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Top Secret/Sensitive Vietnam Contingency Planning HenryA. Kissinger Oct. 2, 1969 [2 of 2]
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
NUMBER
DATE
TYPE
RESTRICTION
1
Memo
Carver, Jr. to Lynn (7 PP) NLN 06-04/4
2 October
B
w/attach
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-03/1 1969
SANITIZED per sec 3. 3 lb )(1) ltr 17 July 2008
SANITIZED parpots 2000 /06/13
2
Report
Soviet Reactions and U.S. Courses of
n/d
B
Action
3
Report
Assessment of Chinese Communist
n/d
B
Actions and U.S. Counter-Courses
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
National Security Council, Vietnam Subject Files
89
FOLDER TITLE
Top Secret/Sensative Vietnam Contingency Planning Henry A. Kissinger Oct. 2, 1969 (Folder 2 of 2)
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S. GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
October 2, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Contingency Military Operations Against North Vietnam
Attached are papers on contingency military operations against North
Vietnam prepared under my direction by a special working group.
The papers do not address the relative merits of this option as against
the present policy or other choices. My purpose at this time is to:
-- give you a general idea of such an option in terms of
objectives and concept of operation.
-- provide in some detail contingency military and political
plans thus far developed by the special working group on this question.
-- give you our appreciation of the issues posed by such an
action.
If this course of action is pursued, certain basic principles must, I
believe, be accepted:
-- To attempt this course and to fail would be a catastrophe.
It must therefore be based on a firm resolve to do whatever is necessary
to achieve success. Since we cannot confidently predict the exact point
at which Hanoi would be likely to respond positively, we must be prepared
to play out whatever string necessary.
-- Hanoi will heavily base its decisions on its view of the
seriousness of our intention to see it through. We (including the whole
bureaucracy) must therefore demonstrate that domestic and foreign
criticism will not deter us.
-- To achieve its full effect on Hanoi's thinking, the action
must be brutal. This would impress Hanoi both by its actual effect and as
a signal of our intent.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
-2-
-- We should limit the number of decisions you will face, in
order to limit the opportunities for domestic critics to put pressure on
you. Each action must therefore be short and compact.
-- Once embarked on this course, we should not allow ourselves
to be deterred by vague, conciliatory gestures by Hanoi. It must achieve
its objectives, or we shall have demonstrated to the world our weakness
rather than our strength. This requires, of course, a precise definition
of our objectives.
HAK:TL:feg:10/1/69
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET- SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
October 2, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Contingency Military Operations Against North
Vietnam
You asked me to consider alternatives to our present policy in
Vietnam. One such alternative is a series of short, sharp mil-
itary blows against North Vietnam designed to bring them to
serious negotiations and an honorable settlement. This paper
is an initial discussion of what this course would involve.
The paper discusses the objective of such a course, the military
concept including targets, possible reactions and U.S. counter-
actions and an index of the other papers.
The Objective:
Our basic objective is to give Hanoi incentive to negotiate a com-
promise settlement through a series of military blows. We ini-
tially assumed that such blows might best be delivered at targets
directly related to Hanoi's capacity to support the war in the south,
the objective of previous bombings. We did not find this feasible,
however, and decided that hitting targets of more general strategic
importance would be more effective.
Our basic goal subsumes several specific military and political
objectives:
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET - -SENSITIVE
- 2 -
(i) To persuade the North Vietnamese, through effective military
action, and an explicit willingness to repeat it, that the alternative to
compromise is unacceptable damage to their society.
(ii) At the same time, to convey to Hanoi and others that our goal
is not the total destruction of the country or the regime, which would
invite major outside intervention.
(iii) Thus, to present the Soviets and Chinese with actions too
limited to justify a military confrontation with us, yet effective and
firm enough to forestall circumvention and promote their eventual
influence on Hanoi to compromise.
Accordingly, supporting objectives would be:
(iv) To impose a substantial physical isolation of North Vietnam
and destroy vital targets sufficient to confront Hanoi with military and
economic disruption and deprivation, involving costly and time-consuming
restoration or countermeasures. Our immediate military objective would
be significant impact on North Vietnam as a society -- not simply a
resumption of bombing aimed at reducing their support of the war in
the south.
(v) To strike and maintain a political posture clearly immune to
all likely pressures against continuing the action so long as Hanoi refuses
to compromise.
What we would be saying by our actions is that:
- the NVN demands for our unconditional surrender are utterly
unacceptable.
- we will go to almost any lengths to end the war quickly.
- we have decided to give NVN incentives to end the war by com-
promise sooner, rather than later.
- we will keep the negotiating avenue open, essentially on the basis
of our May 14th (eight-point) proposal.
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
- 3 -
Military Concept
The concept involves a number of air and naval actions, grouped into
intense phases of short duration, e. g., four strike days, possibly
extended over a week by the variability of the weather. These actions
would be markedly different from the previous air and naval operations
against NVN, which constituted a spasmodic campaign against targets
not in sanctuary and which were primarily related to support of the
war in the south. The military actions contemplated in this paper, in
addition to being intense over a short term, would (a) be directed
against targets of a more strategic nature to achieve lasting military
and economic effect, (b) confront Hanoi with a fait accompli -- that
is, the destruction of a significant target which wouldn't require
continuous follow-up bombing -- and (c) thereby generate strong
psychological impact on the DRV leadership.
The basic military action would be the partial isolation of NVN by
aerial mining of the six deep-water ports and initial interdiction of
the Northeast Rail Line. The sea quarantine would be subsequently
maintained by both periodic reseeding of the minefields and continuing
air and naval operations offshore against NVN watercraft. Should
subsequent phases be required, intensified interdiction of the rail lines
or alternate routes would reinforce the isolation of NVN.
The initial mining operation would be accompanied by the near-
simultaneous disruption of the enemy air order-of-battle and attacks
upon several groups of critical economic and war-supporting facilities
in NVN. These groups have been selected on the basis that their
destruction or neutralization would:
- cause deep psychological impact on the Hanoi leadership.
- signal the return to the hardships and frustration of the earlier
bombing period for NVN.
- cause significant physical damage, representing major capital
investments and reconstruction efforts.
- halt most modern industrial production.
- prevent most foreign exchange earnings.
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET- SENSITIVE
- increase sharply the required imports of essential military
and economic goods.
- disrupt extensively normal living conditions, public services
and transport, and both urban and rural labor forces.
There would then be a pause in major offensive action to await a
diplomatic response from Hanoi. During the pause, however, we
would probably need offshore air and naval action to maintain the sea
quarantine. The level of these actions would depend upon the NVN
efforts to sweep or bypass the minefields.
Subsequent phases, if necessary, would deal with NVN reactions to
counter or moderate the effects of the first phase, as well as include
attacks upon additional critical groups of facilities for increasing
impact. At Tab A is a conceptual plan along these lines.
The critical facilities include at least 29 installations in NVN that
would be significant targets for attack under this concept. These are,
by groups:
- five complexes in the Haiphong port area.
- six electric power stations.
- four airfields (with all but one of the 119 combat aircraft in NVN).
- three manufacturing facilities (cement, machinery, and coal
processing).
- five storage facilities (POL, high-value imports and trucks).
- five transportation targets (three bridges, two railyards).
- the levee system in the Red River Delta.
The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently
preparing an integrated plan along these lines. Tab B is preliminary
in nature pending receipt of these plans. For illustrative purposes,
a sample package of actions which might be conducted over two periods
of four strike days each is as follows:
Reproduced ASSIFIED
TOPRISECRE
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- 5 -
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
Phase I - aerial mining of the six deep-water ports.
- destruction or neutralization of the NVN air order-
of-battle (about 120 jet aircraft).
- neutralization of five transportation targets, three of
which are associated with the initial interdiction of the
Northeast Rail Line.
- destruction of six key electric power plants.
- destruction of five major storage facilities.
Phase II - destruction or neutralization of possibly reconstituted
NVN air order-of-battle.
- destruction of key facilities in the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.
- intensified interdiction of a probably expanded NE road-
railroad route to China.
- breaching of the levee system in the Red River Delta.
These actions run the risk of losses of U.S. aircraft (perhaps up to five
per cent) and some of their crews, as well as inflicting considerable
NVN civilian casualties.
The probability of success is heavily dependent on the weather, although
some portions of the over-all operation could almost always be accom-
plished. For example, the sea mining could be executed in about an hour
during 80 per cent of the days in November and December. Using all-
weather aircraft, we could mine in about one day anytime. At the other
extreme, however, the weather suited for bombing of the key bridges
in the transportation target group occurs about one day out of four in
November. Thus, for the sample Phase I, we could expect a high
probability of partial success -- i.e., the establishment of the sea
quarantine -- but less chance of accomplishing the desired effect on
all the targets within a four-day period. For this reason, some flexi-
bility is required, either in the duration of the phase or in the expected
effect on the target groups.
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 6 -
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Actions and Counteractions.
We have made an initial estimate of possible actions by NVN, the
Soviet Union, and the CPR, with possible U.S. counteractions. Below
is an indication of what is touched upon in the respective tabs, which
I recommend you read.
North Vietnam (see Tab C).
We can expect Hanoi to demonstrate extremely tough resistance. Its
leadership will make judgments on the basis of our estimated intentions
(whether U.S. attacks are an act of desperation or the beginning of a
long and persistent campaign, regardless of consequences); estimates
of its ability to receive sufficient external assistance to permit a viable
economy and estimates of whether its political structure can withstand
the strain of a sustained U.S. campaign. Hanoi, thus, is likely to
respond with measures designed to exert maximum psychological
pressure on the U.S. Administration, threatening to expand the war
by calling for foreign "volunteers, " initiating a large-scale anti-U.
propaganda campaign, suggesting through a break-off in the Paris
talks that a peaceful settlement is no longer possible, conceivably
stepping up communist military activities in Laos and Cambodia, or
even offering a cease-fire.
A movement toward increased NVN military actions will be limited
by her ability to develop alternate supply lines through China and a
reluctance to call for volunteers.
Soviet Union (see Tab D).
The Soviets have always been disturbed by the prospect of the action
envisioned in this option, because they would be confronted with a direct
challenge and with difficult choices. We can expect them to undertake
various efforts to circumvent or mitigate the effect of our actions.
They would almost certainly make a major effort to get supplies to
NVN and to replace the losses inflicted on the NVN air order-of-
battle. They might provide personnel for various NVN operations,
including air defense. We must be prepared to spill Soviet blood and
to inflict damage to Soviet ships, if this proves necessary for the
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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- 7 -
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
effective implementation of our plan. We must also be prepared for
Soviet responses outside the area of Vietnam, such as in Berlin. We
should expect major political pressures, but the chances of major
Soviet pressure to induce NVN toward moderation of her position
are no better than even if Hanoi decides to remain intransigent.
