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4/5m56
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
S/S 3033
CONFIDENTIAL
February 26, 1970
NSC Under Secretaries Committee
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: A Program for International Cooperation
in the Uranium Enrichment Field
Summary and Recommendations:
I. Recommendations:
The Under Secretaries Committee recommends
that subject to your approval, and following
appropriate consultations with the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, the United States
modify its long-standing policy of not cooperating
with other countries in the uranium isotope
enrichment field. Specifically, we recommend
that at the appropriate time and in accordance
with the negotiating strategy recommended in
the attached paper, the Department of State
and the AEC initiate exploratory talks with
certain West European allies and the Commission
of the European Communities on the possibility
of the United States' assisting the Europeans to
construct c. multinationally owned and operated
gaseous diffusion plant that would be located
in Western Europe.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
2.
II. Summary:
A. The Proposal
The proposal for cooperation which we
recommend can be summarized as follows: Beginning
in early 1970, the US would explore the possibility
of cooperating with the Commission of the European
Communities, the six community countries and
the United Kingdom in building a multinational
diffusion plant in Western Europe. The US
would agree, under mutually acceptable conditions,
to make available comprehensive, up-to-date
diffusion technology, on a classified basis
and subject to agreement on matters pertaining
to plant and personnel security. The plant
and its product would be subject to mutually
acceptable safeguards. Including France in
the project presents certain problems because
the French have not signed the LTBT or the
NPT, but WE believe these problems could be
dealt with by subjecting the plant and its
products tc safeguards that would conform with
the NPT. The US would be compensated for the
use of its technology and would seel: agreement
on a time schedule leading to plant operation
toward the end of the 1970's. We would be
prepared, if requested, to discuss the possibility
of similar cooperation with other friendly
countries, including Australia, Canada and
Japan. No information on US gas centrifuge
technology, as distinguished from gaseous
diffusion technology, would be transferred in
the process.
The advantages and disadvantages of this
proposal, including alternative courses of action,
are discussed in detail in the attached paper.
The principal factors that have influenced
our recommendation are summarized below.
B. Determination of Foreign Countries
to Build Their Own Capacity
1. During the next two decades there will
be a substantial growth in the use of nuclear
power and enriched uranium throughout the world.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
3.
2. A number of countries, particularly in
Western Europe, are determined to acquire
independent enrichment capabilities.
3. Great emphasis is being placed abroad
on developing the gas centrifuge process of
enriching uranium, which is a serious cause
of concern from a proliferation standpoint.
The centrifuge is particularly susceptible for
use in clandestine operations because the plant
can be small and can have relatively low
requirements for electricity, as contrasted
with gaseous diffusion technology. The UK,
the Netherlands and Germany are in the final
stages of developing a tripartite centrifuge
project aimed at achieving a modest production
capability in the mid-1970's.
C. Possibility of Influencing Developments
Abroad
Through a policy of cooperation we might
influence developments abroad to serve US
economic, political and nonproliferation interests.
1. We could provide our allies with an
attractive alternative to committing the lion's
share of their investment resources to rapid
development of the centrifuge process. Our
proposed plan for cooperation would not seek to
obstruct the tripartite project because we
recognize ts political importance and view a
multinational centrifuge project as preferable
to several independent national efforts. Never-
theless, we believe it would be mutually beneficial
to offer the Europeans an additional option
for satisfying their enrichment ambitions.
(See Annex A, for estimated cost data on a European
diffusion plant.)
2. We might induce other countries to
delay their production plans for several years
(until the late 1970's) so that US production
capacity would be fully utilized before other
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
4.
large scale new production comes on line.
We also should coordinate our enrichment plans
with the Europeans and others to reduce the
prospect that new enrichment capacity will be
under-utilized to a significant degree.
3. We have had repeated indications that
Europeans and others would welcome our cooperation
in the gaseous diffusion field. Moreover, the
European Commission (EURATOM) has recommended
that the Community explore both the diffusion
and centrifuge processes before making major
investment decisions. Our proposal would be
responsive to these desires. There also is
evidence that the program we are proposing
could improve the prospect of US reactor
sales to Western Europe, particularly in France.
We also recognize that there might be some
adverse reactions to our proposal abroad.
We believe these can be minimized, perhaps
eliminated by adopting an appropriate nego-
tiating strategy.
4. The program of cooperation could strengthen
the Commission of the European Communities
and as a consequence, our efforts in support
of European integration.
5. An early and comprehensive offer of
U.S. assistance in the diffusion field could
have a beneficial effect in inducing certain
key countries (such as Germany) to ratify the
NPT, because it would represent a gnificant
liberaliza ion in US foreign nuclear policy,
and would add credibility to past US expressions
of willingness to help parties to the NPT in
the field of peaceful uses. (On the other hand,
since we expect to cooperate with only a limited
number of countries that are able to meet our
conditions, our proposal would not enhance NPT
acceptance in countries not benefiting from
US assistance and could prove to be especially
troublesome in the case of Japan should it not
be possible due to legal considerations for us
to satisfy in some way Japan's aspirations in
the enrichment field.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
5.
6. We believe our proposal would provide the
US with a number of other political and economic
benefits. We are anxious to assure that foreign
enrichment programs are effectively safeguarded and
that the plants and products are used only for peace-
ful programs. We believe the US might gain a greater
voice in these matters through constructive association
with foreign enrichment plants than by continued
non-participation. Moreover, we would plan to obtain
significant revenues from our technology as well as
a meaningful, continuing voice both in the management
of the plant and its export policies.
D. Related Issues
We have also considered the following related
issues which merit special attention:
1. Whether Our Cooperation Should be Limited To
States That Sign the NPT
We believe US cooperation preferably should be
extended to those interested states in Western Europe
that have signed the NPT. We would not imply that
ratification of the NPT is a sine qua non for our co-
operation, but we would express the view to our pro-
spective partners that our ability t.o complete and
execute cooperative arrangements would be greatly
facilitated if they signed and ratified the Treaty.
France, which will probably not. sign the
Treaty, would not be excluded for reasons discussed
in detail in the attached paper.
2. Implications for our Relations with Other
Countries
While the immediate proposal relates to coopera-
tion in the gaseous diffusion field with Western
European allies, it must be recognized that, if this
is undertaken, cooperation with other friendly countries
such as Canada, Australia and Japan would be difficult
to refuse if they could meet our general conditions.
While any such cooperative projects would have to be
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
6.
considered case by case on their merits, we would expect
the following conditions to apply inter alia:
(a) Our assistance would be furnished on a classified
basis; (b) We would consider associating ourselves
only with well conceived projects of serious intent
where the prospects of adequate financing are high
and where the return to the United States in terms
of revenues and influence appeared to warrant the
provision of US technology; (c) We would give
preference to multilaterally controlled and owned
ventures; and (d) We would insist that the enrich-
ment plant and its products be subject to safeguards
in conformity with the NPT. Furthermore, since our
cooperation would take place pursuant to one or more
civil agreements, we would seek a guarantee that the
plant and its product would be used only for peaceful
purposes. Moreover, any US restricted data would be
furnished only to authorized personnel, under strict
security control, and on a need to know basis for use
in the cooperative project.
3. The Implications of the Foregoing Proposal
or the Disposition of the AEC Gaseous
D: .ffusion Facilities
The Acministration has decided that there should
be no disposal of AEC diffusion plants for the time
being, but that transfer to private industry is the
ultimate objective. The benefits to the US of the
cooperative program outlined above are independent of
whether US enrichment facilities are publicly or
privately owned. In the event of private ownership,
the operators of the US facilities could have a direct
role in the implementation of the cooperative program.
4. Negotiating Strategy
A proposed negotiating strategy forms an integral
part of our recommendations and is spelled out in
Part V of the paper. However, both the timing and
manner of exploratory conversations with the Europeans
and consultations with other countries would be subject
to continuous review by the AEC and the Department of
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
7.
State.
Chairman,
The Under Secretaries Committee
52R
Elliot L. Richardson
Under Secretary of State
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
A Program for International Cooperation in
the Gaseous Diffusion Field
I. Background and Discussion
A. Present U.S. Policy
It is United States' policy to classify information
on isotope enrichment technology, and to withhold it from
other countries, on the premise that the threat of nuclear
weapons proliferation increases as the number of enrich-
ing facilities throughout the world increases. (In the
post World War II period, the only exception to this
policy was a limited exchange on the centrifuge process
with the United Kingdom between 1960 and 1965.) We have
sought to reduce incentives to develop enriching facili-
ties abroad by supplying U-235, under stable and attrac-
tive conditions, to countries that accept bilateral or
multilateral safeguards.
This approach has delayed the construction of for-
eign enrichment facilities: outside of the Communist Bloc,
only France and the United Kingdom have enrichment plants
of modest production scale. It has also resulted in po-
litical and economic advantages for the United States; in-
cluding signif cant returns in foreign revenues.
B. Need for a New Policy
Several factors suggest that a change in policy is
now warranted.
1. During recent years, several industrially ad-
vanced countries have been rapidly shifting to the use of
nuclear power for generating electricity. This trend is
expected to accelerate in the future. It has been esti-
mated that by the year 1980 approximately 320,000 mega-
watts of nuclear power will be installed throughout the
world. This would constitute roughly 13% percent of
a total installed capacity of 2,400,000 megawatts.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
Enriched uranium is the preferred fuel for the
nuclear reactors used to generate electricity and the
only fuel for commercial reactors of US design, which
enjoy predom. nant market acceptance il many nations
of the world.
The projected demand, both domestic and foreign,
for enriched uranium can be met by existing and planned
US capacity until the late 1970's. However, by that
time additional new capacity will have to come on lire.
2. Because of the growing use of enriched uranium
reactors, several foreign countries are seriously con-
cerned about their total dependence On the US for this
nuclear fuel. Despite attractive US fuel supply
policies, they are worried about the certainty of future
supplies and about the possibility, however remote,
that the US might use its monopoly position at some
time to achieve political or economic objectives to
which they may not subscribe. Several countries are
also strongly attracted by the commercial possibilities
of an enrichment plant, both as source of fuel and as
a step towards the export of fuel and reactors. It is
nearly certain that some new foreign enrichment capacity
will be built in Europe and possibly n Japan and
Australia, even if the costs of the product exceed US
enrichment prices. (Some countries believe they ulti-
mately might meet or better the current US price of
$26 per kilogram of separative work.)
The British, Dutch and Germans have reached agreement
on a tripartite project to establish a modest production
capability in Western Europe by the d-1970's based on
the gas centrifuge process.* The Commission of the
European Communities has proposed that the EURATOM member
states undertake pilot projects on both the gaseous
diffusion and the gas centrifuge processes, SO that they
* By the mid 1970's, the centrifuge plant at Capenhurst
is expected to reach a capacity of 200 tons sw/year and
the one at Almelo in the Netherlands .00-150 tons sw/year.
About 100 tons of the ultimate output of the two plants
is expected to be available by the year 1972. This com-
pares with the US diffusion plant capacity of 17,000 tons
sw/year.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
can make a major investment decision on a large scale
enrichment plant by the mid-1970's. Outside of Europe,
Australia and Japan have serious R&D programs under way,
primarily in the centrifuge field, and Canada has ex-
pressed a strong interest in building a gaseous diffusion
enrichment plant in its northwest provinces. (A survey
of current foreign programs and plans is included in
Annex B.)
3. We have a strong incentive tc rationalize our
own enrichment plans with those of the Western Europeans
with the view of assuring that our enrichment capacity is
fully utilized before a major Europear plant comes into
operation. (It would take the Europeans approximately
six years to construct a major gaseous diffusion or gas
centrifuge plant from the time of a firm decision.) This
would suggest a European target of the late 1970's, since
currently planned US capacity will be sufficient to meet
all domestic and foreign needs until that date. If a
major European plant comes into operation as little as
two or three years prior to that date, the US could
suffer a significant loss of revenues.* However, after
the late 1970's further increases in cur domestic demand
should serve to offset any losses we might suffer in the
foreign market. The Europeans should have an interest in
coordinating their plans with ours sirce we both wish to
avoid any over-commitments and the cheapest incremental
enrichment capacity in the world between now and the late
1970's can be achieved through currently planned improve-
ments in the USAEC's gaseous diffusion capacity.
4. From the standpoint of proliferation, the develop-
ment of the centrifuge process is a cause of serious con-
cern. Unlike the massive diffusion plants which require
enormous inputs of electricity and large building com-
plexes, the centrifuge process lends tself to clandestine
operation. Small cascades could be installed in small
buildings or warehouses and could be operated to produce
significant amounts of weapons-grade uranium without use
of a heavy load of electricity to signal their existence.
* Our estimated annual sales of enrichment services under
current price and technical conditions to West European
nations (France and the UK excluded) in millions of
dollars, follows: CY 1976-$117; CY 1977-$148; CY 1978-
$176; CY 1979-$197; CY 1980-$234; TOTAL $872.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 -
Gaseous diffusion plants, in contrast, can be designed
to produce only low enriched material that would be
unsuitable for use in nuclear weapons
For these and other reasons, the United States has
strictly limited the dissemination of information on
advances in centrifuge technology. We have a formal
agreement with the UK and informal agreements with the
Dutch and the Germans to limit access to centrifuge in-
formation according to a common classification guide
prepared by the USAEC. These agreements do not preclude
technical cooperation among the parties, so long as the
common guidelines are respected.
The United States has not opposed the German,
Dutch and British efforts at tripartite cooperation in
this field because we have felt that a multi-national
project, with a built-in "adversary" element of control
is preferable to three independent national developments
which would otherwise be likely to emerge. Moreover,
we have recognized the political importance of the pro-
ject to our allies and have been sympathetic to the
British interest in forging closer ties to the Continent.
The three governments have indicated that their project
agreement will include assurances against non-prolifera-
tion, including adequate safeguards on the plants and the
U-235 they will produce.
We remair concerned, however, about the possible pro-
liferation of such facilities around the world, especially
if centrifuge machines and/or centrifuje technology were
to be exported on an unrestricted commercial basis to non-
nuclear-weapors states.
We are not under any illusion that access to U.S. dif-
fusion technology by itself would prevent any country with
a strong military, political or commercial motive from de-
veloping centrifuge enrichment facilities if they decide to
and are capable of doing so. However, the main thrust of
resource investment, especially in industrially advanced
countries, might well be diverted to gaseous diffusion tech-
nology by a genuine U.S. offer to cooperate.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
5. A policy of U.S. cooperation in the diffusion field
might improve the prospects for U.S. reactor sales in Wes-
tern Europe, particularly France. It would also provide
the U.S. with a number of other political and economic bene-
fits including a greater voice in safeguards on a foreign
plant and its product, significant revenues for our tech-
nology, and a continuing voice in management and export
policies.
6. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has led several sig-
natory, or potential signatory, nations to indicate that
their willingness to relinquish the right of acquiring nu-
clear weapons should remove the basic reason for excluding
them from access to uranium enrichment technology. They
also believe that such access would be a reasonable con-
cession for the nuclear weapons states to make.
Non-nuclear weapons countries that adhere to the NPT
will commit themselves to accept international safeguards
on their peaceful nuclear activities. The Treaty, however,
imposes no constraints against building uranium enrichment
plants, provided the required safeguards are applied to
such plants and their products.
An offer of U.S. assistance in the diffusion field
might favorably influence certain key countries (such as
Germany) in deciding on NPT ratifiction, because it would
represent a significant liberalization in U.S. foreign nu-
clear policy, and would add credibility to past U.S. ex-
pressions of willingness to help parties to the NPT in the
field of peaceful uses.
II. U.S. Policy Options - Cooperation in the Gaseous
Diffusion Field Alone
The U.S. appears to have two basic policy options;
(a) cooperation with the Europeans and perhaps others in
the gaseous diffusion field alone, or in both the dif-
fusion and gas centrifuge fields; or (b) continuation of
our present policy of non-cooperation.
A. Cooperation in the Diffusion Field
This approach would have the following features:
1. Countries included in the initial offer. The
United States would undertake informal, exploratory talks
with the member states of EURATOM (France, West Germany,
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 6 -
Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), the United
Kingdom and the Commission of the European Communities,
aimed at the construction of a multinational gaseous dif-
fusion plant in Western Europe that would come into oper-
ation in the late 1970's.
Our initial proposal would include these allied na-
tions because they are the most advanced in the enrichment
field and are the most determined to establish independent
facilities. Other Western European countries might be in-
cluded subsequently.
Because it appears that France w:.11 not be a party
to the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the NPT, and because
France is a nuclear weapons power, including France in a
cooperative project presents special problems. We
expect that the guarantees and protections referred to
on page 5 of the summary would be effective. They would
include a limitation providing that US restricted data
could be used only on the cooperative project. (Moreover,
France already has in our opinion sufficient enrichment
capacity to satisfy the requirements of its weapons program.)
Notwithstanding this fact, however, it must be recognized'
that the French diffusion plant at Pierrelatte might
benefit indirectly from French access to US diffusion
technology should French participants in the cooperative
project pass on information about the US technology in-
volved to Pierrelatte. To the extent that there is
risk that this might occur, it is possible that US parti-
cipation in the cooperative project could give rise to an
exception to NSAM 294. NSAM 294 (attached at Annex C)
is directed against US assistance in the development of a
French nuclear weapons capability. (The policy set forth
in NSAM 294 is currently under review under the terms of
NSSM 71 of August 14, 1969.)
Furthermore, the US has provided enriched uranium to
France (through EURATOM) for use in French civil nuclear
programs. We believe including France in the coopera-
tive project is essential to its success because if
France were excluded, EURATOM would probably have to be
ruled out as a participant as well. (Some high level
French officials have indicated informally that US cooper-
ation with a European gaseous diffusion plant would be
welcome.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 7 -
2. US Contributions. We would expect our coopera-
tion and the plant operations to take place on a classi-
fied basis in accordance with mutually agreed classi-
fication standards. The precise degree of technical assist-
ance the US would provide the project, as well as the com-
pensation it would receive, would be subject to negoti-
ation. We anticipate, however, that when the exchange was
implemented, the US would furnish its partners comprehen-
sive, up-to-date information on its gaseous diffusion pro-
cess and technical advice and assistance in design, con-
struction and operation of the plant.
One particularly sensitive item is barrier manufactur-
ing technology. We recognize that the Europeans will wish
to acquire their own barrier manufacturing capability, either
initially or for later barrier replacements and plant ex-
pansion. Any cooperative venture which does not result in
a truly independent European capability, that is, facili-
ties which can be operated, maintained, and, if necessary,
expanded without further US involvement, would not meet
European objectives and would be unacceptable. In con-
sidering this matter, it must be recognized that the
Europeans are unlikely to undertake a major financial
commitment to build a gaseous diffusion plant (which would
entail some reorientation away from the centrifuge) unless
they were assured of the provision of comprehensive US
technology, which is the most advanced in the world. Access
to US barriers would be of great assistance to technically
competent people who were trying to develop an independent
capability. Accordingly, we would not. rule out the possi-
bility of providing the Europeans barrier manufacturing
data if it appeared to be an important: element in the ne-
gotiations and if we were assured of an equitable return.
One method would be to offer to provide the Europeans US
manufactured barriers for the first plant and transfer
barrier manufacturing technology at a later date.
3. Quid Pro Quo. In return for its assistance, the
U.S. would inter alia, expect to receive financial compen-
sation for the information it provides and a continuing
voice in the project's management and control, including
export policies. We would expect that the plant and its
products would be subject to safeguards arrangements and
physical and personnel security policies mutually satis-
factory to the parties concerned. Finally, we would seek
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 8 -
to reach agreement on a time schedule which would lead to
full plant operation when the present and projected U.S.
capacity is no longer adequate to meet both domestic and
and foreign demand for enriched uranium.
4. Timing. Cooperation would be carried out in
several phases. During the first phase we would assess
with our prospective partners the attractiveness of dif-
fusion technology in the European context, the optimum
plant size, its location and other planning requirements.
In the second phase, perhaps beginning in late 1972, we
would provide detailed US design data. (European agree-
ment to go ahead on this basis undoubtedly would depend
on an early, firm US commitment on the general scope and
degree of assistance we would provide at a later date.)
The final phase, construction and operation of the plant,
would occur in the late 1970's.
5. Cooperation with Additional Countries. Without
taking the initiative, the U.S. would be prepared to con-
sider entering into similar cooperative efforts with other
friendly countries, on a case-by-case basis, if they could
meet our basic general conditions. These would include
conducting the cooperation on a classified basis, evidence
that the project was well conceived and likely to achieve
adequate financial support, an adequate return for the pro-
vision of U.S. technology, and assurance that the plant and
its products would be under adequate safeguards. Prefer-
erence would be given to projects organized on a multi-
lateral basis. If Australia, Canada and Japan could meet
these requirements, we would consider partnership with
them. Japan, however, might have difficulty meeting these
conditions because of its legal inhibitions against clas-
sifying atomic energy information. This could present us
with a serious problem since next to Furope, Japan is
likely to have the most legitimate interest in its own
enrichment plant.
As a practical matter, the number of cooperative
arrangements with other countries would be very limited
because of the sizeable investment recuired for gaseous
diffusion plants.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 9 -
B. Advantages. The principal arguments favoring
this approach may be summarized as follows:
1. It would provide the Europeans and others
with an attractive alternative to exclusive development
of the gas centrifuge process;
2. It would assure that these efforts are under-
taken on a classified basis and under adequate safeguards;
3. It would encourage the Europeans and others to
construct their plants on a time scale that would assure
maximum use of existing U.S. capacity;
4. It would enable the U.S. to obtain reasonable
compensation for the use of U.S. technology and a U.S.
voice in the continuing management of the project, in-
cluding its export policies. This would preserve impor-
tant economic benefits for the use of our technology,
which could otherwise be diminished or lost through the
construction of an independent foreign enrichment ca-
pacity;
5. It would help us create a more favorable climate
for the sale of U.S. reactors and pment abroad;
6. It could serve to strengthen EURATOM as an in-
stitution which in turn could strengthen the overall
movement towards greater European unity.
C. Disadvantages
1. It might be regarded by some of the European
nations involved as interference with their efforts to
achieve a degree of independence from the U.S. in the
enrichment field.
2. The Europeans might find it preferable, given
their interest in the gas centrifuge, if we evidenced a
willingness to cooperate in both the gaseous diffusion
and gas centrifuge fields. Since we are not prepared to
be forthcoming in meeting such a request, the tripar-
tite countries might regard our offer as a ploy to delay
and perhaps subvert their decision to proceed in the de-
velopment of the centrifuge process. There also might be
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 10 -
suspicions that we are holding back cooperation in the
gas centrifuge field because we have achieved an import-
tant technological breakthrough.
3. There would be an additional risk that U.S.
gaseous diffusion technology might fall in the hands of
countries that might wish to use it for military pur-
poses. This would be true even if our cooperation were
handled on a classified basis.
4. The Europeans conceivably might not be success-
ful in their efforts to construct a viable and economi-
cally competitive enrichment plant without our support.
Hence our assistance might serve to accelerate their
ability to displace our enrichment services in the Euro-
pean market.
5. Although many countries would benefit from the
existence of more than one source of enriched uranium,
we expect to cooperate with only a limited number of
countries that are able to meet our conditions. Our
proposal would not enhance NPT acceptance in countries
not benefiting from US assistance, and as noted it
could prove t.o be especially troublesome in the case of
Japan.
D. Anticipated Foreign Reactions
Whether the possible advantages of this alterna-
tive outweigh the possible disadvantages is related in
large part to the reaction that might be expected from
other countries.
1. The Commission of the European Communities. The
EC Commission has implied that it wou d welcome a US
proposal to cooperate in the diffusion field. It would
mesh neatly with the Commission's own proposal to bring
large scale enrichment facilities into operation towards
the end of the next decade.
2. France. France has proposed at the Hague Summit
that a European isotope separation plant be established.
France would probably be attracted by the US proposal
because its experience and investment in diffusion tech-
nology would give it a place of leadership in the co-
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- 11 -
operative project. On the other hand the French may
resent our proposal if they still hope their own
diffusion technology should provide the basis for
European cooperation.
3. The Tripartite Countries. The Dutch, German
and British reactions are likely to be mixed since they
may view it as hostile to their own plans to pursue the
gas centrifuge and they may be hesitant to get involved
in an additional European enrichment venture. Moreover,
these three countries, especially the Netherlands, are
unlikely to abandon their currently planned efforts in
the centrifuge field. On the other hand, given the
developmental state of their gas centrifuge technology
they might on reflection welcome the more proven option
that we would propose in deciding on the nature of the
large scale enrichment capacity that Europe should con-
struct. We know, for example, that a number of German
interests would favor this type of cooperation with the
US. Since our offer of cooperation would include these
three countries, we would serve to minimize an impression
that we are taking an initiative solely hostile to their
tripartite centrifuge efforts.
Also, the British might be uneasy about any proposal
that would embroil their bid to enter the Community in an
overt intra-Community debate about how to proceed in the
enrichment field. However, if the tripartite project be-
comes a divis ve element in the UK accession debate, the
UK and some EC countries might use a well-timed US pro-
posal as a means of reaching a compromise solution to the
enrichment question.
4. Belg:um and Italy. Both Belgium and Italy have
evidenced a keen interest in discussing possible partici-
pation with the tripartite project and have already had
informal conversations with the three countries. The
Belgians and Italians would probably favor the US option
as another means of getting into the enrichment business
with their Common Market partners on a more equal footing.
5. Japar. and Australia. These countries can be
expected to want to benefit from any change in US policy
and would surely insist on treatment comparable to their
European competitors. Moreover it is basic US Government
policy to treat Japan and Australia whenever possible on
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- 12 -
an equal footing with our NATO allies. The possiblity
of the uncontrolled dissemination of US classified data
through cooperation with Japan must be taken into account,
however, because of Japan's legal prohibition against
national security classification.
6. Canada. We are exploring with Canada the possi-
bility of moving towards a common energy policy with
respect to oil, natural gas, coal, electricity and
uranium. We already have extremely close ties with Canada
in the nuclear field.
Canada has expressed interest in cooperating with
the United States in constructing a diffusion plant.
Given this interest, our close economic and political
ties with Canada, and the importance of uranium to the
Canadian economy, failure to make some provisions for
Canada in any scheme for cooperation in the enrichment
field would be greatly resented in Canada and could be
detrimental to US-Canadian relations.
7. The USSR. Soviet propaganda has reflected dis-
pleasure towards the tripartite centrifuge project. The
USSR might react similarly to any US proposal to cooperate
in the enrichment field which includes the FRG.
In reality, however, the Soviets are likely to feel
easier about a German project in which we exert influence
than in an independent one. They are also not likely to
have a basis for serious concern since our proposal is
aimed at deferring construction of a major foreign enrich-
ment capacity and providing the Europeans with an alterna-
tive to exclusive development of the centrifuge process.
In any case, we should not let the prospect of continued
Soviet attacks against the FRG deter JS cooperation in
the enrichment field.
8. European Countries Not Included and the LDC's.
The reactions of European countries not included in an
initial US proposal to cooperate and of most less developed
countries would probably not be hostile, or present in-
surmountable obstacles to implementing this plan for
cooperation. The financial and technological investment
in a diffusion plant is so great that only the most
industrially advanced countries could seriously consider
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participation with the United States in this field.
Moreover, other countries might see a more diversified
source of supply as in their interest. It should also
be noted that the NPT strongly encourages parties to
cooperate with other nations in the peaceful nuclear
field but allows them the discretion of determining
whether or not it is in their interest to do so.
