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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
2
memo
Sonnenfeldt to HAK
2/5/70
B
3
memo
HAK to the President
n.d.
B
4
memo
HAK to the President
n.d.
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC
340
FOLDER TITLE
6
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
in
*U.S.GPO:1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
HAK
hls you wantme
to draft a mits to
Sisco from you- or
will fyour do do by note plane.
Id call-
why
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
July 17, 1970
SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
K
SUBJECT:
Sisco-Dobrynin Conversation
Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from Joe Sisco reporting the
sensitive aspects of his July 13 talk with Ambassador Dobrynin.
You will see that Sisco made some extremely useful points concerning
recent Soviet moves in the region, their unwillingness to explain
their actions, and the nature of your personal approach and policy.
I think Sisco's presentation should prove helpful and is another
reason for you to compliment him when you see him.
Attachment an Sisco up follow resent
SECRET/NODIS/EYES
Historical File
PRESERVATION COPY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1970
PERSONAL - EYES ONLY
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
I wrote a very brief telegram covering my last
conversation with Dobrynin. What is not contained in the
telegram is that I gave the Ambassador some personal
impressions - strictly personal - of the atmosphere
which the continuing increased Soviet military involve-
ment in the UAR is creating which increases the risks
of possible confrontation with us. I said that it would
be well for Dobrynin to reflect that the President at
the outset of his Administration had declared an era of
negotiations. For seventeen months we had negotiated in
good faith, and we feel that the Soviets have not come
half the way; and that our restraint on the military side
has not been met by restraint but rather by a fundamental
decision on the part of the Soviet Union to involve its
personnel in an operational capacity. This is a most
serious decision for the Soviets to have taken, and
our concern has increased not only because of the
creeping process in recent weeks, but also because of
Soviet unwillingness to tell us quietly and confidentially
what their intentions are and what the outer limits of
their involvement may be as they see it.
I said I had watched our President for months and felt
that he had offered political proposal after political
proposal, and political option after political option in
the context of the United States exercising great restraint
in the face of pressures for providing Israel with
substantial numbers of additional aircraft. I hoped that
Dobrynin was not reporting to Moscow that our involvement
in Vietnam reflected any lack of resolve in the Middle
East. The President was a man of peace, a man who wanted
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
a negotiated settlement, but also a man of firmness and
toughness, which it would be well for the Soviet Union
to take fully into account as it develops Middle East
policy. He would not be pushed around in the Middle East
or anywhere else. These were only personal judgments
I was expressing; but I would advise Dobrynin to take
very, very seriously the words expressed by the President
some months ago that the United States would view with
deep concern any attempt by the Soviet Union to dominate
the Middle East.
Dobrynin responded critically of the recent "tough
talk" which he said would not force the Soviet Union to
make decisions of the kind it would not wish to make. He
remonstrated several times that the emphasis on the Soviet
role was creating a crisis atmosphere, and that it was not
making it easier for Moscow to take constructive initiatives
during the current discussions with Cairo. At the same
time, he was quick to say, these were personal remarks
and we would be receiving the replies to our political
initiative at an early date.
I concluded this portion of the conversation by
saying that I just wanted personally to get this off of
my chest, that I had no authority to say any of this.
I wanted to say what I said because the Soviets in the past
have miscalculated regarding United States intentions and
it was important he reflected to Moscow the resolve and
the fiber and the determination of the President, as I read
the situation.
I have brought this memorandum to the attention of
Secretary Rogers.
J.S.Sinso
Joseph J. Sisco
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY
July 14, 1970
TO:
Henry A. Kissinger
FROM:
Winston Lord
Sisco has sent you his promised memorandum
on the personal points he made to Dobrynin
on July 13. (At Tab 2 is Sisco's brief
reporting cable.) I assume you will want
to forward this to the President, particularly
since he is seeing Sisco tomorrow.
Accordingly, attached at Tab 1 for your
signature is a memorandum enclosing Sisco's
paper.
Recommendation:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab 1.
Attachments
SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY
WL:ms:7/14/70
IFORMATION
SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY
JUL 17 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
HK
SUBJECT:
Sisco-Dobrynin Conversation
Attached at Tab à is a memorandum from Joe Sisco reporting the
sensitive aspects of his July 13 talk with Ambassador Dobrynin.
You will see that Sisco made some extremely useful points concerning
recent Soviet moves in the region, their unwillingness to explain
their actions, and the nature of your personal approach and policy.
I think Sisco's presentation should prove helpful and is another
reason for you to compliment him when you see him.
Attachment
SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1970
PERSONAL - EYES ONLY
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
I wrote a very brief telegram covering my last
conversation with Dobrynin. What is not contained in the
telegram is that I gave the Ambassador some personal
impressions - strictly personal - of the atmosphere
which the continuing increased Soviet military involve-
ment in the UAR is creating which increases the risks
of possible confrontation with us. I said that it would
be well for Dobrynin to reflect that the President at
the outset of his Administration had declared an era of
negotiations. For seventeen months we had negotiated in
good faith, and we feel that the Soviets have not come
half the way; and that our restraint on the military side
has not been met by restraint but rather by a fundamental
decision on the part of the Soviet Union to involve its
personnel in an operational capacity. This is a most
serious decision for the Soviets to have taken, and
our concern has increased not only because of the
creeping process in recent weeks, but also because of
Soviet unwillingness to tell us quietly and confidentially
what their intentions are and what the outer limits of
their involvement may be as they see it.
I said I had watched our President for months and felt
that he had offered political proposal after political
proposal, and political option after political option in
the context of the United States exercising great restraint
in the face of pressures for providing Israel with
substantial numbers of additional aircraft. I hoped that
Dobrynin was not reporting to Moscow that our involvement
in Vietnam reflected any lack of resolve in the Middle
East. The President was a man of peace, a man who wanted
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
a negotiated settlement, but also a man of firmness and
toughness, which it would be well for the Soviet Union
to take fully into account as it develops Middle East
policy. He would not be pushed around in the Middle East
or anywhere else. These were only personal judgments
I was expressing; but I would advise Dobrynin to take
very, very seriously the words expressed by the President
some months ago that the United States would view with
deep concern any attempt by the Soviet Union to dominate
the Middle East.
Dobrynin responded critically of the recent "tough
talk" which he said would not force the Soviet Union to
make decisions of the kind it would not wish to make. He
remonstrated several times that the emphasis on the Soviet
role was creating a crisis atmosphere, and that it was not
making it easier for Moscow to take constructive initiatives
during the current discussions with Cairo. At the same
time, he was quick to say, these were personal remarks
and we would be receiving the replies to our political
initiative at an early date.
I concluded this portion of the conversation by
saying that I just wanted personally to get this off of
my chest, that I had no authority to say any of this.
I wanted to say what I said because the Soviets in the past
have miscalculated regarding United States intentions and
it was important he reflected to Moscow the resolve and
the fiber and the determination of the President, as I read
the situation.
I have brought this memorandum to the attention of
Secretary Rogers.
J.Sinco J.
Joseph J. Sisco
SECRET/NODIS
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NODIS
1. Sisco had brief 30-minute meeting with Dobrynin to
review current state of play re US initiative. Nothing
new or startling emerged. Dobrynin said discussions
continuing in Moscow and that he could not give Sisco any
specific date as to when reply would come. He expected
that we would receive a reply directly from UAR and a
reply also from USSR.
2. In reply to Sisco's expression of increasing concern
continuation
over of Soviet creeping process and unwillingness
indicate outer
of Soviets to limits of their involvement,
Dobrynin reiterated familiar arguments what they are
doing is defensive.
ROGERS
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'70 APR 8 AM 8:53 53
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REF: STATE 50459
1. Sisco opened conversation by saying he first wanted to
say a word about tentative plans he had for a trip to the
Middle East. There was no firm decision as yet. In our
minds the bilateral talks had priority. It was desirable,
however, for him to take a trip to the area and get a
reading on attitudes there. This would be helpful in terms
of our joint efforts in both the Two and Four Power talks.
We were always ready to receive anything the Soviet govern-
ment had for us. Messages during Sisco's absence could be
conveyed to Amb Beam, Ass't Sec Davies and the Secretary
:
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PAGE #2
_________________________
himself. Dobrynin asked for definite confirmation that Sisco
trip was on since he said he was likely to go to Moscow for
this two week period. Sisco later confirmed to Dobrynin trip
definitely scheduled.
2. Sisco said he wanted to raise a subject that Atherton
had already mentioned to Vorontsov and that the Secretary
had mentioned to Dobrynin March 25, our concern regarding
the introduction of SA-3 missiles into the UAR and in
particular Soviet personnel to operate them. Dobrynin
would recall that the Secretary had stressed that we wanted
the Soviets to take our decision on Israeli arms as an
indication of US willingness to exercise restraint. The
Secretary had said that this arms decision had been made
without reference to the bilateral talks and had expressed
the hope that the Soviets would act with restraint. He had
underlined our concern about the introduction of SA-3's and
particularly about the introduction of Soviet personnel iHKa
*hexWAR in an operational capacity into the UAR. Based dn
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_________________________
what Dobrynin had said at that meeting we had had the impression
that he would be reporting to Moscow these expressions of our
concern. Sisco expressed the hope that the Soviet Government
had given careful study to the Secretary's comments. We had
expected and were ready to receive any comment that Dobrynin
might have.
3. Dobrynin said that he had reported to Moscow what the
Secretary had said and that he had nothing to add. Sisco
inquired whether we might expect any further comment or
observations on this matter from the Soviets.
4. Dobrynin said the Soviet view was and is clear. There
was nothing to add about the SA-3's, which were a purely
defensive weapon and no threat to Israel. What kind of a
threat did we think they were for Israel? They were in the
UAR to protect it from Israeli air attack. The Soviets did
not understand why the US used this kind of argument.
5. Sisco said this was a matter of concern to us because
it related to the war of attrition initiated by the UAR_]
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PAGE #4
last year. It related as well more broadly to the dangers
and risks in the area. The question of defensive and offensive
weapons was a difficult one to answer. Clearly the efforts
to achieve a ceasefire worked out by the UN or by the Powers
were related to the kind of climate present in the area.
Sisco said he would report Dobrynin's remarks to the Secretary.
6. Dobrynin then referred to his remarks made at his last
meeting with Sisco concerning a de facto ceasefire. Sisco
said we were studying this and would be giving further thought
to it.
7. Turning to the efforts to obtain a peace settlement Sisco
said that we had reviewed carefully the Soviets' and our oral
statements and the record of his subsequent meeting with
Dobrynin April 1. He found both positive and negative
elements in the exchanges of the past two weeks. We did
note a willingness on the Soviets' part to be more precise
on the points related to peace and we were generally
encouraged by expressions of this willingness in Dobrynih's
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PAGE #5
oral statement and what he had said subsequently to Sisco.
But, Sisco said, in order to make progress it was essential
to receive from the Soviets in writing their formulations.
Sisco recalled that for many weeks of discussion in meeting
after meeting Dobrynin had indicated to him that the Soviet
government would be more specific on peace if the US was more
specific on withdrawal. Dobrynin expressing similar line
now. We felt that we had met this specificity requirement
in our October 28 document, which was intended to reflect
a common US and Soviet position. The October 28 document
was a Soviet-American baby. In particular it was very
specific on the question of withdrawal. We were encouraged
when the Soviets expressed a readiness to be more specific
on the question of peace. But Soviets had failed to respond
specifically on peace whereas we had been specific on with-
drawal. If the language of point 2 of the October 28 document
was not satisfactory to the Soviets, then it was up to them
to suggest precisely and in writing what formulation it
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PAGE #6
_________________________
willing to accept. This was a practical point. We considered
these talks as a means of bringing the parties along. If
there were alternative Soviet proposals then we should have
them in writing. There was not a ghost of a chance of bringing
the Israelis along with the kind of general remarks the Soviets
had been making. We needed a precise text. Until now we
did not see anything different from the Soviet side than in
the past. What is meant when Soviets say they willing to
be more detailed and come closer to our formulation? This
is not enough; we require a precise text from Soviets if
it does find present point 2 in October 28 paper unsatisfactory.
8. Another question, Sisco continued, was that of negotiations.
Based on Dobrynin's remarks to the Secretary and to Sisco we
had understood that the Soviets did not see the Rhodes formula
as viable, though it was a formula we had worked out together
in the Waldorf Astoria. The Soviets had indicated that they
had some ideas regarding negotiations. In our view what is
important is that any formula provide for both direct and
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_________________________
indirect negotiations. We appreciated as the Soviets did
the need for a formula of constructive ambiguity. We strongly
prefer Rhodes formula and regret Soviet back-off. We were
prepared to consider alternatives to the Rhodes formula,
but Soviets must provide precise text. In absence any
to
new, specific Soviet text, we must hold/the formula expressed
in our October 28 document.
9. Sisco continued, for many weeks we had made the assumption
that we were trying to find common ground on the basis of the
October 28 document. Thus, Sisco said, he was taken aback
by Dobrynin's reference in their previous conversation to
the Soviets' June document. We had assumed and know that
the October document was an attempt to marry the Soviet June
document and ours of July. Dobrynin's comment had cast doubt
that we were talking from the same document. Moving back
to June 1969 Soviet document is a move backward.
*. 10. Dobrynin said he would speak first to the last of
Sisco's points. He said the Soviets had never accepted the
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PAGE #8
_________________________
October document as a joint document. There was nothing new
in the Soviet position on this. In their view the October
document was a US document. He did not understand Sisco's
surprise at this. There were two plans, that of the Americans
and that of the Soviets. There was no question of the Soviets
accepting the US plan as a basis for proceeding.