If Hanoi shows some disposition to move constructively, the Soviets
would encourage it since Moscow almost certainly estimates that
over time Hanoi can achieve its objectives in the south by political
means.
Communist China (see Tab E).
Peking will attempt through offers of economic and military assistance
and some political pressures to keep Hanoi in the war, but probably
will follow its past policy of avoiding overt intervention and a consequent
direct confrontation with the U.S. so long as Hanoi's estimated existence
as a socialist state does not appear to be threatened. Peking will sup-
port Hanoi politically and diplomatically, principally by an intense
anti-U.S. propaganda campaign, but will unlikely move toward an
accommodation with the USSR if, as expected, the Soviet response
is anything less than acceptance of a full-scale confrontation of its
own with the U.S. Peking will return Chinese forces withdrawn from
North Vietnam, possibly surfacing them as "volunteers, " and will offer
South China ports and LOCs to move supplies into the north. Some
degree of cooperation with the USSR in supplying Hanoi can be expected.
Peking will provide a sanctuary to DRV aircraft diverted from North
Vietnam. The Chinese might attempt to stimulate attacks by pro-
Peking guerrillas in other Southeast Asian countries in order to divert
U.S. military resources. In response, we should inform the Chinese
that our operation is not directed against them, but we should maintain
pressures on Hanoi regardless of the Chinese role. We do not antici-
pate that the Chinese will try to prevent Hanoi from seeking an
accommodation with us if and when Hanoi decides to do so.
We have identified to date a number of questions which should be
answered, or at least considered, in further study. At Tab H we
have attempted to list some of the more important questions. Such
a paper could be considered a priority work list for additional effort
on this alternative course of action.
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET- - SENSITIVE
Attachments:
A
- Conceptual Plan of Military Operations
B
- Assessment of Military Actions
C
- NVN Actions and U.S. Courses of Action
D - Soviet Actions and U.S. Courses of Action
E
- Chinese Communist Actions and U.S. Courses of Action
F
- Integrated Diplomatic and Military Scenario
G
- Draft Presidential Speech
H
- Major Questions
TOP SECRET-- SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
CONCEPTUAL PLAN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
1. Concept. U.S. military forces will conduct operations against
North Vietnam with forces now available in order to demonstrate U.S.
resolve to achieve basic U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. Such
operations would be designed to attain maximum political, military,
and psychological shock, while reducing North Vietnam's over-all
economic capacity and war-making capacity to the extent feasible.
The operation would commence with a near-simultaneous and
integrated attack against the enemy air order-of-battle and air
defenses, mining of six deep-water ports, interdiction of the North-
east Rail Line, and attacks against selected, critical targets. The
over-all concept is based on the partial isolation and quarantine of
NVN by aerial mining augmented by initial rail interdictions, and
the maximum practical damage to key targets. It is characterized
by boldness of action and intensity of effort and will be conducted
in a period of four strike days, not necessarily consecutive if adverse
weather conditions prevail. Upon completion it should represent an
accomplished fact of measurable proportions.
2. Assumptions.
a. The impending onset of the northeast monsoon brings
prevailing poor weather to NVN. Climatological records indicate
that weather conditions may prevent effective air operations approxi-
mately 50% of the time in November, with the situation becoming
progressively worse until April 1, 1970. The assumption is made
that sufficient good weather will occur to permit application of tactical
air power against NVN targets for the minimum time required to
execute the plan successfully but flexibility in selecting D-Day will
be necessary. Once initiated, attacks can be completed in a minimum
of four days, extended to approximately seven if required by weather.
b. Current constraints will, in general, be altered or relaxed
to permit application of force where, when, and to the extent required
to achieve the stated objectives. Care will be taken in the exercise
of these broadened authorities to minimize civilian casualties and
damage to third-country shipping and to avoid border violations.
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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C. Domestic and international pressures running counter to
U.S. offensive military operations against NVN can be offset through
governmental initiatives or tacitly ignored. The U.S. government's
demonstration of indifference to such pressures might well constitute
the strongest signal to Hanoi.
d. Communist-bloc countries currently supporting NVN's
war-making efforts with arms and war support materiel will continue
to accommodate to any U.S. offensive initiatives by rerouting their
support via alternate channels, but these options will pose problems
of significant proportions.
3. Phasing. Planned operations divide themselves logically into
two phases, with follow-on phases as necessary. Included in Phase I
are those tasks which will close NVN ports, interdict the Northeast
Rail Line, disrupt or destroy her air order-of-battle, and destroy
vulnerable and critical segments of the North Vietnamese economy.
These tasks emphasize the isolation of NVN and the destruction of
key targets wherever located, thereby confronting Hanoi with economic
problems involving costly and time-consuming restoration or counter-
measures. Phase I is characterized as a short strategic campaign
against NVN as a society, rather than as a resumption of old bombing
patterns with self-limiting attacks against widely dispersed and transient
military supply lines to South Vietnam. Phase II would be subject to
continuing review as the campaign progresses and as we measure
North Vietnamese attitudes toward negotiation.
4. Conduct of Operations.
a. The concept for Phase I is based on the fact that North
Vietnam now is completely reliant upon outside sources to sustain her
civilian economy and ability to conduct effective combat operations in
Southeast Asia. Although current stocks of war materiel available in
NVN, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam will permit continuation of
offensive military operations for at least several months without
additional imports, her over-all national requirements will necessitate
shifting of priorities in order to accommodate to growing shortages as
outside sources are impeded. However, even if sea imports are fully
denied, combat operations could be sustained in South Vietnam at a
low rate for an indefinite period of time. Denial of imports by sea and
rail, coupled with the destruction of maximum practicable key targets
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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- 3 -
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and resources, is designed to impact heavily on NVN by achieving
a significant effect on her economy and desire to continue the war.
These operations will reduce imports into North Vietnam to a
critical point and destroy supplies that are exposed to effective
attack. It envisions the maximum concentration of effort for shock
effect. The credibility of this signal is enhanced by its identification
with a concept which exploits the enemy's dependence upon imports.
It outlines a series of inter-related military actions against NVN
which, for the most part, lend themselves to implementation
separately, in combinations, or as an integrated package.
b. The concept in Phase I provides for the integrated and
near-simultaneous execution of the following tasks:
(1) Major air strikes against NVN's counter-air
capability in order to protect the strike forces.
(2) Aerial mining of North Vietnam deep-water ports
and interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line.
(3) The systematic destruction of supplies and selected
logistic facilities employing a concentration of air and naval forces
in a short period of time.
(4) Subsequent enforcement of the quarantine by periodic
reseeding of the minefields and continuing interdiction of NVN lighters
and waterborne logistics craft.
C. Subsequently, within available resources, and as required,
Phase II operations will be commenced with increased intensity as
follows:
(1) The destruction of selected logistics target systems
and industrial targets in order of military importance, employing both
tactical air and B-52 as appropriate, together with naval gunfire attacks
on coastal watercraft and shore logistics installations.
(2) Intensified interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line from
Hanoi to Communist China.
(3) Breaching of the levee system in the Red River
Delta.
TOP SECRET- SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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- 4 -
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d. Operations are sensitive to several factors which dictate
the need for flexibility in execution:
(1) Weather. During the ensuing six months, weather
will be the most critical factor. Bad weather can be expected to inhibit
attacks in the Hanoi-Haiphong areas for days at a time, making it
difficult to predict the achievement of given objectives within a fixed
number of days. Maximum flexibility should be considered in the
selection of the day for the initial attacks. The planned duration of
any action should permit continuous operations until at least a given
minimum effect has been attained. In the event that weather permits
achievement of the desired effect in less than the planned time, the
action could be terminated early or additional attacks undertaken for
increased effect.
(2) Surprise. Surprise in the initial attacks will enhance
optimum results, particularly in the initial strikes on the enemy's
air defenses. Early success in this task will generate a greater shock
effect, free aircraft for other tasks at an earlier time, and broaden
U.S. options for subsequent action. Uncertainties surrounding the
possible impact of the modified Fan Song radar or modifications to
the SA-2 missile must be accepted as calculated risks.
(3) Concentration of Effort. This concept emphasizes
concentration of effort. Concentrated attacks against target areas
or target systems have the advantages of greater shock value, greater
long-term damage to the enemy, and require less assets to protect
strike forces.
(4) Enemy Defenses. Since the cessation of bombing
operations north of the 19th parallel on 31 March 1968, enemy defenses
have been increased to formidable proportions. Any attack against
well-defended targets will require large numbers of suppressive-fire
aircraft. The disadvantage in conducting attacks over relatively short
periods of time is that in addition to the strike aircraft, aircraft are
required for MIG protection, air defense suppression, and electronic
countermeasures. In the initial phases, until these threats can be
appreciably diminished, losses to friendly aircraft approximating
three per cent can be anticipated.
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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5. Tasks. The following tasks will be undertaken:
PHASE I
a. Conduct Major Air Strikes Against NVN Counter-Air
Capability. Air strikes will be directed at H-Hour against active NVN
airfields, aircraft, and other air defenses in order to protect strike
forces and run down the enemy MIG inventory. Simultaneously, those
SAM sites posing the greatest threat to strike forces will also be struck.
The counterair effort and strikes against SAM sites will be continued
against other key target systems, and will terminate upon completion
of Phase I. Reduction of NVN's air defense will expose vital targets
to concentrated air attacks and permit U.S. air and naval forces to
operate against NVN with fewer losses. This action can be expected
to possess shock value beyond that which could be attributed directly
to loss of NVN aircraft, because degradation of the enemy's air defenses
broadens the scope of military options open to the U.S. for follow-on
actions.
b. Mine NVN Ports. Employing aerial delivery, mines
will be seeded in the approaches to six NVN deep-water ports. Once
seeded, these minefields would be fuzed to activate approximately
72 hours later. Delayed activation will permit third-country shipping
to exit the ports safely. Diplomatic message will be dispatched to all
noncombatant governments engaged in maritime trade with NVN to
advise them of the hazards to ships remaining in port or attempting
to enter port. If NVN attempts to accommodate to this quarantine
by over-the-beach off-loading or lightering of cargo, the initial mining
effort will be expanded to seed alternate off-loading areas and shallow-
water ports. Lighters will be interdicted by a combination of naval
gunfire and armed aerial reconnaissance. Minefields will be reseeded
as required to maintain their effectiveness. These actions will have
the combined effects of closing the ports to ships importing arms and
war-supporting materiel to NVN and disrupting the country's economy
and foreign trade reserves. Faced with the prospect of having to
prosecute the war without the substantial quantities of outside help
upon which his very existence depends, the enemy would be forced
to reassess his capabilities with a view toward adapting alternatives.
Additional shock effect could accrue through the enemy's recognition
of our willingness to confront third countries.
