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Top Secret/Sensitive Vietnam Contingency Planning Henry A. Kissinger Oct. 2, 1969 [1 of 2]
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
1
Memo
Carver to Lynn, Jr. ( 16 PP)
29
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
September
NLN 06-04/1 N L N 06-12/1
1969
58
2
Report
Duck Hook (TO PP) pages 1-41
20 July
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
1969
NLN 06-04/2 NLN 06-12/2
Declassfied 8/10/07 letter
3
Memo
Helms to Kissinger ( 63 pp)
17 July
B
w/attach
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
1969
NLN 06-04/3 NLN 06-12/3
2A
Report
Duck Hook p 42-58
20 July
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/2A
1969
NCN 06-02/24
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
National Security Council, Vietnam Subject Files
89
FOLDER TITLE
Top Secret/Sensative Vietnam Contingency Planning Henry A. Kissinger Oct. 2, 1969 (Folder 1 of 2)
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S. GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
1
memo
Carver to Lynn (16 pp.)
9/29/1969
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/1
SANITIZED per sec 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)]
Itr. 3/30/2010
DECLASSIFIED
PER RHC 6/13/2008
2
report
Duck Hook (pages 1-41) (41 pp.)
7/20/1969
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/2
DECLASSIFIED per Itr. 8/10/2007
2A
report
Duck Hook (pages 42-58) (17 pp.)
7/20/1969
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/2
DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 6/29/2009
3
memo
Helms to Kissinger (56 pp.)
7/17/1969
B
w/ attach
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/3
SANITIZED per sec 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)]
Itr. 3/30/2010
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC Files, Vietnam Subject Files
89
FOLDER TITLE
[1] Top Secret / Sensitive Vietnam Contingency Planning: Henry A. Kissinger October 2, 1969 [1 of 2]
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
Policy
commercial or financial information.
B. National security classified information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
an individual's rights.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
1
Memo
Carver to Lynn, Jr. (16 PP)
29
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
September
NLN 06-04/1 N L N 06-12/1
1969
2
Report
Duck Hook pt Honly
20 July
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
1969
letter 8-10-07
Declassified NLN 06-12/2
3
Memo
Helms to Kissinger (63 pp)
17 July
B
w/attach
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
1969
NLN 06-04/3 NLN 06-12/3
2A
Report
Luck Hook p. 42-58
20 July
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06.04/2
1969
NLN 06-12/2
DECLASSIFIED
PER LTR 6/29/2009
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
National Security Council, Vietnam Subject Files
89
FOLDER TITLE
Top Secret/Sensative Vietnam Contingency Planning Henry A. Kissinger Oct. 2, 1969 (Folder 1 of 2)
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S. GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
[89/1/1]
SECRET/SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL
AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OF ANERICAL
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
29 September 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.
Assistant for Programs
National Security Council
SUBJECT
: North Vietnam Target Inventory
1. In response to the request you levied during the course of
our conversation on Friday, 26 September, attached is an inventory
of major physical facilities in North Vietnam that could be viewed as
potential targets. As you know, this inventory was prepared on short
notice and the number of people working on it was held to an absolute
minimum for security reasons. It should, therefore, be viewed as a
quick rough cut rather than a finished study.
2. Per your ground rules, we did not address the probable
political consequences or reactions of the North Vietnarhese or others
(e.g., the Soviets, Chinese, Western Europeans, South Vietnamese,
other Asians, etc. ) of attacks on any or all of these targets, though in
some instances the near certainty of strong international reactions to
attacks on certain targets is alluded to.
3. In the concluding paragraphs of the attached memorandum
we do attempt a brief and summary analysis of the impact a loss of the
inventoried facilities would have on North Vietnam. The key judgment
here is a judgment derived from the analytic review of all available
evidence undertaken in the course of preparing this paper and buttressed
by our continuing analysis of evidence developed over the course of the
years since 1965: namely that even destruction of all these facilities
would not make it physically impossible for North Vietnam to continue
the war. Thus, physical constraints would not foreclose Hanoi's options
or necessarily dictate Hanoi's political response to such attacks.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PER RAE
N
By
JMR
NARA. Date 6/13/2008
George A. Carver, Jr.
[p.1.f15
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 September 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Significant Physical Facilities in North Vietnam
Introduction
Prior to 1965 North Vietnam offered only a limited number
of lucrative targets for air attack. With the initiation of the
Rolling Thunder program, the catalogue of significant installa-
tions became even more limited because of the damage sustained
during the bombing programs and North Vietnam's extensive pro-
grams of dispersal and decentralization of key economic and
military facilities. Since the bombing halt a number of the
more important facilities have been restored or improved. This
memorandum examines the current state of North Vietnam's economic
and military plant in an attempt to identify those installations
whose loss or neutralization might have a meaningful impact on
the capability and willingness of Hanoi's leadership to contimue
with the war.
GROUP 1
SECRET SENSITIVE
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
[pg.24f15] 15]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
I. North Vietnam as a Target System
1. The number of fixed facilities against North Vietnam that
offer significant targets for air attack is limited. The economy
of North Vietnam is essentially agrarian, lacking for the most part
an indigenous economic base heavily committed to the support of
military operations. Hanoi maintains a relatively small military
establishment, and its primary contribution to the war in the South
is in the provision of manpower and in serving as a control center
for the direction of insurgency. In almost all other respects
Hanoi's war making capabilities are dependent on the continued
flow of military and economic goods from its Communist allies.
2. As a result of the previous US bombing campaigns and the
countermeasures adopted by the North Vietnamese, the number of
lucrative targets has fallen off since 1965. The pace of recon-
struction has been slow and deliberate, not only because of the scope
and complexity of the task but also because the regime appeared
reluctant to rebuild large industrial targets until it was relatively
confident that the bombing would not be resumed. Repair activities
at such important plants as the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex
and the Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant have been at such a
slow pace that neither facility is yet restored to the point that
it would be & significant target. In other cases, such as the
heavily damaged Nam Dinh Textile Plant and the Co Dinh Chromite
Concentrating Plant, no reconstruction activity has been noted.
3. Another factor limiting the mumber of significant targets
has been the extensive dispersal programs adopted to offset the
effects of previous air attacks. Most of the major military
barracks and ammunition and supply depots, for example, were
dispersed early in 1965 so that when these target systems were
taken under systematic attack the results, in terms of human
or material losses, were minimal. Similarly, the early es-
tablishment of a widely dispersed petroleum storage system so
effectively offset the destruction of North Vietnam's bulk storage
system that most of these facilities were left unrepaired. As
a result there are today probably only three petroleum storage
areas -- Hanoi, Haiphong, and Vinh -- that are of some significance
as potential targets. The widespread dispersal of small facilities
such as vehicle repair and machine tool shops, as well as the
relocation of some industrial plants has further reduced the
mumber of installations available for air attack.
4. An important characteristic of the remaining target
systems is that the most important of them would be considerably
more difficult to take under attack today than they were during
the Rolling Thunder program. All of the power stations in the
- 2 -
SECRET SENSITIVE
[pg. 3 15]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SEGRET SENSITIVE
main electric power network, for example, have had protective
blast walls constructed around them so that they are considerably
less vulnerable to effective air attack. In addition a number of
the more significant facilities are located in the heavily populated
and heavily defended areas around Haiphong and Hanoi. Attacks
against these targets not only risk the inadvertent killing of
large numbers of civilians but also significantly increase the
chances that losses of US pilots and aircraft will be extremely
high. During the period from April 1967 to March 1968, targets
in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas came under frequent attack. The
US aircraft loss rate in these attacks was 7 times greater than
the rate for operations over all of North Vietnam.
II. Major Facilities
5. This section discusses a selected number of facilities in
North Vietnem that seem to be significant because their neutraliza-
tion or destruction by air attack would meet one or all of the
following objectives:
a. A high degree of physical damage or extensive
disruption of an important economic or military function.
b. The implementation of countermeasures or restoration
of the facility would be costly in terms of human and
material resources.
c. The attack could be expected to have a strong
psychological impact on Hanoi's leadership.
6. The 29 installations selected are listed in the table.*
The list is not intended to be all-inclusive but is judged to
be one which would offer reasonably good prospects of maximizing
the attainment of the above objectives. The specific targets
are listed under several target systems and are listed by order
of priority. The allocation of priority is obviously a highly
subjective procedure, but the ranking in this listing is
supported to some degree by the fact that it reflects the
speed and intensity with which Hanoi chose to restore its bomb
damaged facilities both during and after the US bombing campaigns.
Although each installation is given a separate mumerical ranking
in many cases a successful campaign would require that several
or all of the facilities in any one category be attacked simil-
taneously.
*
Table follows on Page 11.
- 3 -
SECRET SENSITIVE
Epg. 4 of 157
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
I. North Vietnam as a Target System
1. The number of fixed facilities against North Vietnam that
offer significant targets for air attack is limited. The economy
of North Vietnam is essentially agrarian, lacking for the most part
an indigenous economic base heavily committed to the support of
military operations. Hanoi maintains a relatively small military
establishment, and its primary contribution to the war in the South
is in the provision of manpower and in serving as a control center
for the direction of insurgency. In almost all other respects
Hanoi's war making capabilities are dependent on the continued
flow of military and economic goods from its Communist allies.
2. As a result of the previous US bombing campaigns and the
countermeasures adopted by the North Vietnamese, the number of
lucrative targets has fallen off since 1965. The pace of recon-
struction has been slow and deliberate, not only because of the scope
and complexity of the task but also because the regime appeared
reluctant to rebuild large industrial targets until it was relatively
confident that the bombing would not be resumed. Repair activities
at such important plants as the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex
and the Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant have been at such a
slow pace that neither facility is yet restored to the point that
it would be a significant target. In other cases, such as the
heavily damaged Nam Dinh Textile Plant and the Co Dinh Chromite
Concentrating Plant, no reconstruction activity has been noted.
3. Another factor limiting the mumber of significant targets
has been the extensive dispersal programs adopted to offset the
effects of previous air attacks. Most of the major military
barracks and ammunition and supply depots, for example, were
dispersed early in 1965 so that when these target systems were
taken under systematic attack the results, in terms of human
or material losses, were minimal. Similarly, the early es-
tablishment of a widely dispersed petroleum storage system so
effectively offset the destruction of North Vietnam's bulk storage
system that most of these facilities were left unrepaired. As
a result there are today probably only three petroleum storage
areas -- Hanoi, Haiphong, and Vinh -- that are of some significance
as potential targets. The widespread dispersal of small facilities
such as vehicle repair and machine tool shops, as well as the
relocation of some industrial plants has further reduced the
mumber of installations available for air attack.
4. An important characteristic of the remaining target
systems is that the most important of them would be considerably
more difficult to take under attack today than they were during
the Rolling Thunder program. All of the power stations in the
a 2 e
SECRET SENSITIVE
[eg. 5 of 15]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
main electric power network, for example, have had protective
blast walls constructed around them so that they are considerably
less vulnerable to effective air attack. In addition a number of
the more significant facilities are located in the heavily populated
and heavily defended areas around Haiphong and Hanoi. Attacks
against these targets not only risk the inadvertent killing of
large numbers of civilians but also significantly increase the
chances that losses of US pilots and aircraft will be extremely
high. During the period from April 1967 to March 1968, targets
in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas came under frequent attack. The
US aircraft loss rate in these attacks was 7 times greater than
the rate for operations over all of North Vietnam.
II. Major Facilities
5. This section discusses a selected number of facilities in
North Vietnem that seem to be significant because their neutraliza-
tion or destruction by air attack would meet one or all of the
following objectives:
a. A high degree of physical damage or extensive
disruption of an important economic or military function.
b. The implementation of countermeasures or restoration
of the facility would be costly in terms of human and
material resources.
c. The attack could be expected to have a strong
psychological impact on Hanoi's leadership.
6. The 29 installations selected are listed in the table.*
The list is not intended to be all-inclusive but is judged to
be one which would offer reasonably good prospects of maximizing
the attainment of the above objectives. The specific targets
are listed under several target systems and are listed by order
of priority. The allocation of priority is obviously a highly
subjective procedure, but the ranking in this listing is
supported to some degree by the fact that it reflects the
speed and intensity with which Hanoi chose to restore its bomb
damaged facilities both during and after the US bombing campaigns.
Although each installation is given a separate mumerical ranking
in many cases a successful campaign would require that several
or all of the facilities in any one category be attacked simil-
taneously.
* Table follows on Page 11.
- 3 as
SECRET SENSITIVE
[pg. 6 of 15]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Haiphong Port Area
7. The Haiphong port area was virtually untouched throughout
the bombing campaign. The port is, however, of major significance
because it is the entry point for about 85 percent of North
Vietnam's annual imports. These imports are vital to the economy
and are essential to the maintenance of lines of communication
within North Vietnam. In addition, the Haiphong port area
includes five shipyards, a naval base, an air defense center,
a major railroad yard and six major storage areas. An initial
attack in the Haiphong port area would be almost certain to
destroy large quantities of stockpiled supplies. Although these
supplies cannot be quantified with any precision, it is probable
that at least 50,000 tons of miscellaneous cargoes are stored
in the port area at any one time. The immediate disruption to
established distribution systems resulting from a successful
attack would be widespread and severe, and if the port area were
kept under attack alternative means of importing goods and dis-
tributing them internally could not be implemented for at least
2-3 months. The attacks could not be expected to yield any long
term reduction in the flow of imports into North Vietnam because
of the existence of alternative means of supply such as the overland
rail and highway connections with China or the use of other ports
such as Hon Gai and Cam Pha.
8. There are important liabilities associated with this
target system. It is so heavily defended that losses of US
aircraft would undoubtedly be high. Since all of the targets are
located within a radius of 1.5 miles from the center of Haiphong,
a high number of casualties among North Vietnamese civilians
probably could not be avoided. Finally, the attack would stand
a high chance of damaging or sinking foreign shipping in port
and conceivably forcing a US-USSR confrontation.
9. A variant to bombing the port facilities would be a mining
program. A mining program would, of course, not yield the high
levels of physical damage resulting from bombing. It would,
however, avoid most of the risks associated with bombing and would
be about as effective in terms of the disruption of North Vietnam's
import trade and internal transport arrangements.
Electric Power System
10. The importance to North Vietnam of its electric power
system is evident in the persistency with which it attempted to
keep the main power system operative throughout the bombing, the
measures (protective blast walls) devised to reduce its vulner-
ability to bombing, and the priority attached to restoration of
- 4 -
[pg. 7.f15]
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
these facilities after the bombing halted. Although all electric
power stations have significance as targets, the following stations
were selected because they are the ones in which Hanoi has made
the greatest efforts to regain pre-bombing generating capacity:
Operational
Pre-Bomb
Capacity
Electric
Capacity
(Megawatts)
Powerplant
(Megawatts)
August 1969
Hanoi
32.5
25
Uong Bi
24
24
Haiphong West
10
5
Hon Gai
15
6
Thai Nguyen
24
12
Bac Giang
12
12
11. The neutralization of these plants which constitute North
Vietnam's main power network and represent a capital investment
of about $30 million would cripple most of North Vietnam's modern
industry. The impact of bombing North Vietnam's electric power
system would be maximized if strikes were carried out against all
of these plants simultaneously. Successful attacks would not
only undercut the results of 18 months of accelerated repair
activity but would mean that another one to two years would elapse
before the system could again approach pre-bombing capacity. The
reconstruction effort is beyond the capabilities of North Vietnam's
limited material and technical resources, particularly technicians.
Even the resort to alternative power systems such as diesel-driven
generating equipment would be adequate to meet only essential needs
and would preclude the early restoration of normal industrial pro-
duction. In addition the attacks could have a significant impact
on the urban population of North Vietnam because of need to
stagger work shifts to eliminate or strictly ration consumption
by residential-commercial users, and transportation.
Airfields
12. Four of North Vietnam's ten jet airfields are judged to be
significant targets. These are the airfields at Phuc Yen, Bai
Thuong, Kien An, and Yen Bai. The airfields at Bai Thuong and
Yen Bai have been under construction since May 1966 and were
serviceable by May 1968. The Kien An and Phuc Yen airfields
have been fully repaired and improved since the bombing halt.
The construction of aircraft shelters and hardened facilities
at these fields since the bombing halt has greatly increased their
- 5 -
SECRET SENSITIVE
Epg. of 15]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
operational flexibility. North Vietnam currently has an estimated
52 MIG-21's, 53 MIG-15/17's, 10 MIG-19's and 4 I1-28 bombers deployed
in-country. All but one of the MIG-21's, as well as all of the bombers,
and two-thirds of the remaining jet fighters are deployed at these four
airfields. About two-thirds of these aircraft are deployed at Phuc
Yen alone.
Haiphong Cement Plant
13. The Haiphong Cement Plant has an annual production capacity of
700,000 tons and its estimated replacement cost is $30 million.
It was one of the first industrial plants to be repaired after the
bombing halt and it is currently operating at 50 percent of capacity.
The plant is an important factor in North Vietnam's reconstruction
program and as capacity is further restored should once again
become an important source of foreign exchange. Severe damage to
the plant would require more than a. year to repair. Loss of pro-
duction also would mean that North Vietnam would have to import
about 400,000 tons of cement annually to meet domestic requirements.
Cam Pha Coal Preparation Plants
14. Although this plant has been repaired since the bombing
halt, coal exports have not reached more than half the levels of
pre-bombing years. The failure of the coal industry to achieve
pre-bombing production levels has been a matter of great concern
to Hanoi and the subject of numerous commentaries in the Vietnamese
press. Coal exports in past years have accounted for hard currency
foreign exchange earnings of $8-10 million & year. Successful
attacks against the Can Pha facilities would be an effective means
of frustrating Hanoi's attempt to revive the export trade of one
of its major hard currency earners.
Hanoi Machine Tool and Engineering Plant
15. This plant built as a Soviet aid project in the late 1950's
and expanded with Soviet assistance in 1966 is the largest and most
sophisticated machine building plant in the country. It is valued
at about $8 million.
16. The plant has not been bombed previously because it is
located in a heavily built-up area of Hanoi. Although we are
uncertain as to the extent that its production has been dispersed,
the plant is undoubtedly a significant factor in the maintenance
of transport equipment. A successful strike against the plant should
eliminate a large share of the country's output of diesel motors,
small electric motors, generators, water pumps and spare parts.
= 6 de
SECRET SENSITIVE
[pg. 9 of
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
An attack against this previously unstruck plant would undoubtedly
have & deep psychological impact on Hanoi's leadership. It would,
moreover, deprive North Vietnam of a major industrial facility
regarded as one of the economy's showpieces of advanced technology.
Storage Facilities
17. There are a few important storage facilities that would
make lucrative bombing targets. The yield from attacks on these
targets would probably drop sharply after the initial attack,
since the North Vietnamese would quickly revert to their practice
of storing supplies in small and widely dispersed storage areas.
Nevertheless, the initial attacks would probably cut deeply into
North Vietnam's. current cushion of essential goods such as
petroleum, trucks, foodstuffs and construction materials.
18. The storage facilities selected are the following:
Haiphong Chamber of Commerce Wharves
An Khe Army Barracks
Haiphong Petroleum Products Storage
Hanoi Petroleum Products Storage
Vinh Petroleum Products Storage
19. The storage facilities at Haiphong would represent a
rich target in an initial surprise attack. At least 50,000
tons of supplies, much of it high value imports, are stored
in these facilities at any one time. The storage facility
at An Khe is occupied primarily by cargo trucks. Although
there is a rapid turnover of vehicles at An Khe the number in
storage at any one time is high ranging from about 800 trucks
in May of this year to over 1,300 trucks in early August. The
petroleum storage facilities at Hanoi and Haiphong are under
reconstruction and by June 1969 these facilities had an estimated
storage capacity of 37,000 tons. If this capacity is being fully
used these facilities would account for almost 40 percent of North
Vietnam's estimated stockpiles of petroleum. The facility is
significant because it is a major source of petroleum supplies
for the Panhandle areas of North Vietnam.
Transportation Targets
20. There are a large number of bridges along North Vietnam's
lines of communication whose neutralization would impede the
internal distribution of economic and military supplies. For
the most part interdiction of these bridges would be only 8.
minor harassment. The North Vietnamese have demonstrated
extreme skill in offsetting the effects of previous interdiction
and during the bombing built 2 great deal of redundancy into
- 7 -
[pg. 10 of 15]
Reproduced at the SidentiariLib DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
their transport system. There are, however, three bridge targets
that play key roles in maintaining the flow of Hanoi's imports
either overland from China or through the port of Haiphong. These
are:
Hanoi Railroad/Highway (Doumer)
Bridge over Red River
Hanoi Railroad/Highway
Bridge over Canal des Rapides
Haiphong Railroad Bridge
at Hai Duong
21. All of these bridges could be easily by-passed and the
disruption to normal traffic flows would not be sustained for a
long period. The importance of interdicting these bridges could
become highly significant, however, if they were attacked simul-
taneously with an interdiction of the Haiphong Port area through a
bombing or mining program.
22. In addition to these bridge targets, the major rail yards
at Hanoi and Haiphong represent significant targets in North Vietnam's
transport system. Successful attacks could achieve significant results
in terms of damage to equipment and supplies. These rail complexes
not only contain large quantities of materials but account for the
bulk of North Vietnam's capacity for the repair of rolling stock
and equipment. The effects of these strikes would be short-lived.
Traffic flows could be resumed within days and needed transport equipment
could be imported from Communist China.
Levees in the Red River Delta
23. The rice fields and populated centers of the delta are
protected by an elaborate system of levees which have greatly
reduced flooding from natural causes. A successful attack
against the dikes in the Red River Delta could, at the proper
time of the year, have exceedingly disruptive effects in the short
run.
24. A highly successful campaign could destroy as much as 25
percent of the annual rice crop. Most economic and military
activity in Hanoi and its suburbs would be temporarily halted.
Key transport routes leading south and west from Hanoi would be
disrupted. Sizable diversions of labor would be necessary for a
period of weeks to repair flood damage.
25. The most significant results would be accomplished by a
- 8 as
SECRET SENSITIVE
[pg
11
of
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
breaching of the levees during the high water period between
mid-July and mid-August. The fact that this period has passed
explains the bottom ranking of this target system. But, the
levee system is also given a low ranking because the technical
problems of breeching levees by aerial bombing are so complex
and the required sortie and ordnance effort so large, that such
an attack generally holds little promise of success. In addition,
the certainty of extremely adverse international reactions to
the bombing of dams and dikes would be extremely unfavorable to the
United States.
III. Conclusions
26. A review of economic and military facilities in North
Vietnam has resulted in the selection of 29 installations that
could be significant targets for air attack:
Five complexes in the Haiphong Port Area
Six electric power stations
Four airfields
Three manufacturing facilities
Five storage facilities
Five transportation targets
The levee system in the Red River Delta
27. The loss or neutralization of these facilities could have
a deep psychological impact on Hanoi's leadership. Renewed air
attacks would not only signal a return of the hardships and frus-
trations of previous bombing programs but also would yield
significant amounts of physical and material damage. The fruit of
several hundred million dollars in capital investment and post-
bombing reconstruction programs would be lost. Most modern in-
dustrial production would come to a halt as would most foreign
exchange earnings. The potential loss of large quantities of
essential economic and military goods would increase sharply North
Vietnam's import requirements. Finally, there would be extensive
disruptions to normal living, to the provision of public services
and transport, and substantial displacements of both urban and
agricultural labor forces.
28. Despite the possibilities of widespread damage and loss,
the neutralization of these facilities would not have & vital
impact on Hanoi's war-making capabilities. These facilities make
- 9 -
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
[p, 12 of / This document has been reviewed pursuant d'Executive-Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
little direct contribution to the war because, with the exception of
manpower, North Vietnam's military capabilities depend overwhelmingly
on the continued flow of large amounts of economic and military assistance
from its Communist allies.
