination of safety and feasibility, over logistic support and other programs and functions in Antarctica assigned or requested pursuant to paragraph C. (1) above and make all reasonable efforts to provide the support necessary to fulfill the objectives of the U.S. Antarctic program. d. The Department of Transportation shall fund ice- breaker services requested by the National Science Founda- tion for the U.S. program in Antarctica through fiscal year 1972. Funding responsibilities for icebreaker services rendered in support of the U.S. Antarctic program after fiscal year 1972 shall be in accordance with arrangements mutually agreed upon by the Department of Transportation, the National Science Foundation, and the Office of Manage- ment and Budget. The Department of Transportation shall make all reasonable efforts to assure the availability of icebreaker services as requested by the National Science Foundation for the Antarctic program. e. The Department of State is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and the provision of foreign policy direction relating to the development and implemen- tation of an integrated U.S. program for Antarctica; for the conduct of foreign relations regarding Antarctica; and for legal matters relating to the interpretation and imple- mentation of the Antarctic Treaty. 3. Relations between the National Science Foundation and other organizations in carrying out an integrated U.S. program for Antarctica. a. Executive Departments and agencies shall cooperate with the National Science Foundation in fulfilling its responsibilities for the U.S. Antarctic program, and shall appoint agency representatives to advisory committees as may be requested by the Director of the National Science Foundation. b. Federal agencies interested in scientific or other activities for Antarctica, either to be conducted by their own staffs or by other agencies and personnel, should inform the National Science Foundation of their interests and of those aspects of proposed activities which might be included in the U.S. scientific program to be developed and funded by the Foundation. The Foundation shall make allocations to Federal agencies and grants and contracts to non-Federal organizations for scientific and logistic support activities (No.A-51) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 4 it deems necessary and appropriate to the conduct of the U.S. program in Antarctica. C. The National Science Foundation shall advise the Department of Transportation, or other appropriate agencies, of the program plans for Antarctica in sufficient time and in sufficient detail so that the required supporting programs may be developed on an orderly basis. The Departments of Defense and Transportation, and other appro- priate agencies shall in turn consult and collaborate with the National Science Foundation and keep it fully informed regarding all aspects of program support planning and operations for which they have been assigned responsibility. The Departments ої Defense and Transportation or other appropriate agencies shall present to the National Science Foundation statements covering the actual and estimated costs of their support for the Antarctic Program. These statements shall cover the past, current and budget years and shall be submitted at an agreed time each year as necessary to meet the Federal budget requirements. GEORGE P. SHULTZ DIRECTOR Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. (No. A-51) Appendix D RECENT ANTARCTIC PROGRAM TRENDS OF ANTARCTIC TREATY NATIONS Introduction The programs of most of the Antarctic Treaty nations have been subject to close management and budgetary review during the last several years. Partly in response to this pressure, several -- and possibly all -- national programs have increasingly been justified on the basis of immediate and potential economic benefits to be derived. At the same time there has been a growing awareness that Antarctica may have the potential to partially satisfy the increasing world demands for food, energy, and possibly, hard mineral resources. Taken together, these factors have caused a detectable shift in Antarctic program priorities, and they may have prevented a deemphasis of Antarctic research. The discussion that follows sketches the general status and trends of the Antarctic programs of selected countries. Separate, detailed, attention is given to activities and policies related to mineral exploration. The choice of countries examined (USSR, Argentina, Australia, and Chile) is somewhat arbitrary, but is meant to provide a general perspective on major developments. The strong long-term upward trend in the scale of the Soviet program contrasts sharply with the overall picture (Fiqure 1 and 2). The USSR seems to have been the first country to recognize the economic potential of Antarctica and to have committed program resources accordingly. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Several countries not treated in detail -- France, Japan, and South Africa -- also conduct respectable Antarctic programs; the latter two carry out significant geological research. The United Kingdom also deserves comment; its program in the Antarctic Peninsula area is scientifically more productive, particularly in geology, than those of Argentina and Chile combined. Furthermore, British Antarctic planning documents as early as 1970 recognized the need to assess the area's food, and secondarily, mineral resources. This study does not reveal that any country has yet conducted mineral exploration with purely commercial intent. Geological research has been basically scientific in nature, although several countries note that their goal is to lay the groundwork for future economic resource surveys. This later theme seems to be more in evidence in the last several years. The most dramatic increase in reconnaissance geological surveys occurred in the 1971-72 Soviet expedition when a four-year field program was begun around the Amery Ice Shelf in the Australian claimed territory. This field program is being transferred to an area within the Argentine and British claims during the present summer season. Although there has been no commercial mineral activity, several countries have received inquiries from petroleum and mining firms seeking information on the Antarctic legal situation or actual licenses to operate within Antarctica. In all cases this commercial interest was reportedly discouraged. Most recently, a Texas exploration company has contacted several large petroleum companies and the governments of Australia, the USSR, and the United States to seek circum survey. This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. S squard SCIENCE 70 ЯЗамии .Я.г.г.и ЬЕВГОИИЕГ 011 001 00 NUMBER OF WINTER PERSONNEL 08 or 280 oa 02 260 OP 240 OF .2.U U.S.S.R. REDICE os 220 01 200 AT sr or Ba да pael STARY 180 160 язммиг 70 язамии ЗАЯЗА OOSI 140 0011 0001 Number of Personnel 120 ARGENTINA 000 100 008 U.S. 80 .00a Я.2.2.U AUSTRALIA 60 UNITED KINGDOM 008 CHILE 40 FRANCE JAPAN SOUTH AFRICA 20 NEW ZEALAND 68 70 72 74 76 1964 66 START Years - 3 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NUMBER OF WINTER SCIENCE Figure 2 110 PERSONNEL U.S.S.R. 100 90 80 70 ЯЗАМИИ 70 NUMBER OF PERSONNEL 60 50 40 30 U.S. 20 10 1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 YEARS AVERAGE NUMBER OF SUMMER PERSONNEL 1200 1100 1000 900 U.S. 800 NUMBER OF PERSONNEL 700 600 U.S.S.R. 500 400 300 200 100 65-66 67-68 69-70 71-72 73-74 74-75 63-64 YEARS - 4 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. USSR Status and Trends The USSR's Antarctic program appears to have stabilized and matured, following a period of uncertainty and then rapid expansion during the 1960's (Figures 1 and 2). Most of this past expansion as well as the present mix of scientific programs can be traced to decisions reached during a major policy study in 1966 and out of refinements based on annual reviews. Published program objectives emphasize research that will yield practical benefits, particularly from marine and mineral resources, and from meteorological and geophysical forecasting. / Soviet expeditions are sponsored by an Interdepartmental Committee of the Academy of Sciences. The primary organizational and research role is performed by the Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute (AANII) under the Hydrometeorological Service. AANII's Antarctic budget is believed to be about $US 10 million. Additional research and logistic support is provided by several dozen other organizations from government ministries and the Academy of Sciences. These later organizations apparently absorb all or part of the direct costs of air transportation, mapping, geology, rocket sounding, aerology, marine biology, ocean- ography, satellite geodesy, and a number of other programs. - 5 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. to The twenty-first Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE), 1975-76, is expected to be slightly larger in size but similar in scope to the last four expeditions. For the sixth consecutive year the USSR will probably man six year-round stations. A new summer-only station will also be established on the Filchner Ice Shelf to support field work in the surrounding area. It replaces a similar camp that was operated for four years on the Amery Ice Shelf. Attempts to open a new station, Russkaya, on the coast of Marie Byrd Land have been at least temporarily shelved (see map, page 9). New construction and the rebuilding of old facilities is underway or planned for all of the year-round Soviet stations. Bellingshausen, at the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula, has been more than doubled in size during the last few years. At both - 5a - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Mirnyy and Vostok most of the older, obsolete buildings are being replaced. Furthermore, Novolazarevskaya station is expected to be completely relocated and rebuilt at a new location in coming years. Ship and aircraft capabilities are also being improved. This year the USSR's Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute (AANII) has acquired a new icebreaking research/transport ship, with a displacement of 14,000 tons, to replace the old flagship of its Antarctic operations. Two other large research/ passenger ships, strengthened for ice operations, have been obtained since 1967. Rounding out the fleet are two rented cargo ships. A notable weakness in the Soviet program is the lack of long-range air transport capability to shuttle personnel to and from the Continent. At present some expedition scientists are flown as far as Australia where they are picked up by ship for the final leg of the trip. The Soviets have announced that they plan to eliminate this problem, and reportedly are building an airstrip near Molodezhnaya for heavy aircraft. They have also shown interest in purchasing C-130 transport aircraft from the US to meet this need. Mineral Interests The USSR has made no attempt to exploit Antarctica's mineral resources to date, and has proposed that all "Antarctic countries" confine themselves in the coming decade to basic geological research. The Soviets have called for a moratorium - 6 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. on the issuance of commercial prospecting licenses throughout the continent and they seem particularly eager to delay or prevent Western oil and gas exploration on the continental shelf. Their longer-range intent is indicated, however, by the magnitude of their geological exploration program, the largest and most explicitly resource-oriented in Antarctica. Geological research, including as an explicit goal the discovery of mineral resources has been an important component of each of the Soviet Antarctic Expeditions. The current five-year plan, 1971-75, states that the present geological task is to map the continent on the basis of geological, gravi- metric, and magnetic surveys in order to determine its mineral- resource potential. Commentaries by leading Soviet geologists almost invariably refer to Antarctica's rich mineral resources and to the inevi- tability of eventual exploitation. At the conclusion of a recent expedition, the leading Soviet Antarctic geologist announced the discovery of a very large and high quality iron ore deposit, which he claimed "confirms forecasts about the potential mineral wealth of the continent." He also stated that the 30-meter-thick ice overburden "is no obstacle to modern mining technology." Remarks such as these, however, are frequently tempered by estimates that commercial exploi- tation will not begin for another 10 or 20 years. During their 20 annual expeditions the Soviets have carried out geological and geophysical surveys over most of the major exposed rock areas of East Antarctica, particularly in the Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. mountains of Queen Maud Land and Enderby Land and around the Amery Ice Shelf (see map, following page). In addition, by the assignment of Soviet scientists to the programs of other nations and the recent construction of new stations, the Soviets have had the opportunity to geologically assess areas throughout Antarctica. Soviet surveys have identified a number of mineral occurrences and deposits in East Antarctica, but none of them have been of high enough quantity or quality to overcome the projected high cost of extraction. The most significant of these occurrences, which range from minute concentrations of molybdenum to large deposits of coal and iron, are located on the map. Perhaps the most noteworthy of the resources thus far identified is the iron ore deposit south of the Amery Ice Shelf; it extends 120 kilometers, measures over 1,000 meters in thickness, and contains up to 42 percent iron. Geological research at sea has also been carried out during nearly every expedition. As a result perhaps as many as 1,000 bottom samples and cores and some tens of thousands of kilometers of magnetic, gravity, and seismic profiles along ship tracks to the continent and along its coasts have been acquired. The Soviets have also provided funding to enable them to par- ticipate in deep drilling aboard the US ship Glomar Challenger. Before 1971 the Soviet geological program on land was carried out by detachments usually comprised of four to ten geologists and geographers, supported by a flight crew and two - 8 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Soviet Stations and Exploration in Antarctica Soviet station US station Other station Major area c' Soviet explorat on Soviet Mineral Discoveries SOUTH ATLANTIC Be Beryl Gr Graphite Mi Mica Fe Iron OCEAN Q Quartz C Coal Mo Molyodenum Antarctic Circle OUK S Africa SR (Novolazarevskaya) Arg MAUD TUSSR USSR DArg Bellingshausen) LAND (Molo chonya) ©Arg (Marambio) WEDDELL EMP Chile Arg SEA US (Palmer) USSR OUTH UK Druzhnaya Arg MERICA UK mers Ice Six: USSR (Amery Field Camp) 0 Pensacola Mts OAUS: SOUTH US(Sip) US (South Pole) USSR POLE (Mirnyy USSR (Vostok) a) Z (McMurdo) ROSS SEA Mo 120 SOUTH PACIFIC USSR (Leningradskaya) OCEAN 0 500 1000 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. or three small aircraft. The geological work was closely integrated with seismographic, gravimetric, aerial photographic, geodetic, and aerial magnetic and mapping surveys. Under the current five-year plan the scope of this activity has been considerably expanded. During the last four expeditions the Soviets operated a large field camp on the edge of the Amery Ice Shelf. Manned by a party of over 100 aviators, geologists, geophysicists, and mapping personnel, the Amery camp and 5 to 10 outstations served as a base for geological- geophysical survey teams working in an area of about 300,000 km². Aircraft assigned to the field party usually included two IL-14's, two AN-2's, and two large MI-8 helicopters. Published reports on the first two of these expeditions note the coverage of more than 100,000 km² by aerial photography and aerial magnetic surveys. Aerial magnetic surveys totaled about 40,000 kilometers of flight lines. Ground magnetic and gravity measurements were made at more than 200 points. One expedition completed a 400-mile seismic traverse, with 16 stations. Detailed findings of these reconnaissance surveys have not yet been published, but summary reports note the discovery of a number of minerals, including iron, coal, berylium, and copper sulfide. Most of the publicity has been given to the large iron ore deposits on the Amery Ice Shelf, mentioned above. This year (1975-76) the Soviets will move their summer field program to Druzhnaya, a base to be established on the - 10 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. edge of the Filchner Ice Shelf along the Weddell Sea. Pre- expedition announcements suggest that the operation will be modeled after the one conducted from the Amery base. The proposed program is expected to continue for five years, during which all of the area within about 500 kilometers of Druzhnaya, including the Pensacola Mountains, will be surveyed. The Pensacola Mountains have been identified by US geologists as the most promising location for hard minerals in Antarctica. The Soviet geologist who will head Druzhnaya Base claims that the work area is one of the "planets richest geological provinces." Parts of it, he states, are analogous to ore-bearing zones of Siberia, South Africa, and the South American mountains, and the Weddell Sea continental shelf, he believes, is a potential oil and gas reservoir. In an attempt to negate any suggestion of Soviet commerical intent, he comments that "the expedition does not have commercialaims," but instead will be "a scien- tific study of the continent, designed to protect mineral resources for future generations." - 11 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. ARGENTINA Status and Trends Argentina operates six year-round and two seasonal stations in its claimed Antarctic territory. During the last 10 years two stations have been closed and two new stations opened. The number of personnel at the bases has also apparently remained fairly stable, although detailed information about recent expeditions is not available because Argentina has failed to provide required activity reports since 1973. All Argentine Antarctic activities are controlled and supported by the military services, with civilian participation in science projects. Although the main program emphasis seems to be effective territorial occupation, activities at the stations and on summer field expeditions encompass the normal range of Antarctic research subjects and include meteorology, geophysics, glaciology, geology, mapping, and oceanography. Oceanographic capabilities were enhanced last year by transfer of the US research ship Eltanin to the Argentine Navy for Antarctic operations. Argentina's logistic capabilities are extensive in the Peninsula area. At least four helicopters and five small, fixed- wing aircraft operate from six of the research stations and from two transport ships. Continued improvement of a large airfield that was started at Marambio in 1969 allows wheeled C-130 transports to operate in the Argentine Antarctic year-round. - 12 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Political and public attention to Antarctica within Argentina has noticeably increased in the last few years. Government officials and the press have exhibited apprehension over the Antarctic resource issue and Argentina's ability to maintain its claimed sovereign rights in the area. In 1974 Argentina proclaimed the 22nd of February of each year as the Day of the Argentine Antarctic. Later that year, in December, President Isabel Peron personally flew over the Antarctic and made a strong speech reaffirming Argentina's sovereignty in its sector. Mineral Interests Argentine expeditions have traditionally included participation of a few geologists for general reconnaissance work on the Antarctic Peninsula and surrounding islands. The last available Argentine information report indicated that regional geological studies were being expanded in 1973. Late in 1974 an agreement was signed between the Government's Under Secretary for Minerals and several Antarctic organizations, calling for the Economy Ministry to finance geological studies on