Reproduced af Presidential grary DECL ASSIFIED
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c. Interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line and Air Strikes
Against Other Key Targets. To complement the mining and closure
of the seaports and further impede the import of war-supporting
materiel into NVN, the Northeast Rail Line between Hanoi and Dong
Dang in Communist China will be severed by air strikes. To the
maximum extent practicable, rail and highway traffic will be
disrupted at strategic locations, and any large concentrations of
rolling stock and supplies which develop as a result will be attacked
and destroyed. Following hard upon closure of his ports, disruption
of this vital artery will severely reduce NVN's imports and materially
impair his capability to support both his economy and aggressive
military operations in Southeast Asia. It will cause the enemy to face
the prospect of pursuing his aggressive aims without adequate outside
support to sustain him. Major air and naval gunfire attacks will be
launched against additional target complexes as strike resources
permit. Such targets will be of high economic value, the destruction
of which will bite deeply into the available cushion of supplies and
resources.
PHASE II
a. Isolation of NVN. Actions initiated in Phase I will be
continued as necessary to isolate NVN from outside resources.
Particular emphasis will be given to intensified interdiction efforts
against NVN.
b. Air Strikes Against NVN. Major air strikes will be
launched against critical target complexes in NVN. Among such
targets are thermal power plants, industries, and large concen-
trations of stored vehicles, and rolling stock. A surprise attack
against these targets will exploit vulnerabilities which can be expected
to exist in several pertinent target categories only at the beginning of
hostilities. Strikes will be concentrated against these targets to the
maximum extent required to ensure their destruction. Fixed targets
will be attacked in a systematic program to reduce depot stocks,
port facilities, transportation, and distribution systems. Targets
will be struck in a pattern such that the strike effort will be concen-
trated against the highest priority targets until their destruction is
assured before the effort is shifted elsewhere. These actions can
have a profound shock effect upon all segments of North Vietnam
and the effect can be heightened through careful selection of targets.
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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- 7 -
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C. Breaching of t he Levee System in the Red River Delta.
6. Target Selection.
a. Careful study of vulnerability factors, sensitivity to
critical resupply problems, duration of operations, and availability
of strike aircraft will determine final target selection. A number
of critical facilities have been identified which meet one or more
of the following criteria, and will be examined for inclusion in either
a Phase I or Phase II target list:
- Achieve a high degree of damage or disruption
to an important military or economic function.
- Require costly and time-consuming restore or
countermeasures.
- Have strong psychological impact upon Hanoi's
leadership.
b. Possible targets.
- Five complexes in the Haiphong port area, the
destruction of which would eliminate a significant fraction of the
50,000 tons of supplies stored there and would cause widespread
and severe disruption of the established distribution systems.
- Six electric power stations, the destruction of
which would cripple most of NVN's modern industry and require
one to two years for restoration with external support and assistance.
- Four jet airfields, on which are deployed all but one
of the 119 NVN combat aircraft in country.
- One cement plant which currently provides most of
the NVN domestic requirements of about 400,000 tons of cement
annually and would require more than a year to repair.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
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- 8 -
TOP SECRET- SENSITIVE
- One coal preparation plant which is the basis for
Hanoi's effort to revive its hard currency export trade.
- One machine tool and engineering plant which is a
significant factor in maintaining the NVN transportation system and
producing a large share of the country's mechanical equipment.
- Five storage facilities which house some 50, 000 tons
of high-value supplies, up to 37,000 tons of petroleum (40% of the
estimated NVN stockpile), and about 1, 000 trucks (10% of the estimated
NVN inventory).
- Three key bridges which maintain the flow of imports
to Hanoi from Haiphong or China and which, if interdicted simultaneously
with the mining of Haiphong, would be highly significant.
- Two major rail yards which not only contain large quantities
of materiels but also account for the bulk of the NVN capacity to repair
rolling stock.
- The levee system in the Red River Delta which, if
successfully attacked during the high water period of July-August, could
destroy as much as 25% of the annual rice crop of 100, 000 tons, temp-
orarily halt most of the military and economic activity in the Hanoi area,
and divert significant manpower to repair flood damage.
It would be neither feasible nor desirable to include all of these targets
in one short air and naval bombardment. On the other hand, it is essential
to include a substantial number of these whole target groupings'in the first
phase to complement the sea quarantine and to achieve the maximum
over-all military, economic, and psychological impact on the DRV.
Subsequent phases, if necessary, would not only deal with the NVN
reactions to counter or moderate the effects of the first phase, but would
include the remaining target groupings for greater effect.
7. Reaction Time. In order to complete the necessary preparation
actions and reposition forces required to implement this concept plan
fully, a minimum of 86 hours prior notice is required. Without the
mining option, a minimum of 72 hours' notice will be required.
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
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B
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
INTRODUCTION
The two essential elements of the military concept are
-- a mining operation sufficient to seal off the sea approaches
to North Vietnam and thus NVN's supply of waterborne imports,
-- collateral bombing designed to destroy or damage supplies,
industrial capacity, and critical parts of the transportation system,
thereby intensifying the economic strains brought about by the mining.
A detailed assessment of this concept involves analyzing
-- their capabilities to counter the effects of the mining and bombing,
-- requiredactions on our part -- e.g. reseeding the minefields,
destroying lighters, cutting rail lines and highways -- to prevent
their countermeasures from being successful.
A rough preliminary assessment is as follows:*
NVN Countermeasures and Our Responses
General. North Vietnam has stockpiles of food, industrial supplies,
and petroleum sufficient to last several months. Upwards of 30-40%
of their petroleum stocks, 50,000 tons or so of imported supplies, and
perhaps 1000 trucks could be vulnerable to our initial attacks. Neverthe-
less, remaining stocks are largely dispersed and difficult to destroy by
bombing. These stocks can sustain NVN for a few months.
Countering the Mining. North Vietnam would attempt to counter
the effects of the mining in three ways:
-- sweeping or otherwise breaching the minefields,
- - rerouting imports through rail and highway approaches from China,
-- - - airlift from or through China.
The concept assumes that we surprise North Vietnam and that bad
weather will not force major changes in the military plan. Later
we will analyze what we do if these assumptions prove false.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
North Vietnam, even with Chinese or Russian help, probably
cannot sweep the minefields in a way which allows large ships
to continue to dock. She can attempt to unload ships beyond the
minefields into barges and other small craft and sweep the fields
well enough to allow cargo to move ashore this way.
If they try this, we can easily lay more mines. We can also
attack and attempt to destroy the barges and lighters with naval
gunfire and tactical aircraft.
It is more likely that North Vietnam will seek to have imports
rerouted through China.
- - Ships with goods bound for North Vietnam could unload in
Chan-chiang, 560 miles from Hanoi by direct rail line, or Canton,
which is much further by rail from Hanoi; (see attached map)
-- China herself could supply petroleum, food and some other
supplies to North Vietnam by rail or highway.
The general strain on Chinese supplies and transportation
capability would not be great because North Vietnam's requirements
[for 16 million people] are relatively small. There will be local
strains, however, and it will take time (we are analyzing how long)
to assemble rail cars and divert supplies from their normal routes.
Our response to a major overland operation to supply North
Vietnamcouldbe to attack repeatedly the rail lines, marshalling
yards, sidings, bridges and highways from China in an attempt to
stop the supply flow. We couldalso bomb supply concentrations.
We should be more effective in this than we were when bombing
North Vietnam before; we can concentrate our efforts instead of
bombing targets all over North Vietnam. We still will not have
complete success, however. Weather, darkness and the difficulty
of policing the long border with China will provide opportunities for
some supplies to get through.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
There may be an airlift. However, only a fraction of the import
requirements -- high value spare parts, medical supplies, etc --
could be moved by air. The problems posed for us by an airlift
would be more symbolic than real.
Countering the Bombing. The North Vietnamese may try to
restore the airfields we destroy, but they probably will not try to
rebuild the other facilities. They will attempt to do without.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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25
KUN-MING
105 KWEICHOW
KWEICHOW
Kuei-lin
110
HUNAN
Lo-p'ing
Nan-tan
25
Shao-kuan
Ch'u-chiang)
Chih
Yü-ch'i
Nam-p'an Chiang
Hung shui Ho
P'ing-lo
Lu-chai
kiangsi
Liu-chou
Y
N
N
KWANGSI CHUANG
Kuei Chiang
Ching
Shih-p'ing
Pai-se
C
H
I
N
A
Pei
Ho-yüan
Chien-shui
K'ai-yüan
T'ien-tung
Lai-pin
Ko-chiub
Meng-tzu
Wen-shan
AUTONOMOUS REGION
Wuchow
K
W
N
T
N
G
Pay
Chick P'ing-kuo 6udf-19H
Kuei-p'ing Hsün Chiang
San-shui
land
Dong
Li-t'ang
Ching-hsi
Hsi Chiang
(Hsi-nan)
CANTON
Van
Hui-yang
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Fo-shan
Bao Lac
(Nan-hai)
Ha Giang
Cao Bang:
Chiang
Nan-ning
Yü Chiang
Lao Cai
Yü-lin
Kongmoon
KOWLOON
Lai Chau
P'ing-hsiang
VICTORIA
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
MACAO
HONG
Dong Dang
Ning-ming
(Port.)
KONG
Ch'in-hsien
(U.K.)
Phong Saly
Tuan Giao
Yen Bail
Lang Son
Thai
Mao-ming
SHANG-CH'UAN SHAN
Black
Nguyen
NORTH
Mong Cai
Lien-chiang
V
ETNAM
Pei-hai
Sui-ch'i
River
Bac Ninh
HANOI
Hon Gai
Chan-chiang (Ft Bayard)
Hai-k'ang
Hoa Binh
Haiphong
a
Samneua
Song
Nam Dinh
SOUTH CHINA
Hai-an
20
Ninh Binh
GULF OF
Hai-k'ou
20
Luang Prabang
Thanh Hoa
SEA
TONKIN
Tan-hsien
(Na-ta)
Wen-ch'ang
Xieng Khouang
LAOS
Song Ca
HAINAN
Phu Dien
Pei-li
Ch'ang-chiang
Tung-fang
Vinh
(Pa-so)
Wan-ning
CHINA - NORTH VIETNAM
Pak Sane
MEKONG
BORDER AREA
Yai-ch'eng
Huang-liu
(Yai-hsien)
VIENTIANE
Lak Sao
Yü-lin
Nong Khai
Quang Khe
International boundary
Udon Thani
Muang Nakhon Phanom Khammouane
Internal administrative boundary
(Thakhek)
(Shown in China only)
Muang Sakon Nakhon
Railroad
Road
THAILAND
Muong Sen
Demarcation Line
Track or trail
Sépone
Séno
(Tchepone):
Dong Ha
0
50
100
150 Miles
Mukdahan
SOUTH
0
50
100
150 Kilometers
Savannakhet
Muong Nong
VIETNAM
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
110
52597 11-65
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
October 2, 1969
VIETNAM
Contingency Planning
Henry A. Kissinger
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[89/2/1]
CENTRALL TELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
ED,NSC
OCT
I SIGNATURE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
2 October 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Laurence Lynn
Assistant for Programs
National Security Council
SUBJECT
: 2 October Request
Per your request levied this morning, Thursday, 2
October 1969, attached is a quick and summary look at North
Vietnam's overland alternatives to scaborne imports. This
paper summarizes our views on the steps that Hanoi could
take, assuming the necessary Soviet and Chinese cooperative
support, to offset a denial of sea access to North Vietnam.