11. There were several basic issues involved, Dobrynin
continued. We should look at them and attempt to find a
mutually acceptable formula. But the Americans would not
say anything new. The Soviets had indicated they were prepared
to go further if the US was prepared to talk about Gaza and
Sharm a-Sheikh. It was a waste of time to argue whether the
October document was joint or not. Let's have a look at the
basic issues.
12. At this point Dobrynin passed over three pieces of paper
in English and Russian versions. The three formulations
concerned (a) withdrawal procedures, (b) Gaza and (c) Sharm
al-Shaykh. Item (b) is identical to Point 6 in the Soviet
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_________________________
June 17 paper. Item (c) is identical to Point 7 in the Soviet
June 17 paper. FYI. These papers are thin gruel; they are
only a slight variant on June 1969 Soviet document and call
withdrawal
for total GOI withdrawk from Sharm al-Shaykh, Gaza, Sinai,
West Bank, and Golan Heights. END FYI. Revised item (a)
reads as follows:
QUOTE. On the day of deposit with the UN of the
concluding document or documents recording the accord reached
(Section IV), withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the
territories occupied during the conflict of 1967 shall begin.
The withdrawal shall be carried out under the observation of
UN representatives, by stages during agreed periods, not to
exceed a period of two months in all (or as agreed).
During the first month (or as agreed) Israeli troops
shall withdraw from a part of the Arab territories to certain
intermediate lines on the Sinai Peninsula (as well as on the
west bank of the Jordan River and from Syrian territory out
of the El Quneitra area).
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PAGE #10 7
The international UN troops, excluding the Arab armed
forces, shall take the positions on the territories from
which the Israeli armed forces are being withdrawn.
On the day when Israeli armed forces reach the intermediate
lines of the Sinai Peninsula which have been stipulated in
advance (for instance, 30 or 40 kilometers from Suez Canal),
the Government of the UAR shall bring its troops into the
Suez Canal area and begin the clearance of the canal for
resumption of navigation.
During the second month (or as agreed) the withdrawal
of Israeli armed forces to the lines they held prior to
June 5, 1967 shall be completed. During the second stage
the international troops would evacuate the territories on
which they were deployed already on the first stage, and
would follow the outgoing Israeli armed forces. The admin-
istration of the UAR (or the corresponding Arab country)
shall be completely restored in the vacated territories and
its troops and police forces shall be introduced. UNQUOTE
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13
x2. Dobrynin noted that by the Soviet proposals Israeli
troops would still be in occupied territory at a time when
peace was juridically established--i.e., peace would become
effective at intermediate, stage of withdrawal on understanding
that second stage was brief. The Soviets were prepared to
put on paper QUOTE at theprapex proper time UNQUOTE its
formulation regarding peace. The Soviets would like to have
US comments on the formulations here presented.
14.
XXX Sisco said we would study the Soviet formulations
carefully. He welcomed the fact that the Soviets had submitted
formulations in writing but he was disappointed to see the
formulations related and were so close in substance to the
June document. He again asked that the Soviets submit language
in writing on peace and negotiations. Then we could begin
to focus on what the issues are. We had a common interest
in making progress.
15.
1x4x Dobrynin said these points were clear. He reiterated
that the Soviets did not accept the October 28 document -ds
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PAGE #12 7
a basis for discussion. QUOTE Your paper is your paper. UNQUOTE
The Soviets wanted to understand better the US position on
secondary points, then we could proceed. The Soviets wanted
to avoid retrogression.
16
xs. In subsequent informal, QUOTE off record UNQUOTE
discussion, Sisco said US would be able to make specific
substantive comment on the four critical issues: negotiations,
peace, withdrawal and boundaries, once all talks on table
in writing. Sisco told Dobrynin bluntly we unwilling to
buy a QUOTE pig in the poke UNQUOTE. What did Soviets mean
by hinting they will come closer to our formulation on
peace? We had heard this from Dobrynin before. Dobrynin
initially insisted he must first have US comments on
language he had just presented. When Sisco pressed Dobrynin
as to whether he was saying Soviets would not give us
language on peace and negotiations in absence such prior
comments from us, Dobrynin backed down and said he would put
Sisco's request to Moscow.
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*
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1. At working lunch April 1, Dobrynin and Sisco agreed that
in this first follow-up meeting after Dobrynin's session
with Secretary March 25 it would be well to examine as
precisely as possible where we are and to try to determine
what possibilities of agreement were. Principal results
of meeting were:
(a) Soviets continue unwilling to join appeal to
parties to restore ceasefire, but propose as alternative
that US and USSR work quietly with Cairo and Tel Aviv to
achieve an informal understanding on de facto ceasefire;
(b) Soviets continue adamant against arms limitation
talks on ground Arabs feel this would only result in freezing
a military balance clearly favorable to Israel;
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(c) Soviets are willing to consider a formulation on
peace along lines proposed by US to include explicitly
obligation that there be QUOTE a ********* cessation of
war and establishment of peace UNQUOTE provided we are
willing to commit ourselves to Kax total withdrawal.
Dobrynin explicitly specified this included Israeli withdrawal
from Sharm al-Shaykh and Gaza, with latter to be explicitly
designated as an Arab territory.
(d) Soviets propose a slight variant of past USSR
proposal on relationship between timing of withdrawal of
Israeli forces and entry into effect of peace obligations.
Variant was described by Dobrynin as follows: (1) Once
agreed document was deposited with UN, both sides would be
obligated not to take any actions contrary to agreement;
(2) Withdrawal would proceed by stages, and UN forces would
be introduced at the end of the first stage during which
UAR personnel would be limited to clearing Suez Canal
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rather than be introduced in area initially evacuated by
Israeli forces. (3) At the end of the first stage there
would be a de jure acceptance by UAR of both cessation of
war and the state of peace. (4) With the understanding that
the second stage of withdrawal would not be a long one
(a month or two), UN forces would occupy the additional
territories evacuated in that stage, and UAR forces would
return to the Sinai with a UN buffer retained between the
opposing sides. Dobrynin refused to be drawn out on the
area of demilitarization or on whether UN buffer was to
be on one side or on both sides of the border.
(e) Dobrynin refused to agree to the formulation on
peace contained in Point 2 of the October 28th document
but insisted that the formulation USSR has in mind is close
to that of the US. When asked whether he agreed to US
formulation as it related to the fedayeen, he did not accept
this formulation but maintained Soviets had language
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in mind that might approximate this.
(f) On the question of negotiations, Dobrynin XX said
Soviets no longer can accept present formulation on Rhodes
formula, reiterating argument made previously that
interpretation given to it by the parties has made this
unacceptable. When pressed by Sisco for an alternative
formula, Dobrynin said something roughly along the following
lines: The parties will have contact between themselves
through Jarring with the understanding he could use various
forms.
(g) On Sharm al-Shaykh, Dobrynin insisted that there
be explicit reference to UN force, its removal being subject
to major power veto, and indicated willingness to suggest
XXXMXX that UN Secretary General consult with the parties
on question of composition and command of that force. He
categorically precluded any Soviet troops being involved
in such a UN force.
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2. Sisco pressed Dobrynin on two procedural points without
success: (a) Sisco suggested that while Dobrynin exposition
was useful and helpful in understanding Soviet position,
best vehicle for making progress would be for Dobrynin
emendation
to offer specific new language as/amandaxxxx to October 28th
document which we consider to be a joint US-USSR effort and
not solely an American product; and (b) Sisco хиђух suggested
that in next session, which now set for afternoon April 6,
he and Dobrynin discuss all other points in order to be
sure that there are not other significant areas of
disagreement. With respect to first point, Dobrynin insisted
that he was under instructions to talk in terms of emendation
of the Soviet June 1969 paper. Re (b), Dobrynin refused
to focus on these other points unless and until US reacted
to latest concrete Soviet suggestions. Sisco pointed out
these gave rise to difficulties since (1) there were a
number of points of difference between June and October
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_________________________
documents, (2) October document was based on a precise
format in which obligations were undertaken between parties
in relationship to one another, whereas Soviet June document
was considerably less so, and (3) Soviets were asking us to
react and to make concession on concrete points of particular
interest to them in circumstances where US did not even
know whether common ground could be found on these decisive
points or just where we stood on other matters such as
freedom of passage through Suez Canal, Straits of Tiran,
refugee question, etc.
3. During meeting, Sisco also said he wished to raise one
broad question which he thought more fundamental than any
other in determining whether common ground can be achieved:
Would Soviets be willing to agree to guidelines for Jarring
based on assumption of other than total withdrawal? Dobrynin
said he could not reply to this question and suggested he and
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_________________________
XX
Sisco concentrate on concrete points they have been
discussing.
COMMENT: Above exposition by Dobrynin represents no
appreciable advance in Soviet position. It does contain
appearance of greater oral flexibility and a few additional
BECEIAED
enticements (e.g., timing of peace, possible new formulation
on negotiating procedures). Our inclination is to continue
efforts smoke Dobrynin out and press for written counter
language from Soviets, and, meanwhile, to show no signs of
give in our position. Would appreciate Ambassador Beam's
comment on this tactic.
END
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NODIS
SUBJ: Dobrynin-Secretary Rogers Meeting March 11
1. Asst Sec Sisco informed Israel Ambassador Rabin
March 12 that during Dobrynin meeting with Secretary
previous day Soviets proposed resumption of bilateral.
statement
conversations and, as follow-up to Malik/at March 5
Four Power meeting, Dobrynin indicated willingness to
consider kind of precise formulations re peace
contained in Oct 28 and Dec 18 proposals.
2. Secretary told Dobrynin USG will study procedural
suggestion re resumption bilaterals as well as what
latter said about substance.
3. Sisco urged Rabin to hold above very closely and
noted that Soviets had complained to Secretary about
a number of recent leaks. Rabin said he understood. END
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NODIS
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NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT
1. Amhassador Dobrynin called at his request on Secretary
morning March 11 and made detailed presentation, main thrust
of which was that Soviets would like to resume US-Soviet
Middle East talks and are prepared meet US wishes for more
detailed formulation on question of peace providing US will
be more forthcoming on question of withdrawal, particularly
re Sharm al-Shaykh, Gaza and Syria.
2. Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov subsequently called on
NEA/IAI Country Director Atherton with copy of Dobrynin's
talking points. Vorontsov declined leave text but let
Atherton read it and take full notes, on which following
paragraphs are based.
3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS. Further aggravation of Middle East
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_________________________
situation makes it urgent that energetic steps be taken to
arrest increasing tensions in area. Soviet Government
believes that, in addition to ending barbaric Israeli bombings
of UAR civilian centers, there is need for new effort by
major powers to achieve political settlement.
4. Soviet Government continues to believe that Middle East
settlement should result in just and lasting peace, not
just unstable and temporary armistice. Given tense Arab-
Israeli relations, there is need for cautious, protracted
and serious work to bring positions of parties closer.
5. Soviet Government intends to continue seeking settlement
through exchange of views with USG, although US January reply
was far from constructive. Just and lasting peace is possible
on basis of earlier Soviet proposals but, to facilitate
agreement, Soviet Government has additional considerations to
offer.
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6. Taking into account questions raised by USG, Soviets
are prepared to discuss those questions, including establish-
ment of peace, in bilateral talks. Preamble of Soviet plan
recognizes need for just and stable peace in Middle East.
USG has stressed that this question is of prime importance
readiness
and has said that if Arabs show /
to establish peace
this would remove serious barriers to agreement. Soviet
point. Nevertheless,
plan is sufficiently clear on with
view to achieving understanding, Soviet Government would
be ready to supplement provisions in its plan on cessation of
state of war by provision on establishing, as result of
settlement, a state of peace.
7. Soviet plan has sufficient concrete provisions about
obligations of parties resulting from cessation of state of
war and establishment of peace. USG, however, seeks more
detail on these points as is clear from its October 28
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and December 18 papers.
8. Soviet Government is prepared to meet US wishes on this
question if US side shows due understanding of questions
whose solution is of interest to Soviet side, first and
foremost those questions concerning the unequivocal recording
of provisions for the withdrawal of troops.
9. USG has still not indicated that it shares Soviet view
that sovereignty over Sharm al-Shaykh belongs to UAR. USG
has also given no assurances that Israeli troops are to
withdraw from Gaza sector and that this Arab territory is
to be restored to its pre-June 1967 borders with the previous
situation there re-established. Soviet Government raised
these questions in its December 23, 1969 document and USG
has still not replied.
10. Replies on these points are important since Soviet
Government is convinced that principal issue of settlement
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is withdrawal of troops and establishment of secure and
recognized boundaries. Without exact formulations on these
questions, there can be no possibility of moving on whole
question of settlement.
11. In addition to agreement on withdrawal of troops from
all occupied territories and status of peace, it would be
useful to consider and agree on other unresolved provisions
of UAR-Israeli settlement. Soviet Government proceeds from
assumption that both our sides will strive to broaden area
of agreement between them.
12. Question of Jordan-Israel settlement being considered by
Four Powers in New York, but problem of Syria remains
untouched in both Two and Four Power talks. Soviet Government
notes that USG has avoided taking position on this question,
citing as reason Syrian rejection of SC Resolution 242. In
Soviet view, position of Syrian Government does not reliejve
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PAGE 6
us of task of working out concrete aspects of Syrian-
Israeli settlement. If just solution found, Soviet Government
is convinced difficulties stemming from Syrian position
would disappear. Principal aspects of Soviet June 17, 1969
plan relate to all countries directly involved in conflict.
Soviet Government expects USG to express concrete views on
questions touching directly on problem of Syrian-Israeli
settlement.
13. Soviet Government wishes to raise another matter which
it does not consider unimportant. Soviet Government expects
USG to take measures to prevent leaks of information about
confidential US-Soviet discussions, which adversely affect
course of our consultations. Examples have been publication
of text of Kosygin letter and Estabrook report in Washington
Post of February 19 Four Power meeting.
