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Items to Discuss with the President 9 September 70 - Dec 70 [2 of 3]
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
October 16, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
A1 Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, October 16, 1970
1. Inform the President that you met with Congressional leaders on
Wednesday re Cuba and mention rave nbtices they gave to the President's per-
formance during the Middle East and Cuban crises and brief Berlin hassle.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Tell the President you received a call from Lucet on the possibility
of the President seeing Schumman sometime next week. Also, discuss the
timing of the UK Prime Minister visit so you can confirm this with Freeman.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
4. Mention to the President that Hanoi's reaction to the peace proposal
was an obvious manifestation of their sensitivity and probable pique at being
deprived of propaganda value on their own proposal.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
5. Inform the President of the results of your meeting with Dewey & Clay.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of
Malta (Tab A, left flap).
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
AMH:feg:10/15/70
Job A same as 10/15/70 memo
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
October 17, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
A1 Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Saturday, October 17,
1970
1. Remind the President you will be seeing Ambassador Dobrynin
late this afternoon.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Tell the President that you have sent copies of the U.N. speech
to Price and Safire and will have a final version on Sunday morning.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Brief the President on the latest thinking with respect to Chile
and tell him you will be meeting with the Review Group this morning.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
SOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
EYES ONLY
4. Inform the President that you met with Congressional leaders on
Wednesday re Cuba and mention rave notiees they gave to the President's
performance during the Middle East and Cuban crises and brief Berlin
hassle.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
- No
Comments:
5. Discuss the timing of the UK Prime Minister visit so you can
confirm this with Freeman.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7. Mention to the President that Hanoi's reaction to the peace proposal
was an obvious manifestation of their sensitivity and probably pique at being
deprived of propaganda value on their own proposal.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- a -
EYES ONLY
8. Inform the President of the results of your meeting with Dewey
and Clay.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
9. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier
of Malta (Tab A, left flap).
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
October 7. 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
Saturday
17
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, October 16, 1970
45.
Inform the President that you met with Congressional leaders on
Wednesday re Cuba and mention rave notices they gave to the President's per-
formance during the Middle East and Cuban crises and brief Berlin hassle.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5 $ Tell the President you received a call from Lucet on the possibility
of the President seeing Schumann sometime next week. Also, Ascuss the
timing of the UK Prime Minister visit so you can confirm this with Freeman.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7
Mention to the President that Hanoi's reaction to the peace proposal
was an obvious manifestation of their sensitivity and probable pique at being
deprived of propaganda value on their own proposal.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSTUVE/EVE @NiLoYPresidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
8. Inform the President of the results of your meeting with Dewey & Clay.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
9a Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of
Malta (Tab A, left flap).
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Perind
L Tell The President you will beseing
Anlassada Dolynin late This afternon
Tell Re
2. you to nature U.N. to to Present Price That and
Soffire and will have a fresh
you have eat copiesof Nov speed version
on Sunday morning,
3. Bay Buf no President that on of The latest Telphin Thinking
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
who respect to Chile and
EYES ONLY
you will be noting with re
Review Group This morning
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
22
EYES ONLY
October 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig @
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday, Thirsday October 1/9,
22
1970
Review
1. Give the President a report on your meeting with Ambassador
Dobrynin and plans for meeting with Gromyko.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2.
Tell the President you will be leaving Monday afternoon for
California via New York and will be back Wednesday evening.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
$ Discuss the status of U.N. speech.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. lover Diseuss points made ly alassa Rabin in
his pronecoll lostevening City Telcon at Tab A)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES
4. give ONLY The President arundom on your lundron
tall and discussions at Me an Soe angeles Times.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
EYES ONLY
J. Brief the President on the latest thinking with respect to Chile,
and the results of your Review Group meeting on Saturday.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
(50 Inform the President that within you met with Congressional leaders
Mantion rave natices
last Wednesday re Cuba and mention rave notices they gave to the
President's performance during the Middle East and Cuban crises and
brief Berlin hasslewhen hassle you met with Then on October 14ne Cuba
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Discuss the timing of the UK Prime Minister visit so you can
confirm this with Freeman.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7. Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
EYES ONLY
8. Mention to the President that Hanoi's reaction to the peace
proposal was an obvious manifestation of their sensitivity and probable
pique at being deprived of propaganda value on their own proposal.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
9. Inform the President of the results of your meeting with Dewey
and Clay.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
10. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier
of Malta (Tab A, left flap).
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
October 22, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,
October 22, 1970
1. Review plans for meeting with Gromyko.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss points made by Ambassador Rabin in his phone call
last evening (Telecon at Tab A).
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments: Unments an letern
3. Discuss the status of U.N. Speech.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
4. Give the President a rundown on your luncheon talk and
discussions at the Los Angeles Times.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
5. Brief the President on the latest thinking with respect to Chile.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Mention rave notices Congressional leaders gave to the
President's performance during the Middle East and Cuban crises and
brief Berlin hassle when you met with them on October 14 re Cuba.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7. Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
8. Mention to the President that Hanoi's reaction to the peace
proposal was an obvious manifestation of their sensitivity and probably
pique at being deprived of propaganda value on their own proposal.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
9. Inform the President of the results of your meeting with Dewey
and Clay.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 3 -
10. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister
Olivier of Malta (Tab B, left flap).
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to bei declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
24
EYES ONLY
October 23, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
Saturday
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Friday,
October 23,4 1970
1.
Mention Recall that you will meet of with Dobrynin after the UN speech
this fte and discuss timing and modalities of Summit announcement.
and
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss Middle East problem with the President to condition
him in direction of requirement to provide additional assistance to Israel
in order to obtain movement on their proceeding with Jarring talks without
rectification. If you have not done so, you may wish to mention to the
President that you will breakfast with Golda Meir Sunday morning.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Tell the President that, Rockefeller has asked you to give a talk
in New York which would be beneficial to both the President and Rockefeller.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Review the routine for the SAPO UN today. mative From and suie Unimpdate
I have discusse this with the President: Yes
m status of TexTiles,
No
Comments:
5. Tell the Presidentyou will remain in New York overnight and
return to Washington tomorrow in time for the Sato visit. Give him a brief
update on
AC I Comments: have the textile discussed exchange. this with the President: Yes
No
5. Bereio any finagets
dinner and somenix's muting,
E. Till Pres. 8 stall Rulama
on Chili Cable and ation
TAken
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
October 2 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
Mon
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Saturday,
October 24, 1970
1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and
received assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of
Summit announcement.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Bridblest with Molda There in sudianay
2. Discuss Middle East problem with the President to condition
him in direction of requirement to provide additional assistance to Israel
in order to obtain movement on their proceeding with Jarring talks without
rectification. If you have not done so, you may wish to mention to the
President that you will breakfast with Golda Meir Sunday morning.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Review the routine for Sato meeting and give him update on status
of textiles.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
mentun Rrgus decression (trotfally) menture.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE and proble unit
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Dayan Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
M
Review any significant aspects of tonight's dinner and tomorrow's
meetings.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Go
Tell President of State reclama on Chill cable and action taken ie
I have discussed this with the President:
no statement. Kill meyer Yes Backgrounder, No
Comments:
Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier
of Malta (Tab A left flap).
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
4
Discuss mutring today
Tul Thes you are sending
him important memo ownef
and Defense Dephryment
and manyoned problems
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
+
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
October 26, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
@
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday Monday, October 26 27
1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and
received assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of
Summit announcement.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2.
Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to condition
in
requirement of provide dditional assistance to Israel in
order to obtain movement on their proceeding with Jarring talks without
rectification. Mention Rogers discussion (tactfully). Mention Canal problem
and possible visit of Dayan and SRG muting No
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
Comments:
(urth mrs mein
3. Tell President of State reclama on Chile cable and action taken, i. e.,
no statement. Kill Meyer backgrounder. on which further, chence heard surting
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
-2-
4. Discuss.C busescu meeting today. Tell the President you are
sending him an important memo on Defense re-organization and Defense
deployment and management problems.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier
of Malta. (See attached memo)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
?
G Tell The President you will not be going to new you on
take activer now and Jriday —
Wednesday and unin actions ym will
manymer and Reng memos on
lift flap,
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
October 27, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday, October 27
1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received
assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announce-
ment.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President
to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order
to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers discussion with
Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal problem and possible visit of Dayan
and yesterday's SRG meeting.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Tell President of State reclama on Chile cable and action taken,
i.e., no statement. Kill Meyer backgrounder on which we've heard nothing
further.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier
of Malta. (See attached memo)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Tell the President you will not be going to New York on Wednesday
and review actions you will take between now and Friday - -- manpower and
reorganization memos on left flap.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Attachements on left flap: #22769 & 22681
Attachment under #4 same as 10/26/70 memo
AMH:feg: 10/27/60
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
October 29, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, October 30
1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and re-
ceived assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of
Summit announcement. Mention that you and the Secretary of State do
not believe any initiative on Southeast Asia would be appropriate at this
time.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President
to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in or-
der to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers discussion
with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit
of Dayan to U.S. to discuss.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Inform President of problem of message to Allende.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier
of Malta. (See attached memo)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Tell the President you will not be going to New York on Wednesday
and review actions you will take between now and Friday - -- manpower and
reorganization memos on left flap.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
TABE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
October 6, 1970.
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER
FROM:
Marshall Wright MN
SUBJECT:
Haile Selassie Request to see the President
Haile Selassie has personally expressed to our Ambassador his desire
for a private meeting with the President. The Ambassador, of course,
promised to tell Washington, but also made reference to the President's
busy schedule, etc. This sounds exactly like the kind of problem you
were talking about at this morning's staff meeting. Shall we, without
further delay, inform Haile Selassie that the President will see him. ?
On a related matter, I am told by State that you told Alex Johnson that
the President would be willing to see Olivier of Malta. Olivier has not
asked to see the President. Do you want us to tell him that the President
wishes to see him?
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That we inform Haile Selassie forthwith that the President looks
forward to a private meeting with him.
Approve HC
Disapprove
2. That we not stimulate a meeting with Olivier and defer any action on
this until he requests a meeting with the President.
Approve
Lik
Disapprove
Let and Juck mill Pas. in 2.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
October 27, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
Iri
30.
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Fuesday, October
1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received
assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announce
ment. mention that m and See Still do not.believe
my I have initiate discussed on this S.E.Nsia with the President: used by Yes sprospriated No this true,
Comments:
2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President
to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order
to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers discussion with
and yesterday's SRG meeting.
Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal problem and possible visit of Dayan tous
To discuss,
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Tell President of State reclama on Chile cable and action taken,
i.e., no statement. Kill Meyer backgrounder on which we've heard nothing
further.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP 3. SECRET/SENSITIVE IN From Pres. of problem of Message to
EYES ONLY Alleable
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 2, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday, November 2, 1970
1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received
assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announce-
ment. Mention that you and the Secretary of State do not believe any initia-
tive on Southeast Asia would be appropriate at this time.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President
to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in
order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers' discussion
with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit of
Dayan to U.S. to discuss.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender to be released this
a. m., and Cramer speech yesterday in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this
item which was carried in Washington Post small piece this a.m.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
AMH:ms: 11/2/70 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
EYES ONLY
4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Glivier
of Malta. (See attached memo)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Tell President of your message to Brandt covering discussions
with Gromyko. (Rush may be upset about channel and could complain
to Rogers. Hal will talk to him this a. m.)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
October 30, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, October 30
1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and re-
ceived assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of
Summit announcement. Mention that you and the Secretary of State do
not believe any initiative on Southeast Asia would be appropriate at this
time.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President
to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in or-
der to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers discussion
with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit
of Dayan to U.S. to discuss.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. mention Defense anmmuumenton
3. Inform President of problem of message to Allende.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
sub tender H W a.m
liverls Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED aas
TOP and SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES Brames spech ONLY grotudgeyin camed Februla
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LOB tu SECKEL Wash SEMSILLAR Post EXES small ОИГА pull the
Comments:
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NENOKVADON
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier
of Malta. (See attached memo)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Tell the President you will not be going to New York on Wednesday
and review actions you will take between now and Friday -- manpower and
reorganization memos on left flap.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Tell Pres. of your mensass to
Brandt covering discussions with
Geomyke. (Rush may he upset about
channel and could amplain to Rogers-
Hal will talk to him this arm.)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President,
Tuesday, November 3, 1970
1. Tell the President of your plans net to go to Florida until
Tuesday due to interdepartmental work load.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert Presi-
dent to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel
in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Regers'
discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and
possible visit of Dayan to U.S. to discuss. Tell President you are
considering this issue next week.
1 have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender released yester-
day, and Cramer speech Sunday in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this
item which was carried in Washington Post small piece yesterday a.m.)
I have discussed this with the Presidents Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
AMH:ms: This document 11/2/70 has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
2
4. Ask the President if he would like to ⑉ Prime Minister Olivier
of Malta. (See attached memo)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Tell President of your message to Brandt covering discussions
with Gremyko.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Tell the President Walters is back and you will see him this
a. m.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 2, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig @
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tues Monday, November 3, 1970
W
/ Tell Pus of your Blams not of so to Florida
load,
1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received
assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announce-
ment. Mention that you and the Secretary of State do not believe any initia-
tive on Southeast Asia would be appropriate at this time]
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7th Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President
to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in
order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers' discussion
with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit of
WHT week
Dayan to U.S. to discuss. Tell Pres your censidering this usive
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
a. m., and Cramer speech yesterday in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this
3. Mention Defense announcement -sunday on sub-tender tabe released this yeshitory
item which was carried in Washington Post small piece a. a.m.)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
EYES ONLY
4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier
of Malta. (See attached memo)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Tell President of your message to Brandt covering discussions
with Gromyko. (Rush may be upset about channel and could complain
to Rogers Hal will talk to him this a. m. )
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Teel Pres. waters is tack of you
will Del him this AM
S.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 4, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
A1 Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President
Wednesday, November 4, 1970
1. Tell the President of your plans not to go to Florida until
Tuesday due to interdepartmental work lead.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss breakfast with Gelds Meir in such a way to alert
President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance
to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention
Regers' discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal
and possible visit of Dayan to U.S. to discuss. Tell President you are
considering this issue next week.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender released Menday,
and Cramer speech Sunday in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this item
which was carried in Washington Pest small piece yesterday a. m.)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
AMH:ms:11/4770duced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister
Olivier of Malta. (See attached meme)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Tell the President that Walters is back and you have seen
him. You will give President report prepared by Walters. He saw
as signs of immediate action in either Brasil or Argentina, but noted
relief at confirmation of U.S. stand.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President,
Tuesday, November 3, 1970
1. Tell the President of your plans not to go to Florida until
Tuesday due to interdepartmental work load.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert Presi-
dent to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel
in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers'
discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and
possible visit of Dayan to U.S. to discuss. Tell President you are
considering this issue next week.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender released yester Monday
day, and Cramer speech Sunday in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this
item which was carried in Washington Post small piece yesterday a. m.)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier
of Malta. (See attached memo)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Tell President of your message to Brandt covering discussions
with Gromyko.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Gave W.