George sace A. Carver, Jr.
a-
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
Log mive
Log
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 October 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
North Vietnam's Overland Alternative
to Seaborne Imports
Introduction
North Vietnam relies on ocean transport to bring
in about 85 percent of its annual imports, princi-
pally through the port of Haiphong. A closure of
the port of Haiphong and an imposed denial of sea
access to North Vietnam would seriously disrupt
North Vietnam's seaborne trade and force an extensive
revamping of normal transport arrangements. North
Vietnam would be forced to depend primarily on the
overland route from China for the continued import
of vital war-supporting materiel and economic goods.
This memorandum is a preliminary examination of
the process by which the seaborne import trade
would be transferred to overland routes. The
following assumptions are used in making the
analysis:
1. A US mining program has suc-
cessfully denied access to North
Vietnam's major and minor ports to
both oceangoing and coastal shipping.
2. The North Vietnamese have opted
not to contest the mining program and
to transfer all import trade to the
overland routes from Communist China.
3. There is sufficient Soviet
and Chinese cooperation that strains
in their relations are not a limiting
factor in facilitating the overland
movement of traffic.
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I. The Traffic Volume
1. During the 12 months ending on 30 June 1969,
North Vietnam imported by sea an average of 5,200 tons day
of economic and war-related materials. Total sea-
borne imports for the period are shown in the following
tabulation:
Thousand
Goods
Tons
Percent
Foodstuffs
890
47
Fertilizer
110
6
Petroleum
330
17
Timber
30
2
General and
miscellaneous
530
28
Total
1,890
100
2. Rail imports during the same period were on
the order of 300,000 tons. Thus if North Vietnam
were to attempt to maintain the normal flow of
imports the total volume of goods to be moved would
be about 2.2 million tons.
The Immediate Diversion Problem
3. Our analysis of 1968 shipping to North
Vietnam indicates that on the average about 16 ships
were en route to North Vietnam at any one time.
These ships would be carrying about 70,000 tons of
goods, including an estimated 7,000 tons of petroleum.
An immediate task, therefore, would be the diversion
of these ships to an alternate port, such as Fort
Bayard, or their recall to home ports where the goods
would be rerouted overland. On the basis of the
probable average disposition of these ships and
assuming a decision not to recall ships that are
beyond the half-way point on their trip, we believe
that the following decisions would be made. Three
ships en route from Black Sea or Baltic ports with
about 17,000 tons of cargo would be recalled; four
ships with an estimated 23,000 tons of cargo would
be diverted to Fort Bayard. Of the ships en route
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from Chinese and Soviet Pacific ports we estimate
that five ships with an estimated 16,000 tons of
cargo would be recalled and four ships with an
estimated 14,000 tons of cargo would be diverted to
Fort Bayard. The total to be diverted to Fort
Bayard would be 37,000 tons. These diversions could
be made very quickly by using shore to ship com-
munications and the added voyage time would be
only 1 to 2 days longer than if the ships had proceeded
to Haiphong.
II. The Normalization of Overland Traffic
4. The normalization of overland traffic would
raise daily traffic flows to North Vietnam to an
average of about 6,000 tons a day of which about
slightly over 3,000 tons a day would be routed by
the Trans-Siberian railroad. Only 1,200 tons of
the traffic to be moved on the Trans-Siberian
would be traffic diverted from normal movement by
sea. This would be a light burden on a rail line
with a capacity estimated roughly to be about
50 trains or 100,000 tons each way per day. The
addition of 1,200 tons a day would in real terms
be the equivalent of only one additional train per
day. A preliminary judgment indicates that the
reorientation of traffic from Black Sea or Baltic
Sea ports to the Trans-Siberian railroad could,
with the requisite priorities, be accomplished in
about two weeks. By the end of a two-week period,
therefore, overland traffic from North Vietnam via
the Trans-Siberian railroad should be pretty well
normalized. In view of the fact that rail traffic
to China has declined so drastically in recent
years, and the transshipment facilities have been
kept intact, it seems unlikely that transshipment
of cargoes from Soviet to Chinese railroads would
delay the movement of this traffic to any signifi-
cant degree.
The Chinese Problem
5. The convergence of all North Vietnamese import
traffic on the Chinese railroads would represent a
daily tonnage of 6,000 tons of goods. This volume
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is equivalent to what can be carried by about 200
standard-gauge freight cars or about 1,800 trucks
a day. The additive burden to the Chinese railroad
system would be something on the order of 5,300 tons
a day including about 1,000 tons a day of petroleum.
This traffic would require the allocation of about
1,700 freight cars in constant operation and about
350 petroleum tank cars. In each case these allo-
cations are only 1 to 2 percent of China's inventories
of freight and tank cars. Although we cannot judge
precisely how long it would take to reallocate this
traffic to Chinese railroads, it would seem that
the adjustments could be made well before any
shortages would develop in North Vietnam because
of the cessation of sea imports.
The North Vietnamese Problem
6. The total overland input of about 6,000 tons
a day from China to North Vietnam could be moved on
overland routes with a traffic handling capacity
of 16,000 tons a day during the dry season and
13,000 tons a day during the wet season, as shown
below:
Daily Average
Route Capacities
Tons per Day
Railroads
9,000
Roads
5,400 (2,300)
Red River
1,500
Total
15,900 (12,800)
a. Wet season capacity from June
through September.
7. The capacity of the rail connections alone
is 9,000 tons, 50 percent greater than the volume of
goods that must be imported. Further, the capacity
of these routes, particularly the roads, could be
improved by relatively simple expedients involving
mostly labor and basic construction materials.
- 4 -
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8. North Vietnam has adequate inventories of
railroad rolling stock and motor vehicles. The
rolling stock inventory is estimated at 115-130
locomotives and 2,000-2,300 meter-gauge freight cars.
In addition, the dual-gauged Dong Dang line could
be operated with inputs from China's large inventories
of some 6,000 locomotives and 160,300 freight cars.
9. The North Vietnamese truck inventory is esti-
mated to range between 6,500 and 11,500 vehicles.
There has been no evidence of a shortage of trucks,
and vehicle imports during 1969 have been high.
Photography also reveals that North Vietnam is
maintaining large vehicle stockpiles.
10. With sizable inventories of transport equip-
ment and Chinese cooperation, the time required to
reorganize traffic movements within North Vietnam
would probably range from two to three months.
Given the priorities that would be attached to the
task, and the considerable experience gained in
keeping traffic moving during the bombings, it seems
unlikely that disruption of traffic would continue
for long periods. In all probability the North
Vietnamese already have well-developed and detailed
contingency plans to cope with the possibility of a
mining program.
11. In any event the North Vietnamese appear to
have stockpiles more than adequate to cope with
disruptions even if they should last more than
2-3 months. Petroleum stockpiles already in-
country are adequate for 100 days of operation
at current consumption rates. Localized shortages
would probably appear during the readjustment
period, but stocks could be stretched out by stringent
rationing and Communist China could give first
priority to emergency petroleum shipments within
a period of a few weeks at most.
12. Food stocks currently are probably at their
annual low level prior to the major 10th-month
harvest. Assuming a harvest at least equal to
that of recent years, the stocks will reach a peak
in December. Serious food shortages could not then
be expected to develop until next spring and only
if all food imports were continuously cut off.
13. Military stocks appear to be maintained at high
levels. A variety of evidence, including
25X1
photography, indicates that North Vietnam has a deep
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cushion of military supplies. We estimate that
North Vietnam has military supplies adequate for a
period of at least 6 months at the 1968 level of
combat.
Conclusions
14. The diversion of North Vietnam's seaborne
import traffic to overland routes via China is well
within the capabilities of the transport systems of
China, the USSR, and North Vietnam. The immediate
diversion of seaborne traffic would involve only
70,000 tons of supplies. About half of this would
be diverted to Fort Bayard in China for overland
movement to North Vietnam. The remaining tonnage
would be recalled to Soviet ports to make the long
overland transit of China.
15. A preliminary judgment indicates that the
reorientation of traffic from the USSR and Eastern
Europe to the Trans-Siberian railroad could probably
be accomplished in two weeks.
16. The added burden on the Chinese railroads is
well within their traffic capacities and would re-
quire only 1 to 2 percent of China's inventories of
transport equipment.
17. Although the necessary adjustments to a mining
program would probably be most disruptive in North
Vietnam, the disruption should not exceed 2-3 months.
Stockpiles of essential economic and military goods
in North Vietnam are more than adequate to weather
this period, particularly if the Chinese cooperate
by making emergency shipments of some goods such
as petroleum which could become in relatively
short supply.
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ASSESSMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM'S ACTIONS
AND U.S. COUNTER-COURSES
Summary.
We must accept from the outset that Hanoi will be an extremely
hard nut to crack, and that the North Vietnamese leaders may well
conclude that having held out this far, they can do so sufficiently longer
to leave us no choice but to back off. Their prestige is committed to
victory, and their entire system may be jeopardized without it. They
will thus make a very careful calculus of the odds for and against their
being able to achieve their goals. Key factors are (1) their estimate of
whether our action represents a last, desperate move which they can
resist or the beginning of a serious program that will continue regardless
of political consequences, in which they must at least consider the latter;
(2) their estimate of their ability to continue to receive sufficient vitally-
needed economic assistance from outside sources, principally China and
the USSR, to allow the already-strained economy to hold together; and
(3) their estimate of whether political conditions in the North can be kept
stable. Hanoi faces a real dilemma in weighing these factors againsts its
objectives.
Assuming that the scope of our actions does not suggest to Hanoi
that we are attempting to destroy her as a functioning Communist state,
we believe that she will respond more in a psychological than a military
sense, although a sharp step-up in supporting military activity can be
expected. Hanoi will want to generate the maximum amount of pressure
possible against the Administration through criticism on the part of the
U.S. public and world opinion in general, and to this end will mobilize its
political and military resources to suggest that a peaceful solution had
been rendered far more difficult, if not impossible, that U.S. combat
losses can be expected to rise, and that the war will continue at a higher
level. Hanoi probably will break off the Paris talks. It will attempt to
use its diplomatic and political resources to mobilize anti-Administration
campaigns in politically sensitive countries and within the U.S. itself.
