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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION NUMBER TYPE 216 cable Intelligence Information Cable 3/27/72 B EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) Hr. 7/3/12 217 cable Jutelligence Information Cabie 3/11/72 B EXEMPTED per 3.3(6)(1) Itr. 7/3/12 218 cubb Juteiligence Information Cable 3/10/72 B EXEMPTED per 3.3(6)(1) Itr. 7/3/12 219 cable Intelligence Information Cable 2/11/72 B 220 cable Intelligence Information Cable 2/11/72 B 221 cabb Intelligence Information Cabb 3/18/72 B EXEMPTED per 3.3(6)(1) 1tr. 7/3/12 222 memo to Kissinger 2/7/70 B EXEMPTED per 3.3 (b) 1tr. 7/3/12 223 memo to Kissinser EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) Its. 7/3/12 1/20/70 B 224 memo EXEMPTED per 3,3(6)(1) Ltr. 7/3/12 to Kissinger 1/19/70 B 225 memo to Kissinger EXEMPTEL per 3.3 (b) (1) Hr. 7/3/12 1/16/70 B 226 memo re Makarios EXEMPTED per (b) Its. 7/3/12 1/13/20 B 236 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 7/3/72 B 237 telegram Nicosca to Secstate FOR RAC REVIEW 4/28/77 B SANITIZED 9/5/2008 238 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 3/10/72 B PER RAC REVIOW SANITIZED 9/5/2008 BOX NUMBER FILE GROUP TITLE NSC 592 FOLDER TITLE 3 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. - B. National security classified information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. D. rights. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. or a libel of a living person. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library GOOD Seviewed pursuant to Executive GRO:1989 Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NA 14021 (4-85) DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 2a report Biography MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NIN 08-38 NID it DECLASSIFIED per RAC 6/13/08 6 memo Saunders to Kissinger 21/24/72 B 9 Cable FBI to White House 10/19/21 B 15 memo Saunders to Kissinger 6/14/71 B 20 memo Saunders to kissinger 12/1/70 B 24 memo Kissinger to the Resident N/D B SANITIZED por RAC REVIEW 2/17/2009 25a memo Helms to Kiosinger 9/23/70 B EXEMPTED peR 3.3(b)()(6); HR. 7/3/12 33/ telegram Nicosia to Secstate 10/05/70 B 31 telegram Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED pen nac REVIEW 3/18/74 B 6/13/2008 35 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 5/18/73 B 4/7 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 9/15/72 B SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 6/13/2008 50 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 8/17/77 B 51 telegram Nicosia 10 Secstate 7/13/72 B 53 telegram Nicosia 10 Secstate 6/30/72 B FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER NSC 592 FOLDER TITLE 3 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS the Richard Mikon Presidential Loibr,amyo24 1. NA 14021 (4-85) DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 161 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 8/26/70 B PER RAC REVIEW SANITIZED 9/5/2008 168 telegram USDAO 10 RUCRJCS 3/25/70 W 172 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 8/12/69 B 178 telegram Secstate 10 Nicosia 1/19/24 to 180 telegram Secstate no Nicosia 10/2/73 B 181 telegram Secstate to Nicosia 5/16/73 B 182 telegram Secstate to Nicosia 11/12/73 B PER RAC REVIEW SANITIZED 9/5/2008 Secstate N Nicosia 4/27/72 B 184 telegram 188 telegram Secstate to Nicosia 3/8/72 B 200 telegram Secrite to Nicosia 9/25/71 B 201 telegram Secstate 10 Nicosia 9/23/71 B 215 cable Intelligence Information Crisce 3/27/72 B EXEMPTED per 3.3 (b) (1) ltr. 7/3/12 FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER NSC 542 FOLDER TITLE 3 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. 1 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 084700024 ibrarv NA 14021 (4-85) DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 2a report Biography MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NIN 08-38 NID W DECLASSIFIED per RAC 6/13/08 6 memo Saunders to Kissinger 4/24/72 B 9 cable FBI to White House 10/19/21 B 15 memo Saunders to Kissinger 6/14/71 B 20 memo Saunders to Kissinger 12/1/70 W 24 memo Kissinger to the President N/D B SANITIZED POR RAC REVIEW 2/17/2009 25a memo Helms to Kissinger 9/23/70 B 33/ telegram Nicosia to Secstate 10/05/70 B 32 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 3/18/74 SANITIZED PER nac REVIEW B 6/13/2008 35 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 5/18/73 B 47 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 9/15/72 B SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 6/15/2008 50 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 8/17/77 B 51 telegram Nicosia 10 Secstate 7/13/72 B 53 telegram Nicosia 10 Secstate 6/30/72 B FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER NSC 592 FOLDER TITLE 3 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINSTRATONat the Richard Nixon Presidential Library2 is NA 14021 (4-85) DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 54 telegram Nicasca 12 Secstate 6/20/72 B 55 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 6/16/72 B 57 telegram Nicosia 10 Secstate 6/1/72 B 60 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 21/28/72 B 69 Nicosia to Secstate 3/21/72 B telegram 70 telegram Nicosia 10 Secstate 3/22/72 B 72 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 3/21/72 B 84 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 3/4/72 B SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 6/15/2008 89 telegrain Nicosia to Secspite 2/23/72 B 95 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 2/19/72 B 105 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 2/14/72 B 112 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 2/14/72 B 113 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 2/12/72 B PER RAC REVIEW SANITIZED 6/13/2008 FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER NSC 592 FOLDER TITLE 3 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINRSTRATNat the Richard 5. NA 14021 (4-85) DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 117 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 2/11/72 B 122 telegram Nicusia to Secstate 2/10/72 B 123 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 2/8/72 B 128 telegrain Nicosia to Secstate 2/3/72 B 130 telegram Nicosia 10 Secstate 1/31/72 B 131 telegram Nicosia 10 Secstate 1/31/72 B 132 telegram Nicosia to Secspite 1/27/72 B 136 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 1/17/72 B 141 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 10/24/71 3 PER RAC REVIEW SANITIZED 1/22/2009 144 telegram Nicosia 10 Secstate 10/15/71 B 154 telegram Nicosia 10 Secsiate 7/14/71 W 156 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 2/20/71 B 159 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 12/17/20 B FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER NSC 592 FOLDER TITLE 3 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose Investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION at the Richard = NA 14021 (4-85) DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 161 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 8/26/70 B PER RAC REVIEW SANITIZED 9/5/2008 168 telegram USDAO 10 RUCRJCS 3/25/70 B 172 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 8/12/09 B 178 telegram Secstate 10 Nicosia 1/19/24 to 180 telegram Secstate to Nicosia 10/2/73 B 181 telegram Secstate to Nicosia 5/16/73 B 182 telegram Secsiate to Nicosia 11/12/73 B PER RAC REVIEW SANITIZED 9/5/2008 18.4 Secstate N Nicosia 4/27/72 B telegram 188 telegram Secstate to Nicosia 3/8/72 B 200 telegram Secrite to Nicosia 9/25/71 B 201 telegram Secstate 10 Nicosia 9/23/71 B 215 cable Intelligence Information Crisce 3/27/72 B FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER NSC 542 FOLDER TITLE 3 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library - NA 14021 (4-85) DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 216 cable Intelligence Information Cable 3/27/72 B 217 cable Intelligence Information Cable 3/11/72 B 218 cubb Intelligence Information Cable 3/10/72 B 219 cable Intelligence Information Cable 2/11/72 B 220 cabb Intelligence Information Cable 2/11/72 B 221 cabb Intelligence Information Cabb 3/18/72 B 222 memo to Kissinger 2/7/70 B 223 memo to Kissinger 1/20/70 B 224 memo to Kissinger 1/19/70 B 225 memo to Kissinger 1/16/70 B 226 memo re Makarios 1/13/20 B 236 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 7/3/72 B 237 telegram Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED FOR RAC REVIOW 4/28/77 B 9/5/2008 238 telegram Nicosia to Secstate 3/10/72 B SANITIZED PER RAC REVION 9/5/2008 FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER NSC 592 FOLDER TITLE 3 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION the Richard Nixon 11 NA 14021 (4-85) DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION NUMBER TYPE 250 telegram Secstate to Nicosia 7/23/74 B 256 telegram Secstate ro Nicosia 7/1/72 B PER RAC REVIEW SANITIZED 9/5/2008 BOX NUMBER FILE GROUP TITLE NSC 592 FOLDER TITLE 3 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. - B. National security classified information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. D. rights. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. or a libel of a living person. *U. S_GP0:1989-235-084/00024 1 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Richard Nixon Presidential Library NA 14021 (4-85) DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 0733 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 SECRET March 28, 1974 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joseph N. Neubert NSC Contingency Planning Department of State SUBJECT: Contingency Study for Cyprus The NSC staff approves the Contingency Study for Cyprus with the provision it be amended (1) to describe what influence the Soviets might gain through "naval diplomacy" (see pp. 30, 34, and 35) and what options of this sort are open to the USG, and (2) to reflect more recent events (i.e., possible changes in EOKA-B since the death of Grivas, propagandistic Soviet demarches on Greek support for enosis, and potential shifts of policy by the finely balanced new government in Ankara and the military regime in Athens.) Robell Finaling Richard T. Kennedy Deputy Assistant to the President for NSC Planning SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROF n DOC RECD OG NBR B MO DA MO DA HR Renbert, TO: PRES I FROM: Kennedy ROGERS 328 413 7400733 Log IN/OUT ONLY Keneping INITIAL ACTION O UNCLAS NO FORN NODIS SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION kissinger RICHARDSON lou eyes ONLY exdis SCOWCROFT C CODEWORD eliot S SENSITIVE SUBJECT: Contuziony Sludy for TS Cyptus REFERENCE: S/S OTHER NOT XEROXED internal ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED REC ACTION INFO CY MEMO FOR HAK ( ) FOR ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT MEMO FOR pres. ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR ( ) FAR EAST APPROPRIATE ACTION ( ) DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MEMO TO ( ) MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA REC OMMENDATIONS ( ) EUROPE / CANADA JOINT MeMo ( ) LATIN AMERICA refer TO FOR: ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ( ) ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE ( ) SCIENTIFIC DUE DATE: NET ASSESSMENT GROUP COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) program ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING Barban / Stuke advised that CONGRESSIONAL OCEANS POLICY Orig action & Intern unknown Kennedy Mean Closed for IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: DATE FROM TO CY TO 3/28 C S Kennedy SUBSEQUENT Rgl ACTION the required (or to TAKEN): Newber t SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS microfilm & file RQMTS: DISPATCH NOTIFY & DATE SPECIAL DISPOSITION) M/F'D 'D BY OR RECORD COMMENT:) CYS 4/2/74 FOR NSC/S DISP INSTR CY RQMTS: see ABOVE PLUS: SA ) HP ORIG ) WH CROSS REF W/ JOINED BY log # TO ) PA X ) SF see # FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING. ) NS ) EP SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: X destroy) DY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library * GPO: 1973-489-668 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 4474 June 12, 1972 MEMORANEUM FOR: Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Department of State SUBJECT: Appointment for David Popper (S/S 7209365) Mr. Kissinger regrets that his schedule is such that he will not be able to meet with Ambassador Popper. Jeanne W. Davis Staff Secretary CC: Mr. Saunders Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 4474 CONFIDENTIAL June 6, 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal SUBJECT: Appointment Request for You from Ambassador Popper (Cyprus) David Popper, US Ambassador to Cyprus, is here on consultations, June 6-16, and has asked for an appointment with you (attached); you were unable to see him when he was last here. I know your schedule is busy with the trip to Japan and in any event I have seen him. You are also pretty well up to date on the Cyprus problem, after the last go-around which began in February. However, Cyprus remains basically unstable and we will probably be living with tensions there and between our two NATO allies for the foreseeable future. The main reason for your seeing Popper, apart from getting his personal assessment, would be to get a feel for his command out there and to impart some of your own views as to what we want. Since his personal role on Cyprus was the subject of discussion during the last crisis, you may want to get your own sense of how he operates. RECOMMENDATION: That you schedule a short appointment with Popper any available time beginning today through June 16. Approve Saunders' regret due to Japan trip CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 4474 7209365 department OF state Washington, D.C. 20520 May 30, 1972 CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Appointment for Ambassador Popper Our Ambassador to Cyprus, David Popper, will be in Washington June 6 - 16 for consultations. He has asked for an appointment with you during that period. The Cyprus situation is now reasonably calm. The February-March confrontation between Athens and Nicosia is in abeyance and the intercommunal negotia- tions will very likely be resumed in early June. The local talks will have a significant effect on Greco- Turk relations and the general situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. An appointment with Ambassador Popper will provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on the Cyprus problem. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Attachment: Biographic sketch. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ambassador David H. Popper Born in New York City in 1912, Ambassador Popper received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Harvard University. He joined the Department of State in 1945 following service in the United States Army during World War II. Prior to appointment as Ambassador to Cyprus he held a number of Department positions relating to the United Nations. These included Director of the Office of United Nations Political and International Organizations in Geneva, Deputy United States Representative to the Con- ference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Senior Adviser on Disarmament Affairs (USUN), Director of the Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Popper presented his credentials in Cyprus in July 1969. During the period June-August 1971, Ambassador Popper led a team of Department and Bureau of Narcotics and Dan- gerous Drugs experts in consultations with key European, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian governments. The consultations were designed to mobilize support for strengthening the 1969 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOC RECD LOG INITIAL ACTION OFF MO DA MO DA HR NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 530 53019 4474 LOG IN/OUT ONLY TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT U NO FORN NODIS KISSINGER ROGERS, W LOU BUO EXDIS DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION HAIG laird, M C EYES ONLY LIMDIS S CODE WORD RES DATA SUBJECT: David Poxyer and to Cyprus TS requish SENSITIVE its by HAK while in Wash June /- 11 REFERENCE: S/S 7209365 OTHER NOT XEROXED APP'TS: PRES HAK TALKER MEMCON DATE REQ. INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO REC MEMO FOR HAK ( x ) CY ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG x FOR MEMO FOR PRES. ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR SIGNATURE ( ) FAR EAST FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( ) SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION SUb-sAHaran AFRICA MEMO TO ( ) NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA P RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) EUROPE/CANADA JOINT MEMO ( ) LATIN AMERICA REFER TO STATE ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( ) ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE ( ) SCIENTIFIC LR PLANNING COMMENTS: (Including Special (6/3) Instructions) due DATE: PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING CONGRESSIONAL DATE FROM TO S ACTION REQUIRED CY TO 6/6/72 Saunders HAK X Decision (6/8) INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING 6/9 HAK 6/9 /S Davis SAUND Nsds S Don's HAK HAK 6/12/72 Saunders 5 To inform State that HAK not able to see Popper. H HS (06/13) 6/12 JWD sysulseso to Elit MICROFILM DATA CROSS REF WITH NOTIFY DATE DO SEE LOG DISPATCH: LETTER MEMO INIT Sm DISPOSITION JOINED BY LOG COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP, HM JUN1. ORIG TO ) 1972 DATE NSC PAF SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: WHC SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO SUBF GPO: 1972-455-927 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 2876 sent to HAK by CONFIDENTIAL May 30, 1973 Den s MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal SUBJECT: Appointment with Dr. Kissinger for Bob McCloskey (New US Ambassador to Cyprus) this Saturday, June 2 You will recall yesterday having killed a recommendation that the President meet with Bob McCloskey, new US Ambassador to Cyprus, before his June 3 departure. State was so informed. State is asking whether McCloskey could have an appointment with Henry. Perhaps you could bring this to Henry's attention for a possible appointment Saturday, since he may just have interest, although I can imagine how much you will be trying to cram into those days between Iceland and Paris. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 2876 CONFIDENTIAL May 30, 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal WH SUBJECT: Appointment With You for Bob McCloskey, New US Ambassador to Cyprus Bob McCloskey is leaving Sunday, June 3, for Cyprus as the new US Ambassador and has indicated through State he would appreciate a short call on you. This would mean probably Saturday, June 2, given your own schedule. This would be a chance for you to express your thoughts on the Cyprus situation, although it is not essential. Makarios would probably be pleased. Tensions on the island continue as the intercommunal talks have failed thus far to achieve a settlement. The Turk Cypriots demand local autonomy (which Makarios believes go/too far in violating his concept of a unitary national government) and Greek Cypriots demand control. Complicating this impasse is right-wing insistence on nothing short of total union with Greece. Turkey and Greece remain vigilant to their communities' needs. The main point is that the Cyprus problem retains the potential for dragging these NATO allies into confrontation so it is of continued interest to the US. RECOMMENDATION: That you indicate your preference on having Dick Campbell schedule a short appointment with you for McCloskey on Saturday, June 2. Approve appointment let'stry Regret on basis of schedule CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. May 30 9:45 a.m. Mr. Saunders - Mr. Murphy says that this action was a "comedy of errors.' 11 He had a call fromState Dept. this morning in which they told him that they had not requested an appointment with the President but with Dr. Kissinger. Their memo does not clearly state which it is, but since it is addressed to Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Murphy says that it probably intended that. Mr. Murphy understands that Dr. Kissinger thinks very highly of McCloskey and might want to see him. Dr. Kissinger will be back from Iceland and will be in the office on Saturday, June 2nd, Mr. Murphy has reopened the action and suggests a memo to Kissinger by June 1st requesting an appointment for June 2nd, if you think this is proper. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined t NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 2876 May 29, 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Department of State SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador McCloskey (S/S 7309483) The President regrets that his schedule will not permit him to meet with Amb. Mc Closkey prior to the latter's departure for his post. Staff pm Secretary Jeanne Davis Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 2876 CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) May 25, 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal SUBJECT: Appointment for New US Ambassador to Cyprus, Robert McCloskey, with the President As you know, Secretary Rogers' former press secretary, Bob McCloskey, is going to Cyprus as the new US ambassador. He has asked to call on the President (attached) before his June 3 departure. As usual, this would be a nice gesture which would please Makarios if the President had time, but it is not essential and State does not press. Besides, the President doesn't usually see outgoing ambassadors, and given his preoccupations and absences in the coming week, I would not be inclined to recommend this. RECOMMENDATION: That you kill the attached schedule proposal. Approve Send the attached forward CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 VITA ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY Mr. McCloskey is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations and Special Assistant to the Secretary. In this capacity he is responsible for the direction, development, and execution of news policy, plans, and programs. In addition to serving as principal adviser to the Secretary and other officials of the Department on all aspects of the Department's press relations, he has been responsible for maintaining liaison on press matters with the White House and other Government agencies. A Foreign Service Officer, Mr. McCloskey joined the Department as a Foreign Service Staff Officer in Sep- tember 1955 and was assigned to the American Consulate General in Hong Kong. He returned to Washington in January 1957 to serve in the Bureau of Public Affairs. A former news correspondent, Mr. McCloskey served with the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942 to 1945. He was gradu- ated from Temple University (B.S. 1953) and later (1958-1959) studied at George Washington University. He was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November 25, 1922. He is married to the former Anne Taylor Phelan of Chevy Chase, Maryland, and has two daughters. April 1973. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. S/S 7309483 2876 department OF state Washington, D.C. 20520 May 22, 1973 CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Appointment for Ambassador-designate McCloskey The newly appointed Ambassador to Cyprus, Robert J. McCloskey, will be departing for Cyprus on June 3. He is attending a series of briefings to familiarize himself thoroughly with the Cyprus situation and has asked for an appointment with you before he goes to Nicosia. Tensions on Cyprus have increased in recent months as a result of the low-grade insurrection of the sup- porters of General George Grivas who call for union (enosis) with Greece and counterviolence from backers of Archbishop Makarios. The Turkish Cypriot side has reacted by hardening its positions in the local talks. The intercommunal talks, which recommenced in an expanded format on June 8, 1972, have limped along and made little progress. If a constitutional solution is near which ex- cludes enosis, General Grivas has threatened to exercise his option of violence to undercut the talks. As the record of the 1950's and 1960's indicates, violence on Cyprus has brought NATO allies Greece and Turkey into confrontation, engaged the United States and Russia diplomatically, and de-stabilized the Eastern Mediterranean. An appointment with Ambassador-designate McCloskey will permit an exchange of views on the Cyprus problem. Pethiller for Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Attachment: Biographic sketch. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard:Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SCHEDULE PROPOSAL THE WHITE HOUSE Date: WASHINGTON FROM: Henry A. Kissinger CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) VIA: David N. Parker MEETING: Courtesy Call by Robert McCloskey, your new ambas- - sador to Cyprus DATE: At your convenience until his June 3 departure PURPOSE: Permit a brief exchange of view on the Cyprus problem which has the potential for engaging our two NATO allies in confrontation. Since we do not have frequent opportunities to focus on Cyprus, this would provide one convenient peg. FORMAT: Oval Office 5 minutes SPEECH MATERIAL: Talking points would be provided. PRESS COVERAGE: Routine Ziegler announcement; White House photographer STAFF: Dr. Kissinger or General Scowcroft RECOMMEND: State Department. Dr. Kissinger does not believe it is essential. PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Bob McCloskey is well known as Secretary Rogers' press spokesman. BACKGROUND: Cyprus tensions continue, and the US could become involved in another Cyprus crisis. Also, Makarios would doubtless appreciate knowing McCloskey had seen you. Approve Disapprove CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NSC CORRESPONDENCE PRO E DOC RECD MO DA MO DA HR 522 1876 LOG NBR Minder INITIAL ACTION O 5 2214 LOG IN/OUT ONLY TO: PRES FROM: ROGERS UNCLAS NO FORN nodis kissinger x RICHARDSON LOU EYES ONLY EXDIS SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER C X CODEWORD ELIOT x S sensitive TS Robert 5 McCloskey to discuss the cypeus situatter SUBJECT: Request for appt w/ HALL for new us and to Cyprus REFERENCE: S/S 7309483 OTHER NOT XEROXED INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION required REC ACTION INFO CY MEMO FOR HAK ( x ) ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT FOR MEMO FOR PRES. ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR ( ) FAR EAST APPROPRIATE ACTION ( ) DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MEMO TO ( ) MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA X X RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) EUROPE / CANADA JOINT MEMO ( ) LATIN AMERICA REFER TO FOR: ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ( ) ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE ( ) SCIENTIFIC NET ASSESSMENT group DUE DATE: 5/25 COMMENTS: (INCL DING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING CONGRESSIONAL OCEANS POLICY IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: DATE FROM TO S SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): CY TO 5/25 Saunders HAK X san of ( 6/1) SUBSEQ SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS 5/78 5/59 s Script disappred SP DAVIS a nah State (5/31) 5/29 C Davis sgd memo to E/10T 5/30 5/30 /s Samln S Mims Re-opm to HAK! (6/1) 5/30 HAK + Decrocon (6/02) INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING 6/16 C Close per NSC/S DISPATCH NOTIFY & DATE MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: SPECIAL DISPOSITION) M/F'D ADC BY OR RECORD COMMENT:) NSC / S DISP INSTR CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: ) SA + JUN 18 973 CYS FOR ) HP ORIG ) WH CROSS REF W/ JOINED BY LOG # TO ) PA x ) SF SEE # FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING. ) NS suspense CY ATTACHED: x ) EP DESTROY) DY GPO: 1973- 89-668 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 3873 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION HAK. A SECRET/EXDIS May 5, 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal SUBJECT: Cyprus Situation I understand that you asked Sam about the attached cable reporting that Ambassador Bush, at Joe Sisco's apparent instigation, had told Waldheim we do not support Turkey's ''tougher line" on the Cypriot- Czech arms and resumption of the intercommunal talks. I understand the concern that State may be edging instinctively toward unconsidered involvement in the Cyprus situation, and we need to keep a hand on that. We also have an interest in not souring our relationship with Turkey, especially after the Prime Minister's successful visit. Those concerns stand alongside our general interest in avoiding a confrontation over Cyprus and since some of the elements in the situation seem to have changed in recent days, it may be worth putting the present problem in perspective. Background Early last week the UN finally got Makarios to agree to an arrangement for its control over the Czech arms which also satisfied the Greeks. It goes considerably further than a simple UN "inspection" arrangement worked out in a similar situation in 1966, and the UN representative in Cyprus felt that it should satisfy Turkish requirements and clear the way for resumption of the intercommunal talks. With the Czech arms issue presumably resolved, Waldheim then issued an appeal for resumption of the intercommunal talks according to the format agreed upon before the recent crisis broke last February. That format, you will remember, called for participation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, mainland Greek and Turk representatives and a UN representative. Waldheim was especially concerned to get the inter- communal talks restarted before the semi-annual Security Council meeting next month for renewal of the UN peace-keeping mandate on Cyprus. He is particularly worried that some of the governments that contribute troops to the peace-keeping force will begin withdrawing them if there seems to be no effort to mov e toward a settlement. The Canadians, who supply one of the most effective units, are talking about pulling out this summer. SECRET/EXDIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET/EXDIS - 2 - The Greek Cypriots and Greece have both indicated their interest in starting the new intercommunal talks. But--to the UN's surprise--the Turks have shifted now to a much tougher posture which threatens the whole concept. To begin with, the Turks say that the UN-Makarios agreement on control of the Czech arms does not go far enough and is not satisfactory. Then in a reversal of their agreement last fall, the Turks are demanding that Waldheim obtain advance assurances from Makarios that (1) the Greek and Turk Cypriots negotiate on the basis of full equality; (2) the intercommunal talks be predicated on the under- standing that the outcome will be an independent Cypriot state in which the two communities are "partners"; (3) enosis as an eventual solution be explicitly excluded; (4) the agenda focus on Turk interests (constitutional compromise) only. These Turkish preconditions are probably more than Makarios, or even the mainland Greeks, can accept. They actually amount to getting advance substantive commitments which the UN assiduously avoided in arranging the five-party format last fall and winter. The toughening of the Turkish position results in part from the change of government in Turkey. There is, in effect, no government right now, and none of the caretakers wants to shoulder responsibility for beginning talks on a basis that would make them look soft on the Cyprus issue. It was under these circumstances that Sisco and Bush decided--without asking us--to inform Waldheim that we do not support the tougher Turkish line. Sisco has laid down the principle that we do not want to get out in front and therefore want Waldheim to carry the ball. However, he has taken the line with the Turks--again without checking with us-- that we thought the UN-Makarios agreement on the Czech arms was sufficient and that we felt the intercommunal talks were the best hope for progress. He has also pointed out the desirability of Turkey's avoiding the appearance before the Security Council debate of being the party that killed the intercommunal talks. Conclusions The problem is how to keep the Turkish position from isolating Turkey, damaging Greek-Turkish harmony and creating a renewed sense of crisis on Cyprus. Whereas in February the Turks stood back with some confidence that the Greeks would not double-cross them, the present situation re-introduces the old aspect of Greek-Turkish confrontation. The Turks seem disillusioned with Greek handling of the Cyprus issue in the last two months and suspect that Athens, Makarios and Grivas may all be secretly lining up behind enosis. The fact that Turkey is without a government thangh courage to put down DECLASSIFIED This dosprent been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET/EXDIS - 3 - State is naturally concerned to see a new impasse in the way of talks, but the issue is how far we go in making this an issue in US-Turkish relations. State has started out taking the position that the Turkish stand is too rigid and has suggested to the Turks that they not get themselves in a box. Ambassador Handley in Ankara notes, however, that the prospects of successful demarches at this time are "very dismal. 11 To begin with the government crisis immobilizes them for the moment. Morevoer, they appear determined not to see the Cypriot intercommunal talks restarted just for the sake of reducing immediate tension but want them to deal constructively with the Cyprus problem. Until now the Greeks have been doing Turkey's work of softening up Makarios, but now the Greeks seem to have backed off and the Turks apparently may be moving to apply pressure themselves-- if one can ascribe any strategy to their moves at all in the current political crisis. The danger in State's approach is that if we oppose the Turks too obviously, it will appear that we are ganging up with the Greeks and Makarios against them. So the art is not to encourage them on their present course but to avoid confrontation with them. As I deduce your position, it would be that. we should let Waldheim carry the main brunt of the argument with the Turks now; we should not give the Turks the impression we are ganging up against them; we could talk to the Turks when the new government gets its feet on the ground about avoiding isolation when the Security Council debate nears; we can take a straightforward position, as we have for some time, of favoring intercommunal talks as long as we can do so in a low-key way without putting ourselves in open opposition to the Turks. Is this a fair statement of the position? Yes K But above all I want No Du finest possible demandes and I mant all continued of item cleaned SECRET/EXDIS Sere . Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET/EXDIS - 4 - RECOMMENDATION. If you have not already done so, that you call Sisco and make sure he understands that we want a crack at any additional moves he is considering concerning Cyprus. Unless he gets this word from the right level he is likely to keep moving us into a position that challenges Turkey. SECRET/EXDIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. WHCA 1972 MAY 2 23 29 CONFIDENTIAL HCE247 PAGE 01 STATE 076361 62 ORIGIN SS-25 INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R w DRAFTED BY I0/UNP:XVUNOVIC:PJA 5/2/72 EXT 20512 APPROVED BY NEA - MR. SISCO IO/UNP - MR. ARMITAGE NEA/CYP - MR. LONG S/S-0: J.BRIMS 035174 OR 022306Z MAY 72 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE LL AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE Saunders INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION NATO CONFIDENTIAL STATE 076361 EXDIS SUBJECT: CYPRUS REF: A. STATE 074139 B. STATE 074438 C. NICOSIA 953 D. USUN 1577 E. ANKARA 3107 1. AMBASSADOR BUSH TELEPHONED SYG FROM WASHINGTON MAY 1 TO ADVISE HIM THAT WE FELT GOT WAS TAKING TOUGH LINE ON CZECH ARMS QUESTION AND RESUMPTION INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. BUSH TOLD SYG THAT ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT WANT GET INTO MIDDLE OF THIS MATTER, WE WANTED SYG TO KNOW THAT WE DO NOT SUPPORT THIS TOUGHER TURKISH LINE. SYG INFORMED BUSH TURKISH CHARGE AT UN HAD GIVEN HIM EIGHT POINT LIST OF PRE- CONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. SYG HAD EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT TO TURKISH CHARGE, SAYING SUBMISSION OF SUCH PRECONDITIONS INDICATED GOT NOT INTERESTED IN RESUMPTION INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. CO Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 STATE 076361 2. FOR ATHENS AND NICOSIA. UN SECRETARIAT HAS PASSED GOT LIST OF PRECONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS TO GREEK AND CYPRIOT MISSIONS TO UN WHICH HAVE REFERRED THEM TO CAPITALS FOR INSTRUCTIONS. REQUEST EMBASSIES' ASSESSMENT PROBABLE REACTION OF HOST GOVERNMENTS TO TURKISH PRECONDITIONS. 3. FOR ANKARA, ATHENS, NICOSIA. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS RETIMING AND SUBSTANCE APPROACHES US AND/OR UN MIGHT MAKE TO GET PARTIES TO AGREE RESUME INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS IN NEAR FUTURE. IRWIN CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL EXDIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOC RECD LOG NBR INITIAL ACTION off MO DA MO DA NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 555513 3873 LOG IN/OUT ONLY TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT U NO FORN NODIS KISSINGER ROGERS, W LOU BUO EXDIS x DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION HAIG x LAIRD, M C EYES ONLY LIMDIS X CODE WORD RES DATA SUBJECT: Review of Summ SAUNDERS Situation TS SENSITIVE On Cyprus REFERENCE: S/S OTHER NOT XEROXED APP'TS: PRES HAK TALKER MEMCON DATE REQ. INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO REC MEMO FOR HAK ( ) CY ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG FOR MEMO FOR PRES ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR SIGNATURE ( ) FAR EAST FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( ) SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MEMO TO ( ) NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) EUROPE/CANADA JOINT MEMO ( ) LATIN AMERICA REFER TO STATE ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( ) ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE ( ) SCIENTIFIC DUE DATE: LR PLANNING COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions) PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING CONGRESSIONAL DATE FROM TO S SAUNDERS HALE Decision ACTION REQUIRED (5/8) CY TO 5/5 X INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING 6/6 6/6 Any further Action (6/7 Hin Approved bron Sender S Close file. This is over taken 6/6 Saunders nsc/s by Turkish agreement to jain the intercommunal talks. MICROFILM DATA CROSS REF WITH NOTIFY DATE DO SEE LOG DISPATCH: ETTER/MEMO INIT DISPOSITION JOINED BY LOG COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA HP HM ORIG) DATE NSC TO ) PAF SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: WHC r SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO SUBF * GPO: 1972-455.92 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 1440 MEMORANDUM Emithent NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION SECRET February 10, 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR. DR. KISSINGER FROM. HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal ROSEMARY NEAHER I mant the SUBJECT: The Cyprus Situation You have been reading in your brief of new elements of tension in told before GOG any in given more Cyprus. We promised you a fuller picture. The situation is beginning adoce to move more quickly; the following should bring you up to date. The talks Jam refund are middley will The new and expanded intercommunal talks have been held up by haggling by over their format. Turkey's final assent is expected soon, and talks M could begin before the month is out unless present tensions prevent that. The new talks would have a UN representative, a mainland Greek and a mainland Turk constitutional law expert join the Greek and Turk Cypriots. As you may recall, the genesis of this was in the meeting between the Greek (Palamas) and Turk (then Olcay) foreign ministers at the UNGA last fall. They agreed to add the mainland representatives, thereby creating a four-party format. U Thant insisted on the inclusion of a UN person in order to make the format sellable to Makarios who sees protection in a UN role. It is this five-party arrangement that has bounced around for several months. The Greeks accepted outright and have said they will go along with any arrangement which would launch new talks. Makarios agonized at the thought of being pressured in new talks by mainland representatives; he sought assurances that the UN would indeed be involved and then stole the thunder from Turkey by promptly accepting. Turkey was left as the chief hold-out. Turkey's problem is the inclusion of the UN representative. They feel this will undercut new pressure on Makarios injected by the mainland representatives. Recalling their problems with past special UN mediators, SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 2 - Turkey has insisted on clarifications from the Secretary General's special advisor on Cyprus that any UN representative not be a "mediator" per se but be on hand with his "good offices" and that the mainland representatives be actively involved. Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken said this week that Turk needs on this score were on the point of being met and opined that talks could begin by the month's end. Matters stand there. This procedural debate has been lengthy, but even if talks now begin, there will be a long debate over the agenda. On the one hand, Makarios has made it clear he does not believe mainland representatives belong in talks between the local parties on the constitutional questions at stake, on which he believes he has already made maximum concessions to the Turk Cypriots. He is lobbying for broad discussion including the international aspects of the problem such as withdrawal of Turk mainland support. The Turks, on the other hand, are adamant that new talks zero in precisely on the constitutional stalemate; they want none of the past treaties (London- Zurich accords) or constitutional points already agreed upon undercut. Assuming progress at that level, they could envisage broadening the agenda at a later date. The UN special representative who will be involved has been turning over possible new approaches to the talks beyond the simple reliance on the trading of position papers between the two locals which characterized the last phase. He is thinking of (a) trying to consolidate areas of common agreement from past talks and (b) talking about interim or permanent measures which would help the communities live together without confron- tation in the current situation of de facto separation. State has also been developing some ideas on deconfrontation--mutual withdrawal by the two communities from lines of confrontation around the island--if there came a time when they might help the UN representative. Interest by the parties in deconfrontation has been evident but Ambassador Popper now feels the issue has been dealt a blow by the reports of Makarios' new Czech arms. Grivas The clandestine re-appearance of General Grivas on Cyprus and the resulting war of nerves between him and Makarios has added a new element of tension. To put this in perspective, Grivas was the famous pro-enosist and fanatical anti-communist Greek Cypriot who fought against the British in the mid- 50s, almost hand in glove with Makarios' struggle on the political level. With independence and the guarantees given to the Turk Cypriots he SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 3 - pressed on for enosis and became heavily involved in the terrorism of the sixties which twice brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. Those events convinced Makarios and Greece to drop their campaign for enosis and turn to intercommunal talks. Grivas, anathema to the Turk Cypriots and to Makarios by then as a political rival, was moved to confinement in Greece where he remained until his "escape" last fall. A. number of factors have made Makarios certain if not all but sure that Greece is behind the plot. We do not really know. For one thing, Grivas' escape came shortly after Makarios' resistance to Greek pressure last summer to be more forthcoming in the talks, immediately before the Olcay/Palamas talks in New York. These facts against a backdrop of increasing Greco-Turk consultation on the Cyprus problem have led the Archbishop to suspect a plot against him unless he reaches a compromise, presumably satisfactory to the Turk Cypriots. The alternative would be to risk confrontation with Grivas leading to enosis and, again assuming Greco-Turk dialogue, satisfactory results for the Turk Cypriots, i.e. double enosis or partition. In reaction, Makarios has stiffened in the face of a threat. As you know, he has clandestinely imported sizeable quantities of Czech arms almost certainly for the arming of a private police force outside the Greek- controlled National Guard. The introduction of these new arms has sparked reactions in Turkey and Greece. Whether these flow from the fact that they have been involved in the Grivas episode with the idea of precipitating double enosis or whether they view it as a further eroding factor for the new talks, the issue is that our allies are once again concerned enough about Cyprus perhaps to be moving toward some drastic step which would confront us with difficult choices. Greek-Turk Relations and the New Situation On the one hand, Greece and Turkey have recently embarked upon a new period of cooperation over Cyprus. Both sides have privately and publicly insisted that Cyprus not become an issue between them and both shared the initiative in reviving the intercommunal talks as the best framework for solution. It has been their reasonableness which has kept negotiations over procedures for the talks from breaking down. The US has encouraged these efforts. SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 4 - On top of this cooperation, we have had reports that officials on both sides continue to talk about a so-called "dynamic" solution ending in double enosis (partition) as the best way out. Ambassador Popper hears this not only from Turks and Turk Cypriots but also from mainland Greeks and elements of the Greek-Cypriot establishment. Makarios' recent importation of arms has upset both Greece and Turkey and reopened the possibility of a solution imposed on Cyprus by the two of them. The Turks have gone on record to express their grave concern and to indicate privately that they may have to ship new arms to their community. The Greeks are aware of this. We also have a reliable report that in its dialogue with Greece, Turkey has indicated that Makarios must go. - Palamas has told Tasca Greece is urging Turkey to keep cool while it tries to deal with the situation. He also implied that Makarios was the obstacle. Tasca gained the impression Greece would like to see him replaced. Greece plans on the following steps. - -Makarios will be told tomorrow that he must turn the Czech arms over to UNFICYP control and that he must form a govern- ment of "national unity" (presumably involvement of the Turk Cypriots) in Cyprus. - If Makarios refuses, the GOG will make its demands public and will also inform the UN and UK. - Greece does not want violence nor will it make use of Grivas but if Makarios resists, the GOG will take its case directly to the Greek Cypriot people. If Makarios refuses to form a government acceptable to Greece and is backed by Greek Cypriots, then Greece may withdraw from the island. Ambassador Tasca, who has already expressed hope to the GOG that they are not entertaining the thought of a "dynamic" solution, has now told Palamas he believes that the GOG plan is highly dangerous given the support Makarios has among Greek Cypriots. SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 5 - To buy time, State--with our clearance--has instructed Tasca to make the following points to Papadopoulos. The GOG scenario may have the effect of consolidating support behind Makarios and impelling him towards Soviet support. All diplomatic options to resolve the Czech arms problem should be exhausted. One course could be a GOG-GOT demarche to the UNSYG which the US is prepared to support and would ask the UK, Canada and others to make parallel approaches to the UN. At a minimum, the US hopes that Greece will hold off with its scenario to permit discussions among the NATO allies. Meanwhile, a Greek Cypriot official has told Ambassador Popper that Makarios had acquired the arms because of overwhelming evidence of Greek complicity in Grivas' movement to precipitate double enosis. He maintained that Makarios had every right to defend himself and his regime and urged the US to help stop Greece from talking about a political settle- ment on the one hand while conspiring with Grivas on the other. He did suggest that there could be a trade-off of the Czech arms for a return of Grivas to Greece and urged the US to play a role in working this out. But he also said it is obvious to Cyprus that the Greeks are using the arms pretext as a first step toward partition in collusion with Turkey; he believes it would never work and would only set Greece and Turkey against each other. The Situations the US May Face We have traditionally maintained that the intercommunal talks best address the US interest in defusing tensions on Cyprus and hence tensions between Greece and Turkey. We have taken a position of supporting Cypriot independence, and we have cultivated a relationship with Makarios in that context. The situation we now face is one of apparent increased Greek and Turkish interest in imposing a solution regardless of the fate of Makarios, or possibly even regardless of the independence of Cyprus. At the very least it seems that Greece and Turkey may have agreed that (a) Makarios must settle this problem in a way satisfactory to the Turks and Greeks (a national unity government which could mean either Turk Cypriot parti- cipation in it or, a step further, partition) or (b) Makarios must go. In short, if Greece and Turkey are determined to force a situation which would violate Makarios' view of a unitary independent state, or, further, partition Cyprus, the US will face difficult choices between the wishes of our allies and our established opposition to dismemberment of UN members. SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 6 - The following are the situations we may face and the principal implications: Situation 1. There remains a chance simply to diffuse the tensions created by the arms issue. This could come about if we could focus attention on the tensions raised by the arms problem and get everyone back on the track towards resuming talks and forgetting any dynamic overall solution now. Our instructions to Ambassador Tasca to urge the GOG to hold off on its ultimatum to Makarios and concentrate instead on exhausting diplomatic options to resolve the arms problem are one step in this direction. The suggestion has also been made on Cyprus that a trade-off to diffuse tensions be arranged by returning Grivas to Greece in exchange for Czech arms being turned over to UNFICYP. The Cypriots have asked us to become involved in working this out with the Greeks. Implications. The US definitely has an interest in isolation of the arms issue and getting on with the talks. However, it is much less clear that we want to be in the middle in a dispute within the Greek-Greek Cypriot community. If we tried to negotiate the return of Grivas to Greece, we would have to take into account that Greece may well be taking advantage of Grivas' presence on Cyprus to pressure Makarios and may not want such a trade-off. [Intelligence reports suggest that the Greeks may even have Grivas in one of the Greek Cypriot National Guard camps--for release at the proper moment. ] Athens has already tried privately to force Makarios on the arms question and has now surfaced its proposal to issue an ultimatum to him. We would have a question whether we want to pressure Athens off a course it may have already decided on; we want to line up with an initiative on trade-off that essentially meets Makarios needs but may not do much to produce his flexibility in the talks; --we want at all costs to see the talks resumed even though Greece and Turkey are fed up with Makarios. The argument for involving ourselves is that this may be far easier than dealing with either of the two situations that follow. SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 7 - Situation 2. The Greeks go ahead and issue their ultimatum to Makarios to conform or step down; he resists, rallies his people against external pressure and perhaps takes his case to the UN. The assumption here is that the Greeks take a strong stand hoping Makarios will acquiesce but waver before following their strategy through to the conclusion of quickly deposing Makarios. The main implication here would be that the US would be caught between Makarios' call for support in the face of external pressure and Athens' defense that it is attempting to solve a problem as it sees fit. Makarios would get Soviet and perhaps Chinese support (their position is that the local parties solve their own problem) at the UN. The US would be allied with Greek and Turkish intervention. This situation would be the worst of two worlds It would not involve decisive enough action to solve the problem and it would generate worldwide pressure on us to pull the Greeks and Turks off. Whereas there is a theoretical option of acquiescing in a decisive Greek move, the proposed Greek action of issuing an ultimatum and waiting for reaction seems doomed to failure. Situation 3. Greece and Turkey have already decided to cooperate in a dynamic solution to impose a solution or partition Cyprus. They are beyond backing off from this course, actively engaged in deposing Makarios and installing a new Cypriot government. This would put us squarely between our interests in having Greece and Turkey resolve the issue to the benefit of good relations between them and in not seeing intervention in or dismemberment of Cyprus by our two NATO allies. The US in the least would be faced with weathering the storm of intervention on Cyprus by NATO allies who would justify their moves as guarantor powers of the London-Zurich accords or worse, face a situation of partition or double enosis in opposition to our principle of not endorsing the dismemberment of UN nations. If there is to be action, however, this would be better than some indecisive intermediate step. The additional argument against acquiescing in any such move is that it stands a good chance of failing. SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET - 8 - In Conclusion This memo is intended simply to provide background on steps taken to date and a framework within which to think about where events might go from here. If this heats up any more, it may be necessary to call a WSAG meeting. SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOC RECD OG NBR INITIAL ACTION OFF MO DA MO DA HR NSC CORRES PONDENCE PROFILE 02 10 02 10 18 01440 HAK LOG IN/OUT ONLY TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT U NO FORN NODIS X KISSINGER ROGERS, W LOU BUO EXDIS DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION HAIG LAIRD, M C EYES ONLY LIMDIS S X CODE WORD RES DATA Saunders X TS SENSITIVE The Cyprus Situation: Greek-Turk Relations and the new situation SUBJECT: REFERENCE: S/S OTHER NOT XEROXED APP'TS: PRES HAK TALKER MEMCON DATE REQ. INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO REC MEMO FOR HAK ( ) CY ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG FOR MEMO FOR PRES ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR SIGNATURE ( ) FAR EAST FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( ) SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MEMO TO ( ) EUROPE/CANADA NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA Rosemary X RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) JOINT MEMO ( ) LATIN AMERICA REFER TO STATE ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( ) ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE ( ) SCIENTIFIC DUE DATE: LR PLANNING COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions) PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING BY PASS CONGRESSIONAL DATE FROM TO S ACTION REQUIRED CY TO 2/11 Saunders HAK CIX Info 2/14 C INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING Noted by HAK w/ comments MICROFILM DATA CROSS REF WITH NOTIFY DATE SEE LOG DO you DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO INIT DISPOSITION JOINED BY LOG COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP X HM FEB 1 6 1972 DATE ORIG) NSC SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: TO ) PAF WHC SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO SUBF Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library * GPO: 1971-412-412 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 7120111 35903 THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON December 17, 1971 CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: Progress on the Cyprus Problem The news of crises invariably receives total attention while news of progress usually gets buried. I would like to call your attention to some quiet, but hopeful developments. For several months we have been working hard to avoid another crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. As you know, this summer the local negotiations which were basic to the containment of the Cyprus problem broke down and violent incidents began to increase. In the face of a deteriorating situation, we suggested a third-party presence to reinvigor- ate the negotiations. This idea was developed by Greece and Turkey and then elaborated and formally proposed by U Thant as a new negotiating procedure. I supported this proposal during my bilateral meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in October. Subsequently, we made diplomatic representations here and in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia urging acceptance by all parties. On December 13 the Security Council met to consider Cyprus. We were successful in getting a noncontroversial resolution extending the UN force on Cyprus for six more months, which will aid greatly in maintaining a peaceful atmosphere in which negotiations can proceed. In addition, Cyprus accepted the Secretary-General's proposal without qualifications. This breakthrough together with earlier acceptances by Greece and Turkey (the latter with qualifica- tions) will in my view make possible the resumption of the negotiations in the near future. I believe our representa- tions were very important, if not crucial, in getting the parties back to the negotiating table. We will, of course, closely monitor the evolving situation in order to assist the parties whenever our efforts would be appropriate and helpful. On the Cyprus front the new year has a hopeful cast. William P. Rogers Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOC RECD G NBR INITIAL ACTION OFF MO DA MO DA HR NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 1217 12189 55903 Saunders l LOG IN/OUT ONLY TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT U NO FORN NODIS KISSINGER ROGERS, W x LOU BUO EXDIS DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION HAIG LAIRD, M C e EYES ONLY LIMDIS S CODE WORD RES DATA SUBJECT: Progress on the Cyprus TS Problem ENSITIVE REFERENCE: S/S 7/20/11 OTHER NOT XEROXED APP'TS: PRES HAK TALKER MEMCON DATE REQ. INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO REC A MEMO FOR HAK ( ) CY ADVANCE CYS TO hak/haig FOR MEMO FOR PRES. ( p ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR SIGNATURE ( ) FAR EAST FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( ) SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION AFRICA MEMO TO ( ) NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA l RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) EUROPE/CANADA JOINT MEMO ( ) LATIN AMERICA REFER TO STATE ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( ) ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE ( ) SCIENTIFIC COMMENTS: (Including Special 12/26 Instructions) DUE DATE: LR PLANNING PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING CONGRESSIONAL DATE FROM TO S ACTION REQUIRED CY TO 12/28/71 Saunders nsc/s close file. used in Daily Brief. H HS INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING 12/28 Indd L POB MICROFILM DATA CROSS REF WITH NOTIFY DATE Hun SEE LOG DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO INIT DISPOSITION JOINED BY LOG COPIES: (AS MARKED above) SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA HP HM DEC291971 DATE NSC SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: TO ) 1 PAF WHC SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO SUBF Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library * GPO: 1971-412-412 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 31820 September 16, 1971 cyprum MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Department of State SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador Popper (S/S 7112921) This is to confirm my phone call that Dr. Kissinger will meet with Dave Popper on Wednesday, September 22, at 12 noon. It will not be possible to schedule an appointment with the President at this time. TWO Jeanne W. Davis Staff Secretary Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. THE WHITE house washington Jeanne Davis Since this came in an Eliot - Kissinger, d assume you should notify S/S. I have checked to assure that Popper's schedule is free at the appointed time Do you want to confirm to Coleman ? Hal Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to I HAL- I havesetaside THIRU 12:00 noon on MEMORANDUM wednesday, 22 September THE WHITE HOUSE HA16 for meeting. win you handle with Popper, WASHINGTON ACTION please 7 31820 CSH CONFIDENTIAL September 13, 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR DR KISSINGER FROM. Harold H. VSa Saunders Hal SUBJECT: Appointments for Ambassador Popper Our Ambassador to Cyprus, Dave Popper, will be in Washington, September 20 - October 1 for consultations. There are two aspects to his visit here which should be considered in deciding whether he should see you or the President. 1. This would be your opportunity to talk with him about Cyprus. Since you are trying to maintain control over this and have now dealt with it twice in the SRG, an appointment of this kind might be useful to both of you. The purpose would be to get a picture of Popper and his way of analyzing the problem. 2. Popper has just completed several trips for major consultations with selected European, Near Eastern and Asian governments to further the effort to amend the 1961 Single Convention on narcotic drugs. This is a special mission for which Popper was selected because of his past experience with international organizations rather than a job carried out in connection with his present ambassadorial duties. Having checked with Bud Krogh, I judge that in the narcotics context a meeting with the President is not necessary, so in view of the President's normal practice of not seeing our ambassadors unless there is overriding substantive reason, I am not attaching a recommendation for a Presi- dential appointment. I do think, however, that it would be worth your time to have a brief chat with him about Cyprus. I have not pushed this during his other visits here, but now seems a particularly appropriate time. RECOMMENDATIONS. 1. That you schedule an appointment yourself with Ambassador Popper and his country director between September 20 and October 1. Approve HC Disapprove 2. That you not suggest a meeting with the President. Approve 45 Recommend meeting with President CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ambassador David H. Popper Born in New York City in 1912, Ambassador Popper received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Harvard University. He joined the Department of State in 1945 following service in the United States Army during World War II. Prior to appointment as Ambassador to Cyprus he held a number of Department positions relating to the United Nations. These included Director Office of United Nations Political and International Organizations in Geneva, Deputy United States representative to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Senior Adviser on Disarmament Affairs, USUN, Director Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Popper presented his credentials in Cyprus in July 1969. During the period June-August 1971, Ambassador Popper led a team of Department and Bureau of Narcotics and Dan- gerous Drugs experts in consultations with key European, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian governments. The consultations were designed to mobilize support for strengthening the 1969 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 7112921 31820 department OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 August 20, 1971 CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Appointment with President for Ambassador Popper Our Ambassador to Cyprus, David H. Popper, will be in Washington September 20-October 1 for consultations with government officials. During that time he will be available for a call on the President should the President wish to see him. You may wish to consider the following in this con- nection: A. Ambassador Popper will have completed major con- sultations with selected European, Near Eastern, and Asian governments in furtherance of a Presidentially-endorsed initiative to amend the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The Department feels that Ambassador Popper has made a significant contribution in our effort to garner support for these amendments. The President may wish to receive a first-hand report of the Ambassador's reactions. B. As Under Secretary Irwin discussed with you earlier this month, we expect that the Cyprus situation will be passing through a delicate stage during the period late September-early October. The President may wish to discuss the situation with Ambassador Popper. In view of President Makarios' feeling of personal rapport with President Nixon, it would strengthen Ambassador Popper's hand in what may be difficult exchanges with Makarios if he could return to Cyprus after having had discussions with the President. for Parker Theodore W. L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Attachment: Biographic Sketch CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOC RECD LC BR INITIAL ACTION OFF MO DA MO DA HR NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 0820 08 2/10 10,820 LOG IN/OUT ONLY TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT x U NO FORN NODIS KISSINGER X ROGERS, W LOU BUO EXDIS DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION HAIG LAIRD, M C x EYES ONLY LIMDIS S CODE WORD RES DATA SUBJECT: Passible and w/Pres TS for SENSITIVE Ambrisador Pappu to Discuss Control REFERENCE: S/S 7/12921 Drug NOT XEROXED OTHER APP'TS: PRES X HAK TALKER MEMCON DATE REQ. INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO REC MEMO FOR HAK CY ( ) ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG FOR MEMO FOR PRES. x ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR SIGNATURE ( FAR EAST FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( ) SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MEMO TO ( ) NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA * Y RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) EUROPE/CANADA X JOINT MEMO ( ) LATIN AMERICA REFER TO STATE ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( ) ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE ( ) SCIENTIFIC DUE DATE: LR PLANNING 0830 COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions) PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING CONGRESSIONAL DATE FROM TO S ACTION required CY TO 8/23/ HS Nsels Send to Saemders INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING 08/23 /s SAVND S Transferred for Sam (0830 9/13/71 Saunders HAK X 7/16 Declsion (0917) Her Approved 16 SEP 1971 Dries sgd pro belot MICROFILM DATA CROSS REF WITH NOTIFY Eliot X DATE SEE LOG DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO DO DISPOSITION JOINED BY LOG COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP HM SEP 171979 DATE INIT NSC X SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: TO ) PAF WHC suspense CY ATTACHED: YES NO SUBF Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library the GPO: 1971-412-412 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. HAKD 7114168 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 September 13, 1971 SECRET/EXDIS MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE SUBJECT: Cyprus I am attaching for your information a telegram the Secretary today sent to our Embassies in Ankara, Athens and Nicosia which I thought you would like to see in the light of the recent Senior Review Group meetings on this subject. Theodorsh Elist pe Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Attachment: State 167530, cys 2, 3 SECRET/EXDIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Saunders STATES AMERICA UNITED DEP STATE OF DEPARTMENT Department of State TELEG OF CHAIL SECRET 591 PAGE 01 STATE 167530 EXPIRE EXQIN EXPIN EXPIS 5Ø ORIGIN SS-25 INFO OCT-01 - /026 R 66611 DRAFTED BY: NEA: J. J. SISCO SITUAT WH ONROOMS 971 SEP 2 13 PM 51 APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY IO: MR. DE PALMA S/S: MR. ELIOT 016700 R 131722Z SEP 71 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY NICOSIA AMEMBASSY ANKARA INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN NEW YORK USMISSION NATO USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM SECRE T STATE 167530 EXDIS FOR AMBASSADORS TASCA AND CHARGES CRAWFORD AND CUTHELL FROM SISCO SUBJ: CYPRUS 1 - AS A RESULT OF VERY GOOD AND DETAILED REPORTING, I BELIEVE WE NOW HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE BOTH OF THE RESULTS OF THE MAKARIOS PAPADOPOLOUS TALKS AND THE STRATEGY WHICH GOC IN- TENDS TO PURSUE OVER THE COMING WEEKS. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT GOC WILL "SEEK THE ADVICE" OF THE SYG AND THAT THERE IS NOT APT TO BE TOO MUCH COMMON GROUND BETWEEN GOG AND GOT AS TO HOW TO KEEP THE PARTIES ENGAGED AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO POSSIBLE FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION. 2. IN REVIEWING ALL OF THE CABLES CAREFULLY, AND YOU ARE ALL NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richardial Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. OF STATE EXPIN Department of State of STATES AMERICA UNITED TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 STATE 167530 TO BE CONGRATULATED ON THE REPORTING, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE NEED TO FOCUS ON TWO IDEAS THAT HAVE COME FROM YOU AT THIS STAGE. FIRST, AMBASSADOR TASCA'S SENSIBLE THOUGHT THAT WHEN SECRETARY SEES PALMAS AND OLCAY HE ENCOURAGE THEM BOTH TO COME UP WITH SOME KIND OF A MEDIATION PROPOSAL THAT IS SOMEWHERE WITHIN THE BALLPARK IN so FAR AS GOC IS CONCERNED. IT SEEMS TO ME ALSO THAT THIS IDEA CAN BE COMBINED WITH THE OTHER IDEA WHICH YOUR CABLES ELUCIDATED, NAMELY THE IDEA OF A THIRD PARTY PRESENCE AT CONTINUING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. THE TRICK, OF COURSE, WILL BE TO TRY TO FIND THE RIGHT BALANCE IN "UN INVOLVEMENT OR NON- INVOLVEMENT PLUS HAVING THE SECRETARY GENERAL DESIGNATE AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT STATURE, FORCE, AND SUB- TLETY TO INJECT SOME FRESH IDEAS IN THE SITUATION. WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THE CYPRUS ISSUE IS IMMEDIATELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO POLITICAL SOLUTION. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR INTEREST WOULD BEST BE SERVED IF SOME FORM OF CONTINUING INSTRUMENTALITY KEEPING THE PARTIES ENGAGED CAN BE FOUND. 3. I HAVE NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER FULLY EXPIN WITH THE SECRETARY BUT WILL DO SO BEFORE WE GO TO NEW YORK, SINCE NOT ONLY WILL HE BE HEAVILY INVOLVED AS IN THE PAST IN ARAB-ISRAELI TALKS, BUT MUCH OF HIS TIME WILL ALSO (IN ADDITION TO CHINESE REPRESENTATION) BE TAKEN UP WITH INDIA-PAKISTAN MATTERS, AND NOW CYPRUS IN A MUCH MORE INTENSIVE WAY. 40 ASSUMING THAT WE WILL WANT TO ENCOURAGE GOG AND GOT TO DE- VELOP A MEDIATION PROPOSAL ALONG THE ABOVE LINES, WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL THAT MIGHT BE NAMED BY SECRETARY GENERAL. WHILE I PERSONALLY KNOW AND HAVE RESPECT FOR OSORIO- TAFAL, HE DOES NOT STRIKE ME AS THE KIND OF INDIVIDUAL THAT CAN GIVE TALKS THE NEW STARCH THAT IS REQUIRED. IN PREPARATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S TALKS IN NEW YORK, I WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS ON THIS AND ANY OTHER THOUGHTS YOU MAY HAVE. 5. I HOPE YOU WOULD INCLUDE IN YOUR OBSERVATIONS THEI RELATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A NON-AMERICAN AS AGAINST AN AMERICAN BEING DESIGNATED. FROM THIS END, I CAN TELL YOU OUR PREFERENCE WOULD BE IN ANY NEXT STATE THAT IT BE A NON-AMER- ICAN, THOUGH WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT AFFORD TO CLOSE ANY DOORS SINCE CYPRUS ISSUE CAN REACH A MORE NEW AND SERIOUS STAGE OVER COMING MONTHS. GP-3. ROGERS. NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard SECRET Nixon Presidential Library 01/20/265 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Men Haing NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 September 4, 1971 SECRET/EXDIS MEMORANDUM FOR The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff SUBJECT: P. Papers on Cyprus Attached are the following two papers, prepared by the Department of State, which will serve as the basis for discussion at the Senior Keview Group meeting on Cyprus scheduled for Wednesday, September 8, at 3 45 p.m.: - - Cyprus: Strategy Paper for Next Steps, - - Cyprus: Contingency Plans for Violent Incidents. Jeanne mD W. Davis Staff Secretary Attachment CC: Under Secretary of Treasury SECRET/EXDIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET/EXDIS Cyprus: Strategy Paper for Next Steps Situation Ten years of experience with the Cyprus problem demon- strate one constant when the parties to the dispute are not negotiating, the probability of violence increases exponentially. Since June 1968, the local talks have kept the Cyprus problem in a negotiating context. In addition, this instrumentality has provided what is the unique advantage of having the people directly concerned discuss those problems which directly concern them. On August 9, the Turk Cypriot negotiator, Denktash, tablèd a papër setting forth the "final" Turkish Cypriot position. He insisted on and made all Turk Cypriot com- promises made thus far contingent upon the establishment of a separate and autonomous Turk Cypriot administration from the village to the national level. He also raised the need for a specific GOC disavowal of enosis (union with Greece) and injected the question of internatioral guarantees Archbishop Makarios subsequently declared the talks "dead- locked", although neither party has made a move to break off negotiations. With the local talks approaching termination and frustration levels rising on all sides, the possibility of an outbreak of violence is greater than at any time since 1968. Rather than react to a violent development the Cyprus situation would be better dealt with by seeking to revive US/UK/UN diplomacy. The goal of such a diplomatic effort would be preservation of negotiations to avoid a confrontation on the island which would sooner or later bring in Greece and Turkey on opposite sides. There are several options and variations thereon; all of them involve some form of mediation. Mediation Option I: UN UN mediation has clear advantages. First, the UN is already seized of the problem and is on the spot. Both the Secretary General and the Security Council are involved in the Cyprus problem as a result of the March 4, 1964 (and subsequent) Resolutions and the presence of the United Nations SECRET/EXDIS Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals; Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential declassified. Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET/EXDIS 2 Force (UNFICYP) on the island. Second, with the UN out in front, Greck, Turk, and Cypriot fire would be concentrated on that organization rather than any specific country. Third, the UN provides a broad cover for both neutral mediation and, at a later stage, perhaps the guaranteeing of the results of that mediation. There are, however, problems with the UN being the focus of activity. The Turks/Turk Cypriots have already expressed their antipathy toward UN mediation, prefer- ring instead the convening of the London-Zurich guarantor powers. Moreover, in a UN mediation effort U.S. inputs would necessarily be diluted by the views of others, and it is difficult for the UN as an institution to bring pressure to bear on the parties. Variant A. By far the most preferable variation of the UN mediation option would involve consultations among the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots which would result in joint agree- ment on a mediator and the principles upon which mediation would be based. The initiative for the consuttations could be undertaken by any one of the parties, preferably Turkey, or perhaps could be jointly undertaken by Greece and Turkey through their dialogue. Once the parties had agreed on a person and on guidelines, U Thant could formally give the individual his blessing and the mediation would proceed A retired senior statesman (e.g., Lester Pearson) or an interna- tionally renowned legal expert (e.g., Edward Hambro of Norway or Pierre Laline of Switzerland) would be preferable to a currently active "super star. 11 The latter might raise hopes too high with the danger that the failure of his mission would bring increased tension. Variant B. Archbishop Makarios could unilaterally request U Thant either to undertake a mediation effort on the basis of the March 4, 1964 Resolution or to activate his good offices under the December 22, 1967 Resolution. The problem here would be that the Turks might reject the concept of mediation because it was a Makarios proposal. In any case, were the Archbishop to take a UN initiative, the U.S. would be forced to support the effort. Variant C. It is possible that U Thant or his Special Representative on the island, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, might take the initiative to regenerate the SYG's good offices. The local talks were convened by Osorio-Tafall, acting under the SYG's good offices mandate, and he then withdrew stating that he would be available for mediation should the sides reach a deadlock. U Thant's next report to the SC on Cyprus will be in December in connection with renewal of UNFICYP's mandate. He could choose to move in this framework. SECRET/EXDIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET/EXDIS 3 Mediation Option II: U.S. The argument for U S. mediation is that our position as NATO leader and primary ally of Greece and Turkey, as well as our active mediatory roles via the Ball and Vance Missions to defuse crises, give us the primary responsibility for the Cyprus problem Since the U.S. is the repository of a great deal of experience with the Cyprus problem and the country most able to influence all the parties, it is incumbent upon us to shape the Cyprus situation in a positive way before there is a crisis and before we are compelled to intervene under the worst possible conditions. Theoretically, this position has much merit. However, as a practical matter in the present circumstances there should be no direct U.S. mediation. The reasons are that such an effort would immedi- ately put the U.S. in the middle of a three-cornered struggle of Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots and expose us to criticism from all sides. In addition, our influence would be wasted too early in the ,game. A direct U.S. intervention should be preserved as a last ditch option in the case of an uncon- tainable outbreak of violence. Mediation Option III: Independent A thira variant on mediation would be the appointment of a neutral, non-political third party (preferably European as mediator. This option would probably not emerge spontaneously, but could be stimulated by the-U,S., acting in concert with the U.K., or within the NATO framework. For example, Italy, with its interest in playing a significant role in "Mediter- ranean" diplomacy, might be stimulated to perform the mediatory function. Also, Italy has outstanding candidates such as elder statesman Manlio Brosio or legal expert Roberto Ago. Independent mediation, like a UN effort, has the advantage of placing someone else, out in front. Another positive factor is that lack of direct involvement with the UN would make an independent mediator more palatable to the Turks. The main problems would be the difficulty of finding a willing candidate and again the inevitable dilution of U.S. inputs and lack of influence on the countries concerned. U.S. Diplomatic Strategy Given the dangers inherent in the situation on the ground, the need for the U.S. to keep the Cyprus problem in a negotiat- ing context and the considerations involved in mediation, it would be best for the U.S. quietly to reactivate its diplomacy vis-a-vis Cyprus. In general terms, our goal should be to insure that in the case of a real stalemate in the intercommunal SECRET/EXDIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET/EXDIS 4 talks and increasing violence on the Island a mediation effort can be quickly and efficiently mounted. The ideal kind of mediation would be that outlined in Option I A, i.e., a UN-sponsored effort stimulated by the parties and involving a mediator and guidelines previously agreed upon. The next most feasible approach would be Option III. In either case the U.S. role should be that of an amicus curiae providing behind the scenes ideas and support. At the very minimum, if we are successful in proceeding with mediation, the negotiating process will be spun out and time will be gained. At the maximum, breakthroughs might be achieved which would either solve the Cyprus problem or pro- vide for a more stable modus vivendi. Next Steps: 1. We believe Assistant Secretary Sisco should call in the Turkish, Greek, and Cypriot Ambassadors (with supporting actions in the capitals) and ask them to clarify their positions as reflected in the latest documents exchanged in the local talks. In addition, he should discuss with them where we go from here on the Cyprus problem, emphasizing the U.S. desire for diplomacy and negotiation and probing reactions to UNSYG good offices (which Makarios has already floated in the press). 2. The next step would be determined by events in the coming weeks. The Foreign Ministers of all the parties will be in New York for the UNGA and, if stalemate and crisis seem imminent, Secretary Rogers will consider exploring with the Foreign Ministers (particularly Olcay of Turkey) some form of mediation as generally outlined in Option I A. Concurrences: NEA/GRK - Mr. Churchill (subs) NEA/TUR - Mr. Pugh (subs) IO/UNP - Mr. Armitage (subs) EUR - Mr. Richard Davies (info) NEA - Mr. Rodger Davies amp NEA - Mr. Joseph J. Sisco S/PCTING NEA/CYP: TDBoyatt he X 20279, 8/27/71 SECRET/EXDIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET Cyprus: Contingency Plans for Violent Incidents The historical record shows that serious intercommunal violence has often erupted in Cyprus. An action-reaction escalation of violence could bring Greece and Turkey into confrontation as in 1964, 1965, and 1967. With the local talks between Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriot negotiators now approaching deadlock and with frustration and uncertainty increasing, the coming weeks and months will be particularly delicate. Our contingency plans are based on past Cyprus crisis management and are geared for quick reaction to contain vio- lence. U.S. responses vary depending on the kind and scale of the incident, which side initiated the violence and for what reason. Procedure in Case of Accidental Incidents: In the case of an accidental shooting incident, a small scale provocation, or a loss of control by the Greek or Turk Cypriot leadership of a sizeable portion of its military forces or civilian population, initial U.S. responses would appropriately focus on Cyprus itself. 1. The United Nations force on the ground (UNFICYP) has in the past, and could today, -successfully interpose its troops between the local opposing groups. 2. Our Embassy in Nicosia would encourage rapid UNFICYP interposition and would make strong representations (probably in conjunction with other Embassies and U Thant's Special Representative) calling for either the GOC and/or the Turk Cypriot leadership to restore discipline and order within their ranks. 3. On the international diplomatic level we would encour- age joint U.S., U.K., UN diplomatic démarches in London, Washington, New York, Athens and Ankara in support of efforts on the Island to contain the violence. Procedure in Case of Premeditated Violence ona Small Scale: Premeditated violence, by either the GOC or the Turk Cypriots, is always a possibility. Because the vast majority of the mainland Greek troops on Cyprus were withdrawn in the SECRET Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET 2 wake of the 1967 crisis, Cyprus is today virtually defenseless relative to Turkey. For this reason Makarios would surely not go so far as to generate incidents which might invite mainland Turkish intervention. However, it is conceivable that His Beatitude might stimulate incidents simply to get the UN more involved by obtaining an increase in the size of UNFICYP and/ or diplomatic intervention by the Secretary General or the Security Council. In such an event, the scale of violence would probably be kept as small as possible and U.S. reaction would be as described in steps 1, 2, and 3 in the above paragraph. Procedure in Case of Large-Scale Violence: By far the most dangerous contingency would be a decision by the Turk/ Turk Cypriot side to provoke violence as a prelude to Turk military intervention for the purpose of forcibly partition- ing the Island. In this event our primary task would be to përsuade the GOT that such a violent course of action would be self-defeating. 1. We would encourage UNFICYP to interpose its forces. If the fighting is on a large scale UNFICYP interposition might be futile (as in 1967). Certainly in the case of an invasion from Turkey UNFICYP would not take preventive action. 2. In concert with the U K., and other interested parties, the U.S. would make representations in Ankara, Washington, and London to convince the Turks that the GOC's ability to generate a full scale international crisis would inevitably bring main- land Greece into conflict with Turkey, activate the inter- national community against what would be regarded as stark aggression, and possibly involve the Soviet Union in a manner inimical to Turkish interests. 13. A corollary diplomatic move would be to activate the United Nations. U Thant's Special Representative on the Island and UNFICYP would no doubt be involved ab initio in efforts to stop the fighting. In addition, we could consider an emergency session of the Security Council with a view to mobilizing support for an immediate cessation of hostilities. 4. NATO would be involved in a full-blown Cyprus crisis. Since the 1963-64 period, the Secretary General has maintained a Watching Brief. If serious hostilities were to occur, we would activate the NATO Secretary General (as in 1967) to support our diplomatic efforts to counsel moderation and achieve an end to the fighting. 5. Finally, our ace in the hole in a crisis on the scale SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET 3 outlined above remains the Special Presidential Mission. Both were crucial in stopping the shooting in 1964 and 1967 respectively. This option should be preserved as a last ditch effort to avoid or resolve a Greco-Turk confrontation caused by serious fighting on the Island. The Soviet Dimension: The attitude of the Soviet Union in the event of serious intercommunal violence is difficult to predict. The Soviets appear to have two distinct and partially conflicting policy goals. On the one hand, a constant in Russian policy has been preservation of the inde- pendence and territorial integrity, i.e., the "non-NATOization", of Cyprus. On the other hand, the USSR has courted Turkey fairly consistently in recent years. The most probable course of Soviet diplomacy would be to make threatening noises against outside interventions while attempting to cool off Makarios in order to avoid the possibility of such interventions. In any UN activity they would probably come down on the side of a small independent nation but not strongly enough to badly irritate Turkey. In short, in the case of a Cyprus crisis, I would anticipate that the Soviet policy would be verbal as indeed it was in 1967. Converting a Crisis Into Procress. In the past Cyprus nas presented opportunity in crisis. If the situation either by accident or design, should deteriorate to the point where there is large scale fighting and the threat of Turk invasion, and if such a crisis can be defused by diplomacy, then we should give active consideration to steps which might subsequently be taken to assist in removing the basic causes of strife between the two communities. An example of this procedure was the successful US/UK/UN drive to initiate the local talks in 1968 following the Vance Mission's successful resolution of the 1967 crisis. 102 SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 7111586 31035 department OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 July 30, 1971 CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Gradual Worsening of Intercommunal Relations -- Cyprus In recent days there has been some increase in inter- communal tensions on Cyprus. This has been represented by a number of low-level provocations, principally by the Greek Cypriots. Although the situation has warmed up to some degree, we have not yet reached a "take-off" point in which inter- communal tensions begin to have a life of their own and can escalate into real violence. The root cause of this increased tension is the con- tinuing inability of the Turk and Greek Cypriot constitutional negotiators to bridge the very real gaps in their conceptions of an acceptable new governmental framework for Cyprus. This deepening stalemate has impelled the Turkish Government since April to declare publicly and rather often that the Turks are not prepared to carry on the negotiations for an unlimited period of time. In addition, a direct Cyprus dialogue between Athens and Ankara was initiated in June when Foreign Ministers Palamas and Olcay met in Lisbon. These new elements have produced a fear in the Greek Cypriot community that Turkey and Greece may be contemplating means to fundamentally change the status quo on the island. The recent Greek Cypriot provocations may be an attempt by Greek Cypriots to get the message to Turkey and Greece that pressure will not force them to compromise their negotiating position and that the Greek Cypriots continue to control the situation on the ground. The Greek Cypriots may also, however, be attempting to force Security Council consideration of a deteriorating situ- ation on the island in order to enlist world public opinion CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL 2 against possible attempts to solve the Cyprus problem from outside the island. Our best estimate is that the situation may continue to deteriorate but at a relatively slow rate. In the meantime, we are seeking to defuse the situation by urging moderation on all concerned parties. Ambassador Tasca has conveyed to Prime Minister Papadopoulos our assessment of the need to continue the intercommunal negotiations. We are awaiting Ambassador Handley's views on carrying out a similar approach in Turkey, which would be followed up by an approach to Makarios that he exercise restraint in the current situation. CindL Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 7107965 28891 department OF state Washington, D.C. 20520 May 27, 1971 SECRET Attachments MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: The Cyprus Issue I attach, for your information, a memorandum prepared for the Secretary on the present status of the Cyprus issue. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Attachment: Memorandum. SECRET Attachments Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET Background Information on the Cyprus Issue Since early 1968, the Turk and Greek communities have been engaged in a long and difficult series of discussions designed to reach a new constitutional arrangement for the island. These talks were initiated after the serious crisis which erupted late in 1967. Our primary interest in Cyprus is to achieve a Cypriot solution which will remove Cyprus as a bone of contention between our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. The basic constitutional question which stubbornly resists resolution is the conflict between Turk-Cypriot demands for bi-communal autonomy and Greek-Cypriot demands for a unitary government within which the Turkish minority would be guaranteed fairly extensive civil rights. Neither party, nor their re- spective "parent countries", have budged from these basic stances. As a result, there have been no constitutional breakthroughs in the intercommunal talks, during the three years they have been underway. The negotiators from time to time have been forced to concentrate on less basic issues (e.g. partial refugee resettlement, freedom of movement between the two communal areas, and dismantling of quasi-military barricades). There are now danger signs that mounting frustration on both sides may bring about complete impasse in the talks, and thus threaten renewed intercommunal strife. There are also intelligence indications, reported to you separately, that the new Turkish Government under Prime Minister Erim has come to the conclusion that partition and double enosis (annexation of the two parts to Turkey and Greece) represent the best solution to the Cyprus problem. The Turks are seeking a direct dialogue with Greece to discuss the future of Cyprus and will be meeting with the Greeks in this connection at the NATO Ministerial. SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET 2 We believe, and are emphasizing with the Greeks and Turks, that the Cypriot intercommunal negotiations continue to represent the best procedure for resolving the Cyprus prob- lem. We believe a Greco/Turkish dialogue could serve a useful supportive role if restricted to giving new impetus and breathing new life into the Cypriot negotiations. In the meantime we are consulting with our concerned Ambassadors in the interest of sharpening our contingency studies, and in Brussels have shared our apprehension with the Secretary General at NATO. Brosio also believes that the only practical approach to the problem is to plug away at the intercommunal talks, and will so stress at Lisbon in conversations with Olcay and Palamas. SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. he Presidem did not see. MEMORANDUM THE WHITE Pagrae rec'd at 11:59 AM + WASHINGTON INFORMATION mts Scheduled 26099 2-3 CONFIDENTIAL minutes Truary 22, stand up up MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT only FROM: Henry A. Kissinger H SUBJECT. Your Meeting with Ambassador to Cyprus, David Popper-- 12:10 p.m., February 22 Background Ambassador Popper will be calling on you mainly for the purpose of making his initial courtesy call and having the customary picture taken. You did meet briefly at your session with the Mediterranean Ambassadors in Naples, but Ambassador Popper did not have a chance to call on you before he left for his post last July. Since Cyprus is one of those problems which could become more active at any time, it is useful for you to have a firsthand sense of the man who represents you there. Points Ambassador Popper May Raise The Ambassador will probably express his gratitude for the attention you paid to Archbishop Makarios during his visit here for the UN celebrations. Because of the potential for crisis in Cyprus, the Ambassador was most anxious that you establish a personal relationship with Makarios that might be drawn on in the event of trouble. The Ambassador may also describe briefly the state of negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. Without making a great deal of progress, the two continue to engage. Talking Points You may wish to make the following points. - You enjoyed meeting President Makarios in October. He is an impressive individual. Ask Ambassador Popper to carry your personal greetings to the President. You might, if you wish, ask him to say that you continue to watch with interest progress toward a final settlement DECLASSIFIED This on apcument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. the islandeproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library CONFIDENTIAL - 2 - -- You might wish to say a word about your feelings on the current state of Arab-Israeli negotiations since this was of concern to Makarios: While the course is difficult, you hope that we can complete the initial process of fully engaging the Egyptians and Israelis in negotiations. If this can be done, this will be the second major achievement of the U.S. peace initiative--the first having been the re-establishment of the cease-fire. CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON ACTION 26099 CONFIDENTIAL February 22, 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER FROM: Harold H. Saunders the SUBJECT: Request for Appointment with Ambassador Popper (Cyprus) David Popper, our Ambassador to Cyprus, will be calling on the President, February 22 during the open hour (12:10 p.m.). The Department has submitted a request for an appointment with you either before or after his call on the President [Tab B]. This is not absolutely essential today, and Popper will be around for a few more days. However, if you can work him in it might be desirable. Cyprus is one of those problems which could explode as a result of an accident at almost any time. In a situation like that, there is always some value in your having a personal sense of the man representing the President on the scene. The background on Popper, who used to be Joe Sisco's deputy in the Bureau for International Organizations, is in a copy of the memo for the President at Tab A. The main point of the meeting would be to give Popper a chance to tell you a little bit about where the situation on Cyprus stands. I believe you heard him once before during the Naples meeting of Mediterranean Ambassadors. I will be having lunch with him Wednesday. RECOMMENDATIONS. 1. That you send the memo at Tab A to the President if it is needed. 2. That you schedule a brief meeting with Ambassador Popper (not necessarily today). Approve Disapprove CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. A Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. B Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 26099 department OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 S/S 7102517 February 20, 1971 CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Request for Appointment with You from Ambassador to Cyprus, David H. Popper Ambassador Popper will call on the President on Monday, February 22, at 12:10 p.m. While at the White House, the Ambassador would like to pay a brief call on you to discuss the situation in Cyprus as it affects our political and military posture on NATO's southern flank in the Eastern Mediterranean. We therefore recommend that you meet with Ambassador Popper for five or ten minutes either before or after his meeting with the President to get his views on this protracted and potentially explosive problem. Tud - Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. For Executive Secretary Enclosure: Biographic Sketch of Ambassador Popper CONFIDENTIAL Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 26099 BIOGRAPHIC DATA David H. Popper Ambassador to Cyprus Born in New York City in 1912, Ambassador Popper received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Harvard University. He joined the Department of State in 1945 following service in the United States Army during World War II. Prior to appoint- ment as Ambassador to Cyprus he held a number of Department positions relating to the United Nations. These included Director Office of United Nations Political and International Organizations in Geneva, Deputy United States Representative to the Confer- ence on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Senior Adviser on Disarmament Affairs, USUN, Director Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Popper presented his credentials in Cyprus in July 1969. ЫУ 12 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NUMBER MO DA HR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CO ESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PR LE 26099 02 22 FROM: ELIOT X 09 O: PRES CLASSIF: U EXDIS HAK x ROGERS C NODIS LAIRD LOU EYES ONLY DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION 022071 S RES DATA DOC DATE: TS CODEWORD sensitive PARIS MTG NO FORN SUBJECT: Regust for appt with HAK 48 US amt apper ENCLOSURES: ( ) ( ) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED NAME: MEMO FOR HAK ( ) ACTiON INFO RCD CY MEMO TO PRESIDENT ( ) ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG FOR: REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ( ) STAFF SECRETARY X REPLY for PRES SIGNATURE ( ) DIR SECRETARIAT MEMO TO ( ) SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA X RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA X JOINT MEMO ( ) EUROPE/CANADA APPROPRIATE ACTION ( ) LATIN AMERICA ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( ) UNITED NATIONS CONCURRENCE ( ) ECONOMIC DUE DATE: SCIENTIFIC 0222 PLANNING GROUP COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions) PROGRAM ANALYSIS pass DATE FROM TO ACTION REQUIRED 2/22/71 Saunders Secretariat HAK Mimoto Pres 2/22/71 HAK PRES To PRES 02/22 INTERNAL ROUTING MICROFILM DATA DO. INIT RO DATE 2 6 FEB 1971 ORIG) NSC TO ) PAF. WHC SUBF DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO NSC STAFF approval DISPOSITION PAF HAK APPL NOTIFY: WHC HAK MARGINALIA SUBF NS3 FORM REQUIRED COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library * GPO: 1970-385-803 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 25503 CONFIDENTIAL January 29, 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR: HUGH SLOAN FROM: JEANNE W. DAVIS SUBJECT: Presidential Appointment Request for U. S. Ambassador to Cyprus Ambassador David H. Popper will be in Washington during the period February 15-25 for consultations. Ambassador Popper did not see the President prior to his departure for Cyprus in July 1969, and he has not yet had the op- portunity to meet the President at the White House. Additionally, the President met with President Makarios at the White House in October. During their discussion, the President reinforced and substantially added to our friendly relations with Makarios. Should int ercommunal strife erupt in Cyprus again, Makarios' willingness to accept a Presidential emissary and/or appeals from the President may again prove crucial to the restoration of calm locally and the prevention of a Greek-Turkish conflict-over Cyprus. In this context, it would be beneficial if Ambassador Popper could return to Cyprus with a personal greeting for Makarios from the President. If the President's schedule permits, we recommend an appointment with a photo opportunity. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 25503 department OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 7101361 CONFIDENTIAL January 29, 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Appointment with President for Ambassador Popper Our Ambassador to Cyprus, David H. Popper, will be in Washington February 15-25 for consultations with government officials. During that time he will be available for a call on the President should the President wish to see him. You may wish to consider the following in this connection: A. Ambassador Popper did not see the President prior to his departure for Cyprus in July 1969, and has not yet had the opportunity to meet the President at the White House. B. The President met with President Makarios at the White House in October 1970. During their one-hour discussion, the President reinforced and substantially added to our friendly relations with President Makarios. Should intercommunal strife erupt in Cyprus again, Makarios' willingness to accept a Presidential emissary and/or appeals from the President may again prove crucial to the restoration of calm locally and the prevention of a Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus. In this context, it would be beneficial if Ambassador Popper could return to Cyprus with a personal greeting for Makarios from President Nixon. Theorlore L. Eliothe Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Enclosure: Biographic Sketch CONFIDENTIAL Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ambassador David H. Popper Born in New York City in 1912, Ambassador Popper received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Harvard University. He joined the Department of State in 1945 following service in the United States Army during World War II. Prior to appointment as Ambassador to Cyprus he held a number of Department positions relating to the United Nations. These included Director Office of United Nations Political and International Organizations in Geneva, Deputy United States Representative to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Senior Adviser on Disarmament Affairs, USUN, Director Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Popper presented his credentials in Cyprus in July 1969. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NUMBER MO DA HR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CON SPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PRO _E 25503 of 29 15 X TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT CLASSIF: U EXDIS HAK x ROGERS C x NODIS LAIRD DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION LOU EYES ONLY DOC DATE: 01/27/21 S RES DATA TS CODEWORD SENSITIVE PARIS MTG NO FORN SUBJECT: appt. with Press for anb. Pappr 5/5 7101361 ( ) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED NAME: Sanders MEMO FOR HAK ( X ) ACTiON INFO RCD CY MEMO TO PRESIDENT ( ) ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG FOR: REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ( ) STAFF SECRETARY X REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ( ) DIR SECRETARIAT SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION MEMO TO ( ) SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA X JOINT MEMO ( ) EUROPE/CANADA APPROPRIATE ACTION ( ) LATIN AMERICA ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( ) UNITED NATIONS CONCURRENCE ( ) ECONOMIC DUE DATE: 02/02/21 SCIENTIFIC PLANNING GROUP COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions) PROGRAM ANALYSIS SROSSED 2/26 REF: DATE FROM TO ACTION required yry 1/29 Saunders Jeanne Davis For memo to chapin as agreed on the phone. H ITS 1/29 Devis Shoan, H Appropuate Acteon INTERNAL ROUTING 2/26 OpE per 26099 MICROFILM DATA DO DATE INIT 3/1 ORIG) NSC TO ) PAF WHC SUBF DISPATCH: letter/memo NSC STAFF approval DISPOSITION PAF HAK APP'L NOTIFY: WHC x HAK MARGINALIA X SUBF NS3 FORM required COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) * GPO: 1970-385-803 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Tab A see Paparta Ed Tab d seel China THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SECRET/NODIS November 13, 1970 Memorandum for Jeanne Davis From: Winston Lord W Subject: Memcons of Meetings Between the President and Foreign Leaders As indicated on the attached, HAK has approved the attached three memcons for distribution to: -- the State Department; sttached -- the President's files (I have the action memo on the Yen meeting, but don't know where the other ones are); and -- the relevant operators. I would appreciate it if you would make this distribution. Attachments Jeanne - please SECRET/NODIS return my mano we didu jus to HAK (nofair Xeroxing it 1st 1st) we Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE ACTION WASHINGTON SECRET/NODIS November 10, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER FROM: Winston Lord u SUBJECT: Assorted Memcons Attached for your approval for bureaucratic distribution are memoranda of conversation for the meetings between the President and Yahya, Makarios and Yen. You were the only other person present at these meetings and I have boiled down and sanitized your personal notes. Your full records will go into your personal files. I recommend that the attached versions be distributed to the State Department, the President's file, and the relevant NSC operators. Yahya memcon (Tab A) Approve Wpr Other ( We already gave State your approved brief highlights of this session for Ambassador Farley's November 5 meeting with Yahya. ) Makarios memcon (Tab B) Approve K Other Yen memcon (Tab C) Approve H Other This package will complete the official records for the President's meetings of the October 24-25 weekend, since the State Department interpreter did the Cheng Heng meeting and Wright/Nachmanoff did the Selassie/Lakas meetings. NOV 13 1970 SECRET/NODIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. B Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET/NODIS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS: President Richard Nixon Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs DATE & PLACE: 10:00 a. m. Sunday, October 25, 1970, in the President's Oval Office The President opened the conversation by giving background on his offices in the White House and Executive Office Building. He then turned to substance. The President said, "We follow your development with great sympathy. We understand your foreign policy of technical neutrality. Archbishop Makarios replied "Because of our geography and our peculiar conditions we follow a non-aligned policy but by history and tradition and conviction we belong to the West. We are not like other non-aligned countries that are really pro-east. At the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries we defended the Western point of view so much that I was afraid we would lose our non-aligned status. It The President said he hoped that the Middle East would not explode. He appreciated Cyprus being made available as a staging place during the evacuation of the airline hijacking hostages from Jordan. Archbishop Makarios responded that Cyprus was always available for any peaceful purpose in the area. He added that while, of course, he was strongly for peace in the Middle East it was important to understand the Israeli point of view. Israel felt extremely threatened. The President then said, "We are working very hard to get the ceasefire extended and eventually to get talks started, 11 and asked for the Archbishop's advice. Makarios said, "I don't give advice to the President of the United States. However, peace in the Middle East will take time. First, some Arab countries disagree with the initiative for domestic reasons; these are usually countries far away. Second, the U.S. proposal provides a good and fair basis for a settlement. However, in your desire for a settlement you may have been too pro-Arab and therefore may have emboldened them too much. The crisis would be more easily settled if the two super-powers would agree. 11 The President added: "Still the moral influence of small countries is important. We are grateful for your support of the decent principles in the West." SECRET/NODIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET/NODIS 2 Makarios commented, "Some people feel we are moving left. Of course, Communists exploit every problem but we will not become like Cuba, partly because Cypriots are a deeply religious people. 11 The President said, "The tragedy in the world is the flight from religion. You can't fight Communism with materialism. 11 Makarios said, "People who are for Communists are not necessarily the pro-Communists. They don't know what Communism is. For example, I had banned athiests from the voting rolls and a Communist had protested to me that he was not an athiest. Most Cypriots think it means improving life, but the main thing to remember is that Communists support me because I am popular; I don't support them to become popular; I have never appointed a left-wing person to any significant post. They support me because they can't do otherwise and I accept their support because it is a good way of keeping them under control. The simple people of Cyprus have more confidence in me than in anybody. I don't rely on the army or on the police force; my strength is my goodness. I am Archbishop for life, and the fact that I don't particularly want to continue as President makes me stronger. 11 Makarios commented that the U.S. Ambassador to his country "is an excellent person. 11 The President said, "I want very close relations. " In response to Makarios' remark that Cyprus was one of the smallest countries in the world, the President said, "But it has a wise leader. " Makarios then spoke about his plans to visit Japan and about his education at Boston University where he had had to interrupt his studies to return to Cyprus for the independence struggle. He noted that They brought me back, even though I didn't have the degree, to get an honorary degree. 11 SECRET/NODIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. STATE s/s-o ATTENTION' This Copy For BOB BROWN x29380 NEWS CONFERENCE #788 AT THE WHITE HOUSE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION '70 OCT 25 PM 02 3:02 WITH RON ZIEGLER Cypros AT 12:20 P.M. EST OCTOBER 25, 1970 SUNDAY MR. ZIEGLER: We will give you a general rundown on the first two meetings that the President had this morning; first, with the President of Cyprus, Archibishop Makarios. Accompanying the President of Cyprus to the White House was the Foreign Minister of Cyprus and also the Ambassador to the United States from Cyprus, Ambassador Rossides. We will post the spelling of the names of the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister. From the United States side, also present at the White House this morning, were Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco and Thomas Davis, Jr., from the State Department -- he is the Country Director at the State Department 59.00 and also Hal Saunders of the National Security Council staff. Of course, Dr. Kissinger, who sat in on the meeting. President Nixon and President Makarios, in the meeting which lasted from five minutes past 10 until 10:45, discussed, of course, the eastern Mediterranean area and the importance of stability in the eastern Mediterranean area. President Nixon expressed interest in the success of the intercommunal talks which are taking place in Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish communities, and the President received an assessment of these talks from Archibishop Makarios. This is a matter which we hope will continue to make progress. This, of course, as the President expressed, is a matter for the parties involved to work out, but the President did express hope that the discussions would continue and make progress. President Nixon thanked Archibishop Makarios for his government's facilitating reception of the hijacking hostages. As you recall, following the release of the hijack hostages they flew directly to Cyprus. President Nixon expressed his desire for continued friendly relations with Cyprus and his belief in a unified and democratic Cyprus. He also expressed the fact that the United States respects Cyprus' policy of independence and nonalignment. MORE #788 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- #788 The meeting today, of course, allowed President Nixon and Archbishop Makarios to develop a personal relationship. This is the first opportunity of this kind that they have had to meet, and President Nixon appreciates the opportunity to establish these personal ties and his personal relationship with Archrishop Makarios. I think I should mention that they also talked about generally other international matters, including, of course, the Middle East. We will move on now to the President's meeting with the President of Pakistan. The meeting with Yahya Khan lasted from 10:50 until approximately 11:45. President Nixon last met Yahya Khan on his trip to Pakistan, to Lahore, Pakistan, as you recall. He was there from July 31 until August 1 of 1969 on his Asian trip. This allowed President Nixon and President Yahya Khan to renew their personal relationship. Yahya Khan reported to President Nixon on the progress being made in restoring democratic government in Pakistan. As you may know, elections will be held in Pakistan in December for the election of a constituent assembly. They also discussed economic aid, economic assistance, and the President reaffirmed his recent decision wherein he approved PL 480 assistance for Pakistan. They also talked about economic aid or loans to Pakistan. Q What is PL 480? MR. ZIEGLER: PL 480 is the commodity assistance, such as wheat and edible oils. It is the normal PL 480 assistance. Q Were the amounts mentioned? MR. ZIEGLER: I don't have the detailed amounts to give you. AID would have those figures. President Nixon indicated United States continuing understanding of Pakistan's independent foreign policy maintaining harmonious relations with major powers. During the course of their discussion they, of course, talked about the Middle East, Indochina. President Nixon emphasized the United States efforts to promote peaceful solutions to the situation in both the Middle East and Indochina. MORE #788 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -3- #788 They also discussed generally the one-time exception that the United States is making to our embargo policy relating to the sale of arms to India and Pakistan. As you know, State just recently made public the one-time exception of the sale of unsophisticated equipment to Pakistan. Q In that connection, Ron, can you say if the President of Pakistan requested that the United States sell them tanks or spare parts for tanks as a further extension of this limited exception? MR. ZIEGLER: The one-time exception? 