6. Tell the President Walters is back and you will see him this
a.m. yn will suil pres muttio. Nepauro
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Ausis actum in either Bruegs os
argenture int noted velieful at comfermation
MS. stand
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE house
WASHINGTON
HAK
Be sure you
see items to diswas
Percy call on left flap.
Hey
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 5, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig to
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President
Thursday, November 5, 1970
1. Tell the President of your plans not to go to Florida until
Tuesday due to interdepartmental work load.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert
President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance
to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention
Rogers' discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal
and possible visit of Dayan to U.S. to discuss. Tell President you are
considering this issue next week.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender released Monday,
and Cramer speech Sunday in Florida. We'll stay mum on this item
which was carried in Washington Post small piece yesterday a.m.)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister
Olivier of Malta. (See attached memo)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Tell the President that Walters is back and you have seen
him. You will give President report prepared by Walters. He saw
no signs of immediate action in either Brazil or Argentina, but noted
relief at confirmation of U.S. stand.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
caule reply
6. Discuss Blount visit to Paris, meeting with Dobrynin,
Bruce reaction on private meeting, and phone conversation with
help Flap
Percy. statement acpreap.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7. Tell President you are briefing Congressional leadership.
with Admiral Moorer this afternoon.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/08/06 : NLN-NSC FILES-336-1-6-6
HAIE
SECRET
25X1
ECEIVED
WHCA
in
16
28
2581 3091611
ZNY MMNSH
0 051606Z ZYH
FM PARIS
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
SE CR E T 051524Z NOV 70
25X1
FM USDEL, PARIS AMB. BRUCE 711
TO WHITE HOUSE, DR. HA. KISSINGER (EYES ONLY)
REF: WH02175
DELAYED ANSWER TO YOUR MESSAGE UNTIL AFTER PLENARY
MEETING TODAY ON REMOTE CHANCE OTHER SIDE MIGHT PRODUCE
SOMETHING INTERESTING such WAS NOT THE CASE. THEY
REPEATED THEIR USUAL DREARY POLEMICS AND ADDED A NOTE
OF PERSONAL CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH I DID NOT
LET MEET ING. PASS AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM OUR REPORT ON THE
DESPITE THIS, I FRANKLY SEE NO ADVANTAGE TO US IN
POSTPOING PRIVATE MEETING FOR A WEEK. THEIR DELAY IN
SETTING A DATE FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS WAS PROBABLY
RELATED TO OUR ELECTIONS. THEY EITHER WANTED TO SEE
THE RESULTS, OR PERHAPS THEY WERE SUSPICIOUS THAT WE
MIGHT SOMEHOW CAPITALIZE ON A LEAK BY US TO INFLUENCE
THE IMPENDING ELECTIONS. THESE PEOPLE PRETEND TO BE
EXPERTS AT ANALYZING AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION OF WHICH
THEY ARE ABYSMALLY IGNORANT.
I THINK WE MUST ASCERTAIN WHETHER HANOI HAS ANY
INTENT ION TO BEGIN GUNUINE NEGOTIATIONS. IT SEEMS
UNLIKELY THAT THEY ARE PRESENTLY PREPARED TO DEAL
SUBSTANT IVELY WITH THE PROBLEMS, NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE
WE SHOULD IN SECRET SESSIONS EXPLORE THEIR INTENTIONS
AS THOROUGHLY AS POSSIBLE, AND IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE
TO DO SO NOW THAN LATER. THEREAFTER, WE COULD MORE
COMPETENTLY DETERMINE SUBSEQUENT TACTICS.
State Dept. review completed
Presidential Library Review of NSC
Equities is Required Jus 6/29/2012
No Objection To Declassification 2008/08/06 : NLN-NSC FILES-336-1-6-6
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/08/06 : NLN-NSC FILES-336-1-6-6
WE HAVE PRESENTED A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION IN
PRESIDENT' S FIVE POINTS, AND SHOULD NOW PURSUE THEM IN
A WAY THAT DEMONSTRATES OUR FIRMNESS AS WELL AS OUR
WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE IF POSSIBLE A SETTLEMENT. WE
HAVE BEEN MOVING QUITE DELIBERATELY AND PATIENTLY; GOING
INTO SECRET MEETINGS NOW WOULD NOT CREATE AN APPEARANCE
OF ANXIETY OR LACK OF CONFIDENCE ON OUR PART. WE ARE IN
A STRONG POSITION MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY, AND CAN
PRODUCTIVELY EXPLORE HANOI'S ATTITUDE. FINALLY, I THINK
IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO BUILD UP A RECORD OF TRYING FOR
NEGOTIATION THROUGH THESE MEANS. IF NOTHING EMERGES IT
WILL CLEARLY BE CHARGEABLE TO THEIR INTRANSIGENCE.
IF THE PRESIDENT, NEVERTHELESS, WISHES TO POSTPONE
THE MEETING I CAN DO SO BY A "DIPLOMATIC ILLNESS."
THEY MIGHT DECIDE TO COUNTER BY FURTHER POSTPONEMENT.
IT IS, OF COURSE, POSSIBLE THAT MY REQUESTING POST PONEMENT
OF THE SECRET MEETING COMING AFTER THE SHARP RESPONSE I
MADE TO THUY' S REMARKS AB OUT THE PRESIDENT, WOULD LEAD
THEM TO BELIEVE WE CALL IT OFF BECAUSE OF THAT. THEY
MIGHT THEN FEEL THAT FACE IS INVOLVED AND THIS
COULD MAKE HOLDING FUTURE SECRET TALKS MORE DIFFICULT.
GP-1
500
2581
SECRET
NNNN
No Objection To Declassification 2008/08/06 : NLN-NSC FILES-336-1-6-6
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 9, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig @
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Monday, November
9, 1970
1. Discuss Korry message on Chile:
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss your meeting with Dobrynin and release of Generals.
(Soviets to announce at 3:00 p.m. today.)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3, = Inform the President you met with the Attorney General on
the Ivanov case.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Give the President a read-out on the submarine tender.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Inform the President U.K. announced new Ambassador today.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Discuss instructions to Bruce which you and Rogers discussed
this morning. (Message at Tab C)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7. I sent memos to Key Biscayne on President's meeting with
Heath at Camp David and meeting with Dewey, Acheson, McCloy and
Clay on Europe.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 3 -
8. Tell President you are having DPRC meeting today and that
Laird has sent over a separate five-year defense strategy for the
President designed to circumvent the established machinery and that
you will give it to the President on Wednesday.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TABE
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
October 6, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER
FROM:
Marshall Wright MN
SUBJECT:
Haile Selassie Request to see the President
Haile Selassie has personally expressed to our Ambassador his desire
for a private meeting with the President. The Ambassador, of course,
promised to tell Washington, but also made reference to the President's
busy schedule, etc. This sounds exactly like the kind of problem you
were talking about at this morning's staff meeting. Shall we, without
further delay, inform Haile Selassie that the President will see him. ?
On a related matter, I am told by State that you told Alex Johnson that
the President would be willing to see Olivier of Malta. Olivier has not
asked to see the President. Do you want us to tell him that the President
wishes to see him?
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That we inform Haile Selassie forthwith that the President looks
forward to a private meeting with him.
Approve HC
Disapprove
2. That we not stimulate a meeting with Olivier and defer any action on
this until he requests a meeting with the President.
Approve
Lik
Disapprove
Lef one luck will Pus. in 2.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THAT PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 5A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 O? NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED- IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
This document has been Reproduced reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
Dictated by Percy's office
11/5/70 jlj
DRAFT STATEMENT FOR PRESIDENT
When I made my statement in Limerick, Ireland, on
October 4 concerning the United States commitment to NATO, I
was certainly conscious of the meeting of the European Defense
Ministers several days prior to that as well as the resolution
unanimously adopted by the Economic Committee of the North
Atlantic Assembly earlier this year endorsing the principle of
budget contributions from European NATO countries to help meet
the official requirements of the United States forces in Europe.
I commend the Defense Ministers on their efforts to
find ways to provide financial assistance to help defray costs of
United States forces in NATO. It is this type of step to which I
was referring in Ireland when I said that "we will continue to talk
with our NATO allies with regard to how, overall, we can meet our
responsibilities together. 11
Our aim is to strengthen and unify NATO which requires
military, political, and financial considerations. Financial sharing
of United States NATO costs by our European allies will help
achieve this goal.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
Classification
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
USDEL FRANCE - PRIORITY
STATE
NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS
faxxh FOR BRUCE FROM THE SECRETARY
1. We appreciate thoughtful views you have expressed in
back channel message favoring maintenance of scheduled plans
for private meeting Monday with Xuan Thuy. Nevertheless,
and especially in view tenor of DRV remarks in today's
meeting and subsequent press conference, it is our considered
judgment that you should seek postponement for about a week.
2. Please provide us soonest with your recommendation
concerning manner in which you would propose to arrange
postponement and date on which you would suggest meeting
be rescheduled.
GP-1
END
DRAFTED BY:
EA:WHSullivan:ms lefes
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
WPR
NE
11/5/70
20272
The Secretary
per
CLEARANCES:
S/S -
SECRET
Classification
FORM DS-322
4 68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
EFACO
00 WTE1
DE WTE 4398 3162048
0 122044Z NOV 70
FM GENERAL HAIG
Kabur
TO HENRY A. KISSINGER
ZEM
TOPSECRET SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WH02196
MUMBER 12) 1970
NOVEMBER
TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: GENERAL HAIG
1
1. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED WORD FROM AMBASSADOR KORRY
THAT HE HAD BEEN NOTIFIED BYCHILEAN OFFICIALS THAT CHILE WOULD
ANNOUNCE RECOGNITION OF CUBA THIS AFTERNOON AT 1800 LOCAL.
WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF WORKING OUT PRESS LINE TO RESPOND
TO THIS INEVITABILITY. ALSO INDICATIONS CHILES MOVING
2
TO TAKE PUBLIC LINE IN SUPPORT OF PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE.
2. GENERAL PURSLEY CALLED ME THIS MORNING REFERENCE
3
BRIEFING ON SPECIAL PROJECT SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER. HE
STATED THAT THIS HAD BECOME A VERY COMPLEX PROBLEM AND THAT SECRETARY
LAIRD FELT THAT HE AND THE CHAIRMAN SHOULD GET WITH YOU
ON THIS SUBJECT RATHER THAN TO FOLLOW THE BRIEFING ROUTE
WHICH WE PURSUED EARLIER. AFTER SOME PROBING ON MY PART,
I GATHER THAT THE SECRETARY IS HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS.
AT LEAST ON TIMING. WITH STRONG URGING FROM PURSLEY THAT
AFFAIR BE POSTPONED. SIMULTANEOUSLY I WAS APPROACHED BY
4
DICK CAPEN THIS MORNING AT MEETING ON SUPPLEMENTAL AND TOLD
THAAT SECRETARY LAIRD IS WORKING ON A PROJECT INVOLVING
POW'S WITH A SWEDISH CITIZEN. ALLEGEDLY, A SWEDISH CITIZEN
WILL MAKE AVAILABLE A SHIP TO CARRY U.S. POW'S FROM
HANOI TO SAIGON. HE WILL ACT AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN, HOPEFULLY
5
THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SWEDISH RED CROSS. APPARENTLY,
THE SWEDE IS READY TO ANNOUNCE HIS OFFER IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.
AND BOTH PURSLEY AND LAIRD FEELTHATTHIS SHOULD CHANGE PLANS
ON THE OTHER PROJECT. I UNDERSTAND THAT SECRETARY ROGERS HAS BEEN
CUT IN ON THIS PROJECT WHICH IS LARGELY OF PROPAGANDA VALUE IN MY VIEW
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, PLUS OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WHICH PURSLEY
DID NOT PROVIDE, HE STATED SECRETARY LAIRD BELIEVED YOU SHOULD MEET
WITH HIM AND THE CHAIRMAN TOMORROW MORNING IN THE DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT TO DISCUSS THE PROJECT ON WHICH I REQUESTED THE
BRIEFING. I HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THIS BUT TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED
10:30 A.M. TOMORROW FOR YOU TO MEET IN SECRETARY LAIRD'S
OFFICE WITH THE CHAIRMAN IN ATTENDANCE:
3. PER OUR DISCUSSION, I NET FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD YESTERDAY
WITH ADMIRAL MOORER. I BELIEVE WE HAVE FINALLY GOTTEN ACROSS
6
TO HIM THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DPRC EXERCISE. HE WAS SOMEWHAT
STUNNED BY THE TURN OF EVENTS AND ME NOW HAS THE JOINT STAFF
WORKING FEVERISHLY TO PREPARE A RESPONSIVE PACKAGE. I AM
CONFIDENT THAT HE IS 100 PER CENT BEHIND OUR EFFORTS AND WILL
NEVER AGAIN STRAY.
800
NNNN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Sullivan
8:05 p.m., November 10, 1970
K:
LBJ called me and said that Ky had requested to see him.
S:
Yes.
K:
And wanted guidance. What do we tell him?
S:
I see no harm, it would be after he sees President Nixon.
K:
Think it would ba a cheap thing to pay.
S:
Two things, (1) definitely could not see him before he could see
President Nixon and (2) would have to work it out on his own. He
apparently called down there
K:
Right.
S:
The weekend after Thanksgiving, after he had been to Washington.
Have you talked at all with him?
K:
The President?
S:
Yes.
K:
No, but I will.
S:
Have you talked with the Vice President?
K:
No, but I will, right now in fact.
S:
I got a call from Kent Crane urging
K:
I got that meeting cancelled.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Walt Rostow
11/10/70 3:30p.m.
R: I know you are busy.
K: Not at all.