It may use new weapons and techniques in Vietnam in order to convey the
impression of an escalation of its own. It will step up the pace of operations
in South Vietnam, and possibly across the DMZ, and may call for foreign
"volunteers". It will rely on South China ports and Chinese rail and road
communications to bring supplies into North Vietnam. It will hope that a
combination of crisis atmosphere, increased American bloodshed, and an
apparent ability on Hanoi's part to keep going will force the Administration
to back down and accept a settlement on Hanoi's terms.
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Conceivably, it will call for a stand-down cease-fire in South
Vietnam to cause us to stop our operations. Excluding the factor of
American public opinion, this situation should be bearable. Hanoi will
still want a political settlement, and for this purpose probably will leave
the door open for resumption of the Paris talks. Public opinion outside
the U.S. has not proven to be a very effective tool, and should remain
insignificant in this instance. Heightened military activity brings with it
the threat of heavy casualties, which Hanoi has already sought to avoid,
and will impose even greater strain on the North than our actions alone
would bring. Calling for "volunteers" would tend to internationalize the
war, which Hanoi does not want, and would inject new external influences
into its policy deliberations, a situation which NVN wishes to avoid. Hanoi
has kept the UN out of the situation, and will probably continue to do so.
A slackening of Hanoi's military response in a relatively short time can be
expected, while the pressures on Hanoi due to our quarantine will
continue. If it calls for a cease-fire, this could be taken as a sign of
weakness and we should press for more concessions before accepting.
A continuation of our existing policies toward the Vietnam war thus
is indicated, along with an intensified public information campaign to put
our actions into perspective, and the adoption of whatever military steps
are necessary to meet Hanoi's stepped-up military activities so long as
these military activities persist.
In effect, our main problem will not be the specifics of what Hanoi
does against us but whether or not the North Vietnamese leaders will move
toward a compromise within an acceptable time frame. If they do eventually
decide to move toward compromise, the signs may be difficult to read in
view of Hanoi's need to preserve as much of its prestige as possible.
Concrete proposals will not be immediately offered by Hanoi, and should
probably be avoided by us in order to leave the Communists a line of
retreat. Without it they may well conclude that they have no other option
but to fight to the death. We should take every opportunity to make it clear
to Hanoi's leaders that we are willing to make it easy for them to change
their previous policies.
If and when Hanoi does decide to move toward accepting a genuine
compromise settlement of the war, we doubt that it will be deterred by
Chinese Communist disapproval of this course.
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POSSIBLE NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTIONS
AND
US RESPONSES
NVN
US
REMARKS
1. In the South
Step up attacks on
Counter with appropriate
Attacks will probably
urban areas, particularly
military operations, publicize
taper off in fairly brief
Saigon, Hue and Danang
violations of 1968 "understandings"
period due to increased
Communist vulnerabilities
and run-down in supplies
Attack in strength across
Same as above
Same as above
the DMZ
Launch a general "high
Same as above
Same as above
point" offensive in wide
areas of the South
Launch air attacks into
Counter with appropriate
Unlikely to be very
the South against military
-
military operations
effective
and civilian targets
Presume large-scale
Step up interdiction efforts
infiltration
2. In the North
Manpower shortage may
Step up conscription
limit this effort, which
will also impose further
strains on the economy and
social structure
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4-
NVN
US
REMARKS
Call for Soviet, Chinese,
Consider economic and political
May be considered more of
or other "volunteers", to
sanctions against countries
symbolic value than of
include manned aircraft
sending "volunteers". Continue
military value, although
and engineer, support,
with operations despite presence
Chinese units of the type
and AAA units (mostly from
of foreign forces or pilots in NVN
previously in NVN may help
China)
to ease manpower strains
Shift DRV aircraft to Chinese
Chinese will probably not
airfields in Yunnan and
authorize direct attacks on
Kwangsi
US aircraft from Chinese
airfields
Shift LOC's to posts in
Continue periodic strikes of
South China
road and rail lines in NVN
linking NVN with China
Call for Chinese and Soviet
Continue periodic strikes of
cooperation in arranging
NVN airfields
airlift across China of
critical supplies
3. Elsewhere
Step up military pressures
Continue present policies of aiding
Military and diplomatic
in Laos
RLG, implement military and
contingency planning
diplomatic contingency plans
currently under way
Rely more heavily on
Threaten Sihanouk with Cambodia
Cambodian bases for
becoming a battleground
attacks on US and ARVN
centers in the South
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-5-
NVN
US
REMARKS
4. Political
Call on Soviet and Chinese
Organize counter-pressures
for political support in UNGA
diplomatically and through
and in other forums
information campaign
Surface, together with China,
Recall long-standing history
presence of Peking's
of Chinese presence in NVN
"volunteers", thus suggesting
a new Korean-type war
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-6-
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Discussion.
A. North Vietnam
We must accept from the outset that Hanoi will be an extremely
tough nut to crack. Having held out for almost five years under heavy
U.S. pressure and having ordered great sacrifices on the part of the
people, the North Vietnamese leaders will be highly reluctant to yield
now. In view of the uncompromising stand which they have publicly taken,
they will inevitably suffer a loss of prestige before their people and in
the eyes of the rest of the Communist world if they start to back down,
and the very future of their grasp over the people and the Lao Dong Party
may be involved. If they do decide to move toward a compromise, it may
be later rather than sooner, after they have had a chance to assess the
reaction in North Vietnam and in the U.S. and to calculate the odds for
and against their being able to achieve their goals without a breakdown of
the economy and the North Vietnamese political system.
Hanoi accordingly can be expected to strive to convey the impression
that it is fully capable of withstanding the full weight of our attacks, that
it has powerful friends that will be able to help sustain it, that the war
will continue indefinitely but at a higher level and with increased American
casualties, and that the U.S. action has in fact brought the threat of a
wider conflict. All this would be directed principally at American public
opinion and secondarily at world opinion, in hopes that the combination of
criticism, tension, and increased bloodshed would in a fairly short period
of time work upon the Administration to force it to back down and accelerate
the U.S. disengagement from Vietnam.
Nevertheless, behind Hanoi's facade of uncompromising bellicosity,
the North Vietnamese leaders will be facing real dilemmaswhich will
significantly affect their judgment of North Vietnam's ability to hold out.
These include:
Hanoi's Estimate of U.S. Intentions. Although Hanoi's leaders
will want to act on the assumption that our attacks represent an act of
desperation and that we will be compelled by circumstances to break off
fairly soon (an assumption which Peking, at least, will encourage them to
make), they will probably be greatly disturbed by the implications inherent
in the nature of our attack. Our willingness to reverse entirely the
emphasis of the previous year on seeking a political solution to the war
and to strike heavily at targets previously left untouched could be read as
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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-a-
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a U.S. decision to carry on to the end regardless of political con-
sequences. For Hanoi, such a decision could result in the wholesale
destruction of the No Vietnamese political system and economic
structure -- a situation which Hanoi's leaders have never before faced.
They are already quite concerned about the deterioration of political
standards in the North, and are attempting to impose a new set of rigid
political controls. These could hardly be maintained under stress of
sustained U.S. operations at the new levels.
Hanoi's Ability to Continue to Receive Outside Economic Aid.
Even under present conditions Hanoi must rely heavily on outside
economic assistance to maintain the living standards of the North
Vietnamese people at minimum acceptable standards. One-half of the
North's foodgrain requirements are imported via rail from China and by
ship from the USSR and Eastern Europe, and consumer goods as well as
all other types of vital economic necessities come to a significant extent
from outside North Vietnam. Although there has been some degree of
economic recovery since the cessation of the US bombing, the economy
in general remains fragmented and inefficient. Under the impact of the
new level of U.S. attacks, economic conditions could seriously and
quickly deteriorate if Hanoi's land and sea communications with the
outside world are interdicted and remain so to an appreciable extent.
Meanwhile, manpower shortages persist, with a substantial proportion
of all able-bodied males long since sent to the armed fo rces.
Hanoi's Estimate of Internal Political Conditions. Morale in the
North since the bombing halt has apparently declined -- the people
expected an improvement in their living conditions, but none resulted,
and there is an adverse reaction on this score. At the same time, the
regime is emphasizing rigid socialist standards, which entails removing
some of the vestiges of private enterprise still remaining in the North.
Popular resentments are likely to rise as this program is carried out.
The manpower shortages have exacerbated the situation, and there is
resentment at the continued draft. While overt opposition is not present,
passive resistance on the part of some population elements probably does
exist. The regime is capable of maintaining control now, but over a
period of time under changed circumstances may find the problem much
greater.
Bearing in mind the foregoing considerations, Hanoi will probably
take the following specific actions:
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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- 8-
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
1. Hanoi will almost certainly break off the Paris talks. It
may do so by completely removing its delegation and that of the NLF/
PRG, or it might decide to leave some low-level representatives behind
as a means of maintaining some contact -- after all, Hanoi does want
to end the war, and realizes that it will have to talk to us to do so.
2. Hanoi will appeal to world opinion in general to condemn us,
and may open a diplomatic and propaganda campaign through friendly
countries and in the U.S. itself to isolate us and cause us to give up our
military pressure and simply get out of Vietnam.
3. Hanoi may attempt to induce the USSR and the Eastern
European countries to make a special diplomatic effort to make us back
away, including introducing resolutions to condemn us in the UN Security
Council, and possibly also threats of direct intervention.
4. In its diplomatic stance toward us, Hanoi will probably want
to appear to be hard and uncompromising, in order not to suggest weak-
ness or to convey the impression that our attacks had struck home hard
enough to cause it to offer concessions. However, Hanoi may well utilize
its assets in South Vietnam to attempt to draw the fangs of our operations
and make us back off. One possibility open to it is to initiate a call for a
stand-still cease-fire via the "Provisional Revolutionary Government"
which would leave all forces in place. The PRG could also call for some
form of territorial accommodation in which it would call for de facto
control over large areas of South Vietnam on the basis of the "revolutionary
councils" which the Communists claim to have set up in many places on
the basis of "free elections". Hanoi could anticipate a wide measure of
popular support in the U.S. for a cease-fire call, with very little critical
attention paid to the circumstances under which it was to be effected. The
net effect could be a sufficient buildup of political pressure on us to halt
all military activities under conditions which Hanoi would hope to exploit
better than we could. A cease-fire call could also cause friction between
ourselves and the GVN, in view of the latter's opposition to any form of
cease-fire.