0 Yes. MR. ZIEGLER: I am not aware that he did. I was not in the meeting. But the details on this are still being worked out, as you know. But the point that I made earlier, this is a one-time exception of relatively unsophisticated material and replacements to Pakistan. Q Would that include tanks, Ron? MR. ZIEGLER: No, not necessarily tanks, as such. I quite frankly don't know what the breakdown of the unsophisti- cated equipment or replacement equipment is. That is still being worked out. O Is it being worked out in the White House? MR. ZIEGLER: It is being worked out between the two governments. Q Here in Washington? MR. ZIEGLER: In Washington and in Pakistan, in our diplomatic contacts and so forth. But I think primarily the discussions are taking place here in Washington. Q Ron, when the State Department announced the one-time exception, it specifically said tanks were not included. Are you leaving the door open? MR. ZIEGLER: No, I am not leaving the door open at all. I think they did make it clear at that time, that tanks were not included. I am simply saying that the details have not been worked out. I don't intend to leave it open from what the State Department initially said. Q Perhaps my question is confused. What I was really more interested in was whether or not it would include spare parts needed for the existing equipment they have there. MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know. I don't have the details of the discussions. Q Did the two Presidents go into details here today? MORE #788 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -4- #788 MR. ZIEGLER: No, they would not have taken their time to talk about the details of such a decision. They would talk more at the Presidential level, which would be in general concept. Q Are you including jet fighters under this term of unsophisticated equipment? I think the State Department said that at least there is some discussion of providing some jet fighters of some sort. MR. ZIEGLER: I said replacement and relatively unsophisticated equipment. But I am simply not familiar enough with the negotiations to get into detail with you. State had a rather relatively lengthy briefing on this some time ago. I simply want to convey to you that this was discussed between Yahya Khan and President Nixon. Or Ron, your use of the words "one-time exception" sounds pretty flat out that this is a one single shot deal. Is that a correct interpretation? MR. ZIEGLER: It is a one-time exception over 1965 and again reaffirmed in 1967 in the embargo policy of the sale of arms to India and Pakistan, yes. That was made clear, I think, by State when they announced this. Q Ron, can you give us any idea of what assessment Archbishop Makarios conveyed to the President on the progress of talks between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots? MR. ZIEGLER: No, I can't. I wouldn't want to convey what Archbishop Makarios' assessment was in private to the President, except I would say that we hope that they will continue to make progress in these discussions. Q On a parallel situation, President Khan, did they discuss the progress of negotiations between Pakistan and India, various differences? MR. ZIEGLER: That wasn't on the agenda, that I saw, and it wasn't indicated to me when I got a readout of the meeting. So, I don't believe they did. O Was there any discussion of the Indian reaction to Pakistan? MR. ZIEGLER: No, I don't believe they did. Q Was the Pakistan President's proposed visit to China or Pakistan's relations with China touched upon? MORE #788 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -5- #788 MR. ZIEGLER: I would think it would have been, yes. President Khan, of course, has just returned from Moscow, in June, I think. He had a visit there and is planning a visit to China. President Nixon, no doubt, conveyed to President Khan his general feeling about China. Q Mr. Ziegler, there is an interview in the New York Times in which President Sadat of the UAR is bringing some kind of message from Egypt to President Nixon. Could you comment? MR. ZIEGLER: I mentioned earlier that they did talk about the Middle East. Yahya Khan has, of course, just visited with President Sadat of the UAR. So, no doubt, in the course of their discussions, Yahya Khan did convey some of his impressions of the UAR and of his discussions with President Sadat to the President. But I am not prepared to amplify on that. Q Ron, in connection with their talks about China and the President conveying his feelings about China, is there any kind of a message that President Yahya Khan might take with him when he visits --- MR. ZIEGLER: No formal message, as such, no; nor, to follow up your question, I am not aware of a formal message that was conveyed to President Nixon from President Sadat through President Khan, except that I am sure he reported on his talks in the UAR to the President and of his conversations with President Sadat. Q His ideas and assessment? MR. ZIEGLER: An assessment, that is the word I used, yes; not a formal message. MORE #788 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 6 - #788 Q Can you tell us who was present at the talks between the President and the President of Pakistan? MR. ZIEGLER: They met alone, with the exception of Dr. Kissinger, who was present at the meeting. Q Secretary Sisco? MR. ZIEGLER: No. Secretary Sisco met with the other representatives of the Pakistan Government who were here. Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs was here, and the Ambassador of Pakistan was here. We will post those spellings for you. Q Is Archbishop Makarios planning any trips of this sort that President Khan has recently made? MR. ZIEGLER: Not that I am aware of. That is all I have. We will give you a rundown of the other meetings later. Q In the picture session with President Lakas, there seems to have been some conversation between the President and President Lakas of football. Is President Lakas another football fan? MR. ZIEGLER: I believe he is. He attended a university here in the United States. 2 Do you know where? They were talking about Texas Tech. MR. ZIEGLER: President Lakas attended Texas Wesleyan College and Texas Technological College, and they were referring to his Alma Mater's football. Q Do you know which Alma Mater it was? MR. ZIEGLER: We will post that. I don't recall. Q Ron, has the President sent any messages of congratulations or any acknowledgements to President Allende of Chile on his election? MR. ZIEGLER: I don't believe there has been any formal message sent. 0 Are there any additions to the schedule today? MR. ZIEGLER: No. We have posted the schedule. He is meeting with President Lakas of Panama now. He meets with His Emperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia at 2 o'clock and C.K. Yen, Vice President and Premier of China at 3:15, and His Excellency, Cheng Heng Chief of State of Cambodia at 4 o'clock. 2 Could you sort of characterize the pattern of this whole series of appointments today? Each one of these seems to be a past or present sensitive spot. Could you characterize what the President is trying to do today with this series of appointments. MORE #788 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. #778 - 7 - MR. ZIEGLER: Each of the heads of government or chiefs of state is here for the UN celebration. As I mentioned when I initially announced the schedule, the meetings the President is having today are with those which we could work out a mutually convenient time for such a meeting with. I think that is the basis for the meetings today. Q The Star this morning names Theodore Koop of CBS as the gentlemen who in time of emergency would be the government censor and I think it also quotes Herb Klein as saying thatairing this gentleman's name in public would be a healthy thing. Do you have a comment? MR. ZIEGLER: I had a comment on that before in Florida. I have no objection to sometime moving to a declassification of that. That is my personal view. However, it is still classified. So I cannot comment on that report. We are having discussions on that now within the government. My view would be, I think, parallel to Herb Klein's. In that particular instance, my personal view would be that I would have no objection to naming this individual. But it is still classified. Q Ron, has there been any discussion of setting up a hot line with Japan in the event of military uses of Okinawa and Japanese bases in the event of an emergency? MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know if that subject was covered yesterday or not. There was some reference to that, I know, the last time President Sato was here. But I think that if there was, the basis of that discussion would be looking into the technical aspects of accomplishing this. But it was not a major part of the agenda yesterday. Indeed, I don't know if it was discussed at this time. Q You can't confirm it. MR. ZIEGLER: No. Q There is a published report to that effect in Japan. MR. ZIEGLER: As you recall the last time President Nixon met with President Sato, there was reference to the possibility of this. Perhaps there was again in this session, as a small part of their discussion. But it would have, I am sure, evolved around simply agreeing to pursue the technical aspects of this. THE PRESS: Thank you. END (AT 12:40 P.M. EDT) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 32923 MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON September HR 22, 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR COLEMAN HICKS FROM. Harold H. Saunders Hal SUBJECT. Appointment with Ambassador Popper I gather you have had to scrub Ambassador Popper's appointment today. In rescheduling, it may help you to know that Ambassador Popper has to be in New York next Tuesday and Wednesday so that an appointment here on Thursday or Friday, September 30 or 31, would work best. The rest of this week is pretty full in his schedule as I imagine it is on Henry's. I do recommend that Henry try to see Ambassador Popper since he is concerned about Cyprus and this will be his one chance soon to discuss it with the Ambassador. CC. Jeanne Davis Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOC RECD DG NBR INITIAL ACTION OFF MO DA MO DA HR NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 4 22 9 22 19 32923 FROM: ELIOT to LOG IN/OUT ONLY TO: PRES U NO FORN NODIS KISSINGER ROGERS, W LOU BUO EXDIS DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION HAIG laird, M C EYES ONLY LIMDIS Hichs 3 SAUNDERS S CODE WORD RES DATA TS sensitive SUBJECT: Follow- up Request For Appt with HAK for Amb prpper REFERENCE: S/S OTHER NOT XEROXED APP'TS: PRES HAK TALKER MEMCON DATE REQ. INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO REC MEMO FOR HAK CY ( ) ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG for MEMO FOR PRES. - STAFF SECRETARY X ) REPLY FOR SIGNATURE - ) FAR EAST FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( ) SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION AFRICA MEMO TO ( ) NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) EUROPE/CANADA JOINT MEMO ( ) LATIN AMERICA REFER TO STATE ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION necessary ( ) ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE ( ) SCIENTIFIC DUE DATE: LR planning COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions) PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING CONGRESSIONAL DATE FROM TO S ACTION REQUIRED CY TO 9/22 SeundeRs A Decear INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING 9/30 THERY Haks NAK MICROFILM DATA CROSS REF WITH NOTIFY DATE SEE LOG DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO DO init DISPOSITION JOINED BY LOG COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA HP HM 06/04/1971 DATE ORIG) NSC SPECIAL disposition COMMENTS: TO ) PAF R WHC SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO SUBF Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library * GPO: 1971-412-412 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 14361 October 23, 1970 CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: President Nixon's Meeting with President Makarios, 10:00 a.m., October 25 We have been informed that the following will accompany President Makarios to the White House: --Spyros Kyprianou, Foreign Minister --Zenon Rossides, Cyprus Ambassador to the U.S. and the UN. In view of this representation, the following State Department officials will be present at the White House: --Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State --Thomas W. Davis, Jr., Country Director for Cyprus and Presidential aide-de-camp. & Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary CONFIDENTIAL Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 1. when message comes in from State, please attach. 2. Give to Gen. Haig who will try CONFIDENTIAL to clear with March 8, 1970 HAK by phone. CYPRUS FOR: DAVID YOUNG FOR HENRY KISSINGER Thanks. FROM: HAIG AND SAUNDERS Hal Saunders President Makarios safely escaped an assissination attempt earlier today. So far, in Cyprus. there have been no public repercussions on the island. As you know, CIA a month ago warned Makarios of reported plotting against him. Makarios appeared to have rather than rounding them up. decided to let plotters incriminate themselves, Greek Prime Minister Papadopoulos and Turkish community leader Denktash have both issued statements condemning the attempt, which was apparently mounted by an extremist Greek group. following Ambassador Popper, State and we recommend/x brief message to be passed quietly from President Nixon to Makarios: Hair Cabled with cleared Hak- files Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM MSG. NO. 1. TRANSMITTED BY: 2. TO: WH 271 DATE & TIME: DEPARTMENT OF STATE 170 MAP 3 1-1-32 1970 MAR 8 PMI 32 WHITEWOUSE 3. ORIGINATOR: NEA 4. RECEIVED BY: SITUATION ROOM DATE & TIME: 5. DESCRIPTION: Draft Cable to Nicosia in Presidential Message to Makarios 6. CLASSIFICATION & CONTROLS: CONFIDENTIAL 7. NO. OF PGS: 2 8. PRECEDENCE IMMEOIATE 9. VALIDATED BY: s/s-o Rich FOR: CLEARANCE XXX 10 DELIVER TO: ? Mr. Sanders INFORMATION PER REQUEST Revised: 9 Jan. 1970 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1902-200.575 DIPARTMENT OF STATE CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNITED STATES of STATE AMERICA Department of State NDICATE: TELEGRAM COLLECT CHARGE TO DISTRIBUTION ACTION: Anilibassy NICOSIA Immediate INFO: AmPribassy ANKARA Priority AmEmbassy ATHENS 11 AmEmbassy LONDON If USUN New York " US Mission NATO 11 STATE SUBJECT: Attempted Assassination of President Makarios REF: Nicosia 301 FOR AMBASSADOR 1, Please convey to President Makarios following message from President Nixon. QUOTE Your Beatitude: I was аррацей to Leard of the shocking attempt on your life. I am gratified, howover, that you have escaped unharmed to continue your leadership at this important time in your country's history. Such acts as this attempt on your life must be condemned by all. Please accept my most sincere best wishes for your continued safety and good health. UNQUOTE 2. At your discretion you may release text of President Nixon's message W Iveas presse SEXT, Banantment does not plan formal TO LOCAL PRESS, F41 DEPARTMENT DRACTED BY: /HP DRAFTING DATE TEL EXT NEA/CYP:Klbrp/TWDavis:ssn 3/8/70 20279 APPROVED NEA/CYP: BY: T. R. Davis Td CLEARANCES NEA/P:Wharris (sub) WH NEA: : RDavies (sub) RD S/S-O:RRich NSC: HSaunders USIA: ACarter (sub) AC Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant CONFIDENTIAL to Executive Order, 1,3526 and has been determined to be declassified. * U.S. GOVCRNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1869 360-575 DIPARTMENT of CONFIDENTIAL STATES OF STATE Classification Department of State INDICATE: TELEGRAM COLLECT CHARGE TO PAGE 2 DISTRIBUTION ACTION: AmEmbassy NICOSIA release of President's message, although spokesmen may draw upon contents if subject raised at regular noon briefing. END FYI ORAFTING DATE TEL EXT APPROVED BY: Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 8716 R department OF state info Washington, D.C. 20520 S/S-4669 SECRET March 26, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Cyprus--Tension Subsiding Enclosed for your information is a memorandum about the current situation in Cyprus. Theodore h. L. Elithe Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Enclosure: As stated MICROFILM DATA DO SECRET INIT DATE 3/21 ORIG) NSC TO ) PAF WHC SUBF Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Cyprus--Tension Subsiding The events of last week constitute the story of a coup d'etat that did not occur. In the wake of the attempted assassination of President Makarios and the murder of the leading suspect, former Interior Minister Georkadjis, the air became heavy with rumors of a coup. A composite of our own intelligence reports for this period describes a Greek Cypriot plot possibly involving some mainland Greek elements in a conspiracy to eliminate Makarios and bring about union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis) or partition of the island and union of its respective parts with Greece and Turkey (double enosis). By last Friday the permutations of this basic plot began to seem endless. This week we are beginning to recognize the outlines of a self-generated mini-crisis in which traditional sus- picions induced the Turks and the Soviets to credit intelli- gence reports and rumors with a validity that could not be sustained by close analysis and cool judgment. The Turkish Government, assuming that the profusion of smoke implied the existence of at least some flame, called out the fire engines-- just in case. The Turks publicly threatened that any enosis- oriented coup in Cyprus would provoke an "immediate" response. And, if the Turks fear enosis, so do the Soviets, but for different reasons. Their fear of any kind of enosis SECRET Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET 2 solution is based on their opposition to "NATOizing" Cyprus. This produced a series of low-key Soviet demarches supporting Cyprus' sovereignty and integrity. With more than a hint of opportunism, the Soviets peddled the coup rumor and the story of their démarches and thereby put some money in the bank with Makarios, catered to Turkish fears, and struck a propa- ganda blow at the "imperialists." Fortunately throughout this characteristically Byzantine episode of spontaneous combustion the bedrock elements of stability (close contacts between the Greek and Turkish Governments) were preserved and the risk of miscalculation minimized through timely and relatively sympathetic Greco- Turkish communications. Also, on Cyprus itself, political violence and recrimination remained in the intracommunal sphere and did not involve the Turkish Cypriots, who took positive measures to reduce the risk of an intercommunal incident. For our part, we kept the parties informed of our less alarmist assessment and of our acceptance of official Greek denials of any complicity in coup plots and enosis schemes. On a positive note Ambassador Popper in Cyprus informs us that the Greek Cypriot negotiator in the on-going talks with the Turkish Cypriots has linked the resolution of the present crisis with the need to achieve rapid progress in the negotiations as a bulwark against future problems of this nature. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 8442 department OF STATE Encorporated Washington, D.C. 20520 daily Bing HS S/S 4185 March 18, 1970 CVPRUS SECRET MICROFILM DATA MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER DO INIT THE WHITE HOUSE DATE 3/24 Subject: Cyprus - Recent Developments and ORIG) NSC TO ) PAF Current Assessment WHC SUBF Recent Developments: On March 8 as-yet unidentified assailants narrowly missed assassinating President Makarios when they peppered his helicopter with bullets as it took off from the Arch- bishopric in Nicosia. After the attempt, suspicion focused on former Interior Minister Polycarpos Georkadjis and a right-wing terrorist organization, the National Front. Makarios forced Georkadjis to resign his ministerial post in 1968 after the Greek Government implicated him in an abortive attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Papadopoulos. The National Front is a secret terrorist group that vehemently opposes Makarios' policy of abandoning enosis (union with Greece) and negotiating with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of a "feasible" (independent) solution to the Cyprus problem. After being prevented by police from leaving Cyprus on March 13, Georkadjis was gunned down outside of Nicosia on March 15. The murderer or murderers have not been identified but the most plausible theory at this point suggests that co- conspirators in the Makarios assassination attempt were responsible for Georkadjis' death. Greco-Turkish Implications: Since Turkish Cypriots are not suspected of involvement in either of the recent shootings, the impact on the volatile intercommunal situation has been marginal. The negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities are expected SECRET Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET 2 to continue although little progress is expected in view of the entrenched positions of the respective protagonists. While Athens and Ankara are concerned over recent events, they appear determined to continue their commitment to re- solving the Cyprus question peacefully through the local talks. In spite of a growing volume of evidence implicating mainland Greek military officers in Cyprus in the recent shootings, we believe the Papadopoulos government does not condone such activities and that it is taking steps to bring such dissidents to heel. Outlook: We expect Makarios to retain his preeminent position as political and spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriots and to continue to play a major role in the sensitive on-going negotia- tions with the Turkish Cypriots. For all his faults--and they are many--only he commands the overwhelming popular support that is a stabilizing factor within the Greek Cypriot com- munity and a base from which compromise and flexibility are at least possible in the talks. In the longer run, however, his narrow escape will set a precedent and remove a psycho- logical restraint on others with similar intentions. The Georkadjis murder is likely to lead to more intra- communal bloodletting as loyal former EOKA henchmen seek vengeance for the slaying of their patron and leader. Again, however, although it cannot be completely ruled out, we do not foresee this violence spilling over to the Turkish Cypriot community which is still uninvolved in the gun-toting turmoil of the Greek Cypriot community. U. S. Position: We are monitoring events closely and encouraging Athens and Ankara to continue pursuing their positive approach to this problem. We see little benefit in actively inserting ourselves into the situation in Cyprus at this time. In fact, we would like to conserve our capital at this time since we may find more pressing occasions to spend it in the future. Thesdore L. Vist he Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 6761 department OF state Washington, D.C. 20520 1227 SECRET January 23, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Terrorism in Cyprus Enclosed for your information is a memorandum analyzing the background and implication of recent terrorism in Cyprus. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Enclosure: As stated. MICROFILM DATA DO INIT DATE 6/2 ORIG) NSC TO ) PAF SECRET WHC SUBF Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 6761 DEPARTMENT or STATE Washington, DC. 205.0 SECRET January 19, 1970 SUBJECT: Terrorism in Cyprus - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM Background Since last summer a resurgence of terrorist activity within the Greek Cypriot community has threatened the internal security of Cyprus. Fanatic Greek Cypriots who favor enosis (union with Greece) and oppose President Makarios' policy of tolerating the communists and negotiating with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of independence have formed a terrorist group called the National Front. A recent increase in the pace, scope, and seriousness of terrorist incidents and threats is cause for concern. Current Situation With President Makarios in East Africa on a good will tour, the National Front boldly looted a mine storehouse of its dynamite and raided a mountain village stealing its small arsenal of authorized arms. In the wake of these incidents, Acting President Clerides seized the initiative and ordered a concerted police campaign to confiscate all arms held by Greek Cypriot civilians. Clerides has denounced the National Front and is now seeking special legislation to broaden the Government's power to impose "preventive custody." The Immediate Future The Cyprus Government claims to possess National Front documents which order its strike groups to sabotage infrastructure targets on January 15, the anniversary of the 1950 plebiscite in which virtually 100% of the Greek Cypriots voted for enosis. Clerides' decisive actions combined with press speculation anticipating a commemorative gesture from the Front amount to a challenge that is likely to elicit a response from the terrorists within the next few days. Embassy Nicosia concludes that the chances of an incident. possibly serious--during this time are "quite high." Prospective Problems The fragile peace that has characterized Cyprus since the last large scale crisis (November-December 1967) could be shattered if law and order disintegrate Jeopardizing the present leadership and the SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET 2 functioning of the Greek Cypriot-controlled government. With Cyprus' recent history of private armed bands and political gångsterism, an unstable internal situation might tempt other disgruntled Greek Cypriot elements to use violence to further their own parochial political aims. Another ominous possibility is that the current terrorist activity may be directed against the Turkish Cypriots thus embroiling the two Communi- ties in another full-blown Greek-Turkish confrontation. Impact on the Intercommunal Negotiations Local talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots which began under UN auspices in June 1968 have dragged on without significant results and ultimately reached a virtual deadlock in December 1969 over the crucial issue of local autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots. Since then the nego- tiators have agreed to shelve temporarily the local autonomy issue and move on to other internal constitutional issues. Limited progress has subsequently been achieved on organizing the judiciary giving rise to some hope that an ultimate solution may yet be possible. However, if internal security continues to disintegrate and involves Turkish Cypriots as targets of Greek Cypriot terrorists, the fate of the talks which offer the most promising procedure for solving the Cyprus problem will be uncertain at best. We consider the continuation of these talks, which are currently adjourned while President Makarios is absent from Cyprus, to be a genuinely important prop for the maintenance of intercommunal peace. So far, our role in the talks has been to monitor them closely, make our concern for their success known, feed in ideas informally, and make our good offices available should the parties feel we can be of assistance. We shall continue to play this supportive role during this unstable period and shall express our hope that the talks will resume on schedule (January 26) in an atmosphere conducive to further progress. US Actions We have been and will continue playing an active role in a set of sensitive relations to help discourage a further deterioration. We will ask the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as the Go rnments of Greece and Turkey to continue their efforts to prevent any precipitous action that might further endanger Cyprus' internal peace and the intercommunal negotiations. We shall express our concern over the present situation and our hope that all concerned will act to restore calm and continue their efforts to arrange a permanent solution. We will ask U Thant and the UN to take parallel actions. We shall also initiate the following specific actions: 1. We will ask Embassy Nicosia to reiterate to Acting President Clerides or President Makarios our growing concern over the threat to law and order and state our view that the actions thus far taken by the Cyprus SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRET 3 Government seem appropriate under these circumstances. We shall also ask if there is anything we can appropriately do to assist in this regard. 2. We are asking Embassy Athens to seek an appropriate oppor- tunity to welcome Prime Minister Papadopoulos' recent condemnation of the local terrorists and to ask what else the Greek Government might do to improve the local situation. 3. We will caution the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in Cyprus concerning the possibility of random acts of violence committed by Greek Cypriots in opposition to the Makarios regime's clear policy of avoiding such insidents. We will ask them not to overreact should such an incident occur and to continue their policy of seeking a peaceful settlement through the intercommunal negotiations. SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. A OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATE STATES OF the TELEGRAM SECRET 3432 PAGE 01 NICOSI 01224 2712132 62 ACTION SS-30 EXATES INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W 051094 R 271015Z JUN 74 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8717 '74 JUN 28 AM 7:18 SITUATION ROOM WHITEHOUSE ROOM INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY ANKARA USMISSION USUN SECRE T NICOSIA 1224 EXDIS E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PINS PFOR GY CY SUBJECT: GREECE-CYPRUS RELATIONS REF: ATHENS 3936, ANKARA 5012 SUMMARY: WE AGREE WITH ATHENS AS TO GRAVITY NICOSIA/ATHENS CONFRONTATION. APPARENTLY WE ALL AGREE THAT FORMAL DEMARCHES NOT USEFUL AT THIS STAGE. DECONFRONTATION DEMONSTRABLY SERVES USG INTERESTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF GOGREECE AND GOCYPRUS. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO GET MESSAGE TO MAKARIOS AND PARTICULARLY TO IDANNIDES CAND NOT JUST FOREIGN MINISTRY) AS TO DAMAGE A CRISIS COULD DO TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS. 1. WE WISH TO FLAG SOME POINTS THAT LOOK PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FROM HERE, TO POINT OUT ONE CHANGE IN SITUATION, EXCES AND TO COMMENT ON ATHENS PROPOSAL REFTEL. 2. KEY POINTS: (A) WE AGREE WITH ATHENS THAT MAKARIOS-IOANNIDES SHOW- DOWN MAY WELL BE ON THE WAY. (B) CONFRONTATION IS WITH NATIONAL GUARD AND IOANNIDES, NOT WITH EOKA-B. WE THINK EOKA-B LARGELY A FROSTING (THOUGH NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT or STATE Department of State UNITED OF TELEGRAM STATES OF SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 01224 2712132 BRITISH THINK OTHERWISE). LOCALS SEE CONFLICT AS DIRECTLY BETWEEN GOCYPRUS AND GREEK JUNTA, AND THAT IS WHY CENTER- RIGHT IS WAVERING AS IT DID NOT DURING GRIVAS CONFRONTATION, (C) ANKARA PROBABLY EVEN MORE DISTRUSTFUL OF IOANNIDES THAN PAPADOPOULOS, AND MORE LIKELY TO REACT QUICKLY IN PRESENT MOOD AGAINST ANYTHING THAT LOOKS LIKE "ENOSIST COUP. (SEE STATE 103030 PARA 5 AND ANKARA 5012.) (D) IF IDANNIDES' OBJECTIVES ARE ANTI-COMMUNIST, HIS MEANS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, SINCE HE IS FORCING MAKARIOS TO seek SUPPORT WHERE HE CAN FIND IT, AND INCIPIENT POLARIZATION OF GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY COULD BREAK INTO CIVIL WAR PARTICULARLY IF MAKARIOS ELIMINATED, WITH COMMUNISTS HAVING ALMOST ALL AD- VANTAGES EXCEPT CWE HOPE) IN GUNS. CED TALKING TO GREEK FOREIGN MINISTRY UNPRODUCTIVE, EXE SINCE BY ALL ACCOUNTS IT VIEWS SITUATION MUCH AS WE DO. 3. RECENT CHANGE IN SITUATION IS THAT MAKARIOS IS PRESENTLY COUNTERATTACKING AFTER PERIOD CWHICH LED TO STATE 103030) IN WHICH INCREASING NG ACTIVITIES RAISED REAL CONCERN THAT IT IS OUT TO GET HIM. USG INTERESTS ARE BY NO MEANS ENTIRELY CONGRUENT WITH MAKARIOS IN THIS SITUATION (SEE NICOSIA 1153) 4. AS TO WHAT USG SHOULD DO: WE ALL APPARENTLY AGREE THAT BS FORMAL USG DEMARCHE NOT DESIRABLE AT THIS STAGE, PRESENT ISSUE IS HOW TO GET TO IOANNIDES (SEE QUESTION STATE 103030 PARA 7) AND TO MAKARIOS WITH WARNING THAT CONFRONTATION IS DISSERVICE TO THEIR INTERESTS. WE CAN GET TO MAKARIOS! CONFIDANTS WITH EASE AND BELIEVE THAT AMBASSADOR DAVIES' INITIAL INTERVIEW WITH MAKARIOS WOULD BE IDEAL TIME TO MAKE OUR POINTS DIRECTLY AND FORCEFULLY. WE DON'T KNOW HOW TO GET TO IOANNIDES, BUT BELIEVE IT VERY IMPORTANT TO DO SO. (IN FACT, WE THINK MAKARIOS IS WILY ENOUGH, WILL PROBABLY DRAW BACK FROM ULTIMATE CONFRONTATION, BUT IOANNIDES IS UNKNOWN QUANTITY AND EVEN MAKARIOS COULD MISCALCULATE, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE ARE IMPRESSED BY REASONING PARA 4 ATHENS 3936 AND WE FEAR IOANNIDES MAY BE EMBARKED UPON DELIBERATE CRUSADE TO WIRE OUT MAKARIOS.) WE THINK IOANNIDES SHOULD BE REACHED DESPITE EMBARRASSMENT CITED PARA 8 ATHENS 3936. ANY HELP NATO NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State of MAKE AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOST 01224 271213Z CAN PROVIDE IS FINE, BUT WE WONDER IF LUNS HAS ALL THE ARGUMENTS AT HIS FINGERTIPS, 5. IN ADDITION TO OBVIOUS ARGUMENTS IN THIS AND OTHER CABLES AS TO WHY CONFRONTATION DANGEROUS FOR BOTH NICOSIA AND ATHENS, WE SUGGEST A NEW LINE WHICH POTENTIALLY USEFUL. AS PARA 5 ATHENS 3936 SUGGESTS, ATHENS COULD HAVE TROUBLE WITH SOVS AND THIRD WORLD IF IT WENT AFTER MAKARIOS. DOES ATHENS REALLY WANT TO EARN ARABS! EMNITY AT THIS STAGE IN HISTORY? CIN SOMEWHAT SIMILAR VEIN, WE HAVE REMINDED GOCYPRUS THAT KEMALIST PERIOD IS OVER, THAT TURKEY IS MAKING REAL GAINS WITH GOWRELIGIONISTS, AND THAT GOCYRRUS COULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TROUBLE WITH ARABS IF IT GETS TOO ROUGH WITH ITS MOSLEM MINORITY.) 6, AS TO WHAT USG WANTS ANTAGONISTS TO DO, WE THINK THIS IS REALLY QUITE SIMPLE. IF GOGREECE WOULD GIVE ITS OFFICERS MEANINGFUL COMMAND NOT TO ENGAGE IN ANTI-MAKARIOS PROPA- GANDA, DISSOCIATE THE NG FROM EOKA-B ACTIVITIES, AND FIND SOME MEANS TO RECOGNIZE LEGALITY OF GOCYPRUS COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ROLE IN SELECTION OF CADET OFFICERS, WE THINK MAKARIOS (PROBABLY ALREADY SHAKEN) WOULD BE GLAD TO DEFER ANY LARGER PLANS FOR ASSERTING CONTROL OVER NG. ACTION ON THE CADET OFFICER POINT IS CRITICAL CAND CRISIS DATE IS DEFINABLE: SEPTEMBER, WHEN THEY GRADUATE). WITH CONCESSION ON THAT POINT ALONE, ATHENS/NICOSIA RELATIONS WOULD PROBABLY SUBSIDE TO THEIR NORMAL BAD LEVEL. GRANT NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at SECRET the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 6761 Department OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 Cypras 1227 SECRET January 23, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Terrorism in Cyprus Enclosed for your information is a memorandum analyzing the background and implication of recent terrorism in Cyprus. for Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Enclosure: As stated. MICROFILM DATA DO. DATE INIT 5/8 cy NSC TO ) PAF WHC SUBF SECRET No ACTiON REquiRED NOW, SAVNDERS KEPT onig FOR FURTHER AcTio Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * * Department of State TELEGRAM EXA EXCLUS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WH SECRET 154 2 PAGE 01 NICOSI 01087 091058Z 45 3 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W 013057 R 0910157 MAY 73 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7362 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS SECRE T NICOSIA 1087 EXDIS E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PINS IS SUBJECT: PASSENGER SHIPPING AS POSSIBLE PALESTINIAN TARGET REF: STATE 80073, 65060, 61604 SUMMARY: POST IS TRANSMITTING INFO VIA DAD ON CRUISE SHIP MOVEMENTS. REQUEST GUIDANCE WHETHER MORE INTENSIVE EFFORT REQUIRED. END SUMMARY 1. UPON RECEIPT OF DEPT INFO, EMBASSY NOTIFIED FON MIN DIR GEN AND CHIEF OF CYPRUS POLICE OF POSSIBLE HIJACK OF PASSENGER VESSEL IN MEDITERRANEAN. WE PROMISED TO PINPOINT ANY VESSELS ABOUT WHICH WE HAD SUSPICIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT CYPOL ONCE ALERTED IS MAINTAINING CLOSER PORT WATCH, WE WOULD NOT RECOMMEND ADVISING THEM OF SPECIFIC SHIPS UNLESS WE HAVE REASONS FOR SUSPICIONS, IN ORDER TO AVOID CRYING "WOLF" TOO OFTEN. IN SUSPICIOUS CASES, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE SOME SPECIFICS AS TO OUR REASONS. 2. WE HAVE SET UP PROCEDURE TO ASSIST DAO REPORT CRUISE VESSEL MOVEMENTS. EMBASSY DAO MESSAGE 1 R 6 823 0029 73 FURNISHED INFO ON PASSENGER SHIP SCHEDULES IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. ADDITIONAL SCHEDULES WILL BE FORWARDED AS AVAILABLE. 3. IF NECESSARY, EMBASSY COULD TELEGRAPH DAILY SCHEDULES NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. GEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICANCE TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 01987 0910582 OF ALL VESSESL (MOSTLY FREIGHTERS) ARRIVING AND DEPARTING FROM FAMAGUSTA AND LIMASSOL, AS POSTED EACH DAY BY GOVT HARBORMASTER. (THIS INFO AVAILABLE ONLY AT FAMAGUSTA AND WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE STAFF TIME.) HOWEVER, BEFORE DOING SO WE WOULD WANT TO BE CERTAIN THAT DEPT REQUIRES INFO BEYOND CRUISE SCHEDULES PARA 2, AND THAT THIS DOES NOT DUPLICATE INFO ALREADY AVAILABLE TO NAVAL OCEAN SURVEILLANCE INTELLIGENCE CENTER (NOSIC) AND FLEET OCEAN SURVEILLANCE INTELLIGENCE CENTER (FOSIC). 4. INCIDENTALLY, FEW PASSENGER SHIPS ORIGINATE OR TERMINATE JORNEYS AT CYPRUS PORTS. WE WOULD SUPPOSE PIRAEUS MIGHT BE BEST SOURCE OF TNFO RE EASTERN MED PASSENGER SHIPS' PORTS-OF-CALL AND ROUTES. 5. PLEASE ADVISE. IF ADDITIONAL COVERAGE REQUIRED, PLEASE INFORM US OF TERMINATION DATE. DAO REQUIREMENT TERMINATES JULY 1. POPPER EXPIR NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library 98/20/ebs DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * Department of State GELINO STATES AMERICAN TELEGRAM OF WH SECRET 635 PAGE 01 NICOSI 90866 141209Z 12 ACTION SS-25 2 INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 1026 W 071641 P 141115Z APR 73 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7239 SECRE T NICOSIA 866 EXAIL EXCLUS EXDIS E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PINS, PFOR CY IS SUBJECT: REPRESENTATION ON ARAB TERRORISM REF: STATE 68076 BEGIN SUMMARY: FON OFF DIR GEN VENIAMIN STATES ARAB TERRORISTS SEIZED APRIL 9 WILL BE TRIED AND JAILED, AND DEPORTED ONLY IF NECESSARY TO AVOID BLACKMAIL BY FURTHER VIOLENCE. MEANWHILE, CYPRUS IS S-REENING ALLI ARABS AND ISRAELIS NOW IN CYPRUS AND THOSE ENTERING BY AIR. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WELCOMED BY CYPRIOTS. END SUMMARY 1. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE APPOINTMENTS WITH MAKARIOS ON SHORT NOTICE DURING THIS PERIOD OF INTERNAL STRESS IN CYPRUS, BUT I AM SEFTNG HIM MONDAY MORNING, APRIL 16. 2. MEANWHILE, HAVING IN MIND URGENCY OF SITUATION, I CALLED ON FON OFF DIR GEN VENIAMIN (AT MOMENT IN CHARGE AT FON OFF AND DE FACTO COURDINATOR OF MEASURES TO BE TAKEN RE ARAB TERRORISMI AND GAVE HIMI GIST OF MESSAGE T WAS INSTRUCTED TO PASS TO ARCHBISHOP: EXPRESSED PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR STALWART REACTION OF CYPRUS GOVT TO ARAB TERRORISM CASE THUS FAR: AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ACTIONS CYPRUS MIGHT TAKE IN FUTURE WOULD BUTTRESS AND NOT HAMPER ONGOING BATTLE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WHICH MUST BE CARRIED OUT ON ALL FRONTS. NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. FORM PAPARTMENT OF STATE * * Department of State UNITED STATES AMERICAN TELEGRAM OF SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00866 141209Z 3. VENIAMIN TOLD ME THAT AT HIGH LEVEL MEETING APRILI 13 CYPRUS GOVT HAD DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH TRIAL OF EIGHT TERRORISTS NOW IN CUSTODY. HE ANTICIPATED THEY WOULD BE KEPT IN JAIL JUST AS LONG AS CYPRUS GOVT COULD AFFORD TO DO so WITHOUT BEING SUBJECTED TO INTOLERABLE BLACKMAIL AT SAME TIME EGYPT AND SYRIA HAVE BEEN TOLD (AS WE HAVE REPORTED) THAT FUTURE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES INVOLVING CYPRUS WOULD LEAD TO TOTAL EXCLUSION OF ARABS FROM CYPRUS. 4. VENIAMIN THEN OUTLINED FOR ME STEPS CYPRUS GOVT HAS BEGUN TO TAKE TO DISCOURAGE FUTURE TERRORISM IN CYPRUS. ALL ARABS AND ISRAELIS RESIDENT IN CYPRUS ARE BEING SCREENED, AND SUSPECTS WILL BE ASKED TO LEAVE. IMMIGRATION OFFICERS AT AIRPORT ARE AUTHORIZED TO REFUSE ADMISSION TO ALL SUSPICIOUS PERSONS AND WHERE DOUBTFUL TO ALERT CIS (CYPRUS INTELLIGENCE) GOVT SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING ASKING ANOTHER COUNTRY WITH MISSIONS IN BEIRUT, DAMASCUS AND JERUSALEM OR TEL AVIV TO ADMINISTER A REQUIREMENT THAT ARABS BOUND FOR CYPRUS REQUEST VISAS TO BE OBTAINED FROM NICUSIA PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. (CYPRUS HAS ITS: OWN MISSION IN CAIRO.) 