R: Reason I'm calling, President Johnson has been approached in
confidence by Bui Diem as to whether he would be prepared to receive
Ky at the end of the month after he has been in Washington. The Pres-
ident's response was this: 1) he would be glad to do it, but only if it
is regarded as a good idea by the President and 2) if you thought it a
good idea, he wants to know the points President Nixon wants to under-
line with Ky. He wants to make no move whatsoever except as President
Nixon wants it done.
K: Aren't you nice. I will ask the President, may I?
R: Sure. Do you have just another minute? Let me pass along
I have been to London. On Vietnam I suggest you give some thought in
light of indightx intelligence coming from Hanoi, that they are having
some difficult morale problems on the field as well as at home, that you
give a real push in psychological warfare. I get word that for the first
time in the whole thing leaflets saying go home, work the farms, grow
some rice, raise some kids that's something the army in the field and
the people at home may be ready to listen to.
K: Let me take a look at that.
R: Okay.
K: Nice to talk to you.
[At end of conversation with Rostow, Mr. Kissinger turned away from phone
and said "David, make sure I do something about that. "]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
11 November 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Joe Shergalis
SUBJECT: Representation at Memorial Service for General De Gaulle.
The following Chiefs of State and Heads of Government had
indicated that they planned to attend ceremonies for General
De Gaulle in Paris:
Europe -
Belgium
- King Baudouin
Italy
- President Saragat; Prime Minister Colombo
U.K.
- Prime Minister Heath; Prince of Wales
Luxembourg
- Grand Duke Jean; Prime Minister Werner
Germany
- President Heinemann; Chancellor Brandt
Ireland
- Prime Minister Lynch
Netherlands- H.M. Queen Juliana; Foreign Minister Luns
Austria
- President Jonas
USSR
- Kosygin (Pressonly)
Middle East -
Turkey
- Prime Minister Demirel
Lebanon
- President Frangie; Prime Minister Saeb Salam
Israel
- Prime Minister Shazar; Former Prime Minister Ben Gurion
UAR
- Prime Minister Fawzi
Iran
- Shah Pahlaui
India
- Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
Africa -
Ethiopia
- Emperor Haile Selassie
Dahomey
- President Maga
Ivory Coast
- President Houphouet-Boigny
Gabon
- President Bongo
Upper Volta
- President Lamizana
Togo
- President Eyameda
Tunisia
- Prime Minister Hedi Nouira
Malagasy Republic - President Tsiranana
Cameroon
- Prime Minister (East Cameroon) Tchoungoui
Mali
- President Lamizana
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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- 2 -
Other Diplomats -
Mexico
- Ambassador Siluio Zavala Vallado
Greece
- Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos
Canada
- Sec. of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp
Japan
- Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi
Panama
- Charge' Jorge Tulio Royo
Costa Rica- Ambassador Roman Jara
Ecuador
- Ambassador Cesar Aluarez Barba
Guatemala - Ambassador Linarea
Brazil
- Ambassador Lyra Tavares
Australia - Ambassador Alan Renouf
New Zealand - Deputy Prime Minister John Marshall
Honduras
- Ambassador Tito Carcamo
Uruguay
- Senator Eduardo Paz Aguirre
Nepal
- Ambassador Shardul Shumshere J.B. Rana
Malaysia
- High Commissioner To UK Tan Sri Abdul Jamil Rais
Jordan
- Crown Prince Hassan
Zambia
- Vice President Mainza Chona
Norway
- Crown Prince Harald
S. Korea
- Foreign Minister Choi Kyu Hah
S. Africa - Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller
Burundi
- Foreign Minister Libere Ndabakwaje
Algeria
- Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika
Ceylon
- Ambassador Tissa Wijeyeratne
Nigeria
- Commodore Nelson Bossman Soroh
Pakistan
- Minister of Agriculture & Works Mahmdod Haroon
Tanzania
- Ambassador Tibandebage
Morocco
- Director General Cabinet Driss Siaoui
Spain
- Vice President of Government Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 19, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, November 20, 1970
1. Discuss the Pakistan situation. Latest report is on left flap.
Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U. S. delegation to Pakistan for relief
purposes.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Inform the President that you will meet with Secretary Laird and
Admiral Moorer today to work out integrated public relations plan on weekend
activities.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Inform the President that the Soviet tender has left Cienfuegos
and also inform him of the plans re press handling.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
AMH:feg:11/19/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 19, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,
November 19, 1970
1.
Discuss conduct of this morning's NSC meeting.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U.S. delegation to
Pakistan for relief purposes.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Inform President that you will meet with Secretary Laird
and Admiral Moorer Friday morning Today at 10:00 to work out integrated public
relations plan on weekend activities.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
postang Smit Pender while has left Genfulgoes
Shine ge President the latest Comation on The
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
(
4. Inform The President That Somet Tender has left
Crenfrugoes, Reproduced I plans re the Richard Nixon press Presidential handling Library
at DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
child 40 Committee
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
19
EYES ONLY
November 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,
November 18, 1970
Discuss conduct of his mornings NSC meeting.
1. Discuss conduct of meeting with Secretaries Rogers and
Laird and Admiral Moorer on the two Vietnam projects. You have
sent a talker to the President for the meeting.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U.S. delegation to
Pakistan for relief purposes.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Recap the supplemental tactics in light of the Republican leader-
ship discussion yesterday morning and review procedures for conduct of
bi-partisan meeting this afternoon.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Discuss the Cuba-tender issue and the need to have a clear
delineation of White House/State harmony and a confirmation of the
general outlines of the Understanding with the Soviets. I am confident
that if you raise this the President will have been alerted by Haldeman.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget and fact you
will send him a memo on Laird's private five-year program.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Mention to the President the incident yesterday with our
reconnaissance aircraft.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,
November 18, 1970
1. Discuss conduct of meeting with Secretaries Rogers and
Laird and Admiral Moorer on the two Vietnam projects. You have
sent a talker to the President for the meeting.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U.S. delegation to
Pakistan for relief purposes.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Recap the supplemental tactics in light of the Republican leader-
ship discussion yesterday morning and review procedures for conduct of
bi-partisan meeting this afternoon.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Discuss the Cuba-tender issue add the need to have a clear
delineation of White House/State harmony and a confirmation of the
general outlines of the Understanding with the Soviets. I am confident
that if you raise this the President will have been alerted by Haldeman.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget and fact you
will send him a memo on Laird's private five-year program.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Mention to the President the incident yeaterday with our
reconnaissance aircraft.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Bank ?
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 17, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, usdreaday Tuesday, November 17, 1970
Discuss conduct of meeting with Secretaries Rogers and Saind and adminal Moner
1. If you see the President before the meeting with Bunker, discuss
the conduct of the Bunker meeting.
on The Two Vietram projects you have sent a Talber to Represident fn The meeting
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss the Pakistani assistance problem (package on left flap).
The latest information is in the daily brief. Discuss the pros and cons of
sending a U. S. delegation for relief purposes.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Recap the supplemental tactics in light of the Republican leadership
discussion yesterding this morning and reiew procedures for conduct of lipartism meeting This
which afternoon.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
-2-
4. Discuss the conduct of the meeting with Secretaries Rogers and
Laird and Admiral Moorer tomorrow morning on two Vietnam projects.
Fix with the President whether or not he wants to break the news to Rogers
privately before the meeting of the whole group or concurrently during that
meeting. This is a sensitive issue which might prove embarrassing to
Secretary Rogers if he hears about it for the first time before the group.
My suggestion is that the President ask Laird to brief both plans so that
Laird will appear to have taken the initiative, which in fact he has, and
SO that your role remains neutral.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
4.
Discuss the Cuba-tender issue and the need to have a clear delineation
of White House/State harmony and a confirmation of the general outlines of
the Understanding with the Soviets. I am confident that if you raise this
the President will have been alerted by Haldeman.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Inform President that the Vice President and former President
Johnson will meet with Vice President Ky.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget and fact you will
send him a memo on Laird's private five-year program.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
ΓOP SECRET / Reproduced the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 17, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday, November 17, 1970
1. If you see the President before the meeting with Bunker, discuss
the conduct of the Bunker meeting.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Discuss the Pakistani assistance problem (package on left flap).
The latest information is in the daily brief. Discuss the pros and cons of
sending a U. S. delegation for relief purposes.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Recap the supplemental tactics in light of the Republican leadership
discussion this morning.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
-2-
4. Discuss the conduct of the meeting with Secretaries Rogers and
Laird and Admiral Moorer tomorrow morning on two Vietnam projects.
Fix with the President whether or not he wants to break the news to Rogers
privately before the meeting of the whole group or concurrently during that
meeting. This is a sensitive issue which might prove embarrassing to
Secretary Rogers if he hears about it for the first time before the group.
My suggestion is that the President ask Laird to brief both plans so that
Laird will appear to have taken the initiative, which in fact he has, and
so that your role remains neutral.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Discuss the Cuba-tender issue and the need to have a clear delineation
of White House/State harmony and a confirmation of the general outlines of
the Understanding with the Soviets. I am confident that if you raise this
the President will have been alerted by Haldeman.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Inform President that the Vice President and former President
Johnson will meet with Vice President Ky.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget and fact you will
send him a memo on Laird's private five-year program.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
T
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
OP S document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
23576
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger HK
SUBJECT:
Groundwork for East Pakistan Relief
Ambassador Farland has delivered your message to Yahya, and a
chartered plane with an initial shipment of 1, 000 tents and 10,000
blankets is on its way to Dacca. Ambassador Farland has received
normal authority to use $25,000 in AID contingency funds and
$100, 000 in US-owned Pakistani rupees for immediate needs.
An interagency task force is in operation under Deputy AID Adminis-
trator Maurice Williams, and it is coordinating resources of private
agencies. As a former AID Mission Director in Pakistan, he is
our top economic assistance expert on that area.
Ambassador Farland has asked the Pakistani Government for the
earliest possible indication of what assistance is needed. AID today
has inventoried the resources available to the U.S. Government as
follows:
1. Up to $4. 7 million equivalent in Pakistani currency for non-
food expenditures. [This would leave no other local currency
resources available for other emergencies this fiscal year.
2. About $35 million in Pakistani currency for development
works. This would be for basic reconstruction rather than for
purely relief activities.
3. Approximately $10 million remains formally uncommitted
for non-food relief goods under the AID Contingency Fund. But
this amount has been tentatively earmarked for short-run
Cambodian needs. Up to $5 million could be made available,
however.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
4. The PL 480 budget ceiling would have to be raised to
respond to Pakistan's requests for food aid. This could be
done on the basis of executive decision to meet Pakistan's
initial request for 50, 000 tons of wheat. Since you have just
approved a $72 million PL 480 agreement, it should be possible
to speed up shipments under that agreement and replace what
is drawn for emergency shipments later.
Against the background of these availabilities, AID is thinking about
an initial commitment of up to $10 million in dollars, food and local
currency for immediate relief and for assistance in restoring lands
to productive use. Until we have a Pakistani request, we do not know
how this compares with their assessment of the needs. Also, it does
not take account of private contributions (an effort will be made to
bring the Center for Voluntary Action into their coordination).
There are two choices on the next move: One would be to ask
President Yahya whether he would regard it as helpful for Maury
Williams to go to Pakistan to assess possible U.S. contributions to
relief and rehabilitation. The other would be to await the Pakistani
Government's assessment over the next few days.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
23576
department OF state
Washington, D.C. 20520
15413
November 16, 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: East Pakistan Disaster Relief
In response to the need to coordinate activities
within the Government relating to disaster relief for
the coastal areas of East Pakistan stricken by last
week's catastrophic cyclonic storm and tidal bore, and
to the President's desire to make the most generous
possible combined offer of U.S. Government assistance
to Pakistan promptly, I wish to inform you that an
interdepartmental Working Group on East Pakistan
Disaster Relief, chaired by the Honorable Maurice J.
Williams, Deputy Administrator of AID, has been estab-
lished. A11 agencies directly concerned, including
AID and the Departments of State and Defense, are
represented.
Enclosed for your information are (1) a status
report on American relief measures already taken or
underway and (2) an assessment of additional resources
at our disposal for meeting anticipated requests for
assistance from the Government of Pakistan. Also
enclosed is (3) the proposed text of a statement which
the White House may wish to release bearing on the
aforementioned actions and preparations.
Theodore L. Eliot pe
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Enclosures:
1. East Pakistan Disaster Relief Measures
2. Assessment of Additional Resources
3. Proposed Statement
CONFIDENTIAL
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNCLASSIFIED
East Pakistan Disaster Relief Measures Underway
Since the first reports of the disaster, the Disaster
Relief Division of AID, in coordination with the Country
Directorate for Pakistan in the State Department, has been
arranging emergency relief measures and preparing to respond
to anticipated requests for emergency assistance from the
Government of Pakistan. As the enormity of the disaster
became known, the White House requested a special message
from President Nixon to President Yahya expressing sympathy
over the loss and extending an offer to help within the
limits of U.S. resources. The message was cabled to
Islamabad on November 15 and has been conveyed to President
Yahya.
An action group was established within the Disaster
Relief Division, with participation by other concerned
offices of AID, State and other agencies. Consultations
have been held with the visiting Deputy Relief Commissioner
of East Pakistan, who happened to be in Washington for an
AID-sponsored seminar on National Preparedness Planning.
Assessments of potential requirements are underway.
Established preparedness plans permit the American
Ambassador and USAID Mission in Pakistan to use immediately
$25,000 in AID contingency funds and $100,000 in U.S.-owned
Pakistan rupees. Similarly U.S. registered voluntary
agencies, particularly CARE, automatically assist the
disaster victims at the scene.
In response to an initial request by the Government
of East Pakistan to the American Consulate General in Dacca,
AID is sending 1,000 tents and 10,000 blankets to Dacca
by chartered plane on November 17. The AID Office
for Private Overseas Programs has alerted American
voluntary agencies, which are reviewing their resources
to meet relief requests when received from Pakistan.
The Center for Voluntary Action has been contacted in
this connection. The American Red Cross is considering
a request received from the Pakistan Red Crescent Society
through the League of Red Cross Societies.
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
Additional Resources Available
In addition to assistance already underway through
AID and that may be provided by voluntary agencies and
private parties, the following resources are available
to the U.S. Government:
1. Up to $4.7 million equivalent in Pakistan local
currency could be provided from a global allocation for
disaster relief non-food expenditure. However, if this
full amount were found to be required and were committed,
it would not leave any excess local currency resources
available the rest of the fiscal year for emergencies.
in other countries.