III. US Policy Options - Cooperation in Both the
Gaseous Diffusion and Gas Centrifuge Fields
The US could offer (under terms comparable to those
outlined above) to cooperate with the West Europeans and
others in both the diffusion and centrifuge fields instead
of in the diffusion field alone. Under this option we
would provide our partners with a comprehensive, current
picture of where US technology stands in both fields,
and we would then consider actively assisting the
Europeans in the process or processes they deemed most
suitable. This might include extensive cooperation in
either field or in both, depending on the foreign pro-
grams that develop.
A. Advantages
This approach would have the following advantages:
1. It would be more flexible and would permit co-
operation with the Europeans in the technology of their
choice, which they would be able to make in full know-
ledge of where the U.S. technology stands in both fields.
(Countries with high power costs and uncertain demands
for U-235 may prefer the centrifuge process because of
its lower electricity requirements and because it can
be constructed in modest plant increments.)
2. Some of the arguments favoring U.S. participa-
tion in a diffusion plant appear to apply equally to par-
ticipation in a centrifuge effort. For example, since we
probably enjoy a technological lead over the Europeans
in the centrifuge field, we might be able to obtain ade-
quate financial returns for a US contribution. Moreover,
since the centrifuge process presents greater proliferation
risks than diffusion, it could be argued that it would be
all the more important for the U.S., through cooperation,
to exert a significant control over foreign developments
in this field.
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B. Disadvantages
1. The central and very serious disadvantage of this
alternative is that the U.S. would directly contribute to
the dissemination of centrifuge technology and perhaps
hasten its application, with the attendant increased risk
of proliferation.
2. One of the major objectives of a U.S. initiative
at this time would be to offer foreign countries an alter-
native to the development of centrifuge technology in the
hope that they might make their major investments in the
diffusion field.
C. Comment
In the event the U.S. offer to cooperate in the
diffusion field alone were rejected and the Europeans ap-
peared intert on proceeding with a major gas centrifuge
production plant, we would always have the opportunity
of reviewing our various options. But, at this time,
we recommend that no information on U.S. centrifuge tech-
nology, including cost data, be transferred to any other
country or organization.
IV. U.S. Policy Options-Maintain Our Present Policies
The arçuments for and against this approach are
as follows:
A. Advantages
1. It is still possible that the Europeans and
others will not be able to muster the resources to build
a large enrichment plant. Even with the necessary politi-
cal will and financial investment, it may take them several
years to realize their ambitions. Given this uncertainty,
it might be in our interests not to cooperate but to com-
pete aggressively for the foreign market for enrichment ser-
vices.
2. As already noted, any program of US cooper-
ation, even if conducted on a classified basis, would add
to the risk that US information might fall into the hands
of nations desiring to use it for military purposes.
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3. Unless we were prepared to cooperate with
everyone (which is not proposed) we might encounter ad-
verse reactions from those nations not included in our
offer.
4. Cooperation in the development of foreign
enriching capabilities might complicate the transfer
of AEC diffusion plants to private industry that the
President has defined as an ultimate goal. However, the
attractiveness of these plants for vate investment may
not, in any event, depend heavily on :he potential foreign
market for enriched uranium because of the probability that
other nations will develop an independent capability with
or without US help.
B. Disadvantages
1. The foregoing arguments ignore the basic
fact that several countries are firmly resolved to acquire
some independent enrichment capability with or without US
assistance. Moreover, there is every reason to expect
they will be successful even if they ave to pay a substan-
tial premium in the process.
2. The knowledge required to produce plutonium
is unclassified and is widespread and there are large
quantities of plutonium throughout the world with more being
created daily. Maintaining a restrictive policy in regard
to our diffusion process would therefore not preclude any
industrialized country seriously determined to do so, from
producing a nuclear bomb.
3. The period of U.S. monopoly in the uranium en-
richment field is rapidly drawing to a close. For the U.S.
to remain alcof from foreign developments in this field
will not turr back the technological clock, nor will it de-
crease for any meaningful period of time the risks of fur-
ther weapons proliferation inherent in the continuing
peaceful exploitation of the atom. Rather, it might re-
sult only in the forfeiture of an opportunity to use our
present technological superiority in an effort to gain im-
portant economic and security benefits for the United States.
Whether the U.S. could actually gain a degree of
control over the security arrangements of a cooperative ven-
ture that would justify releasing classified information to
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a group of foreign partners, and whether other countries
can be induced to invest in a diffusion plant rather than
continuing to concentrate their investment exclusively in
the centrifuge field, are questions that can only be an-
swered through serious negotiations with the countries con-
cerned.
V. Conclusion
A. After considering the foregoing three alternatives,
we conclude that the first, namely, cooperation in the
gaseous diffusion field would be preferable. This conclu-
sion, however, is based on approval of the following nego-
tiating strategy.
B. Negotiating Strategy
1. Timing
Subject to continuous review by the Department
of State and the AEC, preliminary talks would begin in the
early spring of 1970. By that time the Dutch, British and.
Germans will have a better idea of whether or how the tri-
partite centrifuge project may be expanded to include
other countries. The effect of the project on the
Community's enrichment plans and the fect that a US
proposal might have on UK accession negotiations with the
Community also should be clearer. Moreover, by the early
months of 1970 the new German government will be in a
better position to respond to a U.S. initiative, and Japan
will probably have signed the NPT. Given the importance
that the tripartite project has to the United Kingdom's
accession interests, we would approach the United Kingdom
before we approached our other prospective partners. We
would, after preliminary discussions w.th the British,
begin any initial consultations with the Commission of
the European Communities.
Concurrently with our initial exploratory talks
with the Europeans, the AEC will develop guidelines for
possible royalties or similiar payments for use, after
appropriate coordination within the Executive Branch, should
a negotiating phase follow the exploratory phase.
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2. Approach
We should indicate in initial contacts that U.S.
cooperation in the diffusion field is not conditioned upon
European abandonment of research and development of the
centrifuge process. We would stress that we believe cooper-
ation in the diffusion field could be mutually advantageous
and that it is worth serious study by the Europeans as one
option they may want to consider in deciding upon an enrich-
ment program.
The Europeans can be expected to inquire whether
it is possible that future U.S. enrichment plants might in-
volve the gas centrifuge and whether it would make sense
for Europe to embark on a gaseous diffusion program if such
a possibility exists. They may also ask whether the U.S.
would be prepared to cooperate with them in centrifuge
development either additionally or in place of the dif-
fusion process. Should such questions arise, we would
indicate that the USAEC has no current intention of bring-
ing the centrifuge into commerical application in the U.S.
prior to the late 1970's, that the USAEC's centrifuge pro-
gram is developmental in nature, and that we are reluctant
to cooperate with any countries in this field given the
sensitivity of the technology. Moreover, we would stress
that the diffusion process is the one nost perfected tech-
nologically and that our offer represents the product of
a major investment and of 25 years' experience. Further,
we would point out that a U.S. option could be supplemen-
tary to European enrichment studies in the centrifuge
field already under way and would in no way deprive them
of the opportunity to assess the relative advantages of
both techniques. We believe these are convincing arguments.
If, however, our offer were rejected because centrifuge
information is not included, or if the Europeans elected
to pursue only the centrifuge route, we would have to
review the situation in the light of these circumstances.
3. Other Countries
In the event other countries, particularly Japan,
Australia, and Canada, express an interest either in as-
sociating thenselves with a U.S.-European venture or
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exploring the possibility of some form of bilateral cooper-
ation with the U.S., we would, as noted, indicate a willing-
ness to hold preliminary exploratory conversations with them
on how their long-term requirements for enriched uranium
might best be met, with the understanding that the pre-
conditions to U.S. assistance set forth in this paper would
apply (recognizing that our preference for a multilateral
arrangement may be unrealistic in the case of Canada).
We would be prepared to counter possible Soviet
propaganda directed against the U.S. proposal by citing the
constructive controls that would be inherent in a broadly-
based, multi-national diffusion project.
If this general strategy were followed, subject,
of course, to constant review by the Department of State
and the AEC in response to developments abroad, an effort
at cooperation along the lines recommended above would
appear to be well worth trying. It would give allied
countries an additional option to consider in making their
enrichment plans. They could at worst reject that option
and at best accept it as serving their interest. At the
same time, by exploring the possibilities of cooperation
the U.S. would in no way be bound to enter into a dis-
advantageous agreement if the negotiations did not prove
fruitful from our point of view.
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ANNEX A
Based on various studies by EURATOM and FORATOM,
it is considered most likely that if a diffusion plant
were built in Western Europe for the production of enriched
uranium, the first such plant would be in operation by about
1980 and would have an annual capacity of about 7,500
metric ton units of separative work (SW). If undertaken
as a completely independent European effort, these same
studies estimate a plant investment of between $90 and
$130 per kilogram unit of SW per year; the latter figure
is considered to be the most realistic. Thus, the invest-
ment -- exclusive of electrical generating and other support
facilities -- would be in the order of $975 million. It
should be pointed out that these costs were determined
largely by adjustments to the new plant costs shown in
various published AEC documents rather than by independent
estimates. Thus, we believe that the Europeans -- lack-
ing the US experience and industrial base -- probably have
underestimated the unit cost, for the initial plant at
least, if it were undertaken exclusively on a European
basis. Further, no research and development costs are
included in the foregoing estimates. To bring existing
European diffusion technology to the present US level, it
has been estimated by FORATOM that the expenditure of
$100 to $140 million would be required, with no assurance
that parity would be reached.
Insofar as unit costs of separative work are con--
cerned, by adjusting AEC data to European conditions, the
Europeans have estimated that such costs for an indepen-
dently built European plant would range between $25 and
$37 per kilocram unit of separative work, with only opera-
ting and cap tal charges; they do not include items equiva-
lent to the added factor," interest on inventory or re-
turn on investment.
With US assistance, it is believed that the unit cost
of investment: could be reduced to about $100 per kilogram
unit of SW per year, or a total savings for the 7,500
metric ton unit plant of at least $225 million. Further-
more, the $100 to $140 million in research and develop-
ment expenditure would become unnecessary. If the diffusion
plant were built in cooperation with the US, it is felt
that the uni cost of separative work could be reduced from
the $33 figure to about $25 per kilogram unit (based on
European capital assumptions and electricity at 5 mills per
kilowatt-hour.)
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ANNEX B - Current Foreign Enrichment Programs
1. France
France has a gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte
designed to produce enriched uranium for the Force de
Frappe. The French have floated the idea on several
occasions of developing a multilaterally financed Euro-
pean facility for the production of lightly enriched
uranium. The Germans and other West Buropeans to whom
the proposal was addressed have not reacted enthusiasti-
cally. The French appear to be committed to diffusion
technology and have publicly questioned the feasibility
of the centrifuge process. They have had a modest R & D
program underway in the centrifuge field with which, they
apparently consider, they have had little success.
2. The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and the FRG
In 1965 the British Government announced plans to
modernize their diffusion plant at Capenhurst, primarily
to meet increased civilian demand for nuclear fuel in the
early 1970's. On the basis of economic considerations,
the British have opted to expand their facilities beyond
the modernization of Capenhurst throuch the development
of the centrifuge process. Both the Germans and the Dutch
have R & D programs in the centrifuge field. They have
reached agreement with the British to pool their tech-
nology and resources in a tripartite project. In joining
together they are motivated by political as well as
economic considerations. The British particularly favor
the project as a means of strengthening their ties to the
Continent and as potentially helpful n eventual nego-
tiations to enter the Common Market.
While France has remained aloof from the tripartite
Project, both Italy and Belgium have ndicated a strong
interest in participating. The tripartite countries have
agreed to consult with the Belgians and Italians and there
have already been preliminary talks anong the five
countries.
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3. European Communities
The Commission of the European Communities has been
interested for some time in a Community enrichment
facility and is undoubtedly concerned by the tripartite
development which threatens to read them out of European
cooperation in this field. The Commission has recently
proposed to the Council a three stage program to permit
the Community to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency
in the production of enriched uranium during the next
decade. The program would include detailed studies and
pilot projects on both the diffusion and the centrifuge
processes drawing on French as well as German and Dutch
experience in the enrichment field. It would attempt
to begin production by the preferred process or combina-
tion of processes in the late 1970's.
4. Italy
Italy announced in November of this year that an
Italian industrial firm has produced two prototype centri-
fuges. The talian government has supported modest
industrial research in the centrifuge since the begin-
ning of 1969 It is not clear whether the centrifuge
prototypes have actually been tested. There is reason
to suspect that the Italian announcement was timed to
fortify the Italian bid for membership in the tripartite
centrifuge project.
5. Japan
Outside of Europe, Japan is engaged in serious
research on diffusion and centrifuge :echnology with
lesser efforts in other processes. While Japanese efforts
appear to be favoring work in the centrifuge field, the
Japanese Atomic Energy Agency has set 1975 as the target
year for selection of a single process to be the basis
of further efforts. The Japanese could probably
accelerate this time table, however, if they felt that
construction of a European enrichment facility posed
a serious threat to their ability to compete in this
field in the future.
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6. Australia
Australia started research on a gas centrifuge
development program in 1960-61. In 1968 an official
of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission told US
officials that, based on their research, they believe
a small, economically feasible system might be developed
in four years time. The Australian program is aimed at
achieving self-sufficiency in the production of nuclear
fuel for their power reactor program and at the export
market. They have evidenced a strong interest in
cooperating with the US in this field.
7. Canada
Canada does not have an important R & D program
underway in the enrichment field. They have, however,
expressed an interest in cooperating with the United
States in constructing a diffusion plant in the far
Northwestern areas of Canada, where large supplies of
natural uran.um exist along with a large source of low
cost hydro-electric power which would have no other
marketing value.
8. Other Countries
In addition to the countries mentioned above, Sweden,
Brazil, Israel, Yugoslavia, Egypt, India, Argentina and
several others have evidenced varying degrees of interest
in centrifuge research.
9. United States
It should be borne in mind that the United States
is actively engaged in centrifuge research and is
probably technically far ahead of any of the countries
similarly engaged abroad.
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ANNEX C
NSA - 294
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HOUSE
NGTON
April 20, 1964
294
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 294
TO:
The Secretary of State.
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System
Assistance to France
It is the policy of this government to oppose the development of
nuclear forces by additional states, other than those whose forces
would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force, targeted in
accordance with NATO plans and, except when supreme national
interests were at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the
Alliance.
Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government's
interest not to contribute to or assist in the development of a French
nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear
delivery capacity. This includes exchanges of information and
technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint re-
search and development activities, and exchanges between indus-
trial and commercial organizations, either directly or through
third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these
efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would
identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However,
this directive is not intended to restrict unduly full and useful
cooperation in non-strategic programs and a stivities.
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SECRET
Therefore, the President has directed that effective controls be
established immediately to assure that, to the extent feasible, the
assistance referred to above is not extended either intentionally
or unintentionally,
To this end, specific technical guidance is to be developed and
issued at the earliest possible time for the use of the agencies
that control the export of equipment and technology, including data
exchange arrangements. Responsibility for the development of
such guidance, and when necessary the revision of these guidances,
will be vested in the Departments of State and Defense, in consul-
tation as appropriate with the Department of Commerce, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Office of
Science and Technology, and under the leadership of the Department
of State. The approved guidance documents will be cleared at the
White House and issued as technical appendices to this National
Security Action Memorandum. Necessary guidance will be requested
before specific commitments are made by any agency.
Infer
McGeorge Bundy
SECRET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
)
F.C
Ninen
March 9, 1965
2
ay
Dear Tommy:
I have held your letter of February 26 about NSAM
294 until we could have a first meeting with the two
Secretaries on the Gilpatric Report. In the light of
our discussion of yesterday, I now think we should
clearly go ahead on the basis which is suggested in
the memorandum enclosed with your letter. My
one additional suggestion is that I hope a White
House Staff Officer may also be included in the NSAM
Review Group under State chairmanship. I would
expect to nominate Spurgeon Keeny for this job.
Sincerely,
man
McGeorge Bundy
The Honorable Llewellyn Thompson
Acting Deputy Under Secretary
Department of State
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COPY
SECRET
February 26, 1965
Dear Mac:
You will recall that we had set up a small
working group to look into some of the coordination
and implementation aspects of NSAM 294. I enclose
a preliminary report of the group.
Their findings and views as to continued
application of the policy set forth in the NSAM
seem to me to square with the consensus reached
in the White House meeting of December 30 as
recorded in the January 14 memorandum sent to
participants in the meeting. We all recognize that
we are feeling our way in a singularly complex area,
and the approach suggested by the working group is
in my view a sound one.
I believe we should proceed along these lines,
and plan to ask the other agencies concerned to
designate representatives to the Review Group proposed.
In the Department of State, general NSAM 294 responsi-
bility will continue to rest with the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey
C. Kitchen, and he or an officer designated by him will-
represent the Department on the Review Group.
Sincerely,
Clearances:
Llewellyn E. Thompson
Acting
G/PM - Mr. Kitchen
Mr. Meyers
Enclosure:
Report of Working Group.
The Konorable
McGeorge Bundy,
Special Assitant to the President
The White House.
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SECRET
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENJ ATIONS OF NSAM 294 WORKING GROUP
Conclusions:
1. The purpose of the policy set forth in NSAM 294
is to use export denial, as one means of achieving effective
control over material, equipment and technology which any
nation* seeks to acquire for use in an independent nuclear
weapons/strategic delivery vehicle program, and which would
significantly benefit such program.
2. Adequate legislative authority and export control
mechanisms already exist within the U.S. Government to assure
that all items of potential concern in NSAM 294 terms come
within the congizance of the appropriate export licensing
authorities, either AEC, State, or Commerce.
3. The tasks of the licensing authorities are therefore
(1) to make sure that procedures are in effect which are
adequate to identify all proposed export items falling under
NSAM 294 and (2) to establish the best possible judgment on
the following:
a. The technical, economic, quality, and timing
importance of the item to the national weapons
program.
b. The use actually intended for the item.
c. The alternative sources outside the U.S. for
the item or a comparable substitute.
4. Those items
* In practical terms, the U.K. is at present exempted from this
policy, since we are cooperating with that country extensively
in both the nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle areas. The
policy is also not relev. to Bloc countries, since more
stringent policies are governing with respect to them.
SECRET
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4. Those items which are clearly intended for use in
a national program, would significantly and directly
benefit that program in terms of timing, quality, or cost,
and are unavailable in comparable substitute form elsewhere
than the U.S. are to be denied.
5. Those items intended for other uses, or of only
marginal benefit to the national program, or available
elsewhere than the U.S. without undue difficulty or delay,
will normally be approved. Other than NSAM 294 considera-
tions may come into play, however (Atomic Energy legisla-
tion, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, political considerations,
other U.S. policies, etc.), and individual decisions must
take these into account.
6. While NSAM 294 is of general application, France,
under her present policies, is the major target country now
and for the imnediate future. Nevertheless exports to all
other countries must be continuously evaluated in terms
of both the potential and intention of the recipient
country to engage in a national program.
7. No new control mechanisms or formalized inter-agency
committees are required, but improved coordination, exchange
of views and centralized compilations cf case-by-case
experience are needed. To the extent feasible, definite
lists of commodities and related technologies of importance
in NSAM 294 terms should be developed in order to make the
controls most effective. The agencies with technical
competence in the area are therefore continuing to work
on improving present lists. It is recognized, however,
that the relative and shifting nature of the NSAM 294
control problem probably means that individual decisions
will necessarily continue to be mostly of an ad hoc nature.
Recommendations:
1. Each
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
- 3 -
1. Each agency concerned (State, Defense, AEC, Commerce,
NASA) should name a single senior staff level representative
to have general responsibility within that agency for
NSAM 294 matters.
2. These representatives should keep in close touch
with each other and with all concerned areas within their
own agencies, the purpose being to ensure that NSAM 294
cases arising within or referred through normal channels
to their agencies get adequate and expeditious consideràtion
under the criteria outlined above.
3. These representatives should also be constituted
as an informal NSAM 294 Review Group, meeting under State
chairmanship once a month or as necessary, and including
additional participation from their own agencies as desirable.
The purpose will be to continue to explore ways and reans
to improve inter-agency coordination, discuss implementation
problems which may have arisen, study decisions reached in
individual cases of a precedent value or with unusual
features, build up a central body of NSAM 294 experience,
and make recommendations for change in policy or procedures
to their respective agencies as may be required.
a.
4. The intelligence community should be requested to
provide the Review Group on a regular. basis with evalua ions
of additional country potential and intention to engage
in nuclear weapons programs, to assist the group in achieving
the purpose mentioned in paragraph 6 above.
Clearances:
cc:
Commerce - Mr. Tollin
WE - Mr. Beigel
Defense - Mr. Nichols
L/ EUR - Mr. Trippe
AEC - Mr. O'Donnell
CIA - Mr. Christesen
NASA - Mr. Gorman
MC - Mr. Sipes
E/MDC - Mr. McFadden
G/PM: SGeorge: fm
2/17/6 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
THE
Washington, D.C. 20520
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
CONFIDENTIAL
March 11, 1970
NSC-U/SM 56A
TO:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Under Secretary of Commerce
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The: Director, US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Science Advisor to the President
Mr. James R. Schlesinger, Assistant Director,
Bureau of the Budget
SUBJECT: A Program for International Cooperation in the
Uranium Enrichment Field
I enclose a revised page one of :he Memorandum to the
President on this subject, transmittel to you under cover
of U/SM 56.
The new page one now includes a second paragraph in-
advertently omitted in the original.
A.A.cHartman
Arthur A. Hartman
Staff Director
CONF 'IDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
February 26, 1970
NSC Under Secretaries Committee
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: A Program for International Cooperation
in the Uranium Enrichment Field
Summary and Recommendations:
I. Recommendations:
The Under Secretaries Committee recommends that
subject to your approval, and fo lowing appropriate
consultations with the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, the United States modify its long-standing
policy of not cooperating with other countries in
the uranium isotope enrichment field. Specifically,
we recommend that at the appropriate time and in
accordance with the negotiating strategy recommended
in the attached paper, the Department of State and
the AEC initiate exploratory talks with certain West
European allies and the Commission of the European
Communities on the possibility of the United States'
assisting the Europeans construct: a multinationally
owned and operated gaseous diffusion plant that would
be located in Western Europe.
We would report the results of these talks
together with further recommendations to the National
Security Council as soon thereafter as possible.
Moreover, the actual implementation of any modifica-
tion of our present policy would be contingent upon
the execution of a suitable agreement or agreements
for cooperation with the countries involved, which
would require Presidential approval and review by
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in accordance
with statutory procedures.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
U/SM 56A
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
8/5/70
Helma -
Part of a plug, just picd fun
nancy this AM.
Balance of ply pent you
on or about ape. 20!
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
ument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decl
7799
415m56
MEMORANDUM
HAK has seen
INFORMATION
CC:AH
WL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
March 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Robert M. Behr Rus
SUBJECT: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) Request for
NSC/USC Report on International Cooperation in the
Enrichment Field
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has been advised, presumably
by AEC and/or State, of the existence of the report which has been
forwarded to the President for decision on cooperation in the uranium
enrichment field.
Representative Hosmer informally requested a copy of the report, less
the Under Secretary's memorandum and recommendation to the President.
Representative Holifield, Chairman of the Committee, has followed
through with a letter to the Secretary of State officially requesting the
report.
State informally requested permission to release the report to the
Joint Committee. We informed State that the request should be denied
at this time (1) because we believe that reports which are submitted to
the President as part of recommendations for decision should not be
floated beforehand in Congress, and (2) because we find the report, as it
stands, unsatisfactory in the sense that it is an advocacy paper for a
particular option rather than a balanced presentation of all the options.
State is politely declining Chairman Holifield's request. We think the
matter may be turned off only for the time being. In order to keep this
issue in hand while it is under consideration, we are stressing that the
matter should be closely held. This does not preclude a balanced
version of the report being released to the Committee at a later date.
CONFIDENTIAL
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
415m56
united states
NSC 2780
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545
MAR 2 7 1972
OFFICE OF THE chairman
Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Dear Henry:
I appreciate your letter of March 8, 1972, concerning the
desirability of separating the specific question of our
policy on the export of highly enriched uranium from the
balance of the broader NSSM 120 study. This is a very con-
structive step since our experience has repeatedly demonstrated
that we tend to make the greatest progress when we deal with
discrete policy problems as they arise rather than with a
variety of complex issues in one paper. We will proceed
immediately with the policy study on the transfer of enriched
uranium in conformance with NSSM 150 of March 13.
Insofar as the remainder of NSSM 120 is concerned, we are
making a determined effort, in collaboration with other
government agencies, to complete those portions of the study
dealing with the U. S. international nuclear programs, as
well as to complete our analysis of the U. S. domestic safe-
guards program, for which we have the prime responsibility.
Sincerely,
July
&
Chairman
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
This material contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States within the
downgrading and
meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C.,
declassification
CONFIDENTIAL
Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation
of which in any manner to an unauthorized person
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIEDed by law.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
327 35912
2780
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
U
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER x
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
X
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
laird, M
C
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
SCHLESINGER, J. S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
TS
SENSITIVE
Separation of Specifics on Export of Highly Enriched Uranium from Broader
SUBJECT:
NSSM 120 Study
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG (NSDM150)
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
X
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
)
FAR EAST
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
V
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
X
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
SCIENTIFIC
X
4/1
(
DUE DATE:
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
X
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
WALSH
GUHIN
Sectant
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
15/5/72
John
Reaction necessary
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
DATE
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
MAY171972
DATE
NSC
TO )
PAF
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES
NO
SUBF
X
x
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
* GPO: 1972-455-927
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
To The Valt
Orig 1 of
is with mike Cahin
NOLONIHSM him
THE WHITE House
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined t
Return Rx &
Vault
Check with May M
on originals - Thelva
said she got the from
Reproduced DECLASSIFIED
as been determined t
Popie reviewed pursuant t at the Richard for to Executive Nixon Presidential use Order 13526 Library and in has a been
7799
U/SM 56
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
4/16/70
MEMORANDUM FOR
CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Program for International Cooperation in the Uranium
Enrichment Field
The President has noted the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's
recommendation regarding a program for international cooperation
in the uranium enrichment field as proposed in your memorandum
of February 26, 1970.
Before further action on this matter is undertaken, the report should
address the following questions.
1.
Since the report recognizes that United States policy on the
gas centrifuge process may have to be reviewed, depending
upon the ctions of other countries to the proposed course
of action, what are the full advantages ard disadvantages of
the option to share both centrifuge and difusion technology?
Could the United States offer to share diffusion technology
now, but accompany the offer with a stra ghtforward commitment
to consider sharing centrifuge technology at a later date? What
are the relevant Congressional (JCAE) aititudes bearing upon
the options?
2.
What objectives of the United States - for example, technological
cooperation with Europe and other countries, European inte-
gration, multinational approaches, non-proliferation, influence
in the uranium enrichment field - are to be served or disserved
by the options? What is the likelihood o1 advancing the various
objectives i nd what are the relationships between them?
3.
What are the short-range and probable longer-term problems,
and possible United States responses, which may be generated
by a decision of the United States to share only gaseous diffusion
technology?
Desputed w/ Outside Rept M
CONFIDENT Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
4.
Where does the United States stand in its diffusion and centrifuge
technology and programs? What are likely future trends? What
is the probable status of other countries' programs over the
years without United States cooperation, and what is the inter-
action between their programs and those of the United States?
Specifically, what are the international and domestic political
implications of the recommended course of action if the
United States should decide that its next enrichment plant is
to be of the centrifuge type?
It is recognized that timing may be an important factor in reviewing
these options. The above information, therefore, should be submitted
for the President's consideration on or before May 18. The classification
of the report should be up-graded if necessary to handle the supplementary
information adequately. The nature and content of the review should be
closely held.
Henry A/. Kissînger
MICROFILM DATA
DO
INIT
DATE
4/20
ORIG) NSC
TO ) PAF
WHC
SUBF
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Program for International Cooperation in the Uranium
Enrichment Field
The President has noted the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's
recommendation regarding a program for international cooperation
in the uranium enrichment field as proposed in your memorandum
of February 26, 1970.