14. Soviet Government wishes to stress that it assumes
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_________________________
USG will be guided by broad interests of international
security and of development of relations between our two
states. US and Soviet interests will be served by Middle
East not becoming arena of unwanted confrontation. Soviet
Government believes this can be achieved and will continue
its efforts in this direction in hope USG will do the same.
END TALKING POINTS.
ХОРЖАВХ
15. Secretary responded that we XENDY would study both the
suggestion to resume bilateral discussions and the substantive
Soviet proposals. He made clear that if we should agree to
resume bilateral talks, there would have to be an understanding
of what the resumption of those talks signifies. Our
willingness to resume talks could not be interpreted to mean
an acceptance of the Soviet proposals or that we were willing
to make concessions going beyond our present position as
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_________________________
reflected in the October 28 and December 18 documents.
END
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ROGERS
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ATE 050459
CDIS NOFORN
Sisco-Dobryniň Meeting April 6
Following is summary Sisco Dobrynin meeting April 6.
Detailed report by septel.
1.
In = meeting with Dobrynin April 6, Sisco suggested
USSR.
that the Soviets submit in writing any formulation, has
n mind on peace and negot ations if it finds unsat fac
ie presen formulations
t
two key points in Oct.
er
)C
brynin was
21
0 doing so, but agreed
put this reque to Moscow. At the same
sering Dob in submitted a text, calling for total
Jusisco
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Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, Sharm el-Sheikh, Gaza,
West Bank
/and Golan Heights. The slight difference between this
roposal and the June 1969 Soviet position is that it calls
(not precisely defined)
for a UN buffer/to be established by stages as Israeli
forces withdraw. Sisco indicated that while we would study
the latest Soviet formulations, it is of critical importance
that US know precisely and in writing just what the Soviets
vill accept insofar as commitments to peace and negotiations
are concerned. Once this is made clear by the Soviets, the
US would be in a position to make specific substantive
comment on four critical issues being currently discussed:
negotiations, peace, withdrawal and boundaries. Dobrynin
expressed dissatisfaction with Sisco's unwillingness to
alter the US substantive position on Sharm el-Sheikh and
Gaza and his insistence that the Soviets either accept
language on peace and negotiations in the Oct. 28 document
or submit precisely an alternative for our consideration.
Our assessment is that Moscow will take some time before
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eacting.
earlier
As for Dobrynin's /indications of a possible Soviet
illingness to work with the parties to achieve a de facto
ceasefire, Sisco indicated the matter was under study.
As a follow up to Secretary's recent conversation with
obrynin, Sisco pressed the Soviet Ambassador for Moscow's
reaction to our expression of concern over the introduction
of SAM-3's and in particular introduction of additional
25
Soviet personnel into the UAR. Dobrynin refused to make
EIAED
any commitment, saying only that SAM-3's were of a defensive
nature. He gave no encouragement that anything further
would come from Moscow on this point.
xasled
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SISCO - DOBRYNIN, II
SUMMARY
TAB A
May 6 - Sisco-Dobrynin Meeting
Sisco presented part of our proposed Arab-Israeli agreement. He
explained the following U.S. proposals:
-- A settlement would be based on the UN resolution, the settlement
would be a package, a formal state of peace would exist, all
claims or states of belligerency would end including terrorist
raids, and the parties would agree to abide by the UN charter
in settling future disputes.
Dobrynin did not comment directly on any single item and said Moscow
would have to examine our entire document before giving a positive
reply.
Dobrynin felt U.S. may have misunderstood Soviet position on borders.
They want withdrawal to pre-war lines, but have no objections if the
parties want to change their borders.
TAB B Mtr 8 MEETING
TAB C MAY 12 M76
Tab D May 19utq.
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ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 O?. NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN For 101 (revised 6-85)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Feb. 24, 1970
To General Haig
Copies of the attached will not
be made available through the
Secretariat.
HAR I showed Hal
Плиндив comments
on you mino smill
W pupand id. 2
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
milzat
SECRET/NODIS
ACTION
February 24, 1970
AK
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: The President's Comment on your Memorandum of February 4
(Log 7124) on the Kosygin Letter
In rereading the memorandum (which, you recall I originally sent to you
and which you then forwarded to the President with slight modifications),
I felt that the President's disagreement with one of the paragraphs might
have been based on a misunderstanding.
I don't know whether you may have already discussed the issue with the
President or whether you wish to pursue it further. It is actually quite
an important one: the risks attendant on Moscow's undoubted progress
in building their own role and further eroding ours in the Middle East.
I have tried in the attached (Tab A) to clarify the thoughts in the paragraph
at the bottom of page 2 of your memo of February 4.
RECOMMENDATION
That if you wish to pursue this matter with the President, you sign the
memorandum at Tab A
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
th
SUBJECT: Soviet Position in the Middle East
When I sent you a memorandum earlier this month commenting on
Kosygin's Middle East letter, you noted your disagreement with one
of the paragraphs. You noted that far from suffering a defeat in 1967
the Soviets succeeded in further cementing their friendship with the
Arabs while we ended up as their enemy and that in the long run this serves
Soviet interests.
I am sorry that the point I was trying to make did not come through
clearly. It was that at present the Arabs were suffering from Israeli
military action and that the Soviets by identifying us so closely with
Israel were making it appear as though we do better by our client than
they do by theirs. My conclusion was that since it was unlikely that a
cease-fire would take place, the pressure on the Soviets to provide more
effective aid to the Arabs would rise. I felt that Kosygin himself, by
sending you the letter, had contributed to those pressures. This was why
I described the letter as "disturbing. 11 In other words, while the Soviets
are undoubtedly advancing their long range objective of further alienating
us from the Arabs, they are also committing more and more of their own
prestige and at some point might find it necessary to do something dramatic
to counteract Israeli military actions.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Soviet Position in the Middle East
When I sent you a memorandum earlier this month commenting on
Kosygin's Middle East letter, you noted your disagreement with one
of the paragraphs. You noted that far from suffering a defeat in 1967
the Soviets succeeded in further cementing their friendship with the
Arabs while we ended up as their enemy and that in the long run this serves
Soviet interests.
I am sorry that the point I was trying to make did not come through
clearly. It was that at present the Arabs were suffering from Israeli
military action and that the Soviets by identifying us so closely with
Israel were making it appear as though we do better by our client than
they do by theirs. My conclusion was that since it was unlikely that a
cease-fire would take place, the pressure on the Soviets to provide more
effective aid to the Arabs would rise. I felt that Kosygin himself, by
sending you the letter, had contributed to those pressures. This was why
I described the letter as "disturbing." In other words, while the Soviets
are undoubtedly advancing their long range objective of further alienating
us from the Arabs, they are also committing more and more of their own
prestige and at some point might find it necessary to do something dramatic
to counteract Israeli military actions.
HSonnenfeldt:mm:2/24/70
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PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
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(GSA FORM 7279 0?. NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
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MEMORANDUM
SECRET/NODIS
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION 7054
WASHINGTON
February 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
IK
SUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin
Attached are a draft reply to Kosygin's message and Secretary
Rogers' recommendation. The Secretary's memo makes essentially
the points made in my earlier memo to you but adds these:
1.
The Kosygin message may have been designed to delay our
response to Israel's arms requests, since Nasser has
probably asked the Soviets for more and the Soviets know
the UAR problem is lack of trained manpower and not lack
of equipment.
2.
While it might be tempting to stand back and let pressure
on the UAR and USSR mount further, this carries an element
of risk. Soviet prestige is involved, and they might see
themselves under increasing pressure to do something
visible to reverse the present trend. It is, on balance, in
the U.S. interest to restore the cease-fire.
I agree and the draft reply is written with this in mind.
The Secretary urges an early response. I understand your view to
be that we should deliver our reply Wednesday, mainly not to reply
in a time frame suggested by Dobrynin. I agree because the onus for
delay cannot be placed on us; our response says we have already
been in touch with both sides about restoring the cease-fire. More-
over, Nasser delivered a strongly anti-American speech Monday,
and there is some advantage in ignoring him.
Recommendation: That you approve the attached text and delivery
to Dobrynin by Sisco Wednesday morning.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET/NODIS FEB 3 1970
Historical File
SECRET/NODIS
7054
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 2, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Soviet Message of January 31 on the Middle East
Attached is a suggested reply to the Kosygin message of
January 31 on the Middle East. We will discuss our proposed
reply, after your approval, with the UK, France and with the
Israelis, whose cooperation is essential in restoring cease
fire conditions in the area. Your reply would then be
handed to Dobrynin.
A prompt reply would have the advantage of informing
Kosygin of the current efforts we started on our own several
days ago to help bring about restoration of the UAR-Israeli
cease fire. We agree with the argument that we should not
appear to be excessively hurried and in fact we would not be
ready to respond before Tuesday.
On the other hand, undue delay in informing the Soviets
of our efforts would play into their strategy to place the
onus for the current situation on the United States and to
garner credit in the Arab world for applying pressure on the
United States and Israel.
There are several observations regarding the Kosygin
letter which are worth mentioning.
First, its principal thrust seems to be to get us to get
the Israelis to lift the military pressure on Nasser. It
could possibly signal that Nasser may be about ready to give
up for the time being his war of attrition tactics and he may
be looking for a way out. The Rabat Conference has helped
free Nasser's hands in this regard, since he can always say
his attempt to mobilize Arab resources fell far short of what
SECRET/NODIS
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
SECRET/NODIS
2
he needs. He is also freer after Rabat to pursue a poli-
tical solution if he so decides. This is why I feel it is
so important to continue to stand firm on our two United
States peace proposals and to maintain our efforts to convince
Cairo and Moscow to adopt a positive stance toward them, as
has Hussein.
Second, the inability of Cairo to respond effectively
to the Israeli deep penetration raids is no doubt embarrass-
ing to Moscow. We surmise, though we are not sure, that
Kosygin's letter stems from Nasser's reported trip to Moscow
which must also have involved further UAR arms requests. As
a minimum, we are reasonably certain that Nasser encouraged
Moscow to come forward with a concrete arms proposition to
Jordan. The reference in the message that the Soviets would
be "forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at
their disposal" could signal that the Soviets have taken a
decision to give more arms to Nasser, though there is nothing
to indicate any change in their policy of providing measured
amounts, or that they have decided provide more sophisticated
weapons. It may also be intended to discourage us from pro-
viding Israel with additional arms. Moreover, short of nuclear
weapons, the Soviets know as we do, that more materiel to the
UAR cannot have an immediate effect on the arms balance or
result in a sharp increase in UAR effectiveness, since the
problem is not hardware but Egyptian lack of training and over-
all qualitative capacity. In short, the Soviets are in some-
what of a squeeze at the moment, and it should not be precluded
that in time a more responsive reply to our two peace proposals
will come forth.
Third, while it might be tempting to make only pro-forma
efforts to achieve restoration of the cease fire and let
pressure mount on the Soviet Union and Nasser, this carries
with it elements of risk. Since Soviet prestige is involved,
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
3
they might see themselves under increasing pressure to do
something visible and concrete to reverse the present trend.
The Israeli attacks have made their point psychologically
and have achieved the military objective of reducing their
casualties on the Suez front. Much of the UAR military
capacity in the Suez area has been destroyed. If Nasser as
a quid pro quo is ready to abide by the UN cease fire
resolutions and let up for the time being on his declared
war of attrition, it is in the Israeli and United States
interests to restore observance of the cease fire. More-
over, as long as the deep penetration raids go on, it is
unlikely that Nasser can take any positive moves toward a
peace settlement. This is not to say that the converse is
true; even if Israel relaxed its military pressure, there
is no assurance Nasser would move toward a settlement.
Fourth, there are some important tactical considerations
on how to handle the Kosygin letter.
The letter has propagandistic overtones seeking to pin
responsibility exclusively on Israel and the United States.
Our reply must be framed on the assumption we may find it
necessary and desirable to make it public if the Soviets play
their message that way.
The Soviet letter is firm, one sided, and is confined
exclusively to the Middle East; but it has an element of
threat to us in that it first implies we are in collusion
with Israel and then warns of giving the Arabs more means to
rebuff the Israelis. Our response on this point in parti-
cular should be firm.
It is important to note that Kosygin does not propose
that the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics bring joint influence to bear on both sides to
restore the cease fire; his focus is primarily on Israeli
responsibility for the situation, American collusion, and
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
4
the need for total Israeli withdrawal. For this reason, I
suggest that your reply inform Kosygin of the steps we have
taken and are taking through diplomatic channels to ensure
compliance with the UN cease fire resolutions. We believe
that joint action by the Four Powers is undesirable since
it would offer more opportunity for the Soviets to exploit
this as responsive to their pressure. We therefore should
tell the UK and France that we agree that the UN cease fire
should be restored, that our own efforts have been in train
for some time, and that each should do what he can through
diplomatic channels to help bring about a mutually respected
cease fire.
Finally, we believe your reply should place consider-
able emphasis on the need for a positive reaction by the
Soviets to the two United States peace proposals.
Wm
William P. Rogers
Attachment
Suggested reply to Soviet Premier Kosygin
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
Suggested Reply
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Your message of January 31 has been studied care-
fully. For its part, the United States intends to
continue its efforts to promote a stable peace between
the parties in accordance with the UN Security Council
Resolution of November 22, 1967 and to encourage the
scrupulous adherence by all concerned, not just one
side, to the cease fire resolutions of the United Nations.
I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is the steadfast
policy of the United States.
We do not accept the views expressed by the Soviet
Government in explanation of the current situation in
the Middle East. We have been using our influence with
both sides urging strict observance of the cease fire.