2. About $35 million in Pakistan local currency is
available for development works (as opposed to relief
activities), such as the construction of irrigation facili-
ties and schools. We have no information at this time on
how much local currency development assistance may be
required or could be effectively used.
3. Additional dollar financing for required foreign
exchange non-food imports of goods and services (such as
additional blankets, tents, water purification kits,
helicopters, etc.) would have to be charged to the Con-
tingency Fund under the Foreign Assistance Act. Approxi-
mately $10 million remains formally uncommitted under
this account, but this amount has been tentatively ear-
marked for short-run Cambodian needs. Reserving a portion
for subsequent contingency needs, up to $5 million of this
account could be made available for the Pakistan emergency
if need for non-food imports in that amount were estab-
lished.
4. There is no room for Pakistan's initial request
for 50,000 tons of wheat for emergency relief under the
current PL-480 budget ceiling. The current budget is
fully encumbered--partly because of prior emergencies and
partly because of commodity price increases. Therefore,
in order to respond to Pakistan's requests for food aid,
the PL-480 budget ceiling would have to be raised. Such
action would not require appropriation but could be taken
on an executive decision.
5. While it is premature, in the absence of a
specific Pakistani request and a clear assessment of
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
2
needs to announce a U.S. aid figure, we are thinking about
an initial commitment of up to $10 million in dollars,
food and local currency for immediate relief and for
assistance in restoring lands to productive use. Assuming
that the PL-480 budget problem can be resolved, the propor-
tions within the total would be determined according to
requirements as they become clear.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNCLASSIFIED
Suggested Statement
At the direction of the President, a special inter-
departmental Working Group for East Pakistan Disaster
Relief has been established to coordinate activities
within the Government for relief and rehabilitation
assistance. to the coastal areas of East Pakistan affected
by the catastrophic cyclonic storm and sea surge which
devasted that area November 12-13. The Working Group is
chaired by Maurice J. Williams, Deputy Administrator of
the Agency for International Development, and comprises
senior representatives of the agencies most directly
concerned, including the Departments of State and Defense
in addition to AID.
The U.S. Government, through AID, has arranged for
an emergency air shipment of 10,000 blankets and 1,000
tents to the disaster area on November 17. It is also
considering urgently what it can do, within available
resources, to provide additional emergency relief and
rehabilitation assistance in response to anticipated
requests from the Government of Pakistan. Such resources
could include grants of Pakistani local currency for
domestic procurement of relief supplies and subsequent
reconstruction; emergency food assistance under the
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNCLASSIFIED
2
PL-480 program; and an allocation to cover U.S. dollar
costs of direct relief operations. We are awaiting the
Government of Pakistan's assessment of its requirements,
which understandably takes time in a catastrophy of these
dimensions, before deciding specifically how we might
assist.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Government is maintaining close
liaison with, and advising, American voluntary agencies
interested in helping in this relief effort.
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 15, 1970
MEMOR ANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig @
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday
November 16, 1970
1.
Discuss your conversation with Dobrynin on Saturday and
the reply you hope to make to his note.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
2.
Inform President of your meeting with Laird on Special
Project and contingency plans being prepared for retaliatory
strikes.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
3.
Inform President that the Vice President and former President
Johnson will meet with Vice President Ky.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
EYES ONLY
4. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget and fact
you will send him today memo on Laird's private five-year
program.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
5.
Inform Presdient of action taken in Pakistani disaster.
Presidential message. Priority review of what we can do
to help.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
6. You wished to discuss with the President whether or not we
should keep Anderson as our Panama Canal Treaty Negotiator.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 13, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Friday,
November 13, 1970
1. Discuss conduct of Echeverria meeting.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
2. Inform President you are going to meet with Laird at 10:30
on Special Project.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
3. Inform President that the Vice President and former President
Johnson will meet with Vice President Ky.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
4. Raise with President the Cuba announcement and problem you
are having with State on accepting concept of "understanding".
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRE Reproduced at the\Richard Nixon F residential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
5. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget.
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 11, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
@
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,
November 11, 1970
1.
Discuss plans for the trip to Paris including timing of Pompidou
appointment (2:20 for 40 minutes) and latest information on notables
(list at Tab A). Tell the President that Ambassador Lucet will escort
De Gaulle's grandson whose name is Charles De Gaulle to the aircraft
and will be available if the President wishes to express a brief word of
condolence to the Ambassador. (Lucet and young De Gaulle will be at
foot of ramp when President enters plane.)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2.
Discuss Korry message on Chile.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3.
Discuss with the President your phone call from Rostow indicating
that President Johnson has been approached concerning whether he would
receive Ky at the end of the month after Ky has been to Washington.
President Johnson would only meet with Ky if it was regarded as a good
idea by President Nixon. Smyser, you and Sullivan agreed on suitability
and Haig SO informed Sullivan. (Tab B)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP Nixon Presidentia-Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4.
Inform the President you met with the Attorney General on
the Ivanov case.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5.
Give the President a read-out on the submarine tender.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6.
You may want to discuss your most recent meeting with Dobrynin.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7.
Inform the President that the regular Thursday meeting in Paris
has been postponed a week because of the funeral and that the North
Vietnamese have agreed to our proposal to hold a private meeting on
November 16th due to Ambassador Bruce's "illness."
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
8.
Tell the President you have sent him memos on the possibility
of meeting Heath at Camp David and meeting with Dewey, Acheson,
McCloy and Clay on Europe.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 3 -
9.
Discuss with the President your DPRC meeting on Monday.
You may want to give him Laird's 5-year Defense Strategy Book
which he has given you for the President and appears to be designed
to circumvent the established machiner.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday,
November 24, 1970
1. Inform the President we have talked to Laird and Timmons on
launching a major Congressional action on the prisoner of war rescue
operation.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Inform the President that State and Defense are somewhat at odds
on the "understanding" issue and the inclusion of reconnaissance flights as
an aspect of the "understanding."
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Discuss Pakistan situation which was covered for the first time
quite favorably on the news last night. (Report on left flap.) We are working
intimately with Klein's people to ensure that continued good informational
data is developed and exploited.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
-2-
4. Inform the President that the Soviet tender left Cienfuegos is now in
the port of Casilda. Inform the President that you reviewed with Alexis Johnson
the Congressional briefings to be given on this issue to ensure that (a) some
positive steps have been taken by the Soviets and (b) continued pressure is
applied with respect to the presence of the submarine tender.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Haldeman refused to reopen the issue of the luncheon at Camp David
for Heath. He suggested that you raise it with the President. I think you
should point out that it would look especially cool for the President to travel
all the way to Camp David on Friday, November 18 and then to depart
immediately following the second business session. It would probably be
preferable for him to depart later on Friday morning so that a luncheon
could be included without excessive loss of time.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington
and his assistant yesterday.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
AMH:feg:11/23/70
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
23775
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Pakistan Relief Effort
Latest Actions
Since your talk with Ambassador Hilaly there have been the following
new developments on the Pakistan relief effort:
- After seeing you, Ambassador Hilaly appeared before the White
House press corps to express his government's satisfaction and
deep appreciation for everything the U.S. has done.
-- We are awaiting the survey report of the initial medical team
sent to East Pakistan and a formal central government request before
we dispatch medical units to the disaster area. Three medical units
with over 500 men are or have already been placed on 24-hour alert
to be airlifted. This will be expensive SO it is important to tailor
the units to the exact need.
- - The initial authorization of $10 million is being rapidly drawn
down and is running especially low on dollar funds. A report is
being prepared on how much more will be necessary for the emer-
gency relief phase and then recommendation will be framed on the
best source of funds since the disaster relief fund is almost exhausted.
A Boeing 747 aircraft is being loaded in New York with government
and voluntary agency supplies. It will be flown to Pakistan free of
charge to the donors.
Maurice Williams, the chairman of the WorkingGroup, spent most
of the day in New York meeting with the voluntary agencies. He
reports their judgment that the Pakistan disaster is much worse than
anything they have experienced, both in terms of its magnitude and
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
and the logistical problems of making relief supplies available.
The voluntary agencies agreed that your National Center for
Volunteer Action would serve as a central clearing house for
information on the disaster and voluntary assistance. Final
plans are also being drawn up for launching a major fund raising
drive.
Conclusions
We are temporarily in a state of suspense on the biggest decision beforę
us - - what medical facilities to send into Pakistan. We are in a position
to move quickly, however, just as soon as we get the go ahead from
Pakistan.
On other fronts, the momentum of our relief effort is being maintained
and should continue to increase as all our helicopters on the scene turn
operational tomorrow. Public handling also seems to be improving as
the facts become more widely known. Your meeting with Ambassador
Hilaly and his press briefing should help.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
November 22, 1970
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Monday, November 23, 1970
1. Discuss latest results of air strikes (Tab A).
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Provide the President with yours and State's views on
"understanding" issue.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Discuss P.A. status of special operation - Laird has been told
to stay absolutely mum.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
2
4. Discuss the Pakistan situation. Latest report is on left
flap. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U.S. delegation to
Pakistan for relief purposes.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Inform the President that the Soviet tender left Cienfuegos
is now in the port of Casilda. Also inform him of the plans to
re press handling.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/SPOKE
22 November 1970
Preliminary Results of Strikes in
North Vietnam
(As of 0804 EST 22 Nov. 70)
A total of 260 aircraft in two waves participated. Deteriorating
weather caused diversion to Laos of 50 of the second wave aircraft and
cancellation of the third wave.
There were no aircraft losses from enemy action reported.
No SAM firings or MIG activity were noted and AAA fire was
reported as moderate and generally inaccurate.
Bomb damage assessment based on pilot reports and limited
photography is as follows:
Explosions
2 medium explosions and numerous secondary explosions
An intercepted enemy message reported that "an ammunition dump
belonging to the infantry was hit and explosions are taking place. "
Fires
4 large POL fires
1 large sustained supply storage fire
40 fireballs
numerous other secondary fires
Structures
1 POL warehouse destroyed and numerous military structures destroyed
Railroads
600 feet of railroad track destroyed
DECLASSIFIED
Roads
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
11 road cuts
PER RAC REVIEW 12/29/2008
By 145 NARA, Date 6/29/2012
Bridges
2 damaged
SAMS
An earlier report of 2 SAMs on transports destroyed needs further
clarification because smoke, fire and poor visibility made it difficult
at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
to This re pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
[pp. I of 23
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/SPOKE
2
Trucks
51 destroyed, 40 damaged
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
Cpp. 2. of 2]
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
RTDS
ONLY
NV bombing
results
NMCC
THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
23 November 1970 28
0650 EST
THE JOINT STATE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Subject: Report on Strikes in NVN
1. This MFR consists of a summary to date of FREEDOM
BALT strikes against NPN on 21 November 1970.
2. SORTIES
7AP*
TF 77
TOTAL
Scheduled
282
234
516
Completed
127
133
260
Diverted to Laos
32
18
50
Cancelled WX
123
83
206
Losses
0
0
0
*Includes 10 USMC sorties
2010EST, 2.0HOJ
3. A total of 260 aircraft in two waves participated.
Deteriorating weather caused diversion to Laos of 50 of the
second wave aircraft and cancellation of the third wave.
A total of 206 sorties were cangelled. The first
time over target (TOT) was 01102 (091011) by USS HANCOCK
TOTAL Tin
aircraft; the final TOT was 08003 (160011) with a final
cross out time from enemy terridory of 0828Z (102811) for
/
6th 50
7th AF aircraft.
0300EST, 21 Nov
4. There were no aircraft losses from enemy action
reported. No SAM firings or MIG activity were noted. AAA
fire was reported as moderate and generally inaccurate.
5. Bomb damage assessment based on pilot reports and
limited BDA photography is as follows:
7AP - Trucks - 39 destroyed/20 damaged.
Secondary explosions .. 2 medium and numerous
lesser explosions.
3 large POL fires.
18 fires.
1 POL warehouse and numerous military structures
destroyed.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 6. EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY
TF 77 We Trucks - 12 destroyed/20 damaged.
40 fireballs.
Waterborne logistic craft - 4 destroyed/
4 damaged.
1 large sustained POL fire.
1 large sustained supply storage fire.
Numerous other secondary fires.
Approximately 600 feet of railroad track
destroyed.
11 road cuts.
2 bridges damaged.
1ST MAW - Numerous explosions and fires.
NOTE: Margina1 to adverse weather limited pilot
reports and BDA.
6. Weather conditions, which deteriorated earlier than
forecast, closed most of the primary targets for the second
wave and forced cancellation of the third wave.
7. The above information is based on reports received to
date from CINCPAC forces.
W. P. ANDERSON
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy. Director for
Operations (NMCC)
Distribution:
SECDEF (By hand)
CJCS (Adm Noorer)
DJS (Lt Gen Vogt)
J- - 3 (Lt Gen Zais
J J-33 (BGen Pauly)
TOP SECRET Reproduc erRichard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL WORKING GROUP ON EAST PAKISTAN DISASTER RELIE
DAILY STATUS REPORT - NOVEMBER 21; 1970
1.
Current Situation Report
Ambassador Farland, after personal reconnaissance over the devastated
area, reports that although he saw many unburied remains, he was struck
by the number of survivors on the islands resuming normal life, including
road building and rice harvesting. This observation, he added, in no way
deprecates extent of the disaster, but suggests the resiliency of the
affected population and that their ability to cope with this disaster
is greater than many of us had anticipated.
2. Status U.S. Assistance
The Government of East Pakistan has urgently requested four
additional U.S. Army helicopters. The four UH-1 (Huey) helicopters
which have been waiting on standby are leaving Pope Air Force Base this
morning on three C-141s --- raising the total number of U.S. relief
helicopters to ten. The U.S. are the first of the donor helicopters
operating in the disaster area. The U.S. helicopters are flying from
Begamganj base just north of Noakhali town; British helicopter support
will be located near Patuakhali district; and French helicopters will
operate out of 'Barisal town.
The first airshipments of high-protein survival biscuits have
arrived in Dacca. Two more planes are departing New York this afternoon
with 176,000 pounds of biscuits, and 6,000 pounds of one-quart plastic
bottles to be used to carry drinking water to survivors. The biscuits
were donated by the Office of Civil Defense.
At midnight tonight a third plane is leaving Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
with 50 sixteen-foot motorized relief craft. They should arrive in Dacca
Monday night.