29. The impact of attacks on these facilities would be highly dependent
on the manner in which the program is executed. Hanoi has demonstrated
an exceptional ability to adopt effective countermeasures to US bombing
programs. Attacks against only one or two facilities in a target system
would minimize the possible damage and fail to bite deeply enough into
the available cushion of supplies or resources, thus easing the problems
of recuperation. Therefore, an attack against all the facilities in a given
target system (such as all powerplants) would be a more promising means
of exerting pressure against the Hanoi regime. In other cases, the results
to be expected from attacks against one target system (such as lines of
communications) are maximized if they are combined with attacks against
a complementary system (such as the Haiphong port facilities).
30. A neutralization program against these facilities would also carry
liabilities. Most of the facilities are within heavily defended and densely
populated areas around Hanoi and Haiphong. Attacks in these areas run
a heavy risk of high losses of US aircraft and their crews, as well as
the inadvertent killing or injuring of large numbers of Vietnamese civilians.
- 10
[pg
13
Reproduce betRichard Nixon Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Table
Significant Targets in North Vietnam
Haiphong Port Area
1. Haiphong Docks
2. Haiphong Open Storage Areas
3. Haiphong Naval Base
4. Haiphong Shipyards
5. Haiphong Air Defense Center
Electric Power Stations
6. Hanoi
7. Uong Bi
8. Haiphong West
9. Hon Gai
10. Thai Nguyen
11. Bac Giang
Airfields
12. Phuc Yen
13. Bai Thuong
14. Kien An
15. Yen Bai
Manufacturing Facilities
16. Haiphong Cement Plant
17. Cam Pha Coal Preparation Plant
18. Hanoi Machine Tool and Engineering Plant
Storage Facilities
19. Haiphong Chamber of Commerce Wharves
20. An Khe Army Barracks
21. Haiphong Petroleum Products Storage
22. Hanoi Petroleum Products Storage
23. Vinh Petroleum Products Storage
- 11 -
[19.14
Reproduced at the Richard SECRET Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Transportation Targets
24. Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge over Red River
25. Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge over Canal des Rapides
26. Haiphong Railroad Bridge at Hai Duong
27. Hanoi Rail Classification Yard
28. Haiphong Rail Yards
Agriculture
29. Levees in Red River Delta
- 12 -
[69. 15 of 15]
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CIA Assessment I I
NAN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
October 2, 1969
VIETNAM
Contingency Planning
BACKUP BOOK
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLAS
SPRESIDENT
ument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decl
NVN Mining Plan
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
[89/1/2]
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
DUCK HOOK
20 JULY 1969
Office of Chief of Naval Operations
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 06-04/20 NLN06-12/2 pr letter 8-10-07
TOP SECRET
By KMR NARA, Date 8-28-07
SENSITIVE
[plof41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
SUMMARY OF MINING PLAN FOR HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX
1. This paper summarizes a plan for mining the Haiphong Port
Complex, including Cam Pha and Hon Gai.
BACKGROUND
2. In 1968 cargo throughput into Haiphong averaged 4100 tons
per day. So far in 1969 this average has increased to 5200
tons per day. About 90 percent of all imports via sea into
North Vietnam pass through Haiphong. USSR provides about 50
percent of this shipping. This cargo is estimated to consist
not only of food and petroleum products which contribute to
the prosecution of the war, but in addition, trucks, genera-
tors, and other war supporting materials. (See Tab A). The
closing of the Haiphong Port Complex will have a major effect
on the North Vietnam economy and the capability of the North
Vietnamese to support the war in the South.
HAIPHONG COMPLEX MINE PLAN
3. The mining plan (Tab C) is designed to stop entry of deep
draft shipping into the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam
Pha (all in Haiphong Complex), and to disrupt major attempts
by the North Vietnamese to employ lighterage for offloading
deep draft shipping which would be forced to anchor to seaward
of the minefields.
4. Three options are specified in the Mining Plan, viz, A:
Three CVA's; B: Two CVA's; and C: One CVA. Option A, using
154 mines/605 destructors, provides the most complete and
effective mining of the Haiphong Complex and accomplishes the
mission in one launch (except during brief period when no large
CVA is available). Option A has disadvantage of longer reaction
time because one of the three CVA's involved may be in port when
the plan is initiated. (See Tab B for Reaction). Options B and
c, using 98 mines and 400-600 destructors, provide effective
mining of the deep water channels with much quicker response
time. Disadvantages inherent in B and C are less dense mine-
fields and elimination of certain shallow water destructor fields.
5. Arming delays of 72 hours are set on all mines to allow time
for departure of third nation shipping.
6. The use of mines is not an offensive act since no weapons are
specifically directed against any target. Any damage which occur-
red to either North Vietnam or third country shipping would be
self inflicted resulting from their decision to penetrate waters
that have been openly declared unsafe. There is no coercion on
the part of U.S.
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
[p
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
7. Plans provide for follow-on launches, when directed, to lay
destructor fields. These are designed to disrupt lighterage
if reconnaissance reveals that North Vietnam is offloading sub-
stantial amounts of cargo from ships at anchor. Destructors
will not be delivered earlier than 48 hours after initial mine-
fields are laid. (24 hours is maximum delay which can be set
on destructors).
8. SAR (Search and Rescue) ships and PIRAZ (Positive Identifi-
cation Radar Advisory Zone) ships will be positioned to the
north to provide necessary support. BARCAP (Barrier Combat Air
Patrol) and TARCAP (Target Combat Air Patrol) will also be
provided.
9. Tab A describes North Vietnamese Air Order of Battle which
could be encountered. Considering the low level profile of the
mission (approximately 300') there is little or no danger from
either MIG aircraft or SA-2 emplacements. In most cases, mine-
fields selected are outside the range of aaa, although some
exits from target area will approach AAA defenses. Based on
planned aircraft tracks and known locations of North Vietnamese
air defenses, expected aircraft loss rate will be approximately
3 percent (conservative estimate).
10. Provisions are included in the plan for follow up reconnais-
sance to check on effectiveness of fields and reaction of the
North Vietnamese. Reseeding operations will be executed as
necessary to maintain the integrity of the various minefields.
11. For diversionary purposes, several weeks prior to execution,
PIRAZ and SAR forces will be relocated to positions in the Tonkin
Gulf which they will occupy during the actual mission. After
about 12 hours on station they will return to current operating
areas. This relocation will be repeated at random intervals
(about every 10 days) to inure North Vietnamese defenses and en-
tice them to lower their guard when mission is actually carried
out.
12. Detailed rules of engagement are listed in Tab D. Flak sup-
pression will be required against those AAA sites of greatest
threat to own forces. Talos missiles are authorized over land
against hostile MIG aircraft which threaten U.S. forces.
13. Possible reactions by USSR, Communist China, and North
Vietnam have been analyzed and appear in Tab E. An interesting
conclusion of this analysis is that much of the uneasiness about
Vietnam throughout the world has subsided and that it is likely
that the mining of the Haiphong Complex would generally be in-
terpreted as a show of determination, whereas a year ago it might
have been regarded as recklessness.
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
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SENSITIVE
[p301417 This has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET - SENISTIVE
14. Third nation shipping would have three options: Not to
enter, enter with risk, or anchor outside. Many studies show
that sufficient barges, sampans, and junks are available for
lightering operations but this is a very difficult operation,
requiring large numbers of people and excessive time. It is
particularly difficult during the Northeast Monsoon season
(September-May). Further, while moving from ship to shore,
lighters are vulnerable to ship and aircraft attack without
undue risk to third nation ships and without risk of killing
civilians ashore. If decision is made to interdict lighters
while they are moving from ship to shore, surface gunfire, as
well as air, can be employed.
15. The rules of international law regarding mine-laying have
been reexamined. The traditional laws of war do not cover
mining except in a state of war. The political and techno-
logical history of the cold war has rendered laws of war, based
on the "war or peace" dichotomy, obsolete and irrelevant. Acts
in self-defense are lawful under international law. Therefore,
the mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, as described
in this plan, is considered to be a lawful exercise of South
Vietnam's and U.S. right of collective self-defense against the
aggression of North Vietnam. (See Tab F).
TABS
A - Intelligence
B - Execution Timing
C - Mining Plan Concept
D - Rules of Engagement for Mining Plan
E - World Reaction to Mining
F - Legal Ramification of Mining
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
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SENSITIVE
[p40]41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
A
:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
TAB A
INTELLIGENCE
HAIPHONG
1. General Situation:
a. Air Threat: There are eight serviceable jet airbases in
North Vietnam with an estimated 94 jet fighters of the MIG 15,
17, 19 and 21 variety. Strip alert is stood at five of the eight
bases. The NVN GCI coverage of NVN and the Gulf of Tonkin is
excellent but the NVN Air Force has only a limited all weather/
night capability.
b. SAM Threat: There are three known active SAM sites
which could take under fire aircraft over water conducting opera-
tions in the proposed minefield area. SA-2 operational effec-
tiveness below 1000' is limited due to ground return.
c. AAA Threat: There is limited threat from NVN gun AAA
over the minefield. There is known light AAA (effective range
4 NM) on Ile de Norway and the heavy AAA in the vicinity of Cat
Bi/Kien An airfields and Hon Gai has an effective range of 7 NM
to 25,000 feet.
d. NVN Naval Threat: (Haiphong Area)
Motor Gunboat (PGM)
11
Motor Torpedo Boat (PT)
9
Subchaser (SC)
2
Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo Boat (PTH)
1
(1) The PGM is capable of 43 knots for 1 hour. At 20
knots, range is 655 NM. Armament consists of 2-37MM single
mounts and 2 - 20 MM single mounts. It has surface search radar
SKIN HEAD.
(2) The PT boat is capable of 50 knots for 350 NM. At
30 knots for 410 NM. Armament consists of 4 - 12.7 MM guns,
2 - 18" torpedoes, and 4 depth charges. It has surface search
radar SKIN HEAD.
(3) The PTH is estimated capable of speeds in excess of
40 knots. Armament is 2 - 21" torpedoes and two twin 12.7 MM
gun mounts. It has the POT HEAD surface search radar.
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB A
[p5of41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
2. Enemy Forces.
a. North Vietnam.
(1) Naval Forces: The North Vietnamese Navy was designed
to be a coastal defense force, but has proved itself incapable of
performing the task. Its P-4 Class PT's pose the only threat to
large surface craft, but NVN tactics and torpedo readiness render
this threat almost negligible. The Navy's S0-1 SC have ASW
ordnance, but crews have not been trained to use it. The patrol
craft (Swatow Class PGM and Shanghai Class PTF) provide 37 MM
mobile platforms to supplement shore defenses, but have no sig-
nificant anti-ship capability.
(2) Air Force: The North Vietnamese Air Force has grown
considerably since the beginning of the Vietnam hostilities.
The NVNAF combat inventory presently includes about 94 fighters
and 4 IL-28 bombers located in North Vietnam.
3. Enemy Capabilities.
a. North Vietnam is capable of:
(1) Attacking with light jet bombers and jet fighters/
bombers opposing naval forces operating in the Gulf of Tonkin
or the northwestern area of the South China Sea.
(2) Conducting limited harassment of opposing naval
units operating in the coastal waters.
(3) Conducting limited defensive minelaying operations
in coastal waters.
4. NVN Maritime Activity.
a. The Haiphong port complex handles some 90 percent of
North Vietnamese seaborne imports.
The war has caused North
Vietnam's need for imports, particularly foodstuffs, petroleum,
machinery, construction materials, trucks, earth moving equip-
ment, and generators, to grow. The principal contribution of
the North Vietnamese economy to the war has been as a manpower
source and the maintenance of a logistics system capable of
moving men and imported war material to the combat zones.
b. The bulk of military equipment used by the enemy in both
North and South Vietnam continues to be imported from Communist
countries. The value of such aid in 1968 is estimated at $400
million, down from about $600 million in 1967. The decline in
military imports in 1968 probably reflects reduced needs for air
defense weapons, particularly ammunition and surface-to-air
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB A
[p6 0641]
This of document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
missiles, since the U.S. bombing cutbacks of 31 March and 31
October 1968. There is evidence that large quantities of arms
and ammunition have entered North Vietnam by rail from Com-
munist China. Although there is no specific proof that pin-
points the import of arms into North Vietnam via the sea, this
is still a strong possibility. It could be coming by sea and
never be detected. Regardless of the fact that it cannot be
determined what percentage of arms are coming from which nation
and by which route, a reduction in food, petroleum, machinery,
construction materials, trucks, and other war-supporting items
will reduce the war-making potential of North Vietnam and have
a direct effect on its ability to support the war in the South.
c. Haiphong continues to be important as the port through
which the North Vietnamese economy is propped-up by its com-
munist allies while its manpower is being drained off to the war
in the south.
d. During 1968 seaborne imports to North Vietnam rose to a
new high of 1,960,000 tons, 39 percent above the volume in 1967
and the largest increase recorded for any year. Imports from
Free World countries remained at the same low level as 1967
(accounting for only 2 percent of the total), thus imports from
communist countries provided the total of the increase.
e. More than half of North Vietnam's nearly two million
tons of imports during 1968 comprised of food (790,000 tons) and
petroleum (385,000 tons). The USSR supplied 77 percent of the
petroleum (some 90 percent of which was motor gasoline and diesel
oil). Communist China supplied 18 percent. Imports of general
and miscellaneous cargo (construction equipment, industrial
machinery, trucks and motor vehicles, chemicals, cement, metal
products and waterborne logistics craft) increased in 1968 for
the fourth consecutive year and totaled 605,000 tons.
f. Imports of general and miscellaneous cargo increased from
all parts of the communist world except Communist China, which
showed an 11 percent decrease. Imports of this category from
China showed a particularly steep decline in the second half of
1968. Motor vehicle imports from China, for example, dropped off
from 6,000 tons in the first half of the year to 1,000 tons in
the second half.
Tables 1 and 2 provide ship arrivals, by Flag, to North
Vietnam since 1964.
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB A
[p70]41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Table 1
North Vietnam:
Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals, by Flag
1964-68
Flag
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
Total
580
530
379
386
500
Communist countries
178
274
305
308
351
USSR
48
79
122
181
216
Eastern Europe
58
50
44
29
31
Albania
- -
1
2
1
1
Bulgaria
2
5
9
4
4
Czechoslovakia
7
4
--
---
---
East Germany
1
--
--
---
- 1 am
Poland
48
40
33
24
26
Communist China
72
144
138
97
98
Cuba
--
1
1
1
6
Free World
402
256
74
78
149
Cyprus
---
3
12
5
13
Denmark
1
--
--
---
--
Finland
1
--
--
---
---
France
1
2
--
--
---
Greece
35
28
7
---
---
Indonesia
1
-
--
--
---
Italy
11
1
1
2
1
Japan
74
37
:
---
1
Kuwait
--
--
---
--
1
Lebanon
20
9
1
2
Liberia
7
3
--
--
---
Malta
-
2
4
3
1
Netherlands
8
5
--
- -
---
Norway
43
29
--
--
---
Panama
12
1
:
--
---
Singapore
-
--
---
---
6
Somalia
--
--
--
--
9
Sweden
3
--
---
---
--
United Kingdom
177
136
50
67
114
West Gèrmany
8
--
- -
--
- -
Illegal flag
--
--
- -
---
1
[p8of41]
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
TABLE 2
BLOC SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM - 1969
SOVIET
POLISH
BULGARIAN
GRT.
GRT.
GRT.
MONTH
NO.
DWT.
NO.
DWT.
NO.
DWT.
JAN
24
102,343
2
15,771
-
--
130,885
22,999
FEB
19
90,869
4
27,178
1
7,962
114,780
39,835
11,600
MAR
17
68,268
1
8,231
I
--
85,253
10,580
APR
21
113,695
2
13,564
-
:
140,591
20,359
MAY
21
97,656
1
6,904
2
6,303
122,841
10,086
6,496
JUN
15
65,373
1
9,267
1
5,920
84,879
12,407
9,200
E. GERMAN
CUBAN
CHICOM
JAN
-
--
-
:
8
31,012
44,260
FEB
-
--
-
--
8
39,584
57,610
MAR
1
8,810
-
-
15
59,341
10,130
85,650
APR
1
8,002
1
9,390
7
30,770
10,300
12,686
48,130
MAY
1
8,003
1
9,732
4
14,592
10,300
12,686
22,560
JUN
2
17,658
-
--
7
28,928
23,100
42,360
TOTAL
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
NO.
34
32
34
32
30
26
GRT.
149,126
165,593
144,650
175,420
143,550
127,136
DWT.
198,144
223,825
191,613
232,066
181,050
171,946
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE
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[parg41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NORTH VIETNAM: Maritime Ports, Anchorages, and Shipping Channels
106°45'
107
107°15'
NORTH
VIETNAM
18
18
Cam Pha
Port
18
Port
21
Redon
Uong Bi
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
10
10
Hon Ga
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
10
SONG BACH dang
Quang Yen
APPROX. LOCATION
OF DREDGE
A
HA LONG BAY
2
BAR
AREA
F
B
LA GOELAND
Haiphong
ISLE
+
NAM CAM 14 IIIIIIIIIIII
CAC BA ISLE
Kien An
+
-20°45'
20°45'
Pho Cac Ba
Do Son
CONFIDENTIAL
2 JUL 68
outer BAR
+
AREA
Maritime Port
Maritime Anchorage
ZERO BUOY
Other Port
Shipping Channel
Principal Waterways
A
SONG THAI BINH
GULF OF TONKIN
CANAL DES BAMBOUS -
LACH TRAY /
At Haiphong: 1 POL Pier
2 Maritime Wharfs
-
106°45'
107°
107°15'
DIA
NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR SITUATION AS OF 10 JULY 1969
8 IL-28/BEAGLE
4 YUNNANI, 4 PHUC YEN
20 MI-1/4/HARE/HOUND
VARIOUS AIRFIELDS PRIMARILY HOA LAC
LIGHT JET BOMBER
HELICOPTER
PRIMARILY HANOI/HAIPHONG
78 MIG-21/FISHBED
33 YUNNANI, 39 PHUC YFN
4 MI-6/HOOK
JET FIGHTER
6 BAI THUONG
VARIOUS AIRFIELDS PRIMARILY HOA LAC
HELICOPTER
122 MIG-15/17/FAGOT/FRESCO
59 YUNNANI, 8 KIEN AN, 24 liuchou,
29 PROP TRAINER
YUNNANI
JET FIGHTER
20 HOA LAC, 4 KEP 7 PHUC YEN
3 AN-24/COKE
1 YUNNANI, 2 GIA LAM
40 MIG-19/FARMER
10 KEP, 30 YUNNANI
TRANSPORT
JET FIGHTER
1 IL-18/COOT
GIA LAM
6 UMIG-15/MIDGET
1 YUNNANI, 3 KEP, 1 KIEN AN 1 HOA LAC
TRANSPORT
JET TRAINER
37 IL-14/LI-2/CRATE/CAB
22 AN-2/COLT
HANOI/HAIPHONG/YUNNANI/
HAIPHONG/LANG SON/HANOI
TRANSPORT
LIGHT TRANSPORT
LANG SON AREA AIRFIELDS
YUNNANI AREA AIRFIELDS
0 + PEITUN/YUNNANI
LIUCHOU
33 MIG-21
59 MIG-15/17
CHINA
30 MIG-19
24 MIG-15/17
4 IL-28
1 UMIG-15
LAO CAI
NANNING
10 MIG-19
4 MIG-15/17
3 UMIG-15
39 MIG-21
YEN BAI
LANG SON
DIEN BIEN PHU
7 MIG-15/17
DONG
4 IL-28
SUONG
0 KEP
HIEP HOA
KEP HA
- PHUC YENO
NA SAN
20 MIG-15/17
GIA LAM
CAT BI
UMIG-15
HOA LAC
HANOI
HAIPHONG
8 MIG-15/17
1 UMIG-15
BAC MAI
KIEN AN
20° N
NVN JET AIRCRAFT
LOCATION
NVN
CHINA
BAI THUONG
FIGHTERS
LAOS
6 MIG-21
MIG-15/17
122
39
83
MIG-19
40
10
30
Hainan
SERVICEABLE JET
MIG-21
SERVICEABLE LIGHT A/C
78
45
33
FTRS SUB-
UNSERVICEABLE
19° N
TOTAL
240
94
146
*
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
BOMBERS
VINH 0
IL-28
8
4
4
TRAINERS
UMIG-15
6
5
1
TOTAL JET
AIRCRAFT
254
103
151
DONG HOI
THAILAND
REPUBLIC
SECRET SPOKE
OF
11 JUL 69
VIET-NAM
Statute Miles
0
40
80
DIA. DISIC
[p110g41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
COMMUNIST CHINA
3
2
132
4
34
6
4
3
2
132
157
18
22°
191
134
13A
IA
19
#
13B
PHUC YEN
the
4
13A
6
kep
18
155
HANOI
6
00
BO
IATO
21
12
HAIPHONG
15
nam dinh
IA
20°
LAOS
15
THANH HOA
14
7
x
84
GULF OF tonkin
VINH
84
A
110
15
82
18°
THAILAND
10
SECRET
137
102°
24 APR 69
NORTH VIETNAM
3
1031
VINH linh
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
SAM envelope
RAILROADS
possible SAM THREAT
HH
#
STANDARD GAUGE
ESTIMATED LOCATION
METER GAUGE
REP. OF
OF FIRING BATTALIONS
H
DUAL gauge
INOPE ABLE
VIET-NAM
0
25
50
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Statute Miles
104°
106°
108°
DIA HISIC
[p120]41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
COMMUNIST CHINA
3
2
132
34
6
6A
2
3
132
157
18
22°
191
5
LANG SON afld
YEN bai AFLD
13A
THAI NGUYEN
19
13B
. dien bien PHU AFLD
H
4
500
2
*3
13A
6
KEP AFLD
18
PHUC YEN AFLD
183
HANOI
CAM PHA
HOA LAC AFLDO
HON GAI
IA
HAIPHONG
21
(112
10
to
IA
20°
bai THUONG afld
LAOS
THANH HOA
SITES -
1,202
NVA AAA BY ROUTE PKG 31 OCT 68 31 MAR 69
WEAPONS -
(37-MM AND LARGER
5,129
LIGHT WEAPONS
MEDIUM WEAPONS
37mm/57mm -
4,792
SUB
15
85mm/100mm
337
MONTH
RP 1
RP2
RP 3
RP 4
RP 5
RP 6A
RP
6B
TOTAL
TOTAL
x
1249
468
550
360
93
1001
509
4229
3
31 OCT 68
84
4
4624
38
10
63
-
148
135
395
GULF OF.TONKIN
1393
539
611
384
93
1127
606
4753
30 NOV 68
5165
vinh
AFLD
34
10
10
51
-
162
145
412
1564
599
571
447
89
1179
626
5075
31 DEC 68
84
5439
29
10
10
44
-
119
152
364
1504
560
545
424
$9
1232
570
4929
2
31 JAN 69
5280
29
25
10
52
-
119
118
351
&
1539
555
555
446
153
1223
570
5041
28 FEB 69
5352
36
10
47
117
101
311
10
1425
472
491
432
1192
82
154
618
4792
18°
31 MAR 69
5129
&
-
10
45
-
123
120
337
SECRET
THAILAND
101
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
EXCEPT UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA,
BASED ON DATA
MU gia PASS
& NEW ZEALAND
AS OF 31 MAR 69
137
18 APR 69
102°
1
1A
DONG HoH AFLD
NORTH VIETNAM
1036
X
17
10'
STATUS OF AAA
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
RAILROADS
STANDARD GAUGE
meter GAUGE
REP. OF
DUAL GAUGE
ofon
INOPERABLE
0
VIET-NAM
25
50
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Statute Miles
104°
106°
108°
HISIC
50 130.41] 13
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NORTH vietnam EW/GCI COVERAGE
104
106°
108°
COMMUNIST CHINA
22
PHUC yen
NA SAN AF
KEP
HOA LAC
NGHIA XA
BAC MAI
Do
HA DONG
kien an
THUONG CHE
HANOI
PHU nong CHANG
LANG TaM
NAM dinh
bai THUONG
20°
TIN CHE
THANH HOA
TONG CONG
CHO TUAN
to
LAOS
DONG THAP
CAM NGOC
VINH AF
VINH SON
DONG hoi
AILAND
ESTIMATED NORTH vietnam
EARLY WARNING COVERAGE
TARGET F-105 - 25 percent
BSR HEAD ON
30,000 FT
16°
15,000 FT
EW
3,000 FT
POSSIBLE GCI COVERAGE
F-105 50 percent BSR HEAD
ON AT 30,000 FT
REPUBLIC
GCI
OF
NORTH VIETNAM
AS OF
NAM
14 JULY 1969
0
50
100
Statute Miles
DIA ISIC
SECRET
[p140]41] 14
NO FOREIGN dissem
18 JULY 1969
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
B
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
TAB B
EXECUTION TIMING
1. Response time will vary as a result of several factors:
Location of CVA's, currently assigned mission of CVA's,
location and readiness of mines, and configuration of air=
craft. The response times in this plan range from 12 hours
for options B and C to 86 hours for option A (when one CVA
is in most distant port). Response for option A could be
reduced to 18 hours provided an alerting message returned
the third CVA to Tonkin Gulf.