5. Militarily:
a. In the South, under the assumption that the "understandings"
of 1968 were rendered invalid by our operation, we can anticipate more
blatant attacks on urban areas, particularly Saigon, Hue, and Danang. In
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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-9-
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
addition, there may well be more pressure across the DMZ. Through-
out SVN, once the word had been passed and preparations made, there
will probably be another "high point" of some consequence intended to
inflict as many U.S. casualties as possible to support the activities of
anti-war elements in the U.S. It is conceivable that Hanoi may attempt
to launch air operations across the DMZ into the South to show that if we
escalate, it can too. Finally, Hanoi may resume large-scale infiltration.
b. In the North. In the DRV itself there will almost surely
be an effort to step up the draft and mobilize the masses for a much longer
war, but Hanoi's latitude in this respect might be curtailed due to manpower
limitations and the war-weariness of the people of North Vietnam. (In
fact, a return to the status quo ante November 1, 1968, might have a
serious negative effect on the people, who have been anxious to see the
war end completely, not continue indefinitely.) One new course which is
open to Hanoi is to call for "volunteers", as it has occasionally threatened
to do, possibly up to and including Soviet pilots and/or aircraft, or man-
power drafts along the lines of the Chinese troop contribution. Hanoi will
call on Communist China to furnish deep-water ports in South China to
replace the quarantined ports, and to permit the continued use of Chinese
airfields to Yunnan and Kwangsi as havens for DRV combat aircraft. It
may appeal to Moscow and Peking to cooperate to the extent of permitting
a Soviet airlift across China and to facilitate the shipment of supplies by
rail across China.
c. Elsewhere. Hanoi may counter by stepping up the war in
Laos in an attempt to bring about the rapid erosion or collapse of the
Souvanna Government, hence diverting our military resources from North
Vietnam to meet the wider threat. The North Vietnamese appear to be
introducing a new, full division into Northern Laos, which when added to
the estimated 13-20, 000 DRV forces already there may be capable of
retaking the Plaine des Jarres, Muong Soi, and going on to threaten
seriously Luang Prabang and Vientiane. The Souvanna Government may
not be able to continue if such an attack materializes. Hanoi could anticipate
a fair share of public outcry in the U.S. on the score of U.S. overextension
if we should respond to meet such a new set of circumstances in Laos,
while a collapse of the Souvanna Government and its replacement by a
Communist regime would cause great alarm in Thailand and complicate our
relations with the Thai.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
In Cambodia, it is conceivable that Hanoi may attempt to
drive Sihanouk entirely over to the DRV side, and gain fuller access
to Cambodian territory for sanctuary and for staging operations than
is now the case.
B. U.S. Counter-Reaction
All these moves by Hanoi should be bearable, leaving out the
factor
of U.S. public opinion.
In Paris, we will simply sit tight, and tell the world that we
are willing to resume the talks anytime Hanoi wants to join us. If there
are DRV representatives remaining in Paris, we should attempt to see
them. We should not, however, attempt to maintain contact with the PRG/
NLF representatives unless the GVN is also present.
With respect to Hanoi's appeals for help, we can assume that
neither the USSR nor the Eastern European countries want direct involve
Mere expressions of political and economic support will cause no real
pain. The very nature of our actions should make the provision of
economic assistance more difficult. In the UN, we will attempt to avoid
a vote by mobilizing sufficient votes in the Security Council to kill a
condemnation, and attempting similarly to head off a "uniting for peace"
effort. We will continue our own publicity campaign to justify our actions,
and hope that the brief period of our operations will ease the pressures on
us. Actually, the more active the USSR and the Eastern European countries
are, the better, since we want them involved and can assume that all,
including USSR, will want the war to end before they themselves become
drawn in any deeper.
A PRG call for a cease-fire could be troublesome to deal with if
simply put in terms of a stand-down cease-fire throughout the South without
reference to other, accompanying considerations such as mutual troop
withdrawals. U.S. opinion may see such a cease-fire as a way out, and
demand acceptance. Our response should be to agree in principle to such
a cease-fire provided the proper details were worked out in advance to
permit it to be effectively maintained, and provided the principle of mutual
withdrawals of all foreign troops from South Vietnam were accepted and
such withdrawals actually implemented during a cease-fire. We could insist
that the details had to be worked out between the PRG and the GVN, thus
creating a reason for the two sides to get together for direct talks which
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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-11-
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
the Communists might find difficult to resist. It should be noted that
a cease-fire appeal would cause problems for the Communists as well,
since the degree of territorial control which they would be able to claim
on physical terms is far less than they would desire. In addition, their
forces are already plagued by a lack of willingness to fight on the basis
of "the war is nearly over and why take risks" philosophy, and a rapid
deterioration of Communist military assets could occur following a cease-
fire appeal. Indeed, the fact that the cease-fire issue has not yet been
raised by the Communists suggests that they do not presently see it as
favoring their interests. In these terms, a call by Hanoi or the PRG for
a cease-fire could be taken as a sign of weakness. Accordingly, we should
not give in to public opinion, but should insist on achieving at the minimum
a response on mutual withdrawal and supervision before acceding to a
cease-fire.
None of Hanoi's military actions in the South should cause us any
insuperable difficulty, given the state of the enemy capabilities. Attacks
across the DMZ would probably be roughly about the current scale unless
Hanoi wanted to change its operations entirely and invite a major conflict;
however, larger-scale operations bring greater vulnerabilities and invite
higher casualties. Air attacks could be warded off, and the state of training
of the DRV air force may not in any event be such as to make such attacks
effective. The main problem would be the resumption of larger-scale
infiltration, but this, as noted, would mean a complete reassessment of
strategy, tactics, and goals -- a difficult process in Hanoi without Ho Chi
Minh. In addition, heavy infiltration would dip deeply into North Vietnam's
manpower pool, which could be troublesome in Hanoi, and require a
considerable increase in logistical support, which may not be feasible.
Our most important military response would thus be to delay scheduled
troop withdrawals, to take advantage of any increased enemy vulnerabilities,
and to suggest hat we would be willing to fight it out on any scale.
Regarding Hanoi's moves in the North, we should remain calm
and anticipate that much of what Hanoi may say it will do is window-
dressing intended more for a war of nerves than for real military effect.
If draft calls go up there will be political and economic strains on Hanoi.
Calling for "volunteers" would have the disadvantages from Hanoi's
standpoint of tending to internationalize the war and take it out from under
direct Hanoi control -- the larger the outside contribution, the more say
the contributors would possess. This is supposing that the most likely
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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-12-
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
contributors, the USSR, the Eastern European countries, and Communist
China, would want to be directly involved in the first place. An "inter-
national brigade" would be more of a show than a militarily-useful
contribution. We might suggest, however, that countries from which
"volunteers" were sent would be liable to political and economic counter-
measures, if not military reprisals. Chinese manpower, if returned,
will help, however, in easing Hanoi's own manpower strains.
The shift of Hanoi's seaborne traffic to South China ports will
ease the pressures on it over time, but will require some months to be
effective and still leave vulnerabilities, particularly in connection with
follow-up attacks on road and rail connections to China inside North Vietnam.
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, our follow-on military planning will
need to take the new contingencies into consideration. We should begin
now to strengthen the Lao armed forces, and in fact are doing so. Extra
increments of aid may be necessary, and U.S. military operations on the
ground in Laos should be at least contemplated. There is a chance that
Hanoi may overextend itself if it tries to accomplish too much in Laos.
Regarding Cambodia, we should warn Sihanouk of the possible consequences
to his neutrality which direct involvement would entail, and suggest the
possibility of Cambodia becoming a battleground if Hanoi's actions there
should require a U.S. military response.
The main problem for us will not be the specifics of what Hanoi
does but will simply be whether or not Hanoi's leaders will move toward
a compromise within an acceptable time-frame. Their various actions
to respond to our operation will not count so much as their determination
to last us out. It may well conclude that they can get away with calling
on their people to tighten their belts and to make do with what they have
for as long as they possibly can.
If, as already noted, Hanoi's leaders decide that the undesirable
features of resisting a compromise outweigh the undesirable features
of holding firm, some signs may be set to us. These could include a
beginning of North Vietnamese troop withdrawals from the South, a willing-
ness on the part of the PRG to deal directly with the GVN, and a slackening
of the level of hostilities in the South. When we pick them up, we should
avoid to the extent feasible a public declamation on the subject, because
of Hanoi's need to maintain its prestige. In keeping with Asian military
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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tradition, a line of retreat should be left for a defeated enemy on the
principle that if he considers himself cornered he is likely to fight to
the death in the belief that he has no other recourse. We will thus need
to set with great discretion and judgment in handling Hanoi, and should
take every opportunity to make it clear through intermediaries that we
would be willing to make it as easy as we can for the North Vietnamese to
change their previous policies.
If Hanoi should decide to move toward a compromise solution,
we doubt that it will allow itself to be deterred by opposition on Communist
China's part. Peking has publicly made its objections to a negotiated
settlement known on numerous occasions, yet Hanoi has moved ahead;
presumably Hanoi would do so again even under circumstances in which
the outcome of the negotiations would appear far less satisfactory from
Peking's standpoint than, say, under the present circumstances. As noted
above, for Hanoi to follow the alternative course of calling for direct
Soviet and/or Chinese intervention raises the problem of loss of control
over its power of decision, and as far as Communist China is concerned,
possible domination of North Vietnam by a traditional enemy of Vietnamese
nationalism. Moreover, Hanoi is probably well aware of the Chinese
position against engaging in a direct confrontation with the U.S. (see below
under Assessment of Chinese Communist Courses of Action).
A list of the political disiderata which we want to achieve from
Hanoi through our military operations follows.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
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POLITICAL OBJECTIVES TO BE GAINED FROM
MILITARY OPERATIONS
Basically, what we want to achieve politically is a clear and
unmistakable intention on Hanoi's part to accept the principle that
the people of South Vietnam should be free to determine their future
for themselves without outside interference. This should be signified
by the North Vietnamese in tangible ways, as follows:
-- By indicating to us directly in Paris (reopening the talks
for this purpose if they had earlier broken them off) that
they have accepted our principle, and by following up
their acceptance with genuine negotiating proposals asking
for specifics on our proposals and outlining in a spirit of
compromise what changes, if any, they would want in order
to protect their interests. They could also indicate a willing-
ness to examine both the President's 8-point proposal and
their 10-point proposal to establish areas of agreement.
-- By abandoning their stand against dealing with the Thieu
Government and opening direct talks between the GVN and
the NLF (or PRG) to work out the details of election organ-
ization and supervision.
I
-- By demonstrating acceptance of our call for mutual troop
withdrawals. This need not be done formally, but could
be accomplished by undertaking substantial troop move-
ments which would unmistakably constitute withdrawals of
their forces.
-- By effecting a "lull" in hostilities in the South, and letting
us know directly or through intermediaries that it was
definitely intended as a signal of their intention to lower
the level of hostilities markedly and permanently.
-- By ending their infiltration of men into South Vietnam.
-- By removing their forces from Laos and Cambodia.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Attainment of the first two of the foregoing objectives will
probably not be achieved immediately in view of the loss of prestige
which the North Vietnamese leaders would suffer if they appeared to
be capitulating quickly to our pressure. They may, however, attempt
to signify movement in this direction by undertaking some or all of the
next steps. In such an event, we should expect firm assurances through
intermediaries that these steps were, in fact, intended to show Hanoi's
acceptance of our basic principle and that negotiations, including direct
talks between the GVN and the NLF/PRG, would shortly resume. We
should not accept one of the moves alone, e.g. effecting a "lull", as
constituting sufficient proof of Hanoi's good intentions.