With regard to medical assistance, the U.S. has offered to provide
medical and health care including mobile field hospital units. Prior
to ordering forward such facilities and personnel, we have sent a medical
team to survey and assess medical and health requirements in the disaster
area. The Mission has stressed the need to emplace medical teams that
are entirely self-contained.
3.
Media Handling and Public Reaction
The Mission has reported that Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is now fully aware of the unfavorable foreign press coverage and they
have instructed appropriate officials in Dacca to improve the briefing of
foreign correspondents.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Decontrol following 11/21/71)
NESA/SA:TSwayze:k1s:11/21/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
INFORMATION
23649
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Pakistan Relief Effort
U.S. Response
The initial requests for emergency assistance from the provincial
government of East Pakistan have been met, and contingency plans
are now being made to meet what would seem to be the longer range
needs. The following is a status report on what we have done in
meeting the first requests:
The first air shipment of AID-financed blankets (10,000) and
tents (1,000) is due to arrive in Dacea today. A second air
shipment is being planned which will include contributions from
voluntary agencies and especially in such items as clothing
where they are best prepared to help. This was in response to
an urgent request for 10-30,000 blankets, an unspecified number
of tents and as much warm clothing as possible (Other contributing
governments have accounted for the difference.)
--In response to an urgent need for helicopters to ferry relief
into the disaster area, four U.S. military Huey helicopters have
been dispatched by the U.S. Strike Command from Pope Air Force
Base. They should be operational over the disaster area tomorrow.
In addition, two reconnaissance helicopters, under AID contract
in Nepal, are being prepared for relief operations and also reach
Dacca by tomorrow.
[We received Pakistani clearance to use military helicopters
and crews Tuesday morning, and the aircraft took off at 1:00 a.m.
Wednesday (flight time 27 hours, assembly time 19 hours).
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
--The East Pakistanis also requested 50,000 tons of wheat
and some $2/million in rupees for the local purchase of
building materials and the repairing of coastal embankments.
The 50,000 tons of wheat have already been approved under
the PL-480 program but it will take about a month to ship it.
This does not raise a problem, however, since from all
indications there are sufficient food stocks in East Pakistan
for now, in part because of earlier PL-480 shipments. This
additional wheat should arrive in time to replenish those stocks
before they are drawn down too far. The major problem in the
food relief effort is not an overall shortage but distributing
what is already there in the disaster area. This is the job of
our helicopters.
On the local currency requirements, Ambassador Farland has
provided $52,000 from his emergency fund for immediate needs
and there is some $35 million in Pakistani rupees available for
reconstruction. We still do not have a specific assessment of
reconstruction requirements. AID estimates that perhaps
$10 million could be spent over the next year because of the
undeveloped state of the economy. Whatever we provide on
this front would be in addition to the $10 million that you have
already authorized.
Voluntary Agencies, Private Organizations, and Other Governments
The Working Group is in close touch with all of the major voluntary
agencies in an effort to coordinate and maximize our public and private
response. This includes CARE, Catholic Relief and other organizations
with valuable experience in operating in East Pakistan. An organization
called Pakistan Relief Fund, Inc. has been formed by a group including
Robert Murphy, and other prominent Americans. They hope eventually
to have about 50 prominent citizens as members and will raise funds to
be channeled through U.S. voluntary agencies that are assisting in the
relief effort.
Several other governments including India, Iran, Morocco, Great
Britain, France and West Germany are contributing to the emergency
relief effort. These sources, for instance, are complementing our
shipments of blankets and medical supplies to meet initial requirements.
We are keeping in touch with this effort so that duplication can be avoided.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
Problems Ahead
The central problem at the moment, as noted above, is one of distri-
bution rather than of supply. In view of a possible request for additional
helicopters, contingency preparations are being made for further
airlift. These would probably either have to be diverted from Southeast
Asia or sent directly from the U.S., which is expensive and takes at
least three days before they are operational in the area.
The central government in Islamabad has still not produced a formal
list of requirements. It is unclear what is holding up this necessary
evaluation, although bureaucratic confusion and the fact that President
Yahya has been in Dacca may be part of the problem. AID is attempting
to make an independent judgment, but we can not go much further in the
relief effort until we have a thorough evaluation from the scene.
Ambassador Farland has now flown to Dacca, and Maurice Williams,
the Deputy Administrator of AID and the head of our inter-departmental
Working Group, is prepared to go to the scene if coordination remains
a problem and we do not soon get the necessary response from the
central government.
If additional food proves necessary when the assessment of need is
complete, the current worldwide ceiling on PL-480 expenditures would
probably have to be raised. This would require White House decision,
but it is too early to know now.
Public Handling
The Working Group today has primed the State and AID press officers
to background the press on the situation in East Pakistan and on what
the U.S. has done.
Criticism of the Pakistani government's handling is increasing in the
East Pakistan press. As you know, there is normally deep antagonism
in East Pakistan for the central government in the West, and this has
been exacerbated by the current election campaign as well as by the
present tragedy.
CONFIDENTIAL
SMH:HHSaunders:tmt 11/19/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
December 1, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
wednesday
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday, December 1, 1970
1. the this Re-Resident aa you maguantton brief President on your
discussion with alassada Ralin yesterday
the Inform the President you have arranged a briefing for four of the
newly elected Republican Senators and Buckley at 10:00 a.m. Sisco and
Sullivan will also participate. Weicker won't be able to attend.
a rundom an you lufing agree four GoPSenatas celect understand electBurdly.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
23955
3 Review Berlin access situation. (Left flap)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
undown
Y, Give President location of tender and other Soviet naval moves.
Salestmapon see rapat Tab.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
&
Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord
Carrington and his assistant last week.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Discuss The pessibility of he Present's guing smallstiguarding Kdemer fir
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE EYES ONLY King Hussen your hemot to him
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED is at Tab
1
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
? Tell De President your met with Mass moush,
Scaife, Frager, Me Mural, Tumas, Selman and
Bannett Today.
8. tell The President you'llle meeting untl
Vice admial Today attimeque
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
December 1, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday, December 1, 1970
1. Inform the President you have arranged a briefing for four of the
newly elected Republican Senators and Buckley at 10:00 a.m. Sisco and
Sullivan will also participate. Weicker won't be able to attend.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Review Berlin access situation. (Left flap)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Give President location of tender and other Soviet naval moves.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
4. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord
Carrington and his assistant last week.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 29, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday, November 29
1. Review Berlin access situation. (Left flap)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Give President location of tender and other Soviet naval moves.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No.
Comments:
3. Discuss "understanding" issue and our reconnaissance flights.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
4. Haldeman refused to reopen the issue of the luncheon at Camp
David for Heath. He suggested that you raise it with the President. I think
you should point out that it would look especially cool for the President to
travel all the way to Camp David on Friday, December 18 and then to depart
immediately following the second business session. It would probably be
preferable for him to depart later on Friday morning SO that a luncheon
could be included without excessive loss of time.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
5. Discuss the Pakistan situation. We are working intimately with
Klein's people to ensure that continued good informational data is developed
and exploited.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord
Carrington and his assistant last Monday.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7. Inform the President you have arranged a briefing for the five
newly elected Republican Senators Tuesday. You would plan to have Sisco
and Sullivan also participate. Buckley will be included also.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Ed
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 27, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, November 27
1. Inform the President of your discussion Tuesday with Ambassador
Dobrynin.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Inform the President that Time and Life as well as Look Magazine
will carry major articles on the POW issue this week. You may want to
tell the President that Sidey will be doing a story on the decision to undertake
the rescue mission.
You also have received a phone call from Hobart Lewis in answer to a
Presidential request that he write a story about the mission.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Inform the President that the Soviet tender which left Cienfuegos
and visited Casilda, Cuba for five days returned Tuesday afternoon to
Cienfuegos. Inform the President that you reviewed with Alexis Johnson
the Congressional briefings to be given on this issue to ensure that (a) SOME some
positive steps have been taken by the Soviets and (b) continued pressure is
applied with respect to the presence of the submarine tender.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
-2-
4. Haldeman refused to reopen the issue of the luncheon at Camp
David for Heath. He suggested that you raise it with the President. I think
you should point out that it would look especially cool for the President to
travel all the way to Camp David on Friday, December 18 and then to depart
immediately following the second business session. It would probably be
preferable for him to depart later on Friday morning so that a luncheon
could be included without excessive loss of time.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Inform the President that State and Defense are somewhat at odds
on the "understanding" issue and the inclusion of reconnaissance flights as
an aspect of the "understanding."
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Discuss the Pakistan situation. We are working intimately with
Klein's people to ensure that continued good informational data is developed
and exploited.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington
and his assistant on Monday.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
-3-
8. Inform the President you hope to arrange a briefing for the five
newly elected Republican senators early next week. You would plan to
have Sisco, Sullivan and Haig also participate.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
NO
Comments:
AMH:JTH:feg:11/25/70
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
November 7 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday, Friday
November 2$, 1970
1. Inform the President of your discussion yesterday Tuesday with
Ambassador Dobrynin.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Inform President that|plan to obtain Congressional support for
POW operation has been discussed with both Timmons and Laird and is
moving forward. Laird planned briefing yesterday in Senator Dole's
office with General Gurney, Boggs, Hanson, Fannin, Griffin, Allott,
Packwood, Murphy, Saxby, Mrs. Smith, Curtis, plus five Republican
Senators-elect. This meeting was to provide details of the operation and
plot strategy to obtain maximum support. Laird also briefed the Armed
Services Committee in closed session and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in open session on live T. v.3
In addition, Time and Life as well as Look Magazine will carry major
articles on the POW issue this week. You may want to tell the President
that you will be seeing Sidey this afternoon and that Sidey wants to do Juill a be
doings
story on the decision. to undertable The useue mession
You also have received a phone call from Hobart Lewis in answer to a
Presidential request that he write a story about the mission.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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EYES ONLY
- 2 -
3. Inform the President that the Soviet tender which left Cienfuegos
and visited Casilda, Cuba for five days returned yesterday afternoon to
Cienfuegos. Inform the President that you reviewed with Alexis Johnson
the Congressional briefings to be given on this issue to ensure that (a) some
positive steps have been taken by the Soviets and (b) continued pressure is
applied with respect to the presence of the submarine tender.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
4. Haldeman refused to reopen the issue of the luncheon at Camp
David for Heath. He suggested that you raise it with the President. I think
you should point out that it would look especially cool for the President to
travel all the way to Camp David on Friday, December 18 and the n to depart
immediately following the second business session. It would probably be
preferable for him to depart later on Friday morning so that a luncheon
could be included without excessive loss of time.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Inform the President that State and Defense are somewhat at odds
on the "understanding" issue and the inclusion of reconnaissance flights as
an aspect of the "understanding".
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Discuss Pakistan situation. We are working intimately with
Klein's people to ensure that continued good informational data is developed
and exploited.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 3 -
7. The President is seeing Frank Shakespeare at 11:15 a.m.
You may want to mention Shakespeare S concerns to the President.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
8. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord
Carrington and his assistant on Monday.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
9. before RePresident you plul hope to be arrange
all to hing the five newly elected Repiblica
aliefing of
Senators early next week. you would plan to
have Susio, Sullian and Hang also participate
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
25
EYES ONLY
November 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
@
Wednesday
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday,
November 4, 1970
1. Inform the President we have talked to Laird and Timmons on
launching a major Congressional action on the prisoner of war rescue
operation.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Inform the President that State and Defense are somewhat at odds
on the "understanding" issue and the inclusion of reconnaissance flights as
an aspect of the "understanding."
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Discuss Pakistan situation. which was covered for the first time
quite favorably on the news last night. (Report on left flap.) We are working
intimately with Klein's people to ensure that continued good informational
data is developed and exploited.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Infam The President of your discussion yesterday with
anlassader Dolynn Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
-2-
3
for five days returned yesterday afternoon which to Genfrey
and visited
4.
Inform the President that the Soviet tender left Cienfuegos is now in
Cosilda,
Cuba
the port of Casilda. Inform the President that you reviewed with Alexis Johnson
the Congressional briefings to be given on this issue to ensure that (a) some
positive steps have been taken by the Soviets and (b) continued pressure is
applied with respect to the presence of the submarine tender.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
4.
Haldeman refused to reopen the issue of the luncheon at Camp David
for Heath. He suggested that you raise it with the President. I think you
should point out that it would look especially cool for the President to travel
all the way to Camp David on Friday, November 18 and then to depart
immediately following the second business session. It would probably be
preferable for him to depart later on Friday morning SO that a luncheon
could be included without excessive loss of time.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington
and his assistant yeste rday on Monday.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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- 2 -
mora
That
Inform President plan to obtain Congressional support for POW
operation was discussed with both Timmons and Laird last night.
Defense-plans the following: At 9:30 this morning there will be a said planned
briefing in Senator Dole's office with Secretary Laird and General
Vogt. Included on the Congressional side will be Dole, Miller,
Gurney, Boggs, Hanson, Fannin, Griffin, Allott, Packwood, Murphy,
Saxby, Mrs. Smith, Curtis, plus five Republican Senators-elect.
This meeting will provide details of ne operation and plot strategy to
obtain maximum support. Sand also limp d hufed the anned Senier
Committee in closed session and ne Senate Foreign Relations Committee in open ression
onlive Tiv.
In addition, Time and Life as well as Look Magazine will carry major
That you will be seeing Sidey This afternin and that sidey No wants to do
articles on the POW issue this week. you may want to Tell him The President
have discussed this with the President: Yes
a story on The decision
Comments:
The President is seeing Frank Slaberpean at 11:15 a.m.
you President may want to mention Shew shakepear's concerns. to ne
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
December 2, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,
December 2, 1970
1. You may want to brief the President on your discussion with
Ambassador Rabin yesterday.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP
Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Review Berlin situation. [Left flap]
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
4. Give President location of tender and rundown on other Soviet
naval moves. (See Map at Tab A)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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- 2 -
5. Discuss the possibility of the President's giving a small stag
working dinner for King Hussein on December 8 or 9. Your memo to
him is at Tab B.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord
Carrington and his assistant last week.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7. Tell the President you will be meeting with Vice Admiral
Rickover today.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TABB
ACTION
23784 (Revised)
NOV 30 1970
SECRET/EXDIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A.
KissingAched) HK
SUBJECT:
Visit of King Hussein
You have agreed to see King Hussein for an hour's talk at 3:30 p.m.
on December 8 while he is here on his unofficial visit.