2. Definition of Execution Terms:
M-Hour: DTG of message ordering mining plan implemented.
(A subsequent order is required for launch of
mining aircraft unless L-Hour is specified in
this message).
L-Hour: Time launch of mining aircraft commences as
ordered by appropriate authority. L-Hour may be
pre-designated when M-Hour is signalled or may be
ordered separately.
D-Hour: Time when all fields are in place for option
selected.
A-Hour: Time when all fields are activated.
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
[p150841]
TAB B
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
3. Timing of perti nent events (M-Hour to L-Hour).
OPTION
OPTION
OPTION
A
B
C
(assuming 1 CVA in port)
(1) All desig-
M +68 hrs
M +0
M +0
nated Forces
(CVA from most
in Tonkin
distant port)
Gulf
(2) All mines
M +74
M +0
M +0
aboard CVA's
in readiness
condition "C"
*(3) All Surface
M +77
M +3
M +3
Forces in
launch posi-
tion
*(4) All mines
M +82
M +8
M +8
readied to
Condition "A"
*(5) All mines
M +86
M +12
M +12
loaded &
aircraft
ready for
launch
* Events (3), (4) and (5) are proceeding concurrently.
4. Time available to higher authority to cancel the mining
operation after it is ordered implemented:
a. Unlimited if message implementing mining plan did not
specify an L-Hour and if no L-Hour has been signalled sub-
sequently.
b. After L-Hour has been specified or signalled, the
mining operation can be cancelled provided the cancellation
order is received and understood aboard the CVA's by L +15
minutes.
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB B
[p160841]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
"
C
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
TAB C
MINE PLAN CONCEPT
1. Concept. When directed TF 77 will conduct offensive
CVA aerial mining operations in the Haiphorg Port Complex
in order to interdict the maritime logistic support of
North Vietnam. Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha comprise
the complex to be mined and were selected because over 90
percent of the maritime support for North Vietnam enters
throughout these ports.
a. The plan provides three mining options, i.e.
ALFA (3 CVA's), BRAVO (2 CVA's), and CHARLIE (1 CVA). TF
77 can commence mining operations within 12 to 86 hours
after receipt of an execute directive, dependent on which
option is selected.
b. In each option the mine fields are armed 72 hours
after planting and this fact will be publicly announced.
This allows a safe passage period for shipping that desires
to depart the area.
2. Mine Fields (See Chart - Appendix 7)
a. Haiphong - The port of Haiphong is mined with five
fields. Two fields (A and B) close the main channel with
sea mines. Fields 1 and 2 contain mines and destructors
and are planted adjacent to the main channel. Field 3 is
a destructor field which can be laid over field B in order
to seal the main channel to lighterage craft as well as
ocean shipping.
NOTE: Sea mine fields are lettered, destructor fields are
numbered. Sea mines arm in 72 hours, destructors in 24
hours. No destructors are planted in main channels on the
first launch for any option in order to ensure a safe de-
parture channel during the grace period.
b. Hon Gai - Fields C, D and E are sea mine fields
designed to block the ocean vessel principal access route.
Destructor fields 4 and 5 will block the most used lighter-
age and anchorage areas serving Hon Gai.
c. Cam Pha - Fields F, G, H and I are sea mine fields
designed to prevent access to Cam Pha 72 hours after plant-
ing. Destructor field 6 will interdict lighterage operations
in the area.
PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB C
[p17]4/]Reproduceduceduce at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
d. Mine/Destructor allocations . The following quanti-
ties of sea mines listed are required for fields A through
I for options indicated:
OPTIONS
MINE TYPES
MK 50-0
MK 52-2
MK 52-3
MK 55-2
500#
1000#
1000#
2000#
ACOUSTIC
MAG IND
PRES MAG
MAG IND
A
10
67
12
25
B
10
42
12
14
C
10
42
12
14
Destructor fields 1 through 6 require the following assets:
DESTRUCTOR/MINE TYPES
DST 36
DST 40
MK 50-0
500#
1000#
500#
MAG
MAG
ACOUSTIC
A1/2*
564
40
30
B1
564
48
20
B2
402
40
20
C
358
36
20
*See paragraph 3a for further definition of options.
All mines/destructors required for the above options are
currently aboard 7th Fleet CVA's or at the Naval Magazine,
Subic Bay.
3. Forces:
a. Carrier requirements:
Option: Al - 1 large CVA and 2 small CVA's
A2 - 3 small CVA's
B1 - 1 large CVA and 1 small CVA
B2 - 2 small CVA's
C - 1 large CVA
b. Other ships The operation includes requirements
for the following additional ships:
North SAR - 2 DD/DLG North Search and Rescue,
Strike Monitor
PIRAZ - 1 CAG (TALOS) and 1 DD/DDG Strike and Cap
Control
PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES
TOP SECRET
[p180]41]
TAB C
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
C. Supporting Aircraft - Support aircraft required include:
Bar Cap/Tar Cap - To protect mining force and carrier
F4/F8
force.
Tankers
- Refuel fighters or mining aircraft
EKA3/KA4/KA6
as required.
ECM/AEW
- To provide radar following and to
EA6/E2A/E1B
counter missiles and fire control
radars.
IRON HAND/FLAK SUPPRESSORS - To provide mining force
A4/A7/A6/F4
protection.
RECONNAISSANCE - To provide Post-Strike results/NVN
RA5C/RF8
reaction.
4. Operations:
a. Plan Description - This is a three option plan
providing a choice of 3, 2, or 1 carriers to mine the
Haiphong Complex. Principal advantages/disadvantages of
each option are presented in the following:
Option A
Advantages: A three carrier force provides the max-
imum flexibility in strike size and composition. In this
concept, total mine requirements are not stored on the CVA's.
Some of the required mines are held aboard an ammunition ship
in the Tonkin Gulf thus allowing CVA's normal ordnance stowage
and operations. Provides the most complete and effective min-
ing of Haiphong Complex.
Disadvantages: Requires mine transfer at sea with
attendant delay in response to execute order. Current
posture requires two CVA's at Yankee Station; Third CVA
late arrival could delay execute up to 86 hours. Requires
dedication of two AE's to partial mine load-out thus restrict-
ing conventional ordnance stowage and AE deployment.
Option B and C
Advantages: Mines are stored aboard CVA's thus
speeding response time. Deep water fields are still
effectively mined.
Disadvantages: Mines take up come CVA ordnance
storage space - requiring increased replenishment or slight
lessening of the normal Vietnam in country support capability.
PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES
TOP SECRET
[p191f41]
TAB C
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
b. Aircraft Sortie Requirements - See Appendices I,
II, III, IV and V to TAB C. It will be noted that "second
launch" or "follow-on" sorties are included. These sorties
would provide destructor fields to interdict lighterage
craft but will not be launched until directed.
C. Reconnaissance and Replenishment:
(1) Reconnaissance flights/operations will be
conducted subsequent to the mine laying operation to de-
termine NVN/Foreign shipping reaction/response to the
mining effort as well as results.
(2) In order to extend the maximum effectiveness
of the fields as planted, replenishment operations should
commence in about 4 months for sea mines and 2 months for
destructors. Field attrition resulting from NVN sweeping
or mine detonation may require earlier replenishment, but
no replenishment will take place until directed.
5. Mine Logistics:
a. For option A, to ensure mine availability and prepared-
ness, two AE's will be loaded with identical inventories of
101 mines; and one AE will always be at Yankee Station.
b. For other options carriers will have aboard a pre-
assigned mine loadout and the assisting Mobile Mine Assem-
bly Teams (MOMAT).
c. Subic Bay will support the programmed 4 month mine
replenishment requirement and is capable of providing addi-
tional mine assets. COMSERVPAC/COMINEPAC will ensure that
Subic mine inventories remain filled.
6. Aircraft Losses. Estimated maximum losses would be
3.2%, or for example, in option A2 with 3 launches and
15 support aircraft per launch included, the loss estimate
is 6. Minimum loss estimate is 3 aircraft on option C.
7. Execution Diversion/Deception. If an option is approved
for planning, TF 77 carriers/support vessels will be loaded
to support the option selected. Additionally, CTF 77 will
randomly move SAR/PIRAZ ships into the planned northern
position in order to lessen NVN initial reaction to support
ship positioning when the plan is executed. Normal surface
escort and air cover will be provided during these incur-
sions.
PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES
TOP SECRET
[ p 20 0 41]
TAB C
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
APPENDICES
I - Option Al Sortie Requirements
II - - Option A2
III - Option B1
IV - - Option B2
V - Option C
VI - - Minefield Coordinates
VII - Chart
PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES
TOP SECRET
{ p21 1841] 0f41]
TAB C
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX I TO TAB C
MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS
OPTION ALFA ONE
LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN **
3 A6
A*
6 MK 52-2
A1-A6
6 MK 52-3
A7-A12
4 A6
B*
20 MK 50-0
B1-B20
1 A7
C
4 MK 55-2
C-C4
5 A7
D
7 MK 55-2
D21-D27
14 MK 52-2
D1-D14
6 MK 52-3
D15-D20
2 A7
E
12 MK 52-2
E1-E12
2 A7
F
12 MK 52-2
F1-F12
4 A7
G
12 MK 52-2
G1-G12
9 MK 55-2
G13-G21
1 A7
H
5 MK 55-2
H1-H5
2 A7
I
11 MK 52-2
Il-Ill
4 A6 (NOTE 1)
3
72 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
2 A6 (NOTE 1)
6
24 MK 40 (DST)
N/A
2 A7 (NOTE 1)
6
16 MK 40 (DST)
N/A
27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
18 A4/7
1
180 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
6 A4/
1
30 MK 50-0
T1-T30
27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)
8 A4/7
2
72 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
10 A4/7
5
100 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
14 A4/7 (NOTE 1)
4
140 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
NOTE: (1) FIELDS 3, 4 AND 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT
NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.
* THESE FIELDS ARE ASSIGNED TO A6 AIRCRAFT ON EACH
OPTION OF PLANS A, B AND C IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A
NIGHT ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY OF MINING THE HAIPHONG
DEEP WATER CHANNEL IF DIRECTED.
** MINE CASE NUMBER
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
TOP SECRET
[p221]41] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX II TO TAB C
MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS
OPTION ALFA TWO
27C CVA (CTG 77.X)
FIRST LAUNCH
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
13 A4/7
G
12 MK 52-2
G1-G12
9 MK 55-2
G13-G21
5 A4/7
H
5 MK 55-2
H1-H5
4 A4/7
I
11 MK 52-2
Il-Ill
SECOND LAUNCH
8 A4/7
2
72 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
FOLLOW-ON
14 A4/7 (NOTE 1)
4
140 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)
FIRST LAUNCH
4 A4/7
A
6 MK 52-2
A1-A6
6 MK 52-3
A7-A12
4 A4/
B
20 MK 50-0
B1-B20
16 A4/7
1
100 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
1
30 MK 50-0
T1-T30
SECOND LAUNCH
8 A4/7
1
80 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
FOLLOW-ON
8 A4/7 (NOTE 1)
3
72 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)
FIRST LAUNCH
4 A4/7
C
4 MK 55-0
C1-C44
14 A4/7
D
14 MK 52-2
D1-D14
6 MK 52-3
D15-D20
7 MK 55-2
D21-D27
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
[p231]41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
4 A4/7
E
12 MK 52-2
E1-E12
4 A4/7
F
12 MK 52-2
F1-F12
SECOND LAUNCH
10 A4/7
5
100 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
FOLLOW-ON
10 A4/7 (NOTE 1)
6
40 MK 40 (DST)
N/A
NOTE: (1) FIELDS 3, 4, AND 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO
SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
[p240841] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX III TO TAB C
MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS
OPTION BRAVO ONE
INITIAL LAUNCH
LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
1 A6/1A7
A
5 MK 52-2
A1-A5
6 MK 52-3
A6-A11
3 A6
B
10 MK 50-0
B1-B10
3 MK 52-2
B11-B13
1 A7
C
4 MK 55-2
C1-C4
3 A7/1A6
D
12 MK 52-2
D1-D12
6 MK 52-3
D13-D18
4 MK 55-2
D19-D22
1AA7
E
6 MK 52-2
El-E6
1 A7
F
6 MK 52-2
F1-F6
2 A7
G
6 MK 52-2
G1-G6
3 MK 55-2
G7-G9
1 A7
H
3 MK 55-2
H1-H3
1 A7
I
4 MK 52-2
I1-14
4 A6
2
72 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
18 A4
1
180 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
4 A4
1
20 MK 50-0
T1-T20
FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)
LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
4 A6
3
72 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
14 A7
4
140 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
4 A6
6
48 MK 40 (DST)
N/A
27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
10 A4
5
100 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO
SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.
[p250]41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED TOP
SECRET
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX IV TO TAB C
MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS
OPTION BRAVO TWO
INITIAL LAUNCH
27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
2 A4
B
10 MK 50-0
B1-B10
1 A4
3 MK 52-2
B11-B13
10 A4
D
12 MK 52-2
D1-D12
6 MK 52-3
D13-D18
4 MK 55-2
D19-D22
2 A4
E
6 MK 52-2
El-E6
3 A4
H
3 MK 55-2
H1-H3
5 A4
2
50 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)
4 A4
A
5 MK 52-2
A1-A5
6 MK 52-3
A6-A11
4 A4
C
4 MK 55-2
C1-C4
2 A4
F
6 MK 52-2
F1-F6
5 A4
G
6 MK 52-2
G1-G6
3 MK 55-2
G7-G9
2 A4
I
4 MK 52-2
Il-14
4 A4
1
20 MK 50-0
T1-T20
3 A4
1
30 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
OPTION BRAVO TWO
FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)
27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
9 A4
1
90 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
5 A4
5
50 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
10 A4
6
40 MK 40 (DST)
N/A
27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
7 A4
3
70 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
11 A4
4
110 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO
SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
This has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX V TO TAB C
MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS
OPTION CHARLIE
INITIAL LAUNCH
LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
1 A7/1A6
A
5 MK 52-2
A1-A5
6 MK 52-3
A6-A11
3 A6
B
10 MK 50-0
B1-B10
3 MK 52-2
B11-B13
1 A7
C
4 MK 55-2
C1-C4
3 A7/1A6
D
12 MK 52-2
D1-D12
6 MK 52-3
D13-D18
4 MK 55-2
D19-D22
1 A7
E
6 MK 52-2
El-E6
1 A7
F
6 MK 52-2
F1-F6
2 A7
G
6 MK 52-2
G1-G6
3 MK 55-2
G7-G9
1 A7
H
3 MK 55-2
H1-H3
1 A7
I
4 MK 52-2
Il-14
4 A6/7A7
1
20 MK 50-0
T1-T20
70 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
OPTION CHARLIE
FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)
SORTIES
FIELD
MINE/DST
MCN
5 A7
1
50 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
5 A7
2
50 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
4 A6
3
72 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
2 A6/5A7
4
86 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
3 A7
5
30 MK 36 (DST)
N/A
3 A6
6
36 MK 40 (DST)
N/A
NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO
SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE
TOP SECRET.
[p270841]
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APPENDIX VI TO TAB C
MINING
1. Attrition minefields within 12 mile claimed territorial
limits for the interdiction of ocean traffic in the Haiphong
Deep Water Complex will consist of 9 minefields. A maximum
of one mine/destructor field and 5 destructor fields are
provided to interdict lighterage contingent upon which option
is executed.
a. Minefield Coordinates: (Use H.O. Chart 3162, 5TH ED
and H.O. Chart 3161, 7TH ED, REV 12/68).
(1) Field "A" Coordinates - 20-47.5 N
106-50.3 E
20-47.5 N
106-51.1 E
20-45.8 N
106-52.0 E
20-45.8 N
106-51.3 E
(2) Field "B" Coordinates - 20-45.2 N
106-52.3 E
20-42.6 N
106-57.3 E
20-42.3 N
106-56.4 E
20-44.85 N
106-51.5 E
(3) Field "C" Coordinates - 20-47.6 N
107-06.85 E
20-47.6 N
107-07.1 E
20-46.9 N
107-07.2 E
20-46.9 N
107-06.85 E
(4) Field "D" Coordinates - 20-48.05 N
107-08.6 E
20-48.5 N
107-10.1 E
20-47.5 N
107-10.5 E
20-47.1 N
107-08.8 E
(5) Field "E" Coordinates - 20-50.15 N
107-11.4 E
20-50.15 N
107-12.5 E
20-49.7 N
107-12.6 E
20-49.7 N
107-11.5 E
(6) Field "F" Coordinates - 20-50.0 N
107-13.8 E
20-50.0 N
107-14.9 E
20-49.5 N
107-15.0 E
20-49.5 N
107-13.9 E
(7) Field "G" Coordinates - 20-55.7 N
107-16.8 E
20-55.05 N
107-18.0 E
20-54.2 N
107-17.25 E
20-53.4 N
107-17.2 E
20-53.4 N
107-15.2 E
20-53.0 N
107-16.0 E
(8) Field "H" Coordinates - 20-53.2 N
107-19.65 E
20-53.2 N
107-19.9 E
20-52.5 N
107-19.9 E
[p2808417
20-52.5 N
107-19.65 E
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TOP SECRET
(9) Field "I" Coordinates - 21-05.6 N
107-30.6 E
21-05.3 N
107-31.1 E
21-03.5 N
107-29.3 E
21-04.9 N
107-28.9 E
b. Destructor Field Coordinates:
(1) Field "1" Coordinates - 20-42.1 N
106-47.8 E
20-43.8 N
106-52.3 E
20-41.7 N
106-56.0 E
20-39.8 N
106-49.1 E
(2) Field "2" Coordinates - 20-43.8 N
106-52.3 E
20-44.7 N
106-54.8 E
20-42.5 N
106-58.7 E
20-41.7 N
106-56.0 E
(3) Field "3" Coordinates - 20-44.7 N
106-54.8 E
20-45.8 N
106-57.7 E
20-43.0 N
107-00.6 E
20-42.5 N
106-58.7 E
(4) Field "4" Coordinates - 20-53.8 N
107-01.7 E
20-53.4 N
107-06.8 E
20-52.3 N
107-06.9 E
20-53.0 N
107-01.5 E
(5) Field "5" Coordinates - 20-53.4 N
107-06.8 E
20-55.2 N
107-09.5 E
20-55.0 N
107-10.8 E
20-52.3 N
107-06.9 E
(6) Field "6" Coordinates - 20-59.0 N
107-21.55 E
20-58.7 N
107-22.6 E
20-57.1 N
107-20.0 E
20-57.4 N
107-19.2 E
c. Mine Allocations: Option A
(1) MINEFIELDS
MK 50
MK 52-2
MK 52-3
MK 55-2
A
-
6
6
-
B
20
-
-
-
C
-
-
-
4
D
-
14
6
7
E
-
12
-
-
F
-
12
-
-
G
-
12
-
9
H
-
-
-
5
I
-
11
-
I
TOTAL
20
67
12
25
(2) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS
DST 36
DST 40
MINE MK 50-0
1 (MIXED FIELD)
180
-
30
[$2917413
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DESTRUCTOR FIELDS
DST 36
DST 40
MINE MK 50-0
2
72
-
I
3
72
-
-
4
140
-
-
5
100
-
-
6
-
40
-
TOTAL
564
40
30
Mine Allocations: Option BRAVO
(1) MINEFIELDS
MK 50
MK 52-2
MK 52-3
MK 55-2
A
10
5
6
B
3
C
4
D
12
6
4
E
6
F
6
G
6
3
H
3
I
4
TOTAL
10
42
12
14
(2) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 1
FIELD #
DST 36
DST 40
MINE MK 50-0
1
(MIXED FIELD)
180
-
20
2
72
-
I
3
72
-
-
4
140
-
I
5
100
-
-
6
-
48
-
TOTAL
564
48
20
(3) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 2
FIELD #
DST 36
DST 40
MINE MK 50-0
1 (MIXED FIELD)
120
-
20
2
50
-
-
3
72
-
I
4
110
-
I
5
50
-
-
6
-
40
I
TOTAL
402
40
20
PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES
TOP SECRET
[p30 0341]
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TOP SECRET
Mine Allocations: Option CHARLIE
(1) MINEFIELDS
MK 50-0
MK 52-2
MK 52-3
MK 55-2
A
5
6
B
10
3
C
4
D
12
6
4
E
6
F
6
G
6
3
H
3
I
4
TOTAL
10
42
12
14
(2) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS
DST 36
DST 40
MINE MK 50-0
1 (MIXED FIELD)
120
-
20
2
50
-
20
3
72
-
I
4
86
-
-
5
30
-
-
6
I
36
-
TOTAL 358
36
40
d. Mine Descriptions:
Mine MK 50-0: 500 LB acoustic influence mine
Mine MK 52-2: 1000 LB magnetic induction mine
Mine MK 52-3: 1000 LB pressure magnetic mine
Mine MK 55-2: 2000 LB magnetic induction mine
DST 36: 500 LB magnetic influence mine
DST 40: 1000 LB magnetic influence mine
Mine MK 36-3: 1000 LB pressure magnetic mine
e. Mine Stocks:
NAVMAG SUBIC
MINES
Mine MK 50
148
Mine MK 52-2
330
*Mine MK 52-3
40 (enroute)
Mine MK 55-2
250
*Mine MK 36-3
66
* Mine MK 36-3 acceptable substitute for Mine MK 52-3.
f. Specific Mining Notes:
(1) Mine requirements listed under options B and C are
considered the minimum acceptable number in the minefields.
(2) When CTF 77 assigns minefield responsibility by CTG,
embarked MOMATS will ensure the mines are labeled with the proper
mine case numbers (MCN).
(3) Field BRAVO. Delivery runs should be made to place
mines within the buoyed ship channel.
[p
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
(4) Fields DELTA and GOLF. Mines MK 55-2 should be
planted in the deep sections of the minefield (approximately
9 fathoms or deeper).
g. Replacement Mines. CVA/AE maintain 10 percent in excess
of required mines for spares. Replacement mines will have opera-
tional adjustments preset. Spare mines may be substituted with-
out further adjustment for the same MK Mod mine in any field.
Spare Mine MK 52-2 may substitute for Mine MK 52-3 in addition
to Mine MK 52-2.
PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES
TOP SECRET
[p
[p320f41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
Cam Pha
Hon Gai
&
6
G
5
LONG
4
HO
TRAO
Haiphong
E
F
lessa
A
C ]
D
B
2
1
3
5218 OH
shown
chart
des.
agents
:
SEE APPENDIX VI TAB C FOR MINEFIELD COORDINATES
TOP SECRET
[p330f41]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
SENSITIVE APPENDIX VII
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
D
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TOP SECRET
TAB D
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
MINING HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX
1. The following rules of engagement are effective for US
forces operating in support of the mining plan.
2. Definitions:
a. Territorial seas: A belt of sea adjacent to a coastal
state three miles in breadth measured from the low water mark
along the coast. However, in the states claiming twelve-mile
territorial seas, twelve miles shall be observed for these
rules as if it were the width of their territorial seas. The
following distance is presumed to be claimed as a territorial
sea:
(1) North Vietnam - 12 miles (Presumed)
b. Internal waters: Waters to landward of the territorial
sea.
C. Territorial air space: Air space above the land terri-
tory, internal waters, and territorial seas of a sovereign
country.
d. Immediate pursuit: Pursuit initiated in response to
actions or attacks by hostile aircraft or vessels as defined
in these rules of engagement. The pursuit must be continuous
and uninterrupted and may be extended as necessary and feasi-
ble over territorial/internal air space/seas as prescribed
herein.
e. Hostile aircraft: An aircraft identified as non-US
and non-allied which is observed in the act of attacking or
acting in a manner which indicates with reasonable certainty
an intent to attack US/friendly forces.
f. Hostile vessel (surface or subsurface)
(1) A vessel which is attacking or acting in a manner
which indicates within reasonable certainty an intent to
attack US/friendly forces.
3. General Rules:
a. US forces executing this plan are authorized to attack
and destroy any hostile vessel or aircraft as herein defined.
[p340f41]
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
TOP SECRET
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TAB D
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TOP SECRET
b. Immediate pursuit may be conducted as necessary and
feasible pursuant to the above, subject to the following con-
ditions and limitations:
(1) In event US forces are attacked by hostile forces
in North Vietnam, or over international waters, US forces may
conduct immediate pursuit over internal waters or into terri-
torial seas or air space of North Vietnam.
(2) No pursuit is authorized into Communist Chinese
territorial seas or air space.
(3) US forces, which under the limitations of these
rules enter unfriendly territorial land, sea, or air spaces
in immediate pursuit, are not authorized to attack other un-
friendly forces or installations encountered, unless attacked
first by them, then only to the extent necessary for self-
defense.
(4) Declaration of aircraft or vessels as hostile will
be tempered with judgment and discretion. Cases can occur
wherein the destruction of communist bloc forces would be con-
trary to US and allied interests. All available information
and intelligence shall be considered in determining action to
be taken in such cases.
4. Use of surface to air missiles against hostile aircraft.
Talos, Terrier, and Tartar equipped ships will attack and
destroy aircraft as feasible which are positively identified
as hostile in accordance with these rules of engagement:
a. Before firing, all indications must eliminate any
possibility of firing on friendly aircraft, and must indicate
the probable presence of a hostile aircraft. The above re-
quirements may be satisfied by verifying the identity of air-
craft through special and other intelligence sources or any
other means available.
b. Authority is granted to fire Talos, Tartar or Terrier
missiles over the North Vietnam land mass. Missiles will not
be fired over territory of Communist China.
c. Missiles will be command destructed five seconds after
passing the closest point of approach if intercept is not
accomplished.
5. Use of ALQ-91 (SEE SAW) is authorized in accordance with
CINCPACFLT 190001Z SEP 68.
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB D
[p35g41]
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TOP SECRET
6. Nothing in these rules modifies in any manner the require-
ment of a military commander to defend his unit against armed
attack with all means at his disposal. In the event of such
attack, the commander concerned will take immediate aggressive
action against the attacking force.
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB D
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E
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CIA Assessment I I
Effects of NVN Quarantine
N 06-04 13
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
[89/1/3]
SECRET/SENSITIVE
YS- 107
S-111
INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL
AGENCY
Memorandum For:
STATES OF
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Per your request, we have redone the Quarantine
Memorandum and carefully reviewed all the evidence,
analysis and judgments contained therein. Two copies
of our revised response to your initial request for this
study are appended hereto. Knowledge of this memorandum's
existence has been rigidly restricted to a very small circle,
but those officers who worked on it embody, collectively,
our best talent and expertise on the topics covered in this
study. Unless you direct otherwise, we will make no
distribution whatsoever of this memorandum apart from
the two copies being forwarded to you by this transmittal
Blip.
Dich
Richard Helms
17 July 1969
Attachment
DIRECTOR
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NLN 06-04/3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DÈCLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
S-111
Secret
INTELLIGENCE
ACENCY CENTRAL
LUNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
The Effects of the Imposition
of a Quarantine on North Vietnam
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN06-04/3 per sec. 3.3(b)(1);3.5(c)(50 use 403(g)] per Hr. 3/30/2010
By JMR
NARA, Date 5/18/2010
[p.1 of 56 ] 4.
Secret
1
SANITIZED
16 July 1969
Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 use 403(9)]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SANITIZED
PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1);3.5(c) [50 usc USC 403(g)]
PER LTR. 3/30/2010
[p. 4 of 56]
SECRET
SANITIZED
MEMORANDUM
PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 use 403(9)]
Per 1tr. 3/30/2010
SUBJECT: The Effects of the Imposition of a Quaran-
tine on North Vietnam
CONTENTS
I. Scope of Our Analysis, Working Assumptions
and General Considerations
II. North Vietnam's Dependence on Imports
III. North Vietnamese Reserves and Stockpiles
IV. Logistical Alternatives to Seaborne Imports
V. Possible North Vietnamese Countermeasures
VI. The Potential Burden to China and Costs to
North Vietnam
VII. Probable Political Reactions
a. Communist Chinese
b. Soviet
C. North Vietnamese
d. South Vietnamese
e. Other East Asian Countries
f. Western European Reactions
SECRET
NLN 06-04/3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
[p.50f 56]
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SANITIZED
Per See. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5 (c) [50 USC 403(g)]
Per Hr. 3/30/2010
I. SCOPE, WORKING ASSUMPTIONS, AND GENERAL CONSID-
ERATIONS
1. This memorandum constitutes our reply to the
request that we assess the probable effects of im-
posing a quarantine on North Vietnam. In the pre-
paration of this memorandum, a "quarantine" was con-
strued to mean closing the port of Haiphong by mining
and/or blockade. In preparing this reply, we have
made the working assumption that whatever the means
employed, access to the port is denied to both ocean-
going and coastal shipping. We have also made the
working assumption that this quarantine is carried
out without any effort to interdict the key land
lines of communication connecting North Vietnam and
Communist China, i.e., the roads, air routes and
two major rail lines.
2. This memorandum analyzes the probable impact
of such a quarantine on North Vietnam and the prob-
able reactions to its imposition on the part of the
North Vietnamese, the Chinese Communists, the Soviets,
the South Vietnamese, other Asians, the British and
other West Europeans. As indicated in the outline
above, the analysis begins with an examination of
North Vietnam's dependence on imports, its current
reserves and its present stockpiles of goods not do-
mestically manufactured. We then examine the logis-
tical alternatives to seaborne imports open to North
Vietnam and countermeasures it would be physically
possible for Hanoi to initiate tooffset the impact
of a quarantine. Since the major logistical alter-
natives to seaborne imports require extensive Chinese
Communist assistance and support, we analyze in some
detail the potential burden to China and the poten-
tial economic costs a quarantine would impose on
North Vietnam.
3. After examining what might be called the
physical impact and consequences of the imposition
of a quarantine, the memorandum attempts to assess
the probable political reactions of the North Viet-
namese, the Soviets, the Chinese Communists, the
South Vietnamese, other Asians, and non-bloc Western
Europeans.
4. Given the many complexities and interacting
elements of the problem we were asked to address, it
-1-
SECRET
NLN 06-04/3
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Per Hr. 3/30/2010
is hard to set forth any summary conclusions that
do not have the ring of ex cathedra judgments. Our
data and evidence make it quite clear that a closure
of the port of Haiphong would disrupt North Vietnam's
seaborne trade and force an extensive revamping of
normal transport arrangements. The evidence avail-
able also demonstrates that the disruption to North
Vietnam's import patterns would be severe. Nonethe-
less, as explained in detail in the body of this mem-
orandum, the evidence also indicates that if the Chi-
nese Communists provide the necessary cooperation and
support--at levels well within China's present physical
capabilities--North Vietnam could make the adjustments
necessary to sustain its war-making potential within
two or three months. The maintenance of necessary
import levels without the current seaborne routes
would be more costly than are present arrangements,
but the evidence shows that the necessary added ef-
fort would, of itself, not be likely to become a ma-
jor burden to Hanoi or its Communist allies.
5. As outlined in detail in section III below,
North Vietnam's reserves of vital economic and mili-
tary goods appear more than adequate to weather the
necessary readjustment period. Enough transport
equipment seems available so that by utilizing alter-
nate railroad and water connections with Communist
China, Hanoi has a capacity to handle import traffic
levels almost three times greater than current re-
quirements. In short--to compress a lot of detailed
evidence and analysis into one summary sentence--the
closing of Haiphong would not be likely to have a
major impact on Hanoi's material capabilities to
carry on the war unless China decided to deny its
overland routes to supplies destined for North Viet-
nam, including supplies from Eastern Europe and the
USSR.
6. The political reactions of the various par-
ties that would be affected by, involved in or con-
cerned with the imposition of a quarantine are even
more complex and difficult to analyze than the quar-
antine's physical impact. To avoid the distortion
inherent in conclusions divorced from their support-
ing evidence and analysis, we will not attempt to set
forth summary judgments on these questions of probable
reactions but, instead, refer the reader to the full
discussion set forth in this memorandum's Section VII.
-2-
SECRET
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SANITIZED
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Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 use 403
Per Itr. 3/30/2010
II. North Vietnamese Dependence on Imports
7. The limited size of its modern economy and
the fact that it has always been a food-deficit
country have made North Vietnam highly dependent
on imports. This dependence has increased greatly
during the war because North Vietnam has had to
rely almost completely on external sources for
combat materiel and has had to divert large amounts
of manpower to nonproductive, war-related activi-
ties.
Level of Imports
8. North Vietnamese imports during the 12
months ending in June 1969 totaled 2.2 million
tons. Most of this traffic -- about 85 percent
of total imports -- was brought in through the
port of Haiphong. Although rail imports amounted
to only a small share of the total, rail transport
is of particular significance as the principal
channel for the import of combat materiel.
9. Estimated seaborne imports for the period
1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969 are shown in the
following tabulation:
Thousand
Goods
Tons
Percent
Foodstuffs
890
47
Fertilizer
110
6
Petroleum
330
17
Timber
30
2
General and
miscellaneous
530
28
Total
1,890
100
Daily average
5.2
10. Estimates of rail imports by North Vietnam
are much more tenuous than those for seaborne
imports. On the basis of rather limited evidence,
we estimate that rail imports for the period
1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969 were on the order
of 300,000 tons, of which only about 50,000
tons were combat materiel. The information
that is available indicates that rail imports,
-3-
SECRET
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Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1) 3.5(c) [so use 403(g)]
Per Hr. 3/30/2010
particularly of military goods, have declined
since April 1968. The decline is due in part to
the reduced requirements for military aid after
the US bombing program was restricted in March
1968 and finally halted in October. More recently
we have also seen indications that some goods pre-
viously shipped from the USSR by rail are now being
shipped by sea.
11. More than 97 percent of North Vietnam's
imports are from Communist countries. The USSR
provides the greater share -- 44 percent -- of
these imports. The Soviets provide about one-third
of North Vietnam's imports of foodstuffs, almost
all of its imports of petroleum, and about one-half
of its imports of fertilizers. The USSR also pro-
vided about 40 percent of North Vietnam's imports of
general cargoes such as construction materials,
industrial machinery, metal products, and trans-
portation equipment. Communist China accounts for
almost 40 percent of North Vietnam's imports.
China's trade with North Vietnam is dominated by
foodstuffs which accounted for almost three-fourths
of the volume of seaborne imports from China.
China also provides substantial imports of indus-
trial machinery, construction materials, and
transport equipment. North Vietnamese economic
imports from Free World countries are dominated by
fertilizer imports -- mostly from Japan -- and by
timber imports from Cambodia.
12. North Vietnamese seaborne imports have
reached record totals because of sharp increases
in imports of foodstuffs and petroleum. During
the past 12 months, for example, imports of petro-
leum were about 2.5 times their 1965 level.
Imports of foodstuffs show an even greater in-
crease, being some seven times greater than they
were in 1965.
Foodstuffs
13. North Vietnam's domestic output of rice
has declined steadily from 3.0 million tons of
polished rice in 1965 to 2.5 million tons in 1968.
Output in 1969 should be somewhat higher, barring
unforeseen circumstances, but a dramatic increase
is not expected. Although an effort has been made
to increase the production of subsidiary foodstuffs,
it is doubtful that a significant increase was
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NLN 06-04/3
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[p.9 of 56]
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
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Per Ltr. 3/30/2010
achieved, because many of the same factors that
adversely affected rice production would have
affected subsidiary crops.
14. While domestic rice production has fallen
since 1965 by about 15 percent, the North Viet-
namese population has increased by about 5 percent.
In addition, the war effort has required more and
harder work -- thus requiring a greater intake of
calories. To fill the widening gap, North Vietnam
has been forced to increase imports of foodstuffs
substantially. Imports of foodstuffs by sea
increased from about 120,000 tons and 80,000 tons
in 1965 and 1966, respectively, to about 460,000
tons in 1967 and to more than 890,000 tons for the
year ending June 1969. Imported foodstuffs now
supply one-fifth of the estimated total calories
consumed by the North Vietnamese. With per capita
food consumption at close to minimum levels, the
continued accessibility to food imports is essential
for the maintenance of the population's health and
productive capacity.
Petroleum
15. Seaborne imports of petroleum during the
past year totaled about 333,000 tons. Almost
85 percent of the petroleum imports originated in
the USSR and 95 percent were delivered by sea. The
high level of consumption of petroleum during the
past year reflects the intensity of military
activity and the greater use of trucks, construction
equipment, and marine craft.
Military Imports
16. There is little hard evidence with which
to quantify precisely the current level of North
Vietnam's imports of military goods. Historically,
however, there has been sufficient information --
when combined with aerial photography, data on
ammunition expenditure rates, and changes in the
enemy order of battle -- to permit estimates of
the volume of military imports, and these estimates
have proved to be compatible with other intelli-
gence occasionally obtained from collateral sources.
In addition, the intelligence community estimates
that all of North Vietnam's imports of combat
materiel and major items of military hardware are
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[p.10 of56]
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SANITIZED
Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 use 403 (g)]
Per Ltr. 3/30/2010
delivered by rail rather than by sea. Large amounts
of war-supporting materiel such as trucks and petro-
leum do, however, enter North Vietnam through the
port of Haiphong.
17. Imports of combat materiel, ammunition, and
missiles during the past twelve months have de-
creased from previous levels because of the reduced
requirements for military goods needed for defense
of North Vietnam against US bombing attacks.
18. By the end of 1968, adjustments to the
cessation of the US bombing of North Vietnam had
probably been completed, and imports of military
equipment are now estimated to be at relatively
constant levels, although well below the level of
the first half of 1968. The high level of attacks
flown by US aircraft in the Panhandle of North Viet-
nam between 1 April and 31 October and the continued
attacks against Laos after the 1 November bombing
halt indicate a relatively constant North Vietnamese
requirement, so that imports of military goods such as
ammunition have probably remained fairly stable
during 1969. With the limited evidence on hand we
estimate that in volume terms deliveries of military
goods have probably leveled off at an annual rate of
some 50,000 tons.
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Per Hr. 3/30/2020
III. Reserves and Stockpiles
19. There is little direct intelligence to
permit any precise quantification of North Vietnam's
reserves of essential economic goods or its stock-
piles of military goods. The information that is
available, however, supports a general conclusion
that with but few exceptions the supplies of eco-
nomic and military goods are adequate to satisfy
requirements for a period of at least several
months.
Economic Goods
20. Analysis of open-storage areas at the port
of Haiphong, the entry point for almost all economic
goods, gives ample evidence of a large volume of
stockpiled goods. At the time of the 31 March 1968
bombing pause, slightly more than 50 percent of the
area near the commercial wharves at Haiphong was
occupied by cargo. The bombing cutback facilitated
the movement of cargoes from the wharf area as
trucks and waterborne logistics craft could be used
more intensively during daylight hours. At the time
of the bombing halt, about 60 percent of the area
was occupied by cargo. During the intervening
period, although the monthly level of cargo in open
storage fluctuated considerably because of changes
in the discharge rate and the effects of monsoon
weather on land transport and lightering, the volume
of cargo in open storage has increased with about
70 percent of the available area occupied by cargo
at the end of May 1969, despite the faster clearing
of cargoes away from the wharf area.
21. Significant increases in imports of construc-
tion material (mostly steel products), vehicles, and
earth moving equipment since the total bombing halt
have considerably altered the types of cargo observed
in open storage at Haiphong in 1969. Prior to the
total bombing halt on 1 November 1968, heavy equip-
ment and machinery, stockpiles of sacked grain, and
stockpiles of tires dominated the open storage area.
Most of this cargo remained in the area for many
months at a time with little turnover. With the
addition of the rail spurs in October and the total
bombing halt on 1 November, much of the heavy
equipment and machinery and tires were moved out
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06-04/3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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Per
Hr.
3/30/2010
of Haiphong and replaced by incoming construction
materials. Turnover of foodstuffs since November
1968 has been high, and turnover of most of the
other cargo stored in the open has been at a rela-
tively higher pace than before the 1 November
bombing cessation.
22. With the principal exception of construc-
tion materials, we estimate that North Vietnam
has adequate stockpiles of economic goods. Food
supplies are currently at a high level because of
the recent harvest of the fifth-month rice crop.
The industrial equipment needed for restoring
and/or maintaining industrial output has been
imported during 1969 in increasing amounts, and
limited observations of storage areas in May 1969
showed a variety of industrial equipment and
materials on hand. A high level of petroleum
imports and a well developed dispersed storage
system also point to the availability of adequate
supplies of petroleum.
Supplies of Foodstuffs
23. There is no direct intelligence on the
stockpiles of foodstuffs in North Vietnam. It is
apparent, however, that supplies of rice are
usually abundant immediately after the two rice
harvests in May-June and October-November. More-
over, some subsidiary crops that are harvested
between the rice harvests help to take up the
slack as rice supplies are depleted. With no
measurable carryover of foodstuffs before the 1968
tenth-month rice harvest, a food balance, based on
estimated production, imports, and consumption, shows
the following changes in food reserves during 1969:
Thousand Tons
1969
Dec
1968
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Carried over
1,900
1,640
1,355
1,065
795
505
225
Production
1,600
Imports
100
75
70
90
70
80
90
Available
2,000
1,715
1,425
1,155
865
585
1,915
Consumption
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
Balance
1,640
1,355
1,065
795
505
225
1,555
a.
Including both rice and subsidiary food crops.
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[p.13f56]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SANITIZED
SECRET
Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [so USC 403 (g)]
Per Hr. 3/30/2010
24. Although the levels of any reserve supplies
based on this estimated balance are subject to a
considerable margin of error, the trend indicated
would appear to be valid.
support the estimate
that food supplies were low before the rice harvest
in May 1969. Before the harvests, food supplies are
at low levels -- possibly as little as one month's
supply. Between harvests the import of foodstuffs
offsets to some extent the rate of the drawdown of
total stocks. If the import of food were cut off,
the stocks on hand would be more quickly drawn down
and supplies could reach dangerously low levels a
few months before the harvest. The denial of food
imports would be more critical during the first
half of the year because of the longer growing
season required by the fifth-month rice crop
because of less favorable weather conditions.
25. North Vietnam has consistently been an
importer of foodstuffs, the amount varying annually
depending primarily on the fortunes of the rice
harvest. Thus, good or normal harvests in 1965
permitted a reduction of imports in 1966, and
subsequent poor crops called for heavy increases
in import levels, as shown in the following tabula-
tion:
Thousand Tons
Jan-May
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Imports (foods)
120
80
460
790
385
Production
(milled rice)
3,000
2,800
2,700
2,500
800
26. Estimates of rice production are admittedly
tenuous. North Vietnam has not published production
data on food crops since 1963. Although much of the
discussion on agriculture in official publications
and in periodicals refers to yields and goals for
crop output, there are no published data concerning
the acreage under cultivation to specific food
crops. Therefore, the two annual rice crops are
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estimated relative to an average and relative to
the crop of the previous year from statements by
representatives of the regime concerning the
progress of the crops and of the harvest as well
as relative to weather conditions as we know them
to have been. These estimates have generally
been confirmed subsequently by levels of food
imports.
27. Consumption of foodstuffs in North Vietnam
has been closely rationed since the Communists
took over. The basic ration for rice has remained
relatively constant over the years, but the amount
of rice available has varied and the percentage of
substitutes has increased since 1965. Any short-
fall in annual production of food and in the volume
of imports therefore becomes rather critical
within a few months because relatively little
further belt-tightening can be done.
Supplies of Petroleum
28. On the basis of North Vietnam's imports of
petroleum during the past year and estimates of
consumption patterns, we estimate that the stocks
of petroleum currently on hand total about
100,000 tons, equal to about 100 days of supply
at the estimated 1968 consumption rate.
29. To keep stockpiles at these levels the
North Vietnamese have maintained a highly diver-
sified system of dispersed storage sites. This
system includes more than 150 storage sites with
an estimated capacity of at least 60,000 tons. In
addition, an estimated 400,000 petroleum drums are
now dispersed throughout North Vietnam. Finally,
the North Vietnamese have recently begun to restore
some of these bulk petroleum storage tanks in Hanoi
and Haiphong. By June 1969 these restored facili-
ties had an estimated storage capacity of 37,000
tons.
Industrial Supplies and Equipment
30. Scattered references to stockpiling of
industrial equipment and supplies indicate that
sufficient levels are on hand to meet North Vietnam's
requirements for several months. Although current
consumption requirements are difficult to gauge, the
large amount of such goods in known storage and
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distribution areas and the North Vietnamese ability
to adapt quickly to local shortages caused by the
distribution system indicate sufficient stockpiling
throughout the country. For example, photography
of late May 1969 of the Kinh No transshipment and
storage depot north of Hanoi, one of the major
storage areas in the country, revealed more than 100
mobile generators; large quantities of mobile
compressors, cables, pipe; and large stocks of
crated industrial and agricultural equipment. A
similar high level of supplies and equipment has
been noted in storage areas in Haiphong. There has
been no appreciable change in the amount of goods
known to be stored during 1969.
Construction Supplies and Equipment
31. Most supplies for use in construction
appear to be inadequate, although stockpiles of
construction equipment and structural steel appear
sufficient. Numerous articles critical of the
progress of the construction industry have appeared
in the North Vietnamese press since the beginning
of the year. Domestic production of building
materials such as bricks, tiles, and cement has
not kept up with increased construction requirements
resulting from the bombing years. Cement production,
for example, is estimated to have been only about
100,000 tons for the first five months of 1969, and
observed seaborne imports have added only 10,000 tons.
Consumption of cement for a comparable period in
1965 and 1966 was equal to about 230,000 tons.
32. The shortage of construction materials may
account, in part, for the slow pace in reconstruc-
tion activity since the bombing halt. Large amounts
of construction equipment, such as cranes, bulldozers,
graders, rollers, and compressors, however, have been
consistently noted at Haiphong and other major
storage areas. Some of this equipment has remained
in the areas up to six months before being dis-
tributed. A rallier also reported seeing large
amounts of structural steel in areas between Hanoi
and Phu Ly in late 1968, much of which had lain un-
protected for a sufficient time to become badly
rusted.