the Antarctic Peninsula. The work is intended to identify areas for more detailed mineral prospecting. - 13 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. AUSTRALIA Status and Trends Australia's research program is carried out at three stations that have been in continuous operation since the mid-1950's. One station was completely rebuilt in 1969 and another is currently being reconstructed. Scientific activity at stations conforms to the traditional Antarctic emphasis on weather and upper atmosphere physics. Summer field activities center around geology, glaciology, and mapping. Australia's role in Antarctica is presently the subject of some debate within the Government and the scientific community. Controversy has focused on administrative arrangements and specific program goals, as both the Government and the opposition parties believe Australia's long-term national interest requires an active scientific program. Annual appropriations (about $4.7 million, US) have remained nearly static for the last several years. The resulting toll of inflation has prompted consideration being given to closing one of the stations. The recent surge in national and international interest in Antarctica suggests, however, that funding is more likely to be increased. Mineral Interests Between 1969 and 1974, Australia conducted a modest, but respectable, geological reconnaissance and mapping program in the Prince Charles Mountains, west of Amery Ice Shelf. Each year a field party consisting of about 15 to 25 persons was dispatched; typically it included three or four geologists, a geophysicist, three or four surveyors, and seven or eight aviators. Three - 14 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. helicopters provided field transportation and a small fixed-wing aircraft was used for aerial survey work. In addition to collecting rock samples and establishing control surveys, the field parties made five to ten geomagnetic and gravity observations each season. On the basis of data collected in this program, a geological monograph and 1:250,000 geological maps are being prepared. Published reports do not indicate that minerals with economic potential were either searched for or found. This year (1975-76) the geological field program is being shifted west into Enderby Land. Apparently it will continue there for at least several years at approximately the scale of previous work in the Prince Charles Mountains. Australia has a negligible capability for geological or geophysical surveys offshore in Antarctica. Its two ships, both resupply vessels, are equipped only to take depth soundings. - 15 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CHILE Status and Trends Chile operates three year-round and several summer stations within its claimed territory on the Antarctic Peninsula. The total effort, in terms of active stations, number of wintering and seasonal personnel, and ship support, has apparently not changed appreciably in the last 10 years. The Navy, Air Force, and Army each operate a station, with the Navy providing all logistic support. Scientific activities, other than those associated with meteorology and hydrography, are planned and conducted by the Chilean Antarctic Institute, which supports about 20 scientists and technicians on the peninsula during the summer season. The total Chilean Antarctic budget was approximately $US 5.8 million in 1971; only $US 80,000 was allocated to the Antarctic Institute science program. At that time a new five-year plan called for a tripling of science activities, in support of pure science, and later, economic prospecting. It is not possible to determine whether the proposed increases were approved, because Chile has not met its obligations to exchange Antarctic information since 1973. Mineral Interests Chile has carried out only minor geological research in Antarctica, almost exclusively in the vicinity of its stations around the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula. Emphasis has been on improving the understanding of regional geology. In a typical season 2 to 3 geologists have collected rock samples in the area. - 16 - Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. The current five-year plan, for 1972-1976, called for completion of the basic scientific survey and geological mapping of the South Shetland Islands by 1974. In following years economic geology groups would evaluate the mineral resources of that area, and the Antarctic Peninsula as well. According to the plan, mineral prospecting was to become the main scientific interest by 1975 or 1976, but infor- mation is lacking on current activities. begnedo ГГБ enibivorq 5 ststeqo doss VIIIA bns $2000 neds oltałgol bns bennsiq bns ypolomosjem d.f.tw betsioozza nordw ,stustital grit vd patrub sluzningq srift по anstaindost bas atattmetos OS Juods .погб9г Temmus 9019 8.2 202 26W mseTinG [stos 9dT and of 26W 000.08 202 уГпо : ΓTEΓ ni notîlim nsiq 759V-9VF7 wan 6 smit tedd JA .mergonq stutisani 9100 to ni to entTqins 5 707 bellee eldteroq ton 21 JI .pnidoeqzorq olmonoos 79361 bris bevoriags 292697001 9dd snimmeteb of nottemment spnsioxe of enottsprido 231 Jem Jon 260 .ETer ni Tsotgofogg vino Juo 0917760 26d 231 to nt yTevtaufoxe 320mls .6Tuaning9 oltonsinA to ats bruors Tenoiger to gnivoriqmt - 17 - E S Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL July 10, 1970 WIC Annex 1 AH National Security Decision Memorandum 71 10B TO: The Secretary of State BOOK The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Interior The Secretary of Transportation The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Director of Central Intelligence The Director, National Science Foundation The Director, Office of Science and Technology SUBJECT: United States Antarctic Policy and Program The President has reviewed the memorandum forwarded by the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on May 28, 1970, which contains a statement of objectives in Antarctica and recommendations regarding. appropriate program levels and responsibility for management of the program. Considering United States interests in Antarctica, the President has decided that the Antarctic program should be continued at a level which maintains an active and influential United States presence in Antarctica and which is responsive to United States scientific, economic and political objectives. The President has noted and, subject to normal budget review processes, approved the estimated annual budget level anging from $29 - $34 million. Noting the request of the Department of Defense regarding budgeting responsibility, the President hereby directs preparation for the orderly and efficient transfer of the program to the National Science Foundation whereby the Foundation shall: 1. Budget for the entire United States national program in Antarctica, including the funding of logistic support activities; 2. Continue to fund university research and federal agency programs related to Antarctica; CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 3. Draw upon logistic support capabilities of government agencies on a mutually acceptable reimbursement or non-reimbursement basis; and 1. Use commercial support and management facilities where these are determined to be cost effective. In undertaking the transfer of responsibility, it is understood that an increase in the National Science Foundation budget is not intended to cause a net increase in the total Federal budget since the Foundation will be assuming budget items for logistic support currently carried by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. Present program responsibilities assigned under Bureau of the Budget Circular A-51 shall remain in effect during the course of the transfer of responsibilities and, subject to consultations, the Fiscal Year 1972 budget shall serve as the target for transfer of budget responsibility to the National Science Foundation. To insure the orderly transfer of program responsibilities, changes in responsibilities for operational management and safety of operations shall be coordinated through the Antarctic Policy Group. In the course of the transfer of responsibilities, the Department of Defense shall maintain the Fiscal Year 1970 level of Antarctic logistic support. The Department of Defense shall thereafter assure the avail- ability, on a mutually acceptable reimbursement or non-rcimbursement basis, of essential logistic support components. The President has instructed that the Director of the National Science Foundation and the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with other agencies and offices where necessary, hold appropriate dis- cussions with the principal Members of Congress concerned and submit a progress report no later than June 21, 1971, for his consideration. they A. Kinn Henry A. Kissinger :c: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ONFIDENTIAL This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. DECLASSIFIED Annex 2 7414035 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 2050G CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS(3) July 29, 1974 National Security Decision Memorandum 263 TO: The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense Copies to: The Secretary of the Interior ;/P (Action) The Secretary of Commerce i/S The Deputy Secretary of State /S-S The Director of Central Intelligence 'eam C F The Director, Federal Energy Administration (ek) The Director, National Science Foundation The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Antarctic Mineral Resources The President has reviewed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (USC) report regarding United States policy on Antarctic mineral resources, as forwarded by the USC Chairman on April 26, 1974. The President has approved the attached statement of United States policy, and has authorized preliminary consultations with other Parties to the Antarctic Treaty to gain acceptance of the idea that there should be an internationally agreed approach to the issues of commercial exploration for and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources. These exploratory consultations should be designed so as to preserve the U.S. interests detailed in the USC report and in no way prejudice any options regarding the possible nature and scope of international mechanisms, understandings, or agreements pertaining to Antarctic mineral resources. The Department of State, in coordination with the other interested agencies, will be responsible for the conduct of these consultations. In addition, the President has directed the Under Secretaries Committee to conduct a prompt analysis of what the United States might wish to seek or to avoid in any later discussions on establishing an internationally agreed approach. CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS(3) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 2 CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS(3) A report on the preliminary consultations, and a proposed action program outlining what diplomatic and political steps might be taken to accomplish the substantive recommendations should be forwarded for the President's consideration prior to the undertaking of any further actions in this area. A. Henry A. Kissinger Attachment cc: Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy Counselor to the President for Economic Policy Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS(3) CONFIDENTIAL/GDS Statement of United States Policy on Antarctic Mineral Resources It is the objective of the United States: To ensure that, if undertaken, commercial exploration and exploitation in Antarctica are carried out in a manner that does not disrupt the implementation of the Antarctic Treaty as long as it is in effect, and does not become a cause for significant international discord. To ensure that any exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources is compatible with environmental considerations and with United States obligations under the Antarctic Treaty. To gain acceptance of the concept that there should be an inter- nationally agreed approach for any commercial exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources, which should at the same time (a) permit free access by the U.S. and other nations for exploitation purposes to any part of the Antarctic Treaty area except those areas specifically designated for other uses; (b) be without prejudice to and appropriately com- patible with United States law of the sea interests; (c) provide for the protection of the Antarctic environment; and (d) preserve the rights under the Antarctic Treaty of scientific research. During the time that the United States is seeking an internationally agreed approach, the United States will oppose actions by any nation with the purpose of commercial exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources, and will urge other nations to join the U.S. in such an interim policy. At the same time, however, the United States will continue as feasible and appropriate within the present scientific program to determine the mineral resource potential of Antarctica more accurately. (This position will be reevaluated periodically in light of the progress of any negotiations, actions by other countries, and continuing economic and technological assessments of United States and foreign capabilities to be provided by a Subcommittee of the Under Secretaries Committee.) The United States will continue to maintain and be prepared to augment as appropriate an active and influential presence in Antarctica in keeping with its present and future scientific, economic (including resource potential), political, and security interests in Antarctica. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 1481 Annex 3 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 7510393 XR. 7504882 CONFIDENTIAL May 20, 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR OPIES TO: CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE F (CWM) /P (ACTION) SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Antarctic Mineral Resources The President has reviewed your memorandum of March 10, 1975, regarding U.S. Policy on Antarctic Mineral Resources, and has noted the views of the various agencies that contributed to the report. The President has decided that: 1. We should work with our Antarctic Treaty partners toward an inter- nationally agreed arrangement for dealing with commercial exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the Antarctic, based on the principles established in NSDM 263. We should explore possible mechanisms including consideration of a new decision-making procedure which, inter alia, avoids the present rule of unanimity. 2. We should look toward a special regime for offshore mineral resources of the Antarctic, However, this could be reconsidered if warranted by developments in the Law of the Sea Conference or by discussions with our Antarctic Treaty partners. 3. We should continue our present interim policy of urging nations to refrain from commercial exploration and exploitation, pending an internationally agreed approach. Our interim policy would be reexamined if other parties to the Antarctic Treaty were to undertake precipitate action or if the prospects for arriving at an internationally agreed approach were determined to be remote. 4. The action plan called for in NSDM 263, including appropriate tactical positions, should be developed by the Antarctic Policy Group. The Group should also make more detailed examinations of the principles and alternative organizational and legal approaches applicable to a possible internationally agreed arrangement, the environmental consequences of exploration and exploitation and mechanisms for minimizing such consequences, U.S. interests in the living resources in Antarctic waters, and other relevant matters. For these Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED CONE cument been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 2 A2J0383 purposes, the Antarctic Policy Group should include representatives of all interested agencies. Major unresolved policy issues should be reviewed by the Under Secretaries Committee. Following the June Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and other appropriate consultations, a report should be submitted by the USC to the President on the prospects for reaching an acceptable agreement and recom- mendations for next steps. TUOY esd Henry A. Kissinger basween bluoda Isioremmos inemegnstra no 10 lo noitstiolqxe oldrezoq .EAS a belastisw TO to yoiloq bits bluow Yolloq of of 11 benimsxesz sdt 11 TO noidos dosorqqs asiq beqofeveb bluode bluode bns CONFIDENTIAL/GDS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL Annex 4 National Security Council Study U.S. Program in Antarctica Summary Recommendations Background The President has directed the Antarctic Policy Group to prepare a study of current and long-term interests, objectives and programs in Antarctica. The directive states that the study should: 1) Consider and analyze the major issues; 2) Consider alternative programs and related support activities; 3) Examine administrative arrangements for the U.S. Antarctic Program; and, 4) recommend any changes in the assignment of organizational responsibility which will benefit the program. This study seeks to analyze the issues related to U.S. interests and objectives in Antarctica as well as the implications for U.S. policies and programs. It also offers recommendations regarding an appropriate program level and suitable administrative and support arrangements. United States policy for Antarctica was last reviewed at the National Security level in 1960. U.S. Policy With Regard to Antarctica Long Range U.S. Objectives and Interests: In view of the size of Antarctica, its influence upon the earth's environment, the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty and the advantages to the United States of its continued peaceful development, long-term U.S. objectives and interests in the Antarctic area can be summarized as follows: Maintain the viability of the Antarctic Treaty through the preservation of harmonious international relations in Antarctica; Share in any benefit to be derived from Antarctica and prevent any use of the area which is against United States interests and prejudicial to the stability and peace of the region; Encourage the peaceful development of Antarctica through scientific research and appropriate commercial and economic activities; Preserve freedom of access and free conduct of any peaceful activity under established uniform rules, including the conservation and regulation of exploration and exploitation of natural and living resources; Maintain a suitable presence in Antarctica which continues to provide leadership in the development of the area and furthers the develop- ment of a permanent international arrangement for Antarctica, or one CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- which could be used as a basis for making concrete territorial claims in the event the Antarctic Treaty should become ineffective; Protect such rights as the United States may have acquired by discovery, exploration, occupation, development and use of the area prior to the entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty, and assure the continued right of the United States to discover, occupy, develop and use the area under terms of the Antarctic Treaty; Promote the free exchange of information about plans and activities including data and results of such activities. Immediate U.S. Objectives: Implement the Antarctic Treaty including the exercise of the right of inspection, scientific cooperation, and ex- change of information; Develop through the Treaty Consultative process suitable rules to govern all kinds of activity in Antarctica with particular emphasis on conservation, jurisdiction and economic exploitation; Develop parallel and complementary international agreements for the conservation and regulation of the exploitation of resources in the high seas south of 60° south latitude; Continue scientific investigation of Antarctica, and the uses to which Antarctica may be put, for the benefit of the U.S. and mankind, emphasizing the influence of the area upon worldwide environmental effects, the presence and extent of