I believe it is highly desirable to include as a minimal gesture a
small (12-15) stag working dinner for him as you did when he was
here in the spring of 1969. There are some important substantive
issues that could be profitably discussed in a forum like this.
I recognize that this increases your involvement in this visit.
However, in view of the effort we expended in September to help the
King maintain a stable basis for a negotiated settlement with Israel,
it would be difficult not to go this extra step in helping him to feel
that the U.S. is behind him.
RECOMMENDATION: That you invite Hussein to a small stag working
dinner on December 8 or 9.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET/EXDIS
HHSaunders:tmt 11/30/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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Left Flap
23955
SECRET
INFORMATION
December 1, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT:
Status Report on the Berlin Talks
There is attached at Tab A a status report on the Berlin talks. My
memorandum of November 17 (Tab B) brought you up to date as of the
meeting of November 16. Since then, there has been only one meeting,
a particularly unproductive one, on November 23. The next scheduled
meeting is December 10 which should provide us with a better basis to
assess where things stand than the previous meeting.
Tab Bjis Log Number 23594
ATD:hsc
SECRET
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SECRET
December 1. 1970
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Four Power Talks on Berlin
There has been virtually no substantive progress during the past two
Ambassadorial meetings (November 16 and 23), and indeed in the last
meeting the Soviets took the toughest stance so far both in tone and sub-
stance. The Soviet approach seems to be to take the hardest possible line
and then to mark time, as if they anticipated a shift in direction but were
not exactly sure which way the direction would point. They are protected
most, therefore, by taking the hardest possible line.
There are several factors that have been at play in recent weeks which
may have caused the Soviets to pause:
-- There is a general assumption, fostered by pro-Ostpolitik forces
in the FRG and especially Bahr, that Soviet policy has been impeded by
GDR rigidity. The evidence on this is ambiguous but the frequent comings
and goings between Soviet and East German officials do at least suggest
that the Soviets are trying to get the GDR to take a more pliant attitude,
at least in form. (We do know that the East G. rmans are unhappy about
Polish and other East European efforts to normalize relations with the
FRG without obtaining additional recognition for the GDR; this was reflected
in the hard-line speech of the GDR delegate to the recent Hungarian Party
Congress.)
-- A Warsaw Pact meeting will be held in East Berlin this week, and
the prime focus there will be coordination on German affairs (and the NATO
meeting will run almost concurrently).
-- The Soviets have viewed the Hessian and Bavarian elections as evidence
of renewed strength for Brandt's coalition which, in their eyes, may make it
easier for Brandt to secure ratification of the Soviet-FRG treaty without
significant progress on Berlin (a doubtful calculus, given CDU views).
-- Ulbricht's health, always a source of rumors, may in fact be
failing, leading to more intense intra-party maneuvering in East Germany;
the length of time Ulbricht will (and should) remain in command is relevant
to Soviet decisions on Berlin.
SECRET
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SECRET
-2-
-- The intra-German talks (between Bahr and Kohl) began November 27;
the Soviets will probably wish to test in this channel whether the Germans
will negotiate on Berlin access without an adqquate Four Power mandate
(Bahr reports that he was firm in insisting that he could not discuss Berlin
access without this mandate); which would have a spoiling effect on the Four
Power talks.
-- The Soviets may also have been hoping for a break in Allied Tri-
partite unity; especially since the Pompidou visit to the USSR in mid-October,
the Soviets seem to have targeted the French for separate approaches (the
French have not been unresponsive).
The autobahn slowdown in recent days in connection with the CDU meeting
in Berlin probably was the least the Soviets could do to placate the East
Germans (and to save their own face). At the same time the Soviets hoped
that the political nature of the problem (a CDU meeting) would create further
division between Barzel and Brandt. In the end, bowever, the autobahn
stoppages probably serves the cause of Allied unity and pulled German
opinion together in insisting on something concrete from the Berlin talks.
As of the last Ambassadorial meeting, the Soviets were still unhelpful on
access. While the Four could agree on general principles, the specific commit
ments according to the Soviets, would have to take the form of agreements
between the GDR, the FRG and the Berlin Senat, i.e., the Soviets continue
to refuse to take formal responsibility or access, insisting that this is a GDR
sovereign right. Before the Soviets would offer specific thinking on a
possible FRG-GDR agreement they wanted assurances that there would be
movement by the West to meet Soviet requirements for removing the Federal
presence from Berlin. Abrasimov has clearly linked Federal presence
with access. On the issue of Federal presence the Soviets have continued to
insist that all federal agencies be removed (though there is some indication
they may accept the Bahr concept of a cosmetic change to tuck all federal
offices under the auspices of a Federal "representative" in Borlin (a position
Bahr himself expects to hold an the present FRG official responsible for Berlin)
There is increasing indication that the Soviets want to have a greater role
in West Berlin, including assurances that the NPD and similar offensive
organizatione are eliminated and that the Soviets should have a consulate and
other official officers in West Berlin. So far the Soviets have flatly refused
to consider representation abroad of Berlin by the FRG. However, they
have expressed some interest in learning more about our proposal that FRG
passports issued in West B. rlin bear an additional stamp indicating that they
were issued under the authority of the respective Allied commandant (another
Bahr idea). The Soviets also Insist that we agree that Berlin is not only not a
land of the FRG but not "a part of the FRG.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET
-3-
The advisers of the Four Ambassadors met on November 30 íor a discussion
that centered largely around the ormat of any eventual agreement. There
would be three general elements: the first would entail a Four Power state-
ment on general principles, the second would be the unilateral communications
by the Soviets (on access) and the Three (on Federal presence) together with
the results of the negotiations between the German authorities, and the final
element would again be a Four Power statement tying together the other two
elements. During the advisere meeting, the Soviets hinted that the situation
might be clearer in 3 week or so and perhaps there could then be another
advisers meeting. This hint tends to confirm other indications that the
Soviets may be trying to prepare a new stance for the Ambassadorial meeting
of December 10. This will then be the last meeting for a month or so.
Following that meeting (and assuming that the Warsaw Pact meeting this
week supports a new Soviet line, or confirms the old one) we will be in a much
better position to take a new look at where we staid in the talks and where we
ought to be heading.
ATD:mm
SECRET
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23594
SECRET/NODIS
INFORMATION
November 17, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Analysis of Latest Round of Berlin Talks
Attached is an analysis of the November 16 Ambassadorial meeting (Tab A).
It did not seem to advance the negotiations; indeed if anything the lines seem
to have hardened somewhat.
In general, apart from the points in the attached analysis, I would stress
the following, perhaps obvious points:
1. There will be no written agreement on Berlin that (a) does not
diminish the FRG presence in West Berlin, (b) does not increase de facto
GDR control over access and (c) does not contain "guarantees" of access,
no matter how artiully drafted, that cannot be reversed at a whim by the
Soviets and/or the GDR. More than ever the deterrent to such a reversal
will be essentially subjective, i.e., it will rest on the Soviet calculus of
the probable adverse consequences,
2. We must be more than ever careful (and Rush is doing well) not
to get out in front of the Germans in offering concessions relating to the
FRG's Berlin presence or we will get caught in German internal politics.
3. We must be careful not to be tempted into bilateral dealings with
the USSR. This would demoralize the allies. More than that, given the
realities noted in paragraph 1. above any resultant agreement (other than a
general understanding not to have crises, for what that is worth) will produce
a net concrete loss for our side.
4. He must recognize that if, by an off chance there should be an
agreement acceptable to the allies and we say so, we will thereby be sanctifying
Ostpolitik and all its implications. For as soon as the Allies, and especially
the US, say that there is an acceptable Berlin agreement the CDU cannot refuse
to ratify the Moscow treaty.
SECRET//NODIS
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SECRET/NODIS
-2-
*
*
None of the foregoing need preclude efforts, including by the FRG-GDR,
at piecemeal humanitarian improvements, e. B., in intra-city traffic nor,
indeed in access modalities. Nor, as noted, need it precludo some under-
standing with the Soviets to exercise restraint on both sides. But any
formal agreement, as far as I can see, is bound to have one, several or
all the pitfalls listed in paragraphs 1 to 4 above.
HS:mm
SECRET NODIS
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SECRET/NODIS
November 17, 1970
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Ambassadorial Talks on Berlin, November 16, 1970
The talks on Monday, November 16, concentrated on the access question
and the hest German presence in est Berlin. On both issues the basic
differences have emerged more clearly, and in effect, an impasse has
been reached.
The Access Issues
On November 4, we presented a statement of principles to govern access
to West Berlin, making it clear that any agreement on access would have
to include a fairly precise definition of the procedures. Thus, we have
included in our position the assertion that in the case of transit traffic for
goods and persons, any controls should be limited to identification only,
including sealed vchicles and trains, abolition of visas, freedom from
inspection, etc. All of this would be part of a four-power agreement, on
the theory that the four powers are ultimately responsible for unhindered
access. Following the four-power agreement, there would be intra-German
negotiations, under is four-power mandate, which would then be approved
or sanctioned in some manner by the four powers.
The Soviet position, as spelled out by Abrasimov in the November 16
session, is that this approach is fundamentally unacceptable because it in-
fringes on the sovereignty of the GDR which, since it 'owns" the access
routes, has the nole responsibility for civilian access; there is not, and never
has been a four-power right to control civilian access.
On this juridical basis the most the Soviet side could do would be
"reach agreement" withthe GDR that access should proceed unhindered,
and be given preferential treatment subject to "norms" of international law
and GDR procedures. The three Western powers could take note of this
agreement, and could, for their part, give a mandate both to the FRG and
to the West Berlin Senat to negotiate the details. In this light the Soviets
contend there is no basis for spelling out details of access since there is
no four-power responsibility.
Thus the impasse is: if we cannot commit the USSR to any responsibility
for the acceBa of civilians, and on that basis turn the negotiations over to
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SECRET/NODIS
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over access. Then the pressure for agreement would shift away from the
USSR to the West Germans who would have to negotiate the details, knowing
that success of the talks would depend on their willingness to conclude an
agreement so that the German-Soviet reaty can be ratified. In this case
East Germany, already having gained further de facto acceptance, would
drive the toughest bargain possible.
The only glimmer of hope is that the Soviets have mentioned a "gentlemen"
agreement" that the details as we spell them out will be incorporated into
the GDR-FRG agreement, but on the condition that there is satisfactory
settlement of Soviet demands to restrict and reduce West German political
presence in West Berlin.
West German Presence
The Soviets proceed on the principle that the four powers should agree
on those activities that are specifically prohibited. Since we have resisted
the right of the USSR to have a say in the matter of how we run the Western
sector, the agreement ould take the form of a commitment by the three
powers to take certain actions which the Soviets will take note of. "
On November 4, the Soviets submitted their list of restrictions and
prohibitions. The main demands are to prohibit the "activities of all FRG
parliamentary or other political organs' -- Bundestag, Bundesrat (including
committees and factions which the G. rmans want to continue on the grounds
that they do not derive from the Basic Law), Bundesversammlung, Cabinet
mectings, as well as functioning of Federal offices and agencies. In addition,
"neo-Nazi" and other "revanchist" organizations would be prohibited.
Though the Soviets insist on the principle of listing prohibitions, Abrasimov
has indicated that this does not mean that the Soviets renounce the right to
raise objections to activities not specifically listed.
The nub of the matter in this last point is that we have, at West German
insistence, gone along with the idea of El list of prohibited activities, on the
grounds that we have such responsibilities in West Berlin in any case, and
that it is better to list prohibitions than try to list what is permitted.
In private talks, the Soviets have indicated some flexibility on the question
of Federal offices in Vest Gerlin. Apparently at the Instigation of the West
Germans (perhaps through the clandestine contacts with Bohr) the Soviets said
they might settle for simply renaming all the various ministries and agencies
into one innocuous sounding organization.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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The Outlook
Abrasimov said yesterday (Monday) that his reformulation of our
access proposal was the maximum Moviet position, but urged that the advisors
continue to negotiate for a common position -- thus suggesting that there
may still be some give in the Soviet position. The Soviets are apparently
walking a tight rope between their desire to gain some agreement to promote
the treaty ratification, and their refusal to repudiate their age-old position
that the GDR has sovereignty over civilian access.
As noted above there may still be some room for negotiation on the
gentlemen's agreement that Abrasimov mentioned, but this is a slender
reed to lean on, and, of course, could be wiped out at any future point
since it is conditional on the deal on West German presence.
Even If these two basic issues were somehow resolved through fuzzy
compromises, which are not beyond the ingenuity of our negotiators, there
remains the question of representation of West Berlin abroad. This has not
really been touched on. The Soviets have been hot and cold, sometimes
saying this is impossible, sometimes saying that there might be some room
for a consular understanding. (De facto, the FRG can do it anyway outside
Eastern Europe.) Similarly, the West Germans have shifted around on this.
They told us (through Bahr) that this was not essential, but later have said
it was the main issue. All of this is greatly complicated by the fact that
even if consular representation is agreed to by the Soviets, there will arise
the issue of who speaks for West Berlin in the UN when both German states
are admitted.
In sum, almost any conceivable outcome is going to increase the status
of the GDR, weaken the juridical basis for our presence, and diminish, at
least psychologically, the links between West Berlin and West Germany,
in return for somewhat tighter access procedures, still at the mercy of the
Soviets and GDR, and some better procedures for movement between East
and West Berlin, with these latter issues being negotiated on our behalf.
between the West Berlin Senat and the East Germans.
Though the West Germans, and B.hr in particular, have claimed the
Soviets are under great pressure for an agreement, the record thus far
suggests that the Soviets are willing to protract the talks, and the pressures
will grow on the hest Germans. (This may explain Bahr's rather frantic
efforts to deal with the Soviets behind our back.)
SECRET NODIS
Wilmm
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
December 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,
December 3, 1970
1/ Tell the President you have forwarded to him by separate
memorandum the reports of the Secretaries of State and Transportation.
Discuss press handling and additional steps which should be taken within
the bureaucracy. Caution the President that it is important that we be
prudent in our public statements in order not to prejudice the formal
investigations and possible future legal proceedings.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
2. You may want to brief the President on your discussion with
Ambassador Rabin Tuesday.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Give the President the location of the Soviet submarine tender
and the other group of ships which may be rendezvousing with it. (See
map at Tab A) Inform him of the possibility that a nuclear submarine is
accompanying the Soviet guided missile frigate and oiler.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
4. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP
Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
5. Give the President a rundown on your meeting with Vice Admiral
Rickover.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord
Carrington and his assistant last week.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Ed - add'l cables
added to Lift Flap
MEMORANDUM
material for Decl.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Wil
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
December 3 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Items to Discuss with the President, Thunday W ednesday,
December 3. 1970
1.