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rary DECLASSIFIED
NLN 06-04 13
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
16 of
SECRET
Military Goods
33. Since the bombing halt, the Communists
have undertaken a major supply movement into the
Southern Panhandle of North Vietnam using avail-
able rail lines, truck routes, waterways, and
coastal shipping. This has produced a substantial
military supply buildup, much of which is visible
in open storage. On the basis of photography,
our knowledge of actual logistics movements, and
our estimates of imports and consumption, we feel
certain that stocks available are more than
adequate to support the war in South Vietnam
without further imports into North Vietnam for
several months.
34. Large volumes of supplies are stored in
the open throughout the Southern Panhandle of
North Vietnam, reflecting an apparent confidence
that there will be no resumption of the bombing.
At the same time, there is evidence that the North
Vietnamese continue to disperse supplies and to
build revetments around storage areas as insurance
against any resumption of the air war. The in-
creased volume of supplies moved into the southern
part of North Vietnam has been accompanied by a
substantial increase in throughput into southern
Laos. An estimated 220 tons a day were moved into
southern Laos during the past dry season (October
1968 - May 1969) compared with some 180 tons a day
during the 1967-68 dry season.
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NLN 06-0413
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Per Hr. 3/30/2010
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[ 18 of56]
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Per 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) use
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North of the 19th Parallel
38. Aerial photography has provided the best
and most graphic evidence of the presence and
extent of open storage of military goods in North
Vietnam, although coverage has not been adequate
to identify and quantify the types and amounts of
supplies. Photographic coverage of storage areas
in Hanoi and at the large storage/transshipment
areas associated with the major railroad yards
has pointed toward a continual and large, but
unquantifiable, buildup of supplies at these points.
At Hanoi, the main rail terminal has evidenced
heavy activity and large amounts of supplies along-
side the rail sidings, including tires, drums,
unidentified boxes, crates, and large tarp-covered
piles of supplies. At other points in downtown
Hanoi, recent photography reveals considerable
numbers of parked vehicles, construction equipment,
crates, and large covered stacks of unidentified
boxes and sacks.
39. Within the environs of Hanoi, particularly
at Ha Dong and Kinh No, low-level drone photography
in late May detected large open stores of equip-
ment and covered supplies. At Ha Dong about 200
cargo and POL tanker trucks, tractors, and vans
were recorded, while at the Kinh No rail transship-
ment area large numbers of mobile generators,
tractors, rollers, van trailers, POL tanks, cable
spools, drums, and an extremely large amount of
probable POL-type pipe sections were seen.
40. Coverage of the P'ing-hsiang, China, and
Dong Dang, North Vietnam, areas, located on the
main rail line connecting China and North Vietnam,
in 1967 and 1968 provided hard evidence of large
numbers of motor vehicles stockpiled in the area.
In May 1967, about 900 trucks were stored at P'ing-
hsiang, but in September, 400 were noted near Dong
Dang and 300 just over the border in China. In
August 1968, about 450 vehicles were in a holding
area at Dong Dang, but the areas in China were not
covered.
41. After the bombing halt of 31 March 1968,
the largest railroad yard near the 19th Parallel,
located at Thanh Hoa, underwent rapid reconstruc-
tion. The numbers of railroad cars and the amounts
of cargo noted in the yard increased significantly,
with the turnover of supplies continuing at a
relatively fast pace. At the same time, three
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smaller rail transshipment areas were noted in
operation south of Thanh Hoa to the 19th Parallel.
With the total bombing halt of 1 November, rail
activity at Thanh Hoa again surged in anticipation
of opening service into Vinh. Supplies observed
included 50 camouflaged petroleum tank cars, the
highest number seen in the area since the start of
the bombing. After the bombing halt, activity at
Thanh Hoa continued at similar levels, and other
logistics facilities were shifted south, toward Vinh.
South of the 19th Parallel
42. The identification of stockpiled supplies
in the Panhandle of North Vietnam is necessarily
restricted due to limitations in photographic
coverage and the fact that the major supply/
storage areas serving the flow of goods into Laos
and South Vietnam act as transient stop-over
points rather than hardened storage sites.
43. The largest and most significant supply/
storage/transshipment areas in the Panhandle are
Vinh, Bai Duc Thon, Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi, which
service Routes 137 and 1036 as well as Route 15
near the Mu Gia Pass. Prior to the bombing halt
of 31 October 1968, these areas showed relatively
little activity, with resupply activity dispersed,
concealed, and largely occurring at night. Soon
after the bombing halt, however, the North Viet-
namese quickly capitalized on the development and
immediately increased their supply movements into
the area south of the 19th Parallel. The main
lines of communication were restored and the
logistic base shifted south. At Vinh, through
rail service was quickly restored and several
trains were noted entering and leaving the area.
a quota of
an "average of 400 tons each day" for rail ship-
ment, including water pipe (probable petroleum
pipe), fuel, petroleum storage tanks, and TNT.
The level of supplies in the rail yard increased
significantly and transshipment areas were ex-
panded. Large concentrations of trucks and water-
craft also were noted in the region.
44. Bai Duc Thon, located 25 miles north of the
Mu Gia Pass on Route 15, is the main marshalling
point for convoys entering Laos via Mu Gia and thus
is an excellent indicator of North Vietnamese re-
supply capability and of the amount of supplies
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20
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available to be moved into Laos. Soon after the
bombing halt, large-scale truck traffic into Laos
and tram car use were noted in the area, and the
supply/storage facilities became more active.
Photography of December and January has shown ex-
tensive stockpiling in the area and improvements to
logistics facilities. In January, when the highest
level of supplies was noted in the area, photo-
graphic interpreters counted about 50,000 boxes/
crates throughout the area, with extensive trans-
shipment operations. The level of activity at this
key facility during 1969 generally has remained at
comparable levels. Recent coverage has revealed
North Vietnamese attempts to harden the facilities
at Bai Duc Thon, as at least 66 new storage buildings
were noted in April. In addition, photography since
April has revealed the existence of over 100
revetted or open storage areas along a ten-mile
portion of Route 15 between Route 101 and Laos,
about 15 miles south of Bai Duc Thon. These
points can hold between one and three truckloads
each, with the vast majority usually full when
noted in photography.
45. Soon after the bombing halt, North Vietnam's
small fleet of coastal merchant vessels and tankers
began to move cargo from Haiphong directly to Vinh,
Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi. Deliveries by ship to the
southern Panhandle in December 1968 and January 1969
may have reached 50,000 tons each month, an amount
equal to almost eight times the monthly tonnage
being moved into the Laotian Panhandle at that time.
Since January 1969 the level of activity along North
Vietnam's coast has decreased to a more moderate
level, and we estimate that 10,000-20,000 tons per
month is moving by sea into Vinh, Quang Khe, and Dong
Hoi, with the majority being food shipments into
Vinh.
46. The shipments by coastal vessel into Quang
Khe and Dong Hoi are rapidly moved out of the area
and distributed to either Route 137 or 1036, about
30 miles inland. There is little evidence of ex-
tensive stockpiling in the port areas, but there is
evidence of extensive storage areas along Route 137
and near Bat Lake at the head of Route 1036. In
addition to the several larger storage/transshipment
areas, there are at least several hundred small to
medium sized supply sites dispersed throughout the
Panhandle. These vary from small dispersed POL
storage areas to extensive, well-developed logistic
areas.
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IV. Alternatives
Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1) [50 USC 403(g)]
Per Itr. 3/30/2016
Introduction
47. A quarantine of the port of Haiphong and
the minor ports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha would force
the North Vietnamese to depend primarily on the
overland routes from China for the continued import
of vital war-supporting materiel and economic goods.
The North Vietnamese would not, however, have to
depend entirely on the rail, road, and waterway
connections with China. There are several other
potential countermeasures that could be rapidly
improvised by the North Vietnamese -- the use of
lighters, the transshipment of goods in small craft
from ports in South China, and/or the use of air
transport for high-priority goods. These counter-
measures are well within the capabilities of the
North Vietnamese as long as they have the cooper-
ation of the Chinese or unless the terms of the
quarantine permitted US naval or air force to
interdict the countermeasures.
48. Enemy countermeasures to new weapons and
tactics introduced by the US during the more than
three years of the air war over North Vietnam
showed the North Vietnamese to be shrewd improvisors
with a frequent ability to anticipate US actions.
In view of the numerous press reports since 1965
of discussions within the US Government of the
possibility of closing the port of Haiphong, it must
be assumed that the North Vietnamese have prepared
contingency plans to insure against such a possi-
bility. It is probable that the North Vietnamese
would not depend on any single countermeasure but
would employ a number of alternatives. It would be
difficult, for example, to move heavy machinery in
small craft from ports in South China and lighter
it over the beaches into North Vietnam. However,
bulk food and fertilizer imports could be handled
in this manner with relative ease.
49. At this time the major unknown in estimating
North Vietnam's ability to counter a quarantine of
normal seaborne imports is the degree of cooperation
that would exist between the USSR and China in
countering the quarantine. With the same limited
cooperation as has existed in recent years, even
a long-term closing of the ports would have little
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impact on the viability of the North Vietnamese
economy or the ability of the North Vietnamese to
continue the war in the South or maintain a strong
air defense and military posture in the North.
50. At this particular juncture in Sino-Soviet
relations it can not be assumed, however, that the
Chinese would permit the required amounts of POL,
trucks, machinery, and other imports that North
Vietnam normally imports by sea from the USSR to
transit Chinese territory. For this reason, this
report considers a "worst-case" -- one in which
Soviet military and economic aid to North Vietnam
is cut off and China picks up the tab for also
supplying the equivalent Soviet military and eco-
nomic aid as well as the aid China has supplied in
the past. Thus Peking would have to supply not
only the logistical support for alternative move-
ments of goods to North Vietnam, which it would
have to do even if greatly increased volumes of
Soviet goods were allowed to transit China, but
China would also have to supply the POL, trucks,
food, and other supplies from indigenous sources
or imports.
North Vietnamese Logistical System
51. North Vietnam's total rail and seaborne
imports during the most recent 12-month period
amounted to an average of about 6,000 tons a day.
This volume of goods is equivalent to what can be
carried by about 200 standard-gauge freight cars
or about 1,800 trucks a day.
52. Even if the total volume of seaborne imports
were shifted to the overland route with no belt-
tightening with respect to food or reduction in
fertilizer imports and no lightering across the
beaches, the diversion of imports would not severely
tax the capacity of the overland routes. In con-
trast to the total input of 6,000 tons a day, the
combined capacity of the railroad, road, and water
routes from China to the Hanoi area of North Vietnam
totals almost 16,000 tons per day during the dry
season and 13,000 tons per day during the wet season.
As shown in the tabulation below, the capacity of
North Vietnam's rail connections with China are alone
one-third greater than the volume of goods that must
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be imported. The roads and waterways provide an
additional cushion that can be used to avoid bottle-
necks and to establish additional routes for moving
goods from various areas of South China into North
Vietnam.
Tons per Day
Daily average
6,000
Route capacities
Railroads
9,000
Roads
5,400 (2,300)
Red River
1,500
Total surface
15,900
(12,800)
a. The capacity of the roads declines
during the wet season, which extends
from June through September in the
northern areas of North Vietnam.
53. The capacities given above are conservative
estimates based on a wide variety of factors in-
cluding the extent and conditions of facilities,
the availability of equipment, and the employment of
a normal labor force. Improvisation can enable
theoretical rail system capacities to be temporarily
exceeded for considerable periods of time when the
demand is great or the regime assigns a high priority
to moving supplies over the system. Furthermore,
the permanent capacities could be expanded by rela-
tively simple additional construction and quickly
installed expedients such as the construction of
passing tracks at more frequent intervals. The
capacities of the roads could be increased by im-
proved grading or the more intensive use of manpower
to repair road segments that got washed out during
the rainy season. Furthermore, during the bombing
of North Vietnam, up to 600,000 full-time and part-
time employees were engaged in air defense or bomb
damage repair. If even a small fraction of this
labor force was mobilized to maintain and improve
the main lines of communication with China, there
is no doubt that the capacity of these lines could
be rapidly expanded.
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Railroads
54. The North Vietnamese railroad system between
China and Hanoi consists of the Hanoi-Dong Dang line
and its alternate route, the Kep-Thai Nguyen-Yen Vien
line and the Hanoi-Lao Cai line. The Dong Dang line
is dual gauged, 111 miles long, with an estimated
capacity of 5,400 tons each way per day (EWPD) *
The Communists are engaged in a major realignment
of about 15 miles of this line south of Lang Son.
The new rail segment will upgrade the line's capa-
bilities by removing several sharp turns and a long
steep grade. It is by far the most important route
for overland imports via China. Its alternate corri-,
dor via Kep-Thai Nguyen-Yen Vien is 71 miles long
and has an estimated capacity of 4,300 tons EWPD.
The Lao Cai line currently is of minor importance
for overland imports but it does provide access to
the northwestern regions and China's Yunnan Province
and would assume increased importance if the port of
Haiphong were closed. This line is 170 miles long
and has an estimated capacity of 3,400 tons EWPD.
55. Soon after the 31 March 1968 bombing re-
striction north of the 19th Parallel, the North
Vietnamese took full advantage of the standdown to
restore the rail system to its original status and
in some cases actually to increase the capability
of the system. The North Vietnamese have also
increased their overall tractive inventory in the
last few months by importing about 20 small diesel
locomotives from the Soviet Union.
56. In late 1968 the North Vietnamese acceler-
ated their construction efforts on the 57-mile Kep-
Hon Gai meter-gauge rail line. By June 1969 the
Communists had laid track on all but 19 miles of
this line and had prepared the rail bed on most of
the remaining alignment. There were only a few
small bridges and culverts to be completed. Work
has continued on the largest bridge on the line, a
major one 340 to 400 feet long over the Song Nhat
Duc.
* The term dual-gauge refers to the use of three
or four rails on the same roadbed, making possible
the use of both meter-gauge and standard-gauge
rolling stock. It is not to be confused with
"double tracking" -- two separate tracks on two
roadbeds with a total of four rails.
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[p.25 of 56]
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Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1);
Per Ltr. 3/30/2010
57. Since October the eastern half of the line
has been in service from the mining areas around
Nhue Ho to the vicinity of the ferry slips under
construction across the bay from Hon Gai. It will
probably take no more than two to three months to
complete the bridge over the Song Nhat Duc and
permit through traffic from the Hanoi-Dong Dang
rail line to Hon Gai.
Highways
58. There are five major and several secondary
transborder roads connecting the Hanoi-Haiphong
area with the South China provinces of Kwangsi and
Yunnan. Together, this roadnet has an estimated
minimum capacity of about 5,400 tons EWPD during
the dry season (October-May), decreasing to approx-
imately 2,300 tons EWPD during the rainy season.
From one-half to two-thirds of this total cross-
border capacity is associated with the northeastern
routes leading from the large storage depots of
Nanning and P'ing-hsiang.
Inventory of Railroad Rolling Stock,
and Motor Vehicles
59. North Vietnam's inventory of railroad rolling
stock currently is estimated at 115-130 locomotives
and 2,000-2,300 meter-gauge freight cars. The coun-
try's railroad system consists of dual, standard,
and meter-gauge lines. The main rail link between
China and Hanoi -- the dual-gauged Dong Dang line
could be operated by drawing from China's inventory
of standard-gauge rolling stock which is estimated
(end of 1968) at 6,000 locomotives and 160,300 freight
cars. An alternate route from the border to Hanoi
via Kep and Thai Nguyen also could use Chinese
standard-gauge equipment.
60. As of mid-1969 the estimated North Vietnamese
motor vehicle inventory ranged between 6,500 and
11,500. The wide range stems mainly from a lack of
import data, particularly overland shipments, and
the uncertainties associated with confirming the
large number of vehicles reportedly destroyed by air-
strikes in Laos. A lack of any evidence of a vehicle
shortage problem during 1968 through June 1969, plus
a substantial amount of photointelligence revealing
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use
Per Ltr. 3/30/2010
continuing large vehicle stockpiles within North
Vietnam suggests that a firm vehicle inventory prob-
ably would tend toward the upper limits of the esti-
mated range.
China's Logistical Capabilities
Introduction
61. In the event of a cessation of normal sea-
borne imports, North Vietnam's most serious problem
would be to establish an alternative flow of about
30,000 tons a month of POL from China. Stockpiles
of POL in North Vietnam are presently estimated to
be equivalent to about 100 days of supply at current
consumption rates. The probable increased use of
trucks to haul supplies from China would increase
consumption rates, and shortages of gasoline or
diesel fuels would probably occur in the northeast
areas of North Vietnam in less than 60 days if
overland imports were not greatly increased. We
would expect, therefore, that the North Vietnamese
and Chinese would give priority to establishing an
overland POL artery. The dimensions of the problem
in terms of distance, tank cars, and locomotives is
discussed below. Next, it is assumed that all
normal seaborne imports are shifted to the Chinese
transport system to determine the magnitude of this
additional burden on China's transportation system.
POL by Rail from China
62. POL supplied from within China would come
from one or a combination of three major refineries
at Shanghai, Lan-chou, or Ta-ching. The Chinese
railroad authorities would probably have to institute
a shuttle system by which a given number of tank
cars and locomotives would be assigned to this move-
ment and would not engage in any other operation.
Such a shuttle would operate from the refineries to
Hanoi via P'ing-hsiang, which is across the border
from the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line.
63. The extreme case would require that all
30,000 tons a month move from Ta-ching in Manchuria
to P'ing-hsiang, a distance of about 2,500 miles, or
5,000 miles a round trip. At 350 miles a day, about
15 days travel time would be required. One day for
loading and one day for unloading at each end of
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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the haul would result in a turnaround time of 17
days. Thus, at an average load of 50 tons per tank
car, about 350 cars would be required. This number
of cars represents slightly more than 1 percent of
the estimated 28,500 tank cars in China's inventory.
About 25 locomotives would be needed, less than
0.5 percent of the estimated 6,000 locomotives in
China's total inventory. The burden on China's rail
system would be even less if these shipments were to
originate entirely or in part from Shanghai and/or
Lan-chou.
64. The rail line capacity from any of the
refineries in China is more than adequate to handle
this traffic in addition to the traffic currently
moving over these routes. In terms of logistic
capability alone -- holding the question of the
availability of POL until later -- the Chinese could
have a regular flow of POL moving toward North Viet-
nam well before any shortages would develop because
of a cessation of seaborne shipments.*
Logistical Impact of all Supplies Coming
from China
65. If all remaining Soviet, East European,
and Chinese seaborne imports of food, fertilizer,
machinery, and equipment were to come from North
China and Manchuria, the average length of haul
would be at a maximum about 4,800 miles per round
trip. ** At an average daily haul of 350 miles a
day and allowing two days for loading and unloading,
the turnaround time would be 16 days. Thus, with
an average load per freight car of 40 metric tons,
* The following example shows how the logistical
problem of moving POL to North Vietnam would be
greatly eased if Soviet, Romanian, or other foreign
tankers unloaded POL for North Vietnam at Fort
Bayard. China would probably organize the same
shuttle service but the round trip distance would
be only about 570 miles and the turnaround time would
be four days. Only 80 freight cars and 6 locomotives
would be able to carry the monthly requirements of
30, tons.
** Again, an extreme case because imported food-
stuffs which averaged almost 75,000 tons a month
during the past 12 months would not have to come
from North China or Manchuria.
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about 1,700 freight cars would be required in con-
stant operation to carry the monthly shipments of
130,000 tons. This number of cars represents only
about 1 percent of the freight cars in China's
inventory. *
X
In addition, China would have to continue to
transport the estimated monthly 25,000 tons of mili-
tary and economic goods that presently enter North
Vietnam by rail.
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V. Other Countermeasures
Introduction
66. In the event that oceangoing shipping is
denied access to the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai,
and Cam Pha, a number of other measures could be
introduced to counter the effects of the quarantine.
The North Vietnamese could employ offshore lighter-
ing operations and use various shallow-water
approaches to the ports and inland waterways or
engage in over-the-beach operations. In addition
to the use of the overland routes discussed above,
diverted cargo could be transshipped in Chinese Com-
munist ports into small craft for movement to North
Vietnam, or funnelled through Chinese ports for
shipment on the Chinese railroad system to North
Vietnam. An airlift operated by the USSR with
Chinese cooperation could also move a large volume
of imports. An airlift operated exclusively by
the Chinese and North Vietnamese, however, would be
able to make only a small contribution without com-
pletely disrupting air transport operations in China.
The capabilities of all of these additional alterna-
tives, nevertheless, provide the North Vietnamese
with a flexible system with which to continue the
receipt of imports.
Lightering
67. If oceangoing ships were denied access to
Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha, they could still be
offloaded in offshore areas by using the ships'
gear and lighters.
68. We estimate that North Vietnam has more than
30,000 watercraft of all types. This inventory con-
sists largely of junks and sampans although many
modern lightering craft (obtained from other Com-
munist countries) have been added in recent years,
including 60 Chinese steel-hulled coastal vessels
and 30 Soviet-built 35-40 ton capacity mechanized
landing craft which are ideally suited for over-
the-beach operations. Photography of shipyard
facilities and data on imports indicate the North
Vietnamese have been adding about 125 lightering
craft to their inventory each month since November
1968. In addition to lightering craft, North Vietnam
has nine merchant coastal ships with the largest
having a capacity of 4,000 tons. Assuming normal
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conditions, we estimate approximately sixty 100-ton
lighters would be required to offload the 5,200 tons
of seaborne imports North Vietnam receives daily.
69. Adverse weather conditions and the likeli-
hood that port facilities with cranes would be
denied to lighters could both pose difficulties for
the Communists. Most bulky supply items requiring
cranes probably would move into North Vietnam by
rail. Bulk POL could be lightered from tankers
offshore. In fact, this is the normal way in which
POL is unloaded in Haiphong harbor. Also, calm seas
normally prevail in the northern section of the
Gulf of Tonkin some 60-70 percent of the time through-
out the year except for October when it is calm only
about 50 percent of the time.
70. The waterway network in the delta (princi-
pally the Red River, the Song Thai Binh, and two
connecting canals) provides a flexible system for
the movement of lightered goods inland. There are
ten entrances to the network from the Gulf and,
although several are very shallow at low water, the
depth over the bar increases to five to eight feet
during high water in nearly all cases. If this network
was denied to the enemy by mining, the lightering
would be forced to the use of an over-the-beach
operation which could be highly inefficient, par-
ticularly if suitable cranes were not available.
71. Oceangoing ships could anchor off the
southern coast and offload into lighters which
could then move to southern ports (including Ben
Thuy, Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi), estuaries, and
beaches. Anchorages in this area are less protect-
ed, but landing areas for lighters along the coast
are more numerous than further north near Haiphong.
Much of the cargo offloaded here, however, would
have to be moved overland north some 100 miles to
the major consuming areas.
72. Ports in South China such as Fort Bayard
and Canton could also be used to transship from
oceangoing ships to small craft for movement close
in-shore along the coast south to North Vietnam.
There are ample small craft available in China and
North Vietnam for such an operation.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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Air Transport
73. A sustained airlift could be organized to
maintain a flow of high-priority goods to North
Vietnam. There are 16 airfields in South China and
six in North Vietnam (five in the Hanoi-Haiphong area
and one at Kep) which could be used. All are near
rail lines, major roads, or seaports. The short
distance between the Chinese airfields and those
in North Vietnam requires little flying time and
makes this alternative reasonably economical in the
requirement for aircraft. For example, airfields
at Ning-ming and Nan-ning in China (which probably
would be the fields most extensively used) both
have runways of over 6,000 feet and are less than
30 minutes by air from Hanoi.