living and non-living resources, and Antarctica as a laboratory to monitor environmental changes, long and short term, natural and man made; Continue to encourage scientific cooperation between Antarctic Treaty nations and the specialized agencies of the U.N. and with non-govern- mental scientific associations and organizations; Encourage U.S. commercial and economic activities in Antarctica which are consistent with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty and complement other U.S. objectives; Improve the present methods of accountability in the reporting of plans and activities by Treaty signatories and acceding countries; Establish laws and regulations for exercising jurisdiction over U.S. nationals and their activities in Antarctica. Extent of Geographic Interest in Antarctica and Nature of Program: United States objectives encompass the entire region south of 60° south latitude. However, U.S. activities concentrate on the area lying between 30° west longitude westward to 150° east longitude with additional scientific requirements in Queen Maud Land, Wilkes Land, and in the oceans surrounding Antarctica. Reproduced CONFIDENTIAL at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -3- Scientific research continues for the foresecable future to be the principal U.S. activity. Antarctic research up to the present has developed a datum of basic environmental findings of worldwide as well as regional significance. It offers a. unique yardstick for measuring worldwide environmental changes. It affords a basis for logical advancement of research into studies related to global monitoring of environmental conditions and trends and to the assessment of resource potential for possible future development. Related activities, including those of U.S. commercial enterprises, are encouraged and accommodated insofar as they are compatible with scientific activities and objectives and so long as they are consistent with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty and its development. In all activities, and particularly scientific activities, the United States fosters international cooperation with other countries active in Antarctica, including the use of U.S. logistic capabilities, as available, to support scientific programs of mutual interest and other activities determined to be in the national interest. The United States likewise encourages other nations to contri- bute logistic support to cooperative programs. The Functioning of the Antarctic Treaty: The Antarctic Treaty, which is the result of an initiative taken by the United States, was signed in Washington, D.C., on December 1, 1959 by representatives of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States. It entered into force on June 23, 1961. After the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force (1991), the Treaty may be reviewed at the request of any contracting party and modifications and amendments to the Treaty may be offered at that time. The Treaty provides that the Antarctic shall be used for peaceful purposes, and that military personnel or equipment may be used for scientific research or any other peaceful purpose. The Treaty further provides for a unilateral inspection system to determine compliance with the Treaty. The Treaty calls for free access to the area for scientific purposes, for the free exchange of data, results and information about planned activities, and the exchange of scientists between expeditions. The Treaty freezes the question of previously asserted rights and claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, and provides that no acts or activities carried out while the Treaty is in force will hereafter constitute a basis for a claim. (Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. has asserted any claim in Antarctica to territorial sovereignty, but claims by seven other nations include 80% of the physical territory in Antarctica.) The Treaty prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material in Antarctica. The Treaty further provides a means by which the signatory parties and any other parties conducting substantial, independent activities in Antarctica may meet together to consult on problems of mutual concern and recommend measures to governments by which to further the principles and purposes of the Treaty. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 44- The Antarctic Treaty has accomplished several of the principal long term U.S. objectives in Antarctica and has served U.S. interests well in the last ten years. It has become a landmark in modern treaty-making by the channeling of regional conflicts into productive international research activity under a system of free inspection. It has served as a model for the Space Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Test Ban Treaty. However, several critical issues including the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources and matters related to jurisdiction over persons and activities in Antarctica lie before the Treaty parties for consideration. These issues are the core of the basic disagreement between the nations which claim territorial sovereignty over certain portions of Antarctica and those which do not recognize such sovereignty. The effec- tiveness of the Treaty will be gauged by the ability of the Treaty parties to resolve these issues. An amicable solution of these problems is a long- term United States objective. Presence and continuing U.S. leadership will be required to achieve this objective. Furthermore, as the Antarctic Treaty requires the unanimity of all signatory parties to consult together and to recommend measures in furtherance of the Treaty, the U.S. encourages other signatory countries to continue their participation in the Treaty. The U.S. continues to exercise its rights of inspection and encourages other countries to do likewise. The United States endeavors to develop through the Antarctic Treaty uniform rules of procedure to regulate activities in Antarctica, including the exploration, conservation, and exploitation of living and natural resources. The United States exerts efforts to ensure compliance with such measures by any country which may carry out programs in Antarctica. A review of the implementation of the Antarctic Treaty and of scientific activities which have been carried out there clearly suggests the ubiquitous character of U.S. activities in Antarctica which has given the United States its position of leadership. This has been made possible largely by air support capability developed by the Naval Support Force. The degree to which the U.S. influences the future development of Antarctica and international cooperation depends upon the extent to which the U.S. pursues scientific, logistic, and other activities which provide flexibility of operation and access to a wide and varied area in Antarctica. The use, whenever possible, of automatic stations and satellites to obtain synoptic data required for research and for environmental monitoring will enhance this effort. Support of such activities requires staging areas in Antarctica and on continents adjacent to Antarctica. Activities of Other Countries: An analysis of the activities of other countries in Antarctica indicates that five countries--France, Japan, Great Britain, New Zealand and the Soviet Union--have programs which show growth in geographic extent, rapid development of scientific sophistication and increase in logistic support capability. Soviet activities continue steadily to expand around the entire continent, and Soviet research vessels have been very active in the Southern Oceans. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -5- Four countries--Argentina, Australia, Chile and South Africa--have main- tained relatively constant levels of activity, but they have made capital investments in new facilities which indicate a long term intent to remain in Antarctica. Two countries--Belgium and Norway--have been unable to maintain continuous activities, but both countries have participated actively in the Treaty forum and reiterated their long range interest in Antarctica. None of the acceding parties--Czechoslovakia, Denmark, The Netherlands, and Poland--nor any other country, has carried out substantial, independent expeditionary activities in Antarctica. Scope of Program: During the past five years, the U.S. Antarctic Program has been maintained nearly at a constant level of effort. The average annual expenditure has been $33.0 million. This includes funding for certain capital investments such as research vessels and permanent structures which include part of the replacement facility for the station at the South Pole. Of this annual average, the National Science Foundation program has been $7.5 million, the Department of Defense support effort $18.4 million, with an additional icebreaker support cost of $7.1 million which has been funded totally for the last four years by the Department of Transportation. The actual FY 1970 Department of Defense budget was $17.1 million. However, FY 1971 request to Congress was $13.2 million. This reduction of $4 million in operating funds will necessitate closing Byrd and Pole Stations as soon as operating conditions permit, placing McMurdo Station in essentially a caretake status, and curtailing intracontinental flights. This reduction will require cancellation of 80% of the previously planned and funded scientific programs on the Antarctic continent in 1970-71. In considering alternative programs and related support activities, seven major program levels ranging in total cost from $7 million to $42 million annually have been examined in light of U.S. policy objectives in Antarctica. In examining these alternative program levels and corresponding related support activities, it may be seen that current program costs relate closely to several basic building blocks in the science programs, logistic systems and construction. (See page 6, Table ⑉ Costs of Science Programs, Logistic Systems and Antarctic Construction.) (1) LEVEL I A peripheral continental program and transportation of all cargo and personnel to Antarctica by ship $7.0 million LEVEL II A peripheral continental program with limited local helicopter support, and transportation of all cargo and per- sonnel to Antarctica by ship $7.5 million At the lowest program levels, for example, research activities which take place at the edges of the continent at McMurdo Station, Palmer Station, (1) Underlining indicates additional activities at each level CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFE -6- TABLE - COSTS OF SCIENCE PROGRAMS, LOGISTIC SYSTEMS AND ANTARCTIC CONSTRUCTION (average based on annual expenditures FY 66-70 in millions of dollars) 1 NSF USN COGARD TOTAL Coastal Stations 1.2 2.8 2.4 6.4 Hallett, McMurdo Palmer & Hero Construction (and .5 3.6 1.2 5.3 Capital Investment) Other Ground Support .0 8.9 (12.7)² 2.4 11.3 (15.1) 2 for Air Operations Air Operations, Manned 3.2 3.1 1.1 7.4 Inland Stations, Field Operations Eltanin 2.6 .0 .0 2.6 7.5 18.4 7.1 33.0 I The annual cost of icebreakers is pro-rated to the various activities supported--station resupply and delivery of aviation fuel, construction materiél, etc. 2 Approximately $2.0m of Line 1 and $1.8m of Line II under USN relate directly to the capability to sustain air operations, hence should be combined with the $8.9m "Other Ground Support" to provide an indication of the expense to Navy to maintain this capability. CONSIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -7- Hallett Station (summer only) and on board the research vessel, Mero, can be supported as a self-custaining scientific and logistic unit at costs between $6 million and $7 million. At this level, the United Statesm would maintain a symbolic presence with little leadership potential, limited scientific capability with emphasis on ocean related research, slight capability to monitor environmental conditions, limited capability to support international cooperative programs, and no capability to pursuer activities in the interior of Antarctica. B .8.U LEVEL III A peripheral continental program with limited local helicopter support, a year-round oceano- notjeje graphic program in the Southern Oceans, and a limited program of intercontinental air support between New Zealand and Antarctica $15 million PREVIS LEVEL IV A peripheral continental program with local helicopter support, a year-around oceano- graphic program in the Southern Oceaus, air support for field activities on the continent, and a limited program of inter- continental air support between New Zealand $18 million and Antarctica B LEVEL V A program with coastal and interior stations including South Pole Station, with local helicopter support, a year-around oceano- graphic program in the Southern Oceans, support capability on the continent with the possibility of additional semi-permanent station locations to meet scientific requirements, regular intercontinental air support between New Zealand and Antarctica during the austral $32 million summer For a safe, reliable and efficient air operation staging into Antarctica and one encompassing diversified intracontinental air operations, it has been necessary to develop an air support complex as a staging base for inter and intracontinental flights. The presently existing manned inland stations serve a dual role as ancillary staging bases as well as scientific stations. The cost to the Antarctic Program of this air support complex is about $12 million annually. With the availability of the air support complex an additional $7.5 million provides research activities and their related which adds an oceanographic component to the program at a cost of $2.6 support. The research vessel, Eltanin, represents an additional system million a year. The analysis indicates that the achievement of salient U.S. science program objectives and U.S. policy objectives occurs only after the commitment has been made to an air logistics system capable of supporting operations in CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -8- the continental interior. Maintenance of the U.S. programs at the South Pole and Byrd Stations, the conduct of field research throughout the continent, aerial mapping, remote sensing, and the placement of automatic stations to supplement the manned station network all require air support. The ins] capability of the United States is facilitated by aircraft operations they provide the only means to carry out inspection of activities in the interior of Antarctica, and because they provide the capability to mount inspections on short notice. In conclusion, it is not until Level V that the U.S. can pursue a balanced research program (including the wide-ranging field activities which have given the U.S. scientific leadership), maintain station in the interior of Antarctica (including the South Pole Station), support non-scientific activities in the national interest, and carry out programs in cooperation with other countries. LEVELS VI/VII A program of coastal and interior stations similar to Level V with greatly increased air support capability, additional permanent and semi-permanent stations, and an additional air route via South America to the Antarctic $37-$42 million Increase beyond the present level of science activity and its support in Antarctica would include the cost of additional manned stations around the coast or in the continental interior. The highest program level would also include the establishment of a second intercontinental air route with its attendant aviation support complex through South America to the Antarctic Peninsula. Such levels of expenditure would result in redundancy in terms of scientific return, would arouse some concern among other Treaty nations that the U.S. was seeking to dominate Antarctica, and might encourage com- petition rather than cooperation from the Soviet Union and other nations. The selected program levels have encompassed planned funding for specific capital investments such as the replacement facility at the South Pole. However, in the future, specific capital investments may require additional line item appropriations. These figures do not include periodic adjustments which may be necessary because of inflation and salary increases. Also, no provision has been made for the various and considerable one-time costs which would be incurred in a major change in program level in either direction. Administrative Arrangements: The Department of Defense has stated a desire to "begin planning for an orderly and efficient phasedown of the DOD partici- pation in Antarctic activities and the concomitant transfer of the logistic funding and operating responsibility to a more appropriate agency. Further- more, the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives has stated with respect to the Antarctic logistic support program--that, "if additional funding was needed to support high priority research and tests, it should be sought from other governmental programs in support of scientific research. At the same CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -9- time the logistic support budget was reduced in FY 1971 by approximately $4 million. Six alternative management Plans have been reviewed: Plan A. Continuation of present arrangements under Bureau of the Budget Circular A-51, with Antarctic Policy Group direction. This Plan continues the existing management arrangement for the U.S. Anterctic program as set forth in Bureau of the Budget Circular A-51 of August 3, 1960, which assigns management and budgetary responsibility for U.S. scientific activities to the National Science Foundation and assigns management and budgetary responsibility for logistic support of U.S. scientific and other activities to the Department of Defense. This arrange- ment has worked well and served U.S. interests and objectives for a decade. In that period U.S. Antarctic scientific programs under the direction of the National Science Foundation have advanced significantly. These scientific advances have been based in large measure on the logistic support capabilities developed by the Department of Defense. However, the review of priorities has placed the non-defense oriented Antarctic logistic support function in competition with programs directly related to the mission of the Department of Defense. The prospects of maintaining an adequate DOD budget level for Antarctica are very dim, particularly in light of current Defense priorities and budget restrictions as well as Congressional views on DOD non-mission oriented activities. Plan B. Continuation of present arrangements as in Plan A with exception of funding arrangements. Support funding to be budgeted by the NSF, reimbursing DOD. This Plan continues to present arrangement except that NSF would assume the budgeting responsibility vested in the Department of Defense and maintain the present Navy logistic capability by reimbursing the Department of Defense. This arrangement has the advantage of continuing the present functioning management system. However, the National Science Foundation would find difficulty in presenting, justifying and defending what is in effect the operational budget for another agency before the Congressional committees responsible for the authorization and appropriations of the Foundation. Plan C. NSF to budget and fund for both science and support programs with policy direction by the Antarctic Policy Group; to continue to support university and Federal agency research programs; to draw upon other government agencies for logistic support on a mutually acceptable reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis; to use commercial support when cost effective. This Plan provides an alternative arrangement designed to overcome the budgeting problems for DOD and NSF which Plans A and B present. It has an added advantage of facilitating the development of selected comercial support CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -10- of scientific activities. Analysis has shown that 3. selected mixture of commercial support and government agency support may be cost effective. However, it represents a major departure from the present system and will require phaseover of budgeting responsibility and monagement functions. 