Before further action on this matter is undertaken, the report should
address the following questions.
1.
Since the report recognizes that United States policy on the
gas centrifuge process may have to be reviewed, depending
upon the reactions of other countries to the proposed course
of action, what are the full advantages and disadvantages of
the option to share both centrifuge and diffusion technology?
Could the United States offer to share diffusion technology
now, but accompany the offer with a straightforward commitment
to consider sharing centrifuge technology at a later date? What
are the relevant Congressional (JCAE) attitudes bearing upon
the options?
2.
What objectives of the United States - for example, technological
cooperation with Europe and other countries, European inte-
gration, multinational approaches, non-proliferation, influence
in the uranium enrichment field. - are to be served or disserved
by the options? What is the likelihood of advancing the various
objectives and what are the relationships between them?
3. What are the short-range and probable longer-term problems,
and possible United States responses, which may be generated
by a decision of the United States to share only gaseous diffusion
technology?
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
4. Where does the United States stand in its diffusion and centrifuge
technology and programs? What are likely future trends? What
is the probable status of other countries' programs over the
years without United States cooperation, and what is the inter-
action between their programs and those of the United States?
Specifically, what are the international and domestic political
implications of the recommended course of action if the
United States should decide that its next enrichment plant is
to be of the centrifuge type?
It is recognized that timing may be an important factor in reviewing
these options. The above information, therefore, should be submitted
for the President's consideration on or before May 1. The classification
of the report should be up-graded if necessary to handle the supplementary
information adequately. The nature and content of the review should be
closely held.
Henry A. Kissinger
CONFIDENTIAL
HAK/RMBehr/msm/3-23-70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
April 11, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
Hanlda
SUBJECT:
Uranium Enrichment
my letters we an
Jun
Attached is a package on U.S. cooperation in the uranium enrichment
field prepared by Colonel Behr. It encloses a memorandum from the
hoths
to
Under Secretaries Committee to the President recommending that the
U.S. modify its long-standing policy of non-cooperation with other
countries in the unranium enrichment field. It is believed that addi-
utype
tional information is needed in order to make a balanced presentation
of the arguments to the President. Therefore, a memorandum (Tab I)
to Elliot Richardson has been prepared which requests supplementary
information. I had thought that it might be helpful for your relationship
to discuss the memorandum with him prior to signing it. However,
since we have not been able to accomplish this in two luncheon meetings,
I believe you should go ahead and sign the memorandum.
The memorandum to the President (Tab II) is only a status report for
information purposes and I do not recommend that you send it to the
President.
Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
re 7799
CONFIDENTIAL
April 11, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Uranium Enrichment
Attached is a package on U.S. cooperation in the uranium enrichment
field prepared by Colonel Behr. It encloses a memorandum from the
Under Secretaries Committee to the President recommending that the
U.S. modify its long-standing policy of non-cooperation with other
countries in the unranium enrichment field. It is believed that addi-
tional information is needed in order to make a balanced presentation
of the arguments to the President. Therefore, a memorandum (Tab I)
to Elliot Richardson has been prepared which requests supplementary
information. I had thought that it might be helpful for your relationship
to discuss the memorandum with him prior to signing it. However,
since we have not been able to accomplish this in two luncheon meetings,
I believe you should go ahead and sign the memorandum.
The memorandum to the President (Tab II) is only a status report for
information purposes and I do not recommend that you send it to the
President.
Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL
AMH:JTH:m1r:4/11/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7799
MEMORANDUM
ACTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
March 23, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Robert M. Behr Paid
SUBJECT: US Cooperation in the Uranium Enrichment Field
The NSC Under Secretaries Committee met on February 19, 1970, to
consider an interagency paper (Tab B) on US cooperation in the uranium
enrichment field.
The Under Secretaries Committee has forwarded a memorandum to the
President (Tab A) recommending that the US modify its long-standing
policy of not cooperating with other countries in the uranium enrichment
field:
1. By offering to share US gaseous diffusion technology and to assist
the Europeans to construct a multinationally owned and operated
gaseous diffusion plant in Western Europe, with acceptable safeguards;
and
2. By being prepared to discuss the possibility of similar cooperation
with countries such as Canada, Australia and Japan.
Actual sharing or assistance would, of course be contingent upon the
execution of a suitable agreement or agreements for cooperation which
would require both Presidential approval and review by the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy.
BACKGROUND
With the growing demand for production of electrical power by means of
nuclear reactors, there is a parallel demand for nuclear material to fuel
these reactors. Two techniques are normally used to obtain enriched
uranium (1) the gaseous diffusion technique and (2) the gas centrifuge
process.
Diffusion involves very large plant facilities and consumes great
quantities of electricity. Conversely, gas centrifuges can be housed in
smaller plants and need much less electricity. Diffusion plants can be so
engineered that the nuclear material produced in the enrichment process
is not suitable for nuclear weapons. Centrifuges, however, can be
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
engineered in such a way that rather simple adjustments to the control
mechanisms will produce weapons grade uranium. Thus the centrifuge
technique has a greater potential for nuclear weapons proliferation.
With the exception of some earlier and limited programs of cooperation
with the British, US policy has been (1) to withhold enrichment technology
from other countries, and (2) to reduce incentives to develop enrichment
facilities abroad by supplying U-235 under stable conditions to countries
that accept bilateral or multilateral safeguards. This program has also
produced economic advantages for the US.
Today, several factors suggest that a new policy may be warranted, perhaps
the most important being that foreign countries are attracted both by the
prospect of not being dependent upon the US for nuclear fuel supply and by
the commercial possibilities of exporting fuel and nuclear reactors.
Furthermore, enrichment plants will be built abroad, with or without US
help. The British, Dutch and Germans have concluded a tripartite
agreement to develop the centrifuge process and plants, with expressed
interest in later export. There are indications that the Belgians and
Italians hope to join in this endeavor. Australia has recently expressed a
similar interest.
The questions, therefore are whether uranium enrichment developments
and plants will proceed with or without US cooperation, and what are the
possible advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action. The
interagency paper (Tab B) develops three policy options:
1. Cooperation in the diffusion field alone.
2. Cooperation in both the diffusion and centrifuge fields.
3. Maintain our present policy of non-cooperation in the
uranium enrichment field.
The Under Secretaries Committee recommends Option 1 - - -- cooperation in
the diffusion field -- but no transfer or cooperation in the gas centrifuge field.
While the proposed course of action may be sound, we consider the inter-
agency study lacking. Before forwarding it to the President for decision, the
study should be balanced by answers to the following questions:
1.
Since the report recognizes that US policy on the centrifuge process may
have to be reviewed, depending upon other countries' reactions to a US
proposal to share diffusion technology, what are the full advantages and
disadvantages of the option to share both centrifuge and diffusion tech-
nology?
Could we offer to share diffusion technology now, but accompany the
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
offer with a straightforward commitment to consider sharing
centrifuge technology at a later date, that is, after our current
research has been concluded? To what extent do Congressional
(JCAE) attitudes bear upon the practicality of any option involving
sharing of centrifuge technology?
[The report is now biased in favor of the recommended course,
thereby short shrifting the other options which may be more
attractive to the US in longer-term.]
2. What US objectives are to be served or disserved by the various
options? What is the likelihood of advancing various objectives,
and what are the relationships between these objectives?
[This exercise initially began as an attempt to inhibit the develop-
ment and ultimately the spread of centrifuge technology in Europe
and elsewhere. The British-Dutch-German agreement on the
centrifuge project has made the attainment of such an objective less
likely, although it may still be that superior US diffusion technology
could influence Europeans toward its acceptance as the most
economical alternative open to them at the present time.]
3. What are the short-range and the longer-term problems which may
be opened up by a US decision to share only diffusion technology?
4. Where does the US stand in its diffusion and centrifuge programs?
What is the probable status of other countries' programs over the
years without US cooperation, and the interaction between other
programs and those of the US? Specifically, what happens if a US
offer to cooperate with the Europeans in the gaseous diffusion field
succeeds, and then the US decides its next plant should be of the
gas centrifuge type?
In the consideration of the NSC/USC paper, we have consulted with our
Planning and European staffs, OST, BoB, and Mr. Flanigan's staff. All
agree that the above questions should be answered and reviewed before
the report goes to the President for decision.
Consequently, attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the Chairman
of the Under Secretaries Committee which states that the President (1) has
noted the report and its recommendation and, (2) has requested a report on
the questions mentioned herein to be submitted, on or before May 1, for
his overall consideration. Your memorandum also mentions that the nature
and content of the review should be closely held.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 -
Attached at Tab II is a memorandum from you to the President which
informs him of the report and, its recommendation, and of your action
requesting the Under Secretaries Committee to submit more information.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That you sign the memorandum to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries
Committee at Tab I.
2. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab II. [Tabs to
accompany information memorandum to the President. ]
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
I
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
II
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7799
MEMORANDUM
INFORMATION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Program for International Cooperation in the Uranium
Enrichment Field
The NSC Under Secretaries Committee met on February 19 to consider
an interagency paper (Tab B) on US cooperation in the uranium enrich-
ment field.
The Under Secretaries Committee has forwarded a memorandum to
you (Tab A) recommending that the United States modify its long-
standing policy of not cooperating with other countries in the uranium
enrichment field:
1. by offering to share US gaseous diffusion technology and
to assist the Europeans to construct a multinationally owned
and operated plant in Western Europe; and
2. by being prepared to discuss the possibility of similar
cooperation with countries such as Canada, Australia and Japan.
Actual sharing or assistance would, of course, be contingent upon the
execution of a suitable agreement or agreements for cooperation which
would require your approval and review by the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy.
With the growing demand for production of electrical power by means
of nuclear reactors, there is a parallel demand for nuclear material
to fuel these reactors. Two techniques are normally used to obtain
this enriched uranium or fuel - - (1) the gaseous diffusion technique and
(2) the gas centrifuge process (which, for a number of technical reasons,
offers greater opportunities for nuclear weapons proliferation than does
the diffusion technique).
With the exception of some earlier highly restricted programs of co-
operation with the British, US policy has been (1) to withhold enrichment
technology from other countries, and (2) to reduce incentives to develop
enrichment facilities abroad by supplying enriched uranium for fuel under
stable conditions to countries that accept bilateral or multilateral
safeguards.
SECRET
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SECRET
- 2 -
Today, foreign countries are attracted both by the prospect of not being
dependent upon the US for nuclear fuel supply and by the commercial
possibilities for exporting fuel and nuclear reactors. Enrichment plants
will be built abroad, with or without US help. The British, Dutch and
Germans have recently concluded a tripartite agreement to develop
the centrifuge process and plants, with expressed interest in later export.
There are indications that the Belgians and Italians hope to join in this
endeavor. Australia has recently expressed a similar interest.
The questions, therefore, are whether uranium enrichment developments
and plants will proceed with or without US cooperation, and what are
the possible advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action?
The interagency paper (Tab B) develops three policy options:
1. Cooperation in the diffusion field only.
2. Cooperation in both the diffusion and centrifuge fields.
3. Maintain our present policy of non-cooperation in the
uranium enrichment field.
The Under Secretaries Committee recommends Option 1 for your approval.
While the proposed course of action may be sound, the report lacks some
information which is essential to any decision on these options.
In order to get a balanced picture of the options for you, I have requested
that further information from the Under Secretaries Committee be submitted
for your overall consideration on or before May 1. I have also stressed that
the nature and content of this review should be closely held.
Both Mr. Flanigan's office and the Office of Science and Technology agree
that supplementary information should be made available before con-
sidering the report for decision.
SECRET
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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
February 26, 1970
NSC Under Secretaries Committee
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: A Program for International Cooperation
in the Uranium Enrichment Field
Summary and Recommendations:
I. Recommendations:
The Under Secretaries Committee recommends that
subject to your approval, and following appropriate
consultations with the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, the United States modify its long-standing
policy of not cooperating with other countries in
the uranium isotope enrichment field. Specifically,
we recommend that at the appropriate time and in
accordance with the negotiating strategy recommended
in the attached paper, the Department of State and
the AEC initiate exploratory talks with certain West
European allies and the Commission of the European
Communities on the possibility of the United States'
assisting the Europeans construct a multinationally
owned and operated gaseous diffusion plant that would
be located in Western Europe.
We would report the results of these talks
together with further recommendations to the National
Security Council as soon thereafter as possible.
Moreover, the actual implementation of any modifica-
tion of our present policy would be contingent upon
the execution of a suitable agreement or agreements
for cooperation with the countries involved, which
would require Presidential approval and review by
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in accordance
with statutory procedures.
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2.
II. Summary:
A. The Proposal
The proposal for cooperation which we
recommend can be summarized as follows: Beginning
in early 1970, the US would explore the possibility
of cooperating with the Commission of the European
Communities, the six community countries and
the United Kingdom in building a multinational
diffusion plant in Western Europe. The US
would agree, under mutually acceptable conditions,
to make available comprehensive, up-to-date
diffusion technology, on a classified basis
and subject to agreement on matters pertaining
to plant and personnel security. The plant
and its product would be subject to mutually
acceptable safeguards. Including France in
the project presents certain problems because
the French have not signed the LTBT or the
NPT, but we believe these problems could be
dealt with by subjecting the plant and its
products to safeguards that would conform with
the NPT. The US would be compensated for the
use of its technology and would seek agreement
on a time schedule leading to plant operation
toward the end of the 1970's. We would be
prepared, if requested, to discuss the possibility
of similar cooperation with other friendly
countries, including Australia, Canada and
Japan. No information on US gas centrifuge
technology, as distinguished from gaseous
diffusion technology, would be transferred in
the process.
The advantages and disadvantages of this
proposal, including alternative courses of action,
are discussed in detail in the attached paper.
The principal factors that have influenced
our recommendation are summarized below.
B. Determination of Foreign Countries
to Build Their Own Capacity
1. During the next two decades there will
be a substantial growth in the use of nuclear
power and enriched uranium throughout the world.
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3.
2. A number of countries, particularly in
Western Europe, are determined to acquire
independent enrichment capabilities.
3. Great emphasis is being placed abroad
on developing the gas centrifuge process of
enriching uranium, which is a serious cause
of concern from a proliferation standpoint.
The centrifuge is particularly susceptible for
use in clandestine operations because the plant
can be small and can have relatively low
requirements for electricity, as contrasted
with gaseous diffusion technology. The UK,
the Netherlands and Germany are in the final
stages of developing a tripartite centrifuge
project aimed at achieving a modest production
capability in the mid-1970's.
C. Possibility of Influencing Developments
Abroad
Through a policy of cooperation we might
influence developments abroad to serve US
economic, political and nonproliferation interests.
1. We could provide our allies with an
attractive alternative to committing the lion's
share of their investment resources to rapid
development of the centrifuge process. Our
proposed plan for cooperation would not seek to
obstruct the tripartite project because we
recognize its political importance and view a
multinational centrifuge project as preferable
to several independent national efforts. Never-
theless, we believe it would be mutually beneficial
to offer the Europeans an additional option
for satisfying their enrichment ambitions.
(See Annex A, for estimated cost data on a European
diffusion plant.)
2. We might induce other countries to
delay their production plans for several years
(until the late 1970's) so that US production
capacity would be fully utilized before other
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4.
large scale new production comes on line.
We also should coordinate our enrichment plans
with the Europeans and others to reduce the
prospect that new enrichment capacity will be
under-utilized to a significant degree.
3. We have had repeated indications that
Europeans and others would welcome our cooperation
in the gaseous diffusion field. Moreover, the
European Commission (EURATOM) has recommended
that the Community explore both the diffusion
and centrifuge processes before making major
investment decisions. Our proposal would be
responsive to these desires. There also is
evidence that the program we are proposing
could improve the prospect of US reactor
sales to Western Europe, particularly in France.
We also recognize that there might be some
adverse reactions to our proposal abroad.
We believe these can be minimized, perhaps
eliminated, by adopting an appropriate nego-
tiating strategy.
4. The program of cooperation could strengthen
the Commission of the European Communities
and as a consequence, our efforts in support
of European integration.
5. An early and comprehensive offer of
U.S. assistance in the diffusion field could
have a beneficial effect in inducing certain
key countries (such as Germany) to ratify the
NPT, because it would represent a significant
liberalization in US foreign nuclear policy,
and would add credibility to past US expressions
of willingness to help parties to the NPT in
the field of peaceful uses. (On the other hand,
since we expect to cooperate with only a limited
number of countries that are able to meet our
conditions, our proposal would not enhance NPT
acceptance in countries not benefiting from
US assistance and could prove to be especially
troublesome in the case of Japan should it not
be possible due to legal considerations for us
to satisfy in some way Japan's aspirations in
the enrichment field.)
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5.
6. We believe our proposal would provide the
US with a number of other political and economic
benefits. We are anxious to assure that foreign
enrichment programs are effectively safeguarded and
that the plants and products are used only for peace-
ful programs. We believe the US might gain a greater
voice in these matters through constructive association
with foreign enrichment plants than by continued
non-participation. Moreover, we would plan to obtain
significant revenues from our technology as well as
a meaningful, continuing voice both in the management
of the plant and its export policies.
D. Related Issues
We have also considered the following related
issues which merit special attention:
1. Whether Our Cooperation Should be Limited To
States That Sign the NPT
We believe US cooperation preferably should be
extended to those interested states in Western Europe
that have signed the NPT. We would not imply that
ratification of the NPT is a sine qua non for our co-
operation, but we would express the view to our pro-
spective partners that our ability to complete and
execute cooperative arrangements would be greatly
facilitated if they signed and ratified the Treaty.
France, which will probably not sign the
Treaty, would not be excluded for reasons discussed
in detail in the attached paper.
2. Implications for our Relations with Other
Countries
While the immediate proposal relates to coopera-
tion in the gaseous diffusion field with Western
European allies, it must be recognized that, if this
is undertaken, cooperation with other friendly countries
such as Canada, Australia and Japan would be difficult
to refuse if they could meet our general conditions.
While any such cooperative projects would have to be
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6.
considered case by case on their merits, we would expect
the following conditions to apply inter alia:
(a) Our assistance would be furnished on a classified
basis; (b) We would consider associating ourselves
only with well conceived projects of serious intent
where the prospects of adequate financing are high
and where the return to the United States in terms
of revenues and influence appeared to warrant the
provision of US technology; (c) We would give
preference to multilaterally controlled and owned
ventures; and (d) We would insist that the enrich-
ment plant and its products be subject to safeguards
in conformity with the NPT. Furthermore, since our
cooperation would take place pursuant to one or more
civil agreements, we would seek a guarantee that the
plant and its product would be used only for peaceful
purposes. Moreover, any US restricted data would be
furnished only to authorized personnel, under strict
security control, and on a need to know basis for use
in the cooperative project.
3. The Implications of the Foregoing Proposal
on the Disposition of the AEC Gaseous
Diffusion Facilities
The Administration has decided that there should
be no disposal of AEC diffusion plants for the time
being, but that transfer to private industry is the
ultimate objective. The benefits to the US of the
cooperative program outlined above are independent of
whether US enrichment facilities are publicly or
privately owned. In the event of private ownership,
the operators of the US facilities could have a direct
role in the implementation of the cooperative program.
4. Negotiating Strategy
A proposed negotiating strategy forms an integral
part of our recommendations and is spelled out in
Part V of the paper. However, both the timing and
manner of exploratory conversations with the Europeans
and consultations with other countries would be subject
to continuous review by the AEC and the Department of
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7.
State.
Chairman,
The Under Secretaries Committee
52R
Elliot L. Richardson
Under Secretary of State
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A Program for International Cooperation in
the Gaseous Diffusion Field
I. Background and Discussion
A. Present U.S. Policy
It is United States' policy to classify information
on isotope enrichment technology, and to withhold it from
other countries, on the premise that the threat of nuclear
weapons proliferation increases as the number of enrich-
ing facilities throughout the world increases. (In the
post World War II period, the only exception to this
policy was a limited exchange on the centrifuge process
with the United Kingdom between 1960 and 1965.) We have
sought to reduce incentives to develop enriching facili-
ties abroad by supplying U-235, under stable and attrac-
tive conditions, to countries that accept bilateral or
multilateral safeguards.
This approach has delayed the construction of for-
eign enrichment facilities: outside of the Communist Bloc,
only France and the United Kingdom have enrichment plants
of modest production scale. It has also resulted in po-
litical and economic advantages for the United States; in-
cluding significant returns in foreign revenues.
B. Need for a New Policy
Several factors suggest that a change in policy is
now warranted.
1. During recent years, several industrially ad-
vanced countries have been rapidly shifting to the use of
nuclear power for generating electricity. This trend is
expected to accelerate in the future. It has been esti-
mated that by the year 1980 approximately 320,000 mega-
watts of nuclear power will be installed throughout the
world. This would constitute roughly 13% percent of
a total installed capacity of 2,400,000 megawatts.
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Enriched uranium is the preferred fuel for the
nuclear reactors used to generate electricity and the
only fuel for commercial reactors of US design, which
enjoy predominant market acceptance in many nations
of the world.
The projected demand, both domestic and foreign,
for enriched uranium can be met by existing and planned
US capacity until the late 1970's. However, by that
time additional new capacity will have to come on lire.
2. Because of the growing use of enriched uranium
reactors, several foreign countries are seriously con-
cerned about their total dependence on the US for this
nuclear fuel. Despite attractive US fuel supply
policies, they are worried about the certainty of future
supplies and about the possibility, however remote,
that the US might use its monopoly position at some
time to achieve political or economic objectives to
which they may not subscribe. Several countries are
also strongly attracted by the commercial possibilities
of an enrichment plant, both as source of fuel and as
a step towards the export of fuel and reactors. It is
nearly certain that some new foreign enrichment capacity
will be built in Europe and possibly in Japan and
Australia, even if the costs of the product exceed US
enrichment prices. (Some countries believe they ulti-
mately might meet or better the current US price of
$26 per kilogram of separative work.)
The British, Dutch and Germans have reached agreement
on a tripartite project to establish a modest production
capability in Western Europe by the mid-1970's based on
the gas centrifuge process.* The Commission of the
European Communities has proposed that the EURATOM member
states undertake pilot projects on both the gaseous
diffusion and the gas centrifuge processes, so that they
* By the mid 1970's, the centrifuge plant at Capenhurst
is expected to reach a capacity of 200 tons sw/year and
the one at Almelo in the Netherlands 100-150 tons sw/year.
About 100 tons of the ultimate output of the two plants
is expected to be available by the year 1972. This com-
pares with the US diffusion plant capacity of 17,000 tons
sw/year.
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can make a major investment decision on a large scale
enrichment plant by the mid-1970's. Outside of Europe,
Australia and Japan have serious R&D programs under way,
primarily in the centrifuge field, and Canada has ex-
pressed a strong interest in building a gaseous diffusion
enrichment plant in its northwest provinces. (A survey
of current foreign programs and plans is included in
Annex B.)
3. We have a strong incentive to rationalize our
own enrichment plans with those of the Western Europeans
with the view of assuring that our enrichment capacity is
fully utilized before a major European plant comes into
operation. (It would take the Europeans approximately
six years to construct a major gaseous diffusion or gas
centrifuge plant from the time of a firm decision.) This
would suggest a European target of the late 1970's, since
currently planned US capacity will be sufficient to meet
all domestic and foreign needs until that date. If a
major European plant comes into operation as little as
two or three years prior to that date, the US could
suffer a significant loss of revenues. * However, after
the late 1970's further increases in our domestic demand
should serve to offset any losses we might suffer in the
foreign market. The Europeans should have an interest in
coordinating their plans with ours since we both wish to
avoid any over-commitments and the cheapest incremental
enrichment capacity in the world between now and the late
1970's can be achieved through currently planned improve-
ments in the USAEC's gaseous diffusion capacity.
4. From the standpoint of proliferation, the develop-
ment of the centrifuge process is a cause of serious con-
cern. Unlike the massive diffusion plants which require
enormous inputs of electricity and large building com-
plexes, the centrifuge process lends itself to clandestine
operation. Small cascades could be installed in small
buildings or warehouses and could be operated to produce
significant amounts of weapons-grade uranium without use
of a heavy load of electricity to signal their existence.
* Our estimated annual sales of enrichment services under
current price and technical conditions to West European
nations (France and the UK excluded) in millions of
dollars, follows: CY 1976-$117; CY 1977-$148; CY 1978-
$176; CY 1979-$197; CY 1980-$234; TOTAL $872.
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Gaseous diffusion plants, in contrast, can be designed
to produce only low enriched material that would be
unsuitable for use in nuclear weapons.
For these and other reasons, the United States has
strictly limited the dissemination of information on
advances in centrifuge technology. We have a formal
agreement with the UK and informal agreements with the
Dutch and the Germans to limit access to centrifuge in-
formation according to a common classification guide
prepared by the USAEC. These agreements do not preclude
technical cooperation among the parties, so long as the
common guidelines are respected.
The United States has not opposed the German,
Dutch and British efforts at tripartite cooperation in
this field because we have felt that a multi-national
project, with a built-in "adversary" element of control
is preferable to three independent national developments
which would otherwise be likely to emerge. Moreover,
we have recognized the political importance of the pro-
ject to our allies and have been sympathetic to the
British interest in forging closer ties to the Continent.
The three governments have indicated that their project
agreement will include assurances against non-prolifera-
tion, including adequate safeguards on the plants and the
U-235 they will produce.
We remain concerned, however, about the possible pro-
liferation of such facilities around the world, especially
if centrifuge machines and/or centrifuge technology were
to be exported on an unrestricted commercial basis to non-
nuclear-weapons states.
We are not under any illusion that access to U.S. dif-
fusion technology by itself would prevent any country with
a strong military, political or commercial motive from de-
veloping centrifuge enrichment facilities if they decide to
and are capable of doing so. However, the main thrust of
resource investment, especially in industrially advanced
countries, might well be diverted to gaseous diffusion tech-
nology by a genuine U.S. offer to cooperate.
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5. A policy of U.S. cooperation in the diffusion field
might improve the prospects for U.S. reactor sales in Wes-
tern Europe, particularly France. It would also provide
the U.S. with a number of other political and economic bene-
fits including a greater voice in safeguards on a foreign
plant and its product, significant revenues for our tech-
nology, and a continuing voice in management and export
policies.
6. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has led several sig-
natory, or potential signatory, nations to indicate that
their willingness to relinquish the right of acquiring nu-
clear weapons should remove the basic reason for excluding
them from access to uranium enrichment technology. They
also believe that such access would be a reasonable con-
cession for the nuclear weapons states to make.
Non-nuclear weapons countries that adhere to the NPT
will commit themselves to accept international safeguards
on their peaceful nuclear activities. The Treaty, however,
imposes no constraints against building uranium enrichment
plants, provided the required safeguards are applied to
such plants and their products.
An offer of U.S. assistance in the diffusion field
might favorably influence certain key countries (such as
Germany) in deciding on NPT ratifiction, because it would
represent a significant liberalization in U.S. foreign nu-
clear policy, and would add credibility to past U.S. ex-
pressions of willingness to help parties to the NPT in the
field of peaceful uses.
II. U.S. Policy Options Cooperation in the Gaseous
Diffusion Field Alone
The U.S. appears to have two basic policy options;
(a) cooperation with the Europeans and perhaps others in
the gaseous diffusion field alone, or in both the dif-
fusion and gas centrifuge fields; or (b) continuation of
our present policy of non-cooperation.
A. Cooperation in the Diffusion Field
This approach would have the following features:
1. Countries included in the initial offer. The
United States would undertake informal, exploratory talks
with the member states of EURATOM (France, West Germany,
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Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), the United
Kingdom and the Commission of the European Communities,
aimed at the construction of a multinational gaseous dif-
fusion plant in Western Europe that would come into oper-
ation in the late 1970's.