74. The Chinese inventory of air transports
totals about 300 large fixed-wing aircraft, and
about 140 small helicopters and about 400 small
AN-2s. The large aircraft inventory consists
principally of the IL-14 (96 aircraft), the LI-2
(57 aircraft), and a conglomerate of old C-46s,
C-47s, Viscounts, and IL-18s. North Vietnam also
has a small number of transports, including 22 small
AN-2s and 37 IL-14s and LI-2s. An airlift could be
conducted with these aircraft but it would have to be
relatively small-scale since about 140 IL-14s alone
would be required to airlift less than one-third of
North Vietnam's seaborne imports of 5,200 tons per
day. Even this effort would substantially disrupt
airline service in China.
75. Helicopters could also be used to move es-
sential supplies between P'ing-hsiang and Hanoi and
between Ho Kou and Hanoi (roughly 110 and 170 miles,
respectively). The helicopters most likely to be
used are the MI-6 (Hook), with a payload of 5 tons
and a range of about 390 miles, and the MI-10, which
is capable of transporting 8 tons about 300 miles. The
North Vietnamese have four MI-6s. They also have 20
MI-4s (Hounds), a helicopter with a maximum capac-
ity of 1.6 tons. The total Chinese inventory is believed
to be made up of about 130 MI-4s. The small payloads and
large number of helicopters needed to move a significant
amount of cargo would limit the use of them to high-
priority goods.
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brary DECLASSIFIED
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VI. Burden to China and Costs to North Vietnam
Economic Goods
76. During the past 12 months the Communist
countries have supplied about 96 percent of North
Vietnam's seaborne imports; about 44 percent came
from the USSR, 36 percent from China, and 16 per-
cent from the East European countries, North
Korea, and Cuba. If China were also to assume the
Soviet aid burden it would have to provide an addi-
tional 900,000 tons of goods, including large amounts
of petroleum, foodstuffs, transport equipment, and
industrial products.
77. In the event that a quarantine of ports
prevented the USSR from supplying North Vietnam's
POL requirements and China refused to permit Soviet
POL to transit Chinese territory, the evidence
clearly suggests that the great bulk of North Viet-
nam's requirements could be supplied from China.
North Vietnam's imports of POL during the past
12 months totaled about one-third of a million tons,
less than 3 percent of China's domestic produc-
tion. However, China would have difficulty in
supplying specific products such as aviation fuel
and special lubricants that are in short supply in
China. These and other products, if not available
in Communist China, would have to be supplied by
the East European countries or from non-Communist
countries and transshipped to North Vietnam. The
total cost of North Vietnam's imports of POL in
1968 was less than $15 million. Thus the foreign
exchange costs to China for petroleum products not
domestically available would be minor.
78. During the past year, North Vietnam received
about 47 percent of its total imports of about 110,000
tons of chemical fertilizer from the USSR, about 20
percent from North Korea, and about 24 percent from
Japan. China is not known to have shipped any fer-
tilizer to North Vietnam by sea.
79. China produced about 5 million tons of
chemical fertilizer in 1968, but this output does
not satisfy domestic requirements, and another 2 million
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tons of fertilizer were imported from Japan. In
the event Soviet shipments of fertilizer were cut
off the Chinese would be faced with the following
alternatives: (1) ship to North Vietnam domes-
tically produced fertilizer at the expense of
China's agricultural production, (2) increase
imports from either North Korea or Japan and
transship these imports to North Vietnam, or
(3) substitute increased shipments of food for
fertilizer. About $4 million of foreign exchange
would be the cost to China to replace Soviet fer-
tilizer shipments to North Vietnam if purchased
abroad. Furthermore, while North Vietnam's agri-
cultural output has been lagging there is no reason
to believe that even a total ban on fertilizer
imports would result in an immediate deterioration
in North Vietnam's agricultural output.
80. North Vietnam's imports of foodstuffs have
been almost evenly divided between the USSR and
Communist China, with the USSR supplying mostly
wheat flour. Communist China could easily increase
exports of foodstuffs -- either rice or wheat
flour -- to North Vietnam with only minor internal
adjustments. Total grain production in China during
1968 was estimated at 185-195 million tons, while
total foodstuffs imported by North Vietnam during
the past 12 months amounted to less than 900,000 tons
of which the USSR provided some 300,000 tons. Wheat
is imported by Communist China, and the export of
wheat flour to North Vietnam in place of that from
the USSR would cost China the foreign exchange paid
for such imports, approximately $15 million. On
the other hand, Communist China could replace
Soviet supplies of wheat flour with rice or corn
at no direct foreign exchange costs, but an indirect
cost represented by the loss of potential earnings
from rice exports to Free World consumers.
81. The data on the number of trucks imported
by North Vietnam are incomplete because trucks
arrive both by sea and overland by rail and there is
little firm information on the extent of overland
deliveries. The USSR, East European countries,
and China have all been major suppliers of trucks
to North Vietnam. China, currently producing at an
annual rate of roughly 60,000 trucks a year, would
be hard pressed to supply all of North Vietnam's
requirements. China would find it especially diffi-
cult to supply large numbers of four-ton cross-
country trucks.
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[p.34 of 56]
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82. On balance, if China were to prevent Soviet
trucks from moving by rail overland across China
the North Vietnamese would have to solicit addi-
tional trucks from the East European countries
or from China. China in the short run could draw
on its inventory of about 350,000 trucks or cut
into its current production to meet North Vietnam's
needs. Under any circumstances there would be no
immediate shortage of trucks in North Vietnam.
The present rainy season in Laos reduces North
Vietnam's truck losses due to air attacks. Further-
more, as noted earlier, there is considerable evidence
from aerial photography that there is a large inventory
of trucks, including heavy and specialized types, in
storage in North Vietnam.
Foreign Exchange Implications
83. For China to supply North Vietnam with the
economic goods presently being imported from the
USSR would probably involve some expenditure of
foreign exchange, as noted above. However, the
most important foreign exchange implication for
China would be the presumed loss of potential hard
currency earnings as a result of increased shipments
to North Vietnam of food and textiles. The direct
foreign exchange cost for Communist China to re-
place North Vietnam's supplies of wheat flour would
be approximately $15 million at the levels supplied
in 1968. This would be in addition to the present
cost of the possible forgone sales of 225,000 tons
(1968 levels) of rice on the world market that would
have brought China an estimated $37 million.
84. Amounts of textiles shipped by China in 1968
were not significant. However, if China were to
supply the amounts that came from the USSR in 1968,
the loss in potential foreign exchange earnings might
reach an estimated $10 million.
Military Goods
85. In itself a quarantine of North Vietnam's
ports would have no effect on the volume of either
Soviet or Chinese munitions being shipped to North
Vietnam. Although war-supporting goods -- trucks
and bulldozers and occasionally helicopters --
arrive by sea, an analysis of all available evidence
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suggests strongly that the great bulk of munitions
have entered North Vietnam by rail. However, it is
possible that the Chinese might use the quarantine
of North Vietnam's ports as a pretext for cutting
off all Soviet military aid to North Vietnam. The
Chinese might seek to embarrass the USSR and force
a Soviet-US confrontation.
86. However, at the current level of hostilities,
a cutoff of Soviet military aid would have little
immediate impact on North Vietnam's military capa-
bilities. Communist China continues to be the
principal supplier of infantry weapons to Communist
forces in both North and South Vietnam. Moreover,
China could provide substitutes for every item of
equipment in North Vietnam's military inventories,
although many of these, particularly technical
equipment for air defense, would be of lower
quality or less advanced design. Over a period of
time some of North Vietnam's military capabilities
would be eroded. China's capacity to supply equip-
ment for air defense systems probably is limited
to the extent that for many types of air defense
weapons only spare parts for maintenance and re-
placements for normal attrition could be supplied.
87. Deliveries of equipment for North Vietnam's
surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery
defenses have declined markedly since mid-1968 to
little more than that necessary for repair and
replacement -- a level of requirements that Com-
munist China probably could meet adequately. China
could provide spare parts necessary to keep North
Vietnam's MIG-19s and MIG-15/17s -- numbering
about 40 and 115, respectively -- in combat-ready
condition, but the effectiveness of the approximate
65 MIG-21s undoubtedly would deteriorate if the
supply of spare parts from the USSR were cut off.
The period of time for such deterioration would
depend on the supply of spare parts on hand and the
rates of use of the aircraft. Replacements for
early warning and ground controlled intercept radar
probably could be supplied by China, but limited
productive capacity would preclude China's meeting
any more than a minimum external demand for fire
control and missile control radars.
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88. As North Vietnam's Soviet equipment wears
out or is destroyed in combat, many of the re-
placements provided by China as substitutes would
be of poorer quality and less advanced technical
design. For example, as North Vietnam's MIG-21s
became non-operational for lack of spare parts,
China could substitute the less advanced MIG-19.
China's production of MIG-19s, would be adequate
to permit the total replacement of North Vietnam's
MIG-21 inventory. Much of China's radar production
consists of copies of earlier, less efficient Soviet
designs, and the eventual resupply with such equip-
ment might degrade somewhat the effectiveness of
antiaircraft artillery and of the air warning system.
Types of air defense equipment and probable Chinese
replacements are given in the attached table.
89. In the event the US bombing of North Viet-
nam were resumed and North Vietnam's requirements
reached the levels of 1967 or early 1968, Communist
China undoubtedly would not be able to meet North
Vietnam's requirements for surface-to-air missiles
and antiaircraft artillery ammunition. Production
of SA-2 missiles by China is believed to be little
more than enough to meet the basic load require-
ments for China's 20-25 SAM battalions, only a
fraction of the nearly 4,000 SA-2s fired by North
Vietnam in 1967. No firm estimate of capacity for
artillery ammunition production is available, but
it is believed that China would have great diffi-
culty supplying antiaircraft artillery ammunition at
the high 1967 expenditure rate in North Vietnam.
90. A halt in Soviet munitions shipments to
North Vietnam would not diminish the Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese army military capability in South
Vietnam or produce a significant change in the
character of the ground war. A halt in Soviet
munitions shipments would require the Communists to
substitute Chinese Communist 107-mm rockets and the
RPG-2 antitank grenade launcher for Soviet 122-mm
and 140-mm rockets and the more advanced Soviet
RPG-7. China would also be required to increase its
shipments of antiaircraft artillery up to 57-mm and
howitzer and field gun munitions, most of which have
been supplied by the USSR. Although the Soviet
conventional field guns and antiaircraft guns have
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predominated in South Vietnam, their Chinese
counterparts are similar in design and performance
and could be used without reducing firepower.
91. The Communists would not be forced to
change their battlefield tactics in South Vietnam
which currently emphasize standoff attacks by fire.
The acquisition of more Chinese Communist 107-mm
rockets, in addition to the large number of heavy
weapons currently in use and in stockpiles, would
enable the Communists to continue to use economy
of force tactics and would provide them with added
mobility at a small cost in firepower. The Soviet
122-mm rocket and RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers
have greater range and destructive power than the
Chinese 107-mm rocket and RPG-2, but the Chinese
weapons have the advantage of being lighter and
easier to transport.
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North Vietnam's Air Defense Equipment
North Vietnamese
Probable Communist
Equipment
Inventory
Chinese Replacement
Aircraft
MIG-21
MIG-19
MIG-19
MIG-19
MIG-15/17
MIG-17
SAM missile systems
SA-2 battalions
SA-2 battalions
SA-2 replacement
SA-2 replacement
missiles
missiles
Antiaircraft artillery
100-mm
85-mm - 100-mm
85-mm
57-mm - 85-mm
57-mm
57-mm
37-mm
37-mm
14.5-mm
14.5-mm
Radar
Missile control
Fan Song
Fan Song
Fire control
Beam Track
Fire Can
Whiff
Fire Can
Early warning/ground
Barlock
Cross Legs
controlled intercept
Big Bar B
Rice Cup
Dry Rock
Cross Slot
Flat Face
Dumbo
Long Eye
Knife Rest
One Eye
Moon Face
Score Board
Rock/Stone Cake
Side Net
Spoon Rest
Witch Four
Cross Slot
Dumbo
Knife Rest
Moon Face
Rock/Stone Cake
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VII. PROBABLE POLITICAL REACTIONS
Additional Working Assumption
92. The political reactions of all parties af-
fected by, concerned with or interested in the im-
position of a quarantine on North Vietnam would be
materially influenced by the general situation pre-
vailing at the time the quarantine was imposed. One
set of reactions would be produced if, for example,
the postulated quarantine was imposed soon after
(and in apparent retaliation for) some blatantly
provocative Communist military and/or terrorist
action--e.g a frontal, multi-divisional assault
across the DMZ, the public execution of a large num-
ber of American prisoners in North Vietnam, wide-
spread attacks on South Vietnamese cities and civil-
ian population centers, or systematic, coordinated
attacks on American and Vietnamese hospitals through-
out South Vietnam. Quite a different set of reac-
tions would almost certainly be produced if the im-
position of the quarantine closely followed, and
appeared to be the US response to, some major, super-
ficially sincere and forthcoming North Vietnamese
peace initiative--e.g. an unconditional acceptance
of President Thieu's election proposals. Ringing
the changes on all possible permutations of prior
circumstances would require a memorandum of inordi-
nate length. To simplify the analysis and assess-
ment of probable reactions, we have therefore made
the additional working assumption that the quaran-
tine is imposed under circumstances essentially
similar to those now prevailing, i.e., that North
Vietnam's propaganda, political, military and nego-
tiating posture remains essentially what it is in
mid-July 1969.
Probable Chinese Communist Reactions
93. The primary object of the reaction analy-
sis portion of this memorandum is to assess Hanoi's
probable response to the imposition of a quarantine.
Hanoi's range of options will be so heavily affected,
however, by the responses of Peking and, to a
slightly lesser extent, Moscow that the probable
view from Hanoi can be seen in considerably clearer
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perspective if we first look at the probable reactions
of the Chinese Communists and the Soviets.
94. As outlined above, the evidence available
shows that China has the physical resources and ca-
pabilities to provide North Vietnam with the assist-
ance necessary to overcome the physical impact of a
quarantine imposed under the conditions assumed in
this memorandum's opening section. Since physical
constraints would not appear to inhibit or limit its
policy choices, Peking's political options would
range from shutting off virtually all of North Viet-
nam's imports to providing Hanoi with all assistance
possible. For a time, at least, Peking would be very
much in the driver's seat; for all bulk, war-essen-
tial supplies reaching North Vietnam--including arms,
ammunition, POL, trucks and some foodstuffs--would
have to come overland via Chinese territory.* With-
out overland imports from China, once North Viet-
nam's reserves and stockpiles were depleted, Hanoi
could no longer wage war; for the contribution of
her own industrial plant to North Vietnam's war mak-
ing potential is negligible. **
*If the quarantine involved only mining Haiphong and
not a complete naval blockade some goods and supplies
might be lightered ashore from Soviet vessels at
minor ports such as Campha. Such action would. par-
tially attenuate Hanoi's near-total dependence on
Chinese assistance, but unless the quarantine were
of very short duration, the basic picture would be
essentially that just described in the text above.
**A Soviet support effort effected by sea lift through
Cambodia might perhaps provide enough war materiel
for Communist forces in South Vietnam to continue the
military struggle at present levels, but the evolution
of such a support system would require Sihanouk's open
assistance (or replacement of his regime with a Com-
munist-dominated Cambodian government). Even under
such circumstances, without overland imports from China,
North Vietnam would have severe and mounting internal
economic problems. Our memorandum hence does not fur-
ther address the theoretical alternative of a "Cam-
bodian solution" to the problems that would be created
by the imposition of a quarantine of North Vietnam.
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95. Despite her current dispute and border
problems with the Soviet Union and despite the fact
that the situation here postulated would afford Pe-
king a tempting opportunity to impale Moscow on the
horns of an intriguing dilemma--let Hanoi founder
or risk a direct military confrontation with the
United States by forcing the US blockade--shutting
off North Vietnam's essential supplies and driving
Hanoi to the wall would probably not be viewed in
Peking as a politically profitable course of action.
Even more importantly, Peking would probably view
such a course of action as unacceptable ("incorrect")
on doctrinal grounds. The economic follies of the
"Great Leap Forward" (e.g., backyard steel mills)
and the record of the "Cultural Revolution'
that some of Peking's major policy decisions are in-
fluenced by doctrinal considerations or what might
really be called theological considerations.
96. For years, Peking has urged Hanoi to fol-
low the doctrinally pure ("correct") policy of un-
relenting struggle against the imperialist enemy
and to forswear the revisionist Soviets' cowardly
heresy of premature resort to negotiations 4. Under
the situation postulated at the outset of this
memorandum, Peking could not refuse to aid North Viet-
nam without thereby virtually forcing Hanoi to adopt
a policy Peking has always unremittingly opposed.
Conversely, by coming to Hanoi's rescue, Peking
would lend tangible support to its doctrinal argu-
ments and, at the same time, greatly increase Chi-
nese influence over North Vietnam. Thus Peking would
probably see the quarantine as a golden opportunity
to improve its standing in Hanoi, at Moscow's ex-
pense, and hence would provide the aid that would
make it possible for North Vietnam to cope with the
physical problems created by the quarantine. In
the propaganda field, Peking would almost certainly
attack the quarantine as the latest "proof" of US
wickedness, would accuse the Soviets of being too
cowardly to contest it, and would take the general
line that North Vietnam and other "fraternal" par-
ties could now clearly know who was the real stal-
wart in the "socialist" camp.
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97. Chinese foreign policy in recent years
has displayed a number of not always consistent at-
tributes. Doctrinally-inspired bombast is clearly
one. Pragmatic prudence, however, is usually an-
other. Keeping the supply lines open to North Viet-
nam and providing Hanoi with all possible material
assistance would almost certainly strike Peking as
a politically profitable course of action involving
minimal risks. Peking would also certainly mount
a high decibel propaganda campaign against the US,
possibly one interlaced with "warnings" or threats.
Taking actual physical action against US forces im-
posing the quarantine, however, would be an entirely
different matter. A time of burgeoning tension along
the Soviet border would hardly be an opportune mo-
ment to run the risk of any sort of armed conflict
with the United States. The record of Chinese re-
sponses to air space intrusions indicates that Com-
munist China would probably fire on any US ships or
planes that encroached on Chinese territory and
China would probably aid North Vietnam to some ex-
tent in mine-clearing operations, but Communist
China is unlikely to dispatch its own warships or
aircraft to contest US naval operations off the coast
of North Vietnam.
Probable Soviet Reactions
98. In responding to the imposition of a quaran-
tine on North Vietnam, Moscow would have to select
a course of action from a range of options that
would extend from urging Hanoi to abandon the strug-
gle and seek the earliest possible settlement in
Paris to using military force to break the quaran-
tine and, perhaps, threatening armed retaliation
in other areas (e.g., Berlin) if the quarantine
were not promptly lifted. Moscow's choice of the
optimum Soviet response, however, would not be de-
termined exclusively by the specific issues or con-
siderations directly related to the quarantine.
Instead, Moscow's choice would be made within the
total context of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern
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policy, relations with North Vietnam, posture toward
China and toward the United States.
99. It seems increasingly clear that the reas-
sertion of Soviet interests in Vietnam, signalled by
Kosygin's visit to Hanoi in February 1965, was not
prompted by a simple, opportunistic desire to join
what then appeared as a Vietnamese Communist effort
on the verge of success. Rather, this reassertion
of Vietnam interests was part, of a broad new Soviet
policy to "encircle" and contain Communist China.
This consideration has become increasingly apparent
in Soviet policies throughout South and Southeast
Asia and in the Soviet military buildup on the Chi-
nese border, which also began in 1965. We now have
confirmation from highly reliable sources that the
containment of China has become the priority Soviet
foreign policy objective.
100. This policy of containing China, however,
does not automatically lead to collaboration with
the US. In particular it does not necessarily lead
to Soviet pressures on Hanoi to end the Vietnam war.
While the war in Vietnam does present some obstacles to
US-Soviet collaboration in areas of interest to the
USSR, ever since the talks first began in Paris
(and particularly since the 31 October 1968 bombing
halt), the Soviets have not chosen to regard the
Vietnam struggle as an impediment to doing business
with the US on important matters such as the Middle
East or arms limitation talks. Moreover, it is im-
portant to the USSR, in the context of its anti-
Chinese policy, not to offend Hanoi and to maintain
a Soviet presence in North Vietnam. Hanoi is a
prickly pear, jealous of its autonomy within the
Communist world, and demonstrably capable of play-
ing the Chinese against the Soviets in order to de-
fend and advance its own interests. Moscow appears
well aware of Hanoi's sensitivities and to our knowl-
edge has never pressured Hanoi to adopt positions,
which the Vietnamese Communists might consider pre-
judicial to their interests.
99. Furthermore, Moscow probably sees some
positive benefits in the prolongation of the war
in Vietnam. The war is distracting to the US, it
serves to erode US influence in Europe and in other
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areas of interest to the USSR, and Moscow can only
take comfort from the internal strains within the
US which the world attributes, in part at least, to
the war.
102. For these reasons, if none other, we be-
lieve that the Soviet response to the closure of
Haiphong would be conditioned primarily by a desire
to keep in step with Hanoi. Added to this, however,
would be the question of Soviet "face" as a great
power. Its ships are the principal users of the
port and Soviet prestige would be directly involved
in any mining or blockade. Because Hanoi would al-
most certainly request it, and because face required
it, the Soviets would feel compelled to provide assist-
ance--with equipment and personnel, probably in a semi-
overt role--for mine-sweeping operations and other
countermeasures (e.g., by having Soviet pilots fly
North Vietnamese aircraft.)
103. A blockade would confront the USSR with the
most difficult decisions, decisions which might well
produce severe strains within the Soviet leadership.
Unless it challenged the blockade with its own es-
corted convoys, the USSR would open itself to propa-
ganda attack from Peking charging that the Soviets
were chicken-hearted or secretly working in collusion
with the US. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders would
recognize that the USSR does not have naval forces
capable of challenging a US blockade in that area ef-
fectively, and that the attempt to do this would pro-
voke an unprecedented, direct confrontation with the
US under very disadvantageous circumstances. During
the past five years the Soviets have never given any
indication that they consider the issues involved in
Vietnam worth the risk of such a confrontation with
the United States. (For example, the Soviets have
never made an issue of, or even mentioned, casual-
ties suffered by Soviet personnel manning SAM sites
or assisting in the defense of North Vietnam during
the bombing). Thus a review of all evidence avail-
able weights the odds heavily against the Soviet's
offering a direct physical challenge to a US quaran-
tine or even a US blockade. Nonetheless, the USSR
would almost certainly issue grave warnings and at-
tempt to create the impression that a major world
crisis could soon result if the US quarantine were
not speedily lifted.
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104. To give point to these warnings, the
USSR would probably assert that the US quarantine
had generated very severe obstacles to US-Soviet
collaboration in any area, thus reversing Moscow's
current stance that circumstances are presently
favorable for attempting to resolve a variety of
difficult issues through negotiation. Following
this new tack, the Soviets might alter, or at
least perceptibly chill, their attitude toward
exchanges which have been taking place on such mat-
ters as the Middle East, Vietnam negotiations, and
arms control. They might go further and say that
they perceived a radical turn toward aggressiveness
in US policy, with the implied threat that if this
continued, critical situations would inevitably be
generated at points of confrontation in other areas.
While moves to provoke countercrises elsewhere can
never be entirely excluded, it seems more likely
that in the circumstances postulated, the Soviets
would see more advantage in demonstrating that the
US move could not bring Hanoi to its knees and in
stimulating political pressures in the US and else-
where to impel the US Government to desist.