20 prevent disruption of the on-going science program OF an unplanned áis- continuation of U.S. presence in Anterctica, a transition phase beginning with a continuation of the present management arrangements and moving in an orderly sequence to implementation of Plan C should be adopted. The tran- sition phase will provide NSF the opportunity to plan for the assumption of the additional budgetary and management responsibility and at the same time provide continuity of present authority during the transition phase. Plan D. Transfer budgeting and funding responsibility for logistic support to an agency other than NSF; NSF to budget and fund science program with policy direction by the Antarctic Policy Group. This Plan offers a further alternative solution to budgeting for the U.S. Antarctic Program. However, the transition problems are increased. Designating total logistic support responsibility to an agency other than DOD or NSF will require development of a new management capability. While other departments have participated in Antarctic programs by carrying out scientific programs coordinated and funded by NSF, as well as specific logistic support functions under the overall direction of the DOD, no other Department has an overall operational familiarity with the Antarctic program. Plan E. NSF funds for both science and support programs, utilizing commercial support and management facilities for logistic support with policy direction by the Antarctic Policy Group. In this Plan consideration is given to an entirely commercially supported program in Antarctica. Analysis showed that the estimated costs of such a system, sufficient to support a significant presence in Antarctica, are high. Furthermore, two vital elements of the support system cannot be provided ry this arrangement in the foreseeable future or without very large capital investments--large ski-equipped aircraft, and ice-strengthened ships and icebreakers. Plan F. Establishment of an Antarctic commission to administer support for science programs and development of other potential Antarctic programs. This Plan offers a further alternative budgeting arrangement. It requires new legislation and thus an indefinite transition period during which a program would have to be maintained in accordance with another arrangement. It does not, therefore, offer an immediate budgetary alternative. Subject to the provisions of the legislation, a commission might offer as more efficient and responsive arrangement. Commission legislation proposed in the past, however, has been considered to duplicate existing agency authorities, to isolate 1 tarctic programs from related program activities in other areas CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -11- of the world, and to complicate interagency coordination. In terms of routine policy formulation the Antarctic Policy Group is considered to be a simple, immediately available, and responsive arrangement. In evaluating these alternative management and funding arrangements, one fundamental assumption has been made: This is, any transfer of budgeting and funding responsibility from another agency to the National Science Foundation will be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the NSF budget estimates to accommodate the additional Antarctic logistic support costs. It is further assumed that Congress will appropriate the necessary funds over and above and in addition to the annual appropriation requested by NSF for its annual authorized programs and appropriated by the Congress for those purposes. The success of this arrangement hinges upon the con- currence and support of Congress. It is apparent that the Appropriations Committee holds the view that an agency which is responsible for Antarctic scientific programs ought to budget the Antarctic logistic support costs. It is less clear that the Congressional Committees would view with cor- responding approbation the assumption by the National Science Foundation of this responsibility. However, there is no reason to suppose that it would not be favorably received, particularly when it is pointed out that the change does not involve a net change in the Federal budget. Recommendations In light of the foregoing discussion, the following recommendations concern- ing program level and management are made: Recommendation No. 1: In order to achieve U.S. objectives in Antarctica, it is recommended that the U.S. Antarctic Program be maintained at a level which continues U.S. leadership and supports scientific programs and other activities in Antarctica. Maintenance of a program at approximately the present average annual level would accomplish these objectives. Recommendation No. 2: It is recommended that the National Science Foundation budget for the United States science and support programs in Antarctica; that the Foundation continue to fund university research and Federal agency pro- grans; that the Foundation draw upon the logistic support capability of government agencies on a mutually acceptable reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis; and that the Foundation use commercial support and management facili- ties where these are determined to be cost effective (Pian C). Recommendation No. 3: It is recommended that responsibility for program and operational management and for safety of operations in Antarctica should initially remain as they are set forth in Bureau of the Budget Circular A-51 of August 3, 1960. However, with the transfer of various operational responsi- bilities to other agencies or commercial organizations, it may be desirable to make corresponding transfers of the responsibility for operational management and safety. To ensure that the transfer of these responsibilities is done in an orderly manner, the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, and other interested agencies would recommend such changes to the Antarctic Policy Group for consideration. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOC RECD LOG NBR NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE MO DA MO DA HR // 7507379 Ellint INITIAL ACTION O 6 Gathight, FROM: kissinger, H // w 5 11 REFERENCE: CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE TO: PRES S/S UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT kissinger COLBY, W other U/SM55I LOU NO FORN NODIS SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION SCOWCROFT + SCHLESINGER, J C EYES ONLY EXDIS DAVIS ST EX SEC S codeword SUBJECT: u/sm 55I les Policy Q hogrom sensitive for antaictia INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION REC ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO CY FOR MeMo for HAK ( ) ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT memo FOR PRES ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR ( ) FAR EAST APPROPRIATE ACTION 1 ) DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MEMO TO ( ) MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA RECOMMENDATIONS ( europe / CANADA + ) JOINT memo ( ) LATIN AMERICA REFER TO FOR: ( ) UNITED NATIONS ( ) ECONOMIC ANY CONCURRENCE. ACTION NECESSArY? to State ( X ) SCIENTIFIC + + DUE DATE: program ANALYSIS 11-10 NSC PLANNING + COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) CONGRESSIONAL 632-8997 OCEANS POLICY INTELLIGENCE Concurred by phone 11-12-75. Index X 4/5m 55H Q.E, DATE FROM TO S SUBSEQUENT ACTION required (OR TAKEN): CY TO 11-12-25 Elliott NS % NS c/s see comment above 11/12 calliat Commerced by phone SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS DISPATCH MICROFILM & file RQMTS: CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: NSC/S DISP INSTR NOTIFY & DATE BY M/ NOV 17 1975 BY SPECIAL DISPOSITION: IF CRT ID: SA SF 7506607 FOLDER: 2/5m 55 HP NS CROSS REF W/ suspense CY ATTACHED: X OPEN CLOSE D WH EP Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED PA DY This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 575-600 6822 u/sm 56 MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE MICROFILM DATA WASHINGTON DO February 18, 1970 INIT DATE 0/2/L SECRET ACTION ORIG) NSC MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER TO ) PAF M. Rusk WHC FROM: Robert Behr SUBF SUBJECT: U.S. Cooperation in the Uranium Enrichment Field The Under Secretaries Committee will meet at 4:00 P.M. on February 19th to consider an interagency paper (Tab B) on U.S. Cooperation in the Uranium Enrichment Field. BACKGROUND With the growing demand throughout the world for production of electrical power by means of nuclear reactors, there is a parallel demand for nuclear material to fuel these reactors. This fuel is obtained by a process known as uranium enrichment. Two techniques are normally used -- gaseous diffusion and the gas centrifuge process. Gaseous diffusion involves very large plant facilities and consumes great quantities of electricity in its operations. Conversely, gas centrifuges can be housed in smaller plants and need relatively less electricity. Hence, centrifuges can be operated clandestinely and could present problems from the stand- point of nuclear weapons proliferation. The present U.S. policy is to classify enrichment technology and to withhold it from other countries. We have sought to reduce incentives to develop enrichment facilities abroad by supplying U-235, under stable, attractive conditions, to countries that accept bilateral or multilateral safeguards. This approach has delayed the construction of foreign facilities. Outside of the Communist Bloc, only France and the U.K. have enrichment plants. Our policy has also produced economic advantages for the U.S. in the form of significant returns in foreign revenues. There are, however, several factors which suggest that a new policy may be warranted: -- The industrially advanced countries have been rapidly shifting to nuclear power for generating electricity. This trend is expected to accelerate in the future. The projected demand, both domestic and foreign can be met by existing and planned U.S. capacity until the late 1970's. After that new capacity will have to come on line. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 2 - -- Several foreign countries have become concerned about their total dependence on the U.S. for nuclear fuel. They are attracted by both the prospect of lessening this dependence and the commercial possibilities of exporting fuel and nuclear reactors. It is almost certain that enrichment plants will be built abroad -- with or without U.S. help. The British, Dutch and Germans have already reached agreement on a tripartite project based on the gas centrifuge process. -- We have a strong incentive to rationalize our plans with the Western Europeans so that our enrichment capacity is fully utilized until their plant comes into operation. We both wish to avoid over- commitments and, between now and the late 1970's, the cheapest in- cremental enrichment capacity can be achieved through planned improve- ments to U.S. gaseous diffusion facilities. -- By providing U.S. gaseous diffusion technology to selected countries we could possibly inhibit the spread of centrifuge technology which, from the standpoint of proliferation, is a serious concern. (No advanced nation with strong incentives -- military, political or commer- cial -- can be permanently deterred from developing centrifuge enrichment facilities, but the high capital investment that is required could perhaps be reduced and diverted to gaseous diffusion by a genuine U.S. offer to co- operate.) -- Accession to the NPT has led several signatory nations to indicate that their willingness to foreswear the acquisition of nuclear weapons should remove the basic reason for excluding them from access to enrichment facilities. DISCUSSION The interagency paper develops three policy options with respect to the question of whether we should modify our policy toward cooperation in enrichment technology. These options are as follows (and are summarized, along with pro and con arguments, at Tab A). -- Cooperation in the gaseous diffusion field alone. -- Cooperation in both the gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge fields. -- Maintain our present policies. The study favors the first option -- cooperation in the gaseous diffusion field alone, and the Under Secretaries Committee will be asked to recom- mend that option to the President. The proposal for implementing the first option is summarized as follows: Beginning in early 1970, the U.S. SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 3 - would explore the possibility of cooperating with the Commission of the European Communities, the six community countries and the United Kingdom in building a multinational diffusion plant in Western Europe. The U.S. would agree, under mutually acceptable conditions, to make available comprehensive, up-to-date diffusion technology, on a classi- fied basis and subject to agreement on matters pertaining to plant and personnel security. The plant and its product would be subject to mutually acceptable safeguards. The U.S. would be compensated for the use of its technology and would seek agreement on a time schedule leading to plant operation toward the end of the 1970's. We would be prepared, if requested, to discuss the possibility of similar cooperation with other friendly countries, including Australia, Canada and Japan. No information on U.S. gas centri- fuge technology, as distinguished from gaseous diffusion technology, would be transferred in the process. COMMENT I consider the interagency study and the proposed recommendation to the President to be essentially sound. There are, however, several areas wherein the study could be strengthened. These are: -- The President desires that, in due course, AEC gaseous diffusion plants should be transferred to private industry. The study recognizes this objective, but does not analyze in sufficient depth the impact of relaxing our control over export of gaseous diffusion technology on the plan to transfer the AEC plants to the private sector. What, for example, would be the effect of increasing U.S. Western European enrichment capacity on the price private industry is prepared to pay the U.S. government for the plants? It can be argued that, if the U.S. market is shrunk by added European capacity, industry will reflect this situation in the form of lower bids. -- There is only a limited discussion of the possibility of attracting Japan, Canada and Australia into a West European venture. -- The study would be better balanced if it contained sections on the advisability of close regional control over stocks of processed weapons grade material and on the desirability of negotiating international agree- ment on the export and control of centrifuge technology. RECOMMENDATION This should not be a controversial paper. Unless you have strong SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 4 - reasons for wishing to attend the Under Secretaries Committee meeting, you may find it more profitable to spend your time on other matters. I will attend the meeting in your stead unless advised to the contrary. HAK to attend Behr to accompany HAK Behr to attend for HAK SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL U.S. POLICY OPTIONS I. Cooperation in the Gaseous Diffusion Field Alone A. Advantages 1. It would provide the Europeans and others with an attractive alternative to exclusive development of the gas centrifuge process. 2. It would assure that these efforts are undertaken on a classified basis and under adequate safeguards. 3. It would encourage the Europeans and others to construct their plants on a time scale that would assure maximum use of existing U.S. capacity. 4. It would enable the U.S. to obtain reasonable compensation for the use of U.S. technology and a U.S. voice in the continuing management of the project, including its export policies. This would preserve important economic benefits for the use of our technology, which could otherwise be diminished or lost through the construction of an independent foreign enrichment capacity. 5. It would help us create a more favorable climate for the scale of U.S. reactors and equipment abroad. 6. It could serve to strengthen EURATOM as an institution which in turn could strengthen the overall movement towards greater European unity. B. Disadvantages 1. It might be regarded by some of the European nations involved as interference with their efforts to achieve a degree of independence from the U.S. in the enrichment field. 2. The Europeans might find it preferable, given their interest in the gas centrifuge, if we evidenced a willingness to cooperate in both the gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge fields. Since we are not prepared to be forthcoming in meeting such a request, the tripar- tite countries might regard our offer as a ploy to delay and perhaps subvert their decision to proceed in the development of the centrifuge process. There also might be suspicions that we are holding back cooperation in the gas centrifuge field because we have achieved an important technological breakthrough. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 2 - 3. There would be an additional risk that U.S. gaseous diffusion technology might fall in the hands of countries that might wish to use it for military purposes. This would be true even if our cooperation were handled on a classified basis. 4. The Europeans conceivably might not be successful in their efforts to construct a viable and economically competitive enrichment plant without our support. Hence our assistance might serve to accelerate their ability to displace our enrichment services in the European market. 5. Although many countries would benefit from the existence of more than one source of enriched uranium, we expect to co- operate with only a limited number of countries that are able to meet our conditions. Our proposal would not enhance NPT acceptance in countries not benefiting from U.S. assistance, and as noted it could prove to be especially troublesome in the case of Japan. II. Cooperation in Both the Gaseous Diffusion and Gas Centrifuge Fields A. Advantages 1. It would be more flexible and would permit cooperation with the Europeans in the technology of their choice, which they would be able to make in full knowledge of where the U.S. technology stands in both fields. (Countires with high power costs and uncertain demands for U-235 may prefer the centrifuge process because of its lower electricity requirements and because it can be constructed in modest plant increments.) 2. Some of the arguments favoring U.S. participation in a diffusion plant appear to apply equally to participation in a centrifuge effort. For example, since we probably enjoy a technological lead over the Europeans in the centrifuge field, we might be able to obtain adequate financial returns for a U.S. contribution. Moreover, since the centrifuge process presents greater proliferation risks than diffusion, it could be argued that it would be all the more important for the U.S., through cooperation, to exert a significant control over foreign developments in this field. B. Disadvantages 1. The central and very serious disadvantage of this alternative is that the U.S. would directly contribute to the dissemination of centrifuge technology and perhaps hasten its application, with the attendant increased risk of proliferation. 2. One of the major objectives of a U.S. initiative at this time would be to offer foreign countries an alternative to the development Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED CONT document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 3 - of centrifuge technology in the hope that they might make their major investments in the diffusion field. III. Maintain Our Present Policies A. Advantages 1. It is still possible that the Europeans and others will not be able to muster the resources to build a large enrichment plant. Even with the necessary political will and financial investment, it may take them several years to realize their ambitions. Given this uncertainty, it might be in our interests not to cooperate but to compete aggressively for the foreign market for enrichment services. 2. As already noted, any program of U.S. cooperation, even if conducted on a classified basis, would add to the risk that U.S. information might fall into the hands of nations desiring to use it for military purposes. 