Our initial proposal would include these allied na-
tions because they are the most advanced in the enrichment
field and are the most determined to establish independent
facilities. Other Western European countries might be in-
cluded subsequently.
Because it appears that France will not be a party
to the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the NPT, and because
France is a nuclear weapons power, including France in a
cooperative project presents special problems. We
expect that the guarantees and protections referred to
on page 5 of the summary would be effective. They would
include a limitation providing that US restricted data
could be used only on the cooperative project. (Moreover,
France already has in our opinion sufficient enrichment
capacity to satisfy the requirements of its weapons program.)
Notwithstanding this fact, however, it must be recognized
that the French diffusion plant at Pierrelatte might
benefit indirectly from French access to US diffusion
technology should French participants in the cooperative
project pass on information about the US technology in-
volved to Pierrelatte. To the extent that there is
risk that this might occur, it is possible that US parti-
cipation in the cooperative project could give rise to an
exception to NSAM 294. NSAM 294 (attached at Annex C)
is directed against US assistance in the development of a
French nuclear weapons capability. (The policy set forth
in NSAM 294 is currently under review under the terms of
NSSM 71 of August 14, 1969.)
Furthermore, the US has provided enriched uranium to
France (through EURATOM) for use in French civil nuclear
programs. We believe including France in the coopera-
tive project is essential to its success because if
France were excluded, EURATOM would probably have to be
ruled out as a participant as well. (Some high level
French officials have indicated informally that US cooper-
ation with a European gaseous diffusion plant would be
welcome.)
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2. US Contributions. We would expect our coopera-
tion and the plant operations to take place on a classi-
fied basis in accordance with mutually agreed classi-
fication standards. The precise degree of technical assist-
ance the US would provide the project, as well as the com-
pensation it would receive, would be subject to negoti-
ation. We anticipate, however, that when the exchange was
implemented, the US would furnish its partners comprehen-
sive, up-to-date information on its gaseous diffusion pro-
cess and technical advice and assistance in design, con-
struction and operation of the plant.
One particularly sensitive item is barrier manufactur-
ing technology. We recognize that the Europeans will wish
to acquire their own barrier manufacturing capability, either
initially or for later barrier replacements and plant ex-
pansion. Any cooperative venture which does not result in
a truly independent European capability, that is, facili-
ties which can be operated, maintained, and, if necessary,
expanded without further US involvement, would not meet
European objectives and would be unacceptable. In con-
sidering this matter, it must be recognized that the
Europeans are unlikely to undertake a major financial
commitment to build a gaseous diffusion plant (which would
entail some reorientation away from the centrifuge) unless
they were assured of the provision of comprehensive US
technology, which is the most advanced in the world. Access
to US barriers would be of great assistance to technically
competent people who were trying to develop an independent
capability. Accordingly, we would not rule out the possi-
bility of providing the Europeans barrier manufacturing
data if it appeared to be an important element in the ne-
gotiations and if we were assured of an equitable return.
One method would be to offer to provide the Europeans US
manufactured barriers for the first plant and transfer
barrier manufacturing technology at a later date.
3. Quid Pro Quo. In return for its assistance, the
U.S. would inter alia, expect to receive financial compen-
sation for the information it provides and a continuing
voice in the project's management and control, including
export policies. We would expect that the plant and its
products would be subject to safeguards arrangements and
physical and personnel security policies mutually satis-
factory to the parties concerned. Finally, we would seek
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to reach agreement on a time schedule which would lead to
full plant operation when the present and projected U.S.
capacity is no longer adequate to meet both domestic and
and foreign demand for enriched uranium.
4. Timing. Cooperation would be carried out in
several phases. During the first phase we would assess
with our prospective partners the attractiveness of dif-
fusion technology in the European context, the optimum
plant size, its location and other planning requirements.
In the second phase, perhaps beginning in late 1972, we
would provide detailed US design data. (European agree-
ment to go ahead on this basis undoubtedly would depend
on an early, firm US commitment on the general scope and
degree of assistance we would provide at a later date.)
The final phase, construction and operation of the plant,
would occur in the late 1970's.
5. Cooperation with Additional Countries. Without
taking the initiative, the U.S. would be prepared to con-
sider entering into similar cooperative efforts with other
friendly countries, on a case-by-case basis, if they could
meet our basic general conditions. These would include
conducting the cooperation on a classified basis, evidence
that the project was well conceived and likely to achieve
adequate financial support, an adequate return for the pro-
vision of U.S. technology, and assurance that the plant and
its products would be under adequate safeguards. Prefer-
erence would be given to projects organized on a multi-
lateral basis. If Australia, Canada and Japan could meet
these requirements, we would consider partnership with
them. Japan, however, might have difficulty meeting these
conditions because of its legal inhibitions against clas-
sifying atomic energy information. This could present us
with a serious problem since next to Europe, Japan is
likely to have the most legitimate interest in its own
enrichment plant.
As a practical matter, the number of cooperative
arrangements with other countries would be very limited
because of the sizeable investment required for gaseous
diffusion plants.
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B. Advantages. The principal arguments favoring
this approach may be summarized as follows:
1. It would provide the Europeans and others
with an attractive alternative to exclusive development
of the gas centrifuge process;
2. It would assure that these efforts are under-
taken on a classified basis and under adequate safeguards;
3. It would encourage the Europeans and others to
construct their plants on a time scale that would assure
maximum use of existing U.S. capacity;
4. It would enable the U.S. to obtain reasonable
compensation for the use of U.S. technology and a U.S.
voice in the continuing management of the project, in-
cluding its export policies. This would preserve impor-
tant economic benefits for the use of our technology,
which could otherwise be diminished or lost through the
construction of an independent foreign enrichment ca-
pacity;
5. It would help us create a more favorable climate
for the sale of U.S. reactors and equipment abroad;
6. It could serve to strengthen EURATOM as an in-
stitution which in turn could strengthen the overall
movement towards greater European unity.
C. Disadvantages
1. It might be regarded by some of the European
nations involved as interference with their efforts to
achieve a degree of independence from the U.S. in the
enrichment field.
2. The Europeans might find it preferable, given
their interest in the gas centrifuge, if we evidenced a
willingness to cooperate in both the gaseous diffusion
and gas centrifuge fields. Since we are not prepared to
be forthcoming in meeting such a request, the tripar-
tite countries might regard our offer as a ploy to delay
and perhaps subvert their decision to proceed in the de-
velopment of the centrifuge process. There also might be
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suspicions that we are holding back cooperation in the
gas centrifuge field because we have achieved an import-
tant technological breakthrough.
3. There would be an additional risk that U.S.
gaseous diffusion technology might fall in the hands of
countries that might wish to use it for military pur-
poses. This would be true even if our cooperation were
handled on a classified basis.
4. The Europeans conceivably might not be success-
ful in their efforts to construct a viable and economi-
cally competitive enrichment plant without our support.
Hence our assistance might serve to accelerate their
ability to displace our enrichment services in the Euro-
pean market.
5. Although many countries would benefit from the
existence of more than one source of enriched uranium,
we expect to cooperate with only a limited number of
countries that are able to meet our conditions. Our
proposal would not enhance NPT acceptance in countries
not benefiting from US assistance, and as noted it
could prove to be especially troublesome in the case of
Japan.
D. Anticipated Foreign Reactions
Whether the possible advantages of this alterna-
tive outweigh the possible disadvantages is related in
large part to the reaction that might be expected from
other countries.
1. The Commission of the European Communities. The
EC Commission has implied that it would welcome a US
proposal to cooperate in the diffusion field. It would
mesh neatly with the Commission's own proposal to bring
large scale enrichment facilities into operation towards
the end of the next decade.
2. France. France has proposed at the Hague Summit
that a European isotope separation plant be established.
France would probably be attracted by the US proposal
because its experience and investment in diffusion tech-
nology would give it a place of leadership in the co-
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operative project. On the other hand the French may
resent our proposal if they still hope their own
diffusion technology should provide the basis for
European cooperation.
3. The Tripartite Countries. The Dutch, German
and British reactions are likely to be mixed since they
may view it as hostile to their own plans to pursue the
gas centrifuge and they may be hesitant to get involved
in an additional European enrichment venture. Moreover,
these three countries, especially the Netherlands, are
unlikely to abandon their currently planned efforts in
the centrifuge field. On the other hand, given the
developmental state of their gas centrifuge technology
they might on reflection welcome the more proven option
that we would propose in deciding on the nature of the
large scale enrichment capacity that Europe should con-
struct. We know, for example, that a number of German
interests would favor this type of cooperation with the
US. Since our offer of cooperation would include these
three countries, we would serve to minimize an impression
that we are taking an initiative solely hostile to their
tripartite centrifuge efforts.
Also, the British might be uneasy about any proposal
that would embroil their bid to enter the Community in an
overt intra-Community debate about how to proceed in the
enrichment field. However, if the tripartite project be-
comes a divisive element in the UK accession debate, the
UK and some EC countries might use a well-timed US pro-
posal as a means of reaching a compromise solution to the
enrichment question.
4. Belgium and Italy. Both Belgium and Italy have
evidenced a keen interest in discussing possible partici-
pation with the tripartite project and have already had
informal conversations with the three countries. The
Belgians and Italians would probably favor the US option
as another means of getting into the enrichment business
with their Common Market partners on a more equal footing.
5. Japan and Australia. These countries can be
expected to want to benefit from any change in US policy
and would surely insist on treatment comparable to their
European competitors. Moreover it is basic US Government
policy to treat Japan and Australia whenever possible on
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an equal footing with our NATO allies. The possiblity
of the uncontrolled dissemination of US classified data
through cooperation with Japan must be taken into account,
however, because of Japan's legal prohibition against
national security classification.
6. Canada. We are exploring with Canada the possi-
bility of moving towards a common energy policy with
respect to oil, natural gas, coal, electricity and
uranium. We already have extremely close ties with Canada
in the nuclear field.
Canada has expressed interest in cooperating with
the United States in constructing a diffusion plant.
Given this interest, our close economic and political
ties with Canada, and the importance of uranium to the
Canadian economy, failure to make some provisions for
Canada in any scheme for cooperation in the enrichment
field would be greatly resented in Canada and could be
detrimental to US-Canadian relations.
7. The USSR. Soviet propaganda has reflected dis-
pleasure towards the tripartite centrifuge project. The
USSR might react similarly to any US proposal to cooperate
in the enrichment field which includes the FRG.
In reality, however, the Soviets are likely to feel
easier about a German project in which we exert influence
than in an independent one. They are also not likely to
have a basis for serious concern since our proposal is
aimed at deferring construction of a major foreign enrich-
ment capacity and providing the Europeans with an alterna-
tive to exclusive development of the centrifuge process.
In any case, we should not let the prospect of continued
Soviet attacks against the FRG deter US cooperation in
the enrichment field.
8. European Countries Not Included and the LDC's.
The reactions of European countries not included in an
initial US proposal to cooperate and of most less developed
countries would probably not be hostile, or present in-
surmountable obstacles to implementing this plan for
cooperation. The financial and technological investment
in a diffusion plant is so great that only the most
industrially advanced countries could seriously consider
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participation with the United States in this field.
Moreover, other countries might see a more diversified
source of supply as in their interest. It should also
be noted that the NPT strongly encourages parties to
cooperate with other nations in the peaceful nuclear
field but allows them the discretion of determining
whether or not it is in their interest to do so.
III. US Policy Options - Cooperation in Both the
Gaseous Diffusion and Gas Centrifuge Fields
The US could offer (under terms comparable to those
outlined above) to cooperate with the West Europeans and
others in both the diffusion and centrifuge fields instead
of in the diffusion field alone. Under this option we
would provide our partners with a comprehensive, current
picture of where US technology stands in both fields,
and we would then consider actively assisting the
Europeans in the process or processes they deemed most
suitable. This might include extensive cooperation in
either field or in both, depending on the foreign pro-
grams that develop.
A. Advantages
This approach would have the following advantages:
1. It would be more flexible and would permit co-
operation with the Europeans in the technology of their
choice, which they would be able to make in full know-
ledge of where the U.S. technology stands in both fields.
(Countries with high power costs and uncertain demands
for U-235 may prefer the centrifuge process because of
its lower electricity requirements and because it can
be constructed in modest plant increments.)
2. Some of the arguments favoring U.S. participa-
tion in a diffusion plant appear to apply equally to par-
ticipation in a centrifuge effort. For example, since we
probably enjoy a technological lead over the Europeans
in the centrifuge field, we might be able to obtain ade-
quate financial returns for a US contribution. Moreover,
since the centrifuge process presents greater proliferation
risks than diffusion, it could be argued that it would be
all the more important for the U.S., through cooperation,
to exert a significant control over foreign developments
in this field.
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B. Disadvantages
1. The central and very serious disadvantage of this
alternative is that the U.S. would directly contribute to
the dissemination of centrifuge technology and perhaps
hasten its application, with the attendant increased risk
of proliferation.
2. One of the major objectives of a U.S. initiative
at this time would be to offer foreign countries an alter-
native to the development of centrifuge technology in the
hope that they might make their major investments in the
diffusion field.
C. Comment
In the event the U.S. offer to cooperate in the
diffusion field alone were rejected and the Europeans ap-
peared intent on proceeding with a major gas centrifuge
production plant, we would always have the opportunity
of reviewing our various options. But, at this time,
we recommend that no information on U.S. centrifuge tech-
nology, including cost data, be transferred to any other
country or organization.
IV. U.S. Policy Options-Maintain Our Present Policies
The arguments for and against this approach are
as follows:
A. Advantages
1. It is still possible that the Europeans and
others will not be able to muster the resources to build
a large enrichment plant. Even with the necessary politi-
cal will and financial investment, it may take them several
years to realize their ambitions. Given this uncertainty,
it might be in our interests not to cooperate but to com-
pete aggressively for the foreign market for enrichment ser-
vices.
2. As already noted, any program of US cooper-
ation, even if conducted on a classified basis, would add
to the risk that US information might fall into the hands
of nations desiring to use it for military purposes.
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3. Unless we were prepared to cooperate with
everyone (which is not proposed) we might encounter ad-
verse reactions from those nations not included in our
offer.
4. Cooperation in the development of foreign
enriching capabilities might complicate the transfer
of AEC diffusion plants to private industry that the
President has defined as an ultimate goal. However, the
attractiveness of these plants for private investment may
not, in any event, depend heavily on the potential foreign
market for enriched uranium because of the probability that
other nations will develop an independent capability with
or without US help.
B. Disadvantages
1. The foregoing arguments ignore the basic
fact that several countries are firmly resolved to acquire
some independent enrichment capability with or without US
assistance. Moreover, there is every reason to expect
they will be successful even if they have to pay a substan-
tial premium in the process.
2. The knowledge required to produce plutonium
is unclassified and is widespread and there are large
quantities of plutonium throughout the world with more being
created daily. Maintaining a restrictive policy in regard
to our diffusion process would therefore not preclude any
industrialized country seriously determined to do so, from
producing a nuclear bomb.
3. The period of U.S. monopoly in the uranium en-
richment field is rapidly drawing to a close. For the U.S.
to remain aloof from foreign developments in this field
will not turn back the technological clock, nor will it de-
crease for any meaningful period of time the risks of fur-
ther weapons proliferation inherent in the continuing
peaceful exploitation of the atom. Rather, it might re-
sult only in the forfeiture of an opportunity to use our
present technological superiority in an effort to gain im-
portant economic and security benefits for the United States.
Whether the U.S. could actually gain a degree of
control over the security arrangements of a cooperative ven-
ture that would justify releasing classified information to
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a group of foreign partners, and whether other countries
can be induced to invest in a diffusion plant rather than
continuing to concentrate their investment exclusively in
the centrifuge field, are questions that can only be an-
swered through serious negotiations with the countries con-
cerned.
V. Conclusion
A. After considering the foregoing three alternatives,
we conclude that the first, namely, cooperation in the
gaseous diffusion field would be preferable. This conclu-
sion, however, is based on approval of the following nego-
tiating strategy.
B. Negotiating Strategy
1. Timing
Subject to continuous review by the Department
of State and the AEC, preliminary talks would begin in the
early spring of 1970. By that time the Dutch, British and
Germans will have a better idea of whether or how the tri-
partite centrifuge project may be expanded to include
other countries. The effect of the project on the
Community's enrichment plans and the effect that a US
proposal might have on UK accession negotiations with the
Community also should be clearer. Moreover, by the early
months of 1970 the new German government will be in a
better position to respond to a U.S. initiative, and Japan
will probably have signed the NPT. Given the importance
that the tripartite project has to the United Kingdom's
accession interests, we would approach the United Kingdom
before we approached our other prospective partners. We
would, after preliminary discussions with the British,
begin any initial consultations with the Commission of
the European Communities.
Concurrently with our initial exploratory talks
with the Europeans, the AEC will develop guidelines for
possible royalties or similiar payments for use, after
appropriate coordination within the Executive Branch, should
a negotiating phase follow the exploratory phase.
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2. Approach
We should indicate in initial contacts that U.S.
cooperation in the diffusion field is not conditioned upon
European abandonment of research and development of the
centrifuge process. We would stress that we believe cooper-
ation in the diffusion field could be mutually advantageous
and that it is worth serious study by the Europeans as one
option they may want to consider in deciding upon an enrich-
ment program.
The Europeans can be expected to inquire whether
it is possible that future U.S. enrichment plants might in-
volve the gas centrifuge and whether it would make sense
for Europe to embark on a gaseous diffusion program if such
a possibility exists. They may also ask whether the U.S.
would be prepared to cooperate with them in centrifuge
development either additionally or in place of the dif-
fusion process. Should such questions arise, we would
indicate that the USAEC has no current intention of bring-
ing the centrifuge into commerical application in the U.S.
prior to the late 1970's, that the USAEC's centrifuge pro-
gram is developmental in nature, and that we are reluctant
to cooperate with any countries in this field given the
sensitivity of the technology. Moreover, we would stress
that the diffusion process is the one most perfected tech-
nologically and that our offer represents the product of
a major investment and of 25 years' experience. Further,
we would point out that a U.S. option could be supplemen-
tary to European enrichment studies in the centrifuge
field already under way and would in no way deprive them
of the opportunity to assess the relative advantages of
both techniques. We believe these are convincing arguments.
If, however, our offer were rejected because centrifuge
information is not included, or if the Europeans elected
to pursue only the centrifuge route, we would have to
review the situation in the light of these circumstances.
3. Other Countries
In the event other countries, particularly Japan,
Australia, and Canada, express an interest either in as-
sociating themselves with a U.S.-European venture or
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exploring the possibility of some form of bilateral cooper-
ation with the U.S., we would, as noted, indicate a willing-
ness to hold preliminary exploratory conversations with them
on how their long-term requirements for enriched uranium
might best be met, with the understanding that the pre-
conditions to U.S. assistance set forth in this paper would
apply (recognizing that our preference for a multilateral
arrangement may be unrealistic in the case of Canada)
We would be prepared to counter possible Soviet
propaganda directed against the U.S. proposal by citing the
constructive controls that would be inherent in a broadly-
based, multi-national diffusion project.
If this general strategy were followed, subject,
of course, to constant review by the Department of State
and the AEC in response to developments abroad, an effort
at cooperation along the lines recommended above would
appear to be well worth trying. It would give allied
countries an additional option to consider in making their
enrichment plans. They could at worst reject that option
and at best accept it as serving their interest. At the
same time, by exploring the possibilities of cooperation
the U.S. would in no way be bound to enter into a dis-
advantageous agreement if the negotiations did not prove
fruitful from our point of view.
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ANNEX A
Based on various studies by EURATOM and FORATOM,
it is considered most likely that if a diffusion plant
were built in Western Europe for the production of enriched
uranium, the first such plant would be in operation by about
1980 and would have an annual capacity of about 7,500
metric ton units of separative work (SW). If undertaken
as a completely independent European effort, these same
studies estimate a plant investment of between $90 and
$130 per kilogram unit of SW per year; the latter figure
is considered to be the most realistic. Thus, the invest-
ment --- exclusive of electrical generating and other support
facilities -- would be in the order of $975 million. It
should be pointed out that these costs were determined
largely by adjustments to the new plant costs shown in
various published AEC documents rather than by independent
estimates. Thus, we believe that the Europeans -- lack-
ing the US experience and industrial base -- probably have
underestimated the unit cost, for the initial plant at
least, if it were undertaken exclusively on a European
basis. Further, no research and development costs are
included in the foregoing estimates. To bring existing
European diffusion technology to the present US level, it
has been estimated by FORATOM that the expenditure of
$100 to $140 million would be required, with no assurance
that parity would be reached.
Insofar as unit costs of separative work are con--
cerned, by adjusting AEC data to European conditions, the
Europeans have estimated that such costs for an indepen-
dently built European plant would range between $25 and
$37 per kilogram unit of separative work, with only opera-
ting and capital charges; they do not include items equiva-
lent to the "added factor," interest on inventory or re-
turn on investment.
With US assistance, it is believed that the unit cost
of investment could be reduced to about $100 per kilogram
unit of SW per year, or a total savings for the 7,500
metric ton unit plant of at least $225 million. Further-
more, the $100 to $140 million in research and develop-
ment expenditure would become unnecessary. If the diffusion
plant were built in cooperation with the US, it is felt
that the unit cost of separative work could be reduced from
the $33 figure to about $25 per kilogram unit (based on
European capital assumptions and electricity at 5 mills per
kilowatt-hour.)
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ANNEX B - Current Foreign Enrichment Programs
1. France
France has a gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte
designed to produce enriched uranium for the Force de
Frappe. The French have floated the idea on several
occasions of developing a multilaterally financed Euro-
pean facility for the production of lightly enriched
uranium. The Germans and other West Europeans to whom
the proposal was addressed have not reacted enthusiasti-
cally. The French appear to be committed to diffusion
technology and have publicly questioned the feasibility
of the centrifuge process. They have had a modest R & D
program underway in the centrifuge field with which, they
apparently consider, they have had little success.
2. The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and the FRG
In 1965 the British Government announced plans to
modernize their diffusion plant at Capenhurst, primarily
to meet increased civilian demand for nuclear fuel in the
early 1970's. On the basis of economic considerations,
the British have opted to expand their facilities beyond
the modernization of Capenhurst through the development
of the centrifuge process. Both the Germans and the Dutch
have R & D programs in the centrifuge field. They have
reached agreement with the British to pool their tech-
nology and resources in a tripartite project. In joining
together they are motivated by political as well as
economic considerations. The British particularly favor
the project as a means of strengthening their ties to the
Continent and as potentially helpful in eventual nego-
tiations to enter the Common Market.
While France has remained aloof from the tripartite
Project, both Italy and Belgium have indicated a strong
interest in participating. The tripartite countries have
agreed to consult with the Belgians and Italians and there
have already been preliminary talks among the five
countries.
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3. European Communities
The Commission of the European Communities has been
interested for some time in a Community enrichment
facility and is undoubtedly concerned by the tripartite
development which threatens to read them out of European
cooperation in this field. The Commission has recently
proposed to the Council a three stage program to permit
the Community to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency
in the production of enriched uranium during the next
decade. The program would include detailed studies and
pilot projects on both the diffusion and the centrifuge
processes drawing on French as well as German and Dutch
experience in the enrichment field. It would attempt
to begin production by the preferred process or combina-
tion of processes in the late 1970's.
4. Italy
Italy announced in November of this year that an
Italian industrial firm has produced two prototype centri-
fuges. The Italian government has supported modest
industrial research in the centrifuge since the begin-
ning of 1969. It is not clear whether the centrifuge
prototypes have actually been tested. There is reason
to suspect that the Italian announcement was timed to
fortify the Italian bid for membership in the tripartite
centrifuge project.
5. Japan
Outside of Europe, Japan is engaged in serious
research on diffusion and centrifuge technology with
lesser efforts in other processes. While Japanese efforts
appear to be favoring work in the centrifuge field, the
Japanese Atomic Energy Agency has set 1975 as the target
year for selection of a single process to be the basis
of further efforts. The Japanese could probably
accelerate this time table, however, if they felt that
construction of a European enrichment facility posed
a serious threat to their ability to compete in this
field in the future.
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6. Australia
Australia started research on a gas centrifuge
development program in 1960-61. In 1968 an official
of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission told US
officials that, based on their research, they believe
a small, economically feasible system might be developed
in four years time. The Australian program is aimed at
achieving self-sufficiency in the production of nuclear
fuel for their power reactor program and at the export
market. They have evidenced a strong interest in
cooperating with the US in this field.
7. Canada
Canada does not have an important R & D program
underway in the enrichment field. They have, however,
expressed an interest in cooperating with the United
States in constructing a diffusion plant in the far
Northwestern areas of Canada, where large supplies of
natural uranium exist along with a large source of low
cost hydro-electric power which would have no other
marketing value.
8. Other Countries
In addition to the countries mentioned above, Sweden,
Brazil, Israel, Yugoslavia, Egypt, India, Argentina and
several others have evidenced varying degrees of interest
in centrifuge research.
9. United States
It should be borne in mind that the United States
is actively engaged in centrifuge research and is
probably technically far ahead of any of the countries
similarly engaged abroad.
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ANNEX C
NSA - 294
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HOUSE
NGTON
April 20, 1964
294
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 294
TO:
The Secretary of State.
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System
Assistance to France
It is the policy of this government to oppose the development of
nuclear forces by additional states, other than those whose forces
would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force, targeted in
accordance with NATO plans and, except when supreme national
interests were at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the
Alliance.
Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government's
interest not to contribute to or assist in the development of a French
nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear
delivery capacity. This includes exchanges of information and
technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint re-
search and development activities, and exchanges between indus-
trial and commercial organizations, either directly or through
third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these
efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would
identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However,
this directive is not intended to restrict unduly full and useful
cooperation in non-strategic programs and activities.
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SECRET
Therefore, the President has directed that effective controls be
established immediately to assure that, to the extent feasible, the
assistance referred to above is not extended either intentionally
or unintentionally.
To this end, specific technical guidance is to be developed and
issued at the earliest possible time for the use of the agencies
that control the export of equipment and technology, including data
exchange arrangements. Responsibility for the development of
such guidance, and when necessary the revision of these guidances,
will be vested in the Departments of State and Defense, in consul-
tation as appropriate with the Department of Commerce, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Office of
Science and Technology, and under the leadership of the Department
of State. The approved guidance documents will be cleared at the
White House and issued as technical appendices to this National
Security Action Memorandum. Necessary guidance will be requested
before specific commitments are made by any agency.
Infer
McGcorge Bundy
SECRET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
)
F.L F
NSAIN
March 9, 1965
2ay
Dear Tommy:
I have held your letter of February 26 about NSAM
294 until we could have a first meeting with the two
Secretaries on the Gilpatric Report. In the light of
our discussion of yesterday, I now think we should
clearly go ahead on the basis which is suggested in
the memorandum enclosed with your letter. My
one additional suggestion is that I hope a White
House Staff Officer may also be included in the NSAM
Review Group under State chairmanship. I would
expect to nominate Spurgeon Keeny for this job.
Sincerely,
man
McGeorge Bundy
The Honorable Llewellyn Thompson
Acting Deputy Under Secretary
Department of State
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COPY
SECRET
February 26, 1965
Dear Mac:
You will recall that we had set up a small
working group to look into some of the coordination
and implementation aspects of NSAM. 294. I enclose
a preliminary report of the group.
Their findings and views as to continued
application of the policy set forth in the NSAM
seem to me to square with the consensus reached
in the White House meeting of December 30 as
recorded in the January 14 memorandum sent to
participants in the meeting. We all recognize that
we are feeling our way in a singularly complex area,
and the approach suggested by the working group is
in my view a sound one.