5. VENIAMIN SAYS SURVEY SHOWS ABOUT 400 ARABS NOW LIVING IN CYPRUS, OF WHOM CLOSE TO 200 ARE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED. MOST OTHERS ARE GENUINE TOURISTS MAINLY FROM LEBANON BUT SOME MAY BE AFFILIATED WITH TERRORISTS. THERE ARE ONLY 60 OR 80 VISITING ISRAELIS ON THE ISLIAND. 6.° VENIAMIN STATES CYPRUS GOVT EAGER TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION WITH US RE TERRORISTS AND TERRORISM. WE WILL PURSUE THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS. HE REMARKED THAT TERRORISTS NOW IN CUSTODY HERE HAD CARRIED POLISH WEAPONS OF A TYPE NOT PREVIOUSLY SEEN IN THIS COUNTRY. EXPLOSIVES, HOWEVER, ARE OF TYPE COMMONLY FOUND EVERYWHERE AND ORIGIN NOT IDENTIFIABLE. 7 . VENIAMIN WAS FAIRGY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RESULTS OF THESE MEASURES, COMBINED AS THEY ARE WITH WARNINGS TO EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN GOVTS ABOUT CONSEQUENCES OF FUTURE TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN CYPRUS. CYPRIOTS CONSIDER PUBLIC EGYPTIAN RESPONSE ENCOURAGING. VENIAMIN SAYS THEY HAVE HAD PRIVATE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. FORM on STATE * * Department of State GELLING STATES OF AMERICAN TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00866 << 141209Z EXPRESSION OF REGRET OVER ARRIL 9 INCIDENT FROM SYRIAN GOVT AND SOME SORT OF REASSURING WORD (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED) FROM ARAFAT. VENIAMIN IS WORRIED, HOWEVER, RE POSSIBLE FUTURE LIBYAN CONNECTION WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HERE. NOTES THAT 400-500 CYPRIOT WORKERS AND TECHNICIANS ARE EMPLOYED ON PROJECTS IN LIBYA, AND THAT CYPRUS HAS A TIDY EXPORT TRADE - TO LIBYA. HOWEVER LIBYA HAS NOT YET FIGURED IN LOCAL ARAB ACTIVITIES. 8. COMMENT: I BELIEVE CURRENT CYPRUS GOVT ATTITUDE, AS DESCRIBED BY VENIAMIN, IS ABOUT AS FAVORABLE AS WE COULD EXPECT. CYPRINTS OBVIOUSLY FEEL THAT THEIR STRONGEST POINT IN RESTRAINING ARAB IS UTILITY OF CYPRUS AS MEETING AND TRANSIT POINT FOR THEIR PEOPLE -- WHICH WOULD BE GREATLY DIMINISHED BY AN EXELUSION POLICY. WHEN I SEE ARCHBISHOP APRIL 16, I WILL URGE HIM TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON TRIAL AND DETENTION OF TERRORISTS. DEPT SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS, HOWEVER: IF THE PRESSURES ON CYPRUS BECOME STRONG ENOUGHT, THE CYPRIOTS WILL IN MY OPINION RELEASE AND DEPORT THEIR CAPTIVES IN HOPE OF EXQIC EXSIS AVOIDING FURTHER VIOLENCE, WHATEVER WE OR OTHERS MAY SAY. POPPER NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. FORM DS-1652 DEPARTMENT OF STATE * * Department of State STATE AMERICA UNITED TELEGRAM OF SECRET 381 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00970 01 OF 02 242130Z 40 ACTION SS-25 SITUATION ROOM: SITUATION WHITE 73 APR 25 AM 8:29 021839 HOUSE INFO OCT-01 ADP=00 /026 W P R 241930Z APR 73 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7291 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY USDOCOSOUTH USEUCOM USMISSION NATO USMISSION USUN S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSTA 970 EXDIS NOFORN TEHRAN FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER E.O. 11652: XGDS 1 TAGS: PINS, PFOR, CY, GR SUBJECT: CYPRUS: GRIVAS AND GOG REF: STATE 741173 ATHENS 2227 AND 23933 ANKARA 3069: NICOSIA 937 BEGIN SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE THAT CLERIDES! RESIGNATION THREAT WAS EFFORT TO FORCE GOG TO CURB GRIVAS, AND TO ARREST LOCAL TREND TOWARD VIOLENCE. DOUBT HE WILL MAKE GOOD ON THREAT UNLESS SITUATION WORSENS. WE RECOMMEND USG CONSIDER MAKING CLEAR TO GOG IN WASHINGTON AND ATHENS WHY WE THINK ITS AMBIVALENCE TOWARD GRIVAS DAMAGES ITS INTERESTS AND OURS. OUR PRESENTATION SHOULD NOT BE BASED UPON CLERIDES' RESIGNATION THREAT, NOR SHOULD IT SUGGEST THAT WE THINK IMMEDIATE INTERCOMMUNAL AGREEMENT IN SIGHT ONCE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard 49 Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF EXE STATE UNITED Department of State TELEGRAM STATE OF SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00970 01 OF 02 242130Z GRIVAS PROBLEM REMOVED. WE BELIEVE TIME WILL BE NECESSARY TO RESTORE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. END SUMMARY 1. REF DEPTEL CITED NUMBER OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS PROBABLY PUSHING GREEK GOVT TO CONTROL GRIVAS OR AT MINIMUM DIASSOCIATE ITSELF FROM HIS ACTIVITIES. TO THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN ADDED A) STIFF TURKISH DEMARCH IN ANKARA ASKING GREEK AMB WHETHER CONTINUING GRIVAS TERRORISM SIGNIFIES CHANGE IN ATHENS POLICY TOWARDS ANKARA, B) APPARENT RECOMMENDATIONS FROM GREEK AMBS IN ANKARA AND NICOSIA THAT GREEK GOVT PUBLICLY DENOUNCE GRIVAS AND HIS ACTIVITIES, AND C) UNSYG'S REPRESENTATION TO GREEK PERM REP PANAYOTACOS ON GRIVAS. 2. CLERIDES THREAT TO ABANDON TALKS WAS PRESUMABLY MOST CONSEQUENTIAL DEVELOPMENT FROM GREEK GOVT STANDPOINT, THOUGH LESS EFFECTIVE DOUBTLESS THAN IF SAME THREAT HAD NOT BEEN MADE BEFORE. IN ANY EVENT, ATHENS DID NOT EXPLICITLY DISSOCIATE ITSELF FROM GRIVAS, BUT MADE ANOTHER IN SERIES OF EQUIVOCAL STATEMENTS WHICH OPPOSING GREEK CYPRIOT FACTIONS INTERPRET TO SUIT THEIR PURPOSES (NICOSIA 956). EFFECT OF GREEK GOVT STATEMENT HERE HAS BEEN TO RE-ENFORCE CONVICTION THAT ATHENS CONSENTS TO GRIVAS TERRORISM. SOME GREEK CYPRIOTS MAY ACCEPT ARGUMENT THAT ATHENS IS POWERLESS TO CONTROL GRIVAS3 NO ONE HERE WOULD MAINTAIN GOG LACKS POWER TO DENOUNCE HIM. 3. WHILE CLERIDES HAS NOT YET SAID HE WILL STAY ON, WE THINK HE WILL. HE HAS MADE HIS MOVE AND IT HAS NOT YET SUCCEEDED, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE HE IS PREPARED TO ABANDON ADMITTEDLY SLIM PROSPECTS OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ALSO, APPEALS THAT HE REMAIN BY UNSYG AND GOG WILL SWEETEN PILL OF HAVING HIS BLUFF CALLED. 4. EMBASSY ATHENS HAS ASKED FOR OUR EVALUATION OF THE THOUGHT THAT CLERIDES AND GREEK GOVT HAVE MUTUAL INTEREST IN HEIGHTENING CRISIS so AS TO BRING CLERIDES TO POWER AND RESTORE HARMONY BETWEEN ATHENS AND NICOSIA, WE UNDERSTAND THAT GREEK AND TURKISH EMBASSIES HERE HAVE ENTERTAINED THAT POSSIBILITY SINCE BEFORE RECENT AND BOTH woul RF PI FASED AT TOFA OF NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT on STATE * * of STATES AMERICA NAME UNITED Department of State TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00970 01 OF 02 242130Z CLERIDES AS PRESIDENT. AS WE HAVE TOLD TURK EMB, THIS BEGUILING THOUGHT SIMPLY IGNORES LOCAL POLITICAL REALITIES. AMKARIOS IS THE POLITICAL POWER HERE FOR FORE- SEEABLE FUTURE, BARRING VIOLENT REMOVAL. IT WOULD BE POLITICAL SUICIDE FOR CLERIDES TO PIT HIMSELF AGAINST MAKARIOS, PARTICULARLY ON "PRO-TURKISH" PLATFORM INTO WHICH HE WOULD BE FORCED BY HIS INVOLVEMENT IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, CLERIDES HIMSELF RECOGNIZES THIS REALITY AND HAS AVOIDED BEING DRAWN INTO CONTEST WITH ARCHBISHOP. HE IS MORE LIKELY TO BE SUCCESSOR THAN COMPETITOR, AND ONE OF TRAGEDIES OF PRESENT SITUATION IS THAT MODERATES LIKE CLERIDES ARE LOSING GROUND IN POLARIZATION OF POLITICS BETWEEN GRIVASITES AND LEFT. 5. WE BELIEVE CLERIDES' OBJECTIVE TO BE TWO-FOLD: TO BRING GREEK GOVT INFLUENCE TO BEAR AGAINST GRIVAS AND TO HAVE MAKARIOS CALL OFF ACTIVITIES OF ARMED GROUPS SYMPATHETIC TO HIM, PARTICULARLY LYSSARIDES FACTION. CLERIDES UNDOUBTEDLY EXPECTS THAT MAKARIOS WILL CLAMP DOWN ON PRO-GOVT COUNTERVIOLENCE IF GRIVAS TERRORISM CEASES, BUT NOT UNTIL THEN. 6, ATHENS' REFTELS SPEAK OF "INTERVENTION" AND USE OF NATIONAL GUARD TO HANDLE GRIVAS THREAT. GOC MAKES CLEAR THAT IT sees SITUATION IN REVERSE (SEPTEL TO FOLLOW). TI BLAMES ATHENS FOR CONNIVANCE IN GRIVAS' ACTIVITIES. WHAT IT WANTS IS FOR ATHENS TO REMOVE GRIVAS, FORCE HIM TO STOP OPERATIONS, OR AT LEAST DISAVOW HIM. FROM NATIONAL GUARD, IT seeks END OF ANTI- MAKARIOS PROPAGANDA, BUT NOT ASSISTANCE AGAINST GRIVAS. GOC ASSUMES SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY IF ATHENS TOOK ONE OF THREE STEPS ABOVE. DIRECT GREEK INTERVENTION OTHER THAN THAT ABOVE WOULD BE UNPOPULAR HERE EXCEPT AMONG EXTREME RIGHT WING, WHO OF COURSE WANT ATHENS! INTERVENTION FOR VERY DIFFERENT REASONS THAN TO IMPROVE ATHENS/MAKARIOS RELATIONS, CIN EVENT OF THREATENED TURKISH ATTACK, OF COURSE, WE ASSUME CYPRIOTS WOULD EXPECT GREEK ASSISTANCE, AND THAT ATHENS WOULD FIND IT POLITICALLY NECESSARY TO DO EVERYTHING IT COULD IN FACE OF TURKISH NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY von Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES TELEGRAM OF SECRET 375 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00970 02 OF 02 2421277 2 40 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W 021781 P R 2419307 APR 73 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7292 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY USDOCOSOUTH USEUCOM USMISSION NATO USMISSION USUN S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSTA 970 EXEIS EXDIS NOFORN TEHRAN FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER 7. DEPT HAS ASKED FOR VIEWS AS TO WHAT, IF ANY, ACTION IS CALLED FOR AT PRESENT TO PREVENT GRIVAS TERRORISM FROM WRECKING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND OBSTRUCTING RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. ESSENTIALLY OUR ANSWER IS THAT UNITED STATES, AS GREECE'S PRINCIPAL ALLY, SHOULD CLEARLY TELL GOG THAT WE BELIEVE ITS HANDLING OF GRIVAS ISSUE IS DAMAGING ITS INTERESTS AND OURS. WE BELIEVE VOICE OF USG, ADDED TO THOSE OF UNSYG, TURKISH GOVT AND SOME OF ATHENS! OWN AMBASSADORS, MAY EVENTUALLY PERSUADE GREEK GOVT THAT RISKS OF COUTENANCING GRIVAS OUTWEIGH UNDERSTANDABLE PROBLEMS IN MOVING AGAINST HIM, 8, WE HAVE BEEN MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS INFORMALLY, AND BELIEVE THEY MAY INFLUENCE GOG IF MADE IN DEPT AND ATHENS: NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THERAUTHORIZATION 49 OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library FORM DS.1652 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. PRANTMENT REPA or STATE EXC Department of State UNITED TELEGRAM STATE OF SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00970 02 OF 02 242127Z A . GRIVAS VIOLENCE IS WEAKENING THOSE ON ISLAND (INCLUDING CLERIDES) WHO WOULD ACCOMMODATE WITH TURKEY, AND GRIVASIST ATTACKS ARE FORCING GREEK CYPRIOT LEADERS INTO INCREASINLY STRONG ENOSIST STATEMENTS, WHICH IN TURN MULTIPLY TURKISH SUSPICIONS OF BOTH NICOSIA AND CYPRUS. B. LOW-GRADE INSURRECTION IN CYPRUS PRECIPITATED BY GRIVAS ENDANGERS CAREFULLY NURTURED GREEK-TURKISH ACCOMMODATION. SHOULD VIOLENCE ESCALATE, STABILITY OF NATO SOUTHEAST FLANK COULD ONCE AGAIN BE THREATENED. C. GRIVAS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE TOUGHENED TURKISH DEMAND, AND WHILE THEY CONTINUE, RULE OUT REALISTIC CHANCE OF NEGOTIATED INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT. D. INSOFAR AS GRIVAS SUCCEEDS, HE THREATENS TO PRESENT GOG WITH NIGHTMARE IT WOULD MOST WISH TO AVOID: CIVIL STRIFE ON ISLAND, WITH GRIVASISTS CALLING ON ATHENS TO TAKE CYPRUS IN NAME OF HELLENISM, AND ANTI-GRIVASISTS CALLING ON UN, us, USSR, AND EVEN TURKEY TO PREVENT IT. E. ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY OF COUNTERACTING INFLUENCE OF CYPRUS COMMUNISTS AND LYSSARIDES IS TO IMPROVE GREEK- CYPRUS RELATIONS BY BRINGING GRIVAS UNDER CONTROL SO THAT ARCHBISHOP IS NOT FORCED TO RELY ON LEFT AS HIS ONLY BUTRESS AGAINST GRIVAS. 9. IN ADDITION, BELIEVE WE SHOULD COUNTER ANTICIPATED GREEK RESPONSE BY MAKING CLEAR THAT USG DOES NOT ACCEPT THAT GREEK GOVT IS POWERLESS TO CONTROL GRIVAS TERRORISM. REMOVING GENERAL MIGHT AT MOMENT PRESENT UNACCEPTABLE RISKS3 HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE COMPELLING HIM TO CEASE HIS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES WOULD DO so. 10. A FINAL WORD ON TIMING. WE ENVISAGE ABOVE AS EXTENDED DIALOGUE WITH GOG AND CLARIFICATION OF US POLICY, NOT AS SINGLE DEMARCHE. WE WOULD NOT TIE IT DIRECTLY TO CLERIDES' RESIGNATION THREAT, AND WE BELIEVE THAT USG SHOULD AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT GREEK ACTION NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THERAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SPARTMENT OF STATE THE EXECUTIVE RECEIVED Department of State TELEGRAM STATES OF SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00970 02 OF 02 2421277 WOULD LEAD DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY TO NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. AT THIS STAGE, WE BELIEVE SOME TIME WILL BE NECESSARY TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE AMONG PARTIES BEFORE ANY ONE OF THEM WILL RISK COMMITTING ITSELF TO A SPECIFIC AGREEMENT. 11. DURING MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WE THOUGHT IT BEST LET CLERIDES AND GREEK ENVOYS HERE AND IN ANKARA STATE THEIR CASES themselves, RATHER THAN JOINING FRAY. HOWEVER, WE THINK CLEAR ELABORATION OF US POSITION ON GRIVAS, JOINED WITH INFLUENCE OF OTHER CONCERNED PARTIES, WOULD ALTER PRESENT GREEK POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS. 12, AMBASSADOR POPPER MAY WISH TO COMMENT FROM TEHRAN. GRANT EXSIS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. FORM / OF STATE * EXE™S Department of State UNITED STATES OF , TELEGRAM SECRET 343 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00970 02 OF 02 2509227 2 15 ACTION SS=25 INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W P R 2419307 APR 73 SITUATION ROOM 829996 WHITE HOUSE 73 APR 25 AM 8:29 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA EXCES EXPIR TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7292 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY USDOCOSOUTH USEUCOM USMISSION NATO USMISSION USUN SECRE T SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 970 EXDIS NOFORN CORRECTEDCOP Y (PARA, 8.A.P LAST LINE, LAST WORD) TEHRAN FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER 7. DEPT HAS ASKED FOR VIEWS AS TO WHAT, IF ANY, ACTION IS CALLED FOR AT PRESENT TO PREVENT GRIVAS TERRORISM FROM WRECKING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND OBSTRUCTING RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. ESSENTIALLY OUR ANSWER IS THAT UNITED STATES, AS GREECE'S PRINCIPAL ALLY, SHOULD CLEARLY TELL GOG THAT WE BELIEVE ITS HANDLING OF GRIVAS ISSUE IS DAMAGING ITS INTERESTS AND OURS. WE BELIEVE VOICE OF USG, ADDED TO THOSE OF UNSYG, TURKISH GOVT AND SOME OF ATHENS! OWN AMBASSADORS, MAY EVENTUALLY PERSUADE GREEK GOVT THAT RISKS OF COUTENANCING GRIVAS OUTWEIGH UNDERSTANDABLE PROBLEMS IN MOVING AGAINST HIM. 8, WE HAVE BEEN MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS INFORMALLY, AND SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. OF STATE SEALS AMERICA UNITED NAME Department of State EXETS TELEGRAM OF SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00970 02 OF 02 250922Z BELIEVE THEY MAY INFLUENCE GOG IF MADE IN DEPT AND ATHENS: A. GRIVAS VIOLENCE IS WEAKENING THOSE ON ISLAND (INCLUDING CLERIDES) WHO WOULD ACCOMMODATE WITH TURKEY, AND GRIVASIST ATTACKS ARE FORCING GREEK CYPRIOT LEADERS INTO INCREASINLY STRONG ENOSIST STATEMENTS, WHICH IN TURN MULTIPLY TURKISH SUSPICIONS OF BOTH NICOSIA AND ATHENS. B. LOW-GRADE INSURRECTION IN CYPRUS PRECIPITATED BY GRIVAS ENDANGERS CAREFULLY NURTURED GREEK-TURKISH ACCOMMODATION. SHOULD VIOLENCE ESCALATE, STABILITY OF NATO SOUTHEAST FLANK COULD ONCE AGAIN BE THREATENED. C, GRICAS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE TOUGHENED TURKISH DEMAND, AND WHILE THEY CONTINUE, RULE OUT REALISTIC CHANCE OF NEGOTIATED INTERCOMMUNAL settlement. D. INSOFAR AS GRIVAS SUCCEEDS, HE THREATENS TO PRESENT GOG WITH NIGHTMARE IT WOULD MOST WISH TO AVOID: CIVIL STRIFE ON ISLAND, WITH GRIVASISTS CALLING ON ATHENS TO TAKE CYPRUS IN NAME OF HELLENISM, AND ANTI-GRIVASISTS CALLING ON UN, us, USSR, AND EVEN TURKEY TO PREVENT IT. E, ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY OF COUNTERACTING INFLUENCE OF CYPRUS COMMUNISTS AND LYSSARIDES IS TO IMPROVE GREEK- CYPRUS RELATIONS BY BRINGING GRIVAS UNDER CONTROL SO THAT ARCHBISHOP IS NOT FORCED TO RELY ON LEFT AS HIS ONLY BUTRESS AGAINST GRIVAS. ОИ 9, IN ADDITION, BELIEVE WE SHOULD COUNTER ANTICIPATED GREEK RESPONSE BY MAKING CLEAR THAT USG DOES NOT ACCEPT THAT GREEK GOVT IS POWERLESS TO CONTROL GRIVAS TERRORISM, REMOVING GENERAL MIGHT AT MOMENT PRESENT es es:8 MA as Я9А ET* UNACCEPTABLE RISKS3 HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE COMPELLING HIM TO CEASE HIS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES WOULD DO so. 10. A FINAL WORD ON TIMING. WE ENVISAGE ABOVE AS EXTENDED DIALOGUE WITH GOG AND CLARIFICATION OF US POLICY, NOT AS SINGLE DEMARCHE. WE WOULD NOT TIE IT SECRET NOTTO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FORM Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library PRECEASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. OF STATE EXPIS * Department of State United STATES STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00970 02 OF 02 250922Z DIRECTLY TO CLERIDES' RESIGNATION THREAT, AND WE BELIEVE THAT USG SHOULD AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT GREEK ACTION WOULD LEAD DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY TO NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. AT THIS STAGE, WE BELIEVE SOME TIME WILL BE NECESSARY TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE AMONG PARTIES BEFORE ANY ONE OF THEM WILL RISK COMMITTING ITSELF TO A SPECIFIC AGREEMENT, 11. DURING MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WE THOUGHT IT BEST LET CLERIDES AND GREEK ENVOYS HERE AND IN ANKARA STATE THEIR CASES themselves, RATHER THAN JOINING FRAY. HOWEVER, WE THINK CLEAR ELABORATION OF US POSITION ON GRIVAS, JOINED WITH INFLUENCE OF OTHER CONCERNED PARTIES, WOULD ALTER PRESENT GREEK POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS. 12. AMBASSADOR POPPER MAY WISH TO COMMENT FROM TEHRAN. GRANT NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library FORM DS-1652 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. PRARTMENT OF STATE * * Department of State SEALS AMERICA UNITED MARK TELEGRAM OF SECRET 790 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00198 010504Z 2 15 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 ADR-00 1026 W 093071 R 311105Z JAN 73 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHOC 6949 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY LONDON SECRE T NICOSIA 198 EXDIS SUBJECT: CHRISTOPHIAES VISIT TO ATHENS REF: NICOSIA 175, 112, 87 1. SUMMARY: AT MEETING LATE JAN 30 FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES WAS MUCH MORE CIRCUMSPECT THAN HIS SUBORDINATE (REFTEL 175), BUT CONFIRMED THAT HIS VISIT TO ATHENS HAD NOT ELICITED ANY ASSURANCE OF GREEK ACTION TO CONTROL GRIVAS OR ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS RE GREEK GOVT ROSITION IN INTER- COMMUNAL TALKS. SUGGESTS MAKARIOS MAY SEEK TO UNIFY MODERATES AND RELY LESS ON COMMUNIST SUPPORT. 2. CHRISTOPHIDES PUT SITUATION IN FOLLOWING TERMS: HE HAD DESCRIBED GRIVAS ACTIVITIES BUT HAD NOT SOUGHT ASSISTANCE FROM GREEK GOVT: ON IVS SIDE GREEK GOVT HAD NOT OFFERED ASSISTANCE. FURTHER GREEKS HAD AGREED ANY INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT MUST NOT OPEN DOOR TO PARTITION, BUT SINCE BASIC DISCUSSION PAPER ON LOCAL GOVT HAD NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED, THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF WHAT SORT OF LOCAL AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS GENERAL PRINCIPLE. 3. DURING OUR MEETING CHRISTOPHIDES REITERATED HIS FEARS CONCERNING GRIVAS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO UPSET LOCAL STABILITY, PREVENT OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR MAKARIOS IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, AND SABOTAGE INTERCOMMUNALI SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. OF STATE * * Department of State UNITED TELEGRAM STATES OF SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00198 0105047 NEGOTIATIONS. NEW NOTE WAS REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE DANGERS FROM RECENTLY CREATED PRO-MAKARIOS ARMED GROUPS WHICH MIGHT EXPLOIT PRESENT ELIMATE OF INSTABILITY TO SETTLE FACTIONAL SCORES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES UNRELATED TO THE BIG PICTURE. 4. FONMIN AND I DISCUSSED ONCE AGAIN PARADOX OF APPARENT GREEK TOLERATION AND PERHAPS EVEN SOME COVERT SUPPORT OF GRIVAS, WHEN LATTERS OBJECTIVES WERE AT SUCH VARIANCE WITH THOSE OF GREECE, WHICH CLEARLY WANTED AGREED SETTLEMENT. I MADE POINT THAT POSITION OF COMMUNISTS IN CYPRUS, AND IN ADDITION DISREPUTABLE ACTIVITIES OF MAVERICK LEFTIST LYSSARIDES MOST WEIGH HEAVILY IN DETERMINING GREEK GOVT POSITION: FORMER AMB PANAYOTACOS HAD MADE IT PERFECT CLEAR A YEAR AGO THAT GREEK GOVT WAS HIGHLY DIS- SATISFIED WITH THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS. CHRISTOPHIDES AGREED (HE HAS ANWAYS FAVORED CURBING COMMUNISTS IN CYPRUS) SAID MAKARIOS HAD TOED HIM IN CONFIDENCE THAT AFTER THE ELECTION HE INTENDED TO UNITE THE TWO MAJOR CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES AND RELY ON THEM AS MAIN BASE OP HIS SUPPORT EVEN IF THIS SHOULD FORCE THE COMMUNISTS INTO OPPOSITION. $73 32 AM 8:25 AND ROOM ON HOUSE 5° COMMENT: WE ARE SOMEWHAT SKERTICAL ABOUT THIS LAST STATEMENT. MAKARIOS HAS SPOKEN OF UNIFYING HIS NON- COMMUNIST SUPPORTERS BEFORE BUT WE DOUBY THAT HE WOULD CARRY THROUGH IF RESULTS SHOULD BE TO BWILD UP CLERIDES TOO MUCH OR TO RORCE AKEL INTO OPPOSITION. COMMUNIST SUPPORT HAS BEEN HELPFUL TO MAKARIOS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CYPRUS. AKEL WOULD BE FORMIDABLE THREAT TO HIM IN OPPOSI- TION. MOREOVER, CENTER AND RIGHT ARE LED BY INDIVI- DUALISTS WHO FIND TEAM PLAY DIFFICULT AND TURN TO POLITICS IN FITS AND STARTS RATHER THAN FOR SUSTAINED PERFORMANCE MOST WE WOULD EXPECT IS SOME TILT TOWARD CENTER-RIGHT ALONG LINES ALREADY APPARENT BUT WITHOUT ANY ABRUPT OR DECISIVE TURN. 6.0 AS TO MAJOR POINT # - RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS -- WE WOULD JUDGE THAT FROM NICOSIA ANGLE THEY CONTINUE TO BE JUST AS CLODED BY MISTRUST AND SUSPICION AS THEY WERE BEFORE CHRISTOPHIDES TRIP. REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW MUCH GRIVAS ACTIVITY WILL BE STEPPED UP IN NEXT FEW MONTHS AND HOW MAKARIOS WILL REACT IF STRESS ON HIMI INCREASES. GDS. POPPER SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be 04/20/199 declassified. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library FORM DEPARTMENT OF STATE ELKODNCED THE MOITASIROHTUA OELHE * * EXPIS Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN TELEGRAM WH SECRET 320 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00175 301048Z 2 13 ACTION SS-25 Im 3 INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W 074238 R 301015Z JAN 73 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6943 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON '73 JAN 3: PM 2:37. 37. ONROOW STATE WHITE HOUSE SECRETNICOSIA175 EXDIS SUBJECT: CYPRUS -- FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES VISIT TO ATHENS. 1. FRG AMB TOROK HAS HAD HIGHLY CONFIDENTIALI TALK WITH FONOFF MEMBER OF FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES PARTY DURING ATHENS VISIT LAST WEEK. HIS INFORMANT STATES CYPRIOTS REGARD VISIT AS AN UTTER FAILURE. THEIR MAIN PURPOSE HAD BEEN TO OBTAIN GREEK SUPPORT IN CONTROLLING GRIVAS ACTIVITIES: THEY GOT NO SATISFACTION ON THIS. NOR DID THEY SUCCEED IN TALKING SPECIFICS ON INTER- COMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS. 2. COMMENT: NONE OF PUBLIC COMMENT HERE ON CHRISTO- PHIDES VISIT REFUECTS THIS START ASSESSMENT: ON CONTRARY, IT IS VAGUELY REASSURING. I AM SEEKING EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH FONMIN AND WILLI REPORT FURTHER. GDS POPPER SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. ORM DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXC Department of State United STATES OF AMERICA TELEGR DEC WH AMB PAGE 01 NICOSI 02204 0716382 STUAT ON ROOM THM SECRET 942 47 ACTION SS-25 7:43 INFO OCT-01 1026 W 091377 R 071530Z DEC 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6799 AMEMBASSY ATHENS INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY LONDON SECRET NICOSIA 2204 EXDIS SUBJECT: CYPRUS: "SECOND STAGE- CONFERENCE AND MAKARIOS OBJECTIVES REF: ATHENS 6967 1. SUMMARY: IN RE-EMPHASIZING NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO FOLLOW SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF CYPRUS INTER- COMMUNAL TALKS, MAKARIOS SEEKS TO PROTECT HIMSELF BY ENSUR- ING PARTICIPATION OF GREECE IN DE FACTO RENUNCIATION OF ENOSIS THIS WOULD ENTAIL, AND TO MOVE TOWARD DEMILITARIZA- TION OF ISLAND WHICH WOULD GIVE HIM FREER HAND WITH TURK CYPRIOTS. NON-ALIGNMENT IS HIS CURRENT OBJECTIVE, BUT U.S. CAN HELP NUDGE HIM CLOSER TO WEST. END SUMMARY 2. IN OUR OPINION EMBASSY ATHENS Is QUITE CORRECT IN ATTACHING SIGNIFICANCE TO ARCHBISHOP:S EMPHASIS ON SECOND ROUND OF CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS, FOLLOWING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, TO DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CYPRUS PROBLEM. 3. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT IN AUTUMN 1971, WHEN GREECE AND TURKEY WERE FORCING EXPANDED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS DOWN RELUCTANT THROAT OF THEN FOREIGN MINISTER SYPROS KYPRIANOU, LATTER REPEATEDLY MADE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERESTOF GREECE AND TURKEY IN INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF BROBLEM, WHILE IT WAS FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES ON ISLAND TO SOLVE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS. AS EXPANDED TALKS WERE FINALLY ORGANIZED THIS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES AMERICAN TELEGRAM OF SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 02204 0716382 EXPLU EXCLUS DISTINCTION WAS BLURRED BY INCLUSION OF GREEK AND TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERTS AMONG PARTICIPANTS. BUT KYPRIANOU POINT REMAINS VALID TO THIS EXTEND ANY CONSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT MUST SOMEHOW BE FACTORED INTO EXISITING TREATY STRUCTURE FOR CYPRUS AND INTO PRESENT OR ALTERED SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. 4 ᵒ AS REFTEL INDICATES, IN REFERRING TO "SECOND STAGE" NEGOTIATIONS MAKARIOS IS CERTAINLY ASSUMING THAT FIRST STAGE NOW HAS SOME CHANCE OF SUCCESS. IT IS QUITE CLEAR HOWEVER FROM BOTH HIS PUBLIC AND HIS PRIVATE UTTERANCES THAT HE IS LESS INCLINED THAN GREEK CYPRIOT NEGOTIATOR CLERIDES AND SOME OF HIS OTHER OFFICIALS TO COMPROMISE ON CRITICAL ISSUE OF LOCAL GOVT, NOT YET TACKLED BY NEGOTIATORS, AS well AS ON OTHER POINTS IN CURRENT ROUND OF TALKS. WE believe IT IS STILL DOUBTFUL THAT FULL AGREEMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES CAN BE REACHED. BUT IF IT IS REACHED, ARCHBISHOP CAN BE EXPECTED TO HOLD UP FULL IMPLEMENTATION PENDING WHAT HE PROBABLY REGARDS AS EQUALLY CRITICAL SECOND (INTERNATIONAL) PHASE. 5 . ARCHBISHOP'S INTEREST HERE IS TO ASSOCIATE GREECEUNEQUIVOCALLY WITH THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF A CYPRUS REPUBLIC WHICH WOULD BE A BAR TO ENOSIS AS LONG AS IT EXISTED. SECOND STAGE CONFERENCE WOULD PRESUMABLY GIVE HIM BOTH GREEK AND TURKISH BLESSING FOR SUCH A SET.UP. AT SAME TIME IT WOULD ALLOW HIM TO MOVE TOWARD ANOTHER LONG HELD OBJEC- TIVE, THE PROGRESSIVE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE ISLAND. ARCHBISHOP WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN TO HAVE ALL FOREIGN TROOPS REMOVED FROM CYPRUS.- IN FIRST INSTANCE MAINLAND TURKISH AND GREEK CONTINGENTS, AND AT SOME SUITABLE LATER STAGE UK BASES AND FORCES. THIS WAS CLEARLY IN HIS MIND WHEN IN APRIL 1964 HE ANNOUNCED THAT CYPRUS HAD TER- MINATED THE 1960 TREATY OF ALLIANCE (BUT NOT TREATY OF GUARANTEE). IF MAKARIOS COULD GET ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF ISLAND, AND IF HE COULD THUS OPERATE AS HEAD OF AN ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT STATE, HE PROBABLY CALCULATES THAT HIS LEVERAGE ON TURKISH MINORITY IN CYPRUS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED, AND HIS ABILITY TO MAKE THE MOST OF A NON-ALIGNED POSTURE MAXIMIZED DEC 6° FOREGOING IS OUR OWN EXTRAPOLATION OF WORDS AND THOUGHTS SP NOT TO BE REPRODUCED W HOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 02204 071638Z OF ARCHBISHOP AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ARCHBISHOP WOULD HASTILY DISPOSE OF PROFITABLE BRITISH BASES OR THAT HE WOULD INEVITABLY HEW TO NON- ALIGNED POSITION. LIKE SOME OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS IN THIS REGION, HE WILL WANT TO RETAIN FREEDOM TO DO SO. BUT BY SAME TOKEN WE BELIEVE HE WILL ALWAYS LEAVE HIMSELF ENOUGH MANEUVERING ROOM TO MOVE, HAVING REGARD FOR ATTITUDE OF GREECE AND TURKEY, TOWARD WESTERN FOLD IF THIS SHOULD APPEAR TO OFFER MORE To CYPRUS AND TO HIM. FUNDAMENTAL TASK FOR USG AND WESTERN ALLIES IS TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WILL IMPEL MAKARIOS TO TAKE UP THIS OPTION. GDS. POPPER EXPIS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 26 Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SW DEPARTMENT OF DEP STATE * * Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL 898 PAGE 01 NICOSI 1617 300919Z 16 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 1026 W 004343 R 300840Z AUG 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6457 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY ANKARA '72 AUG 30 PM 12 17 STUA WH ROOM SE AMEMBASSY VALLETTA CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 1617 EXDIS SUBJECT: MINTOFF ON CYPRUS SITUATION REF: STATE 157495, 158232 1 ° MINTOFF IS RIGHT IN HIS IMPRESSION THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IS BEING MADE TOWARD A PERMANENT SOLUTION OF CYPRUS PROBLEM. BUT TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE HE IS ENTIRELY WRONG IN HINTING THAT MAKARIOS MIGHT BE AMEN- ABLE TO A TURKISH APPROACH AS LONG AS IT EXCLUDED PARTI- TION. OR PERHAPS THERE IS A SEMANTIC PROBLEM HERE: MAKARIOS WOULD DOUBTLESS DEFINE ANY TURKSIH PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL OR CANTONAL AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS AND BI- NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP (THE CENTRAL FEATURES OF ALL TURK CYPRIOT THINKING ON THE PROBLEM) AS A PREUUDE TO POSS- IBLE PARTITION AND HENCE UNACCEPTABLE. HE HAS SHOWN NO DISPOSITION EVEN TO CONSIDER SUCH ARRANGEMENTS. 2. HOWEVER THAT MAY BE, WE CAN SEE NO ADVANTAGE AT ALL IN HELPING MINTOFF TO INJECT HIMSELF INTO THIS PICTURE. HE HAS NO SPECIAL CREDENTIALS FOR THE TASK. IF MAKARIOS WISHES TO START A SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH THE TURKS THERE ARE BETTER WAYS FOR HIM TO GO ABOUT IT: AND IF WE ARE TO ENCOURAGE SUCH A DISCUSSION WE CERTAINLY DO NOT NEED MINOTFF AS AN INTEREDIARY. 3. ACCORDINGLY, WE SUGGEST DEPT MAY WISH TO HAVE AMB NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. FORM DS.1652 DEPARTMENT REP OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 NICOSI 01617 300919Z GETZ TAKE LINE WE APPRECIATE MINTOFF :S INTEREST, BUT BELIEVE THAT AT THIS CRITICAL STATE IN INTER- COMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO REFRAIN FROM OUTSIDE INTERCESSION. GDS POPPER bli 30 CONFIDENTIAL NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. FORM DS-1652 PREARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES AMERICAN TELEGRAM OF SECRET 128 PAGE 01 NICOSI 01471 271620Z 47 ACTION SS-25 72 JUL 27 PM 4:21 SITUATION ROSM SITUATION WHITE HOUSE INFO OCT-01 1026 W 032883 2 R 271550Z JUL 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6375 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION UN USMISSION NATO SECRET NICOSIA 1471 EXDIS SUBJECT: PROPOSAL FOR ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY AGREEMENT REF: STATE 135854 1. DEPT ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT. ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY ARRANGEMENT BEING WORKED OUT IN CYPRUS INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIA- TIONS WAS STALLED, APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF NEW DEMANDS EACH SIDE SAYS THE OTHER IS MAKING. FURTHER PROGRESS APPEARS DEPENDENT ON CLEARING UP FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES PRECIPITATED IN LAST NEGOTIATING MEETINGS PRIOR TO JULY 21 RECESS (NICOSIA 1446, 1452). 2. WHEN DEPASSTSEC MARTIN HERZ AND I VISITED CLERIDES AND DENKTASH JULY 27 WE RECEIVED FILL IN ON ELECTRICITY PROBLEM. WHILE VERSIONS DIFFER SOMEWHAT, IT SEEMS CLEAR DENKTASH NOW SEEKS NOT ONLY RE-EMPLOYMENT OF ALL TURK CYPRIOT FORMER ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES BUT ALSO A GUARANTEE THAT WITHIN A FEW MONTHS 20 PERCENT OF ALL ELECTRI- CITY AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES WOULD BE TURK CYPRIOTS. MOREOVER, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE GUARANTEES AGAINST DISCHARGING TURK CYPRIOTS FOR POLITICAL REASONS. OTHER PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN OVER DENKTASH DEMANDS THAT PORTION OF ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY REVENUES BE PAID TO TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNAL CHAMBER, AND OVER NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXCLU * Department of State UNITED STATES AMERICAN TELEGRAM OF SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 01471 271620Z HIS DISCLOSURE THAT FUNDS COLLECTED BY TCPA AS ELECTLICITY CHARGES AND SUPPOSEDLY HELD IN ESCROW HAVE BEEN PAID OUT TO FORMER TURK CYPRIOT ELECTIRICY EMPLOYEES AND PERHAPS FOR OTHER PURPOSES. FOR HIS PART, DENKTASH HAD EARLIER TOLD US GOC IS CLAIMING 3 MILLION POUNDS FOR PAST ELECTRICITY CHARGES AS ELEMENT OF ANY AGREEMENT. 3. THESE NEW COMPLICATIONS MAKE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON ELECTRICITY UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME. WE HAVE IMPRESSION NO FURTHER PROGRESS CAN BE MADE UNTIL NEGOTIATORS SETTLE PROBLEM CREATED BY DENKTASH INSISTENCE ON NEW START FOR TALKS ON BASIS OF QTE DE FACTO SITUATION UNQTE. GDS. POPPER NOT TO BE REPRODU D WITHOUT THE SECRORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library bh/Eo/ebs DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF DEP STATE * Department of State STATES AMERICA UNITED TELEGRAM OF WH SECRET 421 PAGE 01 NICOSI 01456 250936Z 14 ACTION SS-25 EXATE INFO OCT-01 1026 W 012994 '72 JUL 25 AM 11: 39 SITUAT ON ROOM WHITE HOUSE R 2508552 JUL 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6367 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS R ET NICOSIA 1456 EXDIS SUBJECT: CYPRUS: BAYULKEN'S ALLEGED PROPOSALS TO PALAMAS REF: ATHENS 4047 WE WOULD LIKE TO ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH OBSERVATIONS REFTEL. WHILE SHARING DEPT'S CONCERN THAT GOG-GOT CONSULTATION COULD IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES LEAD TO THOUGHTS OF CYPRUS SOLUTION BY MEANS OTHER THAN NEGOTIATIONS, MAIN DANGER OF CYPRUS PROBLEM FOR USG HAS HITHERTO BEEN THAT IT COULD LEAD TO CONFLICT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. IF OUR TWO ALLIES HAVE NOW BEEN ABLE DEVELOP THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO POINT OF APPROACHING THIS PROBLEM WITH DETERMINATION TO PREVENT IT DRAWING THEM INTO CONFLICT, AND ARE CONSULTING TO THAT END, WE THINK THIS IS FUNDAMENTALLY IN US INTEREST. IT IS ALSO IN KEEPING WITH CURRENT USG EMPHASIS ON NEED FOR STATES INVOLVED IN REGIONAL DISPUTES TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOLUTION OF THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. GDS CRAWFORD NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * * Department of State UNITED STATES AMERICA TELEGRAM OF EXC-0 EXCES SECRET 285 PAGE 01 NICOSI 01234 160525Z 14 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 1026 W 118325 R 160555Z JUN 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA '72 JUN 16 AM 30 S TUATION ROOM WHITE HOUSE TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6232 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION UN USMISSION NATO USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM SECRE T NICOSIA 1234 EXDIS SUBJECT: GOT UNLIKELY PRESS TO HAVE CAREER DIPLOMATIC OFFICER SIT WITH TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERT IN EXPANDED TALKS REF: NICOSIA 1201 10 WITH A LARGE ASSIST FROM UNSYG SPECIAL REP OSORIO- TAFALL, I BELIEVE WE HAVE HEADED OFF THOUGHTS OF TURKISH EMBASSY (AND GOT) OF TRYING TO INSIST THAT TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERT ALDIKACTI BE ACCOMPANIED IN EXPANDED TALKS BY A TURKISH CAREER DIPLOMATIC OFFICER. 2° AFTER MY CONVERSATION WITH TURKISH CHARGE INHAN ON JUNE 8 IN WHICH HE HAD MENTIONED NEED FOR A TURKISH DIPLOMATIC OFFICER TO HELP ALDIKACTI IN VIEW OF LATTERS LACK OF ENGLISH, I TOLD OSORIO OF THIS CONVERSATION. AT HIS NEXT MEETING WITH INHAN, AND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY OTHER CONVERSATION, OSORIO NOTED ALDIKACTIS PROBLEM AND VOLUNTEERED TO SERVE AS INTERPRETER HIMSELF AS NEED ARISES. 3. ON JUNE 14 INHAN INDICATED TO ME THAT ANKARA WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT OSORIOS OFFER ALTHOUGH HE CONTINUED NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. OF STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM УИД SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 01234 160525Z FEEL ALDIKACTI WOULD BE WORKING AT A DISADVANTAGE WITHOUT HIS OWN INTERPRETER. INHAN SMILED WHEN I SUGGESTED EXET THAT HE COULD HAVE KNOWN ALL ALONG THAT UN COULD NOT POSSIBLY AGREE TO PRESENCE OF A GOT OFFICIAL WHOSE ATTENDANCE WOULD MARKEDLY UPSET BALANCE IN SYG'S FORMULA. NEVERTHELESS, INHAN STATED ALDIKACTI TO BE BACKED-STOPPED, OUTSIDE OF MEETINGS, BY FULL TIME OFFICER ASSIGNED TO TURKISH EMBASSY HERE. GP-3 CRAWFORD 1e W LETECKVIN NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library as/80/ebs DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2ECKEIVBA # * EXPITS Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM WN CONFIDENTIAL 997 3 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00978 031205Z STUAT ON ROOM WHITE HOUSE 51 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W 039590 0 R 031130Z MAY 72 FM AMEMBASSY NIEOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6067 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE USMISSION UN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION NATO CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 978 EXDIS SUBJECT: REACTION TO TURKISH CONDITIONS REF: STATE 76361 1 - SUMMARY: WE ARE CONVINCED GOC COULD NOT ACCEPT TURKISH PRECONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. WE BELIEVE UNSYG, SUPPORTED BY US, UK AND GREECE, SHOULD URGE TURKEY REFORMULATE CONDITIONS AS UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF TURKISH POLICY. 2. IN REFTEL DEPT REQUESTS OUR ASSESSMENT OF GOC REACTION TO TURKISH PRECONDITIONS WHILE GOC OFFICIALS EVIDENTLY ARE NOT YET FULLY APPRAISED OF LATEST TURKISH POSITION, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IN FORM IN WHICH WE HAVE THEM (STATE 774381 THEY WOULD DEFINITELY BE UNACCEPTABLE HERE. WOULD APPRECIATE OFFICIAL TEXT OF TURKISH POINTS SOONEST, SINCE VERSION UK HICOM HAS JUST RECEIVED FROM UK DEL NEW YORK IS SOMEWHAT BLANDER THAN OURS. 3° IN OUR JUDGMENT GOC COULD NOT ACCEPT LANGUAGE WHICH DIRECTLY ASSERTED VALIDITY OF LONDON ZURICH AGREEMENTS, NOR WOULD IT SPECIFICALLY RENOUNCE ENOSIS AS AN ULTIMATE OBJEC- TIVE, THOUGH IT MIGHT AGREE TO SOME FORMULATION IMPLYING CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE FOR SOME INDEFINITE PERIOD. WHILE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXE™ Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 NICOSI 00978 031205Z EQUAL PARTICIPATION OF TWO COMMUNITIES IN THE TALKS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT AGREE TO DISREGARD MAJORITY STATUS OF GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OR TO ANY DEFINITION OF PARTNERSHIP WHICH LOOKS TOWARD FEDERAL OR CANTONAL STATUS FOR TURK CYPRIOTS. 