3. Unless we were prepared to cooperate with everyone (which is not proposed) we might encounter adverse reactions from those nations not included in our offer. 4. Cooperation in the development of foreign enriching capabilities might complicate the transfer of AEC diffusion plants to private industry that the President has defined as an ultimate goal. However, the attractiveness of these plants for private investment may not, in any event, depend heavily on the potential foreign market for enriched uranium because of the probability that other nations will develop an independent capability with or without U.S. help. B. Disadvantages 1. The foregoing arguments ignore the basic fact that several countries are firmly resolved to acquire some independent enrichment capability with or without U.S. assistance. Moreover, there is every reason to expect they will be successful even if they have to pay a substantial premium in the process. 2. The knowledge required to produce plutonium is unclassified and is widespread and there are large quantities of plutonium throughout the world with more being created daily. Maintaining a restrictive policy in regard to our diffusion process would therefore not preclude any industrialized country seriously determined to do so, from producing a nuclear bomb. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 4 - 3. The period of U.S. monopoly in the uranium enrichment field is rapidly drawing to a close. For the U.S. to remain aloof from foreign developments in this field will not turn back the technological clock, nor will it decrease for any meaningful period of time the risks of further weapons proliferation inherent in the continuing peaceful exploitation of the atom. Rather, it might result only in the forfeiture of an opportunity to use our present technological superiority in an effort to gain important economic and security benefits for the United States. Whether the U.S. could actually gain a degree of control over the security arrangements of a cooperative venture that would justify releasing classified information to a group of foreign partners, and whether other countries can be induced to invest in a diffusion plant rather than continuing to concentrate their investment exclusively in the centrifuge field, are questions that can only be answered through serious negotiations with the countries concerned. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. ASSM71 folder 7006822 THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE use WASHINGTON NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL January 24, 1970 SECRET ATTACHMENT NSC-U/SM 56 TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, United States Information Agency The Under Secretary of Commerce The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Science Advisor to the President Mr. James R. Schlesinger, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget SUBJECT: US Cooperation in the Uranium Enrichment Field The attached paper proposing a modification in our current policy concerning cooperation with foreign countries in the field of uranium enr chment has been developed jo Intly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State. The subject matter is also being considered as part of the study being conducted pursuant to NSSM 71. However, early in the NSSM 71 study 11: was recognized by the Interdepartmental Political itary Group that the study on enrichment technology which was then already underway should continue and that its conclusion need not await complemion of the NSSM 71 study CONFIDENTIAL SECRET ATTACHMENT Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -2- The subject matter of the attached study is in itself of some significance and the course of action proposed should, if it is approved, be implemented in the near future to be of maximum benefit to US interests. I am therefore circulating the paper for early USC consideration. En- Elliot L. Richardson Chairman CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON 537 NSC-U/SM 56 CONFIDENTIAL SECRET ATTACHMENT NSC Under Secretaries Committee MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: A Program for International Cooperation in the Uranium Enrichment Field Summary and Recommendations: I. Recommendations: The Under Secretaries Committee recommends that subject to your approval, and following appropriate consultations with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the United States modify its long-standing policy of not cooperating with other countries in the uranium isotope enrichment field. Specifically, we recommend that at the appropriate time and in accordance with the negotiating strategy recommended in the attached paper, the Department of State and the AEC initiate explorátory talks with certain West European allies and the Commission of the European Communities on the possibility of the United States assisting the Europeans construct a multinationally owned and operated gaseous diffusion plant that would be located in Western Europe. We would report the results of these talks together with further recommendations to the National Security Council as soon thereafter as possible. Moreover, the actual implementation of any modifica- tion of our present policy would be contingent upon the execution of a suitable agreement or agreements for cooperation with the countries involved, which would require Presidential approval and review by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in accordance with statutory procedures. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 2 - II. Summary: A. The Proposal The proposal for cooperation which we recommend can be summarized as follows: Beginning in early 1970, the US would explore the possibility of ccoperating with the Commission of the European Communities, the six community countries and the United Kingdom in building a multinational diffusion plant in Western Europe. The US would agree, under mutually acceptable conditions, to make available comprehensive, up-to-date diffusion technology, on a classified basis and subject to agreement on matters pertaining to plant and personnel security. The plant and its product would be subject to mutually acceptable safeguards. The US would be compensated for the use of its technology and would seek agreement: on a time schedule leading to plant operation toward the end of the 1970's. We would be prepared, if requested, to discuss the possibility of similar cooperation with other friendly countries, including Australia, Canada and Japan. No information on US gas centrifuge technology, as distinguished from gaseous diffusion technology, would be trans- ferred in the process. The advantages and disadvantages of this proposal, including alternative courses of action, are discussed in detail in the attached paper. The principal factors that have influenced our recommenda- tion are summarized below. B. Determination of Foreign Countries to Build Their Own Capacity 1. During the next two decades there will be a substantial growth in the use of nuclear power and enriched uranium throughout the world. 2. A number of countries, particularly in Western Europe, are determined to acquire independent enrichment capabilities. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 3 - 3. Great emphasis is being placed abroad on developing the gas centrifuge process of enriching uranium, which is a serious cause of concern from a proliferation standpoint. The centrifuge is particularly susceptible for use in clandestine operations because the plant can be small and can have relatively low requirements for electricity, as contrasted with gaseous diffusion technology. The UK, the Netherlands and Germany are in the final stages of developing a tripartite centrifuge project aimed at achieving a modest production capability in the mid-1970's. C. Possibility of Influencing Developments Abroad Through a policy of cooperation we might influence developments abroad to serve US economic, political and nonproliferation interests. 1. We could provide our allies with an attractive alternative to committing the lion's share of their investment resources to rapid development of the centrifuge process. Our proposed plan for cooperation would not seek to obstruct the tripartite project because we recognize its political importance and view a multinational centrifuge project as preferable to several independent national efforts. Nevertheless, we believe it would be mutually beneficial to offer the Europeans an additional option for satisfying their enrichment: ambitions. (See Annex A, for estimated cost data on a European diffusion plant.) 2. We might induce other countries to delay their production plans for several years (until the late 1970's) so that US production capacity would be fully utilized before other large scale new production comes on line. We also should coordinate our enrich- ment plans with the Europeans and others to reduce the prospect that new enrichment capacity will be under-utilized to a significant degree. 3. We have had repeated indications that Europeans and others would welcome our cooperation in the gaseous diffusion field. Moreover, the European Commission (EURATOM) has recommended that the Community explore both the diffusion and centrifuge processes before making major investment decisions. Our proposal would CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONF IDENTIAL - 4 - be responsive to these desires. There also is evidence that the program we are proposing could improve the prospect of U.S. reactor sales to Western Europe, particularly in France. We also recognize that there might be some adverse reactions to our proposal abroad. We believe these can be minimized, perhaps eliminated, by adopting an appropriate negotiating strategy. 4. The program of cooperation could strengthen the Commission of the European Communities and, as a consequence, our efforts in support of European integration. 5. An early and comprehensive offer of US assistance in the diffusion field could have a beneficial effect in inducing certain key countries (such as Germany) to ratify the NPT, because it would represent a significant liberalization in US foreign nuclear policy, and would add credibility to past US expressions of willingness to help parties to the NPT in the field of peaceful uses. (On the other hand since we expect to cooperate with only a limited number of countries that are able to meet our conditions, our proposal would not enhance NPT acceptance in countries not benefiting from US assistance and could prove to be especially trouble- some in the case of Japan should it not be possible due to legal considerations for us to satisfy in some way Japan's aspirations in the enrichment field.) 6. WE believe our proposal would provide the US with a number of other political and economic benefits. We are anxious to assure that foreign enrichment programs are effectively safeguarded and that the plants and products are used only for peace- ful programs. We believe the US might gain a greater voice in these matters through constructive association with foreign enrichment plants than by continued non-participation. Moreover, we would plan to obtain significant revenues from our technology as well as a meaningful, continuing voice both in the management of the plant and its export policies. D. Related Issues We have also considered the following related issues which merit special attention: CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 5 - 1. Whether Our Cooperation Should be Limited To States That Sign the NPT We believe US cooperation preferably should be extended to those interested non-huclear weapon states in Western Europe that have signed the NPT. We would not imply that ratification of the NPT is a sine qua non for our cooperation, but we would express the view to our prospective partners that our ability to complete and execute cooperative arrangements would be greatly facilitated if they signed and ratified the Treaty. France, which will probably not sign the Treaty, would not be excluded for reasons discussed in detail in the attached paper. 2. Implications for our Relations with Other Countries While the immediate proposal relates to coopera- tion in the gaseous diffusion field with Western European allies, it must be recognized that, if this is undertaken, cooperation with other friendly countries such as Canada, Australia and Japan would be difficult to refuse if they could meet our general conditions. While any such cooperative projects would have to be considered case by case on their merits, we would expect the following conditions to apply inter alia: (a) Our assistance would be furnished on a classified basis; (b) We would consider associating ourselves only with well conceived projects of serious intent where the prospects of adequate financing are high and where the return to the United States in terms of revenues and influence appeared to warrant the provision of US technology; (c) We would give preference to multilaterally controlled and owned ventures; and (d) We would insist that the enrichment plant and its products be subject to safeguards in conformity with the NPT. Furthermore, since our cooperation would take place pursuant to one or more civil agreements, we would seek a guarantee that the plant and its product would be used only for peaceful purposes. Moreover, any US restricted data would be furnished only to authorized personnel, under strict security control, and on a need to know basis for use in the cooperative project. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 3. The Implications of the Foregoing Proposal on the Disposition of the AEC Gaseous Diffusion Facilities The Administration has decided that there should be no disposal of AEC diffusion plants for the time being, but that transfer to private industry is the ultimate objective. The benefits to the US of the cooperative program outlined above are independent of whether US enrichment facilities are publicly or privately owned. In the event of private ownership, the operators of the US facilities could have a direct role in the implementation of the cooperative program. 4. Negotiating Strategy A proposed negotiating strategy forms an integral part of our recommendations and is spelled out in Part V of the paper. However, both the timing and manner of exploratory conversations with the Europeans and consultations with other countries would be subject to continuous review by the AEC and the Department of State. Chairman, The Under Secretaries Committee Elliot L. Richardson Under Secretary of State CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL A Program for International Cooperation in the Gaseous Diffusion Field I. Background and Discussion A. Present U.S. Policy It is United States' policy to classify information on isotope enrichment technology, and to withhold it from other countries, on the premise that the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation increases as the number of enrich- ing facilities throughout the world increases. (In the post World War II period, the only exception to this policy was a limited exchange on the centrifuge process with the United Kingdom between 1960 and 1965.) We have sought to reduce incentives to develop enriching facili- ties abroad by supplying U-235, under stable and attrac- tive conditions, to countries that accept bilateral or multilateral safeguards. This approach has delayed the construction of for- eign enrichment facilities: outside of the Communist Bloc, only France and the United Kingdom have enrichment plants of modest production scale. It has also resulted in po- litical and economic advantages for the United States, in- cluding significant returns in foreign revenues. B. Need for a New Policy Several factors suggest that a change in policy is now warranted. 1. During recent years, several industrially ad- vanced countries have been rapidly shifting to the use of nuclear power for generating electricity. This trend is expected to accelerate in the future. It has been esti- mated that by the year 1980 approximately 320,000 mega- watts of nuclear power will be installed throughout the world. This would constitute roughly 13% percent of a total installed capacity of 2,400,000 megawatts. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 2 -- Enriched uranium is the preferred fuel for the nuclear reactors used to generate electricity and the only fuel for commercial reactors of US design, which enjoy predominant market acceptance in many nations of the world. The projected demand, both domestic and foreign, for enriched uranium can be met by existing and planned US capacity until the late 1970's. However, by that time additional new capacity will have to come on line. 2. Because of the growing use of enriched uranium reactors, several foreign countries are seriously con- cerned about their total dependence on the US for this nuclear fuel. Despite attractive US fuel supply policies, they are worried about the certainty of future supplies and about the possibility, however remote, that the US might use its monopoly position at some time to achieve political or economic objectives to which they may not subscribe. Several countries are also strong.. attracted by the commercial possibilities of an enrichment plant, both as source of fuel and as a step towards the export of fuel and reactors. It is nearly certain that some new foreign enrichment capacity will be built in Europe and possibly in Japan and Australia, even if the costs of the product exceed US enrichment prices. (Some countries believe they ulti- mately might meet or better the current US price of $26 per kilogram of separative work.) The British, Dutch and Germans have reached agreement on a tripartite project to establish a modest production capability in Western Europe by the nid-1970's based on the gas centrifuge process. * The Commission of the European Communities has proposed that the EURATOM member states undertake pilot projects on both the gaseous diffusion and the gas centrifuge processes, SO that they * By the mid 1970's, the centrifuge plant at Capenhurst is expected to reach a capacity of 200 tons sw/year and the one at Almelo in the Netherlands 100-150 tons sw/year. About 100 tons of the ultimate output of the two plants is expected to be available by the year 1972. This com- pares with the US diffusion plant capacity of 17,000 tons sw/year. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 3 - can make a major investment decision on a large scale enrichment plant by the mid-1970's. Outside of Europe, Australia and Japan have serious R&D programs under way, primarily in the centrifuge field, and Canada has ex- pressed a strong interest in building a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant in its northwest provinces. (A survey of current foreign programs and plans is included in Annex B.) 3. We have a strong incentive to rationalize our own enrichment plans with those of the Western Europeans with the view of assuring that our enrichment capacity is fully utilized before a major European plant comes into operation. (It would take the Europeans approximately six years to construct a major gaseous diffusion or gas centrifuge plant from the time of a firm decision.) This would suggest a European target of the late 1970's, since currently planned US capacity will be sufficient to meet all domestic and foreign needs until that date. If a major European plant comes into operation as little as two or three years prior to that date, the US could suffer a significant loss of revenues.* However, after the late 1970's further increases in our domestic demand should serve to offset any losses we might suffer in the foreign market. The Europeans should have an interest in coordinating their plans with ours since we both wish to avoid any over-commitments and the cheapest incremental enrichment capacity in the world between now and the late 1970's can be achieved through currently planned improve- ments in the USAEC's gaseous diffusion capacity. 