I believe we should proceed along these lines,
and plan to ask the other agencies concerned to
designate representatives to the Review Group proposed.
In the Department of State, general NSAM 294 responsi-
bility will continue to rest with the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey
C. Kitchen, and he or an officer designated by him will-
represent the Department on the Review Group.
Sincerely,
Clearances:
Llewellyn E. Thompson
Acting
G/PM Mr. Kitchen
Mr. Meyers
Enclosure:
Report of Working Group.
The Honorable
McGeorge Bundy,
Special Assitant to the President
The White House.
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SECRET
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENJ ATIONS OF NSAM 294 WORKING GROUP
Conclusions:
1. The purpose of the policy set forth in NSAM 294
is to use export denial, as one means of achieving effective
control over material, equipment and technology which any
nation* seeks to acquire for use in an independent nuclear
weapons/strategic delivery vehicle program, and which would
significantly benefit such program.
2. Adequate legislative authority and export control
mechanisms already exist within the U.S. Government to assure
that all items of potential concern in NSAM 294 terms come
within the congizance of the appropriate export licensing
authorities, either AEC, State, or Commerce.
3. The tasks of the licensing authorities are therefore
(1) to make sure that procedures are in effect which are
adequate to identify all proposed export items falling under
NSAM 294 and (2) to establish the best possible judgment on
the following:
a. The technical, economic, quality, and timing
importance of the item to the national weapons
program.
b. The use actually intended for the item.
c. The alternative sources outside the U.S. for
the item or a comparable substitute.
4. Those items
In practical terms, the U.K. is at present exempted from this
policy, since we are cooperating with that country extensively
in both the nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle areas. The
policy is also not relev. nt to Bloc countries, since more
stringent policies are governing with respect to them.
SECRET
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SECRET
- 2 -
4. Those items which are clearly intended for use in
a national program, would significantly and directly
benefit that program in terms of timing, quality, or cost,
and are unavailable in comparable substitute form elsewhere
than the U.S. are to be denied.
5. Those items intended for other uses, or of only
marginal benefit to the national prògram, or available
elsewhere than the U.S. without undue difficulty or delay,
will normally be approved. Other than NSAM 294 considera-
tions may come into play, however (Atomic Energy legisla-
tion, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, political considerations,
other U.S. policies, etc.), and individual decisions must
take these into account.
6. While NSAM 294 is of general application, France,
under her present policies, is the major target country now
and for the immediate future. Nevertheless exports to all
other countries must be continuously evaluated in terms
of both the potential and intention of the recipient
country to engage in a national program.
7. No new control mechanisms or formalized inter-agency
committees are required, but improved coordination, exchange
of views and centralized compilations of case-by-case
experience are needed. To the extent feasible, definite
lists of commodities and related technologies of importance
in NSAM 294 terms should be developed in order to make the
controls most effective. The agencies with technical
competence in the area are therefore continuing to work
on improving present lists. It is recognized, however,
that the relative and shifting nature of the NSAM 294
control problem probably means that individual decisions
will necessarily continue to be mostly of an ad hoc nature.
Recommendations:
1. Each
SECRET
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SECRET
- 3 -
1. Each agency concerned (State, Defense, AEC, Commerce,
NASA) should name a single senior staff level representative
to have general responsibility within that agency for
NSAM 294 matters.
2. These representatives should keep in close touch
with each other and with all concerned areas within their
own agencies, the purpose being to ensure that NSAM 294
cases arising within or referred through normal channels
to their agencies get adequate and expeditious consideràtion
under the criteria outlined above.
3. These representatives should also be constituted
as an informal NSAM 294 Review Group, meeting under State
chairmanship once a month or as necessary, and including
additional participation from their own agencies as desirable.
The purpose will be to continue to explore ways and means
to improve inter-agency coordination, discuss implementation
problems which may have arisen, study decisions reached in
individual cases of a precedent value or with unusual
features, build up a central body of NSAM 294 experience,
and make recommendations for change in policy or procedures
to their respective agencies as may be required.
4. The intelligence community should be requested to
provide the Review Group on a regular. basis with evaluations
of additional-country potential and intention to engage
in nuclear weapons programs, to assist the group in achieving
the purpose mentioned in paragraph 6 above.
Clearances:
CC:
Commerce - Mr. Tollin
WE - Mr. Beigel
Defense - Mr. Nichols
L/ EUR - Mr. Trippe
AEC - Mr. O'Donnell
CIA - Mr. Christesen
NASA - Mr. Gorman
MC - Mr. Sipes
E/MDC - Mr. McFadden
G/PM: SGeorge: fm
2/17/6 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Fresidential-Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
INFORMATION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
March 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Robert M. Behr RuB
SUBJECT: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) Request for
NSC/USC Report on International Cooperation in the
Enrichment Field
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has been advised, presumably
by AEC and/or State, of the existence of the report which has been
forwarded to the President for decision on cooperation in the uranium
enrichment field.
Representative Hosmer informally requested a copy of the report, less
the Under Secretary's memorandum and recommendation to the President.
Representative Holifield, Chairman of the Committee, has followed
through with a letter to the Secretary of State officially requesting the
report.
State informally requested permission to release the report to the
Joint Committee. We informed State that the request should be denied
at this time (1) because we believe that reports which are submitted to
the President as part of recommendations for decision should not be
floated beforehand in Congress, and (2) because we find the report, as it
stands, unsatisfactory in the sense that it is an advocacy paper for a
particular option rather than a balanced presentation of all the options.
State is politely declining Chairman Holifield's request. We think the
matter may be turned off only for the time being. In order to keep this
issue in hand while it is under consideration, we are stressing that the
matter should be closely held. This does not preclude a balanced
version of the report being released to the Committee at a later date.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mrs. Davis
FYI
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
CONFIDENTIAL
April 20, 1970
NSC-U/SM 56B
TO:
The Deputy Secretary Defense
The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
The Science Advisor to the President
The Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget
INFO:
The Director, United States Information Agency
SUBJECT: Request for Additional Information on Uranium
Enrichment Problem
The attached memorandum from Henry Kissinger is self-
explanatory. The Chairman has asked Herman Pollack, Director,
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, to
organize the preparation of answers to the questions posed.
Because of the classification problem as we move more
deeply into consideration of the status of centrifuge tech-
nology it may be necessary to limit sharply the access to
the supplementary information which has been requested.
Please call Dr. Robert Loftness, Deputy Director for Tech-
nology of the Office of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI (Ext.
22432), to give him the name of the contact point for your
Agency concerning future developments on this study.
Arthur A. Hartman
Staff Director
Attachment:
As stated.
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S/S# 5456
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
April 16, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Program for International Cooperation in the Uranium
Enrichment Field
The President has noted the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's
recommendation regarding a program for international cooperation
in the uranium enrichment field as proposed in your memorandum
of February 26, 1970.
Before further action on this matter is undertaken, the report should
address the following questions.
1.
Since the report recognizes that United States policy on the
gas centrifuge process may have to be reviewed, depending
upon the reactions of other countries to the proposed course
of action, what are the full advantages and disadvantages of
the option to share both centrifuge and diffusion technology?
Could the United States offer to share diffusion technology
now, but accompany the offer with a straightforward commitment
to consider sharing centrifuge technology at a later date? What
are the relevant Congressional (JCAE) attitudes bearing upon
the options?
2. What objectives of the United States - for example, technological
cooperation with Europe and other countries, European inte-
gration, multinational approaches, non-proliferation, influence
in the uranium enrichment field -- are to be served or disserved
by the options? What is the likelihood of advancing the various
objectives and what are the relationships between them?
3.
What are the short-range and probable longer-term problems,
and possible United States responses, which may be generated
by a decision of the United States to share only gaseous diffusion
technology?
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
4. Where does the United States stand in its diffusion and centrifuge
technology and programs? What are likely future trends? What
is the probable status of other countries' programs over the
years without United States cooperation, and what is the inter-
action between their programs and those of the United States?
Specifically, what are the international and domestic political
implications of the recommended course of action if the
United States should decide that its next enrichment plant is
to be of the centrifuge type?
It is recognized that timing may be an important factor in reviewing
these options. The above information, therefore, should be submitted
for the President's consideration on or before May 18. The classification
of the report should be up-graded if necessary to handle the supplementary
information adequately. The nature and content of the review should be
closely held.
Henry Kissinger
CONFIDENTIAL
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alsm 55
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 14, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
ACTING CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Proposed Program of International Cooperation in the
Uranium Enrichment Field
The President has considered the recommendation of the NSC Under
Secretaries Committee, as contained in your memorandum of February 26,
1970 and reaffirmed in your memorandum of April 26, 1970, regarding a
program of international cooperation in the uranium enrichment field.
The President has approved, subject to appropriate prior consultations
with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, exploratory talks with the
Commission of the European Communities, the member States of
EURATOM, and the United Kingdom on the possibility of the United States
assisting in the construction of a multinationally owned and operated
gaseous diffusion plant to be located in Western Europe.
Additionally, the President has decided that the United States will be
prepared, if requested, to discuss the possibility of similar cooper-
ation with other friendly countries, particularly Japan, Canada and
Australia.
The President has noted and approved in principle the negotiating strategy
submitted by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. He has also noted
that the United States would insist that any related enrichment facilities
and their products would be subject to meaningful safeguards and adequate
security controls, and that the United States would give preference to
multilateral control and ownership.
The President has approved the recommendation of the NSC Under
Secretaries Committee subject to the following qualifications:
- The United States position should not be presented as a major coopera-
tive program conditioned upon a continuing United States voice and
participation in the actual management of any facilities.
- The United States shall be prepared not to hold back any technology in
the gaseous diffusion process.
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SECRET
- Regarding any information on the United States gas centrifuge program,
it should be stated only that there is no authorization to discuss the gas
centrifuge program and that the United States Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's gas centrifuge program is developmental in nature.
- The United States position on sharing of diffusion technology should not
be represented to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a means
of impeding foreign gas centrifuge development. This development,
especially in Europe, is an ongoing program and would probably not be
curtailed by an offer to share diffusion technology unless the economics
of the diffusion process were markedly more advantageous.
Noting that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee will report the results
of these talks together with further recommendations as soon thereafter as
possible, the President has additionally requested interim reports on the
consultations with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and on the initial
discussions with the United Kingdom.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
SECRET
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Secretariat
Tab B IS now
signed
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cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
21661
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 23, 1970
SECRET/EYES ONLY
Dear Alex:
Please excuse this tardy reply to your letter of September 1, 1970,
expressing concern about the foreign policy aspects of the United
States uranium enrichment capacity available for supplying nuclear
power programs in other countries.
I agree that an inability to enter into discussions for long-term
advance planning of power needs of other countries could limit our
influence on programs abroad. However, related to this issue of
uranium enrichment capacity will be the European response, and
possibly the reaction of other allies, to the exploratory talks which
the President has authorized on the prospects for our cooperating
and assisting in the construction of a multinational diffusion plant
in Europe.
Moreover, as you know, the question of additional United States
uranium enrichment capacity involves a host of interrelated foreign
policy and domestic issues. There is the President's decision that
the supply of nuclear fuel should ultimately be met by the private
sector to the degree possible. It is my understanding that the pri-
mary issue is not whether the United States will expand its capacity,
but how and when additional capacity is to be constructed. I under-
stand further that there are alternative courses for expanding our
capacity and that these alternatives, after examination of their
technical, economic and other aspects, will be forwarded to the
President for decision.
Because the question of United States uranium enrichment capacity
involves several important foreign policy aspects, the Under
Secretaries Committee is being requested to conduct a review of
SECRET/EYES ONLY
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SECRET/EYES ONLY
2
whether the United States should continue to make further commit-
ments regarding the supply of nuclear fuel to other countries and,
if so, under what conditions should these commitments be made.
Please keep in touch on this matter.
Warmest regards,
A
Henry A. Kissinger
The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State
SECRET/EYES ONLY
at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
Dispatched pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretariat
21661
Split package - Dr. K signed Tab A only
which is ready for dispatch. The rest
of the package went back for his signature
on Tab B (ltr to Alexis Johnson)
nancy 11/20
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cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
21661
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
November 20, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
CHAIRMAN, UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT:
Review of United States Policy on Meeting Additional
Foreign Requirements for Enriched Uranium
Anticipating that future demand for enriched fuel to supply reactors
scheduled for construction in the United States and abroad by about
1973 will fully commit the current United States uranium enrich-
ment capacity, the President has directed that the NSC Under
Secretaries Committee conduct a review of United States policy on
additional commitments to supply enriched uranium for foreign
power programs.
Specifically, the Under Secretaries Committee should address the
questions (1) of whether the United States should continue to make
further commitments to supply enriched uranium to other countries
and (2) if so, under what conditions should such commitments be
made. This review should consider the relationships of United
States foreign policy objectives (1) to the President's decision re-
garding the ultimate goal of having the supply of nuclear fuel trans-
ferred to the private sector to the degree possible, and (2) to the
President's decision authorizing exploratory talks with EURATOM,
the United Kingdom and, if requested, with other allies such as
Japan, Canada and Australia on the possibility of the United States
cooperating and assisting in the construction of a multinational
gaseous diffusion plant abroad.
SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
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SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
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This review, accompanied by the relevant advantages and disad-
vantages of alternative courses of action and the recommendations
of the Under Secretaries Committee, should be submitted to the
President by January 1, 1971.
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
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SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
MEMORANDUM FOR
CHAIRMAN, UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT:
Review of United States Policy on Meeting Additional
Foreign Requirements for Enriched Uranium
Anticipating that future demand for enriched fuel to supply reactors
scheduled for construction in the United States and abroad by about
1973 will fully commit the current United States uranium enrich-
ment capacity, the President has directed that the NSC Under
Secretaries Committee conduct a review of United States policy on
additional commitments to supply enriched uranium for foreign
power programs.
Specifically, the Under Secretaries Committee should address the
questions (1) of whether the United States should continue to make
further commitments to supply enriched uranium to other countries
and (2) if so, under what conditions should such commitments be
made. This review should consider the relationships of United
States foreign policy objectives (1) to the President's decision re-
garding the ultimate goal of having the supply of nuclear fuel trans-
ferred to the private sector to the degree possible, and (2) to the
President's decision authorizing exploratory talks with EURATOM,
the United Kingdom and, if requested, with other allies such as
Japan, Canada and Australia on the possibility of the United States
cooperating and assisting in the construction of a multinational
gaseous diffusion plant abroad.
SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
RH:jlj 11/17/70 rewritten page one of Action 21661 Tab A
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REWRITE - PAGE 2
21661
SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
- 2 -
This review, accompanied by the relevant advantages and disad-
vantages of alternative courses of action and the recommendations
of the Under Secretaries Committee, should be submitted to the
President by January 1, 1971.
Henry A. Kissinger
P. 2 Rewrtn:RH:ms:11/16/70
SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
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21661
Secretariat
I would ordinarily retype these and not send
them back - but the package has to be cleared
with Mr. Sonnenfeldt and the exercise might
have been for nothing.
nancy 11/13
1. Currection
at clip
2 Retyper
letter at
TAB B
3 Sonnenplat Clear with
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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MEMORANDUM
ACTION 21661
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
November 12, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
C
FROM:
Robert M. Behr Thank
See my
SUBJECT: Issue Paper and Further Action on Under/Secretary
Johnson's Letter re US Uranium Enrichment Capacity
Under Secretary Johnson has expressed (Tab C) concern about the
foreign policy aspects (1) of the approaching inadequacy of the US
uranium enrichment capacity, and (2) our concomitant inability to enter
into discussions now for additional long-term commitments to meet the
fuel supplies of other countries.
Mr. Johnson maintains it is important that we make a firm commitment to
increase our capacity (that is when the Administration reviews AEC's
FY 1972 budget proposal). He solicits your support on this point.
Per your request (Tab D), below is a summary of the issue. At Tab A
is a proposed memorandum requesting the Under Secretaries Committee
to look into the foreign policy aspects of this issue. At Tab B is a revised
reply to Mr. Johnson reflecting this action.
Background and Issue
Though currently operating below capacity, US gaseous diffusion plants
are expected to meet domestic and foreign requirements for nuclear
fuel only until the late 1970's at which time additional US or foreign
capacity will be required.
Current US capacity is not now over-committed as AEC's policy has
been to balance our commitments to long-term foreign demand within
our existing production capacity and domestic requirements. The
problem, expressed in Mr. Johnson's letter, is that we may be unable to
accept additional commitments to supply new foreign reactors because of
our failure to define and budget for increased US enrichment capacity.
The central issue is not whether an expansion is necessary but rather
how and perhaps who should build the additional capacity.
directive DoNe
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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+ give DECLASSIFIED fill Jane DONE
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
2
The AEC and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) preference
is to expand US enrichment capacity through an expensive (circa $800
million) improvement and upgrading program for existing diffusion
facilities. Moreover, they would hope to delay any new European plant
based on US technology until after the full utilization of US capacity had
been achieved.
Whith
(PETER FLANIGAN, WILL KREIGSMAN)
The White House staff view is that it is premature to settle now on one
particular course. In light of the President's decision that the supply of
nuclear fuel should ultimately be met by the private sector rather than
the Government, there is a concern that AEC's expansion program would
leave these facilities in federal hands up through this decade because of
the added increment of capital investment associated with a diffusion
improvement program. Moreover, the White House staff points out that
AEC's proposed expansion program is not the only way to increase our
current capacity and that other courses (for example, a less efficient use
of raw uranium but with greater product output, or pre-production of
enriched nuclear fuel since the plants are now operating below capacity)
may be more amenable to a possible transfer of facilities to the private
sector.
From a foreign policy standpoint, the issue relates to the President's
decision to conduct exploratory talks with our European allies in EURATOM
Wk
and the UK on the possibility of the US assisting in the construction of a
IFLANIGAN, KREIGSMAN
gaseous diffusion plant in Western Europe. The White House staff believes
that a European decision to build a facility soon would afford us the options
of (1) delaying the costly program to improve our existing diffusion plants,
and (2) evaluating fully the potential of the gas centrifuge technique. We are
currently at a sensitive stage in the consultations with the JCAE on this
decision, and will not inform the Europeans of our willingness to engage in
such talks until these consultations are completed (probably in early December).
We are, moreover, not at all certain of the Committee's support for the
Administration's readiness to discuss a program of sharing with selected
allies.
There is a host of related issues overlapping domestic and foreign policy
considerations. For example, under current practice, we commit our-
selves to supply fuel for the lifetime (about 30 years) of a reactor whereas
the country which has an agreement of cooperation with us may cancel its
order with three years notice. Needless to say this is a sore point with
the Joint Committee where there is concern that the US could be left with
unused and expensive production capacity should the cancellation option be
widely exercised.
In order to assist in the evaluation of the full range of alternatives for
expanding our enrichment capacity, I believe that the Under Secretaries
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Committee should review the bases of our current and future com-
mitments to fulfill foreign demand. In short, to what extent and under
what conditions should we respond positively to foreign requests for
additional US commitments?
However, the selection of a specific domestic program for increasing
our enrichment capacity appears to me to be a matter more appropriately
handled in the budget process and outside NSC channels. This matter is
now undergoing intensive review within the Executive Office of the President.
At Tab A is a memorandum to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries
Committee requesting the review described above. At Tab B is a revised
letter to Mr. Johnson which informs him of this action.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
That you sign the memorandum for the Chairman of the Under
Secretaries Committee at Tab A.
2. That you sign the reply to Mr. Johnson at Tab B.
Concurrence: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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21661
department OF STATE
WASHINGTON
10880
September 1, 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Henry:
We are concerned about foreign policy aspects of the
approaching exhaustion of U.S. uranium enrichment capacity
available for supplying civilian power reactors in other
countries. We believe these aspects should be carefully
weighed when the Administration reviews, in connection
with the Fiscal Year 1972 Budget, proposals for improving
the output of the AEC's gaseous diffusion facilities.
Although these facilities are currently operating
below full capacity, it is anticipated that future commit-
ments to supply enriched fuel for reactors firmly scheduled
for construction here and abroad by 1973 will commit our
total capacity. Accordingly, in negotiating bilateral
nuclear cooperation agreements, we are committing our-
selves to provide fuel only for reactors on which con-
struction can be scheduled to start before the end of
that year.
Since this is a long lead-time industry, our inability
to enter into discussions on a realistic basis for long-
term advance planning of power needs of other countries
threatens both to limit our influence in civil reactor
programs abroad and to become a serious deterrent to U.S.
exports in this field.
The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs,
The White House.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
2
This situation could lead to major losses from a
balance of payments standpoint. Moreover, it could ad-
versely affect our non-proliferation objectives. Other
countries would have increased incentive to proceed with
wholly independent uranium enrichment capabilities, where-
as we may hope to limit or influence this by improving
our own capacity and by proceeding with the cooperative
steps outlined in the Under Secretaries Committee's
memorandum of February 26, 1970, for the President.
Other countries could also be encouraged to turn to
natural uranium reactors, which are more troublesome
from the standpoint of proliferation.
We are not, of course, in a position to endorse
specific budgetary requests that the AEC may submit.
However, for the foregoing reasons, it is important that
the U.S. make a firm commitment to enhance our capacity
to meet constantly increasing requirements, and it is
on this basic point that we are soliciting your support.
I am sending a copy of this letter to George Shultz
so that the Office of Management and Budget may also be
aware of the Department's interest in this matter.
With all best wishes,
Sincerely,
Acting ally Secretary
cc: Mr. Shultz
CONFIDENTIAL
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MEMORANDUM
ACTION - 21661
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
FOR September REDO PER 17, 1970 HAK NOTE
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
me a staff
FROM:
Robert M. Behr
paperty
SUBJECT: Reply to Under Secretary Johnson's Letter on Uranium
Enrichment
H
Under Secretary Alexis Johnson has written you (Tab B) expressing
the notitiples pap knows
concern about the foreign policy aspects of the approaching exhaustion
of US uranium enrichment capacity for supplying power reactors in other
the
countries. The main points of his letter are:
is
- Anticipated future commitments to supply nuclear fuel for reactors
dring
Administration
scheduled for construction here and abroad by 1973 will commit our
total enrichment capacity.
for, is
- Our inability to enter into discussions for long-term advance
planning of power needs of other countries threatens to limit both
our influence on programs abroad and our exports.
upsuy
Committee
- This could lead to major losses from a balance of payments standpoint
and could adversely affect our non-proliferation objectives by increas-
ing incentives abroad to proceed with wholly independent uranium
for
enrichment capabilities.
OCT
>
They
- We hope to influence the situation by improving our own capacity and
1970
by proceeding with the cooperative steps with allies as recommended
by the Under Secretaries Committee.
- Though State is not in a position to endorse specific AEC budgetary
requests, it is important that we make a firm commitment to increase
our capacity (that is, when the Administration reviews the FY 1972
budget proposals for improving AEC's gaseous diffusion facilities).
- He solicits your support on this point.
Wittingly or not, Mr. Johnson has allowed himself to become an advocate
for AEC/JCAE (Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) views regarding US
enrichment policy that do not jibe with those of the domestic side of the
White House staff.
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CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
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The AEC/JCAE preference is to expand US diffusion capacity through an
expensive upgrading of existing facilities, while delaying a new European
plant based on US technology until after the full utilization of US capacity
has been achieved.
The White House staff view is that it is not yet the time to settle on one
particular course. For example, a European decision to build a facility
soon would afford us the options of (1) delaying the costly program to
improve our existing diffusion plants, and (2) evaluating fully the potential
of the gas centrifuge technique. The White House staff is also considering,
on a highly confidential basis, alternative methods of expanding plant capacity
without the expenditure of large amounts of Federal funds.
Since these options are under study at the present time, I recommend that you
avoid a commitment to support the views expressed by Under Secretary
Johnson.
I have drafted a proposed reply (Tab A) to Under Secretary Johnson which
thanks him for his letter and states that (1) the Administration is carefully
examining the technical, economic and international factors with respect to
decisions in this area, and (2) related to this examination will be the European
response to the exploratory talks on possible cooperation in the construction
of a European diffusion plant.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
Concurrences: Peter Flanigan
James Schlesinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NSC
STATIONERY
SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE CHAIRMAN
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT:
Review of United States Policy on Meeting
Additional Foreign Requirements for
Enriched Uranium
Anticipating that future demand for enriched fuel to supply reactors
scheduled for construction in the United States and abroad by about
1973 will fully commit the current United States uranium enrich-
ment capacity, the President has directed that the NSC Under
Secretaries Committee conduct a review of United States policy on
additional commitments to supply enriched uranium for foreign
power programs.
Specifically, the Under Secretaries Committee should address the
questions (1) of whether the United States should continue to make
further commitments to supply enriched uranium to other countries
and (2) if so, under what conditions should such commitments be
made. This review should consider the relationships of United
States foreign policy objectives (1) to the President's decision re-
garding the ultimate goal of having the supply of nuclear fuel trans-
ferred to the private sector to the degree possible, and (2) to the
President's decision authorizing exploratory talks with EURATOM,
the United Kingdom and, if requested, with other allies such as
Japan, Canada and Australia on the possibility of the United States
cooperating and assisting in the construction of a multinational
gaseous diffusion plant abroad.
SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
- 2 -
This review, accompanied by the relevant advantages and disad-
vantages of alternative courses of action and the recommendations
of the Under Secretaries Committee, should be submitted to the
President by December 15, 1970.
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/LIMDIS/NOFORN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NUMBER
MO
DA
HR
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE
21661
09
02
09
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
CLASSIF:
U
EXDIS
X
HAK
ROGERS
C
NODIS
LAIRD
LOU
EYES ONLY
DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
JOHNSON, U
S
RES DATA
DOC DATE:
TS
CODEWORD
SENSITIVE
PARIS MTG
NO FORN
SUBJECT:
Request for Us's Frim commitment to Enhavee our
capacity to provide Uranium Power Reactors to other Nations
5/5 10880
ENCLOSURES:
)
(
) NOT XEROXED for SUSPENSE FILE
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
NAME:
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
ACTION
INFO
RCD CY
MEMO TO PRESIDENT
(
)
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK HAIG
FOR:
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE
(
)
MEMO
TO
(
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
DIR, SECRETARIAT
X
)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
(UNSIC
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
)
LATIN AMERICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
MICROFILM
DATA
)
UNITED NATIONS
CONCURRENCE
DO
09/05
Nom
)
ECONOMIC
DUE
DATE:
INIT
SCIENTIFIC
X
DATE 11/25
PLANNING GROUP
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
ORIG) NSC
Kennedy
X
TO
)
PAF
WHC
SUBF
DATE
FROM
TO
ACTION required
09/17/20
Behr
HAK
sign ltr to Jahnson
10/6
Nic/s
Behr
redo
INTERNAL ROUTING
11/12
BELL
HAK
Spe to E Chania USC
11/12
HAK
Behrost
with "feldt.
11/13.