Probable North Vietnamese Reactions
105. If the analysis outlined above is correct,
soon after the imposition of a quarantine Hanoi would
have reason to be confident of securing enough ad-
ditional Chinese, and Soviet, assistance to be able
to minimize the quarantine's physical impact. Thus
Hanoi's decision on how to react could be made pri-
marily on political grounds and would probably not
be dictated by physical constraints.
106. In making its decision, Hanoi would have
a fairly broad range of options to choose from.
For example, it could move swiftly to seek a negoti-
ated settlement in Paris. Or it could develop and
mount a general, last-gasp type military offensive
in South Vietnam. Or Hanoi could protest loudly in
the propaganda field, but basically sit tight in the
action arenas--both in Paris and on the battlefield
in South Vietnam--continuing present policies and
programs while waiting to see how the quarantine
affected the over-all political climate and, particu-
larly, the political mood in the United States.
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107. There is abundant evidence indicating
that Hanoi follows the course of political develop-
ments in the United States with careful and detailed
attention. The evidence available does not show
just how much weight Hanoi attaches in making basic
policy decisions to its calculations of US domestic
political factors, but the broad outlines of the
frame of reference within which Hanoi views such
matters are fairly clear.
108. For almost 25 years the Vietnamese Com-
munist leadership has consistently displayed a seem-
ingly ineradicable penchant for repeating strategic
or tactical gambits that have proved successful in
the past. The writings of the Vietnamese Communists'
leaders--Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and General
Giap--all indicate strongly that the Vietnamese pol-
itburo believes the Franco - Viet Minh war was lost
by the French in Paris as much as it was won by the
Vietnamese on the battlefields in Indochina. In es-
sence, the present Hanoi leadership seems convinced
that one of their most successful strategies during
the 1946-1954 struggle against the French was the
utilization of politico-military pressure as politi-
cal abrasive burring on the will of the French people
and the French Government, a strategy which eventu-
ally made continuation of the struggle a politically
unsaleable commodity in Paris. When this point was
reached, the French Government then in power opted
out with hasty dispatch. (Mendes-France took office
in the summer of 1954 with a public pledge to end
the war within a month or resign.) Despite occa-
ional disclaimers or remarks about the difference
in the two situations, the writings and statements
of the Hanoi leadership over the past few years
demonstrates a strong and continuing inclination on
Hanoi's part to see (and look for) parallels between
the mood in France in the early 1950s and that de-
veloping in the United States in the late 1960s.
109. We know from captured notebooks, internal
party directives, and reports of cadre indoctrina-
tion sessions that the Vietnamese Communist Party
is spreading within its own ranks the thesis that
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Communist actions in Vietnam have produced a cli-
mate in the United States which "toppled" (or, some-
times, "defeated") Secretary McNamara, General West-
moreland, and President Johnson. In propaganda pro-
nouncements, cadre indoctrinations, party directives,
and even in statements in public and private negoti-
ating sessions in Paris, the Vietnamese Communists
quote US newspaper articles and editorials and Con-
gressional speeches critical of the Vietnam war,
constantly playing the theme that the "liberation
struggle" is receiving a rising tide of support
from "progressive elements" within the United States.
The available evidence is not conclusive, but a very
strong case can be made for the thesis that Hanoi
has a lot of political chips riding on a calculation
that if North Vietnam sits tight and more or less
stonewalls on its present political posture (but-
tressed by its present levels of military activity),
within a finite time frame (measured in months) ris-
ing political pressures within the United States will
force the US Government to make major concessionary
gestures to Hanoi or accept North Vietnamese demands
that involve major allied concessions.
110. It is within the context just outlined
that Hanoi views the developments of the past 18
months: Secretary McNamara's resignation, the 1968
Tet offensive, General Westmoreland's recall from
Vietnam, the 31 March partial bombing halt accom-
panied by President Johnson's call for negotiations
and personal withdrawal from the electoral arena,
the opening of talks in Paris, the full bombing halt
on 31 October, the lack of US military response to
Hanoi's fudging on the "understandings" with respect
to the DMZ and shelling South Vietnam's major cities,
Governor Harriman's public criticisms of the Saigon
Government and the US negotiating rigidity, the US
Government's frequent public endorsements of the
concept of negotiated settlement, Mr. Clifford's
article, the initial withdrawal of US troops, cur-
rent public debate over how fast US forces in South
Vietnam can or should be withdrawn. Given Hanoi's
attitudes and perspective, there are ample grounds
for making the strong presumptive inference that
Hanoi believes the US is moving steadily down a
road of de-escalation and disengagement and, further,
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probably considers it unlikely that the US Govern-
ment would be politically able to initiate any sig-
nificant "re-escalation" of the struggle.
111. Under present circumstances, therefore,
and in the absence of any major new provocation
from Hanoi of a type discussed above in paragraph
90, Hanoi would almost certainly be surprised at
the imposition of a quarantine. Furthermore, Hanoi
would almost certainly calculate that the quaran-
tine's imposition would swiftly become a topic of
acrimonious debate within the United States and
would prompt a widespread series of public attacks
on the Vietnam policy of the US Government.
112. Since Hanoi could probably withstand or
minimize the physical impact of the quarantine (if
China and the USSR were willing to provide the
necessary aid), Hanoi would probably wait to see how
events unfolded and the political climate developed
before making any definitive decisions on North Viet-
nam's optimum response. Hanoi would not want to
rush to settlement in Paris, for this course of
action would make Hanoi lose face, appear to be act-
ing out of weakness, and probably involve Communist
political concessions Hanoi would not want to make
unless unfolding events proved that such concessions
were unavoidable. On the other hand, Hanoi would
probably see little advantage in immediately launch-
ing heightened offensive activity in South Vietnam--
a course of action that, in any event, would take
some time to organize and prepare.
113. In sum, Hanoi's initial reaction would
probably be to gamble that the US would not be polit-
ically able to sustain the quarantine for any appre-
ciable length of time. Such a gamble would involve
relatively few risks for Hanoi and would be rein-
forced by the calculation that if the US lifted the
quarantine without obtaining any major concessions
from North Vietnam, Hanoi's political image, pres-
tige, and position would be materially enhanced at
Washington's expense. The Soviets would probably
counsel Hanoi to take such a gamble and, in this
instance, Hanoi would find Soviet advice attractively
congenial.
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114. While waiting for events to ripen before
deciding on its final course of action, Hanoi would
certainly mount a strident propaganda campaign
shrilly attacking the US quarantine as an act of
"aggression" and proof positive of America's "neo-
colonialist," "imperialist" perfidy. Hanoi's propa-
ganda chorus would be energetically joined by Com-
munist China, the Soviets and Communist governments
and parties throughout the world. Hanoi would also
probably suspend--or at least temporarily walk out
of--the Paris talks, partly because "face" would
require some response and partly because this action
would fan worldwide apprehension that peace prospects
had been dashed.
115. If the US Government turned what appeared
to be a deaf ear to the criticisms the quarantine
would inevitably provoke at home and abroad and per-
sisted in the quarantine through a period of weeks
stretching into months, the arguments within the
Hanoi politburo would become increasingly nervous
and sharp. These arguments would not revolve around
the physical impact of the quarantine but around the
extent to which its continuation called into increas-
ing question certain fundamental calculations about
the political staying power of the US Government on
which Hanoi's present strategy is largely based.
Contingency plans for prolonged struggle unquestion-
ably exist in Hanoi, but despite a public posture of
implacable determination to fight on forever until
total victory (e.g., General Giap's recent speech),
the abundant evidence of mounting stresses and strains
within North Vietnam and within the Communist move-
ment in South Vietnam makes it debatable (at least)
whether Hanoi really is prepared to carry on the
struggle for a time span measured in years without
scaling down its present minimal political demands
in order to achieve an earlier settlement. Imposi-
tion of a quarantine would almost certainly not in-
duce Hanoi to opt promptly for a negotiated settle-
ment. Persistence in the quarantine over a period
of months would--at a minimum--almost certainly com-
pel Hanoi to review its basic strategy and the po-
litical calculations on which that strategy is based.
Any final decisions on strategic options made after
such a review, however, would not hinge on the quar-
antine alone but would reflect Hanoi's net analysis
-45-
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y DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NLN 06 04/3
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Per Sec. [50 usc
Per Hr. 3/30/2010
of all relevant factors--including levels of Chinese
and Soviet aid, the course of events in South Viet-
nam, trends in the fortunes of the Communists' south-
ern organization, manpower loss rates, the world po-
litical climate and Hanoi's assessment of the polit-
ical temper within the United States.
Probable South Vietnamese Reactions
116. President Thieu and his associates are
clearly convinced that domestic US opinion is a
major factor in determining the course and pace of
US policy in Vietnam. Thieu believed last year
that the decision to end the bombing of North
Vietnam was a move the Johnson administration felt
it had to take for domestic political reasons. Thieu
has also stated in private to his advisers that he
understands the need for President Nixon's admini-
stration to withdraw some American troops this year
in order to assuage public opinion in this country.
117. This view of domestic US political con-
siderations helped Thieu take calmly what he saw as
the failure of the US to retaliate when the Commu-
nists violated the "understandings" which led to the
bombing halt. He appears to have reconciled himself
to the likelihood that the US will not resume the
bombing of North Vietnam or escalate the war by
attacking North Vietnam in any fashion.
118. Thieu's estimate of the political con-
straints under which he believes the US Government
is operating seems to be generally shared by his
associates and, for that matter, by most politically
conscious South Vietnamese. Thus the imposition of
a quarantine against North Vietnam (without some
prior Communist provocation or other major change
in existing circumstances) would come as a surprise
to Thieu, his associates, and most of his fellow
countrymen. The initial reaction of non-Communist
South Vietnamese would probably be one of exultant
delight. There would be a lift in confidence about
the future and about the willingness of the US Gov-
ernment to stay the course (two concepts most Viet-
namese view as inextricably intertwined). This lift
would certainly improve South Vietnamese morale and
would probably have a beneficial effect on South
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Per Sec. SANITIZED 3.3(b)(1); (c) [50 USC
Per Hr. 3/30/2010
Vietnamese performance in some areas. On the other
hand, the fact of the quarantine might somewhat
diminish South Vietnamese interest in seeking accom-
modation with the enemy or lessen the sense of ur-
gency with which they viewed the need to set their
own house in order to gird for a period of political
competition.
119. The longer term impact of the quarantine
on South Vietnamese attitudes, policies and perform-
ance would hinge on the course of events. If the
quarantine should eventually prompt significant
political concessions from Hanoi, these concessions
(more than the quarantine itself) would enhance non-
Communist political prospects in South Vietnam. On
the other hand, if the quarantine should be imposed
and then lifted without any obvious reciprocal ges-
ture from Hanoi, virtually all politically concerned
South Vietnamese would read this course of events as
a major US political defeat which greatly enhanced
the Vietnamese Communists' prospects of success.
Probable Reactions of Other East Asian Countries
120. Virtually all informed East Asians would
see the postulated action as a certain sign that
prospects for an early negotiated end to the war
had faded. Few would expect the US move to affect
decisively Hanoi's will to continue the war, or,
at least in the short term, its ability to do so.
121. The more hawkish US allies in East Asia,
Thailand and South Korea, would welcome the US ac-
tion as an earnest of its intention to persist in
seeking a favorable outcome of the war. In the
other countries reactions would be somewhat ambiva-
lent. While there is clearly a general desire to
see the Communists stopped in South Vietnam, most
governments want to see an end to the war and its
attendant perils. The increased possibility of a
US-Soviet military confrontation in the region would
be particularly unnerving to them. Thus, support
of the US action would be at best lukewarm. Leftist
and anti-US elements, of course, would react vocif-
erously wherever possible.
-47-
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[p.52 of 56]
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SANITIZED
SECRET
Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(5)]
Per Hr. 3/30/2010
122. Japan is a special case. In coping with
vigorous leftist opposition on security issues over
the past year or so, Prime Minister Sato has been
strengthened by the apparent reduction in the threat
of any major expansion of the Vietnamese war. Any
move which appeared to run counter to this trend
would provide his opponents with ammunition for
their attacks on his commitment to the US alliance
and to the continued US military presence in Japan
and Okinawa. Fears of Soviet military involvement
in Vietnam would be especially susceptible to left-
ist exploitation, particularly if the US had insti-
tuted an active blockade rather than relying on
mining the approaches to Haiphong. Furthermore,
the opposition would emphasize the likely deteriora-
tion of prospects for US-Soviet moves toward nuclear
disarmament, a politically effective charge in Japan.
123. In response to all this, the Sato govern-
ment would probably feel compelled to mute what lit-
tle overt support it now gives to the US position in
Vietnam and to adopt an even firmer public posture
in its security negotiations with the US, particu-
larly on the Okinawan issue. More important, on the
island itself, it seems certain that heavy local
agitation against the basing of B-52s at Kadena would
be renewed. As leader of a great maritime nation,
Sato might also find it necessary to voice displeas-
ure with the US effort to close the sea lanes to
Haiphong. Over the longer term, the impact in Japan
of the Haiphong action would depend on subsequent
developments. For example, if the US move came to
be viewed in Japan as the first link in a chain of
actions which greatly prolonged the shooting war,
political elements advocating a loosening of secur-
ity ties with the US would almost certainly gain
supporters.
Probable UK and Other Western European Reactions
124. The dominant reaction in the UK, in of-
ficial circles as well as among the populace at
large, would be grave concern and disappointment
over what would be generally viewed as a distinct
setback to hopes for any early peace in Vietnam.
The most hostile criticism would be focused on the
challenge being posed to the USSR and its implica-
tions for European security (e.g., Berlin), nuclear
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SANITIZED
Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1) 3.5 (c) 50 use 403(g)]
Per Hr. 3/30/2010
disarmament negotiations, and the East-West detente
in general. Violent large-scale leftist demonstra-
tions would once again plague the authorities. The
fact that a number of British-flag dry-cargo vessels
(based in Hong Kong) call regularly at Haiphong
would probably not be a major factor in the UK re-
action to the US move, because these vessels for
the most part are owned or leased by firms controlled
by the Chinese Communists.
125. Elsewhere in Western Europe, reactions
would be about the same as in the UK, with the
degree of antagonism toward the US probably greatest
in the Scandinavian countries. In France, however,
the reaction might lead to a reversal of the warm-
ing trend in Franco-American relations since the
advent of new governments in both countries.
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NLN 06 04 13
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54 of 56
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Road
Kuei-yang
Railroad (meter gauge)
Yangtze
Railroad (standard gauge)
SECRET
CHINA
HANOI DONG DANG
AND HANOI LAOCAI
Liu-chou
RAILROAD CAPACITY
9,000 tons each way per day
CAPACITY OF ROADS CROSSING CHINA BORDER
5, 400 tons each way per day dry season
2,300 tons each way per day wet season
RED RIVER CAPACITY
1,500 tons per day average
Ha Giang
Lao Cai
pay
Ping
hsiang
RAIL IMPORTS
July 1968 June 1969
900 tons per day
Dong Dang
"wis
Lang Son
Yen Bai
Thai
Nguyen
Dual
Pei-hai
5
sm
r
Dien Bien Phu
Dual
Chan-chiang
u/c
Hon
Fort Bayard
HANOI
Gai
*Cank Pha
Lei-chou
Halphong
Peninsula
NORTH
{
SE ABORNE IMPORTS
L A o S
July 1968 June 1969
5,200 tons per day
Mekong
Luang Prabang
VIETNAM
GULF
OF
TONKIN
HAINAN
BURMA
Vinh
O 25 50
100
STATUTE MILES
THAILAND
94270 3-69 CIA
95597 7-69 CIA
NORTH VIETNAM and SOUTH CHINA: Selected Transportation Facilities
SECRET
NLN 06 04 13
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[p. 55 of 56 ]
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secret
Secret
NLN 06-04/3 06
[p: 56 of 56]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
TAB E
WORLD REACTIONS TAB
1. This Tab reviews possible reactions in response to the
U.S. mining of the Haiphong Port Complex.
2. General Comments.
a. Mining of the Haiphong Port Complex would be regarded
as an "escalation" of the war and would be so treated by the
Communist world in its propaganda. It would be accepted as
such by most of the rest of the world as well - particularly
the neutrals such as Sweden and India.
b. Much of the uneasiness concerning Vietnam which was
important in world affairs approximately a year ago has now
subsided. In the present world climate it is likely that this
act would be generally interpreted as showing determination,
whereas a year ago it might have been regarded as recklessness.
It is still possible that charges of "recklessness" would be
directed against the U.S. Small powers would, in general, man-
ifest more disapproval than large powers who would be more
likely to appreciate the dilemma which pushed the U.S. to this
action. Large powers would not be likely, however, to "speak
out" on behalf of the U.S.
c. It would be interpreted by all discerning governments
as primarily a challenge to the USSR. Few would really consider
it as sufficient to disturb the peace of the world, but many
would act as if they so regarded it. In recent decades, the
world has seen a number of examples of the application of force
clearly calculated to signal resolve rather than recklessness.
The majority of the world's leaders have become inured to the
kind of propaganda which inevitably follows this use of force.
In the end, those who have no direct interest in the matter
take precautions to ensure that they will not become involved.
Those who have an interest, but no capability, propagandize.
Those governments which have both interest and capability are
addressed below.
3. North Vietnam.
a. NVN has only a limited, unsophisticated capability to
counter the mining program. Anti-mine warfare efforts should
not have any appreciable effect on the program overall.
b. NVN has a considerable capability to attempt circumven-
tion of the mining program through the use of small (mostly
wooden) boats and lighters. Some of these would be lost, of
10
course, but this would not deter NVN from putting forth a major
effort in this respect.
[ 1370841]
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TAB E
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
c. To the extent that the mining affected the flow of goods
into NVN, a maximum effort to compensate for the reduction would
be undertaken via the overland and coastal-water routes from
Communist China.
d. NVN could be expected to attack US units engaged in the
mining. They are not capable of preventing such a US effort,
but they could attempt harassment of US ships and aircraft.
The expected aircraft loss rate is 3 percent or less.
e. NVN would probably consider that it was in its interest
for a Russian ship to be sunk (or appear to have been sunk) by
U.S. mines. To this end -- and in this eventuality -- NVN might
foster a situation that would encourage a U.S.-USSR confrontation
over the mining issue. Russian failure to stand up to the Ameri-
cans, if that should occur, would be unsettling to NVN, but it
would not drive them into the arms of China.
f. To the extent practicable, NVN would probably respond
to the U.S. escalation with some escalation of its own elsewhere,
probably in Laos.
4. Communist China.
a. Communist China is beginning to figure less and less
as a factor in NVN policy surrounding this war. CHICOMS are
still the most important suppliers of small arms (up to the
size of mortars and some rockets) and ammunition to NVN, but
they no longer retain any discernible political influence with
Hanoi in return for their arms support.
b. Chinese reaction to the mining is expected to be negli-
gible, except in the propaganda areas, which should also have
negligible impact.
C. The Chinese might be persuaded by NVN to step up their
aid, if that is required, but Chinese aid and support of any
kind would not be likely to compensate NVN for the possible
loss of Russian support. (Political and psychological support
is perhaps as important as material). In short, NVN is not
likely to risk the loss of Russian backing by too ready a
dependence on Communist China. At the same time, China would
be asked to do more of what she is now doing.
d. If the shipments of Russian goods across China are now
encountering difficulties, as reports indicate, then the act
of mining, per se, would not be expected to affect that situa-
tion. Other factors, such as the Russian-Chinese border talks,
would be expected to be of much greater direct importance. The
current problems between the Russians and the Chinese are surely
bigger than the future of South Vietnam; they may even be bigger
than the future of North Vietnam.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuanEto 2xeQutive and has been determin SECRET
TOP SECRET
5. The USSR.
a. If the Russians are willing to risk some ship losses
in crossing the minefield in order to demonstrate their re-
solve to support NVN, little will have been gained as regards
the NVN war. Russian-U.S. relations will have suffered a set-
back, but even that should not be serious. The Russians will
know that by flaunting the U.S. minefield they are not running
a great political risk: that they would primarily be showing
only the depth of their own determination. They already know
well the depth of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, and
while they might be momentarily surprised at our mining de-
cision in the light of current U.S. policy, they will soon
recover and see it as a challenge thrown down to them to
abandon their North Vietnamese ally.
b. If necessary to prove their commitment to NVN, the USSR
might cross the minefield. At the very least, they would pro-
vide assistance to the NVN in their efforts to circumvent the
mining program, perhaps even to the extent of dispatching mine-
sweepers. In Russian eyes, it would be, from a political/
psychological point of view, a Berlin-Blockade in reverse.
Thus the probability is that no open confrontation between the
U.S. and Russia would result because none would be necessary.
c. At the same time -- once proper allowance has been made
for "face" on both sides -- the Russians would probably be
further disgusted with the whole business of the war (which
has always been of much less importance to them than to us).
The net effect could be to prompt the Russians to put more
political pressure on NVN to end the war: to accept a "political
settlement." They could not force NVN, and they certainly would
not cut off visible support of NVN; but the war in Southeast
Asia is becoming an annoyance to the Russians in their current
foreign policy aspirations, which primarily seek support against
China. The mining of Haiphong would provide them with one more
good excuse to put added pressure on Hanoi for a settlement.
This pressure would not be visible pressure, for the world to
see, and it would not be likely to be instant. It might not
even be decisive, but it could be an important factor at this
time.
d. Russia's most visible reactions would probably occur
outside of Southeast Asia and impinge upon the question of U.S.-
USSR relations in general. They might, for example, freeze
progress toward such on-going matters as SALT, or they might
become more difficult on matters having to do with solutions
to the Middle East problem. They could even decide on a course
of no cooperation with the present Administration in an attempt
to embarrass it politically.
6. U.S. Counter Actions
a. The U.S. can blunt the anticipated propaganda by the
Reproduced at DECLASSIFIED TOP SECRET
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be TAB declassified.
TOP SECRET
USSR, Communist China, and others by explaining, at the time
the mining of the Haiphong Complex is announced, that the U.S.
has gone to great lengths to end the war in Vietnam, by the
bombing halt, the withdrawal of combat troops, and political
accommodations. These attempts have met nothing but intrans-
igence on the part of North Vietnam and her allies. U.S.
patience and understanding have reasonable limits which are
now being strained. The mining of the Haiphong Complex is
a low order response to the complete lack of cooperation by
the North Vietnamese government and its allies.
b. If the USSR suffers ship losses in attempting to run
the minefield, the U.S. can express sincere regrets and point
out that the loss was completely unnecessary since the original
announcement by the U.S. provided sufficient time for all ship-
ping to depart Haiphong safely. Point out that the USSR callously
sacrified the loss of their men and material in spite of all
U.S. attempts to protect third nation shipping.
c. If the USSR provides minesweepers to North Vietnam, or
sweeps the minefield herself, this will be detected by U.S.
reconnaissance aircraft. Upon completion of the sweeping opera-
tion, the U.S. can reseed the field as necessary.
d. If, as is most likely, the Soviet ships anchor just to
seaward of the minefields and leave the off-loading to the North
Vietnamese via lighterage, the U.S. can respond by seeding the
lighters' routes with MK 36 destructors. All of the normal
routes will have been seeded in the initial mine lay. Follow-
on seeding would be needed if the North Vietnamese select alternate
routes.
e. There is little the U.S. could do to prevent the USSR from
delaying SALT or withdrawing from Mid-East talks. In the case
of SALT the USSR might well decide that her vital interests are
at stake in gambling onaa nuclear arms race and therefore go
ahead with the negotiations. If the USSR drops out of the Mid-
East talks, the U.S. can express regrets and make plans to
continue to seek peace in the Mid-East without Soviet participa-
tion.
f. The U.S. could accept the use of Chinese ports by the
USSR and transshipment of material by rail from China to North
Vietnam. Such an arrangement would delay the arrival of material
in Haiphong and Hanoi and could further strain the relations
between Communist China and the USSR.
g. A Soviet blockade of Berlin should be addressed as a
separate issue without relation to U.S. action in Southeast
Asia. The U.S. response would parallel those actions taken
in the past to all threats by the Soviets and East Germany to
a closure of access to Berlin.