4. From the standpoint of proliferation, the develop- ment of the centrifuge process is a cause of serious con- cern. Unlike the massive diffusion plants which require enormous inputs of electricity and large building com- plexes, the centrifuge process lends itself to clandestine operation. Small cascades could be installed in small buildings or warehouses and could be operated to produce significant amounts of weapons-grade uranium without use of a heavy load of electricity to signal their existence. * Our estimated annual sales of enrichment services under current price and technical conditions to West European nations (France and the UK excluded) in millions of dollars, follows: CY 1976-$117; CY 1977-$148; CY 1978- $176; CY 1979-$197; CY 1980-$234; TOTAL $872. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 4 : I Gaseous diffusion plants, in contrast, can be designed to produce only low enriched material that would be unsuitable for use in nuclear weapons. For these and other reasons, the United States has strictly limited the dissemination of information on advances in centrifuge technology. We have a formal agreement with the UK and informal agreements with the Dutch and the Germans to limit access to centrifuge in- formation according to a common classification guide prepared by the USAEC. These agreements do not preclude technical cooperation among the parties, so long as the common guidelines are respected. The United States has not opposed the German, Dutch and British efforts at tripartite cooperation in this field because we have felt that a multi-national project, with a built-in "adversary" element of control is preferable to three independent national developments. which would otherwise be likely to energe. Moreover, we have recognized the political importance of the pro- ject to our allies and have been sympathetic to the British interest in forging closer ties to the Continent. The three governments have indicated that their project agreement will include assurances against non-prolifera- tion, including adequate safeguards on the plants and the U-235 they will produce. We remain concerned, however, about the possible pro- liferation of such facilities around the world, especially if centrifuge machines and/or centrifuge technology were to be exported on an unrestricted commercial basis to non- nuclear-weapons states. We are not under any illusion that access to U.S. dif- fusion technology by itself would prevent any country with a strong military, political or commercial motive from de- veloping centrifuge enrichment facilities if they decide to and are capable of doing so. However, the main thrust of resource investment, especially in industrially advanced countries, might well be diverted to yaseous diffusion tech- nology by a cenuine U.S. offer to cooperate. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 5 - 5. A policy of U.S. cooperation in the diffusion field might improve the prospects for U.S. reactor sales in Wes- tern Europe, particularly France. It would also provide the U.S. with a number of other political and economic bene- fits including a greater voice in safeguards on a foreign plant and its product, significant revenues for our tech- nology, and a continuing voice in management and export policies. 6. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has led several sig- natory, or potential signatory, nations to indicate that their willingness to relinquish the right of acquiring nu- clear weapons should remove the basic reason for excluding them from access to uranium enrichment technology. They also believe that such access would be a reasonable con- cession for the nuclear weapons states to make. Non-nuclear weapons countries that adhere to the NPT will commit themselves to accept international safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. The Treaty, however, imposes no constraints against building uranium enrichment plants, provided the required safeguards are applied to such plants and their products. An offer of U.S. assistance in the diffusion field might favorably influence certain key countries (such as Germany) in deciding on NPT ratifiction, because it would represent a significant liberalization in U.S. foreign nu- clear policy, and would add credibility to past U.S. ex- pressions of willingness to help parties to the NPT in the field of peaceful uses. II. U.S. Policy Options Cooperation in the Gaseous Diffusion Field Alone The U.S. appears to have two basic policy options; (a) cooperation with the Europeans and perhaps others in the gaseous diffusion field alone, or in both the dif- fusion and gas centrifuge fields; or (b) continuation of our present policy of non-cooperation. A. Cocperation in the Diffusion Field This approach would have the following features: 1. Countries included in the initial offer. The United States would undertake informal, exploratory talks with the member states of EURATOM (France, West Germany, CONF IDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 6 I I Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), the United Kingdom and the Commission of the European Communities, aimed at the construction of a multinational gaseous dif- fusion plant in Western Europe that would come into oper- ation in the late 1970's. Our initial proposal would include these allied na- tions because they are the most advanced in the enrichment field and are the most determined to establish independent facilities. Other Western European countries might be in- cluded subsequently. Because it appears that France will not be a party to the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the NPT, and because France is a nuclear weapons power, including France in a cooperative project presents special problems. We expect that the guarantees and protections referred to on page 5 of the summary would be effective. They would include a limitation providing that US restricted data could be used only on the cooperative project. (Moreover, France already has in our opinion sufficient enrichment capacity to satisfy the requirements of its weapons program.) Notwithstanding this fact, however, it must be recognized that the French diffusion plant at Pierrelatte might benefit indirectly from French access to US diffusion technology should French participants in the cooperative project pass on information about the US technology in- volved to Pierrelatte, To. the extent that there is risk that this might occur, it is possible that US parti- cipation in the cooperative project could give rise to an exception to NSAM 294. NSAM 294 (attached at Annex C) is directed against US assistance in the development of a French nuclear weapons capability. (The policy set forth in NSAM 294 is currently under review under the terms of NSSM 71 of August 14, 1969.) Furthermore, the US has provided enriched uranium to France (through EURATOM) for use in French civil nuclear programs. We believe including France in the coopera- tive project is essential to its success because if France were excluded, EURATOM would probably have to be ruled out as a participant as well. (Some high level French officials have indicated informally that US cooper- ation with a European gaseous diffusion plant would be welcome.) CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -- 7 -- 2. US Contributions. We would expect our coopera- tion and the plant operations to take place on a classi- fied basis in accordance with mutually agreed classi- fication standards. The precise degree of technical assist- ance the US would provide the project, as well as the com- pensation it would receive, would be subject to negoti- ation. We anticipate, however, that when the exchange was implemented, the US would furnish its partners comprehen- sive, up-to-date information on its gaseous diffusion pro- cess and technical advice and assistance in design, con- struction and operation of the plant. One particularly sensitive item is barrier manufactur- ing technology. We recognize that the Europeans will wish to acquire their own barrier manufacturing capability, either initially or for later barrier replacements and plant ex- pansion. Any cooperative venture which does not result in a truly independent European capability, that is, facili- ties which can be operated, maintained, and, if necessary, expanded hout further US involvement, would not meet European objectives and would be unacceptable. In con- sidering this matter, it must be recognized that the Europeans are unlikely to undertake a major financial commitment to build a gaseous diffusion plant (which would entail some reorientation away from the centrifuge) unless. they were assured of the provision of comprehensive US technology, which is the most advanced in the world. Access to US barriers would be of great assistance to technically competent people who were trying to develop an independent capability. Accordingly, we would not rule out the possi- bility of providing the Europeans barrier manufacturing data if it appeared to be an important element in the ne- gotiations and if we were assured of an equitable return. One method would be to offer to provide the Europeans US manufactured barriers for the first plant and transfer barrier manufacturing technology at a later date. 3. Quid Pro Quo. In return for its assistance, the U.S. would nter alia, expect to receive financial compen- sation for the information it provides and a continuing voice in the project's management and control, including export policies. We would expect that the plant and its products would be subject to safeguards arrangements and physical and personnel security policies mutually satis- factory to the parties concerned. Finally, we would seek CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 8 I I to reach agreement on a time schedule which would lead to full plant operation when the present and projected U.S. capacity is no longer adequate to meet both domestic and and foreign demand for enriched uranium. 4. Timing. Cooperation would be carried out in several phases. During the first phase we would assess with our prospective partners the attractiveness of dif- fusion technology in the European context, the optimum plant size, its location and other planning requirements. In the second phase, perhaps beginning in late 1972, we would provide detailed US design data. (European agree- ment to go ahead on this basis undoubtedly would depend on an early, firm US commitment on the general scope and degree of assistance we would provide at a later date.) The final phase, construction and operation of the plant, would occur in the late 1970's. 5. Cooperation with Additional Countries. Without taking the nitiative, the U.S. would be prepared to con- sider entering into similar cooperative efforts with other friendly countries, on a case-by-case basis, if they could. meet our basic general conditions. These would include conducting the cooperation on a classified basis, evidence that the project was well conceived and likely to achieve adequate financial support, an adequate return for the pro- vision of U.S. technology, and assurance that the plant and its products would be under adequate safeguards. Prefer- erence would be given to projects organized on a multi- lateral basis. If Australia, Canada and Japan could meet these requirements, we would consider partnership with them. Japan, however, might have difficulty meeting these conditions because of its legal inhibitions against clas- sifying atomic energy information. This could present us with a serious problem since next to Europe, Japan is likely to have the most legitimate interest in its own enrichment plant. As a practical matter, the number of cooperative arrangements with other countries would be very limited because of the sizeable investment required for gaseous diffusion plants. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -- 9 - B. Advantages. The principal arguments favoring this approach may be summarized as follows: 1. It would provide the Europeans and others with an attractive alternative to exclusive development of the gas centrifuge process; 2. It would assure that these efforts are under- taken on a classified basis and under adequate safeguards; 3. It would encourage the Europeans and others to construct their plants on a time scale that would assure maximum use of existing U.S. capacity; 4. It would enable the U.S. to obtain reasonable compensation for the use of U.S. technology and a U.S. voice in the continuing management of the project, in- cluding its export policies. This would preserve impor- tant economic benefits for the use of our technology, which could otherwise be diminished or lost through the construction of an independent foreign enrichment ca- pacity; 5. It would help us create a more favorable climate for the sale of U.S. reactors and equipment abroad; 6. It could serve to strergthen EURATOM as an in- stitution which in turn could strengthen the overall movement towards greater European unity. C. Disadvantages 1. It might be regarded by some of the European nations involved as interference with their efforts to achieve a degree of independence from the U.S. in the enrichment field. 2. The Europeans might find it preferable, given their interest in the gas centrifuge, if we evidenced a willingness to cooperate in both the gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge fields. Since we are not prepared to be forthcoming in meeting such a request, the tripar- tite countries might regard our offer as a ploy to delay and perhaps subvert their decision to proceed in the de- vélopment of the centrifuge process. There also might be CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 10 I I suspicions that we are holding back cooperation in the gas centrifuge field because we have achieved an import- tant technological breakthrough. 3. There would be an additional risk that U.S. gaseous diffusion technology might fall in the hands of countries that might wish to use it for military pur- poses. This would be true even if our cooperation were handled on a classified basis. 4. The Europeans conceivably might not be success- ful in their efforts to construct a viable and economi- cally competitive enrichment plant without our support. Hence our assistance might serve to accelerate their ability to displace our enrichment services in the Euro- pean market. 5. Although many countries would benefit from the existence of more than one source of enriched uranium, we expect to cooperate with only a limited number of countries that are able to meet our conditions. Our proposal would not enhance NPT acceptance in countries not benefiting from US assistance, and as noted it could prove to be especially troublesome in the case of Japan. D. Anticipated Foreign Reactions Whether the possible advantages of this alterna- tive outweigh the possible disadvantages is related in large part to the reaction that might be expected from other countries. 1. The Commission of the European Communities. The EC Commission has implied that it would welcome a US proposal to cooperate in the diffusion field. It would mesh neatly with the Commission's own proposal to bring large scale enrichment facilities into operation towards the end of the next decade. 2. France. France has proposed at the Hague Summit that a European isotope separation plant be established. France would probably be attracted by the US proposal because its experience and investment in diffusion tech- nology would give it a place of leadership in the co- CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 11 -- operative project. On the other hand the French may resent our proposal if they still hope their own diffusion technology should provide the basis for European cooperation. 3. The Tripartite Countries. The Dutch, German and British reactions are likely to be mixed since they may view it as hostile to their own plans to pursue the gas centrifuge and they may be hesitant to get involved in an additional European enrichment venture. Moreover, these three countries, especially the Netherlands, are unlikely to abandon their currently planned efforts in the centrifuge field. On the other hand, given the developmental state of their gas centrifuge technology they might on reflection welcome the more proven option that we would propose in deciding on the nature of the large scale enrichment capacity that Europe should con-- struct. We know, for example, that a number of German interests would favor this type of cooperation with the US. Since our offer of cooperation would include these three countries, we would serve to minimize an impression that we are taking an initiative solely hostile to their tripartite centrifuge efforts. Also, the British might be uneasy about any proposal that would embroil their bid to enter the Community in an overt intra-Community debate about how to proceed in the enrichment field. However, if the tripartité project be- comes a divisive element in the UK accession debate, the UK and some EC countries might use a well-timed US pro- posal as a means of reaching a. compromise solution to the enrichment question. 4. Belgium and Italy. Both Bolgium and Italy have evidenced a keen interest in discussing possible partici- pation with the tripartite project and have already had informal conversations with the three countries. The Belgians and Italians would probably favor the US option as another means of getting into the enrichment business with their Common Market partners on a more equal footing. 5. Japan and Australia. These countries can be expected to want to benefit from any change in US policy and would surely insist on treatment comparable to their European competitors. Moreover it is basic US Government policy to treat Japan and Australia whenever possible on CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 12 I I an equal footing with our NATO allies. The possiblity of the uncontrolled dissemination of US classified data through cooperation with Japan must be taken into account, however, because of Japan's legal prohibition against national security classification. 6. Canada. We are exploring with Canada the possi- bility of moving towards a common energy policy with respect to oil, natural gas, coal, electricity and uranium. We already have extremely close ties with Canada in the nuclear field. Canada has expressed interest in cooperating with the United States in constructing a diffusion plant. Given this interest, our close economic and political ties with Canada, and the importance of uranium to the Canadian economy, failure to make some provisions for Canada in any scheme for cooperation in the enrichment field would be greatly resented in Canada and could be detrimental to US-Canadian relations. 7. The USSR. Soviet propaganda has reflected dis- pleasure towards the tripartite centrifuge project. The USSR might react similarly to any US proposal to cooperate in the enrichment field which includes the FRG. In reality, however, the Soviets are likely to feel easier about a German project in which we exert influence than in an independent one. They are also not likely to have a basis for serious concern since our proposal is aimed at deferring construction of a major foreign enrich- ment capacity and providing the Europeans with an alterna- tive to exclusive development of the centrifuge process. In any case we should not let the prospect of continued Soviet attacks against the FRG deter US cooperation in the enrichment field. 