4. SEEMS TO US BEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE FOR UNSYG, SUPPORTED BY US, UK AND GREECE, TO SEEK TO PERSUADE TURKEY TO REFORMULATE ITS POINTS AS A UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF TURKISH LEGAL AND POLITICAL POSITION. THIS WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH UNDERSTANDING APPARENTLY REACHED AD REFERENDUM BY GUYER DURING ANKARA VISIT EARLY FEBRUARY (PARA 3 ANKARA 8501 UNDER WHICH GOT WOULD SUBMIT TO UN A POSITION PAPER DESCRIBING ITS VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS. IF EACH PARTY TO INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WOULD AGREE TO PRESENT SUCH A POSITION PAPER FOR THE RECORD, A SITUATION MIGHT BE CREATED IN WHICH TALKS COULD GO FORWARD. 5 . AS TO TIMING, SOONER SUCH REPRESENTATIONS COULD BE MADE, BETTER CHANCE THEY WOULD HAVE OF SUCCEEDING. WE WOULD LIKE TO INFORM CYPRUS GOVT IF AND WHEN DECISION TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION IS TAKEN, IN ORDER TO FORESTALL ANY PRECIPITATE REACTION. POPPER NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE CONP IDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library 88/80/265 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. EXD DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL 388 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00951 290635Z S S ACTION SS-25 UAT ON ROOM TEHOU 72 APR 29 AM 8:52 52 2 16 INFO OCT-01 1026 W 014519 EXPIC P R 281625Z APR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NIEOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6047 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY USMISSION USUN PRIORITY USMISSION NATO EUCOM USDOCOSOUTH CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 951 EXDIS EXC-0 SUBJECT: CYPRUS: GOT REFUSAL RESUME INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS REF: ANKARA 3080 1. SUMMARY. WE SUGGEST REASONS ADVANCED BY BAYULKEN FOR GOT UNWILLINGNESS RESUME INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE NOT PERSUASVIE. IN PARTICULAR, THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE TURK CYPRIOTS WILL AS IN PAST HAVE TO FOLLOW TURKISH LEAD ON TALKS, AND THAT TURKS DO NOT THEREFORE NEED TO "JUSTIFY" RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS TO TURKISH COMMUNITY. WE RECOMMEND GOT BE URGED AGREE To ENLARGED TALKS AT ONCE AND WITHOUT RESERVATIONS. OTHERWISE WHATEVER PROSPECTS EXIST FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF CYPRUS PROBLEM MAY BE LOST. END SUMMARY. 2. REASONS GIVEN AMBASSADOR HANDLEY BY FONMIN BAYULKEN FOR PUTTING OFF RESUMPTION OF ENLARGED INTER- COMMUNAL TALKS DO NOT SEEM TO US PERSUASIVE. FRANKLY, WE WONDER IF THEY ARE NOT PRETESTS TO ENABLE BAYULKEN TO STALL WHILE TURKEY IS WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT. WHILE EMBASSY ANKARA IN BEST POSITION EVALUATE CERTAIN JUDGMENTS OF BAYULKEN (E.G. ANY TURKISH GOVERNMENT "WOULD BE TOPPLED" IF IT NOW NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State EXEMS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 NICOSI 00951 290635Z AGREED TO RESUME TALKS, WE OFFER FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS ON POINTS RELATING TO CYPRUS. A.e CZECH ARMS. UN'S EFFORTS HAVE RESULTED IN SUBSTANTIAL UNFICYP CUSTODY OF CZECH WEAPONS, EXCEPT FOR EXPLOSIVE AMMUNITION, WHICH IS WHAT TURKS AND TURK CYPRIOTS HAVE ALL ALONG SAID THEY WANTED. TRUE, IT IS CUSTODY WITH UNDERSTANDING GOC HAS RIGHT TO WITH DRAW WEAPONS ON DEMAND, BUT THAT SEEMS IMPLICIT IN ANY CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT. (AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT, IT HARD TO IMAGINE GOC DEMANDING WITHDRAW ARMS EXCEPT IN GRAVEST THREAT TO ITS SECURITY FUNCE DEMAND ITSELF WOULD IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES BE REGARDED BY TURKS AS VIRTUAL SIGNAL HOSTILITIES WERE IMMINENT.) FACT THAT UNARMED CYPRUS POLICE HAVE TECHNICAL SUPERVISION OF WEAPONS IS FACE-SAVING FORMULA: POINT IS THAT UNFICYP HAS ACKNOWLEDGED RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTROL (BY FORCE IF NECESSARY ACCESS TO CAMP IN WHICH ARMS ARE STORED. WE HOPE GOT IS FULLY CLEAR ON THIS POINT. IT SEEMS TO US MISLEADING IN THE EXTREME TO CHARACTERIZE UN AGREEMENT AS SIMPLY "GOOD EFFORT.' B. 1) DISARRAY IN ATHENS-MAKARIOS RELATIONS HAS NOT IN ITSELF NOTABLY DISTURBED TURK CYPRIOTS. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME SENSE OF INSECURITY AMONG COMMON PEOPLE, BUT TCPA LEADERSHIP HAS CLEARLY RELISHED PROSPECT THAT GREEK PRESSURE ON MAKARIOS WOULD LEAD To IMPOSED SOLUTION - EITHER BY FORCE OR THROUGH GRECO. TURKISH PRESSURE IN ENLARGED TALKS. IT SEEMS TO US TURK CYPRIOT LEADERS HAVE GENERALLY ACTED ON ASSUMPTION THAT IN LAST ANALYSIS THEY WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW TURKEY'S ORDERS AND PARTICIPATE IN TALKS IF TOLD TO DO so. ONLY FEW DAYS AGO, VICE PRESIDENT KUCHUK INDICATED TO UNSYG THAT CZECH ARMS CONSTITUTED "MAIN OBSTACLE TO RESUMPTION OF TALKS" AND ASKED THAT THEY BE PLACED UNDER UNFICYP FULL CUSTODY (USUN 15091. AS EXCLUS NOTED ABOVE, PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS COME CLOSE TO FULL CUSTODY. 21 WHATEVER FEELINGS OF TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY TOWARDS ATHENS-NICOSIA DISPUTE, IT DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY DISARRAY AMONG GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS SHOULD FROM MAINLAND TURK VIEWPOINT STAND IN WAY OF RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE FREQUENTLY ARGUED THAT LITTLE WILL COME OF NEW TALKS WITHOUT INTENSIVE CONSULTATION BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State THE SECKEIVEN UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 NICOSI 00951 290635Z EXPIS EXPIC EXPIS EXCLUS ON OUTLINE OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT. NOW WOULD APPEAR TO BE PARTICULARLY PROPITIOUS TIME FOR SUCH COOPERATIONS. C. ROLE OF GRIVAS. CONTACTS BETWEEN GRIVAS AND NLMAKARIOS AND POSSIBILITY OF RAPPROACHEMENT BETWEEN THEM IS NATURALLY DISQUIETING TO TURKS AND TURK CYPRIOTS. HOWEVER, FROM TURKISH STANDPOINT, THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD SEEM TO ARGUE FOR PROMPT RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. RENEWED TALK SHOULD TEND DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN GRIVAS AND MAKARIOS, FOR ONCE THEY ARE IN TRAIN ARCHBISHOP WOULD BE UNLIKELY MAKE CONCESSIONS TO GRIVAS ON ENOSIS ISSUE. WE WOULD NOTE, INCIDENTALLY, THAT GRIVAS DID NOT REITERATE HIS ESPOUSAL OF ENOSIS IN CONCERT WITH MAKARIOS, BUT STATED IT UNILATERALLY IN ACKNOWLEDGING ARCHBISHOP'S NAME DAY CONGRATULATIONS. IN OUR READING, THE TWO MEN ARE STILL FAR FROM BEING ON COMMON WAVE LENGTH. 30 WE FEAR GOT SUGGESTIONS AIMED AT "CLEARING ATMOSPHERE so THAT TALKS CAN TAKE PLACE "WILL HAVE OPPOSITE EFFECT. DEPARTMENT IS AWARE HOW DELICATELY BALANCED UNSYG'S FORMULA IS AND WHAT GREAT EFFORTS WERE REQUIRED TO GET ALL PARTIES ON BOARD. CYPRUS ITSELF ONLY OVERCAME FINAL HURDLE AND AGREED FORMALLY TO REACTIVATE TALKS TWO DAYS AGO (USUN 1510). WE ARE QUITE CERTAIN ASSURANCES TURKEY IS CONTEMPLATING RELATING TO ARMS, ENOSIS, AND STATUS OF COMMUNITIES WOULD UPSET PRESENT BALANCE AND MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR GOC, IF NOT GOG, TO AGREE TO NEW TALKS. 4. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER TURKISH REPRESENTATIONS FORESHADOWED REFTEL HAVE YET BEEN MADE. WE HOPE DEPT WILL SUPPORT IN STRONGEST TERMS RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ON PRESENTLY PROPOSED BASIS WITHOUT DELAY OR CONDITIONS. PERHAPS SAME POINT COULD BE CONVEYED TO BRITISH AND UNSYG. GP - 3. POPPER NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET 277 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00887 210935Z 14 2 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 1026 W P R 201430Z APR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6007 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY ANKARA 72 APR 085430 AM 59 AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION UN PRIORITY USMISSION NATO USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM SECRET NICOSIA 887 EXDIS CORRECTED COPY Y (PARA 2. B.) NOFORN SUBJECT: TIGHTER AGREEMENT ON CZECH ARMS 1. SUMMARY. UNFICYP EXPECTS CONCLUDE APR 20 A SECOND AGREEMENT ON STERILIZATION OF CZECH ARMS IMPORTED TO CYPRUS IN LATE JANUARY. IT IS FAR TIGHTER THAN THE FIRST, WHICH WAS IN ITSELF A DISTINCT IMPROVEMENT OVER 1967 ARRANGE- MENT, AND IS TANTAMOUNT TO UNFICYP CUSTODY. WHEN SIGNED AND COMMUNICATED TO TURKEY AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS, IT SHOULD SATISFY EVEN THE LATTER THAT THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN REMOVED AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO RESUMED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. THIS INFO STRICTLY NOFORN UNTIL RECEIVED THROUGH SOME OTHER CHANNEL. 2. FROM CONFIDENTIAL UNFICYP SOURCE WE LEARN THAT AT APRIL 19 MEETING WITH UNSYG SPEC REP OSORIO-TAFALL AND UNFICYP FORCE CMDR CHAND, ARCHBISHOP THEATRICALLY ANNOUNCED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MORE DELAYS BY GOC OFFICIALS OVER DETAILS OF NEW CZECH ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENT, AND AGREED WITH ALL ELEMENTS OF NEW PROPOSAL DRAWN UP BY UNFICYP. NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * * EXPIS Department of State UNITED STATES OF HOMEMENT TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00887 210935Z ARCHBISHOP PROMISED HE WOULD SIGN THIS AT FURTHER MEETING APRIL 20. OUTLINE OF AGREEMENT, WHICH WE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE OFFICIALLY FROM OSORIO IN NEXT DAY OR TWO, IS AS FOLLOWS: A ° PREAMBULAR PARA OF AGREEMENT WILL STATE THAT GOC ESCHEWS USE OF THESE ARMS EXCEPT IN CASE OF FOREIGN ATTACK. (EXACT LANGUAGE OF THIS PARA WAS ONLY ITEM NOT FINALLY DECIDED AT APR 19 MEETING. MAKARIOS DICTATED HIS THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE, WHICH OSORIO THEN TOOK AWAY FROM MEETING TO REWORK.) B . THERE WILL BE NO QUESTION OF PARTIAL REMOVAL OF ARMS: EITHER ALL WILL BE REMOVED FROM STORAGE UNDER EVENTUALITY CITED IN PREAMBULAR PARA, OR NONE. C. ALL RPT ALL ARMS, FUSES AND SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION WILL BE REMOVED TO STORAGE SITE WITHIN PERIMETER OF UNFICYP BASE CAMP (ADJACENT NICOSIA AIRPORT). Do WITHIN PERIMETER OF UNFICYP BASE CAMP, ACTUAL BUILDING DESIGNATED FOR STORAGE WILL BE HEAVILY WIRED, FLOODLIT AND UNDER CONTROL OF UNARMED RPT UNARMED CYPOL. E. STORAGE BUILDING WILL HAVE TWO LOCKS: ONE BEING UNFYCIPS. ACCESS OF UNARMED CYPOL GUARDS AND OTHER REPRE- SENTATIVES OF GOC INTO BASE CAMP WILL BE CONTROLLED BY UNFICYP BY MEANS OF PASSES ISSUED BY IT. F o IT IS AGREED THAT UNFICYP HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF ITS CAMPS AND INSTALLATIONS AND WILL PREVENT, WITH USE OF ARMS AS MANY BE NECDGSARY, ANY ATTEMPT BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS TO ENTER BASE CAMP . G. HIGH EXPLOSIVE AMMUNITION WILL BE LOCATED IN EXISTING BUNKERS AT ATHALASSA. THESE ALSO WILL BE DOUBLE LOCKED AND SUBJECT TO INSPECTION WHENEVER DESIRED: WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFI- CATION BY UNFICYP FORCE COMMANDER AND/OR CHIEF OF STAFF ACCOMPANIED BY OTHERS THEY MAY DESIGNATE. 3. OUR UNFICYP SOURCE POINTS OUT THAT 400 UNFICYP SOLDIERS CURRENTLY RESIDE AT BASE CAMP. AS CONSEQUENCE OF NEW ARMS AGREEMENT, NORMAL GUARD OF CAMP WILL BE AUGMENTED BY ONE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00887 210935Z BRITISH AND ONE AUSTRIAN PLATOON. 40 COMMENT: IF FOREGOING IS SIGNED TODAY WITHOUT CHANGE, UNFICYP WILL HAVE ACHIEVED, THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS MADE TOUGH BY BACKING AND FILLING TACTICS WHICH MAKARIOS PRETENDED WERE RESPONSIBILITY OF HIS SUBORDINATES, AN AGREEMENT FOR CONTROL OF ARMS IMPORTED IN LATE JANUARY WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY UNFICYP CUSTODY. THAT so MUCH WAS WRUNG FROM GOC IS PRIMARILY RESULT OF PERSISTENCE ON PART OF UNFICYP LEADERSHIP LOCALLY BASED ON (A) ABIDING SUSPICION OF MAKARIOS'TRICKS, (B) AWARENESS THAT ANYTHING OTHER THAN A REALLY TIGHT AGREEMENT WOULD NOT SATISFY GOT AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND THEREBY REMOVE CZECH ARMS AS OBSTACLE TO RESUMED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. OFFICE OF UNSYG WAS REPORTEDLY FAINTHEARTED THROUGHOUT AND WOULD WILLINGLY HAVE SETTLED FOR LESS. WE BELIEVE MAKARIOS WENT ALONG BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH DISPOSED TO QUIBBLE ABOUT THE DETAILS so FAR AS THEY MIGHT APPEAR DEROGATE FROM GOC SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVES, HE GENUINELY WANTED ARMS ISSUE OUT OF THE WAY® WE BELIEVE HIS OBJECT IN SO DOING WAS TO PUT HIMSELF ON SIDE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO RESUMED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, LEAVING GREEK GOVTS DEMANDS FOR RESHUFFLE OF GOVT, PURGE OF COMMUNISTS, AND "OBEDIENCE TO THE CENTER", IN HIS WAKE. GP-3 CRAWFORD NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4 Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM EXPIN EXCES SECRET 657 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00844 141328Z 42 22. ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 /026 W 033199 R 140745Z APR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5986 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON 39 USMISSION USUN NY USMISSION NATO SECRET NICOSIA 844 EXDIS CORRECTEDCOPY-TEXT SUBJECT: CYPRUS - CRISIS REVIEW REF: STATE 60808 1. WE THINK REFTEL IS EXCELLENT ANALYTICAL DOCUMENT, WRITTEN WITH BALANCE AND PERSPECTIVE. WE HAVE VERY FEW COMMENTS ON ITS SUBSTANCE. 2. IN PARA 2 REFTEL ASSUMPTION IS MADE THAT SECOND STAGE AGREEMENT FOR CONTROL OF CZECH ARMS HAS BEEN COMPLETED. AS WE PREDICTED IN NICOSIA 748, CYPRUS BUREAUCRATS HAVE NOT YET FOLLOWED THROUGH ON ARRANGEMENTS. OSORIO-TAFALL KEEPS PRESSING, AND WE DO WHAT WE CAN TO SUPPORT HIM IN DISCREET WAY, BUT UN EFFORTS HAVE so FAR BEEN MET WITH DELAYS ON ACCOUNT EXCLUS OF HOLIDAYS, DISAGREEMENT ON DETAILS, ETC. OSORIO THINKS HE WILL GET WHAT HF WANTS IN THE END, BUT IF HE IS UNSUCCESSFUL CZECH ARMS ISSUE MAY STILL HAUNT US. 3. IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT WHILE GREEK SIDE WAS SATISFIED EVEN WITH FIRST STAGE ARRANGEMENTS: TURKISH SIDE HERE CONTINUES TO EMPHASIZE DEMAND FOR FULL UN CUSTODY OF CZECH ARMS AS NECESSARY MEASURE TO SAFEGUARD TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY. NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 29 Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00844 141328Z THIS WAS REPEATED TO US BY VICE PRESIDENT KUCHUK AND DEFENSE MINISTER OREK DURING COURTESY CALL TODAY. PRIVATELY, UNFICYP SOURCES STATE THEY WOULD NOT WELCOME ACTUAL CUSTODY, WHICH COULD PRECIPITATE UN FORCE INTO CENTER OF CRISIS SITUATION IF ARMS WERE EVER SEIZED BY GOVT BECAUSE OF PURPOSED EMERGENCY SITUATION. EXCESS 4. IN PARA 7 REFTEL STATEMENT IS MADE THAT MAKARIOS MAY BE IN CONCILIATORY FRAME OF MIND. WE HOPE THIS IS SO, BUT ASIDE FROM TANGENTIAL REFERENCE TO WHAT HE TERMS NEED FOR FRESH APPROACH, WE MUST SAY WE HAVE SEEN NO SIGN HE IS WILLING TO PROPOSE OR ACCEPT ANY NEW SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS (CF NICOSIA 840). AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL NEITHER GREEK NOR TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP IS SHOWING MORE FLEXIBILITY TODAY THAN WAS THE CASE LAST SUMMER, WHEN CLERIDES-DENKTASH DISCUSSIONS FADED AWAY. AT SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT AS TACTICAL MATTER EACH SIDE MIGHT WISH TO PRESERVE HARDEST POSSIBLE PUBLIC POSTURE FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES, BEFORE NEW TALKS BEGIN. 5.0 RE PARA 8 REFTEL, WE ARE FRANK TO SAY WE MUST RESORT LARGELY TO SUBJECTIVE ESTIMATES IN TRYING TO ASSESS STRENGTH OF MAINLAND GREEK MILITARY INFLUENCE ON CYPRUS, AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF MAKARIOS. BASED ON OUR CONVERSATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS, WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT MAINLAND GREEK CONTINGENT, PLUS MAINLAND NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS AND UNITS THEY COULD MOBILIZE WOULD BE VERY POWERFUL FACTOR INDEED. IN CASE OF REAL TROUBLE WE THINK OFFICERS COULD AT LEAST ENSURE THAT MANY GUARD UNITS WOULD SIMPLY STAND ASIDE AND WE HAVE NOTED THAT WHEN THINGS ARE TENSE FACTION- RIDDEN CYPRUS POLICE ELEMENTS TEND TO BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT MAKING THEIR SYMPATHIES KNOWN « IN SUM, WE WOULD RATE MAINLAND GREEK MILITARY POWER HIGHER THAN NEA/CYP, BUT WE AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT WITH SO MANY ELEMENTS HOLDING THEMSELVES ALOOF TO SEE WHICH WAY CAT JUMPED, GREEKS COULD PROBABLY NOT DEPEND ON "QUICK SURGICAL SUCCESS." WE AGREE ALSO THAT THIS MIGHT BE FACTOR WHICH DETERRED GREEDS FROM RESOLVING FEBRUARY CRISIS BY RESORT TO FORCE. 6. IN THIS CONNECTION, DATT HAS GIVEN US FOLLOWING ESTIMATE OF THE POSITION AS HE SEES IT. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, GREECE CAN COUNT ON ALL THE NATIONAL GUARD UNITS IN THE NICOSIA AREA. THESE ARE MAINLY ARMOR, ARTILLERY, AND RAIDING FORCES UNITS AND 211 INFANTRY BATTALION (GREENLINE WHOSE MEN ARE SCREENED FOR POLITICAL RELIABILITY AT THE TIME OF INDUCTION. LESS RELIABLE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon residential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00844 141328Z GUARDSMEN ARE ASSIGNED TO UNITS WHICH ARE DEPLOYED ELSEWHERE, MAINLY AROUND THE TURK CYPRIOT ENCLAVES. THESE UNITS WOULD EITHER NOT BE INVOLVED AT ALL IN A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH MAKARIOS OR AT MOST WOULD PLAY ONLY A MINOR SECURITY ROLE. THE KEY UNITS WOULD SURELY BE RESPONSIVE TO MAINLAND GREEK ORDERS. THE COMBINED STRENGTH OF THESE UNITS IS ABOUT 3,000 TO WHICH IS ADDED THE NATIONAL CONTINGENT (ELDYK), GIVING A REACTION FORCE STRENGTH OF ABOUT 4,000. SUCH A FORCE SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF FORCING MAKARIOS TO ACCEPT GREEK DEMANDS OR STEP DOWN WITHOUT HAVING TO SHOOT IT OUT WITH LOYALIST POLICE ELEMENTS OR ARMED BANDS. END OF DATT COMMENT. 7 . FINALLY, WE AGREE THAT PERIOD JUST AHEAD LOOKS LIKE ONE OF PAUSE AND CONSOLIDATION, THOUGH UNEXPECTED INCIDENTS ARE ALWAYS POSSIBLE. EARLY RESUMPTION OF LOCAL TALKS IS CLEARLY MOST DESIRABLE. FOR THIS TO HAPPEN, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SECOND STAGE CZECH ARMS ARRANGEMENT PUT INTO EFFECT, AND CYPRUS CABINET CHANGES CONSUMMATED. THESE STEPS WOULD FOCUS ATTENTION ON TURKISH SIDE WHICH, AS FAR AS WE CAN RECALL, HAS NOT YET FORMALLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY ACCEPTED EXCES SECGEN'S FORMULA FOR NEW TALKS. TURKS AND TURK CYPRIOTS MIGHT STILL INSIST ON FULL UN CUSTODY FOR CZECH ARMS AS MINIMUM CONDITION FOR RESUMING TALKS, AND RESUMPTION MAY THEREFORE NOT COME QUICKLY. 8. ONCE NEW TALKS HAVE BEGUN, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON SKILL WITH WHICH GREEK AND TURKISH "EXPERTS" CAN PRESS THE TWO CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF SOME TYPE OF COMPROMISE PROPOSAL. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION INDICATING THAT GREEK AND TURKISH GOVTS EVER SOUGHT TO WORK OUT IN DETAIL SOME TYPE OF LOCAL AUTONOMY SOLUTION, SUCH AS CREATION OF A TURKISH CYPRIOT MINISTER FOR LOCAL OR TURKI H COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, ALONG LINES DISCUSSED LAST AUTUMN. WF SUGGEST THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE, SO THAT WITH SKILLFUL COOPERATION OF UN REP A JOINTLY SUPPORTED PROPOSAL COULD RE PRESENTED WITH MAXIMUM EFFECT AT PROPER MOMENT IN INTERCOMMUNAL DISCUSSIONS. WHILE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS ARE NOT HIGH, WE DOUBT THAT ANY ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL WOULD EXPIS RECEIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION UNTIL A LOCAL AUTONOMY SOLUTION UNDER A MODIFIED CYPRUS CONSTITUTION WERE THOROUGHLY EXPLORED. AS DEPT KNOWS, OUR OWN VIEW IS THAT SUBSEQUENT FALLBACK MIGHT BE ONE BUILDING UPON MODUS VIVENDI CURRENTLY EXISTING BETWEEN TWO COMMUNITIES ON ISLAND. 9. IN FOREGOING PROCESS, US ROLE SHOULD IN OUR VIEW CONTINUE TO BE TO URGE ACCOMMODATION AND MODERATION ON ALL PARTIES AND NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 04 NICOSI 00844 141328Z TO MAKE WHAT WE THINK WOULD BE HELPFUL SUGGESTIONS, IN LOW KEY, AS APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITIES ARISE. JUDGING BY RECORD OF PAST FEW YEARS, ONE CANNOT BE TOO OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RESULTS OF SUCH INTERCESSION. IF MATTERS DETERIORATE, WE MIGHT BE REQUIRED RESORT TO MORE STRENUOUS MEASURES AS WF DID IN 1964 AND 1967. THE TIMING AND NATURE OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN A TRUE CRISIS SITUATION IN CYPRUS ARE COVERED IN EXISTING POLICY PAPERS. POPPER EXPIRES LEFECKVW NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon esidential Library ebs DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXPIS Department of State OF STATES UNITED AMERICA TELEGRAM COMMEIC. wH SECRET 271 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00815 071326Z 42 2/ ACTION SS-25 3 INFO OCT-01 /026 W R 071030Z APR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5972 SITUATION ROOM 112225 INFO AMEMASSY ANKARA PM AMEMBASSY ATHENS 12 AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION UN SECRE T NICOSIA 815 EXDIS SUBJECT: EMBASSY ATHENS COMMENTS ON ROSSIDES COMMUNICATION TO UN, AND ARCHBISHOPS DISARMAMENT STATEMENT REF: ATHENS 1935, 1936: USUN 1221 1. WE ARE GLAD TO COMMENT ON ATHENS REFTELS, AS REQUESTED BY EMBASSY ATHENS. 2. IT IS HELPFUL TO PLACE STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES BY PROTAGONISTS IN CYPRUS PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. SEEN IN THIS WAY, THERE IS LITTLE THAT IS SUBSTANTIALLY NEW ABOUT EITHER ROSSIDES LETTER TO UNSYG OR MAKARIOS STATEMENT ON DISARMAMENT. 3. CYPRUS GOVT HAS BEEN DENYING VALIDITY OF TREATY OF GUARANTEE FOR YEARS. IT VIEWS TREATY AS AN INFRINGEMENT OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY. TO DO THIS WAS WHOLE POINT OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2077 (XX) OF DEC 18, 1965, FIRST OPERA- TIVE PARAGRAPH OF WHICH STATES, "TAKES COGNIZANCE OF THE FACT THAT THE REP OF CYPRUS, AS AN EQUAL MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ENTITLED TO AND SHOULD ENJOY FULL SOVEREIGNTY AND COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT ANY FOREIGN INTERVENTION OR INTERFERENCE. SECOND PARA OF RESOLUTION CALLS ON ALL STATES, IN CONFORMITY WITH CHARTER OBLIGATIONS, "TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY, NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET 28 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00815 071326Z INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REP OF CYPRUS AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY INTERVENTION DIRECTED AGAINST IT." THOUGH ADOPTED BY LESS THAN OVERWHELMING VOTE, THIS RESOLUTION HAS BEEN GOC'S CONSISTENT GUIDELINE FOR CYPRUS POLICY AND PROCEDURE IN UN GENERALLY. 4. AS TO MAKARIOS DISARMAMENT STATEMENT, IT MERELY PUTS IN MORE FORMAL WORDS WHAT GOC, WITH TONGUE IN CHEEK, HAS OCCASION- ALLY ADVOCATED -- THAT IS, REMOVAL OF THE MAINLAND CONTINGENTS AND DISARMAMENT OF ALL LOCAL FORCES, LOOKING TOWARD EVENTUAL DEMILITARIZATION OF THE ISLAND. ONLY REAL NOVELTY IN APRIL 2 STATEMENT IS ITS EXPLOITATION OF INACCURATE VERSION OF PRIMIN ERIM'S REMARKS. MAKARIOS MAY PERHAPS BE EXCUSED FOR USING THIS VERSION SINCE AS ANKARA TELEGRAMS INDICATE, NO ONE BOTHERED TO CORRECT WIDELY QUOTED VERSION FOR SOME TEN DAYS, OR UNTIL AFTER MAKARIOS, THROUGH ACT OF POLITICAL GAMESMANSHIP, HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF IT. 5. IN SHORT, WE SEE NO INDICATION FROM ROSSIDES LETTER AND DISARMAMENT STATEMENT THAT' AS ATHENS REFTEL STATES, MAK- ARIOS IS OPENING A NEW PHASE IN HIS STRUGGLE FOR SUPREME CONTROL OF A FULLY SOVEREIGN AND AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS. THAT HAS BEEN THE NAME OF HIS GAME EVER SINCE THE 1960 CYPRUS EXETS EXPIRES CONSTITUTION BROKE DOWN IN 1964, AND PROBABLY EVEN EARLIER. NO ONE HERE REGARDS THE ROSSIDES LETTER AND THE MAKARIOS STATEMENT AS ANYTHING MORE THAN FAIRLY ROUTINE REAFFIRMATIONS OF STANDARD CYPRIOT POSITIONS. 6. AS TO OTHER POINTS RAISED IN REFTELS, WE HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS. SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS GIVEN STRONG VERBAL SUPPORT TO MAKARIOS IN AND OUT OF UN: HOWEVER, IF THERE IS ANYTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT SOVIET CONDUCT IN CURRENT CRISIS, IT IS SOVIET FOREBEARANCE AND CAUTION IN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO AVOID ACTION THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS SERIOUSLY ROCKING CYPRUS BOAT. CER- TAINLY A CYPRUS INITIATIVE IN SECURITY COUNCIL IS POSSIBLE IF MATTERS DETERIORATE FURTHER: APPEAL TO NON-ALIGNED AND COMMUNIST WORLD IS ONE OF GOC WEAPONS IN THE CYPRUS POWER STRUGGLE. ANY EFFECTIVE MOVES SOVITES AND CHICOMS MIGHT TAKE TO PRESERVE CYPRUS INDEPENDENCE WOULD HAVE TO USE INSTRUMENTALITIES WHICH WERE MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN INITIATIVE IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL. NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE ASTERERIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 78 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of tate UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00815 071326Z 7. AMB. TASCA'S POINT IN ATHENS 1935 IS WE THINK QUITE CORRECT: MAKARIOS UNDOUBTEDLY WANTS TO DOMINATE AND ULTIMATELY INTE- GRATE TURKISH COMMUNITY, AND TO MOVE FROM FULL INDEPENDENCE, THE ONLY CURRENTLY "FEASIBLE" SOLUTION, AS HE SEES IT, TOWARD EVENTUAL ENOSIS. WHILE HE WOULD NEVER ADMIT IT, I BELIEVE HIS DRIVE FOR POWER IS SUCH THAT HE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY, SOME DAY, OF ASSUMING A POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ROLE IN GREECE. OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT WITH DEPT HAS PRODUCED A WIDE RANGE OF OPINION ON THIS POSSIBILITY, AND IT COULD HARDLY BE SAID TO BE A NEAR-TERM EVENTUALITY. 8. I ALSO AGREE WITH AMB TASCA THAT MAKARIOS IS FOLLOWING A POLICY WHICH APPEALS TO SIZABLE SEGMENTS OF GREEK ANC CYPRIOT PUBLIC OPINION. THE ARCHBISHOP DOMINATES THE CYPRUS STYLE DEMOCRACY HE RUNS ON THE ISLAND. WHILE IT IS FAR FROM A MODEL OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION: IT LOOKS PRETTY GOOD IN THIS REGION OF THE WORLD, WHERE EVERYTHING IS RELATIVE. COMPARED TO GREECE, CYPRIOTS ENJOY SUBSTANTIAL FREEDOM, AND RECENT EVENTS HAVE TENDED TO EMPHASIZE THE POINT HERE. POPPER SECRET 28 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED MEPRODICEM reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has RY DEPAL-MENT DEPART OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM EXET EXCES PM SECRET 928 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00771 311633Z 2 51 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 1026 W 063890 R 311525Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5950 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN USMISSION NATO SECRE T NICOSIA 771 EXDIS NOFORN SUBJECT: CLERIDES SEES HOPE FOR RECONCILIATION WITH GREECE 1 - SUMMARY: CLERIDES HOPES THAT BY AGREEING TO CABINET CHANGES MAKARIOS CAN INDUCE GREEK GOVT TO SEND AMBASSADOR TO NICOSIA. SUGGESTS PRESIDENT MIGHT STEP DOWN IN 1973 TO ALLOW A SELFLESS REPLACEMENT (READ CLERIDES) TO MAKE NECESSARY COMPROMISES FOR AN INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT. 2. WHEN I SAW CYPRUS HOUSE OF REPS PRESIDENT CLERIDES MARCH 31 FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON, HE TOLD ME THAT MAKARIOS HAD JUST ASKED TO SEE HIM, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL WEEKS. CLERIDES SAID HE BELIEVED MAKARIOS WANTED To DISCUSS QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE RESHUFFLE OF CYPRUS COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. 3. CLERIDES BELIEVES THAT WITH TIGHTER CONTROL OF CZECH ARMS AN IMMEDIATE PROSPECT, STAGE IS SET FOR ADDITIONAL STEPS WHICH MIGHT GIVE SATISFACTION TO GREEK GOVT AND THUS PAVE WAY FOR SUFFICIENT RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN ATHENS AND NICOSIA TO PERMIT DESPATCH OF A NEW GREEK AMBASSADOR TO CYPRUS. NEXT MOVE, IN CLERIDES OPINION, MUST BE TO INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES IN GOC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AS DEMANDED BY GREEKS WITH VIEW TO FORMATION OF "GOVT OF NATIONAL UNITY". CLERIDES THINKS IT SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF HOMELAND TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00771 311633Z WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OPERATE A GOVT INCLUDING EXTREME RIGHT- WING ENOSISTS ALONG WITH SUPPORTERS OF INDEPENDENCE AS ONLY FEASIBLE CYPRUS SOLUTION, BUT HE WOULD BE QUITE WILLING TO SEE MINISTERS PARTICULARLY OBNOXIOUS TO GREECE REPLACED ALONG WITH ONE OR TWO OTHER HIGH GOVT OFFICIALS. 4. WHAT CLERIDES HAS IN MIND WOULD BE TRANSFER OF FONMIN KYPRIANOU TO AN AMBASSADORIAL POST, AND RESIGNATION OF PERHAPS TWO OTHER MINISTERS (I ASSUME HE WAS REFERRING TO EDUCATION MINISTER PETRIDES AND FINANCE MINISTER PATSALIDES, BOTH OF WHOM APPEAR TO HAVE AROUSED GREEK IRE.) THESE CHANGES WOULD BE MADE OVER PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS BUT AN INDICATION OF THINGS TO COME WOULD BE GIVEN TO GREEKS IMMEDIATELY. CLERIDES SAYS GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU HAS HINTED THAT IF THIS COURSE WERE TAKEN MEDIATION COMMITTEE SET UP IN FEBRUARY BY CLERIDES MIGHT BE REACTIVATED AND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SEND A NEGOTIATOR TO ATHENS, PRESUMABLY CLERIDES HIMSELF, TO PATCH THINGS UP WITH PRIMIN PAPADOPOULOS. 5. FOREGOING IS WHAT CLERIDES SAYS HE INTENDS TO RECOMMEND TO MAKARIOS. I ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT WITHOUT SOME RESPONSE TO GREEK GOVT DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION OF ATHENS AS "NATIONAL CENTER" WHICH SHOULD HAVE PRIMACY IN ALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS RELATING TO HELLENISM. CLERIDES SAID HE HOPED THIS ABSTRACT ISSUE MIGHT BE FINESSED IF CYPRUS GOVT WERE REORGANIZED AND IF EXPANDED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS COULD GET UNDER WAY. 6. THIS GAVE ME OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT THAT UNDERLYING CURRENT DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS WAS VERY REAL SENSE OF FRUSTRATION FELT BY BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY BECAUSE OF ARCHBISHOP'S FAILURE, IN 3 1/2 YEARS OF EARLIER INTER- COMMUNAL TALKS, TO SHOW SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO MEET DEMANDS OF TURKISH COMMUNITY FOR AUTONOMY AND PROTECTION OF RIGHTS I WAS NOT IMPLYING THAT TURKISH SIDE WAS NECESSARILY ANY MORE FLEXIBLE, BUT IF NEW INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WERE SIMPLY TO BE RERUN OF OLD, SAME PRESSURES WHICH HAD LED TO RECENT CRISIS WOULD INEVITABLY RECUR. 7 * CLERIDES AGREED. SAID HE RECOGNIZED NEED FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT AS ETHNARCH MAKARIOS SIMPLY COULD NOT AFFORD TO SIGN SECRET 25 NOT TO BE REPRODUCED V HOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECKELVBA Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00771 311633Z ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT WHICH LIKE LONDON-ZURICH TREATIES WOULD EXCLUDE ENOSIS AND PERPETUATE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS. HIS OWN THINKING ABOUT THIS PROBLEM, HE CONTINUED, LED HIM TO CONCLUSION THAT IF SATISFACTORY SETTLE- MENT WERE EVER TO BE REACHED, IT WOULD BE WITH SOMEONE ELSE IN THE PRESIDENCY. HE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO PROPOSE TO ARCH BISHOP THAT LATTER STATE HE WOULD NOT RUN FOR A NEW TERM IN FEBRUARY 1973, WHEN HIS PRESENT TERM EXPIRES. SOME OTHER LEADER WOULD HAVE TO COME FORWARD AND BE ELECTED AT THAT TIME, IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WOULD BE HIS DUTY TO MAKE THE DISAGREEABLE COMPROMISE REQUIRED FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH THE TURKISH SIDE. IN DOING THIS, THE NEW INCUMBENT WOULD BE SACRIFICING HIS FUTURE POLITICAL CAREER, BUT HE WOULD BE PERFORMING A SERVICE TO GREEKS IN BOTH CYPRUS AND GREECE. IF ARCHBISHOP COULD MOVE ALONG THIS TRACK INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WOULD PROCEED INCONCLU- SIVELY FOR REST OF 1972 AND MARCH TO CONCLUSION SHORTLY AFTER NEW ADMINISTRATION INSTALLED IN EARLY 1973. 8. CLERIDES AGREED TO KEEP ME INFORMED OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ARCHBISHOP. 9. COMMENT: AS FORESHADOWED IN EARLIER CONVERSATIONS, CLERIDES CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT HE CAN RESTORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH GREEK GOVT IF ALLOWED TO DO so AND THAT HE COULD BRING ABOUT AN INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT IF THROUGH ASSUMPTION OF PRESIDENCY HE WERE TO HAVE A FREE HAND IN NEGOTIATIONS. ARCHBISHOP HAS ALL ALONG SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE CHANGES IN HIS CABINET IN DUE COURSE, IF NOT REQUIRED TO DO SO UNDER GREEK PRESSURE. HE MIGHT THERE ACQUIESCE IN THIS PORTION OF CLERIDES SCENARIO. WHAT IS LESS CLEAR IS THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO STEP DOWN IN FEBRUARY 1973. ON CONTRARY, BRIEF CONVERSATION 1 HAD WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT GEORGE PELAGHIAS A FEW DAYS AGO LEFT ME WITH IMPRESSION THAT MAKARIOS MAY BE CONSIDERING SOME NEW PROPOSALS OF HIS OWN FOR USE IN EXPANDED INTER- COMMUNAL TALKS. POPPER SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. OF STATE '72 Department of State UNITED STATES OF MEMBER SECRET STUATION TUATION ROOM ROOM TELEGRAM 556 OUSE WH PAGE 01 NICOSI 00723 251108Z 2 18 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 1026 W EXET 014906 R 251015Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5921 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN USMISSION NATO EUCOM USDOCOSOUTH SECRE T NICOSIA 723 EXDIS SUBJECT: CYPRUS: VIEWS OF TASSOS PAPADOPOULOS REF: NICOSIA 716 1. SUMMARY: FROMER LABOR MINISTER CONFIRMS THAT MAKARIOS' CURRENT INTENTION IS TO RESIGN PRESIDENCY IF BISHOPS INSIST, BUT TIMING IS UNCERTAIN. SPECULATES MAKARIOS WILL BACK HELLENIC MINES DIRECTOR PASCHALIS PASCHALIDES, RATHER THAN CLERIDES AS NEXT PRESIDENT. END SUMMARY: 2. AT A DINNER ON MARCH 24 I ASKED UNIFIED PARTY FLOOR LEADER AND FORMER LABOR MINISTER TASSOS PAPADOPOULOS ABOUT REASONS FOR AND STATUS OF HIS CURRENT JOINT EFFORT WITH CLERIDES PRODUCE AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD RESIGNATION OF MINISTERS. PAPADOPOULOS (WHO HAS A TENDENCY TO EXAGGERATE CENTRALITY OF HIS ROLE IN ANY SITUATION) SAID THIS IDEA HAD BEEN HIS. HE HAD SOLD CLERIDES ON IT AND BOTH HAD THEN PRESENTED IT TO MAKARIOS. OBJECT WAS TO INTRODUCE FLEXIBILITY INTO OTHERWISE LOCKED. IN SITUATION. IF ALL MINISTERS RESIGNED VOLUNTARILY, MAKARIOS WOULD HAVE A FREE HAND TO PICK A NEW CABINET WITH NO LOSS OF FACE. NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXETS Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00723 251108Z 3. PAPADOPOULOS SAID HE HAD ALSO FELT THIS MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO CLERIDES, WHO UNFORTUNATELY BEING REGARDED AS WORKING WITH GREECE THIS SITUATION BECAUSE OF AMBITION REPLACE MAKARIOS. THEIR JOINT GAMBIT IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD LEAVE MAKARIOS IN POWER, WITH A NEW CABINET IN WHICH CLERIDES WOULD BE BUT ONE (ALTHOUGH AS MINISTER OF INTERIOR, THE MOST IMPORTANT) OF SEVERAL NEW FACES. IN THAT CASE, THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS WORKING WITH GREECE TO GET MAKARIOS. JOB WOULD BE SOFTENED AND EVENTUALLY FORGOTTEN. GOG NEITHER INFORMED NOR INVOLVED IN THE CLERIDES- PAPADOPOULOS INITIATIVE. (THIS WOULD SEEM CORROBORATED BY GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOUSS IGNORANCE ON THIS SCORE WHEN I SAW HIM EARLIER IN DAY = SEPTEL). 4. PAPADOPOULOS SAID THAT IN CLERIDES CONTINUING SOUNDINGS OF MINISTERS ALL NOW IN LINE ON WILLINGNESS TENDER RESIGNATION IF OTHERS DO, EXCEPT KOMODROMOS. PAPADOPOULOS ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT PROSPECTS FOR HIS INITIATIVE RE CABINET NOT GOOT, PARTICULARLY SINCE IDEA PROPABLY DOES NOT REALLY APPEAL TO MAKARIOS. 5. PAPADOPOULOS EXPECTED AS DOES EVERYONE ELSE, THAT BISHOPS WILL PERSIST IN DEMANDING MAKARIOS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT. HE SAID THAT ON BASIS HIS MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH MAKARIOS HE ESTIMATES IT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN PRESIDENT WILL RESIGN IF CONFRONTED BY RENEWED REQUEST FROM BISHOPS. TIMING, HOWEVER, IS UNCERTAIN. MAKARIOS IS REFLECTING ON TWO POSSIBILITIES: REMAINING IN OFFICE FOR FURTHER PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY THREE MONTHS TO SUPERVISE ELECTIONS BEFORE RESIGNING: ANNOUNCING HIS INTENTION RESIGN WHEN HIS CURRENT PRESIDENTIAL TERM EXPIRES IN FEBRUARY 1973° 6. AS REGARDS A SUCCESSOR IF AND WHEN MAKARIOS RESIGNS, PAPADOPOULOS FELT ARCHBISHOP MORE LIKELY THROW HIS INFLUENCE BEHIND PASCHALIS PASCHALIDES THAN CLERIDES. 7. AT CONCLUSION OF OUR CONVERSATION, PAPADOPOULOS REPEATED A THEME - WE ARE HEARING EVER MORE OPENLY FROM CLERIDES THOSE AROUND CLERIDES: MAKARIOS HAS REMARKABLE ABILITIES NOT TO BE REPRODUCE VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE MOITASIROHTUA Ot EXECUTIVE 2ECKELVB/ EXCES * Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00723 251108Z IN SOME FIELDS AND HAS MADE A CONTRIBUTION NO OTHER MAN COULD HAVE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF CYPRUS AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE. WITH ALL HIS QUALITIES, HOWEVER, TIME HAS COME FOR HIM TO STEP ASIDE, GIVING WAY TO SOMEONE WITH A MORE MODERN-MINDED, LESS INERTIAL APPROACH TO GOVERN- MENT. INCLUDED IN THE CHANGEOVER MUST BE A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM TO FREE CYPRUS FROM THIS ONCE AND FOR ALL SO THAT IT CAN FULFILL ITS PROMISE AS A DEMOCRACY FOSTERING RAPID SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. 8. COMMENT: PAPADOPOULOS' READING OF SITUATION TENDS BEAR OUT THAT GIVEN US EARLIER BY VENIAMIN (REFTEL). REFERENCE TO PASCHALIDES IS INTRIGUING. PASCHALIDES IS VERY MUCH A SILENT STRONG MAN ON THE CYPRUS SCENE. AS DIRECTOR OF HELLENIC MINES, WHICH IS IN FACT A VERY LARGE HOLDING COMPANY WITH A VARIETY OF INTERESTS, HE HAS SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE A TOUGH-MINDED, SOMEWHAT INSCRUTABLE EXECUTIVE. HE IS ALSO GENERALLY REGARDED AS ARCHBISHOP'S BUSINESS MANAGER. IN ADDITION HIS EXECUTIVE ABILITIES, HOWEVER» HE ALSO HAS POLITICAL ACUITY. IN MANY WAYS HE WOULD BE A GOOD NO-NONSENCE PRESIDENT. IN BACKING HIM, WERE THIS To COME TO PASS, MAKARIOS WOULD BE NEATLY GETTING BACK AT REVENGE ON CLERIDES FOR HAVING, AS HE IMAGINES, DISLOYALLY TRAFFICKED WITH GREECE. GP-3. CRAWFORD NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM LL SECRET 448 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00722 250915Z 2 22 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 /026 W 014402 R 250815Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5920 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS TUAT ON ROOM IEHOUS AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN '72 MAR 25 AM II 49 USMISSION NATO USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM SECRE T NICOSIA 722 EXDIS SUBJ: CYPRUS: CONVERSATION WITH GREEK CHARGE 1 - I CALLED ON GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU MARCH 24 FOLLOWING HIS RETURN PREVIOUS DAY FOLLOWING HIS CONSULTATIONS: IN ATHENS. 2. ZAPHIRIOU IS UNDERSTANDABLY BEING EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS. HIS POSITION IS NOT AN ENVIABLE ONE AND HE IS CLEARLY FOLLOWING ORDERS AND KEEPING HIS MOUTH SHUT. HE DID, HOWEVER, PROVIDE FOLLOWING, WHICH WAS EVIDENTLY THE LINE FOR PUBLIC USE WHICH HE HAD BEEN GIVEN IN ATHENS. 