You may want to brief the President on your discussion with
Ambassador Rabin yesterday. Tweday
I have discussed this with the President:
Yes
No
Comments:
B
Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP
Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
3. Review Berlin situation. [Left flap]
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
M
Give President location of tender and rundown on other Soviet
naval moves. (See Map at Tab A)
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
- 2 -
5 Discuss the possibility of the President's giving a small stag
working dinner for King Hussein on December 8 or 9. Your memo to
him is at Tab B.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord
Carrington and his assistant last week.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
7. Tell the President you will be meeting with Vice Admiral
Rickover today
I have discussed this with the President: Yes
No
Comments:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ACTION
23784 (Revised)
NOV 30 1970
SECRET/EXDIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A.
(Sted) HK
SUBJECT:
Visit of King Hussein
You have agreed to see King Hussein for an hour's talk at 3:30 p.m.
on December 8 while he is here on his unofficial visit.
I believe it is highly desirable to include as a minimal gesture a
small (12-15) stag working dinner for him as you did when he was
here in the spring of 1969. There are some important substantive
issues that could be profitably discussed in a forum like this.
I recognize that this increases your involvement in this visit.
However, in view of the effort we expended in September to help the
King maintain a stable basis for a negotiated settlement with Israel,
it would be difficult not to go this extra step in helping him to feel
that the U.S. is behind him.
RECOMMENDATION: That you invite Hussein to a small stag working
dinner on December 8 or 9.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET/EXDIS
HHSaunders:tmt 11/30/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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RECEIVED
WHCA
1970 DEC 2 11 09
CONFIDENTIAL
HCD036
PAGE 01 BERLIN 01861 021053Z
21
ACTION EUR-25
INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-ØØ USIE-00
CCO-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SS-20 I0-13 ACDA-19 NIC-01 RSR-01 /114 W
119771
0 021028Z DEC 70
FM USMISSION BERL IN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6750
AMEMBASSY BONN
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION NATO
CINCUSAREUR FOR POLAD & OPS/HEIDELBERG
CINCEUR FOR POLAD & OPS/VAIHINGEN
CINCUSAFE FOR POLAD & OPS/WIESBADEN
USELMLO/CASTEAU
CONFIDENTIAL BERL IM 1861
NATO FOR HILLENBRAND AND SUTTERLIN
SUBJECT: BERLIN ACCESS - DELAYS RESUMED DECEMBER 2
REF:
BERL IN 1857
1. AFTER NIGHT OF RAPID CLEARANCE (80 TO 120 TRUCKS PER
HOUR) AT ALL CHECKPOINTS EXCEPT LAUENBURG (WHERE 12 TO 18 HOUR
DELAYS CONTINUED), SLOWD OWNS RESUMED MORNING OF DEC. 2. AS OF
0900 CHECKPOINTS REPORTED CLEARANCE RATE HAD BEEN RUNNING
FIVE OR TEN PER HOUR SINCE ABOUT 0630, WITH VEHICLES WAITING
AT ALL POINTS. HEL MST EDT REPORTS ABOUT 50 TRUCKS, DREILINDEN
70 TRUCKS AND 50 PASSENGER CAR S WAITING.
2. AT TWO CONTROL POINTS OFFICIALS REPORT COMMENTS RELAYED
FROM EAST GERMANS TO EFFECT THAT DELAYS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL
DECEMBER 6 BECAUSE OF "NPD MEET ING" IN BERLIN. CHECK WITH SENAT
CAS, AND MISSION SOURCES REVEALS ONLY THAT BERLIN NPD HAS
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BERL IN 01861 021053Z
ASKED MEMBERS TO "STAND BY DURING PER IOD DECEMBER 4-6."
SENAT BELIEVES NPD MEMBERS PLAN TO DISTRIBUTE ELECTION MATERIALS
AND COLLECT SIGNATURES FOR NPD CANDIDACIES. NO SPECIFIC
MEETING OF NPD PLANNED.
3. SENAT HAS INFORMED MISSION OF SCHEDULED VISITS BY FEDERAL
MINISTER OF INTER IOR GENSCHER TO BERL IN DECEMBER 2 AND FEDERAL
MINISTER OF INNER-GER MAN AFFAIRS, FRANKE DECEMBER 6 AND 7.
PRESIDENT HEINEMANN IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT BERLIN DECEMBER 6
THROUGH 8. ANY ONE OR ALL OF THESE VISITS MIGHT PR OVIDE FURTHER
EXCUSE FOR ACCESS INTERFERENCE.
4. USC OB CONCURS. GP-3
1-
MORRIS
CONFIDENTIAL]
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SIFELD
SECRET
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ACTION EUR-12
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FM AMEMBASSY PAR IS
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USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 PAR IS 16701
LIMDIS
SUBJECT: UNILATERAL FRENCH ACTIONS RE BERL IN
BRUSSELS FOR SECRETARY ROGERS AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILLENBRAND
1. SUMMARY: THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PRESENT THE FACTS,
AS WE AND THE ER IT ISH HERE AND HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PIECE THEM
TOGETHER, ON THE UNILATERAL FRENCH ACTIONS RE BERLIN IN
MOSCOW AND BONN ON SATURDAY, 28. IN MOSCOW, THE FRENCH
RESPONDED TO A UNILATERAL SOVIET PR OT EST WITHOUT INFORMING OR
CONSULTING THE US OR UK ON THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET PR OT EST OR
OF THE FRENCH RESPO RE THERETO. IN BONN, THE FRENCH TOLD THE
FRG THE NOVEMBER 30 CDU/CSU FRAKTION MEETING IN WEST BERLIN
WOULD BE INOPPORTUNE, AGAIN WITHOUT INFORMING OR CONSULTING THE
US OR UK. WERE THESE MOVES (A) A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO BREAK
AWAY FROM TRIPARTITE SOLIDARITY, (B) A CHANGE IN FRENCH
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS, (C) THE BEGINNING OF
A FRANCO-SOVIET "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" FOLLOWING POMPIDOUS
MOSCOW TRIP (BERL IN 1830), OR (D) FRENCH SUBMISSION TO SPECIAL
SOVEIT PRESSURE? THE ANSWER, AS WE SEE IT, TO EACH PART OF THIS
SECRET
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SECRET
PAGE 02 PARIS 16701 01 OF 02 02105 0Z
QUESTION IS NEGATIVE, EPN THOUGH IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT ON THE
PARTICULAR ISSUE OF FRG PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN THE FRENCH HAVE
TRADITIONALLY BEEN LESS FORTHCOMING THAT WE OR THE UK.
2. PICTURE HERE IS ONE OF FRENCH EMBARRASSMENT AND REGRET OVER
LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN QUAI, BONN AND MOSCOW AND FAILURE
TO CONSULT OR INFORM ALLIES. RATHER THAN HIGH-LEVEL CRITICISM
OF FRENCH ACTIONS, WE RECOMMEND SECRETARY REITERATE IN LOW-KEY
TO SCHUMANN DURING DECEMBER 2-4 NATO MINISTERIAL OUR SURPRISE
AND CONCERN OVER THIS LAPSE IN CONSULTATION AND MAINLY LISTEN TO
WHAT LATTER HAS TO SAY. END SUMMARY.
3. CALLING ATTENT ION TO CONCERN, ALREADY EXPRESSED BY US AND UK
TO FRENCH OVER LATTER'S UNILATERAL ACT IONS IN MOSCOW AND BONN
RE BERL IN AND ASKING FOR CLAR IF IF CAT ION, POLCOUNS
CALLED ON QUAI DEPUTY D IRECTOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS JURGENSEN
DECEMBER 1. AT NOVEMBER 30 LUNCHEON, WE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN
OVER THESE FRENCH ACTIONS TO PR IME MINISTER'S D IPLOMATIC
ADVISOR DE LA FOURNIERE, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM POLAND AND
WAS BAFFLEDBY WHOLE STORY. ESSENTIALLY, PICTURE WHICH EMERGES
FROM THEIR COMMENTS IS CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION AND LACK OF
COORDINATION BETWEEN QUAI, BONN, AND MOSCOW ON NOVEMBER 28--
WHEN FONMIN SCHUMMANN, POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR DE BEAUMARCHAIS,
D IRECTOR ARNAUD AND OTHERS WERE STILL IN POLAND WITH PREMIER
CHABAN DELMAS AND TOP FRENCH DIPLOMATS IN BONN WERE
AWAY ON A DIPLOMATIC CORPS HUNT. JIRGENSEN REGRETTED TEMPORARY
CONFUSION IN FRENCH RANKS AND LACK OF CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES,
EMPASIZING THAT ON NOVEMBER 29 AFTER SCHUMANN'S RETURN FRENCH
WERE BACK ON RAILS IN BONN GROUP. HE STRESSED IMPORTANT THING
WAS THAT AN ALLIED RESPONSE WAS EVENTUALLY GIVEN TO THE SOVIETS.
(FOR THIS SESSION, WE DID NOT GO AFTER JURGENSEN ON REASON FOR
FRENCH REFUSAL TO ACCEPT LAST CLAUSE OF UK- UK RESPONSE.)
J URGENSEN UNDER SCORED CONT INUED FRENCH DETERMINATION, DESPITE
UNT OW ARD EVENTS OF PAST WEEKEND, TO CONCENTRATE THEIR ACTIONS
ON BERLIN IN BONN GROUP AND FOUR-POWER TALKS IN BERLIN AND TO
DENY SOVIETS THE POSSIBILITY OF SPLITTING UNITY OF THE THREE ON
BERLIN QUESTION.
4. UNILATERAL ACTION IN MOSCOW: JURGENSEN BLAMED AMB. SEYDOUX
IN MOSCOW FOR FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH US AND UK AMBASSADORS
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET
PAGE 03 PAR IS 16701 01 OF 02 021050Z
BEFORE DEL IVER ING "HARD" RESPONSE TO SOVIET DEMARCHE OF NOV .26.
IN ATTEMPT TO DISMISS THOUGHT OF ANY FRANCE-SOVIET DEALING HE
ADDED QUAI HAD SENT "STRONG WARNING" TO SEYD OUX TWO WEEKS AGO TO
STOP TRYING TO NEGOTIATE ON BERL IN IN MOSCOW EACH TIME SOVIETS
APPROACHED HIM BILATERALLY. ASKED ABOUT FRENCH EMB REP' S COMMENT
IN BONN (BONN'S 13818) THAT QUAI "REJECTED IDEA OF A PROPOSED
TRIPARTITE REPLY TO SOVIETS," JURGENSEN DENIED QUAI HAD SENT
" INSTRUCT IONS" TO THIS EFFECT. HE POINTED OUT THAT CONFUSED
FRENCH ACTIONS IN BONN AND ELSWHERE HAD TAKEN PLACE DURING "A
" MATTER OF HOUR S" WHEN QUESTION WAS RAISED ABOUT NECESSITY OF
SECOND FRENCH REPLY TO SOVIETS," AND THAT THE NOV. 29 INSTRUCTIONS
FOLLOWING SCHUMANN-CHAIRED MEET ING HERE WAS NOT A REVERSAL OF
QUAI ATTITUDE TOWARDS A TRIPARTITE REPLY.
SECRET LIMDIS
SECRET
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET LIMDIS
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1970 DEC 2 11 32
12
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INR-07 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 DODE-00 I0-04 ACDA-10 PRS-01
RSR-01 RSC-01 /072 W
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0 R 021005Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY PAR IS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5736
USMISSION BERL IN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMSSION NATO
SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 16701
LIMDIS
5. BRITISH DCM PALLISER TELLS US HE EMPHASIZED TO DE
BEAUMARCHAIS DEC 1. HIS "SURPRISE AND DISMAY" OVER QUAI'S
INSTRUCTING SEYDOUX TO RESPOND TO SOVIET DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW
WITHOUT ENSURING THAT CONSULTATION HADTAKEN PLACE WITH ALLIES.
IN UNUSUAL COMMENT WHICH PALLISER SAID MUST BE CAREFULLY
PROTECTED, DE BEAUMARCHAIS SAID HE FULLY AGREED WITH PALLISER BUT
COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO GO BEYOND THAT. DE BEAUMARCHAIS
WENT ON TO INDICATE AN ' INEXCUSABLE TECHNICAL SLIP" HAD OCCURRED
WHEN QUAI FAILED TO REPEAT TO BONN, LONDON AND WASHINGTON
ITS NOV. 28 INSTRUCTION TO SEYDOUX. DE BEAUMARCHAIS HAD THIS
MESSAGE REPEATED TO THESE POSTS ON EVENING OF NOV 28 IMMEDIATELY
AFTER HIS RETURN FROM POLAND.
6. UNILATERAL
ACTION IN BONNBY NE IT HER JURGENSEN NOR QUAI DEP
DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL W. EUROPE PROVIDED A CLEAR RESPONSE TO OUR
QUER IES AS TO WHY FRENCH UNILATERALLY APPROACHED WEST GERMANS
"IN FRIENDLY MANNER" ON SAME DAY TO SAY THEY CONSIDERED NOVEMBER
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET
PAGE 02 PAR IS 16701 02 OF 02 021101Z
30 CDU/CSU MEET ING " INOPPORT UNE". BOTH LAMELY EXPLAINED
THIS ACTION WAS PART OF OVERAL BREAKDOWN, WITH A STILL
EMBARRASSED JURGENSEN CLAIMING THIS WAS, AFTER ALL, ALLIED
VIEW AND NOT A CHANGE IN ALLIED POLICY. BOYER TOLD EMBOFF NOV 30
THAT IN DECIDING ON THIS APPROACH TO FRG, QUAI HAD BEEN INFLUENCED
BY VON STADEN REMARKS (BONN'S 13579) RE SOVIET IRRITATION CONCERING
THE MEET ING AND FRG DESIRE FOR ADVICE FROM ALLIES.