8. European Countries Not Included and the LDC's. The reactions of European countries not included in an initial US proposal to cooperate and of most less developed countries would probably not be hostile, or present in- surmountable obstacles to implementing this plan for cooperation. The financial and technological investment in a diffusion plant is so great that only the most industrially advanced countries could seriously consider CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 13 - participation with the United States in this field. Moreover, other countries might see a more diversified source of supply as in their interest. It should also be noted that the NPT strongly encourages parties to cooperate with other nations in the peaceful nuclear field but lows them the discretion of determining whether or not it is in their interest to do so. III. US Policy Options - Cooperation in Both the Gaseous Diffusion and Gas Centrifuge Fields The US could offer (under terms comparable to those outlined above) to cooperate with the West Europeans and others in both the diffusion and centrifuge fields instead of in the diffusion field alone. Under this option we would provide our partners with a comprehensive, current picture of where US technology stands in both fields, and we would then consider actively assisting the Europeans in the process or processes they deemed most suitable. This might include extensive cooperation in either field or in both, depending on the foreign pro- grams that develop. A. Advantages This approach would have the following advantages: 1. It would be more flexible and would permit co- operation with the Europeans in the technology of their choice, which they would be able to nake in full know- ledge of where the U.S. technology stands in both fields. (Countries with high power costs and uncertain demands for U-235 may prefer the centrifuge process because of its lower electricity requirements and because it can be constructed in modest plant increments.) 2. Some of the arguments favoring U.S. participa- tion in a diffusion plant appear to apply equally to par- ticipation in a centrifuge effort. For example, since we probably enjoy a technological lead over the Europeans in the centrifuge field, we might be able to obtain ade- quate financial returns for a US contribution. Moreover, since the centrifuge process presents greater proliferation risks than diffusion, it could be argued that it would be all the more important for the U.S., through cooperation, to exert a significant control over foreign developments in this field. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order, 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 14 I I B. Disadvantages 1. The central and very serious disadvantage of this alternative is that the U.S. would directly contribute to the dissemination of centrifuge technology and perhaps hasten its application, with the attendant increased risk of proliferation. 2. One of the major objectives of a U.S. initiative at this time would be to offer foreign countries an alter- native to the development of centrifuge technology in the hope that they might make their major investments in the diffusion field. C. Comment In the event the U.S. offer to cooperate in the diffusion field alone were rejected and the Europeans ap- peared intent on proceeding with a major gas centrifuge production plant, we would always have the opportunity of reviewing our various options. But, at this time, we recommend that no information on U.S. centrifuge tech- nology, including cost data, be transferred to any other country or organization. IV. U.S. Policy Options-Maintain Our Present Policies The arguments for and against this approach are as follows: A. Advantages 1. It is still possible that the Europeans and others will not be able to muster the resources to build a large enrichment plant. Even with the necessary politi- cal will and financial investment, it may take them several years to realize their ambitions. Given this uncertainty, it might be in our interests not to cooperate but to com- pete aggressively for the foreign market for enrichment ser- vices. 2. As already noted, any program of US cooper- ation, even if conducted on a classified basis, would add to the risk that US information might fall into the hands of nations desiring to use it for military purposes. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -- 15 - 3. Unless we were prepared to cooperate with everyone (which is not proposed) we might encounter ad- verse reactions from those nations not included in our offer. 4. Cooperation in the development of foreign enriching capabilities might complicate the transfer of AEC diffusion plants to private industry that the President has defined as an ultimate goal. However, the attractiveness of these plants for private investment may not, in any event, depend heavily on the potential foreign market for enriched uranium because of the probability that other nations will develop an independent capability with or without US help. B. Disadvantages 1. The foregoing arguments ignore the basic fact that several countries are firnly resolved to acquire some independent enrichment capabilı with or without US assistance. Moreover, there is every reason to expect they will be successful even if they have to pay a substan- tial premium in the process. 2. The knowledge required to produce plutonium is unclassified and is widespread and there are large quantities of plutonium throughout the world with more being created daily. Maintaining a restrictive policy in regard to our diffusion process would therefore not preclude any industrialized country seriously determined to do so, from producing a nuclear bomb. 3. The period of U.S. monopoly in the uranium en- richment field is rapidly drawing to a close. For the U.S. to remain aloof from foreign developments in this field will not turn back the technological clock, nor will it de- crease for any meaningful period of time the risks of fur- ther weapons proliferation inherent in the continuing peaceful exploitation of the atom. Rather, it might re- sult only in the forfeiture of an opportunity to use our present technological superiority in an effort to gain im- portant economic and security benefits for the United States. Whether the U.S. could actually gain a degree of control over the security arrangements of a cooperative ven- ture that would justify releasing classified information to CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 16 I I a group of foreign partners, and whether other countries can be induced to invest in a diffusion plant rather than continuing to concentrate their investment exclusively in the centrifuge field, are questions that can only be an- swered through serious negotiations with the countries con- cerned. V. Conclusion A. After considering the foregoing three alterna- tives, we conclude that the first, namely, cooperation in the gaseous diffusion field would be preferable. This conclusion, however, is based on approval of the fol- lowing negotiating strategy. B. Negotiating Strategy 1. Timing Subject to continuous review by the Department of State and the AEC, preliminary talks would begin in the early spring of 1970. By that time the Dutch, British and Germans will have a better idea of whether or how the tripartite centrifuge project may be expanded to include other countries. The effect of the project on the Community's enrichment plans and the effect that a US proposal micht have on UK accession negotiations with the Community also should be clearer. Moreover, by the early months of 1970 the new German government will be in a better position to respond to a U.S. initiative, and Japan will probably have signed the NPT. Given the importance that the tripartite project has to the United Kingdom's accession interests, we would approach the United Kingdom before we approached our other prospective partners. We would, after preliminary discussions with the British, begin any initial consultations with the Commission of the Europear Communities. 2. Approach We would indicate in initial contacts that U.S. cooperation in the diffusion field is not conditioned upon European abandonment of research and development of the centrifuge process. We would stress that we believe cooper- ation in the diffusion field could be mutually advantageous and that it is worth serious study by the Europeans as one option they may want to consider in deciding upon an enrich- ment program. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 17 ! 1 The Europeans can be expected to inquire whether it is possible that future U.S. enrichment plants might in- volve the gas centrifuge and whether it would make sense for Europe to embark on a gaseous diffusion program if such a possibility exists. They may also ask whether the U.S. would be prepared to cooperate with them in centrifuge development either additionally or in place of the dif- fusion process. Should such questions arise, we would indicate that the USAEC has no current intention of bring- ing the centrifuge into commercial application in the U.S. prior to the late 1970's, that the USAEC's centrifuge pro- gram is developmental in nature, and that we are reluctant to cooperate with any countries in this field given the sensitivity of the technology. Moreover, we would stress that the diffusion process is the one most perfected tech- nologically and that our offer represents the product of a major investment and of 25 years' experience. Further, we would point out that a U.S. option could be supplemen- tary to European enrichment studies in the centrifuge field already underway and would in no way deprive them of the opportunity to assess the relative advantages of. both techniques. We believe these are convincing argu- ments. If, however, our offer were rejected because cen- trifuge information is not included, or if the Europeans elected to pursue only the centrifuce route, we would have to review the situation in the light of these circumstances. 3. Other Countries In the event other countries, particularly Japan, Australia, and Canada, express an interest either in as- sociating themselves with a U.S.-European venture or ex- ploring the possibility of some form of bilateral cooper- ation with the U.S., we would, as noted, indicate a willing- ness to hold preliminary exploratory conversations with them on how their long-term requirements for enriched uranium might best be met, with the understanding that the pre-con- ditions to J.S. assistance set forth in this paper would apply (recognizing that our preference for a multilateral arrangement may be unrealistic in the case of Canada) We would be prepared to counter possible Soviet propa- ganda directed against the U.S. proposal by citing the con- structive controls that would be inherent in a broadly-based multi-national diffusion project. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 18 I I If this general strategy were followed, subject, of course, to constant review by the Department of State and the AEC in response to developments abroad, an effort at cooperation along the lines recommended above would appear to be well worth trying. It would give allied countries an additional option to consider in making their enrichment plans. They could at worst reject that option and at best accept it as serving their interest. At the same time, by exploring the possibilities of cooperation the U.S. would in no way be bound to enter into a disadvantageous agreement if the negotiations did not prove fruitful from our point of view. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX A Based on various studies by EURATOM and FORATOM, it is considered most likely that if a diffusion plant were built in Western Europe for the production of enriched uranium, the first such plant would be in operation by about 1980 and would have an annual capacity of about 7,500 metric ton units of separative work (SW). If undertaken as a completely independent European effort, these same studies estimate a plant investment of between $90 and $130 per kilogram unit of SW per year; the latter figure is considered to be the most realistic. Thus, the invest- ment -- exclusive of electrical generating and other support facilities -- would be in the order of $975 million. It should be pointed out that these costs were determined largely by adjustments to the new plant costs shown in various published AEC documents rather than by independent estimates. Thus, we believe that the Europeans -- lack- ing the US experience and industrial base probably have underestimated the unit cost, for the initial plant at least, if it were undertaken exclusively on a European basis. Further, no research and development costs are included in the foregoing estimates. To bring existing European ffusion technology to the present US level, it has been estimated by FORATOM that the expenditure of $100 to $140 million would be required, with no assurance that parity would be reached. Insofar as unit costs of separative work are con- cerned, by adjusting AEC data to European conditions, the Europeans have estimated that such costs for an indepen- dently built European plant would range between $25 and $37 per kilogram unit of separative work, with only opera- ting and capital charges; they do not include items equiva- lent to the "added factor," interest on inventory or re- turn on investment. With US assistance, it is believed that the unit cost of investment could be reduced to about $100 per kilogram unit of SW per year, or a total savings for the 7,500 metric ton unit plant of at least $225 million. Further- more, the $100 to $140 million in research and develop- ment expenditure would become unnecessary. If the diffusion plant were built in cooperation with the US, it is felt that the unit cost of separative work could be reduced from the $33 figure to about $25 per kilogram unit (based on European capital assumptions and electricity at 5 mills per kilowatt-hour.) CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX B - Current Foreign Enrichment Programs 1. France France has a gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte designed to produce enriched uranium for the Force de Frappe. The French have floated the idea on several occasions of developing a multilaterally financed Euro- pean facility for the production of lightly enriched uranium. The Germans and other West Europeans to whom the proposal was addressed have not reacted enthusiasti- cally. The French appear to be committed to diffusion technology and have publicly questioned the feasibility of the centrifuge process. They have had a modest R & D program underway in the centrifuge field with which, they apparently consider, they have had little success. 2. The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and the FRG In 1965 the British Government announced plans to modernize their diffusion plant at Capenhurst, primarily to meet increased civilian demand for nuclear fuel in the early 1970's. On the basis of economic considerations, the British have opted to expand their facilities beyond the modernization of Capenhurst through the development of the centrifuge process. Both the Germans and the Dutch have R & D programs in the centrifuge field. They have reached agreement with the British t.o pool their tech- nology and resources in a tripartite project. In joining together they are motivated by political as well as economic considerations. The British particularly favor the project as a means of strengthening their ties to the Continent and as potentially helpful in eventual nego- tiations to enter the Common Market. While France has remained aloof from the tripartite Project, both Italy and Belgium have indicated a strong interest in participating. The tripartite countries have agreed to consult with the Belgians and Italians and there have already been preliminary talks among the five countries. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 3. European Communities The Commission of the European Communities has been interested for some time in a Community enrichment facility and is undoubtedly concerned by the tripartite development which threatens to read them out of European cooperation in this field. The Commission has recently proposed to the Council a three stage program to permit the Community to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency in the production of enriched uranium during the next decade. The program would include detailed studies and pilot projects on both the diffusion and the centrifuge processes drawing on French as well as German and Dutch experience in the enrichment field. It would attempt to begin production by the preferred process or combina- tion of processes in the late 1970's. 4. Italy Italy announced in November of this year that an Italian industrial firm has produced two prototype centri- fuges. The Italian government has supported modest industrial research in the centrifuge since the begin- ning of 1969. It is not clear whether the centrifuge prototypes have actually been tested. There is reason to suspect that the Italian announcement was timed to fortify the Italian bid for membership in the tripartite centrifuge project. 5. Japan Outside of Europe, Japan is engaged in serious research on diffusion and centrifuge technology with lesser efforts in other processes. While Japanese efforts appear to be favoring work in the centrifuge field, the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency has set 1975 as the target year for selection of a single process to be the basis of further efforts. The Japanese could probably accelerate this time table, however, if they felt that construction of a European enrichment facility posed a serious threat to their ability to compete in this field in the future. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 6. Australia Australia started research on a gas centrifuge development program in 1960-61. In 1968 an official of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission told US officials that, based on their research, they believe a small, economically feasible system might be developed in four years time. The Australian program is aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in the production of nuclear fuel for their power reactor program and at the export market. They have evidenced a strong interest in cooperating with the US in this field. 7. Canada Canada does not have an important R & D program underway in the enrichment field. They have, however, expressed an interest in cooperating with the United States in constructing a diffusion plant in the far Northwestern areas of Canada, where large supplies of natural uranium exist along. with a large source of low cost hydro-electric power which would have no other marketing value. 8. Other Countries In addition to the countries mentioned above, Sweden, Brazil, Israel, Yugoslavia, Egypt, India, Argentina and several others have evidenced varying degrees of interest in centrifuge research. 9. United States It should be borne in mind that the United States is actively engaged in centrifuge research and is probably technically far ahead of any of the countries similarly engaged abroad. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX C NSA - 294 CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. File 5937 WHITE HOUSE VABHINGTON April 20, 1964 294 SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 294 TO: The Secretary of State. The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Director of Central Intelligence The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Director, Office of Science and Technology SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France It is the policy of this government to oppose the development of nuclear forces by additional states, other than those whose forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force, targeted in accordance with NATO plans and, except when supreme national interests were at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the Alliance. Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government's interest not to contribute to or assist in the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French na tional strategic nuclear delivery capacity. This includes exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint re- search and development activities, and exchanges between indus- trial and commercial organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However, this directive is not intended to restrict unduly full and useful cooperation in non-strategic programs and activities. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 2 - SECRET Therefore, the President has directed that effective controls be established immediately to assure that, to the extent feasible, the assistance referred to above is not extended either intentionally or unintentionally. To this end, specific technical guidance is to be developed and issued at the earliest possible time for the use of the agencies that control the export of equipment and technology, including data exchange arrangements. Responsibility for the development of such guidance, and when necessary the revision of these guidances, will be vested n the Departments of State and Defense, in consul- tation as appropriate with the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Office of Science and Technology, and under the leadership of the Department of State. The approved guidance documents will be cleared at the White House and issued as technical appendices to this National Security Action Memorandum. Necessary guidance will be requested before specific commitments are made by any agency. 