3. GREECE IS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT WHETHER MAKARIOS STAYS OR GOES. IT CONTINUES TO INSIST UPON INSTALLATION OF A GOVT IN CYPRUS WHICH WILL COOPERATE FULLY WITH ATHENS, IN DEEDS AS WELL AS WORDS, SETTING ASIDE THE DEVIOUSNESS AND DECEITS THAT HAVE TOO OFTEN CHARACTERIZED ITS PAST PERFORMANCE. BISHOPS' REQUEST FOR MAKARIOS' RESIGNATION FROM PRESIDENCY IS AN ECCELESIASTIC MATTER OF NO CONCERN TO GOG. 4. ON THE LATTER POINT, ZAPHIRIOU SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXCES Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00722 250915Z ANY OF THE BISHOPS SINCE HIS INTRODUCTORY CALLS AND WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO DO So. STORIES OF HIS SECRET MEETINGS WITH THEM, OF CARRYING MESSAGES BACK AND FORTH, ETC., WERE NONSENSE. ZAPHIRIOU COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT BISHOPS WERE RELIABLE REPORTED TO BE "QUITE EMOTIONAL" ABOUT NEED FOR ARCHBISHOP'S RESIGNATION AND IT APPEARED LIKELY THEY WOULD INSIST. NEVERTHELESS, IT NOTED THAT THEY HAD DELAYED IN REPLYING TO MAKARIOS AND THIS COULD CONCEIVABLE MEAN THEY TRYING TO WORK SOME NUANCE INTO THEIR EXPECTED LETTER TO HIM WHICH MIGHT PERMIT SOME GRACE PERIOD OR DISCUSSION. COMMENT: FLAVOR OF THIS WAS THAT GREECE WOULD IN NO WAY REDUCE ITS DEMANDS ON MAKARIOS TO CLEANSE HIS GOVT AND SUBORDINATE HIS POLICIES TO ATHENS, AND IN RELYING ON THE THRUST THROUGH THE BISHOPS TO PRODUCE COMPLIANCE OR RESIGNATION. 5. GREEK EMBASSY AS SUCH IS OBVIOUSLY VERY MUCH ISOLATED. AS INDICATED SEPTEL, ZAPHIRIOU TOTALLY UNAWARE THAT ARCHBISHOP'S ASSOCIATES HAVE BEEN POINTING OUT ALL OVER TOWN THAT FINAL PHRASE OF HIS MARCH 19 LETTER TO BISHOPS WAS NOT A PROMISE TO RESIGN. ALSO, WHEN I ASKED FOR HIS OPINION OF CLERIDES. CURRENT EFFORT TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR MAKARIOS TO COMPLY WITH GREEK NFDEMAND BY ROUNDING UP CABINET RESIGNATIONS, ZAPHIRIOU REPLIED WITH APPARENT SINCERITY THAT HE COMPLETELY UNINFORMED. COMMENT: SINCE MOST ASPECTS OF GOG OPERATION AGAINST MAKARIOS WOULD SEEM TO BE HANDLED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS AND SINCE ZAPHIRIOU HAD BEEN AWAY PART OF THE WEEK, THIS COULD BE TRUE. 5. ZAPHIRIOU DID ACKNOWLEDGE INDIRECTLY A ROLE IN HAVING ARRANGED FOR ARCHBISHOP TOTAFV#THE SALUTE AT GREEK EMBASSY AT TODAY'S MARCH-PAST ON OCCASION OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE DAY. IT WOULD SEEM HE BROUGHT WORD BACK FROM ATHENS THAT MARCH 25 COMMEMORATES A MOMENTOUS EVENT IN GREEK HISTORY, DIVORCED FROM CURRENT POLITICS. AFTER ZAPHIRIOU'S RETURN ARCHBISHOP DECIDED ALLOW PARADE To PASS GREEK EMB AND ACCEPTED ZAPHIRIOU'S INVIATION GIVEN HIM IN THE STANDS. GP-3. CRAWFORD NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST. NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library 99/80/265 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE THE EXECUTIVE SECKELVBA * Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET 741 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00721 241630Z 42 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 1026 W R 241550Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5919 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS SITUSTON.ROOM SITU 851858 ONROOM AMEMBASSY ANKARA '72 MAR 25 AM 50 2 USMISSION USUN SECRE T NICOSIA 721 EXDIS NOFORN SUBJ: CYPRUS: KYPRIANOU AND PETRIDES REPORTEDLY TELL CLERIDES THEY WOULD RESIGN, KOMODROMOS HOLDS OUT REF: NKI-639 1. STELIOS TEHOCHARIDES, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND CLOSE FRIEND OF CLERIDES, TOLD ACTING DCM AT DINNER MARCH 23 THAT CLERIDES HAD SPENT WEEK SOLICITING CABINET MINISTERS VOLUNTARILY TO RESIGN IN ORDER OPEN DOOR TO MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WITH GREECE. BOTH FONMIN KYPRIANOU AND MINEDUCATION PETRIDES HAD FINALLY AGREED, ALBEIT WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE, ON CONDI- TION THAT DECISION TO RESIGN WAS UNANIMOUS. LONE HOLD- OUT WAS MININT KOMODROMOS. 2. COMMENT: EVEN IF CLERIDES SHOULD SECURE THE RESIGNATIONS OF THE WHOLE CABINET, WE HAVE SOME DOUBT WHETHER MAKARIOS WOULD GO ALONG WITH PLAN. IT IS NOT HIS STYLE TO ALLOW THE SITUATION TO BE MANAGED BY SOMEONE ELSE -- PARTICULARLY CLERIDES. HE IS MORE LIKELY, WE THINK, EITHER TO CONTINUE DEFY GREECE OR RESIGN. GP-3 CRAWFORD NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXPIS * Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET 776 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00716 241613Z 44 02 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 1026 W 008503 R 241515Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5914 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS USMISSION GENEVA 172 MAR 25 AM 50 AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION UN USMISSION NATO USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM SECRE T NICOSIA 716 EXDIS GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER SUBJECT: CYPRUS - TOUR HORIZON WITH VENIAMIN 1. SUMMARY. FONOFF DIR GEN VENIAMIM UNCONCERNED AT NIXON- ERIM JOINT STATEMENTS REFERENCE TO TREATIES. VENIAMIN EXPECTS BISHOPS WILL REITERATE REQUEST THAT MAKARIOS RESIGN AS PRESIDENT AND THINKS IT "90PC CERTAIN" ARCHBISHOP WILL THEN ANNOUNCE HIS INTENTION RESIGN AFTER RPT AFTER PRESID- ING OVER ELECTIONS IN WHICH HE WOULD NOT BE A CANDIDATE. VENIAMIN BELIEVES PAPADOPOULOS TOO FAR COMMITTED TO HIS EFFORT REMOVE MAKARIOS TO DEFLICT NOW, EVEN IF THIS ENTAILS USE OF FORCE. 2. I CALLED ON VENIAMIN MARCH 23 To PROVIDE TEXT OF CYPRUS PORTION NIXON-ERIM MARCH 22 JOINT STATEMENT (STATE 492131. I EXPLAINED THAT LANGUAGE ON TREATIES WAS COMPARABLE THAT USED IN 1967. AS DEPT HAD INFORMED ROSSIDES AND NICOLAIDES, USG STRESSED PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES COMMITMENT TO INDFPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CYPRUS. VENIAMIN SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD FROM EITHER NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the RichardWixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Department of State TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00716 241613Z ROSSIDES OR NICOLAIDES BUT IN ANY CASE USG REFERENCE TO TREATIES NOT A MATTER OF CONCERN. 3. DISCUSSING PROBABLE NEXT STEPS IN ATHENS. NICOSIA CONFRONTATION, VENIAMIN SAID THAT, PRODDED BY GREECE, BISHOPS ALMOST CERTAIN TO REITERATE THEIR REQUEET FOR MAKARIOS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT. IF THEY DO SO, MAKARIOS PRESENT DISPOSITION IS TO ANNOUNCEHIS INTENTION RESIGN AFTER PRESIDING OVER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN WHICH HE WOULD NOT BE A CANDIDATE. REASON FOR NOT RESIGNING BEFORE ELECTIONS IS HIS FEAR GREECE WOULD INTERVENE TO PRE- VENT THEIR BEING HELD: MAINLAND GREEKS HAD NOT HAD PRIVILEGE OF ELECTIONS IN RECENT YEARS. 4. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENTS MARCH 13 REPLY TO GOG FEB 11 REQUESTS, HIS MARCH 19 REPLY TO MARCH 2 SYNOD REQUEST, AND OTHER SKILLFUL PREPARATIONS LEFT HIM IN RELATIVELY GOOD POSITION TO DEFY PRESSURES ON HIM, VENIAMIN AGREED. HE REMARKED THAT ARCHBISHOPS THINKING EXCES HAS GONE IN CYCLES. FOR A FORTNIGHT AFTER FEB 11 HE HAD BEEN INCLINED TOWARD RESIGNATION. THEN HIS MOOD SHIFTED TO COMBATIVENESS. NOW, WHILE HE HAS LAID ALL THE NECESSARY GROUNDWORK TO KEEP OPEN THE OPTION OF RESISTANCE, HE IS 90PC DISPOSED TO RESIGN, 10PC INCLINED TO RESIST. WITH GREECE UNRELENTING IN ITS DEMAND FOR SUBSERVIENCE, WITH BISHOPS ALIGNED AGAINST HIM AT ATHENS IMPORTUNING, AND WITH TURKEY WAITING IN THE WINGS WITH POLITICAL DEMANDS, IN TERMS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT, THAT HE CANNOT MEET, ARCHBISHOP FEELS ODDS AGAINST HIM ARE TOO GREAT. 5. VENIAMIN SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW PAPADOPOULOS IS NOW TOO FAR COMMITTED IN HIS EFFORT TO REMOVE MAKARIOS TO DEFLECT. IF HE FAILS CARRY THROUGH THE EFFORT HE HAS BEGUN, HIS POSITION IN GREECE COULD IN LONGER TERM BE UNDONE. IT PROBABLE, THEREFORE, HE W L PRESS ON, USING FORCE IF NECESSARY AND JUSTIFYING INTERVENTION ON SOME PRETEXT PROVIDED BY PRO-MAKARIOS» ANTI-MAKARIOS (GRIVAS) OR RIGHT LEFT CLASHES. NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 28 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF MEDICAL TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00716 241613Z 6. VENIAMIN PREDICTED THAT EVEN IF GREECE SUCCEEDED IN RE- MOVING MAKARIOS BY PRESENT NON VIOLENT PRESSURES OR USE OF FORCE, IT WOULD QUICKLY RUN INTO REAL DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING CYPRUS. HAS NOW SHOWN BZ WIDESPREAD HOSTILITY DIRECTED AT CLERIDES BECAUSE OF BELIAT THAT HE IS WORKING WITH GREECE, RESENTMENT AT GOG HIGH-HANDEDNESS WOULD LEAD ENOUGH CYPRIOTS TO ACTIVE RESISTANCE TO CREATE CHRONIC INSTABILITY WITH LIKELIHOOD OF SPILL OVER INTO INTERCOMMUNAL ARENA. AND IF THIS BROUGHT TURKEY IN RUSSIA WOULD BE IN TOO, QUITE POSSIBLY IN MILITARY SENSE. (COMMENT: VENIAMIN WAS EMOTIONAL AND RATHER THREATENING AT THIS POINT IN CON- VERSATION. I DID NOT FEEL HE WAS REFLECTING ANY FIRM UNDERSTANDING WITH SOVIETS BUT, RATHER, HIS HOPES AS TO HOW THEY WOULD ACT9) 7. VENIAMIN DID NOT FEEL THAT CYPRUS POLICY FIGURED IN ANY IMPORTANT WAY IN PAPADOPOULOS DISMISSAL OF ZOITAKIS. 8. IN RESPONSE MY NON-SPECIFIC QUESTION ON STATUS UNFICYP GOC NEGOTIATIONS FOR TIGHTER CONTROL OF CZECH WEAPONS, VENIAMIN SAID VAGUELY PAPER HAD GONE FORWARD TO ARCHBISHOP FOR DECISION. VENIAMIN HIMSELF OPPOSED TO FURTHER CONTROLS ON GROUNDS SOVEREIGN GOC HAS NO OBLIGATION ACCOMMODATE TURKS, BUT ARCHBISTOP UNFORTUNATELY INCLINED BE GENEROUS. 9. VENIAMIN INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD BEEN SCHEDULED LEAVE MARCH 25 FOR TWO WEEK VISIT TO JAPAN (OVVICIAL) AND HONG KONG (VACATION), BUT THIS HAD BEEN CANCELED AT LAST MINUTE ON ORDERS OF PRESIDENT WHO FELT HE SHOULD NOT LEAVE COUNTRZ AT THIS TIME. 10. RE ARCHBISHOPS DISPOSITION TO RESIGN, IT CERTAINLY SEEMED THAT VENIAMIN WAS REPORTING -- SADLY -- WHAT HE FELT TO BE THE CASE. HOWEVER, WE WONDER IF MAKARIOS HAS IN FACT MADE UP HIS MIND TO 90/100 DEGREE INDICATED. AT OTHER TIMES SINCE FEB 11 HE HAE TALKED RESIGNATION TO TO LAY A FALSE SCENT AND BUY MORE TIME. GP - 3 CRAWFORD NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard lixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 69 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 70 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 42 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXPIS Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM WN SECRET 081 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00684 211650Z 53 ACTION SS-25 SITUATION ROOM SITUATION ROOM HOUSE HM MAR 22 2 3 INFO OCT-01 1026 W 110827 R 211540Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NIEOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5901 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKRA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION UN USMISSION NATO USMISSION GENEVA SEC R E T NICOSIA 684 EXDIS GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER SUBJECT: CYPRUS PROSPECTS FRO PROGRESS TOWARD RESUMED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS 10 SUMMARY: SINCE ALL CONCERNED USG ELEMENTS SEEM IN ACCORD RE DESIRABILITY OF MOVING FROM PRESENT STAGE OF GOG-MAKARIOS CONFRONTATION TO POINT WHERE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS CAN BE RESUMED, WE EXAMINE QUESTION OF WHOSE TURN IT IS TO MOVE. 2° MAKARIOS HAS NOW REPLIED TO GREEK DEMANDS OF FEB 11. MARCH 13 REPLY WAS ALONG EXPECTED LINES. MAKARIOS HAS COM- PROMISED ON ARMS AND INDICATED WILLINGNESS MAKE CERTAIN CABINET CHANGES. HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED ATHENS TO BE CENTER OF HELLENISM. PALAMAS EVIDENTLY DOES NOT FAULT MAKARIOS REPLY IN THESE RESPECTS (PALAMAS CONVERSATION WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR :- LONDON 2479). 3. MAKARIOS HAS, HOWEVER, HELD FIRM AGAINST BLANKET DEMAND FOR COMPLIANCE WITH ATHENS DIRECTIVES ON MATTERS RELATING TO CYPRUS PROBLEM, EVIDENTLY FEELING THAT COMPLIANCE IN THIS RESPECT WOULD STRIP HIM OF HIS PREROGATIVES AS DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED CHIEF OF STATE. NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 55 Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM CE SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00684 211650Z 4. IF GREECE WERE INTERESTED IN MOVING PROMPTLY TO RESUMED TALKS, IT COULD CLAIM TO HAVE GOTTEN MUCH OF WHAT IT WANTED FROM INITIATIVE LAUNCHED FEB 11. UNFORTUNATELY& HOWEVER, BURDEN OF PALAMAS REMARKS TO BRITISH AMB AND GOG REPLY TO MAKARIOS ON MARCH 16 WOULD SEEM TO RULE OUT COMPRO- MISE. IN OUR VIEW THIS WOULD APPEAR TO MAKE GREECE THE PARTY WHOSE ATTITUDE AND POLICIES ARE CURRENTLY HOLDING UP (#) TURKISH CYPRIOTS (NICOSIA 659, 6781 NOW LOOM AS AN ADDITIONAL LARGE OBSTACLE UNLESS THEY CAN BE SATISFIED ON ARMS CUSTODY. 5. WE OFFER ONE COMMENT ON PARA 3 ATHENS 1526. IF, AS EMBASSY ATHENS POINTS OUT, MAKARIOS IS MANEUVERING TO KEEP CURRENT DISPUTE WITHIN FRAMEWORK SERVING HIS OWN INTERESTS, THIS WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE BECAUSE HE OPPOSES RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS BUT BE- CAUSE HE IS TRYING AGAINST ODDS TO PROTECT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND THE CYPRIOT STATE. 6. FOREGOING IS IN A SENSE ACADEMIC SINCE GREECE APPARENTLY DETERMINED PRESS ON AGAINST MAKARIOS AND NEXT ACT IN ITS INITIATIVE, FURTHER MEETING OF HOLY SYNOD TO CONSIDER MAKARIOS REPLY TO REQUEST HE RESIGN PRESIDENCY, IS SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 22. IN THIS REGARD, PRESS REPORTS THAT PALAMAS WAS IN TOUCH WITH GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU BY TELEPHONE FOLLOWING MARCH 20 MEETING ON CYPRUS CHAIRED BY PAPADOPOULOS, AND ZAPHIRIOU SAW BISHOP ANTHIMOS SAME EVENING. ZAPHIRIOU EVIDENTLY RETURNED TO ATHENS MORNING MARCH 21. GP - 3 CRAWFORD NOTE BY OC/T: NICOSIA 684. (#) OMISSION IN PARA 40 CORRECTION TO FOLLOW. LETECK NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION SECRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 25 residential Library 12/20/ebs DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE & EXCES Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET 930 TION ROOM TION ROOM EHOUSE AM PAGE 01 NICOSI 00614 140912Z 21 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 /026 W 053488 P R 140840Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5862 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION UN PRIORITY USMISSION NATO USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM SECRE T NICOSIA 614 EXDIS EXE SUBJECT: UNFICYP-GOC AGREEMENT ON CZECH ARMS 1. UNFICYP'S SENIOR POLITICAL ADVISER, JOHN MILES, MAR 13 PROVIDED US AND TURKISH EMBASSY SEPARATELY WITH RUN- DOWN ON MAR 10 AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOC AND UNFICYP CONCERN- ING CZECH ARMS. ON ALL ESSENTIAL POINTS, BRIEFING GIVEN US DUPLICATED THAT PROVIDED EARLIER BY A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE INICOSIA 5991. ACCORDINGLY, NOFORN STRICTURE REGARDING SUBSTANTIVE PORTIONS OF AGREEMENT MAY BE REMOVED. UNFICYP'S POSSESSION OF PURPORTED SALES CON- TRACT, AND FACT IT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO EMBASSY, REMAINS NOFORN. 2. SHORTLY AFTER MILES BRIEFING OF TURKISH EMBASSY, LATTER SENT COUNSELOR TUNABAS TO US IN HOPE THAT WE COULD PROVIDE CLARIFICATION ON SOME POINTS OF CONFUSION. FROM TUNABAS REVIEW IT WAS OBVIOUS TURKISH EMBASSY HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN AND/OR HAD FAILED PERCEIVE RESPECTS IN WHICH MAR 10 AGREEMENT IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER 1967 PROCEDURE. KNOWING THAT GOT AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVE BEEN INCLINED TO REJECT AS UNSATISFACTORY ANYTHING SHORT OF FULL UNFICYP CUSTODY, WE TRIED HARD TO SHOW TUNABAS WHEREIN PRESENT AGREEMENT SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE # Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN TELEGRAM SECRET 143 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00661 1812092 18 2 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W 092652 0 P 181105Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5889 USMISSION UN IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY USMISSION NATO PRIORITY SECRE T NICOSIA 661 EXDIS NOFORN SUBJECT: CYPRUS = CZECH ARMS REF: ATHENS 1520, NICOSIA 645, 639 1. WE WOULD REMIND ADDRESSEES THAT ALL INFORMATION CONCERNING EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN OSORIO-TAFALL AND GOC FONMIN KYPRIANOU MUST BE HELD AS NOFORN, IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD FUTURE UTILITY OF SOURCE. 2. WE SUGGEST PROPER COURSE IS TO WORK ENTIRELY FROM TEXT OF PUBLISHED UNSYG CZECH ARMS REPORT AS BASIS FOR STRENGTHENING ARMS AGREEMENT. REPORT CONTAINS KEY SENTENCE READING "IT WAS FURTHER MADE CLEAR THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE RE- GARDED AS PROVISIONAL AND WOULD NOT RRECLUDE A SUBSEQUENT IMPROVED ARRANGEMENT." 30 I ASKED UNSYG SPEC REP OSORIO TAFALL HOW UNSYG REPORT HAD BEEN RECEIVED. HE SAID HE HAD HAD A DIFFICULT SESSION WITH TCPA LEADERS KUCHUK AND DENKTASH MARCH 17, BUT THAT IN THE END HE THOUGHT HE HAD SOFTENED THEM BY STRESSING THAT REAL POSSI- BILITY EXISTED FOR IMPROVING ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENT. NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 29 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00661 1812092 4. OSORIO TOLD ME HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT IMPROVED ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE CONCLUDED. AFTER SOME PROBING HE DISCLOSED THAT BASIS OF HIS HOPEFULNESS WAS CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH UK HIGH COMMISSIONER EDMONDS. LATTER SAW MAKARIOS MARCH 17. ARCH = BISHOP EVIDENTLY TOOK LINE THAT QUESTION OF CZECH ARMS WAS NO LONGER IMPORTANT, AND THAT CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE TIGHTENED. WE LEARNED FROM ANOTHER SOURCE THAT A SIMILAR GENERAL STATEMENT WAS MADE TO UNFICYP BY FONOFF DIRGEN VEN- IAMIN WITH WHOM SPECIFICS NOW BEING DISCUSSED. 5. AT SAME TIME, OSORIO TOLD ME ATHENS ATTITUDE TOWARD PRESENT ARRANGEMENT HAD HARDENED. THIS APPEARS TO REPRESENT CHANGE IN GREEK THINKING: ACCORDING TO BRITISH SOURCES (LONDON 3231) WE HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT GREEK UNDEL HAD WELCOMED ARMS AGREEMENT. THIS CORROBORATED BY -. USUN 905. CAS INFO INDICATES GOG WILL ACCEPT MY ARRANGEMENT APPROVED BY UN. 60 SINCE UN IS ACTIVELY NEGOTIATING WITH CYPRUS GOVT AND SEEMS OPTIMISTIC, WE THINK BALL SHOULD BE LEFT IN THEIR HANDS FOR TIME BEING. CONTRARY TO UN SECRETARIAT VIEW (USUN 988) WE THINK THERE IS CHANCE FOR REAL IMPROVEMENT AND IT WOULD BE PITY IF OSORIO WERE REINED IN BY NEW YORK. WE AGREE USG VIFW ON THIS SCORE SHOULD BE EXPRESSED TO SYG. WE WILL FOLLOW NEGOTIATIONS HERE ON THIS MATTER CLOSELY. POPPER SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED HOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library EL/89/ebS DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF BE линоги THE MOITASIROHTUA THE EXECUTIVE SECKELVKA STATE Department of State STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET 934 UATION RO VRO AGE 01 NICOSI 00613 140914Z I AM 11 40 2 CTION SS-25 NFO OCT-01 1026 W 053525 140805Z MAR 72 M AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0 SECSTATE WASHDC 5861 NFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA MEMBASSY ATHENS ECRE T NICOSIA 613 XDIS OFORN E UBJECT: NKA 2173 ON "PRESIDENT MAKARIOS' CONTINUING RELIANCE ON LYSSARIDES" IXQ-S PARA 1.A OF REF NKA TO EFFECT MAKARIOS INSTRUCTED YSSARIDES ARRANGE FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO IVE HOM VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IS NOT BORNE OUT BY FACTS, OR IS IT PALUSIBLE. AS REPORTED NICOSIA 518, MARCH 3 RESOLUTION CALLING N MAKARIOS TO CONTINUE AS PRESIDENT WAS SUBMITTED BY NIFIED PARTY, PROGRESSIVE FRONT AND INDEPENDENTS (I.We, COALITION F NON-COMMUNIST MR'S NOT INCLUDING LYSSARIDES' EDEK PARTY). ESOLUTION WAS PATTERNED AFTER ONE ADOPTED BY REPRESENTATIVE F RIGHT-WING INTEREST GROUPS AND NON-COMMUNIST DEPUTIES EARLIER N DAY. PROCEDURE OF HAVING RIGHT TAKE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE ESOLUTION TO PARLIAMENT (WHICH LEFT THEN SUPPORTED) WAS EARLY DESIGNED EMPHASIZE TO GREECE NON-COMMUNIST SUPPORT FOR AKARIOS AGAINST GREEK PRESSURE. IDEA, WE UNDERSTAND, WAS CLERIDES'. N ANY CASE WE FINE IT INCONCEIVABLE THAT MAKARIOS WOULD ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO HOUSE THROUGH LYSSARIDES SINCE IN PRESENT IRCUMSTANCES EFFECT WOULD BE TO ALIENATE SERIOUSLY RIGHT- ING PARLIAMENTARIANS. MOREOVER, CLERIDES IS LAST MAN TO D TAKE ORDERS FROM 10R BY WAY OF ) LYSSARIDES. GP-3. POPPER SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXCES Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET 328 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00599 111009Z 18 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 1026 W 037222 PR 110840Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA STUAT WH ON ROON TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5852 22 MAR 11 PM 36 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN PRIORITY USMISSION NATO USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM SECRE T NICOSIA 599 EXDIS NOFORN SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CZECH ARMS 1 - SUMMARY: GOC AND UN HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON CZECH ARMS. DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR UNFICYP CUSTODY BUT IS MORE FORMAL AND CONSIDERABLY TIGHTER THAN 1967 ARRANGEMENTS. THIS SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR GOT TO SWALLOW WITHOUT EXCESSIVE PROTEST. 2. CONFIDENTIAL UNFICYP SOURCE ADVISES EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCLUDED MORNING MARCH 10 BETWEEN GOC AND UNFICYP ACTING FOR UNSYG COVERING CZECH ARMS IMPORTED INTO CYPRUS LATE JAN 1972. 2. MAKARIOS REFUSED ACCEPT IDEA OF UNFICYP CUSTODY AT THIS TIME IMPLYING TO OSORIO THAT REASON FOR TRANSACTION -- SUSPECT LOYALTY OF CYPRUS FORCES UNDER GREEK MAINLAND OFFICERS - - PRECLUDES THIS PARTICULARLY AS LONG AS GRIVAS REMAINS ON ISLAND. MAKARIOS DID, HOWEVER, ACCEPT AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTING MORE FORMAL AGREEMENT THAN THAT REACHED IN FEB 1967 AND PROVIDING FOR MUCH TIGHTER UNFICYP CONTROL THAN IT HAS HAD OVER FIRST CZECH SHIPMENT. NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00599 111009Z EXPIS EX@I& EXPIS 4. SPECIFICALLY: (A) UNFICYP MAY INSPECT WITHOUT WARNING AND AT ANY FREQUENCY: (B) CHIEF OF STAFF AS WELL AS FORCE COMMANDER AND ONE ATTENDANT OFFICER ARE AUTHORIZED INSPECT TOGETHER OR INDIVIDUALLY (ONLY FORCE COMMANDER HAD INSPECTION ROLE UNDER 1967 AGREEMENT): (C) GOC AGREES TO NO DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT ADVICE TO UNFICYP: (D) POSSIBILITY OF INSPECTION BEING CONVERTED INTO A DIFFERENT ARRANGEMENT AT LATER DATE IS NOTED (THIS Is TO SUGGEST LIKELIHOOD OF MOVE TO FULL UNFICYP CUSTODY AT SUCH TIME AS GRIVAS LEAVES CYPRUS): (E) GOC STATES ALL RPT ALL ARMS IN RECENT CONTRACT ARE TO BE AVAILABLE FOR UNFICYP INSPECTION. WE UNDERSTAND (E) INCLUDED AT UNFICYP INSISTENCE TO COVER EVENTUALITY OF SOMEONE DISCOVERING ADDITIONAL ARMS THAT ARRIVED WITH SHIPMENT BUT WHICH ARE NOT SHOWN IN ALLEGEDLY COMPLETE LIST GIVEN UNFICYP BY GOC. 5. UNFICYP HAS BEEN GIVEN COPY OF CONTRACT BETWEEN GOC MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (BUYER) AND A SELLER WHOSE NAME DELETED. ARMS LIST IS APPENDED TO THAT CONTRACT WHICH IS DATED SEPTEMBER 20, 1971 AND Is SHOWN AS HAVING BEEN CONCLUDED IN NICOSIA. CONTRACT STATES TOTAL VALUE OF TRANSACTION IS POUNDS STERLING 582,705. 60 UNFICYP IS HOPEFUL THAT EVEN THOUGH AGREEMENT FALLS SHORT OF UNFICYP CUSTODY, AS DEMANDED BY GOT, IT WILL BE SEEN IN ANKARA AS MAXIMUM THAT COULD BE OBTAINED AT THIS TIME AND AS ACCEPTABLE SINCE IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY TIGHTER THAN 1967 to ARRANGEMENT. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT, IN ADDITION, ARMS ARE EFFECTIVELY UNDER SCRUTINY OF MAINLAND OFFICERS WITH NATIONAL GUARD SINCE LATTER COHABIT ATHALASSA COMPOUND WITH CYPOL. 70 OSORIO-TAFALL HAS INFORMED ME HE IS TEMPORARILY EMBARGOED FROM GIVING US DETAILS ON ARMS AGREEMENT SINCE UNSYG WISHES ANNOUNCE IN NEW YORK IN A DAY OR TWO OR ALTERNATIVELY GOC MAY ANNOUNCE. PENDING ANNOUNCEMENT, ALL FOREGOING DETAILS MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY PROTECTED AS NOFORN. 6. TEXT OF ARMS CONTRACT AND ATTACHED LIST BEING POUCHED NEA/CYPR. GP-3. POPPER NOT TO BE REPRODUCED V THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library 9L/80/ebs DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF L.L. STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM W/ SECRET 539 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00593 101637Z ACTION SS-25 Culo 2 41 3 INFO OCT-01 /026 W 030374 EXCES P R 101515Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5847 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN USMISSION NATO USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM S E C R E T NICOSIA 593 EXDIS SUBJECT: CYPRUS: END OF ROUND TWO 1. SUMMARY: WE THINK ROUND TWO IN GREEK GOVT'S CON- FRONTATION WITH MAKARIOS HAS EFFECTIVELY COME TO AN END. ROUND THREE COULD, THOUGH IT NEED NOT NECESSARILY, INVOLVE VIOLENCE. 2. FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES, CYPRUS EVENTS SINCE PRESENTA- TION OF GREEK DEMANDS TO MAKARIOS ON FEB 11 CAN BE CONSIDERED TO FALL INTO PHASES. FIRST BEGAN WITH PRESENTATION OF GREEK NOTE, AND WAS CHARACTERIZED BY MAKARIOS® ADOPTION OF POSTURE OF BLAND IMMOBILITY IN FACE OF GREEK DEMANDS, COUPLED WITH ASSIDUOUS CULTIVATION OF POPULAR SUPPORT AGAINST ATHENS. SECOND ROUND WAS INTRODUCED BY MARCH 2 ACTION OF HOLY SYNOD, INSTIGATED BY ATHENS REQUESTING ARCHBISHOP'S RESIGNATION. THIS WAS FOLLOWED, ON MARCH 3, BY GOG'S DEMAND, SUBMITTED TO MAKARIOS BY GREEK CHARGE THROUGH CLERIDES THAT MAKARIOS IMMEDIATELY ACCEPT AND IMPLEMENT GREECE'S FEB 11 CONDITIONS. 3. AS OF MARCH 10, OUR FEELING IS THAT ROUND TWO IS NOW ESSENTIALLY OVER. WE KNOW, AND CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT GREEKS SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00593 101637Z DO AS WELL, THAT MAKARIOS WRITTEN REPLY TO FEB 11 DEMANDS, WHEN IT IS DELIVERED WILL SHOW HIM UNYIELDING ON ESSENTIALS RELATING TO SOVEREIGNTY OF CYPRUS AND PREROGATIVES OF HIS OFFICE. WE EXPECT THAT WITHIN NEXT DAY OR Two MAKARIOS AND EXPIN UNFICYP WILL HAVE CONCLUDED AND PUBLISHED A REASONABLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON CZECH ARMS - - NOT GOING AS FAR AS TO PROVIDE FOR UNFICYP CUSTODY BUT NONTHELESS AN IMPROVED AND TIGHTER VERSION OF 1967 ARRANGEMENT FOR INSPECTION. (SEPTEL.) REVELATION THROUGH NEWS MEDIA THAT GOG REP GEN HARALAMBOPOULOS CONSPIRED WITH CYPRIOTS TO IMPORT ARMS AND THEN DENY KNOWLEDGE OF DEAL IS TELLING BLOW AT CONFIDENCE OF TURKISH GOVT IN GREECE. 4. ARCHBISHOP'S PROBABLE TACTIC IN DEALING WITH HOLY SYNOD'S REQUEST IS ALSO NOW COMING INTO FOCUS. HIS APPROACH LIKELY BE TWO-FOLD. WITH REQUEST ITSELF, HE WILL TEMPORIZE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THERE MAY, IN CANON LAW, BE GROUNDS FOR DEBATE ON PROPRIETY OF HOLDING A PRESIDENTIAL AS WELL AS ECCLESIASTIC OFFICE, BUT THAT FOR HIM TO RESIGN AS "SUGGESTED" AFTER TWICE BEING DULY ELECTED WOULD BE TO THROW CYPRUS INTO CHAOS. OTHER PRONG OF HIS APPROACH SEEMS LIKELY TO BE MANEUVER TO UNSEAT YENNADHIO, BISHOP OF PAPHOS, AND WIN ACCEPTANCE OF THESIS THAT THREE SEPTUAGENARIAN BISHOPS ARE NOT THE CHURCH OF CYPRUS, WHICH IS CYPRIOT PEOPLE AND PRIESTHOOD IN TOTALITY. 5. UNLESS GOG IS MUCH LESS WELL INFORMED OR MORE SELF- DECEIVING THAN WE THINK, WE JUDGE THAT IT Is READING EVENTS ABOUT AS WE ARE. WE CONSIDER THAT SUDDEN RETURN TO ATHENS OF GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU MORNING OF MARCH 10 IS RELEVANT. 6. WHAT OF ROUND THREE? AGAIN, IT IS PAPADOPOULOS MOVE. CARDS HE PLAYED ON FEB 11 AND MARCH 2 HAVE NOT PRODUCED THE DESIRED RESULTS. WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER HE WILL SEIZE OPPORTUNITY OF ARCHBISHOP'S REPLY, WHICH WE ARE SURE WILL BE DRAFTED WITH AN EYE TO LEAVING GREECE SOME GRACEFUL EXITS, TO REDUCE CONFRONTATION AND SEEK COMPROMISE, OR WHETHER HE WILL ESCALATE USING VIOLENCE, SOME CYPRIOTS FEAR THAT BEING A MILITARY MAN AND FRUSTRATED BY SEEMING FAILURE OF HIS FIRST TWO MOVES, HE WILL RESORT TO PRE- PLANNED VIOLENCE USING, IN FIRST INSTANCE, GRIVAS. IN THIS REGARD, INTERESTING ARTICLE IN GOG CONTROLLED MISIMVRINI SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00593 101637Z MARCH 9 (FBIS M092018) COULD BE CONSTRUED AS TELEGRAPHING THE PUNCH. ARTICLE SAYS GRIVAS GETTING READY TO STRIKE BECAUSE HE CANNOT TOLERATE CYPRUS SLIPPING FURTHER TOWARD COMMUNIST ANARCHY AND ENSLAVEMENT GRIVAS SUPPORTERS ADEQUATELY ARMED AND READY TO MOVE ... MAKARIOS MUST GO .... TIMING OF THE IMPENDING STRIKE IS UP TO GRIVAS. 7. ON HIS SIDE, MAKARIOS Is ACTING AS IF HE ALMOST WELCOMES A SHARPENING OF CONFRONTATION BROUGHT ON BY HIS REFUSAL TO BEND. HE CAN EVEN BE SEEN IN SOME RESPECTS TO BE GOADING GREECE ON. IN PAST COUPLE DAYS THE MAKARIOS CONTROLLED PRESS IN CYPRUS HAS BEGUN INTENSIVE NEEDLING OF GOG, SUGGESTING SPLITS WITHIN THE MILITARY ELEMENTS OF ATHENS REGIME, DISCREDITATION OF PALAMAS AND PANAYOTACOS GRIVAS® ALLEGED REFUSAL LEND HIMSELF TO GREECE'S TRAITOROUS, ANTI- ENOSIS OBJECTIVES, ETC. KANELLOPOULOS, MAVROS, ZIGDHIS, ET AL, ARE BEING CITED AS THE TRUE VOICES OF GREEK PEOPLE. AND IN ANOTHER JAB, PAPADOPOULOS IS CHALLENGED TO LET ANY = ONE WHO DOUBTS THIS GO TO THE POLLS. 8. IN SUM, IT SEEMS TO US THAT WE ARE MOVING INTO THIRD ROUND -- ROUND IN WHICH LIKELIHOOD OF VIOLENCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED. COMPROMISE IS STILL POSSIBLE, BUT ODDS IN FAVOR OF IT SEEM SMALLER. WE WONDER WHETHER EMBASSY ATHENS WOULD SHARE THIS ASSESSMENT. GP-3. POPPER SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION 25 OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE EXECUTIVE Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM WN SECRET 247 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00578 091641Z 2 50 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 /026 W R 091620Z MAR 72 SITUATIO 318483 ROOM WH WHITE TE HOUSE FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5843 '72 MAR 9 PM 4:30 30 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS SECRE T NICOSIA 578 EXDIS SUBJECT: CYPRUS: DEPT'S CONVERSATION WITH SAMPSON REF: STATE 39422 1. IN REGARD CONVERSATION REPORTED IN REFTEL WE WOULD NOTE THAT SAMPSON, WHILE NOT FAR FROM THE CENTER, SAW ONLY PART OF THE ACTION ON FEB 11 AND IN SUCCEEDING DAYS. FULLEST DESCRIPTION OF ABORTIVE MEDIATION EFFORT BY PARLIAMENTARIANS IS CONTAINED IN NICOSIA'S A-24 OF FEB 29. OTHER MESSAGES THAT BEAR ON PARLIAMENTARIANS INITIATIVE ARE NICOSIA 296, 302, 315, 319 AND 377* 2. IN THE SAME CONNECTION, WE SOMEWHAT PUZZLED BY DEPT'S STATEMENT, PARA 3, "IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT PANAYOTACOS DID SAY TO SOMEONE GOG WANTED MAKARIOS OUSTER." AS CONTAINED IN REPORTING AT THE TIME, PANAYOTACOS DID SAY THIS QUITE SPECIFICALLY AND SEPARATELY ON FEB 11 TO UNSYG SPECIAL REP OSORIOA-TAFALL, UK HICOMER EDMONDS AND US CHARGE (PARA 4, NICOSIA 305). IT WAS IN THE LAST OF THESE CONVERSATIONS THAT PANAYOTACOS ALSO SAID HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GRIVAS WHO HAD ASSURED PANA- YOTACOS HE WOULD DEPART FROM CYPRUS IF ARCHBISHOP LEFT. PANAYOTACOS ALSO REFERRED TO LIKELIHOOD OF CYPRIOT PEOPLE KILLING MAKARIOS IF HE DID NOT COMPLY WITH GREEK DEMANDS. GP-3. POPPER SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PECKELVSA * Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM WH SECRET 241 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00577 0916267 2 50 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 1026 W S TUATION ROOM 018308 WH TE HOUS '72 MAR 9 PM 4 30 Cujeo R 091555Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5842 INFOHUESGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2784 AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN USMISSION NATO USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM SECRETNICOSIA577 EXDIS EXE SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CONVERSATION WITH GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU 1. SUMMARY: GREEK EMBASSY IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS CONFINE CONTACT WITH GOC TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION GREEK DEMANDS ARE IN ANY WAY NEGOTIABLE. 2. GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU CALLED ON DCM MARCH 8. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT SEEMED TO BE TO ASCERTAIN, FOR ATHENS, WHETHER USG LETTING ITSELF BE DRAWN INTO THE MIDDLE. HE HAD APPARENTLY HEARD OF DIMITRIOUS MARCH 6 CALL ON ME (NICOSIA 5311. WE ASSURED HIM THIS NOT THE CASE: USG HOPING ITS FRIENDS CAN WORK OUT THEIR - DIFFERENCES, WE CONTINUE OPPOSE RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE AND SUPPORT NEGOTIATION. 3. NOTING THAT ON MARCH 3 ZAPHIRIOU HAD APPARENTLY DELIVERED MESSAGE FROM HIS GOVT FOR MAKARIOS THROUGH CLERIDES RATHER THAN FOREIGN MINISTRY CHANNELS, WE ASKED WHAT ZAPHIRIOU'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE REGARDING CONTACTS WITH GOC AND FONMIN KYPRIANOU PARTICULARLY, DURING THIS AWKWARD PERIOD. ZAPHIRIOU REPLIED THAT HE AUTHORIZED CARRY ON NECESSARY ROUTINE BUSINESS CONTACT WITH GOC MINISTRIES, BELOW THE SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE 28 AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00577 091626Z MINISTERIAL LEVEL. CONTACT WITH MINISTERS, ESPECIALLY KYPRIANOU, GENERALLY THOUGH NOT ABSOLUTELY RULED OUT, IN ORDER AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE OF PRESENT DISPUTE IN A WAY THAT MIGHT LEAD CYPRIOTS TO FEEL GREEK DEMANDS ON MAKARIOS ARE IN ANY WAY NEGOTIABLE. 4. ZAPHIRIOU SAID THAT IN CONTEXT OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS: HE HAD MADE NO INITIAL COURTESY CALL ON KYPRIANOU. GP-3. POPPER EXPIRES SECRET 28 NOT TO BE REPRODUCED W OUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF 1 EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library bL/20/ebs DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM WN SECRET 103 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00572 0915027 46 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 /026 W 017518 R 091355Z MAR 72 i STUATION ROOM WHITE HOUS WHITE HOUS FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5839 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 9 PM 30 AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN USMISSION NATO SECRE T NICOSIA 572 EXDIS SUBJECT: CYPRUS - CZECH ARMS REF: NICOSIA 556, 563 1. DEPT WILL HAVE NOTICED OSORIO REPORT RE HISTORY OF CZECH ARMS DEAL AND THAT PROVIDED BY CANADIAN HICOMER MCGAUGHEY DIFFER IN ONE SIGNIFICANT RESPECT. FORMER STATES GREEK NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER HARALAMBOPOULOS BELIEVED ARMS WERE DESTINED FOR NATIONAL GUARD, LATTER FOR CYPRUS POLICE. UNABLE TO RECONCILE THESE REPORTS DIRECTLY, I SOUGHT ELWCIDATION FROM OSORIO. HE STATES ORIGINAL PLAN WAS TO DIVIDE ARMS BE- TWEEN GUARD AND POLICE, FORMER GETTING HEAVY WEAPONS AND MUCH NEEDED SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION. BUT WHEN HARALAMBOPOULOS REFUSED TO ALLOW NATIONAL GUARD TO BE USED TO PREVENT TURK CYPRIOTS FROM BARRING GREEK CYPRIOTS FROM THEIR LAFA IN CHATOS- MARATHOVOUNO AFFAIR, ARCHBISHOP DECIDED NOT TO RELEASE ANY OF ARMS TO NATIONAL GUARD. 2. OSORIO STATES ARCHBISHOP NOW WILLING TO PLACE CZECH ARMS UNDER UNFICYP CUSTODY, RATHER THAN MERELY GIVE UNFICYP RIGHT OF INSPECTION, IF NECESSARY TO COMPOSE DIFFERENCES WITH GREECE. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO CHECK OUT THIS REPORT. POPPER SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE fele EXPIN Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET 775 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00562 081148Z 18 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 /026 W 005988 R 081050Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5833 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN USMISSION NATO SECRE T NICOSIA 562 EXDIS FOR ASST. SECY SISCO SUBJECT: CYPRUS -- LABOR MINISTER SUGGEST U.S. INTERCESSION 1. SUMMARY: GOC LABOR MINISTER MAVROMMATIS URGES EMBASSY RESUME OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH CYPRUS GOVT: SEEKS USG INTERCESSION TO PREVENT CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH MIGHT ACTUALLY LEAD TO COMMUNIST DOMINATION IN CYPRUS. LINE OF REPLY TO THIS TYPE OF IMPORTUNITY IS PROPOSED. 2. AT SOCIAL AFFAIR EVENING MARCH 7 I RAN INTO GOC LABOR MINISTER MAVROMMATIS WHO IS ONE OF STRONGER FIGURES IN MAKARIOS CABINET. ALTHOUGH HE HAD HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT HE WOULD SEE ME, HE IMMEDIATELY TOOK ME ASIDE FOR A TALKS. 3. HIS FIRST OBSERVATION WAS THAT HE KNEW I HAD NOT BEEN TO SEE ARCHBISHOP, AND HE STRONGLY URGED ME TO DO SO. 4. MAVROMMATIS THEN MADE A PLEA FOR U.S. ACTION TO DEFUSE CRISIS BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS. IF MAKARIOS WERE FORCED BY THE GREEKS TO RESIGN HE SAID, HE FORESAW POSSIBILITY OF CHAOS ON ISLAND. GREEKS WERE CARRYING ON THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST MAKARIOS UNDER BANNER OF ANTI-COMMUNISM. IN FACT, IF MAKARIOS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF HOMELAND TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00562 081148Z RESIGNED AND A NEW ELECTION WERE CALLED COMMUNISTS HAD REAL CHANCE TO COME INTO POWER THROUGH LEGAL ELECTORAL PROCESSES. CLERIDES, WHO WOULD BE ACTING PRESIDENT, WOULD RUN VERY BADLY IN ANY ELECTION SINCE MAKARIOS SUPPORTERS WOULD REGARD HIM AS HAVING BEEN LESS THAN FAITHFUL IN MANEUVERS LEADING UP TO PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION. THUS, PARADOXICALLY, GREEK ACTION MIGHT LEAD TO ELECTION OF PRESIDENT CLOSE TO COMMUNISTS WHO WOULD GIVE THEM PREPONDERANT ROLE IN GOVT. IT WAS IMPERATIVE,HE THOUGHT, THAT THIS CHAIN OF EVENTS BE INTERRUPTED. 5. MAVORMMATIS SAID THIS COULD BEST BE DONE BY RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A REAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN ATHENS AND NICOSIA, HE HOPED AT LEVEL OF PAPADOPOULOS AND MAKARIOS. GREEK GOVT HAD MADE IT CLEAR THEY DID NOT WANT TO TALK, EXCEPT TO RECEIVE MAKARIOS' ACQUIESCENCE TO THEIR DEMANDS. ONLY A WORD FROM U.J. COULD BRING THE TWO SIDES INTO CONTACT WITH VIEW TO WORKING OUT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD RESTORE ATHENS-NICOSIA AMITY, FACILITATE SETTLEMENT WITH TURKS AND PRESERVE WESTERN INTERESTS IN CYPRUS. 6. I REPEATED TO MAVROMMATIS LINE I HAD USED WITH NICOS DIMITRIOU EARLIER (NICOSIA 531) IN SUMMARY, THAT USG WAS RELUCTANT TO INTERVENE IN FAMILY QUARREL BETWEEN GREEKS, AND THAT PROGRESS ON ARMS ISSUE AND INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT WAS BEST MOVE CYPRUS GOVT COULD MAKE TO END CRISIS. 7. COMMENT: I EXPECT TO RECEIVE INCREASING PRESSURE WITH REGARD TO OUR ABSOLUTE LACK OF OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH CYPRUS GOVT, AND WITH REGARD TO WHAT CYPRUS GOVT CONSIDERS REGRETTABLY PASSIVE ATTITUDE OF USG. AS TO OFFICIAL CALLS, DEPT SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT OUR CONTINUED ABSTENTION IS BEING BUILT UP INTO AN IMPORTANT LOCAL ISSUE. AS TIME GOES ON IT WILL BE IN- CREASINGLY INFERRED BY OUR FRIENDS THAT WE ARE DELIBERATELY STANDING ASIDE WHILE GREECE TRIES TO RUN OVER MAKARIOS, THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. SOME NOT SO FRIENDLY TO US WILL ASSERT THAT U.S. IS ACTUALLY BEHIND THE GREEK EFFORT, AND THEY WILL BE ALL TOO READY TO ATTRIBUTE OUR PASSIVITY TO THE MOST UNPALATABLE CAUSES. 8. IT WOULD BE EASIER TO MAINTAIN OUR PRESENT POSITION OF SUB- STANTIVE ALOOFNESS IF WE COULD RESUME NORMAL RELATIONS WITH CYPRUS GOVT. WHILE I CAN SEE ADVANTAGE IN DISCREET USG INTERCESSION AT PROPER TIME, I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE RIGHT SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED W OUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF T EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State EXPIRE UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00562 081148Z MOMENT FOR IT. I PLAN TO CONTINUE TO RESPOND TO THE INCREASING IMPORTUNITIES I EXPECT SOMEWHAT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES. USG DEEPLY TROUBLED BY CURRENT DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO FRIENDS. WE HAVE ALWYS SUPPORTED AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS AND CONTINUE TO DO SO: BUT CYPRIOTS WILL RECOGNIZE WE HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN GREECE AFFECTING PEACE OF THIS REGION AND FREE WORLD SECURITY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE FELT IT PREFERABLE NOT TO INJECT USG INTO A FAMILY QUARREL BETWEEN GREEKS. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, COUNSELED GOG AGAINST USE OF FORCE, AND WE EMPHASIZE OUR BELIEF THAT DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE WORKED OUT PEACE- FULLY. POPPER SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department file of State EXPIS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET 707 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00556 080930Z LL 21 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 /026 W 004935 R 080845Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5828 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN USMISSION NATO EUCOM USDOCOSOUTH SE C R E T NICOSIA 556 EXDIS SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CZECH ARMS REF: NICOSIA 539 (NOTAL) 1. SUMMARY: CZECH ARMS TO BE PLACED UNDER UN INSPECTION. GREEKS HELPED PREPARE ORIGINAL ARMS LIST. THEY COULD NOW EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE ARMS. 2. UNSYG SPECIAL REP OSORIO-TAFALL, AS WELL AS AMBASSADORS OF AUSTRIA AND SPAIN AND CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER, SAW MAKARIOS MARCH 8. 3. OSORIO TELLS ME MAKARIOS CONFIRMED THAT GOC WILLING TO PLACE CZECH ARMS UNDER UNFICYP INSPECTION AS A FIRST STEP. OSORIO NOW NEGOTIATING WITH FONMIN KYPRIANOU TO DETERMINE HOW AND WHEN THIS COMMITMENT SHOULD BE FORMALIZED. CYPRIOTS ARE RESISTING A FORMAL AGREEMENT, BUT OSORIO WANTS AT LEAST AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES DETAILING UNFICYP RIGHT AND OBLIGATION TO CARRY OUT PERIODIC INSPECTION. 4. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION WITH ARCHBISHOP OSORIO ASKED HOW UN COULD BE SURE ARMS TO BE INSPECTED REPRESENTED ENTIRE QUAN- TITY OF ARMS IMPORTED. MAKARIOS SAID THIS WAS SIMPLE MATTER. GOC WOULD GIVE UNFICYP LIST CONTAINED IN ORIGINAL CONTRACT. IT SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State EXET UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 00556 080930Z COULD BE CHECKED WITH GREEK NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER GEN. HARALAMBOPOULOS, WITH WHOM LIST HAD BEEN WORKED OUT BY CYPRIOTS. 5. COMMENT: OSORIO SPECULATES, RIGHTLY WE BELIEVE, THAT HARALAMBOPOULOS WAS ORIGINALLY UNDER IMPRESSION ARMS WOULD BE GIVEN TO NATIONAL GUARD. AT SOME POINT, - PROBABLY AFTER ARRIVAL OF GRIVAS, THE SIGNALS WERE EVIDENTLY CHANGED. IF THIS VERSION OF EVENTS BECOMES PUBLIC AND GOES UNCHALLEGNED, GOG CASE ON THE ARMS WILL LOSE SOME OF ITS FORCE. GOG WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THAT CYPRUS GOVT ERRED IN SECRETLY AND INDEPENDENTLY ORDERING ARMS, WHICH ON ARRIVAL HAVE IMPAIRED CYPRUS STABILITY AND PROSPECTS FOR INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT. IT WILL LOGICALLY BE COMPELLED, WE WOULD THINK, TO LIMITING ITS PROTEST TO FACT THAT MAKARIOS HAS KEPT ARMS OUT OF MAINLAND GREEK CONTROL -- QUITE A DIFFERENT POINT AND ONE WHICH WOULD BE MUCH LESS RE- ASSURING TO TURKS. 6. IN ACTUALITY, GREEK ARE ABLE TO ASSUME EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF ARMS SINCE THEY ARE NOW LOCATED A IN ATHALASSA COMPOUND, HEADQUARTERS OF BOTH POLICE AND NATIONAL GUARD. A RAIDING FORCES BATTALION OF NATIONAL GUARD HAS JUST BEEN MOVED FROM BELLAPAIS TO ATHALASSA. POPPER NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O, MR. MAGEE, 3/8/72. SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED W OUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF T EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library es/80/ebs DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DIPARTMENT OF STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES OF HEREBY TELEGRAM WH EXCES EXE SECRET 946 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00531 061242Z 41 ACTION SS-25 2 INFO OCT-01 /026 W TUATION ROOM 119444 WHITE R 061115Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA '72 MAR In 11 37 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5816 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY LONDON USMISSION USUN USMISSION NATO SECRE T NICOSIA 531 EXDIS SUBJECT: CYPRUS: PROMINENT NON-GOVT CYPRIOT SUGGESTS U.S. SEEK COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD PREVENT MAKARIOS RESIGNATION 1. SUMMARY: FRIEND OF MAKARIOS FEARS CHAOS IN CYPRUS IF MAKARIOS RESIGNS AS PRESIDENT. SUGGESTS U.S. INTERCEDE WITH GREECE TO WORK OUT COMPROMISE SOLUTION UNDER WHICH MAKARIOS WOULD SETTLE ARMS QUESTION, START INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, REORGANIZE CABINET, AND NOT SEEK RE-ELECTION IN 19730 AMBASSADOR REPLIED USG NOT DISPOSED TO INTERVENE IN DELICATE FAMILY QUARREL. 2. SUNDAY NIGHT, MARCH 50 NIDOS DIMITRIOU, EX-MEMBER OF CYPRUS CABINET, RESPECTED COLLEAGUE OF MAKARIOS, AND VERY FRIENDLY WITH U.S. EMBASSY OFFICIALS, TELEPHONED AND ASKED TO SEE ME URGENTLY. WE MET MORNING MARCH 6. 3. DIMITRIOU SAID SOURCES CLOSE TO ARCHBISHOP HAD INFORMED HIM LATTER WAS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING RESIGNATION AND DECISION WOULD BE MADE WITHIN THE WEEK. DIMITRIOU WAS APPALLED AT WHAT HE FORESAW AS CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A MOVE. MAKARIOS WOULD CON- TINUE AS ARCHBISHOP AND ETHNRACH BUT NEW PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL SITUATION ON ISLAND. COMMUNISTS WOULD EX= PLOIT CONFUSED SITUATION: PROGRESS IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT MAKARIOS® AGREEMENT: AND NO ONE COULD TELL WHERE MATTER WOULD END. DIMITRIOU FELT DEEPLY THAT THE ARCH- NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State UNITED AMERICA TELEGRAM STATES OF SECRET EXEMS EXCES PAGE 02 NICOSI 00531 0612422 BISHOP MUST BE PREVAILED UPON TO CHANGE HIS MIND AND REMAIN IN OFFICE. 40 CONTINUING, DIMITRIOU STATED HE COULD ENVISAGE A COMPROMISE ARRANGEMENT WHICH COULD SAVE THE SITUATION. THIS WOULD INVOLVE MAKARIOS AGREEING NOT TO SEEK RE-ELECTION WHEN HIS TERM OF OFFICE EXPIRES IN EARLY 19738 STARTING TALKS ON URGENT BASIS: SETTLING ARMS DEAL IN SATISFACTORY WAY: AND AGREEING TO CABINET REORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD REPLACE SOME MINISTERS. IF SUCH A COMPROMISE OFFER WERE MADE, EVERYTHING WOULD DEPEND ON REACTION OF GREEK GOVT. 5. STATING HE WAS SPEAKING AS AN INDIVIDUAL, DIMITRIOU EXPRESSED HOPE USG WOULD MOVE INTO SITUATION TO HELP SETTLE QUARREL BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS. IN PAST, USG HAD BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN SHAPING GOVTS AND POLICIES IN GREECE, HE SAID: SINCE AN IMPOSED SETTLEMENT OF CURRENT CRISIS WOULD NOT WORK, WOULD NOT U.S. BE BETTER OFF IN HELPING TO AVOID IT? 6. I SAID THAT WITH HIS LONG EXPERIENCE IN GOVT DIMITRIOU SHOULD APPRECIATE EXTREME DELICACY OF SITUATION AS FAR AS U.S. WAS CONCERNED. THIS WAS NOT A DISPUTE BETWEEN NATO ALLIES OF THE KIND WHICH HAD COMPELLED U.S. INTERVENE IN CYPRUS CRISES IN THE PAST® IT WAS A FAMILY QUARREL BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF HELLENISTS» EACH OF WHICH PROCLAIMED ITS ESSENTIAL UNITY WITH THE OTHER. DIMITRIOU KNEW WHAT HAPPENED TO PEOPLE WHO STEPPED INTO FAMILY QUARRELS. I WOULD GIVE EVERY CONSIDERATION TO WHAT DIMI- TRIOU HAD SAID AND WOULD KEEP MY GOVT FULLY INFORMED, BUT HE SHOULD REALIZE THE DIFFICULTIES. 7. DIMITRIOU RETURNED TO THE CHARGE, AND I USED THE OCCASION TO PROBE HIM AS TO EXACTLY HOW LEADING GREEK CYPRIOTS VIEWED THEIR POSITION WITH REGARD TO GREECE AS THE "NATIONAL CENTER". DIMITRIOU SAID ALL HIS FRIENDS FELT GREEK AND WANTED TO BE GREEK, BUT THEY WERE DISILLUSIONED WITH GREECE. GREEK GOVT WAS NOT WILLING TO GIVE CYPRUS A SQUARE DEAL: ITS GOVT WAS DICTATORIAL: IT WAS ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE A DIKTAT ON GREEK CYPRIOTS BY APPOINTING A STOOGE AS PRESIDENT. WHILE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE HELLENISTS, TWELVE YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE HAD FOSTERED AN INDEPENDENT WAY OF THINKING ON ISLAND. IT WAS TRUE THAT GREECE HAD LARGER RESPON- SIBILITIES THAN CYPRUS, BUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SHOULD BE SOLVED BY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS TO REACH COMMON DECISIONS. NOT TO BE REPRODUCT' WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT OF STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 03 NICOSI 00531 061242Z ATHENS MUST NOT IGNORE FACT THAT MAKARIOS WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN CYPRUS. 80 I ASKED DIMITRIOU HOW HE EXPLAINED MAKARIOS® DEPENDENCE ON COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN CYPRUS, REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO ADDRESS BY DR. LYSSARIDES TO CROWD BEFORE ARCHBISHOPRIC MARCH 30 DIMITRIOU MADE IT CLEAR HE THOROUGHLY DISAPPROVED OF CONNIVING WITH COMMUNISTS (FROM LONG ACQUAINTANCE WITH HIM I AM SURE THIS IS THE CASE), AND SAID NOT ONLY ARCHBISHOP BUT COMMUNIST LEADER PAPAIOUANNOU HAD BEEN UPSET BY LYSSARIDES ACTION. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION I REMARKED THAT IT SEEMED TO ME PERSONALLY A MISTAKE FOR MAKARIOS NOT TO GET THE CZECH ARMS QUESTION SETTLED QUICKLY ONCE AND FOR ALL, AND EQUALLY A MISTAKE FOR THE ARCHBISHOP TO TO HAVE TURNED DOWN FLATLY THE COMPROMISE INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL MADE BY THE GREEK GOVT IN SUMMER OF 1971 9. CONCLUDING OUR CONVERSATION, DIMITRIOU SAID HE NOTED THAT I HAD NOT SEEN ARCHBISHOP SINCE MY RETURN FROM AFRICA, WONDERED WHY NOT AND STRONGLY SUGGESTED THAT I DO SO ° I SAID HE MUST APPRECIATE THAT I WAS IN A VERY DELICATE POSITION, HIGHLY VISIBLE ON ISLAND, AND THAT I FELT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FROM USG STANDPOINT TO AVOID ANY MISINTERPRETATION THROUGH MY ACTIONS. DIMITRIOU SAID HE COULD APPRECIATE THIS BUT MY CONTINUING FAILURE TO SEE ARCHBISHOP MIGHT NOT BE PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD. ALREADY THERE WERE RUMORS THAT U.S. WAS BEHIND GREEK ACTION AND THAT WE MIGHT BE DESIROUS OF SEEING MAKARIOS REMOVED. I ASSURED DIMITRIOU THERE WAS NO TRUTH WHATEVER IN STORIES, MANY OF THEM SPREAD BY COMMUNISTS, THAT U.S. WAS CONNIVING WITH GREEK GOVT IN THIS AFFAIR. 8. DIMITRIOU ASSURED ME THAT HE HAD COME TO SEE ME ENTIRELY ON HIS OWN VOLITION AND WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF ANYONE IN CYPRUS GOVT. HE INTENDS TO TRY TO SEEK MAKARIOS TO URGE HIM NOT TO RESIGN. COMMENT: I AM INCLINED TO BELIEVE DIMITRIOU WAS NOT ASKED BY GOVT TO COME TO SEE ME. IT IS A FACT, HOWEVER, THAT HE SEES ARCHBISHOP FREQUENTLY TO DISCUSS CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS. POPPER NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard 55 Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 5953 cyper THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON November 14, 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of the Republic of Cyprus that the appointment of Nikos C. Dimitriou as Ambassador Extraor- dinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus would be agreeable to the Government of the United States. Major General, USAF Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dispatched 11/14/73 (rb Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 5953 November 13, 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOW CROFT FROM: Jeanne W. Da SUBJECT: Agrement for Cyprus Ambassador The State Department has recommended granting of agrement to Nikos C. Dimitriou as the new Ambassador of Cyprus to the U.S. (Tab B). Attached for your signature at Tab A is a memorandum for the Secretary of State concurring in the appointment. RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 5953 November 8, 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM: Jeanne W. Davis SUBJECT: Agrement for Cyprus Ambassador Attached for your signature is a memorandum for the Secretary of State concurring in the appointment of Nikos C. Dimitriou as the Ambassador of Cyprus to the US. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 7320261 THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON 5953 October 29, 1973 CONFIDENTIAL Dear Mr. President: The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Mr. Nikos C. Dimitriou as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Cyprus to the United States. A biography of Mr. Dimitriou is enclosed. A thorough review of United States Govern- ment records reveals no grounds for objection. I believe this appointment would be satisfactory. If you concur, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Respectfully, Kinneth Rush Kenneth Rush Enclosure: Biography. The President, The White House. CONFIDENTIAL GDS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. CONFIDENTIAL BIOGRAPHY - Mr. Nikos C. Dimitriou Republic of Cyprus Dimitriou was born in Larnaca on July 20, 1920. A member of one of Cyprus' most prominent families, he is married and has three daughters, one of whom is currently studying sociology at Fordham University. His wife's name is Nadina. Dimitriou is Greek Orthodox, speaks Greek and English, and is interested in photography, journalism, riding, swimming and golf. Mr. Dimitriou has had a distinguished and varied career in business, banking, and government. At the time of his ambassadorial appointment, he was serving as Chairman of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus, Chairman of the Regional Advisory Board of the National and Grindlays Bank Ltd., and Honorary Consul General of Denmark. Formerly, he served as Minister of Commerce (1968-?), Chairman of the Cyprus Develop- ment Bank (1966-68), Chairman of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1958-62), and District Governor of Rotary Inter- national. One of Cyprus' leading businessmen, Dimitriou has also been successful in expanding the family's business interests. Dimitriou is a moderate in political and economic affairs. In articles written for the local press, he has repeatedly expressed the view that the Cyprus problem can only be solved on the basis of independence and accommodation between the Greek and Turk Cypriots. He also believes strongly in the role of the private sector in economic development. Cosmopolitan in outlook, intelligent, and well-read, Dimitriou is known for his candor as well as for his organizational and commercial talents. Long a friend of the U.S. and of U.S. officials in Cyprus, Dimitriou seems an excellent choice for ambassador. A thorough search of United States Government sources reveals no grounds for objection. CONF IDENT IAL DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 per RAC Review 6/13/08 By MIH NARA, Date 5/8/12 NIN 08-38/10932 [p. 10+1] Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROF E DOC RECD I.OG NBR INITIAL ACTION O MO DA MO DA HR 10 29 10:30 09 953 Saunders Rush,K= LOG IN/OUT ONLY TO: PRES FROM: ROGERS UNCLAS NO FORN NODIS SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION kissinger RICHARDSON LOU EYES ONLY EXDIS SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER C CODEWORD eliot S sensitive TS subject: agrement for nibos C Dimitriou as Amb of Cyprus to US S/S 1320361 OTHER NOT XEROXED INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION required REC ACTION INFO CY MEMO FOR HAK. ( ) ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT FOR // MEMO FOR PRES. ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR ( ) FAR EAST APPROPRIATE ACTION ( ) DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT africa MEMO TO ( ) MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA europe / CANADA D RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) JOINT MEMO ( ) LATIN AMERICA REFER TO FOR: ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ( ) ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE ( ) SCIENTIFIC NET assessment GROUP DUE DATE: (11/03) COMMENTS: (INCLUDING PECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC planning CONGRESSIONAL follow agement procedures OCEANS POLICY Protocal State D IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: DATE FROM TO S SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): CY TO 1/8 QUANST DAVIS SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS 11/8 Scoweroft x 5gm memo to Kirsinger (11/16) 11/10 Sunday S Further actur per request (11/16) 11/12 Scroft X Sgn memo to Kissinger ("/16) 11/12 DACES 5 further action per telcon u/ mc Farlane(%) 11/13 5'croft X Jgn memo to Kissinger (4/17) 11/14 C S'croft sod memo to Kissingrr DISPATCH MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: NOTIFY DATE SPECIAL DISPOSITION) M/F'D BY OR RECORD COMMENT:) NSC / S DISP INSTR CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: CYS FOR SA NOV 16 1973 HP ORIG WH CROSS REF W/ JOINED BY LOG # TO PA ) SF SEE # FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING ) NS ) EP suspense CY ATTACHED: destroy) DY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library * GPO: 1973-489-668 DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 6 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 9 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 15 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DOC RECD OG NBR INITIAL ACTION OFF MO DA MO DA HR NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 05 21 05 28 09 28891 LOG IN/OUT ONLY x TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT X U NO FORN NODIS KISSINGER x ROGERS, W LOU BUO EXDIS DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION HAIG LAIRD, M C EYES ONLY LIMDIS S x CODE WORD RES DATA TS sensitive subject: Into memo to Sec. Rogers on the present status of the Cyprus issue REFERENCE: S/S 7107965 OTHER NOT XEROXED APP'TS: PRES hak TALKER MEMCON DATE REQ. INTERNAL ROUTING AND DiSTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO REC MEMO FOR HAK ( ) CY ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG FOR MEMO FOR PRES. ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR SIGNATURE - ) FAR EAST FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( ) SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION sub-saharan AFRICA MEMO TO ) ) NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA X RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) EUROPE/CANADA JOINT memo ( ) LATIN AMERICA REFER TO STATE ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( ) ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE ( ) SCIENTIFIC DUE DATE: LR PLANNING COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions) PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING CONGRESSIONAL DATE FROM TO S ACTION required CY TO INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING MICROFILM DATA CROSS REF WITH NOTIFY DATE SEE LOG DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO DO DISPOSITION 6/1 INIT JOINED BY LOG COPIES: (AS MARKED above) DATE SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP HM ORIG) NSC \ SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: TO ) PAF WHC SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO SUBF * GPO: 1971-412-412 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 20 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 42 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON INFORMATION 22986 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: Henry A. Kissinger K SUBJECT Your Meeting with Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus State Dept. review completed Background The principal U S concerns in Cyprus have been: (1) that tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities not erupt and draw Greece and Turkey into war, (2) that the well organized Communist party not achieve predominance As long as Makarios is there, the latter seems under control. But in 1964 and 1967 when Turkey was on the brink of invading Cyprus to protect the Turkish minority (20%), it was to a large extent the intervention of the U S President or his emissary which helped to resolve the crisis The main purpose of this meeting is to establish a personal relationship--which Makarios has sought--as a basis for such future action if unhappily it should 25X1 become necessary Makarios follows a non-aligned foreign policy but inclines toward the West. He speaks English well. ON FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY JLS 8/2/2012 Issues Makarios May Raise 1 He may ask that the U S press Turkey to force more flexibility into the Turkish Cypriot line in the negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. [These talks began after the 1967 crisis to try to re-write the constitution and devise a governmental structure so as to provide more workable guarantees for the rights of the Turkish minority. We have tried to stay out of the middle ] SECRET No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 SECRET - 2 - 25X1 Talking Points 1 I appreciate the opportunity to establish personal ties. These have been important in times of past crisis I also value the views of a non- aligned leader who understands the Western view of the world 2 Your Beatitude appreciates our concern over Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and our hope that Cyprus will maintain its independent and non-aligned stance The main objective of the U S vis-a-vis the USSR is to achieve a balance which will permit the nations of the area to make peace and to enjoy freedom from external domination. 25X1 3 I appreciate your government's facilitating reception of the hijacking hostages 25X1 We will continue our efforts to get peace talks started. We negotiated a basis for talks last summer, but that has been undercut. 4 The negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities on Cyprus are for President Makarios and his countrymen to work out. The U S cannot help but have a concern for their successful outcome--both because of our desire to see violence avoided among our friends and because of the importance of a stable Cyprus to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean I am counting on Your Beatitude's wisdom to achieve a positive result. 5. I appreciate removal of Cypriot ships from trade with North Vietnam Trade with Cuba remains a continuing concern of the United States and I hope that it may be possible for Cyprus to reduce its involvement in that commerce. These restrictions are both important to U S policy [The U S has pressed persistently for the removal of ships flying the Cypriot flag from the North Vietnam trade (successfully) and from their growing involvement in the Cuban trade (65% of non-Communist shipping) Secretary Irwin's memo is attached. Its main points are reflected above. SECRET No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 22986 DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON SECRET October 22, 1970 14246 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject Bilateral Meeting with President Makarios of Cyprus, October 25, 10 a.m. President Makarios' appointment with you is important for the following reasons Makarios is the key personality in the Cyprus dispute. In past crises, Makarios' acceptance of U.S. Presidential emissaries has been crucial to the maintenance of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean Such a meeting will give you the opportunity to emphasize the need for Makarios to lead the way to an early negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem. In your conversation you may wish to give emphasis to the following points A. We attach great importance to the intercommunal negotiations and look to Makarios to demonstrate magnanimity. 25X1 B. We appreciate His Beatitude's cooperation in receiv- ing hostages from the Middle East 25X1 C. The removal of Cyprus ships from the North Vietnam trade permits us to consider requests from the World Food Program for PL-480 aid to Cyprus, but we are concerned over Cyprus' growing role in the Cuban trade. ), December II Acting Secretary Enclosures ) Issues and Talking Points Biographic Sketch SECRET Group 3: Downgraded at 12-year inter- Vals, not automatically declassified. No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Cyprus Issues and Talking Points Issues We Should Raise: 1. Settling the Cyprus Problem - The intercommunal talks which seek to design a new governmental structure within which the 80 percent Greek Cypriot majority can co-exist peacefully with the 20 percent Turkish Cypriot minority are foundering on the issue of local autonomy. Nevertheless the talks provide a rationale for avoiding conflict and offer the best hope for a viable solution. We recommend that you: --state that we attach great importance to con- tinuation of the negotiations which we strongly support as the best procedure for solving the Cyprus problem and ask Makarios for his analysis of the prospects for progress in the talks. -note our view that both sides must exercise continued restraint and greater flexibility and that we look to His Beatitude, as leader of the more powerful side, to demonstrate magnanimity. 2. Cyprus and the Middle East - The GOC has played a cooperative role in receiving released hostages 25X1 25X1 recommend that you: --thank His Beatitude for facilitating the reception of hostages from the Middle East and inform him that we appreciate his cooperative attitude 25X1 25X1 --state clearly that Communist propaganda alleging U.S. or NATO interest in using Cyprus for military purposes is completely without foundation, and declare our support for Cyprus' independence and non-aligned stance. CONFIDENTIAL No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 CONFIDENTIAL - 2 - 3. Cypriot Shipping to North Vietnam and Cuba - The GOC, at our urging, has recently removed its flag ships from the North Vietnam trade. However, we remain concerned over Cyprus' growing involvement in the Cuban trade. For example, during the first six months of 1970, Cyprus flag vessels constituted 65 percent of the total non-Communist shipping to Cuba. We recommend that you: --note our appreciation for the removal of Cyprus flag shipping from the North Vietnam trade and inform Makarios that the USG can now consider requests from the World Food Program for PL-480 aid for Cyprus. --declare our distress, however, over the extent of Cyprus' involvement in the Cuban trade and ask that Makarios review this for possible remedial action. Issues He May Raise: 1. Turkey's Role in the Intercommunal Talks - Makarios may ask that the USG put pressure on the Govern- ment of Turkey to be more flexible and forthcoming in guiding the Turkish Cypriot line in the intercommunal talks. We recommend that you: --say that we do not believe it would be appropriate for us to become involved in substantive issues at this time. However, we would like all parties 25X1 concerned to be as flexible as possible. CONFIDENTIAL No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 25X1 No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Denie Page No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 25X6 No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Denied 25X6 No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 JMBER MO DA HR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CO SPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PR LE 22986 1023 X 09 TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT CLASSIF: U EXDIS HAK ROGERS C NODIS LAIRD LOU EYES ONLY DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION IRWIN S X RES DATA DOC DATE: 109270 TS CODEWORD SENSITIVE PARIS MTG SUBJECT: Makarios Talku for Pres Meety w/ NO FORN ENCLOSURES: ( ) ( ) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED NAME: Saunders MEMO FOR HAK ( ACTION INFO RCD CY MEMO TO PRESIDENT ( X ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG FOR: REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ( ) STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ( ) DIR SECRETARIAT MEMO TO ( ) SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA RECOMMENDATIONS ( ) NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA X JOINT MEMO ( ) EUROPE/CANADA APPROPRIATE ACTION ( ) LATIN AMERICA ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( ) UNITED NATIONS CONCURRENCE ( ) ECONOMIC DUE DATE: SCIENTIFIC 230ct PLANNING GROUP COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions) PROGRAM ANALYSIS DATE FROM TO ACTION REQUIRED 10/23 HAK Pres 10/26 Pres NSC close info out INTERNAL ROUTING MICROFILM DATA DO INIT DATE ORIG) NSC TO J, PAF WHC SUBF DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO NSC STAFF APPROVAL DISPOSITION PAF X HAK APPL NOTIFY: WHC HAK MARGINALIA SUBF X NS3 FORM REQUIRED COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) * GAO: 1970-385-803 No Objection To Declassification 2009/02/17 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-4-2 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NANCY : Action completed. The appoint at was set up, and The in to in This memo was included Mr. Saunders = FOR ACTION - OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM Copy sent to Gen. Haig & Dr. K for info. Fl in the President's talking nancy with Makarios on 10/25. points for his meeting D This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has den been determined to b Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10938] (1 p.) EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1)(6), ltr. 7/3/2012 +3.5(c) A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 25a ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER. CB /MIH 10/8/2014 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-7-9 DEPARTMENT STATE * Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM MAR To 10 33 PH '74 25X1 25X1 EXP-0 SECRET 7898 PAGE 01 NICOSI 00459 1815352 53 ACTION SS-30 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W 000027 R 1815157 MAR 74 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8305 State Dept. review completed SFCRET NICOSIA 459 EXPIS E.O. 11652: XGDS-3 TAGS: OGEN CY SUBJECT: REF: STATE 44274 1. I MADE POINTS 2 (A) AND 2 (8) PER REFTEL TO FONMIN DIRGEN VENIAMIN IN COURSE OF A BRIEFING TO HIM ON PHASEDOWN PLANNING. 25X1 2. I DID NOT USE PARA 2 (C) SINCE VENIAMIN DID NOT EXPRESS PARTICULAR INTEREST IN CONTRACT EMPLOYEE QUESTION, 3. I BELIEVE THAT NOTICE WILL HELP TO ASSURE FOREIGN MINISTRY SUPPORT IF POLICE SHOULD RAISE QUES- TION ABOUT GRANTING PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO 25X1 EMPLOYEES WITHOUT OFFICIAL PASSPORTS, OR IF CUSTOMS CHALLENGES EXQIC RIGHT TO 90-DAY DUTY FREE PRIVILEGES. IF ISSUE ARISES WE WILL OF COURSE TAKE POSITION SUGGESTED PARA 2 (C). WE HOPE TAX AND CORPORATE OBLIGATION QUESTIONS WILL NOT ARISE. 4. BRIEFED VENIAMIN FAIRLY EXTENSIVELY ON LIBERAL SEPARA- TION PROVISIONS FOR THOSE EMPLOYEES BEING RELEASED, EXPRESSED REGRET AT NECESSITY TO LET THEM GO. HE RAISED NO QUESTIONS. GRANT NSA, NAVY reviews completed NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY na FORM No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-7-9 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. GRANTMENT OF STATE EXPIS Department of State UNITED STATES TELEGRAM OF SECRET 341 PAGE 01 NICOSI 02450 051151Z 20 ACTION SS-30 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W 037218 0 0511357 DEC 73 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8033 S ECRET NICOSIA 2450 73 DEC 5 PM 12:24 SITUATE HOUSEM SITUATION WHITE HOUSE EXDIS FOR ASST SECRETARY SISCO FROM AMB. MC CLOSKEY EO 11658: GDS TAGS: OGEN CY SUBJECT: CALL BY AMB OF LEBANON 1. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR MOUNIR TAKIEDDINE, COUSIN OF PRIME MINISTER AND BROTHER OF MINISTER OF INTERIORPN RETURNING TO BEIRUT TO ASSIST IN PREPARATION FOR VISIT OF SECRETARY TO LEBANON. ACTING ON INSTRUCTION, HE CAME TO MY OFFICE TODAY TO ASK WHETHER WE HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS WHICH WOULD BE OF BENEFIT TO HIS GOVERNMENT IN ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY. TWO SPECIFIC SUBJECTS HE MENTIONED WERE PALES- TINIANS AND SYRIA: ON LATTER, HE SAID THAT LEBANON WOULD BE PREPARED TO UNDERTIKE ANY APPROPRIATE STEP TOWARD ASSISTING IN NORMALIZING WASHINGTON/DAMASCUS RELATIONS. 2. REPLYING THAT I WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO MAKE ANY OFFICIAL SUGGESTIONS, I SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS APPROACH AND GET BACK IN TOUCH IF THERE WERE ANYTHING TO SUGGEST. 3. COMMENT: TAKIEDDINE UNANIMOUSLY REGARDED AS ABLEST DIPLOMAT HERE. LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OBVIOUSLY ENTHUSIASTIC WITH PROSPECT SECRETARY'S VISIT AND ENDEAVORING SCRUPULOUSLY INSURE ITS SUCCESS. MC CLOSKEY NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THSEDERORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library FORM DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 34 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 35 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 11/00/2018 *******C 0NFIDENTIAL*******S COPY FLASH ESA791QVA585 DE RUQVHN #0796 0991505 Z 091500Z APR 73 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7208 INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 607 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2014 CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NICOSIA 796 E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: PINS CY SUBJECT: ATTACK ON ISRAELI AMB'S RESIDENCE REF: NICOSIA 793, 792 I HAVE JUST TALKED TO ISRAELI AMB TIMOR. HE TELLS ME TERROSITS WERE WAITING FOR HIM TO LEAVE RESIDENCE FOR OFFICE AND MISSED HIM BY ONE MINUTE. HE AND HIS FAMILY WHO LIVE ON THIRD FLOOR OF APARTMENT ARE UNIJURED BUT SHAKEN. ASSAILANTS DROPPED TWO CHARGES AS THEY RUSHED THROUGH GROUND FLOOR OF APT IN PURSUIT OF AMBASSADOR. LANDLORD LIVING IN THAT APT WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED, HIS APT WRECKED, AND APT ABOVE VERY BADLY DAMAGED, THIRD FLOOR APT LESS SO. POLICE GUARD, SHOT IN BACK, WAS CRITIKY NY WOUNDED. ISRAELI AMB UNDERSTANDS ONLY TERRORIST KILLED WEREYJT AIRPORT NOT RPT NOT AT RESIDENCE, BUT HAS BEEN TOLD THAT THREE OR FOUR OF RESIDENCE ASSAILANTS WERE CAUGHT AND POSSIBLY WOUNDED. RENTED CAR WAS USED AND ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES FOUND IN TI. POPPER BT *WHSR COMMENT * SAUNDERS,LL RECALLED PSN: 025622 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:099/15:25Z DTG:091500Z APR 73 *******C NFIDENTIAL*******S COPY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. EN/Ed *******C ONFIDENTIAL*******S COPY FLASH ESA620QVA572 DE RUQVHN #0789 0991355 Z 091350Z APR 73 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7202 INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 604 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2011 CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NICOSIA 789 E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: PINS CY SUBJECT: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE BOMBED ABOUT 3:15 P.M. RESIDENCE OF ISRAELI AMB IN NICOSIA WAS BOMBED. FIRST REPORT INDICATES CYPRIOT POLICE GUARD INJURED, AMBULANCES PROCEEDING TO SCENE. WILL REPORT FURTHER. POPPER BT *WHSR COMMENT * SAUNDERS RECALLED PSN: 025610 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:099/14:11Z DTG:091350Z APR 73 *******C0NFIDENTIAL*******S COPY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. DEPARTMENT No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-9-7 STATE Department of State AMERICA TELEGRAM STATES OF SECRET 438 PAGE 01 NICOSI 01715 151516Z 25X1 S EXPIS ? 44 ACTION SS-25 INFO OCT-01 1026 W 120179 R 151250Z SEP 72 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA State Dept. review completed TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6513 SECRET NICOSIA 1715 EXDIS SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST MISSION ACTIVITIES 1. IN COURSE OF RAMBLING DISCUSSION ON CYPRUS PROBLEMS WITH FONOFF DIRGEN VENIAMIN SEP15, I ASKED HIM WHY HE THOUGHT NEWLY ESTABLISHED NICOSIA CHICOM MISSION HAD BEEN BUILT UP TO such A HIGH LEVEL so RAPIDLY AND WHAT HE THOUGHT MISSION WAS DOING. VENIAMIN, WHO AS A FORMER DISTRICT OFFICER, HAS A KEEN SENSE FOR CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES, SAID HE KNEW OF AT LEAST TWO PURPOSES CHICOMS WERE SEEKING. FIRST, THEY WERE "ENCIRCLING" THE SOVIET EMBASSY -- BY WHICH HE MEANT THEY WERE KEEP- ING TABS ON MOVEMENTS OF SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND ACTIVITIES OF EMBASSY AS A WHOLE. SECOND, CHICOMS HAD ALREADY MADE CONTACT WITH WHAT HE CALLED A MADIST FACTION IN AKEL, LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY. 2. VENIAMIN SAID THIS FACTION CONSISTED OF SOME 200 PERSONS WHO WERE DISSATISFIED WITH PASSVIITY OF AGING AKEL LEADERSHIP. GROUP INCLUDED NOT ONLY RADICAL YOUNGSTERS BUT ALSO A FEW PROMINENT PERSONALITIES SUCH AS PLUTIS SERVAS, A FORMER COMMUNIST MAYOR OF LIMASSOL, AND DR PAVLIDES, PROMINENT FAMAGUSTA RADIOLOGIST. 3. COMMENT: FOREGOING CONFIRMS AND AMPLIFIES EARLIER THOUGH WE CANNOT DETERMINE ACCURACY OF 200 FIGURE. END COMMENT. VENIAMIN SAYS HE IS HAPPY ABOUT THIS DEVELOPMENT SINCE IT WILL PRESUMABLY SPLIT AKEL AND LESSEN ITS EFFECTIVENESS. ON OTHER HAND, HE RECOGNIZES THAT EMERGENCE OF AN ACTIVIST RADICAL LEFT NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SMOTHEOR ZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 30 No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-9-7 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-9-7 DEPARTMENT CA DEP STATE H Department of State UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TELEGRAM SECRET PAGE 02 NICOSI 01715 151516Z EXPIS EXP-3 MOVEMENT IN CYPRUS COULD INTENSIFY ISLANDS PROBLEMS. 4. DEPT PLEASE REPEAT AS DESIRED. GDS. POPPER NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-9-7 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 50 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 51 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised, 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOYED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 53 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 42 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised, 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 54 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised, 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 55 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 42 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised, 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 57 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 42 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised, 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 60 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS been REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 72 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 42 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. *******CONFIDENTIAL*******SCOPY FLASH ESA697AAB842 DE RUQVHN #0793 0991435 Z 091430Z APR 73 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7206 INFO AMEMBASSY TELAVIV 606 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2013 CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NICOSIA 793 EO 11652: NA/A TAGS: PINS CY SUBJECT: ATTACK ON ISRAELI AMBASSADORS RESIDENCE REF: NICOSIA 789 BOMB ATTACK ON ISRAELI AMBIS RESIDENCE WAS CARRIED OUT BY FOUR ASSAILANTS PRESUMED TO BE ARABS. ACCORDING TO INFO OBTAINED BY EYEWITNESSES, POLICE GUARD AT RESIDENCE SAW ASSAILANTS PLACING EXPLOSIVES AND FIRED AT THEM AS THEY RAN. TWO SAID TO HAVE BEEN KILLED OUTRIGHT. ONE SHOT AND INJURED WHEN ESCAPE VEHICLE WAS BLOCKED, AND ONE STILL AT LARGE. POPPER BT *WHSR COMMENT * SAUNDERS,LL RECALLED PSN: 025606 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:099/14:49Z DTG:091430Z APR 73 *******C 0NFIDENTIAL*******S COPY Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

nara / coll_rn-nsf / doc

CYPRUS Vol. I January 1969-June 30, 1974 [1 of 2]

ID: 266848772
Type: document

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collections	National Security Files (Nixon Administration) Central Files
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levelOfDescription	fileUnit
recordType	description
ocrSource	nara-archive

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