Additionally, Hanoi may attempt to appear responsive by:
-- Expressing a willingness to restore and abide by the
Geneva Agreements of 1954 and the 1962 Geneva Accords
on Laos.
-- Calling for a cease-fire.
These moves must also be accompanied by more tangible steps
to be acceptable. Restoration of the Geneva Agreements and the Geneva
Accords cannot be accomplished without the removal of foreign troops
from Cambodia and Laos, and a call for a cease-fire cannot be agreed to
without at the minimum Hanoi's responding affirmatively and demonstrably
to our call for mutual troop withdrawals. We will also want agreement on
international supervision of a cease-fire at an early stage.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
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TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE
INTEGRATED DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SCENARIO
Time
Action
Agency
D-30
Establish for the record in a low-key way the history State, White House
of Hanoi's intransigence in Paris and violation of the
"understandings; " this will be accomplished by
appropriate statements and backgrounders.
D-30
Alert military commanders in the field that operations Defense
will be carried out as planned; order them to begin
necessary preparations.
D-6-1/2 to D-2 Most distant CVA departs port for Tonkin Gulf (timed Defense
to appear as normal movement).
D-3
Issue alert order to Commander SEVENTH Fleet to
Defense
prepare to execute mining plans and to Commander
SEVENTH Air Force to prepare to execute air strikes.
D-2
Issue execute order to Commander SEVENTH Fleet
Defense
and Commander SEVENTH Air Force.
H-9
All surface forces in launch position for mining
Defense
operation in Tonkin Gulf. All air forces at ready
status for air strikes.
H-4
Final go - no go.
White House
TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Time
Action
Agency
H-2
Increase readiness posture for SAC and SIOP
Defense
forces world-wide.
H-1
Launch air strikes against NVN targets from bases
Defense
in Thailand and SVN.
H-1
Launch mine operation aircraft from carriers to
Defense
Tonkin Gulf.
H-1
Inform GVN.
State: Embassy Saigon
H-1
Inform TCC's (including GVN).
State: Meeting of Ambassadors
in Washington with
Secretary
H-1
Inform UK Prime Minister
State: Ambassador in London
H-1
Inform Japanese Ambassador in Washington and
State: DepAsst Secretary for
Prime Minister in Tokyo.
East Asian Affairs;
Ambassador in Tokyo
H-1
Inform NATO allies.
State: Meeting of Ambassadors
in Washington with
Hillenbrand
H-1
Inform OAS.
State: OAS Rep
H-1
Inform Laotians.
State: Asst Secretary for East
Asian Affairs
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE
Time
Action
Agency
H-1
Inform Ambassadors of countries with ships in or
State: Country Directors
en route to Haiphong, Hon Gai, Cam Pha.
H-1
Inform USSR.
White House to Dobrynin
H-1
Inform Cambodia.
White House to Cambodian
Charge' and American
Charge' to Sihanouk
H-1
Inform Congressional Leadership (call meeting
White House
at H-2).
H-1
Alert TV networks.
White House
H-1
Press backgrounder (locked door until "H").
White House
H- 1 12
Inform USSR.
White House: Molink Message
H
Naval aircraft mine all NVN deep-water ports;
Defense
aircraft strikes at selected NVN targets.
H
COMUSMACV increases readiness posture.
Defense
H
Speech by President.
White House
H
UN -- Request UNSC meeting.
State: USUN
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Time
Action
Agency
H
Summon special meeting of Paris talks.
State: Embassy Paris/
US Delegation
H+2
UNSC meeting.
State: USUN
H+5
OAS meeting.
State: OAS Representative
H+5
Inform other governments.
State: Diplomatic Posts
H+12
SEATO meeting.
State: Embassy Bangkok
D-Day
Commence intensified world-wode diplomatic and
State, White House
informational campaign to gain under standing of
our actions.
D-Day
Be prepared to contend with NVN escalatory actions
Defense
in SVN and Laos.
D+1
Initiate follow-up air strikes.
Defense
D+2
Lay destructor weapons.
Defense
D+3
Minefields activated. Continue combat operations
Defense
as directed.
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The President's Copy
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4th Draft
October 2, 1969
DRAFT OF A PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH
My fellow Americans,
It is my duty to tell you tonight of a major decision in our
quest for an honorable peace in Vietnam.
I want to begin with a few words about the meaning of
negotiation.
Negotiation, as we understand it - - and as almost everyone
in the world understands it -- is a process in which two sides seek
to resolve a conflict by considering concrete proposals on their
merits, by bargaining, by give-and-take, by compromise. Negotiation
is a two-way street. Both sides must be willing to engage seriously
in this process, in good faith. Or there can be no settlement.
There can be no settlement when only one side makes an
honest effort to put forward reasonable compromise terms. There
can be no settlement when the other side arrogantly declaims to
the gallery and demands capitulation.
Almost exactly one year ago, the United States halted all
bombing of North Vietnam on the understanding that "prompt, pro-
ductive, serious and intensive negotiations" would follow.
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Our Government was led to believe that the bombing itself
was the major obstacle to peace. The United States was told this
repeatedly by many, both at home and abroad. President Johnson
courageously took the risk of removing that so-called obstacle. I
supported his decision.
But I must tell you tonight that it is the sober and considered
judgment of this Government that the genuine negotiations we expected
have not yet taken place.
And I would remind you: This is after one long year -- a
year of still more bloodshed and suffering in South Vietnam.
When I assumed the Presidency, I found that the other side
had met the U.S. concession of a bombing halt with continued ferocity
on the battlefield and sterile posturing in Paris.
Nonetheless, I resolved to take still more new initiatives for
peace through patient and flexible diplomacy. This Administration
has altered our negotiating position significantly in the direction of
compromise and conciliation.
--
We did not insist that the other side stop doing what
it was doing before the United States moved in the
direction of settlement.
-- We did not insist that the other side declare in advance
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process of de-escalation through withdrawal of combat
forces.
Indeed, we took the very course of action which was urged
upon us by so many critics. We seized the initiative for peace,
trusting -- as we were assured we could -- that the other side was willing
to respond and follow suit.
-- Nor did we even insist that the other side acknowledge
that it was following suit. For, as you know, North
Vietnam has never admitted what is known to all the
world -- that troops of the North Vietnamese Army
have been fighting in South Vietnam for years.
- - We have asked only that mutual de-escalation and mutual
withdrawal take place in fact. That the Paris peace talks
move as rapidly as possible toward a settlement through
genuine negotiation.
Thus we did not seek to humiliate our foe. Indeed, we went
further by offering bold new proposals designed to engage him in
honorable compromise.
-- This Administration offered -- as a major step toward
peace -- to negotiate the details of a mutual withdrawal
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over a period of twelve months, provided only that some
safeguard in the form of international supervision is part
of the agreement.
-- We have proposed -- again in a major new initiative --
that free elections take place in South Vietnam, and pledged
to accept their outcome, whatever it might be. We accepted
National Liberation Front participation in those elections,
as well as a role in organizing them.
-- We proposed an international supervisory body for overseeing
such elections and verifying withdrawals. We also said such
a body could help arrange a supervised cease-fire.
- - Moreover, we told the other side clearly that we would
entertain any alternative proposals they might have for
self-determination in South Vietnam.
As the most concrete demonstration of our good faith and
desire to reach a settlement, this Administration began the withdrawal
of American combat forces. Where the previous four years had seen
only the continued buildup of American forces in Vietnam, reaching
a ceiling of 549, 500 men, it was this Administration that started the
process of withdrawal. The ceiling is now down to 484,000. By
December 15, we will have withdrawn at least 60,000 men. Some
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have argued that this number is insignificant. I ask them if they
would consider the same number to be insignificant if it counted men
being added rather than withdrawn.
I can reveal now what Hanoi was clearly able to observe --
that several months ago I changed General Abrams' orders to modify
the strategy and tactics of our forces remaining on the battlefields
of South Vietnam, in order to cut back offensive operations and thereby
reduce the intensity of the fighting and the scale of casualties on both
sides.
Our B-52 operations have been reduced by about 20 per cent.
And, since their high point early this year, our tactical air missions
have been cut by about 25 per cent.
Thus, by both word and deed, we have explicitly ruled out
attempting to impose a purely military solution.
We have also announced the withdrawal by next summer of 6, 000
U.S. fighting men from Thailand.
With resultant reductions in the overall level of U.S. armed
forces, we have accordingly reduced our military draft.
These were all major new steps which clearly demonstrated
our readiness to end this war on reasonable terms.
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We are ready to continue the process of diplomatic
compromise and military de-escalation, if only the other side
acts in good faith.
Yet, in taking these initiatives for peace, my fellow citizens,
I realized there was the danger that Hanoi -- in the grip of a distorted
perception of the United States - - would tragically misunderstand our
policy.
- - That they would see our will to peace as weakness.
-- That they would see our hopeful de-escalation as headlong
retreat.
-- That they would judge us willing to endure both
indifference in Paris and mounting savagery on the
battlefield.
-- That they would suspect our public resolve for peace
disguised a private resignation to surrender.
-- That they would believe, most wrongly, that the
American people lacked the will to call them to account
for their cynical refusal to compromise.
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-- That they would believe that their fanaticism would
outlast what they saw as our national fatigue.
I decided shortly after taking office that we had to do all we
could possibly do to bring an honorable peace to Vietnam. At the
same time, I repeatedly warned Hanoi that they should not mistake
our purpose or abuse our patience.
In my address to you on May 14, I said, "But no greater
mistake could be made than to confuse flexibility with weakness or
of being reasonable with lack of resolution. I must also make clear,
in all candor, that if needless suffering continues, this will affect
other decisions. Nobody has anything to gain by delay.' These
words were not said lightly.
This warning was privately confirmed to Hanoi's chief
negotiator in Paris at the beginning of August. He was informed
that if no major progress toward a settlement of the war had been made
by the first of November, we would be compelled to take measures of
the greatest consequence.
But tonight - -- after months of the most thorough study and
deliberation -- I must report to you that Hanoi has indeed made a
tragic miscalculation of our will and purpose. They have not heeded
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our clear warnings. They have refused to credit the word of the
United States.
- - Denouncing our every initiative as a fraud, they have
treated negotiations as a forum for U.S. capitulation.
- - Judging the U.S. position untenable, they have stubbornly
refused to alter their own.
- - Believing victory over freedom inevitable, they have
seen no need for compromise.
I must tell you that their only answer to our many offers has
been a monotonous demand for our own humiliation and the destruction
of the South Vietnamese Government.