Thus any implication that the United States has been a
party to or has encouraged violations of the cease fire
is without foundation. 9 Moreover, your attempt to place
SECRET/NODIS
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
2
responsibility on one side is not supported by the facts;
there have been repeated violations of the UN cease fire
resolutions by both sides. Full compliance with these
resolutions on all fronts, including the prevention of
fedayeen attacks against Israel, would help establish a
more favorable atmosphere for progress towards a settle-
ment.
As I have pointed out, the United States, just
shortly before the receipt of your letter, discussed
this matter with both Israel and the UAR and urged both
sides to adhere strictly to the UN cease fire resolutions.
We intend to continue these discussions in order to
bring about early restoration of the cease fire between
Israel and the UAR. It will be recalled that in early
1969 the UAR announced and initiated a policy of non-observance of
the cease fire. An early indication by the UAR that it
will abide by the UN cease fire resolutions if Israel
will do the same would contribute to a reduction of
tension and violence and facilitate a political solution.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
3
We are prepared to continue our efforts in that direction.
We are not aware of any recent Soviet efforts to this
end.
We have noted the reference in your message to the
effect that "the Soviet Union will be forced to see to
it that the Arab states have means at their disposal
"
The United States has always opposed steps which could
have the effect of drawing the major powers more deeply
into the Middle East conflict. This could only com-
plicate matters further.
For this reason, the United States: (1) supports
the prompt restoration of the cease fire; and (2) favors
an understanding on limitations of arms shipments into
the area. The question of arms limitations was raised
directly with Mr. Gromyko in July of last year, our
willingness to discuss this important subject was reaf-
firmed in my speech before the General Assembly this
last fall and subsequently was again taken up with
Mr. Gromyko by Secretary Rogers, and our strong prefer-
ence for limitations was reiterated as recently as
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
4
January 25. Our proposals for discussion of this matter
were rejected by the Soviet Union.
While preferring restraint, as I indicated on
January 25, the United States is watching carefully the
in the Middle East
relative balance/there and we will not hesitate to
provide arms to friendly states as the need arises.
On the broader question of a peace settlement, the
United States remains committed to help achieve a peace
agreement between the parties as called for by the UN
Resolution of November, 1967. We have noted your
point to the effect that if the question of withdrawal
were resolved, there would be no serious obstacles to
agreement on other questions. As you know, there can
be no withdrawal unless there is full agreement between
the parties on all of the elements of a peace settlement.
In this connection, the proposals of October 28 and
December 18, 1969, meet the legitimate concerns of both
sides on all key questions, including withdrawal. We
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
5
believe these proposals constitute reasonable guide-
lines which would provide Ambassador Jarring the means
to start the indispensable process of negotiations
between the parties under his auspices. It is a matter
of regret that Soviet unresponsiveness to these pro-
posals is holding up this process; a more constructive
Soviet reply is required if progress towards a settle-
ment is to be made.
We note your desire to work with us in bringing
peace to this area. We do not believe peace can come
if either side seeks unilateral advantage. We are
willing to continue our efforts to achieve a stable
peace in the Middle East in a spirit of good will.
We are providing copies of this communication to
Prime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.
SECRET/NODIS
Dispatched by Special Messenger on 2/4
at 12:30 a.m. to be held in State Operations
Center for Delivery to Ted Eliot opening of
business 2/4/70 per General Haig.
Florence Gwyer 2/4/70
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
February 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin Note on the Middle East
Attached is a memorandum for your signature to the Secretary
of State enclosing the original of the President's reply to
the Kosygin note on the Middle East, together with copies of
the letter to be furnished by the Department of State to the
Ambassadors of France and Great Britain.
I have coordinated this package with Hal Saunders who is also
furnishing you a separate memorandum containing guidance to
Joe Sisco for handling the necessary press backgrounder on this
subject. I believe you will want to call Joe Sisco this evening
and inform him of the action taken with respect to the reply and
mention to him that Hal will be in touch with him to provide
guidance on the background.
Attachments
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
February 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT:
Response to Chairman Kosygin's Message
of January 31, 1970
Attached is the response to Chairman Kosygin's message of
January 31, 1970 on the Middle East.
The President has approved Assistant Secretary Sisco's delivering
this repponse, in person, to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin some
time Wednesday morning.
Additional copies of the President's reply are attached for delivery
to the Ambassadors of France and Great Britain, following delivery
of the original.
Henry A. Kissinger
Attachments
SECRET/NODIS
Dispatched 2/4/70, Rept. #1039
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 4, 1970
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Your message of January 31 has been studied carefully. For
its part, the United States intends to continue its efforts to
promote a stable peace between the parties in accordance with
the UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 and
to encourage the scrupulous adherence by all concerned, not
just one side, to the cease-fire resolutions of the United
Nations. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is the stead-
fast policy of the United States.
We do not accept the views expressed by the Soviet Govern-
ment in explanation of the current situation in the Middle East.
We have been using our influence with both sides urging strict
observance of the cease-fire. Thus any implication that the
United States has been a party to or has encouraged violations
of the cease-fire is without foundation.
Moreover, your attempt to place responsibility on one side
is not supported by the facts; there have been repeated viola-
tions of the UN cease-fire resolutions by both sides. Full
compliance with these resolutions on all fronts, including
the prevention of fedayeen attacks against Israel, would help
establish a more favorable atmosphere for progress towards
a settlement.
As I have pointed out, the United States, just shortly before
the receipt of your letter, discussed this matter with both
Israel and the UAR and urged both sides to adhere strictly
to the UN cease-fire resolutions. We intend to continue these
discussions in order to bring about early restoration of the
cease-fire between Israel and the UAR. It will be recalled
that in early 1969 the UAR announced and initiated a policy
-2-
of non-observance of the cease-fire. An early indication by
the UAR that it will abide by the UN cease-fire resolutions if
Israel will do the same would contribute to a reduction of
tension and violence and facilitate a political solution. We
are prepared to continue our efforts in that direction. We
are not aware of any recent Soviet efforts to this end.
We have noted the reference in your message to the effect
that "the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the Arab
states have means at their disposal
"
The United States
has always opposed steps which could have the effect of
drawing the major powers more deeply into the Middle East
conflict. This could only complicate matters further.
For this reason, the United States: (1) supports the prompt
restoration of the cease-fire; and (2) favors an understanding
on limitations of arms shipments into the area. The question
of arms limitations was raised directly with Mr. Gromyko
in July of last year, our willingness to discuss this important
subject was reaffirmed in my speech before the General
Assembly this last fall and subsequently was again taken up
with Mr. Gromyko by Secretary Rogers, and our strong pre-
ference for limitations was reiterated as recently as
January 25. Our proposals for discussion of this matter
were rejected by the Soviet Union.
While preferring restraint, as I indicated on January 25, the
United States is watching carefully the relative balance in the
Middle East and we will not hesitate to provide arms to
friendly states as the need arises.
On the broader question of a peace settlement, the United
States remains committed to help achieve a peace agreement
between the parties as called for by the UN Resolution of
November, 1967. We have noted your point to the effect that
if the question of withdrawal were resolved, there would be
no serious obstacles to agreement on other questions. As
you know, there can be no withdrawal unless there is full
agreement between the parties on all of the elements of a
-3-
peace settlement. In this connection, the proposals of
October 28 and December 18, 1969, meet the legitimate con-
cerns of both sides on all key questions, including withdrawal.
We believe these proposals constitute reasonable guidelines
which would provide Ambassador Jarring the means to start
the indispensable process of negotiations between the parties
under his auspices. It is a matter of regret that Soviet un-
responsiveness to these proposals is holding up this process;
a more constructive Soviet reply is required if progress
towards a settlement is to be made.
We note your desire to work with us in bringing peace to this
area. We do not believe peace can come if either side seeks
unilateral advantage. We are willing to continue our efforts
to achieve a stable peace in the Middle East in a spirit of
good will.
We are providing copies of this communication to Prime
Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.
Sincerely,
Richard nifer
His Excellency
Aleksey N. Kosygin
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow, U.S.S. R.
Kissinger Lake
Eges Only
SECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
The strategy of our reply that I propose is:
-- to come down very hard on the Soviet threat;
-- to relate Israeli observance of the cease-fire to
corresponding observance by the other side, including
irregular forces;
-- to press the Soviets to spell out their views on what
the Arabs would commit themselves to if Israel withdrew.
Because this message is going to both Prime Minister Wilson and
President Pompidou, I believe State must be brought in. I have
talked to Secretary Rogers and given him the memorandum at Tab B
suggesting the elements of a reply based on our conversation from
New York. I have also talked to Joe Sisco who agrees with this
general approach.
I have also told Ambassador Freeman that we have a message and
will talk to him before replying. I will reach Ambassador Lucet
tonight. These small gestures of consultation are worth the effort
since they will have the letter anyway. After we have a draft reply,
we should seriously consider telling the Israelis.
We will have a Idraft reply for your consideration on Monday. My
recommendation is that we should hold it, however, until at least
Wednesday and preferably Thursday.
Attachments
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
The strategy of our reply that I propose is:
-- to come down very hard on the Soviet threat;
-- to relate Israeli observance of the cease-fire to
corresponding observance by the other side, including
irregular forces;
-- to press the Soviets to spell out their views on what
the Arabs would commit themselves to if Israel withdrew.
Because this message is going to both Prime Minister Wilson and
President Pompidou, I believe State must be brought in. I have
talked to Secretary Rogers and given him the memorandum at Tab B
suggesting the elements of a reply based on our conversation from
New York. I have also talked to Joe Sisco who agrees with this
general approach.
I have also told Ambassador Freeman that we have a message and
will talk to him before replying. I will reach Ambassador Lucet
tonight. These small gestures of consultation are worth the effort
since they will have the letter anyway. After we have a draft reply,
we should seriously consider telling the Israelis.
We will have a Idraft reply for your consideration on Monday. My
recommendation is that we should hold it, however, until at least
Wednesday and preferably Thursday.
Attachments
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
Feb. 2, 1970
7054
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
nle.
FROM:
Harold H. Saunders
SUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin
President Nasser's speech was delivered
this afternoon. I have taken this into account
in the covering memo to the President. Hal
Sonnenfeldt has no problems with the attached.
SECRET/NODIS
HHSaunders:tmt 2/2/70
SECRET/NODIS
ACTION 7054
FEB 3 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
HK
SUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin
Attached are a draft reply to Kosygin's message and Secretary
Rogers' recommendation. The Secretary's memo makes essentially
the points made in my earlier memo to you but adds these:
1.
The Kosygin message may have been designed to delay our
response to Israel's arms requests, since Nasser has
probably asked the Soviets for more and the Soviets know
the UAR problem is lack of trained manpower and not lack
of equipment.
2.
While it might be tempting to stand back and let pressure
on the UAR and USSR mount further, this carries an element
of risk. Soviet prestige is involved, and they might see
themselves under increasing pressure to do something
visible to reverse the present trend. It is, on balance, in
the U.S. interest to restore the cease-fire.
I agree and the draft reply is written with this in mind.
The Secretary urges an early response. I understand your view to
be that we should deliver our reply Wednesday, mainly not to reply
in a time frame suggested by Dobrynin. I agree because the onus for
delay cannot be placed on us; our response says we have already
been in touch with both sides about restering the cease-fire. More-
over, Nasser delivered a strongly anti-American speech Monday,
and there is some advantage in ignoring him.
Recommendation: That you approve the attached text and delivery
to Dobrynin by Sisco Wednesday morning.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET/NODIS
HAK;DRY;jlp;2/2/70
Retyped HHSaunders:rn:2/2/70 5 p.m.
SECRET/NODIS
7054
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 2, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Soviet Message of January 31 on the Middle East
Attached is a suggested reply to the Kosygin message of
January 31 on the Middle East. We will discuss our proposed
reply, after your approval, with the UK, France and with the
Israelis, whose cooperation is essential in restoring cease
fire conditions in the area. Your reply would then be
handed to Dobrynin.
A prompt reply would have the advantage of informing
Kosygin of the current efforts we started on our own several
days ago to help bring about restoration of the UAR-Israeli
cease fire. We agree with the argument that we should not
appear to be excessively hurried and in fact we would not be
ready to respond before Tuesday.
On the other hand, undue delay in informing the Soviets
of our efforts would play into their strategy to place the
onus for the current situation on the United States and to
garner credit in the Arab world for applying pressure on the
United States and Israel.
There are several observations regarding the Kosygin
letter which are worth mentioning.
First, its principal thrust seems to be to get us to get
the Israelis to lift the military pressure on Nasser. It
could possibly signal that Nasser may be about ready to give
up for the time being his war of attrition tactics and he may
be looking for a way out. The Rabat Conference has helped
free Nasser's hands in this regard, since he can always say
his attempt to mobilize Arab resources fell far short of what
SECRET/NODIS
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
SECRET/NODIS
2
he needs. He is also freer after Rabat to pursue a poli-
tical solution if he so decides. This is why I feel it is
SO important to continue to stand firm on our two United
States peace proposals and to maintain our efforts to convince
Cairo and Moscow to adopt a positive stance toward them, as
has Hussein.
Second, the inability of Cairo to respond effectively
to the Israeli deep penetration raids is no doubt embarrass-
ing to Moscow. We surmise, though we are not sure, that
Kosygin's letter stems from Nasser's reported trip to Moscow
which must also have involved further UAR arms requests. As
a minimum, we are reasonably certain that Nasser encouraged
Moscow to come forward with a concrete arms proposition to
Jordan. The reference in the message that the Soviets would
be "forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at
their disposal" could signal that the Soviets have taken a
decision to give more arms to Nasser, though there is nothing
to indicate any change in their policy of providing measured
amounts, or that they have decided provide more sophisticated
weapons. It may also be intended to discourage us from pro-
viding Israel with additional arms. Moreover, short of nuclear
weapons, the Soviets know as we do, that more materiel to the
UAR cannot have an immediate effect on the arms balance or
result in a sharp increase in UAR effectiveness, since the
problem is not hardware but Egyptian lack of training and over-
all qualitative capacity. In short, the Soviets are in some-
what of a squeeze at the moment, and it should not be precluded
that in time a more responsive reply to our two peace proposals
will come forth.