1 An ( McGeorge Bundy SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON C F L. NSAM March 9, 1965 2 2ay Dear Tommy: I have held your letter of February 26 about NSAM 294 until we could have a first meeting with the two Secretaries on the Gilpatric Report. In the light of our discussion of yesterday, I now think we should clearly go ahead on the basis which is suggested in the memorandum enclosed with your letter. My one additional suggestion is that I hope a White House Staff Officer may also be included in the NSAM Review Group under State chairmanship. I would expect to nominate Spurgeon Keeny for this job. Sincerely, man McGeorge Bundy The Honorable Llewellyn Thompson Acting Deputy Under Secretary Department of State Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. COPY SECRET February 26, 1965 Dear Mac: You will recall that we had set up a small working group to look into some of the coordination and implementation aspects of NSAM. 294. I enclose a preliminary report of the group. Their findings and views as to continued application of the policy set forth in the NSAM seem to me to square with the consensus reached in the White House meeting of December 30 as recorded in the January 14 memorandum sent to participants in the meeting. We all recognize that we are feeling our way in a singularly complex area, and the approach suggested by the working group is in my view a sound one. I believe we should proceed along these lines, and plan to ask the other agencies concerned to designate representatives to the Review Group proposed. In the Department of State, general NSAM 294 responsi- bility will continue to rest. with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen, and he or an officer designated by him will represent the Department on the Review Group. Sincerely, Clearances: Llewellyn E. Thompson Acting G/PM Mr. Kitchen Mr. Meyers Enclosure: Report of Working Group. The Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assitant to the President Reproduced the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified, SECRET CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF NSAM 294 WORKING GROUP Conclusions: 1. The purpose of the policy set forth in NSAM 294. is to use export denial, as one means of achieving effective control over material, equipment and technology which any nation* seeks to acquire for use in an independent nuclear weapons/strategic delivery vehicle program, and which would significantly benefit such program. 2. Adequate legislative author ty and export control mechanisms already exist within the U.S. Government to assure that all items of potential concern in NSAM 294 terms come within the congizance of the appropriate export licensing authorities, either AEC, State, or Commerce. 3. The tasks of the licensing authorities are therefore (1) to make sure that procedures are in effect which are adequate to identify all proposed export items falling under NSAM 294 and (2) to establish the best possible judgment on the following: a. The technical, economic, quality, and timing importance of the item to the national weapons program. b. The use actually intended for the item. c. The alternative sources outside the U.S. for the item or a comparable substitute. 4. Those items In practical terms, the U.K. is at present exempted from this policy, since we are cooperating with that country extensively in both the nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle areas. The policy is also not relevent to Bloc countries, since more stringent policies are governing with respect to them. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidentialt ibrary DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET 2 1 I 4. Those items which are clearly intended for use in a national program, would significantly and directly benefit that program in terms of timing, quality, or cost, and are unavailable in comparable substitute form elsewhere than the U.S. are to be denied. 5. Those items intended for other uses, or of only marginal benefit to the national program, or available elsewhere than the U.S. without undue difficulty or delay, will normally be approved. Other than NSAM 294 considera- tions may come into play, however (Atomic Energy legisla- tion, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, political considerations, other U.S. policies, etc.), and individual decisions must take these into account. 6. While NSAM 294 is of general application, France, under her present policies, is the major target country now and for the immediate future. Nevertheless exports to all other countries must be continuously evaluated in terms of both the potential and intention of the recipient country to engage in a national program. 7. No new control mechanisms or formalized inter-agency committees are required, but improved coordination, exchange of views and centralized compilations of case-by-case experience are needed. To the extent feasible, definite lists of commodities and related technologies of importance in NSAM 294 terms should be developed in order to make the controls most effective. The agencies with technical competence in the area are therefore continuing to work on improving present lists. It is recognized, however, that the relative and shifting nature of the NSAM 294 control problem probably means that individual decisions will necessarily continue to be mostly of an ad hoc nature. Recommendations: 1. Each SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 3 - 1. Each agency concerned (State, Defense, AEC, Commerce, NASA) should name a single senior staff level representative to have general responsibility within that agency for NSAM 294 matters. 2. These representatives should keep in close touch with each other and with all concerned areas within their own agencies, the purpose being to ensure that NSAM 294 cases arising within or referred through normal channels to their agencies get adequate and expeditious consideràtion under the criteria outlined above. 3. These representatives should also be constituted as an informal NSAM 294 Review Group, meeting under State chairmanship once a month or as necessary, and including additional participation from their own agencies as desirable. The purpose will be to continue to explore ways and means to improve inter-agency coordination, discuss implementation problems which may have arisen, study decisions reached in individual cases of a precedent value or with unusual features, build up a central body of NSAM 294 experience, and make recommendations for change ir policy or procedures to their respective agenciés as may be required. 4. The intelligence community should be requested to provide the Review Group on a regular. basis with evaluations of additional-country potential and intention to engage in nuclear weapons programs, to assist the group in achieving the purpose mentioned in paragraph 6 above. Clearances: cc: Commerce - Mr. Tollin WE - Mr. Beigel Defense - Mr. Nichols L/ EUR - Mr. Trippe AEC - Mr. O'Donnell CIA - Mr. Christesen NASA - Mr. Gorman MC - Mr. Sipes E/MDC - Mr. McFadden Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED GThis document has been, reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 2/17/65 SECRET 6822 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL To: NSC Secretariet overtaken by 7799 Per Col.Bohn. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined 1 6822 CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT 21/3/70 MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE SUBJECT: Program for International Cooperation in the Uranium Enrichment Field The President has reviewed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's recommendation regarding a program for international cooperation in the uranium enrichment fiel d, as contained in your memorandum of February 26. Before further action on this matter, the President has requested that the report be supplemented by information pertaining to the following questions. 1. Since the report recognizes that United States policy on the gas centrifuge process may have to be reviewed, depending upon the reactions to the proposed course of action, what are the full advantages and disadvantages o.' the option to share both centrifuge and diffusion technology, including relevant Congressional considerations and consideration of offering to share both now or phasing into centrifuge sharing at a late r date? 2. What objectives of the United States/are to be served or disserved by the various options? What is the likelihood of advancing various objectives, and what are the relationships between these objectives? --for example, technological cooperation with Europe and other countries, European integration, multinational approaches, non- Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document prolife has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified field CONFIDENTIAL - 2 - 3. What are the short-range and probable longer-term - problems, and possible United States responses, which may be opened up by a decision of the United States to share only gaseous diffusion technology? 4. Where does the United States stand in its diffusion and centrifuge programs? What is the probable status of other countries' pro- grams over the years without United States cooperation, and what is the interaction between other programs and those of the United States? Specifically, what are the international and domestic political implications of the rec.- ommended course of action if the United States should decide that any new United States plant is to be of the centrifuge type? The President recognizes that timing may be an important factor in reviewing these options and has, therefore, requested that the above information be submitted for his ##### overall consideration on or before April 22. The classification of the report should be up-graded if necessary to handle the supplementary information adequately. The nature and content of H the reocew shoald be closely held. Henry A. Kissinger Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER FROM: Robert M. Behr SUBJECT: US Cooperation in the Uranium Enrichment Field The NSC Under Secretaries Committee met on February 19 to consider B an interagency paper (Tab C) on US cooperation in the uranium enrich- ment field. The Under Secretaries Committee has forwarded a memorandum to A the President (Tab B) recommending that the US modify its long-standing policy of not cooperating with other countries in the uranium enrichment (1) to thare US goseous d ffasion technologyand field by offering to assist the Europeans to construct a multinationally owned and operated gaseous diffusion plant# in and(2) Western Europe, with acceptable safeguards, '/\ by being prepared to discuss the possibility of similar cooperatio 1 with countries such as Canada, Australia and Japan. Implementation of such a policy would be contingent upon the execution of a suitable agreement or agreements for cooperation which would require Presidential approval and review by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. BACKGROUND With the growing demand for production of ectrical power by means of a nuclear reactors, there is a parallel demanc. for nuclear méterial to fuel these reactors. Two techniques are normaliy used to obtain enriched Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- CONFIDENTIAL uranium to fuel nuclear reactors (1) the gaseous diffusion technique and (2) the gas centrifuge process. Gaseous diffusion involves very large plant facilities and consumes great quantities of electricity. Conversely, gas centrifuges can be housed in smaller plants and need much less electricity. The proliferation of gas centrifuge plants could present problems of clandestine operation and of nuclear weapons pro- liferation. earlier highly instricted With the exception of some programs of cooperation with the Europeans, U.S. policy has been (1) to withhold enrichment technology from other coun- and (2) tries. We hav e sought to reduce incentives to develop enrichment facil- ities abroad by supplying U-235 under stable conditions to countries that accept bilateral or multilateral safeguards. This program has also pro- duced economi C advantages for the US.in-the form of significant returns in foreign reventes. Today, several factors suggest that a new policy may be warranted; pulep the mos importor them he fact that t Projected domestic and foreign demand for enriched ## uranium can be met by existing and planned US capacity until the late 19- 70's, when new capacity will have to come on line. /. 2. Foreign countries are attracted by both the prospect of not being dependir g upon the US for nuclear fuel supply and by the commercial out by possibilities of exporting fuel and nuclear reactors. Enrichment plants will be built abroad, with or without US help. The Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -3- 3 CONFIDENTIAL Beitish, Dutch and Germans have concluded a tripartite agreement and tomarhet to develop A the gas centrifuge process and plants, and there are in- dications that the Belgians and Italians will join in this endeavor. 3. We have a strong incentive to rationalize our plans with the The question, therefore, whether wannum enrechment develop to and and plants desador, will proceed bith without us coopers tion, and who advantages Europeans so that our enrichment capacity is best utilized until their plant comes into operation. 4. By providing US gaseous diffusion technology to selected countries we could possibly inhibit the spread of centrifuge technology which, loge under essions CS action. from the standpoint of proliferation, is a serious concern. On the other hand, by cooperating in both diffusion and centrifuge tech- nology, the US could also possibly influence the spread of both technologies through agreements for cooperation. 5. Accession to the NPT has led several signatory nati ons to indicate that # this accession should remove the basic reason for excluding them from access to enrichment facilities. DISGUSSION (70bB) The interagency paper, develops three policy options: 1. Cooperation in the gaseous diffusion field alone. 2. Cooperation in both the gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge fields. 3. Maintair our present policy of non-cooperation in the uranium enrichment field generally. The Under Secretaries Committee recommends Option l-cooperation Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL -4- in the gaseous diffusion field, but no transfer or cooperation in the gas centrifuge field. the lacking. Y Kconsider the interagency study and the proposed course of action es- anywel be ingit sentially ##### sound, However, before this is forwarded to the President for decision, the study should be more balanced by in answers the following to respects: following questions: What are the fall advantage and desadve of the 1. The report should present a more extensive discussion of the Insert option to share both centrifuge and diffusion technology, including attached relevant Congressional considerations ? [As it now stands [The the now report is geared in favor ### of the recommended course of action. ] what US 2. The report should clarify the objectives of the US to be served or Whateston disserved by the various options? the likelihood of advancing var- what are ious objectives and the relationships between the various objectives. ? [This exercise initially began as an attempt to inhibit the develop- ment and ultimately the spread of gas- centrifuge technology in Europe and elsewhere. The British-Dutch-German agreement on theo trainment of such the gas centrifuge project has made such an objective less likely, Amay be although it is still possible that cooperation in the gaseous diffusion technology would influence Europeans toward its development at least for the near future. enrichment fa cilities. 3. The rep rt requires negotiating strate gies for both options which involve sharing technology, not just for the one involving the sharing of gaseo IS diffusion technology These strategies and the argumen- What ave range tation for the options need to identify both the short and the longer- term problems which may be opened up, by a US decision toshare onl Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL Insert A 1. Since the report recognizes that US policy on the centrifuge process may have to be reviewed, depending upon other countries' reactions to a US proposal to share diffusion technology, what are the full advantages and disadvantages of the option to share both centrifuge and diffusion tech. - and nology, including relevant Congressional considerations? What would a negotiating strategy which involved sharing both technologies, probably offering ty phasing into centrifuge sharing at a later date ? lecklike? [The report is now geared in favor of the recommended course, thereby shortcutting some of the longer-term implications and the review of US ######## policy on sharing centrifuge technology also. ] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 4. The report needs is also incomplete in that it does not present a summary 1 does difference and centrifuge analy sis of where the US stands in its programs, ythe probable Wbtesthe status of other countries' programs over the years without US cooperation, and the interaction between other programs and those of the US. 7 Specifically, what happens if the US makes a play to cooperate in the gaseous diffusion field, succeeds 1]12/1 in the sense that the Europeans go gaseous diffusion for the time being, and then the next US plant should be of the gas centrifuge type? [In other words, since the goal of impeding the development of gas centrifuge technology abroad seems relatively unobtainable in light of the tripartite agreement, hat should be the longer term policy and objectives of the US in the uranium enrichment field generally? In sum, timing is an important consideration in weighing whether or not the US should change its policy by cooperat.ng in diffusion technology development vith other countries or by cooperating in both diffusion and centrifuge technologies. We have With been cooperating with the planning staff, European staff, OST and Mr. Flanigan's staff on this project. All agree that the above que steams answered and conside red the report h the report should be revised as suggested a bove before it goes to the President for decision. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL - 6 - H Consequently, attached at Tab A is a memorandum from you to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee which states that the President (1) has noted the recommendation and report, (2) has re- quested a report on the questions mentioned herein, and (3) has requested that a further report in response to these questions be submitted for his overall consideration on or before April 22. your 762 memorandum also men terms that the notive and content of the review should beclosely held. If you wish to call this matter to the attention of the President before going back to the Under Secretaries Committee with a request from II Attached at Tab I is a brief memorandum ### from you to the President ^ which advises him of the report and the recommendation, outlines its content, and requests his approval to have the Under Secretaries Committe e submit a further report in response to the que stions in order to gain a more complete and longer-term picture before ####### deciding on the matter. RECOMMENDA TIONS 1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I 2. Upon his pproval, that you sign the memorandum to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee at Tab II Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

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U/SM 55-56 [2 of 3]

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