Behr
tonsels to HAK
Sign memo to Johnson, Tchmn of use
11-20
HAK
nsc/s -Tab
A only - - for dispatch
11-23
HAK
nse/s
HAK Tab seemed B signed the to A. Johnson
#
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
Xame
NSC
#
STAFF APPROVAL
DISPOSITION
PAF
HAK APPL
NOTIFY:
WHC
HAK marginalia
SUBF
NS3 FORM REQUIRED
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
* GP0: 1970-385-803
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NUMBER
MO
DA
HR
NATIONAL SECURITY Loss
CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE
21421
8
19
18
AL50 EXDIS 11568
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
CLASSIF:
U
HAK
NODIS
107173
ROGERS
C
LAIRD
LOU
EYES ONLY
DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
DOC DATE: 8/19
Behn
s
RES DATA
TS
CODEWORD
SENSITIVE
PARIS MTG
NO FORN
SUBJECT: Proposed Program for Cooperation in The
Uranum Enselement Freed with us allies
ENCLOSURES: (
)
(
) NOT XEROXED FOR suspense FILE
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
NAME:
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
ACTiON
INFO
RCD CY
MEMO TO PRESIDENT
(
)
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR:
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE
(
)
ON/ACTION
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY for PRES SIGNATURE
(
)
DIR, SECRETARIAT
MEMO
TO
(
)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
JOINT memo
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
CONCURRENCE
(
)
ECONOMIC
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
&
PLANNING GROUP
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
See also 107734
FAR EAST
11568 for
priorento
DATE
FROM
TO
ACTION REQUIRED
8/19
8/28
Behr PAK
HAK
Beln
Prez Redot fou decision
INTERNAL ROUTING
8/28
Behr
HAIC
Prea faderision
9/8
Hah
Pres
Decision
9/12
Daric
HAK
Danie
appropriate action (dispotch)
of Memerto NSC/USC
MICROFILM DATA
DO
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
DATE INIT 9/18
NSC
STAFF APPROVAL
DISPOSITION
PAF
ORIG) NSC
X
HAK APPL
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WHC
HAK MARGINALIA
TO
)
PAF
SUBF
X
NS3 FORM REQUIRED
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
WHC
SUBF
* GPO: 1970-385-803
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NUMBER
MO
DA
HR
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE
23247
10
3112
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
CLASSIF: U
EXDIS
X
HAK
ROGERS
C
NODIS
X
LAIRD
LOU
EYES ONLY
DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
s x
RES DATA
10/20/70
Johnson, U
DOC
DATE:
TS
CODEWORD
SENSITIVE
PARIS MTG
NO FORN
NX European collaboration with French on uranium enrichment plant
SUBJECT:
ENCLOSURES: (
)
(
) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
NAME: BEHR
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
ACTiON
INFO
RCD CY
MEMO TO PRESIDENT
(
)
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR:
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE
(
)
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
DIR, SECRETARIAT
MEMO
TO
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
X
XX
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APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
ANY ACTION necessary
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
CONCURRENCE
(
)
ECONOMIC
DUE DATE: 11/5
SCIENTIFIC
XX
X
PLANNING GROUP
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
X
X
DATE
FROM
TO
ACTION REQUIRED
Behr/
11/04
Sonnen
HAK
Information
Behr: memo to Johnson: CO: Sonnenfeldt
11/123
NSC/S
Behr/Sonnenfeldt
Sonnenfeldt: substance on French Deal cc:Be
INTERNAL ROUTING
11/14
BEHR
HAK
Sign memo to Johnson
11/23
HAK
NSC/S
HAK signed letter to U Johnson / Dispatched
11/25
NSC/S
HAK
REOPEN/Decision
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon:Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
12/28
HAK
Behr
redo
3/19
Behy Jeldt
HAK
fur hero to Area (3/23)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DATE
FROM
S
CY TO
TO
3/23
Behr/
HAV
X
ACTION Decision REQUIRED
4/3
AAN
Behr
S
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
Further Action / (3/25) feleth 4/c
4-5-71
BEHR
CUHIN
4/12/71
HAK
X
Rgn memo to shulty 04/15
4/13/71
Cleance (4/14)
NS4
LEHMIN
S
CAO
4/14
Lehman
Nsc/s
cleared &
4/14/
Nsc/s
HAK
HAK X Signed Mimo
Initial memo to shulty 04/19
CROSS 4/20 REF WITH
MICROFILM DATA
NOTIFY
DATE
DO
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
now
40m
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
COPIES: (AS X MARKED ABOVE)
DATE INIT 4/21
HP,
HM
ORIG)
NSC PAF MM
TO )
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
* GPO: 1971-412-412
MEMORANDUM
23247
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
April 20, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GEORGE P. SHULTZ
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
K
SUBJECT:
Uranium Enrichment
You will recall that, on 14 September 1970, the President authorized
exploratory talks with EURATOM, the United Kingdom and other allies
on the possibility of our cooperating in the construction of a multi-
national uranium enrichment plant utilizing US gaseous diffusion tech-
nology. Action on this decision was subject to appropriate consultations
with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE).
Discussions to date with the JCAE have led to an impasse. I understand
the committee refuses to endorse our international cooperation proposal
until there is a commitment by the Administration to fund the cascade
improvement program (CIP) for existing US plants.
It is my understanding that you are currently conducting a review of the
Administration's position on the CIP issue. The matter has acquired
some important international overtones which I should like to bring to
your attention in order that they may be appropriately factored into your
review.
The Europeans and other allies (particularly Japan, Canada and Australia)
know that the President has authorized discussions on a cooperative
international approach and that the Administration is currently consulting
with the JCAE. The delay resulting from JCAE opposition serves to
reinforce their doubts and questions regarding US intentions in the uranium
enrichment field. Their doubts are, moreover, coupled with a desire for
a certain independence from outside energy sources.
There has, therefore, been a flurry of actions by the Europeans and others
including, for example, (1) an announcement by France that it plans to
construct a gaseous diffusion plant with eventual participation open to other
European countries; (2) a French agreement with the USSR for the latter to
supply toll enrichment services; (3) inquiries from Japan regarding our
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
2
intentions and possible cooperation in a Japanese program; (4) an announce-
ment by South Africa that it intends to construct a uranium enrichment plant
based upon an as yet unrevealed technology; and (5) rumours of various
other dealings. Also, the fourth Geneva conference on peaceful uses of
atomic energy is coming up in September, and it is expected that both official
discussion and corridor talk will focus on uranium enrichment.
From the international standpoint, if we are to continue our leadership in
this area and hopefully influence developments toward a mutually beneficial
rationalization of uranium enrichment plans, we have no time to lose
regarding initiation of discussions with our allies. In view of the long
production lead-times and the time required for such negotiations, our allies
need to know our intentions soon for planning purposes.
I am fully aware of your desire to avoid commitments which would prejudice
future budget decisions. However, I believe the above international consid-
erations should be appropriately factored into your present reassessment
of our position and the other related issues.
Moreover, I would suggest that this reassessment be completed at the
earliest practicable date in order that we know where we stand and can
decide on the options open to us regarding foreign cooperation. If the
alternative is further delay, from an international view we may wish to
proceed to exploratory talks with our allies without the JCAE's blessing.
I would appreciate being informed of your conclusions. Colonel Robert M.
Behr will be handling this matter for me.
cc:
John Ehrlichman
Edward David
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION B3247 23247
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
April 12, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
BluB
FROM:
ROBERT M. BEHR/HELMUT SONNENF ELDT
15/AD
SUBJECT:
Breaking the Log Jam re Cooperation with
Allies in the Uranium Enrichment Field
Per your request (Tab B), below is a discussion of how we might break the
log jam caused by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy's (JCAE) refusal
to endorse our proposal to explore with our allies possible cooperation in
a multinational gaseous diffusion plant.
Background. AEC recently appeared before the JCAE to discuss again
uranium enrichment issues, including the President's decision authorizing
talks with EURATOM and other allies on possible cooperation.
The JCAE position remained firm: i.e., no endorsement of the sharing
proposal without Administration commitment to the cascade improvement/
cascade uprating programs (CIP/CUP) for the three US plants. CIP/CUP
would cost the government at least $200-$800 M over 5 or more years.
AEC's plan would cost $800 M and increase plant capacity by 50%. The
APR 20 1971
JCAE strongly favors early initiation of CIP.
The Administration considers commitment to CIP unnecessary for now as
plant capacity can be increased for the near-term by altering plant operating
conditions. Mr. Shultz had informed Dr. Seaborg that (1) the Administration
is not prepared to spend in FY 1971 or 1972 the $16 M already appropriated
for CIP at congressional initiative, and (2) no commitment could be given
now to initiation of CIP in the FY 1973 budget, However, OMB is undertaking
a reassessment of the Administration's position on these subjects.
We understand that Mr. Holifield would consider the Administration's release
of the $16 M sufficient evidence of a commitment to CIP. (These funds would
be used for the procurement of long lead-time items.)
Will Kriegsman (Domestic Council staff) would oppose releasing the $16 M
at this time unless it could result in a quid pro quo, (e.g., withdrawal of
intral'l implication
Mr. Holifield's opposition to the President's government reorganization
proposals). From the domestic standpoint, the primary benefit in our
remaining uncommittted to CIP/CUP is to use this "lever" to gain support for
other proposals. (This presupposes OMB approves CIP; if it does not, the
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
es
This document mla has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order and been to
Reproduced at
the Richard Nixon Presidential 13526 Library has DECLASSIFIED determined be declassified. infecting failure
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
2
political trade-offs would have to be even greater.) Will Kriegsman also
believes that proceeding on the CIP/CUP may not be entirely consistent with
the President's desire to transfer uranium enrichment functions to the
private sector at some future date.
Breaking Out of the Log Jam. There are two approaches to this impasse.
In brief, you could now ensure that relevant international factors are
considered in OMB's reassessment of the CIP/CUP issue. If OMB's review
confirms the decision that deferral of CIP/CUP is economically or otherwise
correct, we could then consider "bucking the JCAE."
"Bucking the JCAE" means initiating discussions with foreign countries
without the Committee's blessing. There is no procedural requirement by
which civil, as contrasted with military, cooperative agreements can be
overruled by the JCAE unless, of course, Congress passes a new law. But,
the JCAE holds hearings on agreements, is consulted often by AEC before
negotiations to avoid direct confrontation over a fully negotiated document,
and frequently exercises its will through extra-legal pressures.
Also, the JCAE would likely make life more difficult in implementing an
agreement which had not received its blessing earlier. Thus, the absence
of its blessing could lessen the attractiveness to other countries of our
initiative. (If it became necessary to consider this option, methods of
avoiding difficulties would deserve serious study.) "Bucking the JCAE" is
the more difficult option and, though not necessarily unrealistic, we view
it only as a possible last resort measure if no way out of the log jam appears.
For now, we believe the best course is to inform Mr. Shultz (proposed
memorandum at Tab A) that you hope (1) international considerations
(outlined in your memorandum) will be appropriately factored into OMB's
reassessment of the Administration's position on CIP; and (2) OMB's
reassessment can be completed soon as we have no time to lose from the
international standpoint. (Your memorandum does not, however, prejudge
the CIP issue.)
We have coordinated this matter at the staff level with the Domestic Council,
OST and OMB. JOHN LEHMAN CONCURS.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you initial the memorandum for Mr. Shultz at Tab A.
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION 23247
SECRET/SENSITIVE
April 2, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ROBERT M. BEHR
HELMUT SONNENFELDT
THROUGH: JEANNE DAVIS
FROM:
RICHARD T. KENNEDY RTK
On the attached package HAK has gone
along on your recommendation that we
continue the present course for now.
However, he would like to have an immediate
memorandum explaining how we can break
out of the log jam caused by the deal Congress
is demanding and the resistance of the
domestic staff. HAK has indicated that
he is willing to take on the domestic
staff if necessary, but wants to know how
and where we go from here so as to speed
things up.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
ocument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declas
MEMORANDUM
ACTION - 23247
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
March 23, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
ROBERT M. BEHR
RuB
HELMUT SONNENFELDT
SUBJECT:
French Proposal to Cooperate in Gaseous
Diffusion Study
Background
In September (1970), the President authorized exploratory talks with
EURATOM, the UK and, if requested, with other allies, on the possibility
of US assistance in the construction of a multinational gaseous diffusion
plant. Action on this was subject to the appropriate Congressional (Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy/JCAE) consultations.
There were initial discussions of the plan with the JCAE during the last
Congress, but no action was taken because the JCAE wanted more detail
and full committee review.
In his annual foreign policy report (February 25, 1971), the President
announced that the Administration has undertaken consultations with the
JCAE concerning ways in which we might assist our allies to construct
a multinational uranium enrichment plant to help meet future world
demands. Though there had been press speculation both here and abroad
regarding this decision, we are now on the record.
The JCAE considered the sharing proposal again on March 18 in executive
session and in the context of the overall uranium enrichment question: i.e.,
present US capacity will not meet domestic and foreign demand through the
1975-1985 time period. The JCAE earlier threatened to withhold endorse-
ment of the President's sharing proposal until the Administration agrees
to fund the AEC's $500-$800 million improvement program (CIP/CUP) for
existing plants. According to a debrief on the recent session, the JCAE
position remains firm: no endorsement without Administration com-
mitment to the CIP/CUP program. The FY 1972 budget has no funds for
the expansion program. However, the Administration has committed itself
to provide the product necessary to meet US demand and even additional
commitments to foreign programs for the next year. Mr. Schultz has
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
written Chairman Seaborg that though no funds for the improvement
program are included in the 1972 budget, the $16.1 million added by
Congress in 1971 will remain in OMB reserve.
We understand Mr. Holifield would consider the Administration's re-
lease of this $16.1 million as sufficient evidence of an Administration
commitment to AEC's plant expansion program. However, these funds
are for long leadtime items, or the first step in a $500-$800 million
program, and, according to Will Kriegsman, the domestic side of the
White House would oppose any such bargain with Mr. Holifield unless
it could result in a quid pro quo such as withdrawal of Holifield's oppo-
sition to the President's organizational proposals.
Mr. Schultz has also informed AEC that "there is at this time no intention
to refuse to accept domestic or foreign orders for enrichment services. "
However, OMB believes our production capacity should be increased for
the present by such methods as raising the amount of U-235 in the "tails"
or discarded waste rather than by an expensive plant expansion. Accepting
a higher percentage of U-235 as waste would allow our plants to process
more material because the final stages of the processing effort extract
relatively small quantities of U-235.
The Europeans know the President has authorized discussions on a co-
operative approach and that the Administration is in consultations with the
JCAE. They question longer-term US intentions regarding future supply
and the delay reinforces their doubts. There has therefore been a flurry
of actions by the Europeans to solve the longer-term problem by reducing
as substantially as possible European dependence on outside energy sources
(including Middle East oil).
French Proposal
With regard to the French proposal for bilateral cooperation in a technical
and economic feasibility study for a gaseous diffusion plant in Europe (pre-
sumably under EURATOM), we gave you (Tab B) two options:
- Agree to a bilateral study with the French; or
- Continue along present course toward exploratory talks with EURATOM,
its member states and the UK, combined with a special approach to the
French (i.e., while we would commit ourselves to close consultations
with the French, we would not bind ourselves to any bilateral arrangement).
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
You leaned (Tab B, Page 2) toward a bilateral study with the French, but
within the framework of Option 2, our exploratory talks with EURATOM.
Presumably this means talking with EURATOM about a community project
and simultaneously conducting a bilateral study with the French. You
requested a memorandum for the President's decision on this matter.
In the meantime:
- There has been no action regarding our approach to EURATOM in
light of the requirement for Congressional consultations.
- French officials have told the Australians that France plans to construct
a new diffusion plant for nuclear power fuel in France, though construc-
tion in Australia could not be excluded, and also made clear the French
interest in "joint" but not "multinational" ownership (Tab C).
- France has announced (Tab D) its decision to go ahead with a feasibility
study for a diffusion plant with eventual participation open to Western
European countries.
- France has contracted for Soviet supply of uranium enrichment services,
though down playing this "small contract" and noting its intention to
continue buying US enriched uranium (Tab E).
We recommended against a bilateral study with the French primarily on the
grounds that it could (1) seriously complicate if not undermine our approach
to EURATOM, and (2) easily be considered a direct siding with France a-
gainst the UK-Dutch-German centrifuge effort.
In light of recent events, we still feel that we should avoid being distracted
from our course now by a bilateral study with the French. We agree with
Brussels (Tab F) that time is of the essence if we are to assure that our
quasi-monopoly in supplying nuclear fuel is replaced by a mutually bene-
ficial rationalization of production capacity and market structures. The
alternative to a US initiative may be a chaotic, uncoordinated spate of
European enrichment efforts, possibly accompanied by a weakening of
safeguards.
A bilateral study with France could well contribute to rationalizing plans
with Paris and it would help currently bruised US-French relations. But
enriched uranium supply is very much a "community" concern shared
among many Europeans. Therefore, we believe our first priority is to get
along with our Congressional consultations and begin discussing this matter
in a European context. This would not preclude consideration of possible
bilateral approaches at a later date.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
However, if, in the light of recent adverse developments in US-French
relations, you still prefer to forward this matter to the President recom-
mending a bilateral study with the French, we suggest it best to have the
benefit of the Under Secretaries Committee's views since the Committee
(1) initially recommended the cooperative approach to EURATOM, and
(2) has the responsibility for implementing the President's "go ahead".
At Tab A is a memorandum requesting the Committee's views on the
French proposal and our options. There should be no trouble in meeting
the short time fuse for the USC report.
RECOMMENDATION:
That for the present we continue along our course toward discussions
with EURATOM, its member States and the UK on a rationalization of
the problem in a multinational context.
APPROVE RTK JAHK
DISAPPROVE
SEE ME
Alternatively:
1.
If you wish the USC's views on the French proposal before forwarding
it for the President's decision, the memorandum at Tab A requests a
USC report.
2. If you wish to forward the French proposal for the President's decision
now without the benefit of the USC's views, the memorandum for the
President at Tab A (1) sets forth the options with their advantages and
disadvantages and recommends that he approve a bilateral arrangement
with the French.
Attachments
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3/23
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
23247
ACTION
SECRET/SENSITIVE
March 19, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
ROBERT M. BEHR
RuB
HELMUT SONNENFELDT
SUBJECT:
French Proposal to Cooperate in Gaseous
Diffusion Study
Background
In September (1970), the President authorized exploratory talks with
EURATOM, the UK and, if requested, with other allies, on the possibility
of US assistance in the construction of a multinational gaseous diffusion
plant. Action on this was subject to the appropriate Congressional (Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy/JCAE) consultations.
There were initial discussions of the plan with the JCAE during the last
Congress, but no action was taken because the JCAE wanted more detail
and full committee review.
In his annual foreign policy report (February 25, 1971), the President
announced that the Administration has undertaken consultations with the
JCAE concerning ways in which we might assist our allies to construct
a multinational uranium enrichment plant to help meet future world
demands. Though there had been press speculation both here and abroad
regarding this decision, we are now on the record.
The JCAE, now under Senator Pastore rather than Representative Holifield,
considered the sharing proposal again yesterday (March 18) in executive
session and in the context of the overall uranium enrichment question: i.e.,
present capacity will not meet domestic and foreign demand through the
1975-1985 time period. The JCAE earlier threatened to withhold endorse-
ment of the Presi 'ent's sharing proposal until he Administration agrees
to fund the AEC's $500-$800 million improvement program (CIP/CUP) for
existing plants. According to preliminary debrief on yesterday's session,
the JCAE position remains firm: no endorsement without Administration
commitment to the CIP/CUP program. (Mr. Holifield was in the chair.)
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
The FY 1972 budget has no funds for the expansion program. However,
the Administration has committed itself to provide the product necessary
to meet US demand and even additional commitments to foreign programs
for the next year. Mr. Schultz has written Chairman Seaborg that though
no funds for the improvement program are included in the 1972 budget,
the $16. 1 million added by Congress in 1971 will remain in OMB reserve.
Moreover, "there is at this time no intention to refuse to accept additional
domestic or foreign orders for enrichment services. Whatever steps are
necessary will be taken to assure that enriching capacity is available to
meet these commitments."
The Europeans know what is going on and question US intentions regarding
future supply. There has therefore been a flurry of actions by the Europeans
to solve the longer-term problem by reducing as substantially as possible
European dependence on outside energy sources (including Middle East oil).
French Proposal
With regard to the French proposal for bilateral cooperation in a technical
and economic feasibility study for a gaseous diffusion plant in Europe
(presumably under EURATOM), we gave you (Tab B) two options:
Agree to a bilateral study with the French; or
Continue along present course toward exploratory talks with
EURATOM, its member states and the UK, combined with a
special approach to the French (i.e., while we would commit
ourselves to close consultations with the French, we would not
bind ourselves to any bilateral arrangement).
You leaned (Tab B, Page 2) toward a bilateral study with the French, but
within the framework of Option 2, our exploratory talks with EURATOM.
Presumably this means talking with EURATOM about a community project
and simultaneously conducting a bilateral study with the French. You
requested a memorandum for the President's decision on this matter.
In the meantime:
There has been no action regarding our approach to EURATOM in
light of the requirement for Congressional consultations.
French officials have told the Australians that France plans to
construct a new diffusion plant for nuclear power fuel in France,
SECRET/SENSETHME at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
though construction in Australia could not be excluded, and also
made clear the French interest in "joint" but not "multinational"
ownership (Tab C).
France has announced (Tab D) its decision to go ahead with a
feasibility study for a diffusion plant with eventual participation
open to Western European countries.
France has contracted for Soviet supply of uranium enrichment
services, though down playing this "small contract" and noting
its intention to continue buying US enriched uranium (Tab E).
We recommended against a bilateral study with the French primarily on the
grounds that it could (1) seriously complicate if not undermine our approach
to EURATOM, and (2) easily be considered a direct siding with France
against the UK-Dutch-German centrifuge effort.
In light of recent events, we still feel that we should avoid being distracted
from our course now by a bilateral study with the French. We agree with
Brussels (Tab F) that time is of the essence if we are to assure that our
quasi-monopoly in supplying nuclear fuel is replaced by a mutually beneficial
rationalization of production capacity and market structures. The alternative
to a US initiative may be a chaotic, uncoordinated spate of European enrich-
ment efforts, possibly accompanied by a weakening of safeguards.
A bilateral study with France could well contribute to rationalizing plans
with Paris and it would help currently bruised US-French relations. But
enriched uranium supply is very much a "community" concern shared
among many Europeans. Therefore, we believe our first priority is to get
along with our Congressional consultations and begin discussing this matter
in a European context. This would not preclude consideration of possible
bilateral approaches at a later date.
However, if, in the light of recent adverse developments in US-French
relations, you still prefer to forward this matter to the President recommend-
ing a bilateral study with the French, we suggest it best to have the benefit
of the Under Secretaries Committee's views since that Committee (1)
initially recommended the cooperative approach to EURATOM, and (2) has
the responsibility for implementing the President's "go ahead". At Tab A
is a memorandum requesting the Committee's views on the French proposal
and our options. There should be no trouble in meeting the short time fuse
for the USC report.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
RECOMMENDATION:
That for the present we continue along our course toward discussions
with EURATOM, its member States and the UK on a rationalization of
the problem in a multinational context.
Alternatively:
1.
If you wish the USC's views on the French proposal before forwarding
it for the President's decision, the memorandum at Tab A requests a
USC report.
2.
You wish a memorandum for the President's decision on the French
proposal now without the benefit of the USC's views
.
Attachments
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/EXDIS
MEMORANDUM FOR
CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT:
French Proposal to Cooperate in Gaseous
Diffusion Feasibility Study
In order that the French proposal for a bilateral economic and technical
feasibility study regarding a gaseous diffusion plant in Western Europe
can be presented to the President for his consideration, the NSC Under
Secretaries Committee should conduct an analysis of the proposal and
the alternative responses open to us with their relevant advantages and
disadvantages. Meanwhile, however, this project should in no way slow
up the process of going forward with the President's decision regarding
the necessary Congressional consultations on exploratory talks with
EURATOM and the UK on the possibility of our cooperating in the
construction of a multinational gaseous diffusion plant.
The fact and purpose of this review should be closely held with limited
distribution. The report and recommendations of the Under Secretaries
Committee should be forwarded for consideration by the President not
later than April 22, 1971.
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
ACTION - 23247
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
French Proposal to Cooperate in Uranium
Enrichment Program
Background
In September, 1970, you authorized exploratory talks with EURATOM,
its member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands), the UK and, if requested, with other allies on the possibility
of assisting in the construction of a multinational gaseous diffusion plant
to help meet future world demand for enriched uranium to fuel nuclear
power reactors. Action on this was subject to appropriate consultations
with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE).
Initial consultations were held with the JCAE last Congress, but the
Committee requested more detail and full committee review before any
overtures were made to the Europeans.
The JCAE recently considered the sharing proposal in executive session
in the context of the overall uranium enrichment question: i.e., present
US capacity will not meet domestic and foreign demand through the 1975-
1985 time period. As Alex Johnson reported to you, the JCAE position
remains firm that they will not endorse the sharing proposal without some
commitment to AEC's $500-$800 million improvement program for ex-
isting plants. This is in spite of the fact that we were already committed
to provide the product necessary to meet US demand and some additional
commitments to foreign programs by alternative means during FY 1972.
State and AEC are now acting to remove this impasse.
The Europeans know you have approved a cooperative approach and that
we are now in consultations with the JCAE. They question the longer-
term US intentions regarding future supply and the delay with the JCAE
reinforces their doubts. There has been a flurry of actions by the
Europeans to solve the longer-term problem by reducing as substantially
as possible European dependence on outside energy sources (including
US enriched uranium and Middle East oil).
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
French Proposal
Ambassador Lucet has approached me with a proposal (memorandum
attached) for US-French bilateral cooperation in a technical and economic
feasibility study for a gaseous diffusion plant in Europe (presumably tied
in with EURATOM).
There are two options:
Option 1. Agree to a bilateral study with the French.
The principal advantage in this approach would be the political
benefits of accommodating the French at a time when our relations are
bruised by such matters as our refusal to give COCOM approval for France
to sell integrated circuit technology to Poland.
A bilateral project would have definite practical advantages for
the French by enabling them to update their diffusion technology. More
advanced technology or an additional facility would put them in a better
commercially competitive position vis-a-vis the UK-Dutch-Germany
centrifuge effort and the UK's diffusion technology.
On the other hand, a bilateral arrangement could reduce our
flexibility in structuring a broader EURATOM agreement. It would also
complicate and possibly undermine our planned initiative regarding
exploratory talks with EURATOM and other multinational cooperative
efforts in the diffusion area.
Moreover, such a bilateral arrangement might appear in the
eyes of other EURATOM members as a direct challenge to the ongoing
UK-Dutch-German centrifuge development effort, and would not necessarily
contribute to a mutually beneficial rationalization of production capacity and
market structures within the "community" context.
We would gain little in technological terms from such a project
with France. Also, we can expect stronger opposition from the JCAE
toward a bilateral deal than they have exhibited toward our proposed
multinational project.
Option 2. Continue along present course toward exploratory talks with
EURATOM, its member States and the UK, combined with a
special approach to the French.
This option would have the advantage of avoiding the pitfalls
mentioned above of a bilateral arrangement, but would not preclude
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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HAILLISNES/LTHOTS
3
close consultations with the French as we approach EURATOM and the
other members. This option also would not preclude consideration of
possible bilateral approaches at a later date depending upon the outcome
of the discussions with EURATOM regarding a multinational effort.
On the other hand, turning down France's offer for a joint
feasibility study could exacerbate our already bruised relations. In fact,
France has announced its decision to go ahead with a feasibility study
with or without us and with eventual participation open to Western European
countries.
RECOMMENDATION:
In the light of recent adverse developments in US-French relations, I
recommend that we accept the French proposal for a joint feasibility
study. Our action in this regard would, of course, be subject to Congressional
consultations.
If you approve, I will inform State and AEC of your decision in order that
the necessary consultations and planning can begin.
Approve Bilateral with France
Disapprove Bilateral, Continue along Present Course in
Multinational Context
See Me
HAILISNES/LTHOTS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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FILE : VE(FRANCE
LE MINISTRE
DES
Paris, March 16, 1970
AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES
ilerkmitt ilerk
MEMORANDUM
Sennerfald
Outlook for Franco-American Cooperation
in the Field of Isotope Separation
The rapidly increasing construction of nuclear
power plants using enriched uranium as fuel for the
production of electricity naturally leads the European
countries to give thought to their future supply of this fuel.