Third, while it might be tempting to make only pro-forma
efforts to achieve restoration of the cease fire and let
pressure mount on the Soviet Union and Nasser, this carries
with it elements of risk. Since Soviet prestige is involved,
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
3
they might see themselves under increasing pressure to do
something visible and concrete to reverse the present trend.
The Israeli attacks have made their point psychologically
and have achieved the military objective of reducing their
casualties on the Suez front. Much of the UAR military
capacity in the Suez area has been destroyed. If Nasser as
a quid pro quo is ready to abide by the UN cease fire
resolutions and let up for the time being on his declared
war of attrition, it is in the Israeli and United States
interests to restore observance of the cease fire. More-
over, as long as the deep penetration raids go on, it is
unlikely that Nasser can take any positive moves toward a
peace settlement. This is not to say that the converse is
true; even if Israel relaxed its military pressure, there
is no assurance Nasser would move toward a settlement.
Fourth, there are some important tactical considerations
on how to handle the Kosygin letter.
The letter has propagandistic overtones seeking to pin
responsibility exclusively on Israel and the United States.
Our reply must be framed on the assumption we may find it
necessary and desirable to make it public if the Soviets play
their message that way.
The Soviet letter is firm, one sided, and is confined
exclusively to the Middle East; but it has an element of
threat to us in that it first implies we are in collusion
with Israel and then warns of giving the Arabs more means to
rebuff the Israelis. Our response on this point in parti-
cular should be firm.
It is important to note that Kosygin does not propose
that the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics bring joint influence to bear on both sides to
restore the cease fire; his focus is primarily on Israeli
responsibility for the situation, American collusion, and
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
4
the need for total Israeli withdrawal. For this reason, I
suggest that your reply inform Kosygin of the steps we have
taken and are taking through diplomatic channels to ensure
compliance with the UN cease fire resolutions. We believe
that joint action by the Four Powers is undesirable since
it would offer more opportunity for the Soviets to exploit
this as responsive to their pressure. We therefore should
tell the UK and France that we agree that the UN cease fire
should be restored, that our own efforts have been in train
for some time, and that each should do what he can through
diplomatic channels to help bring about a mutually respected
cease fire.
Finally, we believe your reply should place consider-
able emphasis on the need for a positive reaction by the
Soviets to the two United States peace proposals.
Wm
William P. Rogers
Attachment
Suggested reply to Soviet Premier Kosygin
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
Suggested Reply
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Your message of January 31 has been studied care-
fully. For its part, the United States intends to
continue its efforts to promote a stable peace between
the parties in accordance with the UN Security Council
Resolution of November 22, 1967 and to encourage the
scrupulous adherence by all concerned, not just one
side, to the cease fire resolutions of the United Nations.
I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is the steadfast
policy of the United States.
We do not accept the views expressed by the Soviet
Government in explanation of the current situation in
the Middle East. We have been using our influence with
both sides urging strict observance of the cease fire.
Thus any implication that the United States has been a
party to or has encouraged violations of the cease fire
is without foundation. Moreover, your attempt to place
SECRET/NODIS
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
2
responsibility on one side is not supported by the facts;
there have been repeated violations of the UN cease fire
resolutions by both sides. Full compliance with these
resolutions on all fronts, including the prevention of
fedayeen attacks against Israel, would help establish a
more favorable atmosphere for progress towards a settle-
ment.
As I have pointed out, the United States, just
shortly before the receipt of your letter, discussed
this matter with both Israel and the UAR and urged both
sides to adhere strictly to the UN cease fire resolutions.
We intend to continue these discussions in order to
bring about early restoration of the cease fire between
Israel and the UAR. It will be recalled that in early
announced and
1969 the UAR initiated a policy of non-observance of
the cease fire. An early indication by the UAR that it
will abide by the UN cease fire resolutions if Israel
will do the same would contribute to a reduction of
tension and violence and facilitate a political solution.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
3
We are prepared to continue our efforts in that direction.
We are not aware of any recent Soviet efforts to this
end.
We have noted the reference in your message to the
effect that "the Soviet Union will be forced to see to
it that the Arab states have means at their disposal
11
The United States has always opposed steps which could
have the effect of drawing the major powers more deeply
into the Middle East conflict. This could only com-
plicate matters further.
For this reason, the United States: (1) supports
the prompt restoration of the cease fire; and (2) favors
an understanding on limitations of arms shipments into
the area. The question of arms limitations was raised
directly with Mr. Gromyko in July of last year, our
willingness to discuss this important subject was reaf-
firmed in my speech before the General Assembly this
last fall and subsequently was again taken up with
Mr. Gromyko by Secretary Rogers, and our strong prefer-
ence for limitations was reiterated as recently as
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
4
January 25. Our proposals for discussion of this matter
were rejected by the Soviet Union.
While preferring restraint, as I indicated on
January 25, the United States is watching carefully the
in the middle East
relative balance there and we will not hesitate to
provide arms to friendly states as the need arises.
On the broader question of a peace settlement, the
United States remains committed to help achieve a peace
agreement between the parties as called for by the UN
Resolution of November, 1967. We have noted your
point to the effect that if the question of withdrawal
were resolved, there would be no serious obstacles to
agreement on other questions. As you know, there can
be no withdrawal unless there is full agreement between
the parties on all of the elements of a peace settlement.
In this connection, the proposals of October 28 and
December 18, 1969, meet the legitimate concerns of both
sides on all key questions, including withdrawal. We
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
5
believe these proposals constitute reasonable guide-
lines which would provide Ambassador Jarring the means
to start the indispensable process of negotiations
between the parties under his auspices. It is a matter
of regret that Soviet unresponsiveness to these pro-
posals is holding up this process; a more constructive
Soviet reply is required if progress towards a settle-
ment is to be made.
We note your desire to work with us in bringing
peace to this area. We do not believe peace can come
if either side seeks unilateral advantage. We are
willing to continue our efforts to achieve a stable
peace in the Middle East in a spirit of good will.
We are providing copies of this communication to
Prime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.
SECRET/NODIS
Unofficial translation
from Russian
Dear Mr. President,
According to information now available the Israeli leaders,
ignoring the decisions of the Security Council have in fact
resumed anew military actions against the Arab states, including
bombings of population centers of the UAR in the immediate
vicinity of Cairo. Not only military installations of the UAR
and Jordan are being attacked but also civil population, destruc-
tion is being brought to towns, villages, industrial and other
installations. The aims of these adventurist actions are clear -
to force the neighbouring Arab countries into accepting the
are
demands which put forward by Israel. All this takes place at a time
when the UAR and other Arab countries, honoring decisions of the
Security Council, are not so far striking back at Israel.
In this instance as in determiningtheir position in Middle
Eastern affairs in general the Israeli leaders are evidently
proceeding from the assumption that the US will go on supporting
Israel and that under these circumstances the four great powers
will fail to come to a common view on the implementation of the
decisions of the Security Council.
There is danger that in the immediate future the military
actions may become widescale while the decisions of the Security
Council and the UN General Assembly will be loosing weight in the
eyes of world public.
2.
We are now studying the question to what extent the
Israeli counting on political and other support from outside
has ground and has been coordinated with the diplomatic actions
by certain powers. We consider it our duty however to draw
your attention, Mr. President, to the highly risky consequences
the course chosen by the Israeli leaders may have both from
the point of view of the situation in the Middle East and inter-
national relations as a whole.
We proceed from the conviction that stable peace can and
should be established in the Middle East. The Soviet Union
has persistently strived for this and has influenced its
friends accordingly. If on the other hand the US Government
supported its pronouncements in favor of peace in the Middle
East by practical steps, and in the first place -- vis-a-vis
the Israeli leaders, then there would not have been such a
situation in which for two years and a half the occupier continues t
hold the occupied lands, hundreds of thousands of Arabs are
forced to abandon their homes and people continue to perish.
Adherence by Israel to its present course may only
widen and deepen the conflict, perpetuate tension in one of the
most important areas of the world since it is impossible to
force the Arab countries to reconcile themselves to the
aggression, to the seizure of their territory.
3.
It is in the interests of universal peace and internationa
security to warn the Government of Israel against adventurism,
to undertake urgent and firm actions, which will help in
stopping the growth of military tension and will make Israel
listen to the voice of reason. We believe that this would also
correspond to the national interests of the United States.
We would like to tell you in all frankness that if Israel
continues its adventurism, to bomb the territory of UAR and of
other Arab states, the Soviet Union will be forced to see to
it that the Arab states have means at their disposal, with the
help of which a due rebuff to the arrogant agressor could
be made.
The situation in the Middle East urgently dictates the
necessity of immediate cessation by Israel of its dangerous
armed attacks and sorties against the UAR and other Arab states.
The four powers are capable and must compell Israel to
abandon its policy of military provocations and to see to it
that a lasting peace be established in the Middle East.
We believe that now it is necessary also to effectively
use the mechanism of bilateral and four-power consultations
in order: 1) to ensure speediest withdrawal of Israeli
forces from all the occupied Arab territories, 2) to ensure
establishment of peace in theMiddle East.
4.
Withdrawal of forces is the key question for establishing
peace. If it is solved then there would hardly be any parti-
cular difficulties on the way to agreement on other questions.
We would like you, Mr. President, to appraise the situation
from the viewpoint of special responsibility for the maintenance
of peace which lies on our countries. As for the Soviet
Government, there is no lack of goodwill on our part as well
as resolution to act in the interests of peace in the Middle
East.
Appropriate communications have been sent by us to
Prime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.
Sincerely,
A.Kosygin
ORMA TOTAL
SECRET/NODIS
February 1, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Message from Kosygin
The key points in the message from Kosygin which Ambassador
Dobrynin gave me last night (Tab A) are:
1. The Israelis have in effect resumed military action
against the Arab states.
2. The USSR is studying to what extent Israeli action
has been coordinated with [U.S.] diplomatic action.
3. If Israel continues, this will widen the conflict with
highly risky consequences for the situation in the Mid-
East and international relations as a whole. If Israel
continues, "the USSR will be forced to see to it that the
Arab states have means at their disposal" to rebuff
Israel.
4. The Four Powers must compel Israel to stop and to
see that a lasting peace is established. Withdrawal of
Israeli forces is key; if this is solved, there would hardly
be any difficulty on other questions.
My thoughts about this message are as follows:
1. The tone is relatively moderate, but nevertheless this
is the first Soviet threat to your Administration, so the
tone of your reply will be important. The Soviets avoid
directly threatening action of their own. So far, it would
seem that they are loath to make this a US-USSR con-
frontation.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
2. There is evidence that the combination of our firmness
and the Israeli raids are hurting Nasser.
-- There is a strong likelihood that Nasser made a
secret visit to Moscow January 22-27. That may
be the background for this note.
-- Nasser told the Jordanian Foreign Minister that
he cannot accept our position
(a) because the USSR won't let him, and
(b) because he would appear to be capitulating if
he negotiated while the Israeli bombing continues.
3. The Soviets seem to have become increasingly concerned
about a peace plan with a U.S. label on it.
-- This document suggests action by the Four Powers,
and Kosygin has sent it to Wilson and Pompidou.
-- It implies that we can compel the Israelis to settle.
4. The letter holds out the bait that if the cease-fire could
be restored and withdrawal achieved, other issues would fall
into place. It does not spell out a view on the other issues
and therefore leaves the Soviet view vague. What is worse,
the position that Israel must withdraw before other issues
are settled is a return to the Soviet position of 1967, which
seems to negate much of the progress made in the US-USSR
talks last summer.
5. The overall conclusion from the message and the
circumstances surrounding it is that they are not in the
stronger position vis-a-vis us. Our policy of holding firm
creates the following dilemma for them: If they do not agree
to our proposals, they get nothing, the onus for escalation
falls on them and their client will lose if the escalation leads
to a major clash. If they do agree, they would have to
deliver their client on our terms.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
The strategy of our reply that I propose is:
-- to come down very hard on the Soviet threat;
-- to relate Israeli observance of the cease-fire to
corresponding observance by the other side, including
irregular forces;
-- to press the Soviets to spell out their views on what
the Arabs would commit themselves to if Israel withdrew.
Because this message is going to both Prime Minister Wilson and
President Pompidou, I believe State must be brought in. I have
talked to Secretary Rogers and given him the memorandum at Tab B
reflecting your views on the elements of a reply. Assistant Secretary
Sisco is drafting an answer.
I have also told Ambassador Freeman that we have a message and
will talk to him before replying. I will reach Ambassador Lucet
tonight. These small gestures of consultation are worth the effort
since they will have the letter anyway. After we have a draft reply,
we should seriously consider telling the Israelis.
We will have a draft reply for your consideration on Monday. My
recommendation is that we should hold it, however, until at least
Wednesday and preferably Thursday.
SECRET/NODIS
January 31, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT:
Soviet Message on the Middle East
The President wishes the numbered points below to be used as
guidelines in drafting a response to the Soviet message. He also
wishes the response to take into account consultations with the
British and French.
1. We will use our influence to bring about restoration
of the cease-fire provided that the Soviet Union will use its influence
in the same direction, in particular as regards Fedayeen attacks.
2. The situation could only be complicated if outside powers
became involved directly or indirectly. At the same time, we have
made clear that if necessary we will take steps to correct any im-
balance in armaments in the region.