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[840541] This document been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
TAB E
TOP SECRET
h. The US could destroy North Vietnamese lighterage with
gunfire from US destroyers as the lighters depart the deep
water anchorages for the beach. There would be no threat to
third nation shipping and no loss of civilian lives.
i. Adverse weather conditions, particularly during the
Northeast Monsoon period from September to May with attendant
high sea states, would make NVN lighterage operations both
dangerous and inefficient. In addition both people and re-
sources would be diverted from other tasks, like fishing and
inner harbor transportation, if an extensive lighterage opera-
tion were attempted. This diversion and the delay in the
arrival of imports would have a cumulative adverse effect on
the North Vietnamese economy and their ability and willingness
to continue the war effort in the South.
PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB E
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
F
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
[89/1/2]
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
DUCK HOOK
20 JULY 1969
Office of Chief of Naval Operations
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 06-04/2 per Itr. 6/29/2009
TOP SECRET
B JMR
NARA, Date 10/30/2009
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED SENSITIVE
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
TAB F
LEGAL RAMIFICATION OF MINING OF HAIPHONG HARBOR
AND ITS APPROACHES
1. The traditional international law doctrines, particularly
as codified in Hague Convention VIII (1907) impose the follow-
ing restrictions, among others, on the use of mine warfare:
a. The use of mines presupposes the existence of a state
of war.
b. The laying of mines with the sole object of intercept-
ing commercial shipping is prohibited.
c. The use of mines in time of peace could be considered
an act of war by third countries.
d. Interference by mines with movements of international
shipping on high seas is prohibited.
2. Whatever the historic worth of these prohibitions, a modern
legal analysis of the use of mines in present day international
conflict requires an examination of several additional factors.
The international laws of war have evolved throughout history
out of an interaction from disputes between nations, conflicts
between military efficiency and humanitarianism, and changing
weapons technology. Since the end of World War II, these laws
have been subjected to the unprecedented pressures of cold war
international politics and introduction of modern weapons.
Because of the resulting revolutionary changes, the traditional
laws of war have been rendered obsolete, but no fixed principles
have yet been internationally accepted to replace them.
3. However, the national right of self-defense, which has
existed since time immemorial, has been recognized in the U.N.
Charter and strengthened in international practice. Also, the
former simple dichotomy between state of peace and state of war
no longer has legal or political validity. Therefore, in
assessing the legality of an act of coercion, the rigid formu-
las of pre-World War II are irrelevant, and new standards for
legality must be sought.
4. South Vietnam, a sovereign nation, possesses the inherent
right to defend itself against aggression. In the exercise of
this right, South Vietnam requested U.S. assistance in repelling
the aggression which has been waged by North Vietnam with in-
creasing ferocity for several years. Therefore, the United
States and South Vietnam have the right under international law
to participate in the collective defense of South Vietnam
against armed attack.*
*Department of State Bulletin, dated March 4, 1966, entitled
The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of
Viet-Nam.
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TOP SECRET
5. A principal source of supplies for the continued prosecu-
tion of that aggression is the Port of Haiphong. The aggres-
sion could be greatly reduced by effectively denying to North
Vietnam these necessary supplies. As part of its self-defense
effort, therefore, South Vietnam and its allies would be justi-
fied in employing a reasonable method of denying this flow of
supplies. The mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches,
can properly be considered such a method. Mine emplacement
shou ld extend seaward of Haiphong Harbor only so far as is
necessary to halt the entrance of shipping to the harbor.
Advance notification must be given to all shipping concerning
time of activation of mines laid. All shipping entering
Haiphong after that time would do so at its own peril.
6. The fundamental test of any act in international law is
reasonableness. The reasonableness of self-defense actions is
gauged by the standards of necessity and proportionality. It
is clear beyond dispute that South Vietnam is deeply engaged
in self-defense action against the overt hostilities of North
Vietnam. Thus, the necessity for action is clear. In asses-
sing the proportionality of the mining of Haiphong, the follow-
ing elements are pertinent:
a. Mining is a passive, not aggressive, measure.
b. Advance notice will be given to third countries.
c. Mining will be restricted to the area around Haiphong.
d. Potentially, no loss of life or property need be
incurred.
e. This defensive measure will reduce loss ofllife and
material elsewhere in the zone of hostilities.
7. In summary, the traditional laws of war do not cover mining
except in a state of war. The political and technological
history of the cold war has rendered the laws of war, based on
the war or peace dichotomy, obsolete and irrelevant. Acts in
self-defense are lawful under international law. Therefore,
mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, as described in
this plan, is considered to be a lawful exercise of South
Vietnam's right of self-defense against the aggression of
North Vietnam.
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TAB F
[p.43 of 58]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
NLN 06-4/2
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
SUMMARY OF INTERDICTION (QUARANTINE) PLAN
FOR PORT OF SIHANOUKVILLE
1. This paper summarizes a plan for the interdiction (quaran-
tine) of all war material entering the Cambodian port of
Sihanoukville.
BACKGROUND
2. The bulk of arms and ammunition coming from out-of-
country sources to the enemy in III and IV CTZ is obtained
by NLF agents from, or through, Cambodian sources. There is
ample evidence that much of the military equipment entering
Sihanoukville, ostensibly for the Cambodian armed forces, is
in fact intended for the Communist war effort in South Viet-
nam. (See Tab A). The following table shows the estimated
munitions deliveries to Sihanoukville since late 1966 based
on Navy intelligence analysis.
MUNITIONS TONNAGE SUMMARY
1966 (4th Qtr.)
950
1967
4500
1968
8000
1969 (to date)
4500 to 9000
INTERDICTION (QUARANTINE) PLAN
3. To stop the flow of military material through Sihanouk-
ville, interdiction (quarantine) of ships destined for coast-
line of Cambodia will be initiated. Interdiction (quarantine)
is defined as a selective blockade, i.e., it would deny access
of certain types of material to Cambodia. Ships will not be
allowed to enter Sihanoukville unless they have previously
obtained a Certificate of Clearance (NAVICERT) from U. S.
State Department at last port of departure; or, unless they
received clearance in the approaches to Cambodia as conse-
quence of a search of ship by U. S. interdiction (quarantine)
forces.
4. To carry out interdiction (quarantine), six destroyers
will be equally spaced along barrier line approximately 60 NM
from Cambodian coast. A 6-plane P3A detachment operating
out of U-Tapao or Sattahip will provide maritime air patrols
to give timely warning of approaching shipping to barrier
forces. (See Tab B for details).
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
5. Rules of engagement contained in Tab C,and include pro-
visions for increasingly severe measures to insure success-
ful execution of the interdiction (quarantine) plan.
6. Interdiction (quarantine) is a defensive measure and
must be subject to twin tests of necessity and proportion-
ality imposed by international law. These tests require
that action be necessary to meet the clear and present
threat, and proportioned to the threat. The interdiction
(quarantine) of Sihanoukville appears to meet these cri-
teria. (See Tab E).
7. Possible reactions by the USSR, Communist China, and
North Vietnam have been analyzed and are covered in Tab D.
TABS
A - Intelligence
B - Quarantine Plan
C - Rules of Engagement for Quarantine
D - World Reaction to Quarantine
E - Legal Ramifications of Quarantine
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
[p.45 of 58]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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.......
A
:
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TOP SECRET
TAB A
INTELLIGENCE
SIHANOUKVILLE
1. Enemy Forces. The Cambodian Navy, Marine Royale Khmere
(MARK), including riverine forces, is composed of about 50
ships, about 30 of which are amphibious craft. The naval
forces also include about 12,000 general service personnel
and 200 naval infantry. The main naval operating base and
headquarters is located at Chrui Changvar Krau (11-35N/104-
55E), near Phnom Penh. Secondary bases are at Kampot, Kep
Lem Dam, and Ream. The Navy is capable of only moderately
effective patrol of major inland waterways, a small capabil-
ity for coastal patrol, and a limited transport capability
for the Army. The effectiveness of the Navy is low due to
deficient training and maintenance, lack of spare parts,
budgetary limitations, and small size. The 1,500 man Cam-
bodian Air Force, Aviation Royale Khmere (AVRK), has about
140 aircraft, including about 12 MIG-17's, about 14 T-28D's,
about 12 AlH (AD-6) aircraft, about 20 transport aircraft,
and about 23 French Morane-Sauliner trainers. AVRK units
in Cambodia are located at Pochentong Base, six miles west
of Phnom Penh. Siem Riep airfield in northwest Cambodia is
reportedly being improved to acquire primary status. Kampot,
Kratie, and Prek Kak are secondary fields. The AVRK is capa-
ble of providing a limited air defense capability and of
supporting army and aerial activities in civic action pro-
grams. AVRK effectiveness is considered marginal. Main-
tenance is from satisfactory to poor, and parts, ammunition,
and fuel are in short supply.
2. Sihanoukville Maritime Intelligence:
a. The USIB has estimated that Cambodian sources supply
as much as 15 percent of the daily food requirements of all
communist forces in South Vietnam.
b. Recently, a reliable source reported that two types
of contracts exist between Cambodian authorities and the
Viet Cong. The first involves the shipment of non-military
goods to the communists; the other governs the shipment of
arms and ammunition. In addition, the recent visit of a
high level Viet Cong leader (Phat) to Phnom Penh for talks
with Sihanouk, alledgedly related to delays in shipments
caused by the Cambodians, lends further credence to past
reports that Sihanouk, himself, has been a party to some
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB A
[p.46 of 58]
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kind of an understanding with the communists on this subject.
Other recent reports from fairly reliable sources refer to
arms and ammunition being held back by the Cambodians pending
the negotiation of new controls with the Viet Cong. Taken
together, all the evidence adds up to the picture of some
kind of official Cambodian involvement in a regularized mu-
nitions movement to the enemy forces in and around South
Vietnam. The evidence suggests that the tonnages of arms
and ammunition involved over the past year or so have con-
stituted an important, and at times a major, proportion of
communist requirements in III and IV Corps.
c. The USIB has recently concluded that there is little
doubt that the importance of the Cambodian logistics route
to the enemy war effort has grown significantly over the past
two years or so.
d. Total shipping activity at Cambodian ports increased
in 1968 above the level of 1967. Ship calls were up 10
percent (from 568 to 627), and imports increased by 27 percent,
from 582,000 tons to 742,000 tons. Free World ships made 95
percent of all calls at Cambodian ports. For the first year
since 1965, ship arrivals and total imports at Sihanoukville
exceeded those at Phnom Penh. Imports handled at Sihanouk-
ville were 80 percent greater than in 1967. Petroleum,
cement, and coal were the most important bulk imports, account-
ing for 62 percent of the total.
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB A
[p.47 of 58]
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B
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TOP SECRET
TAB B
INTERDICTION (QUARANTINE) PLAN FOR SIHANOUKVILLE
1. General. Intelligence reports continue to indicate that
war materials intended for use by enemy forces in Republic of
Vietnam are moved by sea to Cambodia for transshipment within
Cambodia to enemy base areas located within Cambodia or astride
the border within Vietnam. Although there are alternate points
of entry into Cambodia at Kampot and Ream, Sihanoukville, be-
cause of both political and geographic factors is virtually
the sole ocean terminus of Cambodian commerce. Alongside berths
at Sihanoukville can accommodate four ocean-going ships and
four lighters simultaneously, which provide an estimated mili-
tary port capacity of 2700 long tons per day. Use of the al-
ternate points of entry of Kampot and Ream would dictate either
off loading from seagoing merchantmen to junks off the entrance
to Sihanoukville or intermediate points of origin within the
range of small coastal junks.
2. Mission. Establish control of ocean traffic by inter-
diction (quarantine) in the vicinity of Sihanoukville, Cam-
bodia, in order to deter or prevent military supplies from
arriving in Cambodia via the sea.
3. Execution. Commander SEVENTH Fleet will alert and deploy
Navy combat forces as directed, in order to maintain control
of ocean traffic by interdiction (quarantine) of the approaches
to Sihanoukville, Cambodia.
a. Cruiser-Destroyer Group SEVENTH Fleet (TG 70.8). Plan,
and when directed, conduct naval operations, including:
(1) Provision of necessary destroyer forces.
(2) Exercise command and control of the patrol and
interdiction/quarantine forces.
b. Patrol Force SEVENTH Fleet (TF 72). Plan, and when
directed, conduct naval operations, including:
(1) Provision of patrol aircraft, aircrews and logis-
tics support as required.
(2) Position VP detachment when directed.
c. Logistic Support Force SEVENTH Fleet (TF 73).
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB B
[p.48 of 58]
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(1) When directed provide logistic support to all
forces and elements as required.
(2) Make timely recommendations to minimize logis-
tic complexity in accomplishing this task.
4. Definitions. For the purpose of this plan, Interdiction
(quarantine) is defined as follows: A peacetime act (in con-
trast to a belligerent blockade which is a wartime act) where-
in all shipping suspected of carrying military supplies to
the quarantined ports are subject to visit and search. Those
ships carrying prohibited materials to the quarantined ports
are not captured, but are directed to proceed to another
destination of their own choice. Any vessel or craft which
fails or refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall
be subject to being taken into custody by use of such force
as is necessary for that purpose.
5. Concept. This operational concept provides for Pacific
Fleet control of maritime traffic within the Gulf of Thai-
land to counter the flow of military supplies to the VC/NVA
forces through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. These
maritime control operations are envisaged under conditions
short of general war.
a. To carry out an interdiction (quarantine) of Sihan-
oukville a surface ship barrier will be established around
Cambodia in the Gulf of Thailand. High seas shipping bound
for Cambodia will be denied passage into Cambodia. unless
they have previously obtained a clearance certificate
(NAVICERT) from the U. S. State Department at their last
port of departure or have been inspected by U. S. interdic-
tion (quarantine) forces and found free of military supplies.
Any shipping which fails to satisfy requirements for passage
will be turned back or diverted. U. S. forces assigned will
conduct minimum offensive action to insure compliance. Rules
of engagement are discussed in Tab C.
b. The barrier line for the interdiction (quarantine)
will be established approximately 60 NM from the coast of
Cambodia in the Gulf of Thailand. This line will extend
from the southern-most tip of South Vietnam to the seaward
extremity of the Island of Poulo Panjang, thence to a posi-
tion 11°N, 102°E, thence along longitude 102°E to the coast
of Thailand (See attached map). Maritime air patrols will
be flown to cover the seaward approaches to the Gulf of
Thailand in order to provide timely warning to the barrier
PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB B
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TOP SECRET
forces off the coast of Cambodia.
c. With Cambodia situated between the two friendly
countries of South Vietnam and Thailand there is little
threat to U. S. forces engaged in the interdiction (quaran-
tine). It is not anticipated that protection beyond that
inherent to the ships in the barrier line would be required.
6. Forces Required. The following forces are required to
establish the barrier line in the Gulf of Thailand and pro-
vide the associated surveillance patrols:
6 P3A
8-12 Destroyers (or suitable forces presently assigned
to Market Time).
a. Six destroyers will be equally spaced along the
barrier line. The barrier line will be approximately 300 NM
in length with 50 NM between destroyers. The remaining des-
troyers will provide periodic relief.
b. With 6 P3A's based at U-Tapao it is possible to
patrol 60 to 75 NM outboard (to seaward) of the surface
barrier and provide a revisit time which will guarantee
100 percent coverage of shipping approaching the barrier
line. (See attached map).
c. The AO which normally supports the southern Market
Time forces can also support the barrier destroyers.
7. Operating Instructions.
a. Close surveillance.
(1) Action, while keeping shipping under close sur-
veillance, will be designed to obtain information only and
should involve no damage to property or personnel casualties.
b. Stopping of ships.
(1) Use all available communication means to signify
intent to stop ship: International code signals, flag hoists,
blinking light, loudspeaker, radio, etc.
(2) This failing, warning shot across bow may be used.
(3) This failing, use minimum force required to cause
ship to stop.
PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB B
[p.50 of 58]
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TOP SEGRET
c. Diversion of shipping.
(1) Diversion instructions shall be at the discretion
of CINCPACFLT.
(2) Ensure that ship responds to diversion as directed.
(3) If ship fails to respond, stop ship, board, and
declare intent to sequester ship by use of force.
d. Seizure of ships.
(1) In the seizure of ships, the objective is to take
these ships to a designated port without damage. The optimum
would be to escort ships to port. If this cannot be done,
the following actions are authorized;
(a) Put boarding party aboard to supervise
ship's crew.
(b) Forceful boarding and control of ship's
operations.
(2) The above failing destroy.
e. Destruction.
(1) If necessary to destroy, give ample warning of
intentions to permit sufficient time for debarkation of ship's
crew and passengers. Assist as operational conditions permit.
3. Scene of action commander keep appropriate commanders
advised.
PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB B
[8.51 of 58]
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EAST
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
TAB C
MARITIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
SIHANOUKVILLE
1. Rules of Engagement
a. Actions must be completely and successfully consum-
mated with use of minimum force required to accomplish
missions assigned.
b. Be alert and prepared for hostile action/reaction.
C. Take action in a manner to minimize personnel
casualties and render all possible assistance to personnel
in distress.
d. Minimize interference with other shipping.
e. Nothing in these rules modifies in any manner the
requirements of a military commander to defend his unit
against armed attack with all means at his disposal. In
the event of such attack, the commander concerned will take
immediate action against the attacking force.
f. Be prepared to take increasingly severe measures.
In so doing, and recognizing language difficulties, allow
sufficient time between actions for ship masters to realize
full consequence for failures to respond properly.
g. Take offensive action against enemy surface ships
and aircraft in the immediate area of operations only as
necessary to counter direct interference with the execution
of the assigned military actions.
h. Territorial limits are defined as extending to the
limits of the territorial sea, which is a belt of sea
adjacent to a coastal state three miles in breadth, measur-
ed from the low water mark along the coast. However, in the
states claiming over three mile territorial seas, that dis-
tance claimed shall be observed as if it were actually the
width of their territorial seas if that claimed width does
not exceed twelve miles.
i. Immediate pursuit is pursuit initiated in response to
actions or attack by hostile aircraft or vessels. The pur-
suit must be continuous, uninterrupted and feasible and may
be extended as necessary over territorial/internal air space/
seas. Immediate pursuit is authorized as necessary and
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB C
53
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feasible into territorial/internal seas and air space of
Cambodia.
j. Instructions for visit and search, boarding, and
control of crew are in accordance with Naval Warfare Publi-
cation (NWP-50A) and Naval Warfare Information Publication
(NWIP 10-2).
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB C
[p.54.+58]
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TAB D
WORLD REACTIONS TAB
(SIHANOUKVILLE)
1. This Tab reviews possible reactions in response to the
U.S. interdiction (quarantine) of Sihanoukville.
2. Interdiction (quarantine) of Sihanoukville would
generally be regarded as an escalation of the conflict, but
it should not prove as controversial as mining because it
would clearly discriminate between ships carrying contraband
and those which do not.
3. All shipping which is of no concern to U.S. would be
able to obtain a NAVICERT and thus proceed unmolested. The
ChiCom shipping presumably would not be able to obtain a
NAVICERT, and thus probably would not attempt to enter the
quarantined port. In the end, it is improbable that any
serious confrontation on the high seas would actually occur.
4. It is considered likely that Soviet shipping would not
challenge the U.S. interdiction (quarantine). The Cuban
example would suggest that the Russians have already pro-
vided an historical as well as a legal precedent for this
judgment. Moreover, Russian shipping would probably qualify
for a NAVICERT in virtually all cases; thus, both the U.S.
and the Russians would enjoy the advantage of a face-saving
device being built into the quarantine.
5. The question does arise as to what political or psycho-
logical benefits might accrue to the U.S. vis-a-vis Russian
willingness to continue its support of NVN in the war.
With Russian interest now focused more and more on matters
outside of Southeast Asia, it is expected that, aside from
the propaganda value, the Russians would view this U.S. act
with relative equanimity. They would not regard the quaran-
tine as much a direct challenge as the mining of Haiphong.
They probably would recognize the quarantine as a demonstra-
tion of U.S. resolve and might, therefore, put more pressure
on Hanoi to reach a speedy settlement.
6. Cambodia probably would object to such an interdiction
(quarantine) and again break off diplomatic relations with
the U.S. Conversely, Sihanouk could use such a U.S. act as
a convenient means to discontinue his current relations with
the North Vietnamese, if he desired. It is difficult to
forecast his choice. In either event, Cambodia has no means
to counter the successful execution of the quarantine.
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB D
[p. 55 of 58]
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7. NVN has a considerable capability to compensate via
Laos for the loss of Sihanoukville as a logistics route
for arms and ammunition. This would not be without con-
siderable effort, and perhaps some sacrifice in overall
capabilities, in light of the fact that the enemy logis-
tics system is already heavily burdened by the present
demands upon it.
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB D
[p. 56 of 58]
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E
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TOP SECRET
TAB E
LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF QUARANTINE (INTERDICTION) OF
SIHANOUKVILLE, CAMBODIA
1. As a sovereign nation, South Vietnam has the right to act
in self-defense against aggression. Pursuant to this right,
South Vietnam may request other nations to come to its assist-
ance. The United States has responded to South Vietnam's request
for assistance in acting against the aggression from North Vietnam.
2. The legality of the acts of self-defense by South Vietnam and
its allies is judged by applying the dual tests of necessity and
proportionality. The necessity for forceful acts in self-defense
has been demonstrated beyond argument by North Vietnam's unrelent-
ing aggression against South Vietnam during the past several years.
3. The uninterrupted furnishing of military supplies to North
Vietnamese and NLF troops constitutes the sole means whereby the
aggression against South Vietnam can be sustained. The function
of this supply system is in fact part of the continuing aggression.
Therefore, any reasonable step taken to stem this flow of supplies,
and thereby eliminate the capability to continue the conflict
would be an act in self-defense.
4. It has been shown that the port of Sihanoukville, Cambodia
plays a significant role in the furnishing of military supplies
to NLF and North Vietnam troops. This plan prescribes the
procedures for an interdiction (quarantine) of Sihanoukville for
the purpose of intercepting military supplies destined for NVN/NLF
forces through that port. As indicated above, such action can
be considered an act of self-defense provided it is proportionate
and does not excessively impinge on the rights of other nations.
5. The international precedent for an interdiction (quarantine)
was established in the international community when the United
States quarantined Cuba during the US-USSR missile crisis in
October 1962. As in the Cuban precedent, this plan provides
for the following restraints and safeguards:
a. No ships carrying non-military supplies will be kept
from entering Sihanoukville.
b. Ships carrying military supplies for North Vietnam will
be diverted to any other port of their own choosing.
c. No force will be employed in the interdiction (quarantine),
unless a ship carrying military supplies refuses to comply with
these procedures; and in that case, only so much force as is
required to ensure compliance will be employed.
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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TAB E
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d. There will be no intrusions into the territorial waters
of Cambodia.
e. The inconvience offered to international shipping will
be minimal because of the use of certificates of clearance (NAV-
ICERTS).
6. Based on these carefully prescribed limitations, it is clear
that the sole purpose of the interdiction (quarantine) is the
interception of military supplies destined for North Vietnam.
No other object is intended; no other effects should be exper-
ienced. This plan represents a limited, measured, proportioned
response to one source of North Vietnamese aggression.
7. In view of the conclusions reached above, and the inter-
national acceptance afforded the United States quarantine of
Cuba, the prototype of this plan, it is clear that the interdic-
tion (quarantine) of Sihanoukville is supported by international
law and practice.
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
TAB E
[p.58 of 58]
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