The idea has therefore developed in various quarters that
additional facilities for the separation of isotopes could
be installed in Europe. Recent initiatives have confirmed
that trend of thought. In the late Spring of 1969, the
Common Market Commission recommended that this problem should
be approached on an European Economic Community basis ; the
President of the French Republic expressed his interest in the
matter on the occasion of the Conference at The Hague ;
and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs developed the
concept further on March 6, 1970, at Brussels. On the other
hand, three of the European countries Grat Britain, The
Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany - have decided
to pool their efforts to develop the ultracentrifuge process.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
...
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2.
Unlike the British Government, wich has ceased to
manifest any interest in the gaseous diffusion method, the
French Government is continuing its research in this method,
in the belief that is can still be greatly improved. The
experience acquired by the Americans in this field is very
wide, while that of the French is more limited although far
from negligible ; it is more than likely that discussion by
both countries of their own experience might prove to be
fruitful for both of them.
In this spirit, American and French authorities
could undertake a technical and economical study intended
to show the feasibility of a plant for isotope separation
by gaseous diffusion capable, in particular, of supplying the
European market, the capital and operating costs to be
appraised on the basis of prevailing economic conditions in
Western Europe. A study of this kind, if its results proved
to be positive, could then serve as a basis for the joint
preparation of a project for the construction of a plant
which would quite naturally come within the scope of the
common actions provided for in the EURATOM treaty.
Under these conditions, the output of the plant
would be subject to official controls to ensure its use for
peaceful purposes. Its location in France would provide all
the necessary assurances as to the preservation of technolo-
gical secrets relating to the design of the plant and the
production of its essential parts.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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MEMORANDUM
ACTION 23247
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
November 25, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Robert M. Behr/Helmut Sonnenteldt
HK
SUBJECT: Recommended Course Re Handling French Proposal
moter
to Cooperate in Gaseous Diffusion Study
(See
You will recall that Helmut Sonnenfeldt, at your request (Tab A), asked
(Tab B) the French Ambassador about the apparent difference in the note
he left with you on April 13 and the subsequent French approach to State on
the matter of cooperation on a gaseous diffusion plant. Lucet said to you
that he had proposed bilateral cooperation in a technical and economic
feasibility study, which could then serve as a basis for a joint US/French
proposal to EURATOM. The resulting project would be under EURATOM.
The French overture to State was put, at the outset, in the context of a
multinational arrangement.
Lucet said the French are still awaiting our response. There are
essentially two alternatives:
Option 1. Agree to bilateral study with French.
The only advantage we see in this approach would be the political
gesture of accommodating the French.
On the other hand, a bilateral arrangement could reduce our flexi-
bility in structuring a broader EURATOM agreement. In the event of
a joint proposal, we would have to reach agreement with the French
on all of the basic terms before approaching EURATOM. This
approach could complicate our initiative regarding exploratory
talks with EURATOM. Moreover, it might appear in the eyes of
other EURATOM members as a direct challenge to the ongoing
(UK-German-Dutch) centrifuge development effort.
Option 2. Continue along present course toward exploratory talks with
EURATOM and the UK, combined with a special approach to the
French.
While this option would not accommodate the French proposal made
to you, it would avoid the pitfalls of a strictly bilateral arrangement
and would not preclude a "special" approach to the French as we
approach EURATOM and the other members.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
As soon as consultations with the Joint Committee are completed,
we intend to approach EURATOM and its member states. We would
apprise the French that this matter has been under study within the
US Government for some time and we agree with France (1) that
US-European cooperation in a multinational diffusion plant is worthy
of serious consideration and that (2) EURATOM would provide a good
framework for such possible cooperation. We would also mention
that we attach importance to close cooperation with the French as this
undertaking evolves in Europe.
We think it best to avoid at this time any hints that we are considering a
special, exclusive bilateral study with the French. (The President's
decision proceeded along the basis that any approach to Europe would be
multilateral, not bilateral. The multilateral approach we have now in
mind would be consistent with the line the French took at State.) Moreover,
we should not advise the French of our decision to approach EURATOM
until consultations with the Joint Committee are completed.
RECOMMENDATION:
We recommend against a special bilateral approach with the French. We
believe we should respond to the French proposal as outlined in Option 2
above when we are ready to begin exploratory talks. In the meantime, if
asked about proposed bilateral cooperation, we should respond only that
the whole subject of uranium enrichment policy is still under study within
the US Government.
Approve Recommended Course
Disapprove Recommended Course
Prepare Memorandum for President's Decision
PK
2 lean towards bilated
study girl Frend in plin 2
framemark If
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEPA OF STATE
C
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
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IAEA
SUBJ: FRENCH INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR URANIUM
ENRICHMENT
10 IN CONVERSATION WITH GLENNAN, TIMBS (AUSTRALIAN AEC) (PROTECT
SOURCE), WHO HERE FOR MEETING BOARD GOVERNORS, VOLUNTEERED REPORT
ON HIS AND ALAN WILSON'S RECENT VISIT PIERRELATTE GASEOUS DIFFUSION
PLANT.
2. TIMBS AND WILSON WERE GIVEN RED CARPET TREATMENT AT
ALL STAGES, CULMINATING IN DISCUSSION SUBJECT WITH GIRAUD, IN
PRESENCE CURIEN, WHO HAS REPLACED JACQUES MARTAIN IN FOREIGN MINISTRY.
3. AT PIERRELATTE, THEY WERE SHOWN*EVERYTHING EXCEPT
THE BARRIER" IN THREE OF FOUR SECTIONS OF PLANT, INCLUDING
TOP. THIRD SECTION 15 TO 20 PERCENT U-235) WAS AVAILABLE
FOR VISIT AS WELL IF VISITORS INTERESTED. TIMBS DESCRIBED
PLANT AS BEAUTIFULLY AUTOMATED AND WAS OBVIOUSLY
IMPRESSED WITH ENTIRE SHOW, ESPECIALLY SERIOUS INTEREST
FRENCH.
CONFIDENTIAL
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 01196 251506Z
4. FRENCH INFORMED TIMBS THEY PLANNED BUILD NEW
GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT FOR PRODUCTION POWER REACTOR
FUELS NEW PLANT PROPOSED BE BUILT IN FRANCE, BUT COULD
BE BUILT IN AUSTRALIA OR OTHER SUITABLE FOREIGN COUNTRY
OFFERING ADEQUATE SUPPLY URANIUM AND OTHER CONDITIONS
SUCH AS AVAILABILITY POWER AT REASONABLE COST.
5. FRENCH INTERESTED IN JOINT OWNERSHIP PLANT, BUT NOT
RPT NOT IN MULTINATIONAL OWNERSHIP. WHEN TIMBS RAISED
QUESTION RE POSSIBILITY JAPAN AS THIRD PARTY, FRENCH
SAID THEY HAD NO OBJECTION JAPANESE PUTTING UP PART OF
CAPITAL TO BE REPAID BY FUTURE DELIVERIES OF PRODUCT,
BUT APPARENTLY WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE INTERESTED IN JARANESE
VOICE IN MANAGEMENT.
6. PLANNED PLANT TO HAVE CAPACITY SIX MILLION UNITS
SEPARATIVE WORK. CAPITAL COST WOULD BE GUARANTEED NOT
RPT NOT EXCEED $110 PER UNIT AND COULD BE AS LOW AS $90.
7. ACCORDING TO FRENCH, COST OF SEPARATIVE WORK, WITH
AMORTIZATION AND DEPRECIATION AT 18 PERCENT, INCLUDING
INTEREST AT 8 PERCENT, AND POWER 12500 MW) AT 6 MILLS PER KWH,
WOULD BE ABOUT $25, WITH MAXIMUM OF $27.50 PER KILOGRAM.
8. TIMS SAID WOULD BE DELIGHTED MAKE SIMILAR VISIT
TO US: HE DEPARTS VIENNA FOR AUSTRALIA FRIDAY AFTERNOON.
GLENNAN
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 28 Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT 1818 OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
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AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
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USMISSION EC BRUSSELS UNN
AEC GERMANTOWN UNN
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS 4012
SUBJECT: GOF ANNOUNCES FEASIBILITY SURVEY OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION
PLANT
REF: STATE 40402
1. FRENCH PRESS MARCH 11 AND 12 CARRIED REPORTS OF PRESS
CONFERENCE MARCH 11 AT PIERRELATTE BY FRENCH ATOMIC ENERGY
ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL GIRAUD WHERE LATTER ANNOUNCED GOF DECISION TO
GO AHEAD
WITH FEASIBILITY STUDY OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION ENRICHMENT PLANT
OF 5 TO 6 MILLION UNITS CAPACITY COSTING 3 TO 3.5. BILLION FRANCS
($540 - $630 MILLION) AND CONSUMING ABOUT 204 MILLION KILOWATTS.
STUDY WILL BE PERFORMED BY TECHNIP, ENGINEERING SUBSIDIARY
OF GOVT-OWNED INSTITUTE FRANCAISE DE PETROLES AND BECHTEL
FRANCE, TOTALLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF BECHTEL CORPORATION OF
SAN FRANCISCO. PARTICIPATION IN EVENTUAL PLANT WILL BE OPEN TO
"EUROPEAN" COUNTRIES. SURVEY ENVISAGES FRENCH SITE AND IS TO BE
COMPLETED BY END 1972. GIRAUD SAID FRANCE WILL CONSIDER
CONSTRUCTION ALONE IF NECESSARY.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF MEMBER
TELEGRAM
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2. AEC REP AND EMBOFF FOLLOWED UP ANNOUNCEMENT MARCH 12 WITH
AUGUSTINE ALLINE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIAL IN CHARGE
ATOMIC ENERGY MATTERS. ALLINE CONFIRMED ACCURACY GIRAUD'S
REMARKS AND SAID THAT MFA HAD PARTICIPATED IN POLICY DECISION.
HE ALSO CLARIFIED WHAT GIRAUD MEANT BY "EUROPEAN" PARTICIPATION:
ALL EUROPEAN NATIONS ELIGIBLE EXCEPT USSR AND EE.
3. ALLINE MADE FOLLOWING REMARKS ON DECISION: (A) POMPIDOU
HAD MADE DECLARATION AT DEC 1969 HAGUE SUMMIT PUTTING GOE ON
RECORD FAVORING JOINT EUROPEAN ATOMIC EFFORT. SINCE THEN,
LITTLE PROGRESS MADE AND GOF IN VIEW FEB 26 DECISIONS BY
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO ACCELERATE REACTOR PROGRAM HAS DECIDED
TO MOVE AHEAD. (B) GOF PLANS CONSULT WITH EURATOM BUT HAS
NEVER CONSIDERED THAT EURATOM MIGHT BE IN CHARGE OF PROJECT.
ORGANIZATION HAS NO REAL INCOME: IS LIMITED TO SIX,
SOME OF WHOM IN ANY EVENT ARE INTERESTED IN COMPETING CENTRIFUGE
PROJECT:
AND EURATOM AS RESEARCH ORGANIZATION NOT SUITABLE FOR
OPERATIONAL REVENUE PRODUCING TASKS. (C) OTHER ELEMENTS IN
GOF DECISION WERE LACK OF RESPONSE FROM US TO ITS SUGGESTION
SHARING ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY AND DELAYS IN US CONSIDERATION
WHETHER AND HOW TO EXPAND ENRICHMENT CAPACITY. GIRAUD WILL
BE DISCUSSING THIS AND RELATED MATTERS DURING HIS VISIT TO
AEC NEXT WEEK.
4. PRESS COVERAGE HAS BEEN COPIOUS AND LARGELY FAVORABLE.
HOWEVER, PRESTIGIOUS LE MONDE IN FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL MAR. 13
EDITION POINTS OUT DIFFICULTIES. (A) CAPACITY WILL EXCEED
FRENCH NEEDS WHILE BEST POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS ARE WORKING ON
COMPETING CENTRIFUGE PROJECT. (B) COULD NOT US EASILY EXPAND
OUTPUT TO RETAIN EUROPEAN MARKET? (C) EVEN IF ALL GOES FOR
BEST PROJECT WILL BE ENORMOUSLY EXPENSIVE AND REQUIRE HIGH
PRICES. (D) FINALLY, GERMANS WILL PROBABLY WANT HIGH PRICE
FOR PARTICIPATION. GOF LET CHANCE SLIP THROUGH ITS HANDS
FOREVER BY NOT MAKING ITS PROPOSITION THREE YEARS SOONER.
DECON 12/31/73
WATSON
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
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LIMDIS
SUBJECT: SOVIET ENRICHMENT FRENCH URANIUM
REF: PARIS 3746
10 AEC REP AND EMBOFF DISCUSSED SOVIET CONTRACT PROVIDE ENRICHED
URANIUM SERVICES WITH ALLINE, IN CHARGE OF ATOMIC AFFAIRS, MFA,
ON MARCH 12.
20 ALLINE SAID THAT FRENCH DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH SOVIETS
HAD SEVERAL ELEMENTS: FIRST, US PRICES HAD BEEN INCREASED TWICE
AT TIME WHEN SOVIETS ARE ON RECORD AS STATING THEY PREPARED
OFFER ENRICHMENT SERVICES SECOND, GOF STILL REGRETS FOLD DOWN
US-FRENCH BILATERAL AGREEMENT IN FAVOR OF PASSING ENRICHMENT
SERVICES THROUGH EURATOM. ALLINE HINTED THAT IF US AND FRANCE
STILL HAD APPROPRIATE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS GOF MIGHT STILL
BE PURCHASING FROM US. FINALLY, TRANSACTION WAS ON A PURELY
COMMERCIAL BASIS.
3 ᵉ WE ASKED ALLINE ABOUT PRICE. HE SAID THIS INFORMATION OF
COURSE CONFIDENTIAL AND COULD NOT BE FURNISHED. HOWEVER, HE
NOTEDTHAT SINCE TRANSACTION WAS COMMERCIAL THE PRICE COULD
NOT BE FAR FROM US ENRICHMENT PRICE.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
24
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED THE STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 PARIS 04011 121809Z
40 AT DINNER WITH EMBOFF MARCH 9, FONMIN SCHUMANN'S DEPUTY
CABINET DIRECTOR CUVILLIER ATTEMPTED TO DOWNPLAY SIGNIFIGANCE
OF RECENTLY CONCLUDED "VERY SMALL CONTRACT" FOR SOVIET SUPPLY
OF ENRICHED URANIUM SERVICES. AT SAME TIME, CUVILLIER EMPHASIZED
FRENCH INTENTION TO CONTINUE PURCHASES OF ENRICHED URANIUM FROM
US. GP-3
WATSON
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
14
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
ANDERSON
/
BEHR
CONFIDENTIAL 743
BERGSTEN
CHAPIN
PAGE 01 EC BRU 00878 161130Z
DRIDGE
18
FILE
T
KENNEDY
GUIIN
LEHMAN
ACTION SCI-06
NACHMANOFF
ROBINSON
INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 I0-13 ACDA=19 CIAE-00 INR-08 L-04
RONDON
SAUNDERS
NSAE-00 NSC-10 OST-01 RSC-01 SS-20 H-02 RSR-01 SMITH P=03
SMYSER
PRS-01 USIA-12 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /122 W
SONNENFELDT
WRIGHT
056313
OR 160955Z MAR 71
FM USMISSION EC BRUSSELS:
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2725
AEC GERMANTOWN 67
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS UNNI
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION OECD PARIS UNN
CONFIDENTIALEC BRUSSELS 878
POLICY
SUBJECT: US=EUROPEAN COOPERATION ON URANIUM ENRICHMENT
REFS: A) PARIS 4012 B) BONN 2986 C ) STATE 40402
1.
SUMMARY: IT IS APPARENT THAT INTERMITTENT OIL CRISES IN THE
PERSIAN GULF AND NORTH AFRICA TOGETHER WITH THE UNANTICIPATED SURGE
IN DEMAND FOR ELECTRIC POWER WITHIN THE PAST YEAR, ARE REINFORCING
WEST EUROPEAN DETERMINATION TO REDUCE AS RAPIDLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY
AS POSSIBLE RUEOPEAN LONGTERM DEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDE ENERGY SOURCES.
IN A NUCLEAR FUEL CONTEXT (LEAVING ASIDE PROSPECTS FOR COAL AND
NATURAL GASI, THIS VIEW IS ACCENTUATED BY A GROWING LOSS OF
CONFIDENCE IN THE US AS A RELIABLE SOURCE OF SUPPLY THE EUROPEAN
ATTITUDE IS EVIDENCE BY THE RECENT INCREASE IN THE TEMPO, MAGNITUDE
AND NUMBER OF INITIATIVES DEVOTED a TO FINDING ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF
SUPPLY TO THE US AND BUILDING UP EUROPE'S OWN URANIUM ENRICHMENT
CAPABILITY FOR THE LONGER TERM. SO FAR AS US POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIALI
PAGE 02 EC BRU 00878 161130Z
INTERESTS ARE CONCERNED, TIME IS BECOMING OF THE ESSENCE IF THE US
WISHES TO USE ITS WASTING TECHNOLOGICAL ASSET OF ADVANCED GASEOUS
DIFFUSION TECHNOLOGY TO ASSURE THAT ITS QUASI-MONOPOLY IN SUPPLYING
NUCLEAR FUEL IS REPLACED BY A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RATIONALIZATION OF
PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND MARKET STRUCTURES UNDER EFFECTIVE SAFE-
GUARDS CONTROL. THE ALTERNATIVE TO A SIGNIFICANT US INITIATIVE
COULD WELL BE A CHAOTIC, UNCOORDINATED SPATE OF EUROPEAN
ENRICHMENT EFFORTS, POSSIBLY ACCOMPANIED BY A WEAKENING OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. MOREOVER, AN UNDULY GREAT DEPEND-
ENCE ON SOVIET ENRICHMENT SERVICES IN THE EVENT OF INSUFFICIENT
ASSURANCES OF EUROPEAN OR US PRODUCTION CAPACITY CANNOT BE RULED
OUT. END SUMMARY.
2. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY OFFICIALS
BEAR WITNESS TO THE EUROPEAN DISQUIET. MORE IMPORTANT, RECENT AND
PROSPECTIVE ACTIONS OF THE FRENCH, GERMANS AND OTHER WEST EUROPEANS
PROVIDE CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF THIS DEVELOPING TREND. RECENT FRENCH
NOTIFICATION OF THEIR PURCHASE OF ENRICHMENT SERVICES FROM THE
SOVIET UNION SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO THE LACK OF
RESPONSE FROM THE US TO THE SUGGESTED SHARING OF ENRICHMENT
TECHNOLOGY AND DELAYS IN US CONSIDERATION WHETHER AND HOW TO
EXPAND ENRICHMENT CARACITY (PARIS 40121. SIMILARLY, THE GERMANS
HAVE MADE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR THAT A KEY ELEMENT IN PLANNING AND
SCHEDULING FOR NEW EUROPEAN ENRICHMENT CAPACITY IS THE BELIEF THAT
US' ENRICHMENT CAPACITY WILL BE INADEQUATE TO MEET FORECASTED
EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS (BONN 29861.
3.
WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION AS A COMPETING SOURCE OF SUPPLY,
ATTENTION HAS BEEN FOCUSED FOR SOME TIME ON THE SWEDES AND GERMANS
AS POSSIBLE CUSTOMERS FOR SOVIET ENRICHING SERVICES. WHILE
GERMAN OFFICIALS HAVE CONSISTENTLY DOWNPLAYED SUCH SUGGESTIONS,
OUR FEELING IS THAT THE GERMAN CONSTRAINT MAY HAVE FLOWED PRIMARILY
FROM A RELUCTANCE TO BEING THE FIRST IN THE WEST TO CONTRACT WITH
THE SOVIETS IN THIS POLITICALLY SENSITIVE AREA. GIVEN THE RECENT
RG=SOVIET AGREEMENT ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, WITH BOTH SIDES
TRYING TO FIND APPROPRIATE AREAS FOR COOPERATION, IT WOULD NOT BE
TOO SURPRISING TO FIND THE GERMANS FOLLOWING THE FRENCH LEAD IN
PURCHASING SOVIET ENRICHMENT SERVICES IN THE ABSENCE OF MORE MEAN-
INGFUL US ASSURANCES ON SUPPLY OR ENRICHMENT COOPERATION
40 US AND EUROPEAN ATTITUDES AND DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING NUCLEAR
FUELI SUPPLY POLICIES, MARKET PROJECTIONS, PLANNED NEW OR IMPROVED
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 EC BRU 00878 161130Z
PRODUCTION FACILITIES, ETC., HAVE AN OBVIOUS INTER-RELATIONSHIP
AND THEY ALL HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE EXISTING UNCERTAINTY IN THE
US AND EUROPE ABOUT OVERALLIDEMANDS ON US AND PROSPECTIVE EUROPEAN
URANIUM ENRICHING CAPACITY FOR THE PERIOD 1975-85. ACCORDINGLY,
WE URGE THAT THE US PROCEED PROMPTLY TO EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS
WITH MAJOR EUROPEAN CONSUMERS IN AN EFFORT TO RATIONALIZE THE
GLOBAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND PICTURE. THESE TALKS, WHICH NEED NOT
INVOLVE A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT FOR SHARING US TECHNOLOGY ABROAD
COULD BOTH CLARIFY THE EXTEND TO WHICH OVERSEAS CONSUMERS ARE
WILLING TO REDUCE TO CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS THEIR FORESEEABLE
REQUIREMENTS FOR US ENRICHING SERVICES AND CRYSTALLIZE TO A
SIGNIFICANT DEGREE THEIR PLANS AND HOPES FOR CONSTRUCTING ADDITIONAL
ENRICHING CAPABILITIES EITHER INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COOPERATION WITH
THE US. THIS MIGHT PERMIT THE US TO DECIDE ON A TIMELY BASIS THE
NATURE AND DEGREE OF ASSURANCES ON SUPPLY AND/OR COOPERATION ABROAD
WHICH WE WOULD WANT TO PROVIDE. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD MINIMIZE THE
RISK THAT ADDITIONAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY WOULD BE BUILT PREMATURELY
IN THE US OR OVERSEAS AND WOULD ASSURE A BETTER BASIS FOR DECIDING
ON THE OPTIMUM SCHEDULE FOR ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR CIP/CUP.
GP-3
ABRAMS
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
11/28
BOB/TOM:
Remember the Uranium Enrichment
and the French Ambassador (23247)
(Hak had signed a memo tb Johnson
at State on 11/23 and that was M/f)?
Well, here is more. That package
had two folders -- one from Behr
(Johnson letter) and this one from
Sonnenfeldt (an info memo).
Accordingly, this should be micfofilmed
and sent to PAFILES and added to the
already-started set of cards for 23247.
But, the fun isn't over. On 11/25,
another memo from Behr/Sonnenfeldt
was sent to Hak for decision and so
far it hasn't crome back to us. Since
the suspense had a typed duplicate
log ticket (which I think you may have
done) I have left it in suspense and
have taken out this "part from Sonnenfeldt".
Understand? If questions, ask me. If
I understnad, I'll explain.
Craig.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
ument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decl
MEMORANDUM
23247
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
November 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
HK
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt to
SUBJECT:
Conversation with the French Ambassador: (1) Gaseous
Diffusion; (2) Integrated Circuits.
As instructed, I asked the French Ambassador today about the apparent
difference in the note he had handed you on April 13 and the subsequent
approach of the French Minister to State on the matter of cooperation on
a gaseous diffusion plant.
Lucet said that his approach to you was intended to propose bilateral
cooperation in a feasibility study (and other relevant studies) which would
then serve as a basis for a proposal for a joint US-French project. The
actual project, however, would be under EURATOM, as mentioned in the
French approach to State. I said this clarified the matter for me. Lucet
said the French were still awaiting our response.
(NOTE: Bob Behr will shortly send you a joint memorandum on this
with suggestions on how we might proceed.)
Lucet also referred to the French request for our support in COCOM on
the export of integrated circuits to Poland. He mentioned that a French
delegation had just been here and had seen Trezise and Wright from State
and Mountain from Defense. Lucet said that the discussions had been very
full and frank and Trezise had intimated that a US official might come to
Paris to determine whether a distinction could be made between civilian
and military applications of these circuits. Lucet stressed that this was
a matter of great importance to his Government and that Schumann had
mentioned it to Secretary Rogers, in addition to the approach that was
made to the White House. I said I had not yet heard from State regarding
the conversations with the French delegation; but the matter would of
course be given full consideration. Lucet stated that he had mentioned
the subject to you recently and hoped that you could again intervene in
France's behalf, as you did last year.
CC: Col. Behr
Fred Bergsten
SECRET/SENSTVE at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
1970
HAK has seen
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
23247
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Action November 4, 1970
we
@
SECRET/SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
I Lave theirpy
RUB
FROM:
Robert M. Behr/Helmut Sonnenfeldt
$
that Len talking
SUBJECT: Cooperation with the French on Gaseous Diffusion
bilaterally pleaseping Hal
down
On a recent memo relating to French computer technology and COCOM
controls, you penned a note requesting a status report on Lucet's inquiry
concerning cooperation on a gaseous diffusion plant (Tab A). Lucet left
an aide-memoire with you on this April 13 which suggested (though did
not explicitly state) a bilateral US-French cooperative project (Tab B).
You subsequently phoned Lucet and told him to take up the matter with
NOV 13 1970
State. When the French Charge went to State on April 21 (Herman Pollack,
SCI), the French pitch was very much altered in tone, and was geared to
a multilateral EURATOM approach (Tab C). In response, Pollack could
only advise the French that the basic policy on the export of diffusion
technology was under review, and there could be no response to the French
approach until that broader issue was decided.
Consideration of the broader question of export of diffusion technology
culminated with the President's decision of September 14 (Tab D) by which
he approved the commencement of exploratory talks with the Commission
of the EC, the member states of EURATOM and the UK on the possibility
of assisting in the construction of a multinationally owned and operated
diffusion plant. This decision proceeded on the basis that any approach
would be multilateral not bilateral, and so any prospect of a special exclusive
bilateral arrangement with France was not seriously considered. But,
this multilateral approach would be consistent with the line the French took
at State.
The President's mid-September approval was subject to appropriate con-
sultation with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. On this point a snag
has developed. Congressman Holifield and his staff man (George Murphy)
oppose the President's decision. Another round of consultations with the
Committee will probably be held before the end of the month, but at this
point it is very difficult to judge whether the Committee can be brought
around. We will be working with State and the AEC and with Timmons'
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NUMBER
MO DA HR
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE
23247
10
31
12
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
CLASSIF: U
EXDIS
HAK
ROGERS
C
NODIS
LAIRD
LOU
EYES ONLY
DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
S
)
RES DATA
DOC DATE: 10-30-70
Johnson, u
TS
CODEWORD
sensitive
PARIS MTG
NO FORN
SUBJECT: European collaboration wy Cauada Frengh on uranium
enrichment plant.
ENCLOSURES: (
)
(
) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
NAME: BeHR
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
ACTiON
INFO
RCD CY
MEMO TO PRESIDENT
(
)
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR:
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE
(
)
DIR, SECRETARIAT
MEMO
TO
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
-
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
-
)
UNITED NATIONS
CONCURRENCE
(
)
ECONOMIC
DUE DATE:
11/5
SCIENTIFIC
PLANNING GROUP
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DATE
FROM
TO
ACTION REQUIRED
Behr
11/04
Someupelate
HAK
11/13
5
NSC/5
Sonmengeldt
Information appropriate Action an French
Memo to Johnson CC Behr
INTERNAL ROUTING
11/13
NSC/S
Behn
Memo to Cohnsow CC Lonnexpt
11/18
Belin
HAK
wifer
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
NSC
STAFF APPROVAL
&
DISPOSITION
PAF
HAK APPL
NOTIFY:
WHC
HAK MARGINALIA
SUBF
X
NS3 FORM REQUIRED
COPIES: (AS MARKED above)
* GPOP 1970-385-803
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
office to ensure that we line up the Republican representation if Holifield
calls for a vote of the whole Committee. In light of the sensitive stage
of the consultations, the US Government has not been discussing this matter
with any country. As a matter of fact, however, most of the EC countries
are aware that a major decision has been taken and that we are facing
some trouble in the Joint Committee.