3. We are prepared to continue working toward a peaceful
settlement. We have noted your statement that if the question of
withdrawal were resolved, agreement on other issues would fall
into place. We made detailed and fair proposals including with-
drawal on October 28. We believe that a response from you --
especially on the other elements -- in the same spirit could provide
a basis for the parties to begin negotiating.
4. It is our assumption that an effective cease-fire,
including irregular forces, would have to exist for negotiations to
proceed in good faith. At the same time, the existence of such
negotiations will provide an incentive to maintain an effective
cease-fire.
The attached communications and all other documents connected
with them should be given distribution exclusively on a need-to-
know basis.
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
February 2, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Attached is a copy of the letter I mentioned to you
on the phone this morning. It is, of course,
furnished strictly for your eyes only.
/s/
Henry A. Kissinger
Attachment
Cy of incoming Kosygin note dated Jan 31, 1970
HAK:AMH:ms:2/2/70
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Unofficial translation
from Russian
Dear Mr. President,
According to information now available the Israeli leaders,
ignoring the decisions of the Security Council have in fact
resumed anew military actions against the Arab states, including
bombings of population centers of the UAR in the immediate
vicinity of Cairo. Not only military installations of the UAR
and Jordan are being attacked but also civil population, destruc-
tion is being brought to towns, villages, industrial and other
installations. The aims of these adventurist actions are clear -
to force the neighbouring Arab countries into accepting the
are
demands which put forward by Israel. All this takes place at a time
when the UAR and other Arab countries, honoring decisions of the
Security Council, are not so far striking back at Israel.
In this instance as in determiningtheir position in Middle
Eastern affairs in general the Israeli leaders are evidently
proceeding from the assumption that the US will go on supporting
Israel and that under these circumstances the four great powers
will fail to come to a common view on the implementation of the
decisions of the Security Council.
There is danger that in the immediate future the military
actions may become widescale while the decisions of the Security
Council and the UN General Assembly will be loosing weight in the
eyes of world public.
2.
We are now studying the question to what extent the
Israeli counting on political and other support from outside
has ground and has been coordinated with the diplomatic actions
by certain powers. We consider it our duty however to draw
your attention, Mr. President, to the highly risky consequences
the course chosen by the Israeli leaders may have both from
the point of view of the situation in the Middle East and inter-
national relations as a whole.
We proceed from the conviction that stable peace can and
should be established in the Middle East. The Soviet Union
has persistently strived for this and has influenced its
friends accordingly. If on the other hand the US Government
supported its pronouncements in favor of peace in the Middle
East by practical steps, and in the first place - vis-a-vis
the Israeli leaders, then there would not have been such a
situation in which for two years and a half the occupier continues to
hold the occupied lands, hundreds of thousands of Arabs are
forced to abandon their homes and people continue to perish.
Adherence by Israel to its present course may only
widen and deepen the conflict, perpetuate tension in one of the
most important areas of the world since it is impossible to
force the Arab countries to reconcile themselves to the
aggression, to the seizure of their territory.
3.
It is in the interests of universal peace and international
security to warn the Government of Israel against adventurism,
to undertake urgent and firm actions, which will help in
stopping the growth of military tension and will make Israel
listen to the voice of reason. We believe that this would also
correspond to the national interests of the United States.
We would like to tell you in all frankness that if Israel
continues its adventurism, to bomb the territory of UAR and of
other Arab states, the Soviet Union will be forced to see to
it that the Arab states have means at their disposal, with the
help of which a due rebuff to the arrogant agressor could
be made.
The situation in the Middle East urgently dictates the
necessity of immediate cessation by Israel of its dangerous
armed attacks and sorties against the UAR and other Arab states.
The four powers are capable and must compell Israel to
abandon its policy of military provocations and to see to it
that a lasting peace be established in the Middle East.
We believe that now it is necessary also to effectively
use the mechanism of bilateral and four-power consultations
in order: 1) to ensure speediest withdrawal of Israeli
forces from all the occupied Arab territories, 2) to ensure
establishment of peace in the Middle East.
4.
Withdrawal of forces is the key question for establishing
peace. If it is solved then there would hardly be any parti-
cular difficulties on the way to agreement on other questions.
We would like you, Mr. President, to appraise the situation
from the viewpoint of special responsibility for the maintenance
of peace which lies on our countries. As for the Soviet
Government, there is no lack of goodwill on our part as well
as resolution to act in the interests of peace in the Middle
East.
Appropriate communications have been sent by us to
Prime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.
Sincerely,
A. Kosygin
Уважаемый Γ-H Президент,
По известным B настоящее время данным, израильское
руководство, игнорируя решения CoBeTa Безопасности, фак-
тически вновь начало военные действия против арабских
государств, B TOM числе И бомбардировки населенных пунк-
ToB OAP, находящихся B непосредственной близости oT Ka-
ира. Удары наносятся He только по военным объектам OAP
и Иордании, Ho и по мирному населению, подвергаются pa3-
рушению города и населенные пункты, промышленные и дру-
гие сооружения. Цели этих авантюристических действий яс-
ны - вынудить соседние арабские страны принять выдвига-
емые Израилем требования. Bce это происходит B TO время,
когда OAP и другие арабские страны, выполняя решения Co-
BeTa Безопасности, He предпринимают пока ответных ударов
по Израилю.
B данном случае, KaK И вообще при определении своей
позиции B ближневосточных делах, израильские руководите-
ли, очевидно, исходят из ToΓo, что США будут и впредь
поддерживать Израиль И что B этих условиях четыре вели-
кие державы He сумеют прийти K единому мнению насчет ВЫ-
полнения решений CoBeTa Безопасности.
Существует опасность, что военные действия B ближай-
шее время MoΓyT приобрести широкие масштабы, a решения Co-
BeTa Безопасности И Генеральной Ассамблеи OOH B глазах
мировой общественности будут терять авторитет.
Мы изучаем сейчас вопрос 0 ToM, B какой Mepe расче-
ты Израиля Ha политическую и иную поддержку извне оправ-
даны и скоординированы C дипломатическими акциями HeKo-
торых держав. Однако мы считаем своим долгом привлечь
Ваше внимание K B высшей степени рискованным последствиям,
которые может иметь Kypc действий, избранный израильским
руководством, KaK C точки зрения положения Ha Ближнем Boc-
2.
ToKe, TaK и международных отношений B целом.
Мы исходим из ToΓo, что Ha Ближнем BocToKe может И
должен быть установлен прочный мир. Советский Союз неиз-
MeHHo стремится K этому и cooTBeTcTBeHHo влияет Ha своих
друзей. Если бы, C другой стороны, правительство США свои
заявления B пользу мира Ha Ближнем BocToKe подкрепило
практическими шагами, и B первую очередь перед израиль-
скими руководителями, TO He было бы TaKoΓo положения, что
два C половиной года захватчик удерживает оккупированные
земли, сотни тысяч арабов вынуждены покинуть свои дома и
продолжают погибать люди.
Продолжение Израилем eΓo нынешнего Kypca способно
лишь расширить и углубить конфликт, увековечить напряжен-
ность B одном из важнейших районов мира, TaK KaK невозмож-
Ho заставить арабские страны смириться c агрессией, C 3a-
xBaToM их территорий.
B интересах всеобщего мира и международной безопас-
ности - предостеречь правительство Израиля oT авантюриз-
Ma, предпринять безотлагательные и твердые действия, Ko-
торые помогут пресечь нарастание военной напряженности и
побудят Израиль прислушаться K голосу pa3yMa. Мы думаем,
что это отвечало бы и национальным интересам Соединенных
Штатов.
Мы хотим co всей откровенностью сказать BaM, что ec-
ли Израиль будет продолжать свой авантюризм, бомбить Tep-
риторию OAP и других арабских государств, TO Советский
Союз вынужден будет позаботиться o ToM, чтобы арабские
государства располагали средствами, при помощи которых
можно было бы дать достойный отпор зарвавшемуся aΓpeccopy.
Обстановка Ha Ближнем BocToKe срочно диктует необхо-
димость ToΓo, чтобы Израиль немедленно прекратил свои
опасные вооруженные нападения И вылазки против OAP и дру-
гих арабских государств.
3.
Четыре державы B состоянии И обязаны заставить Израиль
отказаться OT проведения политики вооруженных провокаций
и сделать TaK, чтобы Ha Ближнем BocToKe был установлен
прочный мир.
Мы полагаем, что сейчас необходимо также эффективно
использовать механизм двух- И четырехсторонних консультаций,
чтобы: I/ добиться скорейшего вывода израильских войск
CO Bcex оккупированных арабских территорий, 2/ добиться
установления мира Ha Ближнем BocToKe.
Вывод войск - ключевой вопрос для установления мира.
Если OH будет разрешен, TO вряд ЛИ встретятся особые труд-
ности Ha пути K договоренности по другим вопросам.
Мы хотели бы, Γ-H Президент, чтобы Вы оценили поло-
жение под углом зрения особой ответственности 3a поддержание
мира, лежащей Ha наших cTpaHax. Что касается CoBeTcKoΓo
правительства, TO y HeΓo HeT недостатка B доброй воле и
решимости действовать B интересах мира Ha Ближнем BocToKe.
Соответствующие обращения направлены нами премьер-
министру Вильсону и президенту Помпиду.
C уважением
А.Косыгин
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February nile 2, 1970
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin
Attached are a draft reply to Kosygin's message and Secretary
Rogers' recommendation. The Secretary's memo makes essentially
the points made in my earlier memo to you but adds these:
1. The Kosygin message may have been designed to delay our
response to Israel's arms requests, since Nasser has probably
asked the Soviets for more and the Soviets know the UAR problem is
lack of trained manpower and not lack of equipment.
2. While it might be tempting to stand back and let pressure on
the UAR and USSR mount further, this carries an element of risk.
Soviet prestige is involved, and they might see themselves under in-
creasing pressure to do something visible to reverse the present trend.
It is, on balance, in the U.S. interest to restore the cease fire.
I agree and the draft reply does so.
The Secretary urges an early response, perhaps Tuesday. His
arguments are:
1. An early reply would inform Kosygin of the efforts we launched
several days ago to urge Israel and the UAR to restore the cease fire.
2. Undue delay in replying would play into Soviet strategy of
placing onus for the current situation on the U.S. and of garnering
credit in the Arab world for applying pressure on the U.S. and Israel.
I believe the original idea of a Thursday reply would be prefer-
able. The parties involved already know what we are doing. A hurried
reply makes it look as if we feel vulnerable.
There is one immediate operational problem. The Four Powers
will meet today (Monday), and we will have to instruct Ambassador
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
Yost to stand off any Soviet effort to turn this into a Four Power
exercise. The fact is that we have already (last Thursday to
Saturday) urged Israel and the UAR to return to observance of the
cease fire. What we want now is comparable action by the USSR.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That, as soon as you have approved the attached text, Sisco
inform the British, French and Israelis.
Approve
Disapprove
2. That, when you have received a report on their responses,
you authorize delivery of our response by Sisco to Dobrynin Thursday.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET/NODIS
Not yet seen by
secretary Ragers.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Soviet Message of January 31 on the Middle East
Attached is a suggested reply to the Kosygin message of
January 31 on the Middle East. We will discuss our proposed
reply, after your approval, with the UK, France and with the
Israelis, whose cooperation is essential in restoring cease
fire conditions in the area. Your reply would then be
handed to Dobrynin.
A prompt reply would have the advantage of informing
Kosygin of the current efforts we started on our own several
days ago to help bring about restoration of the UAR-Israeli
cease fire. We agree with the argument that we should not
appear to be excessively hurried and in fact we would not be
ready to respond before Tuesday.
On the other hand, undue delay in informing the Soviets
of our efforts would play into their strategy to place the
onus for the current situation on the United States and to
garner credit in the Arab world for applying pressure on the
United States and Israel.
There are several observations regarding the Kosygin
letter which are worth mentioning.
First, its principal thrust seems to be to get us to get
the Israelis to lift the military pressure on Nasser. It
could possibly signal that Nasser may be about ready to give
up for the time being his war of attrition tactics and he may
be looking for a way out. The Rabat Conference has helped
free Nasser's hands in this regard, since he can always say
his attempt to mobilize Arab resources fell far short of what
SECRET/NODIS
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified
SECRET/NODIS
2
he needs. He is also freer after Rabat to pursue a poli-
tical solution if he so decides. This is why I feel it is
so important to continue to stand firm on our two United
States peace proposals and to maintain our efforts to convince
Cairo and Moscow to adopt a positive stance toward them, as
has Hussein.
Second, the inability of Cairo to respond effectively
to the Israeli deep penetration raids is no doubt embarrass-
ing to Moscow. We surmise, though we are not sure, that
Kosygin's letter stems from Nasser's reported trip to Moscow
which must also have involved further UAR arms requests. As
a minimum, we are reasonably certain that Nasser encouraged
Moscow to come forward with a concrete arms proposition to
Jordan. The reference in the message that the Soviets would
be "forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at
their disposal" could signal that the Soviets have taken a
decision to give more arms to Nasser, though there is nothing
to indicate any change in their policy of providing measured
amounts, or that they have decided provide more sophisticated
weapons. It may also be intended to discourage us from pro-
viding Israel with additional arms. Moreover, short of nuclear
weapons, the Soviets know as we do, that more materiel to the
UAR cannot have an immediate effect on the arms balance or
result in a sharp increase in UAR effectiveness, since the
problem is not hardware but Egyptian lack of training and over-
all qualitative capacity. In short, the Soviets are in some-
what of a squeeze at the moment, and it should not be precluded
that in time a more responsive reply to our two peace proposals
will come forth.
Third, while it might be tempting to make only pro-forma
efforts to achieve restoration of the cease fire and let
pressure mount on the Soviet Union and Nasser, this carries
with it elements of risk. Since Soviet prestige is involved,
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
3
they might see themselves under increasing pressure to do
something visible and concrete to reverse the present trend.