They have laughed in private meetings at our negotiators'
frustration. And they have responded to our words of moderation with
vituperative insult. In my speech at the United Nations on September 18
I said, "When the war ends, we stand willing to help the people of
Vietnam -- all of them. -- in their tasks of renewal and reconstruction. "
I also said that "the people of Vietnam, North and South, have endured
an unspeakable weight of suffering for a generation. And they deserve
a better future. " Hanoi's response to these words was only name
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calling. Radio broadcasts referred to a "bellicose, brutal and cunning
imperialist, 11 to our nation's "bellicose acts and colonialist policy. 11
These are the words only of blind and reckless hostility.
The record here is unmistakable. Within a few days, the U.S.
Government will publish the complete documentary record -- public
and private -- of our search for peace in the face of the unmitigated
intransigence of North Vietnam. The world can judge for itself who
has prolonged this tragic war.
This record will show, in addition to our warning at the
beginning of August, a series of very private efforts we have made
to find a reasonable settlement.
-- Before the inauguration in January, I made a private
offer of a rapid settlement of all the issues involved.
This was rejected.
- - In April, the Soviet Union's Ambassador here in Washington
was given a proposal of direct and rapid talks on all
questions, specifically including political issues. No
reply was received.
- - In May, I personally repeated this proposal to the
Ambassador. Again, there has been no reply.
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-- In June, we attempted to send an emissary to Hanoi to
offer direct negotiations on all the issues involved.
After arriving in Laos, he was refused a visa for entrance
into North Vietnam, although he had been led to believe
that he would be received in Hanoi. He left a message
with the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Laos. There
has been no reply.
-- At the end of June, we offered to send another emissary
to Hanoi to establish direct talks. He also was refused
entry.
- - On August 4, my Assistant for National Security Affairs
held a secret meeting with Hanoi's chief negotiator in
Paris. He emphasized our flexibility and desire to
achieve a reasonable compromise. In addition to reviewing
our previous offers, he made several points clear:
We realized, he said, that neither side could be
expected to give up at the conference table what had
not been conceded on the battlefield, and that a fair
political process must register the existing relation-
ship of political forces.
We knew that we differed from them on how to achieve
this, but we also believed that neither side should be
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asked to accept the proposition that there is such a
thing as a disguised defeat.
We were not asking them to disband their organized
political forces and they should not ask for the
destruction of the organized non-Communist political
forces.
Finally, he said that in order to demonstrate our good
will in the period between then and November 1st,
we would make another withdrawal of American troops
and reduce our B-52 and tactical air operations by
10 per cent.
There has been no direct response to that conversation.
This record confronts the United States with fateful but
clearcut choices.
We can go on, as some suggest, in one-sided unrequited
concessions. We can slowly withdraw our forces despite the proven
intransigence of the enemy. But let no one call this the way to peace.
-- For we must face the cruel fact the enemy has it in his
power to continue killing too many American men, and
is doing so.
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-- I therefore cannot take the responsibility for basing our
policy on the continued withdrawal of American troops,
under these conditions, exposing those remaining to ever
greater risks at the hands of an enemy who shows no will
to peace.
- - While Hanoi may be willing to condemn its sons to endless
bloodletting, I will not do so with ours.
-- We insist on a fair settlement now.
Or, some argue that this slaughter could be ended by
precipitate withdrawal.
But let no one call this the way to peace. Let no one believe
that a forced and hasty retreat by the U.S. will somehow end the
killing in South Vietnam.
-- Just the opposite. For South Vietnam, a nation still
struggling toward adequate self-defense, the sudden
withdrawal of our support would inevitably invite the
cruel retribution of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.
-- Here, too, the calculus is plain. Terror and barbarism
have plagued the villages of Vietnam for a decade. With
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a sudden collapse of our vital support, the massacres
at Hue and the recurrent atrocities in the contested
countryside could well become the nightmare of the
entire nation.
-- Though we had made a commitment to free choice and
started South Vietnam to self-sufficiency in defense,
this course would leave the issue once more to untold
violence.
-- Nor would the South Vietnamese bear alone the
consequences of our rapid retreat. We, too, would
pay a bitter price: in dangerous vindication of those
among our enemies who advocate violence, in the collapse
of our friends' confidence in America and, most of all,
in the loss of America's confidence in herself.
I cannot choose either of these courses. I was not elected to
preside over the senseless attrition of American lives by a deluded
foe. To abandon trusting friends to a long night of terror. To shatter
our integrity as a nation.
Thus, our course is clear.
Continued bloodshed on the battlefield and Hanoi's rigidity
at the peace table have taught us there is but one other choice.
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Hanoi and her allies have long believed that this nation would
accept a humiliating defeat, that our Government would have no
alternative but to submit to the surrender demanded of us in Paris.
Hanoi has misjudged the strength of the American people.
Our enemies have mistaken debate for defeatism.
After difficult and careful consideration, I have decided that
we have no choice but to prove to Hanoi that we mean to have an
honorable peace in Vietnam.
That decision had to be my responsibility. It is our common
responsibility -- yours and mine -- to demonstrate our unflinching
resolve to end this war now.
Today, pursuant to my order
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I want to make several points quite clear:
-- First, our political objective is precise. We seek to
prove to the leaders of North Vietnam that they have no
alternative but prompt and genuine negotiations to settle
this conflict. We take this action not to interrupt the
process of negotiation, but to see it begin at last. Not
to make new demands, but to find an honest compromise.
We retain our flexible and conciliatory stand in Paris,
ready to respond to any reasonable proposal by the other
side. Naturally, we pray that their response comes soon,
for the sake of their own people.
-- Second, our military action has been measured. It will be
swift, punishing and concentrated in a short period of time.
We are not resuming the daily bombing of limited targets
in North Vietnam. When our action is completed, in a few
days, Hanoi will have an interval in which to respond by
demonstrating a will to peaceful and productive negotiation.
-- Third, our aims are limited. We do not require the
destruction or surrender of North Vietnam. We do seek
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reasonable compromise at the peace table. But Hanoi
must now make this choice.
-- We seek no expansion of the conflict. We seek its end.
We covet no territory in Southeast Asia. We seek no
confrontation with the Soviet Union or China. Our actions
are directed against North Vietnam, and North Vietnam
alone. But we will take steps within those limits to make
our action effective. And the fateful choice of outside
powers to involve themselves in this action will be theirs.
I accompany our action today with a call for renewed effort
in every quarter to halt this war.
-- I call upon the leaders of North Vietnam to understand
finally that a just and mutually-agreed settlement is the
only way to bring peace, true independence, and an
eventual reconciliation to both North and South Vietnam.
Their brave people have already suffered too much for
the twisted dream of conquest in the South. Continued
intransigence by their leaders will only compound their
agony.
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-- I call once again upon the Soviet Union -- in its own
interest -- to use its influence with Hanoi to bring an
end to this war. If the leaders of the Soviet Union truly
desire an era of negotiation rather than confrontation,
let them at last begin with Vietnam. But let them also
know that we will not be deflected from our course.
-- I say to our friends in South Vietnam that our resolve to
find an honorable settlement is stronger than ever before.
Let us fortify our firmness in battle with a new spirit of
compromise when genuine talks begin.
-- And finally, I ask you, My fellow Americans, for the
same strong support you have always given your President
in a moment of trial.
For at this moment, we can only stand together in purpose
and determination.
As so often in the past, we Americans did not choose this
test of strength. It was clearly forced upon us by an
adversary, indifferent to our peaceful purpose and heedless
of our resolve.
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Let there be no mistake that we have any other choice.
We must face the fact that doubt and debate now can only
mislead our enemy and prolong the bloodshed.
This has been at once, my fellow Americans, a most difficult
yet most inescapable decision.
For that very reason, it is irreversible.
We cannot have the peace we cherish unless we act to secure
it -- and act together.
Tonight, that fact is as plain as ever before in our history.
Our road ahead is clear, and there is no turning back. I
know that if we travel it together, as we must, we will end this bitter
war.
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IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
The following list of important questions is based upon our
examination of the Vietnam alternative course of action to date.
While the list is certainly not complete, we should have a very
good idea of the answers to these questions before adoption of
such an action. The questions are presented in the general order
in which they would occur if we proceeded with the course.
a. General.
1. What are the prospects of success for this course
of action? How would we measure it? What are the consequences
-- favorable and unfovorable -- of our succeeding in this manner?
Of our failing in this manner?
2. How hard hitting should we make the first phase?
Should the second and subsequent phases be tailored for roughly
equal impact, or should they be stepped up in over-all impact?
To what limit of force should we be prepared to go in order to
spur meaningful negotiations? Should we be prepared to use nuclear
weapons?
3. Should we make any major readjustments in our
current military posture?
b. In the Period Before the First Phase.
1. What should be the nature, channel, and timing
of warnings to Hanoi? How would Hanoi, Moscow, and others
react to warnings? Would warnings affect military operations
through loss of surprise? Should we undertake warning actions,
such as increasing certain reconnaissance flights or early readying
of forces?
2. What should be our diplomatic stance during this
period? Shoud we offer more -- perhaps only to build the record
further -- or would this be a sign of weakness or duplicity?
3. What signals or actions by the other side would
persuade us not to proceed?
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4. How would we relate the decision to proceed and
the many political and diplomatic actions with the vagaries of the
weather?
5. To what extent should we consult with our allies?
When should we do it?
C. During the First Phase.
1. How should we determine how long the phase should
last? Will we be able to measure the attack effectiveness as we
proceed? If not, how will this affect the operation?
2. What would be the likelihood and consequences of
military failure? What can be done to compensate for unexpected
eventualities, such as a long period of bad weather? Can we achieve
a minimum desired effectiveness by alternative means?
3. What actions by Hanoi would be sufficient to merit
our halting the attack before it is completed?
4. What military actions should we undertake con-
currently, e.g., should we alert our strategic and/or the various
theater forces? What reinforcing actions would be appropriate in
SVN, recognizing that there would be a substantial reduction of
tactical air support available in country?
5. How would we handle the likely immediate reactions
of the USSR, Communist China, and other foreign countries? What
preparations should be made?
6. How would we deal with the likely domestic reaction?
What preparations should be made? (These questions fall outside our
competence.)
d. Interval Between Phases.
1. What specific responses are we looking for ? How
would we respond to vague signals of willingness to talk seriously?
How would we react to enemy actions which seem promising but are
unacknowledged by them?
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2. What measures would we be prepared to take against
targets within NVN if we found them to be effectively countering our
sea quarantine, e.g., a key railroad bridge between Hanoi and China?
Would we permit air or naval response to coastal battery fire against
our quarantine forces?
3. What diplomatic stance should we adopt during the
interval?
4. If Hanoi responds in a manner acceptable to us,
should we offer to assist in removing the mines? Alternatively, should
we simply not interfere with NVN sweeping and bypassing efforts and
allow the mines to remain active for their present time?
5. How long should we wait before initiating a second
phase of attacks? (Most of the questions concerning Phase I would
apply to this and subsequent phases.)
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