When the consultations are completed, State plans to inform the UK,
EURATOM and its member states of the President's decision. A special
approach would be made simultaneously to France in response to its pro-
posal to State of April 21. The US response would be that we agree with France
(a) that US-European cooperation in the construction of a multinational
diffusion plant in Europe is worthy of serious consideration and (b) that
EURATOM would provide a good framework for such possible cooperation.
We would also mention that we attach importance to close cooperation with
France as discussion of this question proceeds in Europe.
Meanwhile, U. Alexis Johnson has written you (Tab E) regarding a report
by an American commercial source that there is a movement afoot in Europe,
possibly originating with France, to collaborate with Canada on a consortium
for a Uranium enrichment plant utilizing cheap Canadian hydroelectric power.
Mr. Johnson states that there was some thought that Trudeau might approach
the President on this. We agree with Mr. Johnson that we cannot and should
not do anything about this information at this time. He hopes that we will
soon shake the Joint Committee loose on letting us talk to the Europeans
about an enrichment plant. If there is anything to this report it should emerge
at that time.
Since Mr. Johnson is only informing you of this report, we do not believe
you need reply to this letter.
anymay
If Lucet raises the question of his approach to you last April, you may wish
to advise him that the French approach and you may wish to distinguish
between the approach to you and the one to State -- has been folded into
the larger question of the export of this technology generally. At this point
in the consultations with the Joint Committee, you will be able to tell Lucet
only that you would hope that a decision on the broad issue and the French
request can be announced in the next couple of months.
(NOTE: We have not been able to account for the difference in Lucet's
approach to you on April 13 (for bilateral cooperation) and to the formal
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-3-
French approach (at your suggestion) to State on April 21 relating the
matter to US-EURATOM relations. While intriguing, in any talk with
Lucet it would probably be unwise for you to attempt to determine what,
if any, significance there is in the discrepancy. (It may just be a goof.)
In any case, it does not seem feasible, in light of developments, for you
to give any encouragement to Lucet on a bilateral basis.) its
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
22860 hand unformed Q
SECRET
ACTION
October 20, 1970
Hal Linettas
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt tts
asked about tle
SUBJECT: French COCOM Case; Your Potential Involvement.
Frend squal
on murlear differenplant the
In June, the French submitted to COCOM their proposal to sell to Poland
certain machinery and technology required to produce a line of integrated doesio
circuits. The request also included an expansion of the number and type
of silicon transistors to be produced by the Polish plant approved for
Hand
million, export by but COCOM is the last second October. stage of This the particular French/Polish case industrial involves only venture, $7 Please
let
the total value of which might exceed $50 million. You will recall that the
after lengthly inter-agency debate and French intercession with you. It
first stage (involving silicon transistors) was approved last October only medium
was made clear then to the French that the U.S. decision in no way
established a presumption for approval of subsequent transactions.
In the present case, all agencies concerned (Defense, State and Commerce)
1 business November
agreed that qualitatively and quantitatively transferring the technology and
production equipment in the French request involved a substantial increase
OCT
in the security risk over last year's case. The quality and quanitity of the
31
devices to be produced exceed the needs implicit in the stated end use, and
have direct military potential. Further, neither the USSR nor any Eastern
0/6/
European country has the capability at this time to manufacture the
integrated circuit systems commercially, and the acquisition of this
technology has been high on the Soviet shopping list. It is considered
that the Soviets would probably have access to any Western electronic
technology acquired by Poland. Finally, the agencies considered that
approval of this case would make it almost impossible to maintain COCOM
embargoes on this line of important technology (obversely, there is the
possibility that, if their request is not approved, the French might proceed
with the sale and thumb their nose at COCOM). Thus, in light of the unanimity
within the bureaucracy not present in the case last year, we cleared (with
General Haig's concurrence) a cable stating the U.S. objection. Copy is
attached at Tab A.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
- 2 -
Predictabily, the French were upset at the U.S. objection. Late on
October 16, Lucet sent me an aide-memoire for transmission to you
(Tab B). I told the French that the note would be studied with care,
but that they should understand that there was unanimity within the
U.S. Government on this case unlike the situation which prevailed last
year. In short, I gave the French no basis for encouragement. On
October 17, Alphand called in Culley (DCM in Paris) and gave him a
similar note (Tab C). The notes point out the considerable importance
the French place on this deal, and also indicate that the French read more
into the favorable American decision of last year than they should have.
The French proposed to send a team to Washington to furnish us with
additional information which, they say, it is not possible to provide within
COCOM because of potential competition in the Polish market. The French
insist that the transfer of technology will not create any strategic difficulties
in the military field.
Prior to Lucet's transmittal of the note to me, Phil Trezise met with his
French counterpart who happened to be here and provided him with a copy
of the aide-memoire Lucet later sent me. Trezise told him that we were
willing to hold meetings with a French team of technicians, as well as
individuals who could review the political aspects. Having received Trezise's
report, Cully also told Alphand the same thing. The French will very soon
propose a date for the arrival of their team.
There are two possible directions which this issue can take. One possibility
is that once the French team arrives, the solid phalanx of agency opposition
will begin to crumble, with State finally favoring the deal, and with Defense
remaining opposed on security grounds. At some point the issue will then be
sent here for arbitration as it was last year. The other possibility (probably
more remote) is that the agencies will remain solidly opposed, and the French
then will expect you or the President to reverse the bureaucracy by a political
decision. At that point you may want to take up the issue with the President.
Regardless which direction the matter takes, the issue will be sticky, partic-
ularly in light of our own negative decision in the case of the catalytic cracker
for Poland. The other COCOM members are cagey in playing this one.
Apparently, the UK, Dutch, Italians, Germans and Japanese are not happy
with the French request on security grounds, but may not wish to buck the
French (the UK increasingly feels that the French are getting away with
more in COCOM than others). Commercial factors are also at play. These
others may very well consider that if the French have their way on this case,
then a quid pro quo can be demanded which would involve a loosening of the
COCOM restrictions for future cases -- which would benefit their own
commercial interests.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
- 3 -
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the general line of "no encouragement" which I took with
the French.
Approve K
Disapprove
Other
That, since State has already agreed to receive the French team, you agree
that there is no need for you to become involved at this point (I shall of
course continue to monitor the action).
A
Agree R
Disagree
tnform Luct of Stah umo will
I called Lucet 11/3 tomote
That State willnecave Heach team ts.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Rounenfellt
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
ACTION
April 16, 1970
HS
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT:
Cooperation with the French on Gaseous Diffusion
The memorandum which Ambassador Lucet left with you on April 13
(Tab A) proposed that US and French authorities study the feasibility
of constructing in France a gaseous diffusion isotope separation plant.
It makes clear that the French are still very interested in the diffusion
method for uranium enrichment, in contrast to the UK, FRG and Dutch
joint efforts in the centrifuge process. The memo is unclear on what
sort of controls (bilateral, Euratom, IAEA) the French would accept
if such a US-French plant were constructed.
The French undou otedly are aware that we are considering the possibility
of cooperating on a multi-national basis with W estern Europe in the
gaseous diffusion field, and may have proposed this bilateral effort to
undercut any poss ble multilateral steps. Aside from this and the political
benefits of a Franto-American deal in this field, a bilateral project of
the kind proposed would have definite practical advantages for the French:
-- they would be able to update thei own gaseous diffusion
technology to put it roughly on a par with ours (only the US, UK, USSR,
China and France have diffusion technology);
-- by having an additional facility, the French would be in a
better commercially competitive position relative to the tripartite centrifuge
project (particula:: if the Italians and Belgians join to make it a five
nation project).
We would benefit little in technological terms from any such project,
although it would serve to energize our other bilateral scientific cooperation
efforts with the French. Politically, the gain in Franco-American relations
would have to be balanced against any possible undermining of Euratom
and other multi-national cooperative efforts in the diffusion area.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
- 2 -
As a practical matter, a Presidential decision on the fundamental issue
of US policy on cooperation in the uranium enrichment field should
precede any decision on the French proposal. The USC has submitted
a memo on this basic issue (recommending US sharing of diffusion
technology on a multi-national basis in Western Europe), but
Bob Behr considers the study lacking and has recommended that it
be sent back for further work (his memo of March 23, Log #7799).
The French proposal should be factored in to that broader study. The
most appropriate inethod of doing that--and at the same time avoiding
placing the White House in the middle of the fundamental issue before
its resolution-- would be for you to suggest to Ambassador Lucet when
you meet with him on Friday that he deliver the French proposal to
the State Department directly.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you
-- return to Lucet the memorandum he left with you
(Tab A);
-- suggest that the proposal may app ear quite interesting
but would require technical study;
-- and that it would be more appropiiate if he were to convey
the proposal directly to the State Department.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LE MINISTRE
DES
Paris, March 16, 1970
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
ilik will
MEMORANDUM
Sennerfeld
Outlook for Franco-American Cooperation
in the Field of Isotope Separation
The rapidly increasing construction of nuclear
power plants using enriched uranium as fuel for the
production of electricity naturally leads the European
countries to give thought to their future supply of this fuel.
The idea has therefore developed in various quarters that
additional facilities for the separation of isotopes could
be installed in Europe. Recent initiatives have confirmed
that trend of thought. In the late Spring of 1969, the
Common Market Commission recommended that this problem should
be approached on an European Economic Community basis ; the
President of the French Republic expressed his interest in the
matter on the occasion of the Conference at The Hague ;
and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs developed the
concept further on March 6, 1970, at Brussels. On the other
hand, three of the European countries Grat Britain, The
Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany - have decided y,
to pool their efforts to develop the ultracentrifuge process.
...
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2.
Unlike the British Government, wich has ceased to
manifest any interest in the gaseous diffusion method, the
French Government is continuing its research in this method,
in the belief that is can still be greatly improved. The
experience acquired by the Americans in this field is very
wide, while that of the French is more limited although far
from negligible i it is more than likely that discussion by
both countries of their own experience might prove to be
fruitful for both of them.
In this spirit, American and French authorities
could undertake a technical and economical study intended
to show the feasibility of a plant for isotope separation
by gaseous diffusion capable, in particular, of supplying the
European market, the capital and operating costs to be
appraised on the basis of prevailing economic conditions in
Western Europe. A study of this kind, if its results proved
to be positive, could then serve as a basis for the joint
preparation of a project for the construction of a plant
which would quite naturally come within the scope of the
common actions provided for in the EURATOM treaty.
Under these conditions, the output of the plant
would be subject to official controls to ensure its use for
peaceful purposes. Its location in France would provide all
the necessary assurances as to the preservation of technolo-
gical secrets relating to the design of the plant and the
production of its essential parts.
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Action
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
9723
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS
INFORMATION
hell
April 27, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
Tell, State stald
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Lust nevel
thing pillair,
SUBJECT: Coope :ation with France on Gaseous Diffusion: French Take the
Different Line at State than Lucet d:.d with You
Earlier this month, Ambassador Lucet left a memo with you proposing
that US and French authorities study the feasibility of constructing in
X
France a gaseous diffusion isotope separation plant. In responseto your
MAY
.19
request, I recommiended (log #9335) that you suggest to Lucet that it would
be more appropria te if he were to convey the pr oposal directly to the State
1970
Department. I understand you took this action :n a phone conversation
with the Ambassacor on April 17.
The French Chargé and Scientific Counselor ca led on Herman Pollack,
State's Director o: Scientific Affairs, on April 21 (memcon attached at
Tab A). The Chai gé mentioned that Ambassador Lucet had raised this
subject with you and that it was their understanding that you intended to
mention it to the Fresident in the next few days You also suggested, he
reported, that the French discuss the subject with State.
Substantively, the French emphasized that they envisaged a US-French
feasibility study O: the construction by EURATOM of the gas diffusion plant,
and that EURATOM safeguards would apply. In effect, France would serve
as intermediary between the US and EURATOM. The plant, they stressed,
would not be French.
The line the French took at State departs from that in the memo Ambassador
Lucet left with you. The tenor of that memo was that the British, Dutch
and Germans were concentrating on the centrifuge process, but the French
still valued the gazeous diffusion process. In that context, they were
interested in Franto-American cooperation. There was no mention that
the prospective plant would be constructed by E JRATOM. Moreover, while
the memo indicated the output of the plant would be subject to "official
controls, " there was no reference to EURATOM: controls. Admittedly, the
memo was vague, but the tone clearly suggested a bilateral approach, in
contrast to the EURATOM-wide stress at State.
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reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS
-2-
In response to the French approach, Pollack noted that the basic policy
on the export of diffusion technology was under review, and it might be
months before a decision was reached. (Your April 16 memo to the Chairman,
NSC Under Secretaries Committee, requested that supplemental information
on a program for international cooperation in uranium enrichment should
be submitted by May 18.) Tab C.
The shift in emphasis by the French is confusing, although the EURATOM
role would presumably make the proposal more attractive to us. In addition,
it seems that the French are attempting to use your involvement to move
State toward a positive consideration of their proposal.
CC: Col. Behr
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
May 20, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Cooperation with the French on Gaseous Diffusion
This morning I called SCI Director Pollack and reported to him HAK's
penned comment on Log #9723 (i. e., that HAK's recollection was simply
that he had advised Ambassador Lucet to take up the matter with the
State Department), in contrast to the comment made by the French Charge
to Pollack on April 21. Pollack appreciated confirmation of HAK's
conversation with Lucet, which he had earlier thought was somewhat
misrepresented by Ambassador Lucet.
Pollack said that the response to the French demarche had not yet been
agreed even within State. There were some differences of view between
SCI and EUR. In any event, the final position will be sent on the Eliot
to HAK channel for approval prior to any further discussion with the
French.
DD
Arthur T. Downey
SECRET
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HP
Dr Kricinger
I:HPollack:ans
CONFIDENTIAL
1/23/70 x-21554
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BE Behr hr
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: April 21, 1970
SUBJECT:
EURATOM
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Jacques Leprette, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.,
Embassy of France
Mr. Maumice Levy, Scientific Counselor,
Embassy of France
Mr. Herman Pollack, Director, SCI, Department of State
COPIES TO:
U - The Under Secretary
PM - Mr. Lehmann (cc)
J - Ambassador Johnson
SCI - Mr. Zook (cc)
S/S - Mr. Eliot
EUR/FBX - Mr. Tanguy (cc) White House - Dr. Kissinger (cc)
EUR/RPE - Mr. Phillips (cc) AEC - Mr. Kratzer (cc)
Late last week 1r. Levy requested an opportunity for him and
Mr. Leprette to visi: me privately at 2:30 p.m. today.
Mr. Leprette opened by expressing the hope that our conversation
could be kept to jus: the three of us. Thereafter most of the
conversation was carried by Mr. Levy.
They sought my :eaction to a proposal that a French-U.S. team
be established to ca :ry out a feasibility and preliminary economic
study of the construction by EURATOM of gasecus diffusion plant
based on American te chnology. In effect the French would serve as
intermediary with other EURATOM countries. They emphasized that
EURATOM safeguards would apply and that they were proposing a
EURATOM, not a French plant. They also made clear their belief that
an arrangement would have to be established that would maintain the
classified nature of the barrier and possibly other diffusion
technology.
I stated that the basic question of our policy on the export
of diffusion technology was under review, and that it would be weeks
and possibly months before a decision was rei ched. It might
therefore be some time before a reaction to their suggestion was
possible.
In response to my query they indicated they had given no
thought tc whether any technology made available would also be
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
used in Pierrelatte or Capenhurst. They also had no suggestions
to offer as to how the U.S. might handle criticisms of such a
distinctive and significant cooperation in a sensitive nuclear
energy field with c non-signatory to the NPT.
Mr. Leprette stated that late last week Ambassador Lucet
raised this same subject with Dr. Kissinger in the course of a
review of U.S.-French relations. It was their understanding that
Dr. Kissinger intended to mention this to the President in the
next few days. Dr. Kissinger also suggested they discuss the
subject with the Department of State.
I indicated the need to consult elsewhere in the Department
of State, and with the Atomic Energy Commission and White House
staff before responding to their suggestion. I was asked to limit
as much as possible the number of those brought into the discussion
at this time and to keep the discussion as confidential as possible.
They stated they did not intend at present to extend their
consultations to other agencies.
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MEMORANDUM
ACTION - 10773/11568/21421
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
September 8, 1970
SECRET - RD ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
7
SUBJECT: Proposed Program for Cooperation with Allies in the
Uranium Enrichment Field
The NSC Under Secretaries Committee has recommended (Tab C/Studies,
Tabs D, E, F) that you modify the long-standing US policy of not co-
operating with other countries in the uranium enrichment field by
authorizing:
- exploratory talks with western European states on the possibility
of sharing US gaseous diffusion technology on a classified basis to
assist them to construct a multinationally owned and operated
diffusion plant; and
- similar discussions, if requested, on the possibility of multinational
cooperation with other friendly countries, particularly Japan, Canada
and Australia.
Any sharing would be contingent upon the execution of a suitable agreement(s)
for cooperation which would require your approval.
Background
With the growing demand for electrical power by nuclear reactors, there
is a parallel demand for enriched uranium to fuel the reactors. Additional
enrichment facilities will be required by 1980 to meet projected world
requirements for nuclear fuel, even with the full utilization of our present
capacity.
Two techniques are commercially attractive for production of enriched
uranium - the gaseous diffusion process and the gas centrifuge process.
The diffusion process is of proven reliability with known cost factors.
Diffusion plants are located in the US, the UK, France, the USSR and
Communist China. The centrifuge process is in the experimental stage
in the UK, the FRG, the Netherlands and the US, and is believed to have
considerable commercial promise.
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CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
CONFIDENTIAL/S: SITIVE
SECRET - RD ATTACHMENT
- 2 -
Except for some restricted programs with the UK, US policy has been (1)
to withhold enrichment technology from other countries, and (2) to reduce
incentives abroad to develop enrichment facilities by supplying enriched
uranium under long-term agreements and with safeguards.
Today, other countries are attracted by the prospect of not being dependent
totally on the US for nuclear fuel and by commercial possibilities for ex-
porting nuclear reactors and fuel. In any event, enrichment plants will be
built abroad even if US technology is withheld.
Britain, Germany and the Netherlands have concluded an agreement to
develop commercial gas centrifuge facilities. Belgium, Italy and Australia
have signified interest in this centrifuge effort. Prime Minister Vorster re-
cently announced South Africa's intention to build enrichment facilities based
upon a new, and as yet undisclosed, process. France has expressed interest
in the US cooperating with Europe in the diffusion field.
Issue and Options
The issue, therefore, is whether the US should cooperate with foreign
uranium enrichment developments. There are three options.
Option 1. Maintain our present policy of non-cooperation.
The main arguments for this option are that (1) cooperation, even
on a classified basis, increases the risk that US advanced technology
might be diverted to military purposes or obtained by others for
military purposes; and (2) aggressive US competition, combined
with the financial uncertainty surrounding the independent develop-
ment of large-scale facilities abroad, might prolong the US hold on
the foreign market.
On the other hand, (1) industrially advanced countries - particularly
Western Europeans, Australia and Japan - are determined to acquire
some independent enrichment capability with or without US cooperation;
(2) cooperation with allies on a multinational basis would pay political
dividends by signalling US recognition of their enrichment needs and
could promote European integration; and (3) after the late 1970's, the
US cannot meet projected US and foreign requirements for nuclear fuel
without expanded production capacity acquired at considerable expense.
Option 2. Cooperation in the gaseous diffusion field alone.
The main arguments for this option are that (1) it would provide Europeans
and others with an alternative to development of centrifuge facilities
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CONFIDEN TIAL/SENSITIVE
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CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
SECRET - RD ATTACHMENT
which offer greater possibilities for nuclear weapon proliferation
than do diffusion facilities; and (2) Europe's demand for fuel could
be satisfied by a single diffusion plant, multinationally owned and
operated.
On the other hand, this option could be seen as a ploy to subvert the
tripartite (UK-FRG-Dutch) centrifuge program because we do not
include possible cooperation in the centrifuge process.
Option 3. Cooperation in both the diffusion and centrifuge fields.
The main arguments for this option are that (1) the Europeans and
others would have the option of selecting the technology of their
choice; (2) since the spread of small centrifuge plants from advanced
countries to less industrialized countries could increase weapon pro-
liferation risks, the US should attempt to influence foreign export
policies of the advanced countries through the terms of agreements
for cooperation; and (3) it could reduce the need for further US
expenditures to increase US plant capacity.
On the other hand, Option 3 could increase the risks of nuclear weapon
proliferation unless, of course, we successfully influence foreign ex-
port policies through restrictive terms within agreements for cooper-
ation.
Recommendation and Rationale
I concur in the Under Secretaries Committee's recommendation to offer to
share only diffusion technology, but with some qualifications which are sum-
marized as follows:
1.
It is doubtful that an offer of a multinational diffusion plant incorporating
advanced US technology will appreciably slow down the development of
centrifuges by those countries so engaged. We should be prepared to
consider cooperation in this effort, but not as a part of our initial offer
because we could be giving away, prematurely, good bargaining counters.
2.
We do not want to oversell gaseous diffusion technology or exaggerate the
potential risks in gas centrifuge technology because we may, at a later
date, choose the centrifuge technique ourselves. It may also then be
feasible to cooperate in the centrifuge field with friendly foreign gov-
ernments, if adequate security precautions could be arranged.
3.
We should make no effort to force entry into the management of European
diffusion operations. They may be interested in improving the enrichment
process they Reproduced at the Richarg Nixon Presidential ur technology, but
This document has and has been determined to be declassified.
clcarly not their independence.
CONFIDENTIAL/SF 'SITIVE
SECRET - RD ATT, CHMENT
4 I :
I recommend that you approve Option 2: (1) exploratory talks with the Com-
mission of the European Communities, the member States of EURATOM and
the UK on the possibility of assisting in the construction of a multinationally
owned and operated diffusion plant, and (2) similar talks, if requested, with
other friendly countries such as Japan, Canada and Australia. This option,
as qualified above, would be responsive to varying degrees of expressed
interest by several of our allies in weighing US diffusion technology as an
alternative to centrifuge development.
At Tab A is a proposed memorandum to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries
Committee which states that you approve exploratory talks on cooperation with
the Commission of European Communities, the UK and other allies in the
uranium enrichment field with the qualifications I have set forth.
Additional Considerations
The majority of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) would probably
support an offer to share diffusion technology under adequate security controls
with equitable compensation. The Committee has, however, a strong anti-
pathy to sharing centrifuge technology because of potential risks for nuclear
weapon proliferation and our presumed lead in the field. Consultations with
the JCAE members would be held before moving ahead with exploratory
talks.
As a next step, we should review what still needs to be classified in the
diffusion process and the overall security implications of the centrifuge
process. This does not affect the present recommendation since it is agreed
that sharing diffusion technology on a classified basis presents no unreason-
able risks.
At Tab B is a proposed National Security Study Memorandum requesting
such a review.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
That you approve the memorandum to the Chairman of the Under
Secretaries Committee at Tab A, which authorizes exploratory talks
on cooperation in the diffusion field.
APPROVE
R
DISAPPROVE
SEE ME
2.
That you approve the proposed NSSM at Tab B which requests a review
of what needs to be handled on a classified basis in the diffusion field
and of the overall security implications of the centrifuge process.
APPRO
VE
DISAPPROVE
SEE ME
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Mr. This document to Executive Order 13526 and has to beccanmeaendations.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 14, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
ACTING CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Proposed Program of International Cooperation in the
Uranium Enrichment Field
The President has considered the recommendation of the NSC Under
Secretaries Committee, as contained in your memorandum of February 26,
1970 and reaffirmed in your memorandum of April 26, 1970, regarding a
program of international cooperation in the uranium enrichment field.
The President has approved, subject to appropriate prior consultations
with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, exploratory talks with the
Commission of the European Communities, the member States of
EURATOM, and the United Kingdom on the possibility of the United States
assisting in the construction of a multinationally owned and operated
gaseous diffusion plant to be located in Western Europe.
Additionally, the President has decided that the United States will be
prepared, if requested, to discuss the possibility of-similar cooper-
ation with other friendly countries, particularly Japan, Canada and
Australia.
The President has noted and approved in principle the negotiating strategy
submitted by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. He has also noted
that the United States would insist that any related enrichment facilities
and their products would be subject to meaningful safeguards and adequate
security controls, and that the United States would give preference to
multilateral control and ownership.
The President has approved the recommendation of the NSC Under
Secretaries Committee subject to the following qualifications:
- The United States position should not be presented as a major coopera-
tive program conditioned upon a continuing United States voice and
participation in the actual management of any facilities.
- The United States shall be prepared not to hold back any technology in
the gaseous diffusion process.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET
SECRET
- Regarding any information on the United States gas centrifuge program,
it should be stated only that there is no authorization to discuss the gas
centrifuge program and that the United States Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's gas centrifuge program is developmental in nature.
- The United States position on sharing of diffusion technology should not
be represented to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a means
of impeding foreign gas centrifuge development. This development,
especially in Europe, is an ongoing program and would probably not be
curtailed by an offer to share diffusion technology unless the economics
of the diffusion process were markedly more advantageous.
Noting that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee will report the results
of these talks together with further recommendations as soon thereafter as
possible, the President has additionally requested interim reports on the
consultations with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and on the initial
discussions with the United Kingdom.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
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SECRETS document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 14, 1970
National Security Study Memorandum 101
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, National Security Agency
The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
SUBJECT:
Review of Security Requirements regarding Uranium
Enrichment Technology
The President has directed a review of United States security re-
quirements to determine whether a need continues for the classification
of uranium enrichment technologies and, if so, to what extent.
This study should take into consideration the security interests involved
in the classification of both the gaseous diffusion process and the gas
centrifuge process. The study should also consider the relations of
these security interests to the dissemination of these technologies to
foreign governmental or non-governmental bodies. Where appropriate,
the study should identify and provide the rationale for the classification
of any particular elements of uranium enrichment processes which are
considered more sensitive than others.
The President has directed that the United States Intelligence Board
perform this study. For the purposes of this study, the United States
Intelligence Board shall include representatives of the addressees and a
representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.
The study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by October 29,
1970.
Henry A. Kissinger
CC: The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The ChairmReprodubeda the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant Executive Order 13526,and has been determined to be declassified.
23247
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON
October 30, 1970
SECRET - EYES ONLY
Dear Henry:
Glenn Seaborg told me the other day that one of
the AEC Commissioners had heard through an American
commercial source who has connections in Europe, that
there is a movement afoot in Europe, possibly originat-
ing with France, to collaborate with Canada on a con-
sortium for a uranium enrichment plant utilizing cheap
Canadian hydroelectric power. There was some thought
that Trudeau might approach the President on it.
It seems to me that from our standpoint a plant
in Canada would be much more desirable than one in
Europe, even though I suppose because of the cheap
power it might be commercially more competitive with
our own plants. I do not think that we can or should
do anything about this information at this time. I
would hope that we will soon be able to shake the Joint
Committee loose on letting us talk to the Europeans about
an enrichment plant, and if there is anything to this re-
port it should emerge at that time.
You will also recall that Nakasone talked about a
consortium with Canada.
Sincerely,
The Honorable
U. Alexis alon Johnson
Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.
SECRET - EYES ONLY
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