The Israeli attacks have made their point psychologically
and have achieved the military objective of reducing their
casualties on the Suez front. Much of the UAR military
capacity in the Suez area has been destroyed. If Nasser as
a quid pro quo is ready to abide by the UN cease fire
resolutions and let up for the time being on his declared
war of attrition, it is in the Israeli and United States
interests to restore observance of the cease fire. More-
over, as long as the deep penetration raids go on, it is
unlikely that Nasser can take any positive moves toward a
peace settlement. This is not to say that the converse is
true; even if Israel relaxed its military pressure, there
is no assurance Nasser would move toward a settlement.
Fourth, there are some important tactical considerations
on how to handle the Kosygin letter.
The letter has propagandistic overtones seeking to pin
responsibility exclusively on Israel and the United States.
Our reply must be framed on the assumption we may find it
necessary and desirable to make it public if the Soviets play
their message that way.
The Soviet letter is firm, one sided, and is confined
exclusively to the Middle East; but it has an element of
threat to us in that it first implies we are in collusion
with Israel and then warns of giving the Arabs more means to
rebuff the Israelis. Our response on this point in parti-
cular should be firm.
It is important to note that Kosygin does not propose
that the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics bring joint influence to bear on both sides to
restore the cease fire; his focus is primarily on Israeli
responsibility for the situation, American collusion, and
SECRET/NODIS
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4
the need for total Israeli withdrawal. For this reason, I
suggest that your reply inform Kosygin of the steps we have
taken and are taking through diplomatic channels to ensure
compliance with the UN cease fire resolutions. We believe
that joint action by the Four Powers is undesirable since
it would offer more opportunity for the Soviets to exploit
this as responsive to their pressure. We therefore should
tell the UK and France that we agree that the UN cease fire
should be restored, that our own efforts have been in train
for some time, and that each should do what he can through
diplomatic channels to help bring about a mutually respected
cease fire.
Finally, we believe your reply should place consider-
able emphasis on the need for a positive reaction by the
Soviets to the two United States peace proposals.
William P. Rogers
Attachment
Suggested reply to Soviet Premier Kosygin
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
February 2, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Reply to Kosygin
Attached are a draft reply to Kosygin's message and Secretary
Rogers' recommendation. The Secretary's memo makes essen-
tially the points made in my earlier memo to you but adds these:
1. The Kosygin message may have been designed to delay our
response to Israel's arms requests, since Nasser has probably
asked the Soviets for more and the Soviets know the UAR problem
is lack of trained manpower and not lack of equipment.
2. While it might be tempting to stand back and let pressure on
the UAR and USSR mount further, this carries an element of risk.
Soviet prestige is involved, and they might see themselves under
increasing pressure to do something visible to reverse the present
trend. It is, on balance, in the U.S. interest to restore the cease
fire. 2 agere +th eliaft reply does n.
The Secretary urges an early response, perhaps Tuesday. His
arguments are:
1. An early reply would inform Kosygin of the efforts we launched
several days ago to urge Israel and the UAR to restore the cease fire.
2. Undue delay in replying would play into Soviet strategy of
placing onus for the current situation on the U.S. and of garnering
credit in the Arab world for applying pressure on the U.S. and
Israel.
I believe the original idea of a Thursday reply would be prefer-
able. The parties involved already know what we are doing. A
hurried reply makes it look as if we feel vulnerable.
There is one immediate operational problem. The Four Powers
will meet today (Monday), and we will have to instruct Ambassador
SECRET/NODIS
RETURN THIS RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY TO
REGISTRY NO.
Henry A. Kissinger
HAK-10
UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION
DATE
(Serial No., File No., Subject)
1/31/70
Secret/Nodis/Sensitive Memo,
INCLOSURES
SMOTME
2 -- 2 cys ea.
ADDRESSEE
The Honorable William P. Rogers
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.
Receipt for communication(s) described above is hereby acknowledged by:
ADDRESSEE'S SIGNATURE
DATE RECEIVED
TO BE RETURNED TO THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT
16-70499b-1 GPO
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
February 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Guidance to Ziegler on Kosygin Middle East Message
I note in General Haig's memorandum on this subject that Ziegler is
to say that it would be erroneous to categorize the message in terms of
containing a threat.
The fact is that
1. the note does contain a threat;
2. you said it did in your memo to the President and Secretary Rogers
said so in his;
3. you told Ambassador Freeman -- and I subsequently told Lucet - -
that it was moderately threatening;"
4. any one who reads the note, when it becomes fully public will see
that it contains a threat;
5. our proposed response, at least in the version that I saw and on the
basis of which Sisco is consulting the allies, contains a passage that warns
against major powers getting drawn in more deeply and of our intention to
maintain the balance; i.e., it responds to a threat and when our reply
becomes known it will be so interpreted.
It seems to me that we should either conform our public posture to our private
one or refuse to give any characterization whatsoever, even one that rejects
someone else's.
Whatever one may think of the purposes and nature of the Soviet move --
and I am increasingly impressed with its stupidity and shortsightedness
(see my forthcoming memo on this) -- the Soviets knew very well that they
were making a threat. And Dobrynin tried to accentuate it by trying to hustle
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-2-
you into an immediate answer. It will do us no good in our relations with
the present Soviet leaders to turn the other cheek to what is plainly a
threat -- which is what we are doing by explicitly denying that it is one.
Consequently, I strongly urge you to change the guidance to Ziegler
so that the answer to the "threat" question is identical to the one immediately
following, on whether the letter contained a "warning, " that is, make no
comment on contents, and say we are studying the note and will reply in
due course.
SECRET? NODIS
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
February 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
as
SUBJECT: Guidance to Ziegler on Kosygin Middle East Message
I note in General Haig's memorandum on this subject that Ziegler is
to say that it would be erroneous to categorize the message in terms of
containing a threat.
The fact is that
1. the note does contain a threat;
2. you said it did in your memo to the President and Secretary Rogers
said so in his;
3. you told Ambassador Freeman -- and I subsequently told Lucet - -
that it was moderately threatening;"
4. any one who reads the note, when it becomes fully public will see
that it contains a threat;
5. our proposed response, at least in the version that I saw and on the
basis of which Sisco is consulting the allies, contains a passage that warns
against major powers getting drawn in more deeply and of our intention to
maintain the balance; i.e., it responds to a threat and when our reply
becomes known it will be so interpreted.
It seems to me that we should either conform our public posture to our private
one or refuse to give any characterization whatsoever, even one that rejects
someone else's.
Whatever one may think of the purposes and nature of the Soviet move --
and I am increasingly impressed with its stupidity and shortsightedness
(see my forthcoming memo on this) - - the Soviets knew very well that they
were making a threat. And Dobrynin tried to accentuate it by trying to hustle
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-2-
you into an immediate answer. It will do us no good in our relations with
the present Soviet leaders to turn the other cheek to what is plainly a
threat -- which is what we are doing by explicitly denying that it is one.
Consequently, I strongly urge you to change the guidance to Ziegler
so that the answer to the "threat" question is identical to the one immediately
following, on whether the letter contained a "warning, " that is, make no
comment on contents, and say we are studying the note and will reply in
due course.
SECRET? NODIS
February 4, 1970
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Your message of January 31 has been studied carefully. For
its part, the United States intends to continue its efforts to
promote a stable peace between the parties in accordance with
the UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 and
to encourage the scrupulous adherence by all concerned, not
just one side, to the cease-fire resolutions of the United
Nations. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is the stead-
fast policy of the United States.
We do not accept the views expressed by the Soviet Govern-
ment in explanation of the current situation in the Middle East.
We have been using our influence with both sides urging strict
observance of the cease-fire. Thus any implication that the
United States has been a party to or has encouraged violations
of the cease-fire is without foundation.
Moreover, your attempt to place responsibility on one side -
is not supported by the facts; there have been repeated viola-
tions of the UN cease-fire resolutions by both sides. Full
compliance with these resolutions on all fronts, including
the prevention of fedayeen attacks against Israel, would help
establish a more favorable atmosphere for progress towards
a settlement.
As I have pointed out, the United States, just shortly before
the receipt of your letter, discussed this matter with both
Israel and the UAR and urged both sides to adhere strictly
to the UN cease-fire resolutions. We intend to continue these
discussions in order to bring about early restoration of the
cease-fire between Israel and the UAR. It will be recalled
that in early 1969 the UAR announced and initiated a policy
-2-
of non-observance of the cease-fire. An early indication by
the UAR that it will abide by the UN cease-fire resolutions if
Israel will do the same would contribute to a reduction of
tension and violence and facilitate a political solution. We
are prepared to continue our efforts in that direction. We
are not aware of any recent Soviet efforts to this end.
We have noted the reference in your message to the effect
that "the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the Arab
states have means at their disposal ...". The United States
has always opposed steps which could have the effect of
drawing the major powers more deeply into the Middle East
conflict. This could only complicate matters further.
For this reason, the United States: (1) supports the prompt
restoration of the cease-fire; and (2) favors an understanding
on limitations of arms shipments into the area. The question
of arms limitations was raised directly with Mr. Gromyko
in July of last year, our willingness to discuss this important
subject was reaffirmed in my speech before the General
Assembly this last fall and subsequently was again taken up
with Mr. Gromyko by Secretary Rogers, and our strong pre-
ference for limitations was reiterated as recently as
January 25. Our proposals for discussion of this matter
were rejected by the Soviet Union.
While preferring restraint, as I indicated on January 25, the
United States is watching carefully the relative balance in the
Middle East and we will not hesitate to provide arms to
friendly states as the need arises.
On the broader question of a peace settlement, the United
States remains committed to help achieve a peace agreement
between the parties as called for by the UN Resolution of
November, 1967. We have noted your point to the effect that
if the question of withdrawal were resolved, there would be
no serious obstacles to agreement on other questions. As
you know, there can be no withdrawal unless there is full
agreement between the parties on all of the elements of a
-3-
peace settlement. In this connection, the proposals of
October 28 and December 18, 1969, meet the legitimate con-
cerns of both sides on all key questions, including withdrawal.
We believe these proposals constitute reasonable guidelines
which would provide Ambassador Jarring the means to start
the indispensable process of negotiations between the parties
under his auspices. It is a matter of regret that Soviet un-
responsiveness to these proposals is holding up this process;
a more constructive Soviet reply is required if progress
towards a settlement is to be made.
We note your desire to work with us in bringing peace to this
area. We do not believe peace can come if either side seeks
unilateral advantage. We are willing to continue our efforts
to achieve a stable peace in the Middle East in a spirit of
good will.
We are providing copies of this communication to Prime
Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Aleksey N. Kosygin
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow, U.S.S.R.
RN:HAK:mlh:2-4-70
SENT STATE:
LDY'd
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
'70 FEB 4 AM II: 38
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
February 4, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT:
U.S. -Soviet Exchange on the Middle East
The President has asked that U.S. officials refrain from
commenting on the recent exchange of notes between himself
and Chairman Kosygin on the Middle East situation.
I would be grateful if you would disseminate the President's
desires on this matter to the appropriate members of your
staff and have already taken steps here to insure that my staff
is fully cognizant of the President's wishes.
Henry A Kissinger
SECRET
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
February 4, 1970
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
Reply to Note from Chairman Kosygin
on the Middle East
Attached is a copy of our reply to the Kosygin note, the text
of which I furnished to you via this channel on Monday.
HenrynA. Kissinger
Attachment
Xeroxed copy of Ltr to Chairman Kosygin
signed by President Nixon 4 Feb 70
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Further Background on the Kosygin Letter
In an earlier memorandum I speculated on the inept position adopted
by the Soviets in the Kosygin letter. At the time I thought that perhaps
the Soviet reaction reflected internal strains and frustrations in the
wake of an exasperating visit with Nasser. The full text of the inter-
cepted conversation between Brezhnev and Defense Minister Grechko
seems to confirm this.
Brezhnev was obviously bitter about the Israeli raids, and especially
the accuracy of the strike on the house of the Soviet advisers, which
he implied was deliberate. His concern, however, was mainly on how
to keep the incident quiet and out of the public eye. The conversation
also indicates that top Soviet military leaders had been meeting on the
Middle East and that Brezhnev had a personal hand in the drafting of
the letter to you. Thus, the raid of January 28 may have triggered a
Soviet decision to send the letters to you, Pompidou and Wilson to
justify a new shipment of Soviet arms.
Brezhnev refers to sending "a system" after first sending "means of
defense. " The conversation sheds no further light on what kind of
weapons might be involved. One interpretation could be that the new
system will be offensive weapons (more advanced aircraft or even
tactical missiles) but that new radars or surface-to-air missiles will
have to be installed first. It could be that both systems are defensive,
however. We will watch this closely and prepare a more extensive
review of the possibilities in the next few days.
As I noted, the ill-timed demand for a cease-fire played into our hands
quite nicely, in view of our efforts in Jerusalem and Cairo. This may
be explained by the fact that Brezhnev expected the letters to go forward
on that same day (January 29), when in fact they were not delivered
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
until January 31, that is, after we had initiated our soundings on a
cease-fire. The desire of the top leaders to fire off an immediate
demarche may also explain the little thought given to whether a call
for a cease-fire would put Nasser in an untenable position either to
agree under pressure or turn down Israeli agreement to mutual
cessation.