7. COMMENT: RE FRENCH ACTION IN MOSCOW, WE AND BRITISH BELIEVE
THAT WITH ALPHAND IN CHARGE OF QUAI, POMPIDOU HIMSELF MIGHT
WELL HAVE DECIDED THAT SHARP SOVIET NOTE REQUIRED FAST AND
STIFFEST POSSIBLE FRENCH REPLY TO SHOW THAT FRENCH WOULD NOT
BOW TO SOVIET PRESSURES TO SPLIT TRIPARTITE SOLIDAR ITY IN
BERL IN. POMPIDOU WOULD NOT HAVE BOTHERED WITH THE MECHANICS OF
COORDINATING FRENCH ACTION WITH ALLIES -- A PROCESS WHICH
CLEARLY APPEARS TO HAVE BROKEN DOWN LAST WEEKEND. IN VIEW OF
OBVIOUS QUAI EMBARRASSMENT AND REGRETS EXPRESSED TO US AND
BRITISH, WE DO NOT BELIEVE STRONG ADDITIONAL CRITICISM OF
FRENCH ACTIONS WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE. WE AGREE WITH BONN
(13896) AND BERLIN (1830), HOWEVER, THAT THESE ACTION SHOULD
NOT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT HIGH-LEVEL US APPROACH.
WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE SECRETARY REITERATE IN A LOW
KEY TO SCHUMANN
DURING NATO MINISTERIAL, OUR SURPRISE
AND CONCERN OVER THESE EXAMPLES OF LAPSE IN FRENCH
CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES AND MAINLY LISTEN TO WHAT HE HAS
TO SAY.
WATSON
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
23955
SECRET
INFORMATION
December 1, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT:
Status Report on the Berlin Talks
There is attached at Tab A a status report on the Berlin talks. My
memorandum of November 17 (Tab B) brought you up to date as of the
meeting of November 16. Since then, there has been only one meeting,
a particularly unproductive one, on November 23. The next scheduled
meeting is December 10 which should provide us with a better basis to
assess where things stand than the previous meeting.
Tab Bjis Log Number 23594
ATD:hsc
SECRET
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SECRET
December 1, 1970
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Four Power Talks on Berlin
There has been virtually no substantive progress during the past two
Ambassadorial meetings (November 16 and 23), and indeed in the last
meeting the Soviets took the toughest stance so far both in tone and sub-
stance. The Soviet approach seems to be to take the hardest possible line
and then to mark time, as if they anticipated a shift in direction but were
not exactly sure which way the direction would point. They are protected
most, therefore, by taking the hardest possible line.
There are several factors that have been at play in recent weeks which
may have caused the Soviets to pause:
-- There is a general assumption, fostered by pro-Ostpolitik forces
in the FRG and especially Bahr, that Soviet policy has been impeded by
GDR rigidity. The evidence on this is ambiguous but the frequent comings
and goings between Soviet and East German officials do at least suggest
that the Soviets are trying to get the GDR to take a more pliant attitude,
at least in form. (We do know that the East Germans are unhappy about
Polish and other East European efforts to normalize relations with the
FRG without obtaining additional recognition for the GDR; this was reflected
in the hard-line speech of the GDR delegate to the recent Hungarian Party
Congress.)
-- A Warsaw Pact meeting will be held in East Berlin this week, and
the prime focus there will be coordination on German affairs (and the NATO
meeting will run almost concurrently).
-- The Soviets have viewed the Hessian and Bavarian elections as evidence
of renewed strength for Brandt's coalition which, in their eyes, may make it
easier for Brandt to secure ratification of the Soviet-FRG treaty without
significant progress on Berlin (a doubtful calculus, given CDU views).
-- Ulbricht's health, always a source of rumors, may in fact be
failing, leading to more intense intra-party maneuvering in East Germany;
the length of time Ulbricht will (and should) remain in command is relevant
to Soviet decisions on Berlin.
SECRET
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SECRET
-2-
-- The intra-German talks (between Bahr and Kohl) began November 27;
the Soviets will probably wish to test in this channel whether the Germans
will negotiate on Berlin access without an adqquate Four Power mandate
(Bahr reports that he was firm in insisting that he could not discuss Berlin
access without this mandate); which would have a spoiling effect on the Four
Power talks.
-- The Soviets may also have been hoping for a break in Allied Tri-
partite unity; especially since the Pompidou visit to the USSR in mid-October,
the Soviets seem to have targeted the French for separate approaches (the
French have not been unresponsive).
The autobahn slowdown in recent days in connection with the CDU meeting
in Berlin probably was the least the Soviets could do to placate the East
Germans (and to save their own face). At the same time the Soviets hoped
that the political nature of the problem (a CDU meeting) would create further
division between Barzel and Brandt. In the end, bowever, the autobahn
stoppages probably serves the cause of Allied unity and pulled German
opinion together in insisting on something concrete from the Berlin talks.
As of the last Ambassadorial meeting, the Soviets were still unhelpful on
access. While the Four could agree on general principles, the specific commit-
ments according to the Soviets, would have to take the form of agreements
between the GDR, the FRG and the Berlin Senat, i.e., the Soviets continue
to refuse to take formal responsibility for access, insisting that this is at GDR
sovereign right. Before the Soviets would offer specific thinking on a
possible FRG-GDR agreement they wanted assurances that there would be
movement by the West to meet Soviet requirements for removing the Federal
presence from Berlin. Abrasimov has clearly linked Federal presence
with access. On the issue of Federal presence the Soviets have continued to
insist that all federal agencies be removed (though there is some indication
they may accept the Bahr concept of a cosmetic change to tuck all federal
offices under the auspices of a Federal "representative" in Berlin (a position
Bahr himself expects to hold as the present FRG official responsible for Berlin).
There is increasing indication that the Soviets want to have a greater role
in West Berlin, including assurances that the NPD and similar offensive
organizatione are eliminated and that the Soviets should have a consulate and
other official officers in West Berlin. So far the Soviets have flatly refused
to consider representation abroad of Berlin by the FRG. However, they have
have expressed some interest in learning more about our proposal that FRG
passports issued in West B. rlin bear an additional stamp indicating that they
were issued under the authority of the respective Allied commandant (another
Bahr idea). The Soviets also insist that we agree that Berlin is not only not a
land of the FRG but not "a part" of the FRG.
SECR ET
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SECRET
3.
The advisers of the Four Ambassadora met on November 30 íor a discussion
that centered largely around the ormat of any eventual agreement. There
would be three general elements: the first would entail a Four Power state-
ment on general principles, the second would be the unilateral communications
by the Soviets (on access) and the Three (on Federal presence) together with
the results of the negotiations between the German authorities, and the final
element would again be a Four Power statement tying together the other two
elements. During the advisers meeting, the Soviets hinted that the situation
might be clearer in a week or so and perhaps there could then be another
advisers meeting. This hint tends to confirm other indications that the
Soviets may be trying to prepare a new stance for the Ambassadorial meeting
of December 10. This will then be the last meeting for a month or so.
Following that meeting (and assuming that the Warsaw Pact meeting this
week supports a new Soviet line, or confirms the old one) we will be in a much b
better position to take a new look at where we stadd in the talks and where we
ought to be heading.
ATD:mm
SECRET
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23594
SECRET/NODIS
INFORMATION
November 17, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Analysis of Latest Round of Berlin Talks
Attached is an analysis of the November 16 Ambassadorial meeting (Tab A).
It did not seem to advance the negotiations; indeed if anything the lines seem
to have hardened somewhat.
In general, ápart from the points in the attached analysis, I would stress
the following, perhaps obvious points:
1. There will be no written agreement on Berlin that (a) does not
diminish the FRG presence in West Berlin, (b) does not increase de facto
GDR control over access and (c) does not contain "guarantees" of access,
no matter how artiully drafted, that cannot be reversed at a whim by the
Soviets and/or the GDR. More than ever the deterrent to such a reversal
will be essentially subjective, i. e., it will rest on the Soviet calculus of
the probable adverse consequences,
2. We must be more than ever careful (and Rush is doing well) not
to get out in front of the Germans in offering concessions relating to the
FRG's Berlin presence or we will get caught in German internal politics.
3. We must be careful not to be tempted into bilateral dealings with
the USSR. This would demoralize the allies. More than that, given the
realities noted in paragraph 1. above any resultant agreement (other than a
general understanding not to have crises, for what that is worth) will produce
a net concrete loss for our side.
4. We must recognize that if, by an off chance there should be an
agreement acceptable to the allies and we say so, we will thereby be sanctifying
Ostpolitik and all its implications. For as soon as the Allies, and especially
the US, say that there is an acceptable Berlin agreement the CDU cannot refuse
to ratify the Moscow treaty.
SECRET//NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS
-2-
* * * * *
None of the foregoing need preclude efforts, including by the FRG-GDR,
at piecemeal humanitarian improvements, e. B., in intra-city traffic nor,
indeed in access modalities. Nor, as noted, need it preclude some under-
standing with the Soviets to exercise restraint on both sides. But any
formal agreement, as far as I can see, is bound to have one, several or
all the pitfalls listed in paragraphs 1 to 4 above.
HS:mm
SECRET NODIS
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SECRET/NODIS
November 17, 1970
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Ambassadorial Talks on Berlin, November 16, 1970
The talks on Monday, November 16, concentrated on the access question
and the West German presence in West Berlin. On both issues the basic
differences have emerged more clearly, and in effect, an impasse has
been reached.
The Access Issues
On November 4, we presented a statement of principles to govern access
to West Berlin, making it clear that any agreement on access would have
to include a fairly precise definition of the procedures. Thus, we have
included in our position the assertion that in the case of transit traffic for
goods and persons, any controls should be limited to identification only,
including sealed vehicles and trains, abolition of visas, freedom from
inspection, etc. All of this would be part of a four-power agreement, on
the theory that the four powers are ultimately responsible for unhindered
access. Following the four-power agreement, there would be intra-German
negotiations, under a four-power mandate, which would then be approved
or sanctioned in some manner by the four powers.
The Soviet position, as spelled out by Abrasimov in the November 16
session, is that this approach is fundamentally unacceptable because it in-
fringes on the sovereignty of the GDR which, since it "owns" the access
routes, has the sole responsibility for civilian access; there is not, and never
has been a four-power right to control civilian access.
On this juridical basis the most the Soviet side could do would be
"reach agreement" withthe GDR that access should proceed unhindered,
and be given preferential treatment subject to "norms" of international law
and GDR procedures. The three Western powers could take note of this
agreement, and could, for their part, give a mandate both to the FRG and
to the West Berlin Senat to negotiate the details. In this light the Soviets
contend there is no basis for spelling out details of access since there is
no four-power responsibility.
Thus the impasse is: if we cannot commit the USSR to any responsibility
for the acceBB of civilians, and on that basis turn the negotiations over to
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SECRET/NODIS
-2-
over access. Then the pressure for agreement would shift away from the
USSR to the West Germans who would have to negotiate the details, knowing
that success of the talks would depend on their willingness to conclude an
agreement so that the German-Soviet reaty can be ratified. In this case
East Germany, already having gained further de facto acceptance, would
drive the toughest bargain possible.
The only glimmer of hope is that the Soviets have mentioned a "gentlemen's
agreement" that the details as we spell them out will be incorporated into
the GDR-FRG agreement, but on the condition that there is satisfactory
settlement of Soviet demands to restrict and reduce West German political
presence in West Berlin.
West German Presence
The Soviets proceed on the principle that the four powers should agree
on those activities that are specifically prohibited. Since we have resisted
the right of the USSR to have a say in the matter of how we run the Western
sector, the agreement would take the form of a commitment by the three
powers to take certain actions which the Soviets will Stake note of. "
On November 4, the Soviets submitted their list of restrictions and
prohibitions. The main demands are to prohibit the "activities of all FRG
parliamentary or other political organs -- Bundestag, Bundesrat (including
committees and factions which the G. rmans want to continue on the grounds
that they do not derive from the Basic Law), Bundesversammlung, Cabinet
meetings, as well as functioning of Federal offices and agencies. In addition,
neo-Nazi and other "revanchist" organizations would be prohibited.
Though the Soviets insist on the principle of listing prohibitions, Abrasimov
has indicated that this does not mean that the Soviets renounce the right to
raise objections to activities not specifically listed.
The nub of the matter in this last point is that we have, at West German
insistence, gone along with the idea of a list of prohibited activities, on the
grounds that we have such responsibilities in West Berlin in any case, and
that it is better to list prohibitions than try to list what is permitted.
In private talks, the Soviets have indicated some flexibility on the question
of Federal offices in West Gerlin. Apparently at the Instigation of the West
Germans (perhaps through the clandestine contacts with Bohr) the Soviets said
they might settle for simply renaming all the various ministries and agencies
into one innocuous sounding organization.
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The Outlook
Abrasimov said yesterday (Monday) that his reformulation of our
access proposal was the maximum Soviet position, but urged that the advisors
continue to negotiate for a common position -- thus suggesting that there
may still be some give in the Soviet position. The Soviets are apparently
walking a tight rope between their desire to gain some agreement to promote
the treaty ratification, and their refusal to repudiate their age-old position
that the GDR has sovereignty over civilian access.
As noted above there may still be some room for negotiation on the
gentlemen's agreement that Abrasimov mentioned, but this is a slender
reed to lean on, and, of course, could be wiped out at any future point
since it is conditional on the deal on West German presence.
Even If these two basic issues were somehow resolved through fuzzy
compromises, which are not beyond the ingenuity of our negotiators, there
remains the question of representation of West Berlin abroad. This has not
really been touched on. The Soviets have been hot and cold, sometimes
saying this is impossible, sometimes saying that there might be some room
for a consular understanding. (De facto, the FRG can do it anyway outside
Eastern Europe.) Similarly, the West Germans have shifted around on this.
They told us (through Bahr) that this was not essential, but later have said
it was the main issue. All of this is greatly complicated by the fact that
even if consular representation is agreed to by the Soviets, there will arise
the issue of who speaks for West Berlin in the UN when both German states
are admitted.
In sum, almost any conceivable outcome is going to increase the status
of the GDR, weaken the juridical basis for our presence, and diminish, at
least psychologically, the links between West Berlin and West Germany,
in return for somewhat tighter access procedures, still at the mercy of the
Soviets and GDR, and some better procedures for movement between East
and West Berlin, with these latter issues being negotiated on our behalf
between the West Berlin Senat and the East Germans.
Though the West Germans, and B.hr in particular, have claimed the
Soviets are under great pressure for an agreement, the record thus far
suggests that the Soviets are willing to protract the talks, and the pressures
will grow on the West Germans. (This may explain Bahr's rather frantic
efforts to deal with the Soviets behind our back.)
SECR NODIS
William
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