In short, the Soviets seem to be responding emotionally to the killing
of Soviet advisers and out of frustration over their inability to do much
about the entire state of affairs. This, of course, could have some
ominous implications for future moves, since as I noted in my earlier
memorandum, the Middle East was a source of internal tensions within
the Soviet leadership at the time of the June war. Brezhnev may be
worried that his own position is vulnerable to charges of softness, and
the letter could have been for the record to protect himself against any
new Kremlin debate over Middle East policy. On the other hand, a
failure of his initiative may make him even more vulnerable. In this
connection, Brezhnev referred to the "nervous strain" of his job, and
some trouble with his throat. This is the second time in the last two
months that we have noted Brezhnev having health problems.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
7108
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
K
SUBJECT:
Reflections on the Middle East
In view of our current efforts to restore the cease-fire, Kosygin's
message and the active discussion between Hussein and Nasser of our
documents in Cairo this weekend, you might be interested in a few
reflections on the forces at work.
It is an oversimplification, but the two following propositions do help
sharpen thinking on the present situation:
1. the Israelis hold the key to war;
2. Nasser holds the key to negotiations.
The Likelihood of War
It is mainly the Israelis who will determine whether or not there will
be another full-scale military clash. While the Arabs could provoke
Israel, they cannot now sustain a coherent military operation. The
Israelis control the air and have the power and ability to intensify and
sustain a conflict to any degree they choose within obvious limits.
The Israelis have tried to walk the fine line between escalating their
attacks on the UAR enough to put pressure on Nasser but not enough to
have the major powers call them for renewing the war. By bombing
military targets around Cairo, they have gone just a little too far and
have provoked independent responses from both the US and the USSR.
The question now is whether they will be satisfied that they have made
their point by sending Nasser running to Moscow or whether they will
feel compelled--lured by the taste of success- to follow through and
see if they can accomplish what two previous wars have not achieved--
toppling Nasser.
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They say their official policy is willingness to return to the cease-fire
provided Nasser indicates his willingness. Since Nasser publicly disavowed
the cease-fire, some Israeli diplomats have said he would have to reaffirm
his adherence to it publicly. This at least leaves open the question whether
what they really want is not to bring Nasser to restore the cease-fire or to
negotiate--but to bring him down.
The Israelis may recognize that by bringing the USSR into direct communi-
cation with the US they have gone too far for the moment. They may reduce
the intensity of their raids, though they are unlikely to stop unilaterally lest
that be read as bowing to Soviet pressure. However, the possibility cannot
be rules out that the Israelis may still seek the right time to strike one very
sharp blow to try to bring Nasser down.
The Limits on Nasser
We know less about Nasser's state of mind, but it holds the answer to
following question: Can the combination of our firmness and Israeli
pressure produce a negotiation from the present situation, or should we
be content with renewed observance of the cease-fire to await a further
change of Egyptian and Soviet thinking?
The present situation and recent reports give us a closer look at Nasser's
mind than we have had for some time. Jordanian Foreign Minister Rifai
has recently returned from talks with Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad,
and we have full reports from those conversations. Eugene Black has also
seen Nasser. And now we have Kosygin's message giving indirect evidence
of the concern Nasser must have communicated to the Soviets.
Nasser's main objective is not to get the Sinai back but to stay in power.
His dilemma is that there has been enough dissatisfaction with his leader-
ship over the past five years that, even if he makes peace he may be eased
aside. Until now he seems to have judged that he was better off in a no-peace,
no-war situation. Now that option is being narrowed as the war moves to
the outskirts of Cairo.
The following seem to represent the main elements in Nasser's thinking
as they emerge from recent reports:
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- 3 -
1. He is deeply concerned over the recent series of Israeli air
attacks around Cairo and feels under considerable pressure to do
something about them.
- He has apparently been concerned enough to turn to Moscow.
- He has tried to give the impression of not appearing concerned
that he will be toppled. But the Jordanian Foreign Minister did
report that the raids had created confusion among Nasser's
advisers, that his enemies were using the raids against him and
that Nasser himself had said he had to retaliate or he would be
"dragged from office. 11
- He may be less concerned about what has happened to date
than about what could happen. If there were large numbers of
civilian casualties, he says he would be forced into retaliatory
action (unspecified).
2. He knows he does not have the option of a real military response.
At the Rabat summit he was open in acknowledging that he
does not have the capability to inflict more than pinprick retaliations.
Therefore, his first objective must be to try to call off the
Israeli attacks (i. e. restore the cease-fire).
- If he feels he cannot pay the price of a public statement that
the UAR will observe the cease-fire, he will face the choice between
continued attacks at some level and trying to achieve an overall
settlement.
3. Nasser still seems to be hoping for a political settlement, but
he seems to see this more as something the US and USSR do for
him than as the result of compromises he himself makes.
- He has been very careful not to close the door on our proposals.
He must know we alone can press Israel.
- He has encouraged the Jordanians to see what they could get
out of us.
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- 4 -
- He may even desire to talk directly with us, but feel constrained
to avoid this because of the short rein the Soviets may have on him.
This being the case, he has put the Soviets on the spot where they
feel they must press us.
- But so far he seems to prefer the choice of going down in an
"honorable" battle with the Israelis to that of negotiating with them
on their or our terms. This would be a repudiation of his own
policy of almost twenty years.
4.
In the long run, he has no interest in cutting himself or the Arabs
off from the U.S. - but only because he needs us.
- - At the Rabat summit, he opposed a resolution requiring all
Arabs to break with the U.S.
- - He has apparently urged the Libyans to look to Paris and not
Moscow for arms.
- - He has often told American visitors that he wants a U.S.
presence to balance the Soviet presence in Egypt.
- At the same time, he is deeply suspicious of the U.S. He may
well feel that, in a crisis, he can depend only on the USSR. He
says the Soviets are sensitive about his talking with us. He may
suspect that our proposals are really aimed at driving a wedge
between him and Soviets.
Conclusion
These reflections point up the shortcomings of Egyptian and Soviet policy.
The Israelis have demonstrated Nasser's impotence, and he has put
himself in a political position where it is difficult for him even to return
to observance of the cease-fire without appearing to bow to Israeli
pressure, let alone negotiate. Now that he has turned to Moscow to lean
on us to press Israel to stop the bombing, he is about to demonstrate
Soviet inability to get him out of his box.
At the same time, the Israelis have demonstrated what a fine line
it is they are walking. They have made their political (and military)
points - that Nasser is incapable of defending Egypt and that Moscow
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- 5 -
(so far) seems unable to bail him out. But their attacks have now struck
so close to raw Soviet nerves that Moscow has felt it necessary to
approach us at the highest level and at least apparently to think (though
apparently rejecting for now) about intervention in some form to help
Nasser.
The advantage to us is that the Arabs will come to realize that it is the
US and not the USSR that holds the key to what they want. The problems,
of course, are (1) that we cannot move Israel unless Nasser himself
makes the difficult decision to compromise and (2) that the harder Israel
presses, the greater becomes the danger of direct Soviet involvement.
There are two schools of thought on how we should deal with the situation:
One is that we should conciliate the Arab radicals insofar as
possible. This would mean not supplying more arms to Israel now,
diluting somewhat our position and squeezing Israel to accept.
The problem with this is that, even in the unlikely event that we
succeeded, the situation may be enough out of control that Nasser
(and Hussein) may fall and there will be no one left to make peace.
The other is to let Israel keep the pressure on, with the assumption
that the only way to peace is for Nasser and the Soviets to come to
terms with the reality of Israeli power. The two question marks in
this approach are (1) whether Nasser could survive politically if he
could ever bring himself to negotiate peace and (2) whether, if he
judges that he cannot, the Soviets can stand aside in the face of
continuing Israeli pressure.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
INFORMATION
FEB 4 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
HK
SUBJECT: Further Thoughts on Kosygin Middle East Message:
An Inept Performance
The more I reflect on the Kosygin letter, the more inept, and for that
reason, disturbing a performance I find it.
Regardless of whether it was intended as a serious diplomatic move
or as a pressure play -- and the simultaneous and ostentatious trans-
mittal of the letter by Soviet Ambassadors suggests that it was intended
to become public -- the purpose of the operation presumably was to get
the Israelis to desist. In addition, the Soviets no doubt would have wanted
to keep the three Western powers off balance and arguing with each other
and to maintain the gulf that has been opening between us and the Israelis.
Beyond this, they must be anxious to keep their reputation as an effective
protecting power of the Arabs alive.
It is doubtful whether any of these purposes will in fact be accomplished,
at least with any degree of permanence; meanwhile certain other effects
of the letters would appear to be distinctly to Soviet disadvantage.
It should not have taken much intelligence to expect at least the US (if not
France and the UK) to reply that it favors restoration of the cease-fire
on a reciprocal basis. Moreover, the Soviets must have known by
January 31 that we were already busy diplomatically in both Cairo and
Jerusalem to this end; and that the Israelis have already said that they
will abide by a reciprocally observed cease-fire.
Thus the upshot of the Soviet move will be to place the onus for getting
the cease-fire restored on Nasser and the Arabs, and through them on
the Soviets themselves, rather than on us and the Israelis. But this pro-
duces a situation for which Nasser can hardly be grateful: if he gives any
kind of positive response, he will be seen as doing so under pressure of
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
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Israeli military action. In addition, it would also point up Nasser's,
and Soviet, impotence since they seem unwilling or unable to control
the Fedayeen whose activities will presumably wreck any cease-fire
after a period of time.
If the cease-fire is not restored, as seems likely in view of Soviet inability
to deliver their clients, the Soviets are stuck with their threat to provide
means for a rebuff. But merely sending more equipment, even if it is
more advanced, is unlikely to accomplish anything, at least if the past
is any guide. So the onus of escalation is on the Soviets and the Kosygin
letter has added to its weight.
If one of the letter's purposes was to keep the Western powers at odds
with each other, or at least not to drive them more closely together, its
tone and content will tend to have the opposite effect. True, there will
be continuing differences about the utility of the four-power forum, and
to that extent the Soviets did not calculate incorrectly. But the threat
element has also produced a quickening of Western consultation and efforts
to attune the responses.
Another effect, which cannot be in Moscow's interest, is to dissipate what
had threatened to become a US-French confrontation on arms shipments.
The new, explicit Soviet threat to increase arms deliveries has now,
inevitably, drawn a response from us which explicitly ties the arms issue
back into the US-Soviet context (even though the French angle remains as
well).
Some have argued that whatever else the Soviets were attempting to do,
their main political purpose was to re-emphasize US identification with
Israel by (1) implying actual US-Israeli collusion, and (2) drawing from
the US a new statement of support for and defense of Israel which will
offset the impression of the last few weeks that we were drifting apart.
Even if it is granted that when the exchange is complete we will again
look to be somewhat more firmly on Israel's side, the ultimate effect of
this may well not be in Moscow's interest: if Nasser is prepared to
promise reciprocal observance of the cease-fire he will, as noted above,
be doing so in response to Israeli military pressure for which we will
also get some of the credit; if the fighting goes on despite the Soviet
threats, we will be credited with having faced down the Soviets. Moreover,
if there turns out to be some Soviet or Arab flexibility with respect to our
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-3-
October proposals, we will get the credit both for having made those
proposals and for having induced Soviet/Arab flexibility by standing
firm in the face of Soviet threats. While the ensuing situation would
involve us in problems with the Israelis, the net effect would be to make
us appear as the most influential outside power in the region.
But if for some or all the above reasons the Soviet move in inept, it is
also disturbing. Since it is unlikely to produce a cease-fire, except
under conditions little short of humiliating for Nasser, the pressure on
the Soviets to make good on their threat will rise. This basic danger is
not a new one; but the Soviets have engaged more of their prestige and
thus stand to lose more of it if the Israeli attacks continue, and if our
answer is widely interpreted as a rejection of their threats. The Middle
Eastern problem has frequently lurked beneath the surface of Soviet
leadership politics and in 1967 was used by a rebellious faction in an
indictment against the present leaders. This could happen again under
present internal conditions in Moscow and lead the leaders to do some-
thing brave to recoup.
HSonnenfeldt:mm:2/4/70
SECRET/NODIS
Under instructions from Moscow I would like in
confidence to express some considerations in connection
with the aggravation of the military situation in the Middle
East.
Guided by special responsibility of our countries
for the maintenance of peace A.N. Kosygin has already
drawn the attention of President Nixon to the dangerous
escalation by Israel of military actions against the UAR
and other Arab countries and called upon the US Government to
use its influence so that Israel stop its armed attacks,
dangerous for the cause of peace. The head of the Soviet
Government stated at the same time that on its part the
Soviet Union would show good will and determination to act
in the interests of peace in the Middle East.
It has been noted in Moscow that the American side,
persistently putting forward the proposal on the cessation
of fire on both sides, gives as its reasons the need to
create a favorable situation for the search of political
settlement. At the same time the United States ignores the
fact that Israel not only occupied by means of aggression
substantial Arab territories for the liberation of which the
Arab peoples are now fighting but continues barbaric air
raids against areas deep in the UAR and other Arab countries.
We would like to draw the attention of the American side to
the need for a realistic approach towards this question with due
regard to the political situation in the Arab countries caused by
2.
the people's indignation at the Israeli aggression. In order to have
the escalation of military operations in the Middle East
discontinued it is necessary first of all that Israel take
practical steps in this direction. We have reason to count that
if the Israelis stop their bombings of the UAR, the UAR on its
part will display restraint in its actions, without, of course,
any official statements to that effect.
I would like to ask you, Mr. Kissinger, to bring the
context of this conversation to the attention of President
Nixon. I would like to receive a reply to this communication.
RETURN THIS RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY TO
REGISTRY NO.
Henry A. Kissinger
HAK- 10
UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION
DATE
(Serial No., File No., Subject)
1/31/70
Secret/Nodis/Sensitive Memo,
INCLOSURES
SMOTME
2 -- 2 cys ea.
ADDRESSEE
The Honorable William P. Rogers
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.
NOTE.-This sheet to be retained in Originator's suspense file until receipt has been
signed and returned; then this sheet should be destroyed.
TITLE
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT
16-70499a-1 GPO