Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
266848779
label
LEBANON Vol. I January 1969-January 31, 1970 [3 of 3]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
266848779
contentType
document
title
LEBANON Vol. I January 1969-January 31, 1970 [3 of 3]
citationUrl
collections
National Security Files (Nixon Administration)
Central Files
iiifBase
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
266848779
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
url
mediaId
d637a1d0fa68b317
ocrText
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
145
telegram
Amemb Beirut to CN
1/6/69
B
MANDATORY SANITIZED REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-11/, lp.
DERSEC. 3.3(b)(1), Hr.2/19/2010
199
Report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/28/69
B
REVIEW 3pas
PER sec. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10
200
Report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/25/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-11/3 3pgs
Exempted PeR Sec. .3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10
201
report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/25/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-1/4 2pgs.
Exempted sec. 3.3(b)(1), HR. 9/29/10
202
report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/25/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/5 3p95
Exempted peR sec. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10
203
cable
CIA to White House Situation Room
11/20/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NCN0911/6 2p95.
Exempted peR sec. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10
204
Report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/28/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/7 3pas
Exempted peR sec. 3. 3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10
205
Report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/28/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-11/8
3pas
Exempted peR Sec. 3(b)(1), HR. 9/29/10
206
report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/28/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/9 4pgs
Exempted peR Sec. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10
207
Information
Cable
10/26/69
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
repoMANDATORY Exempted
NLN0911/10 2pgs.
PER Sec. 3.3(b)(1); HR.
BOX NUMBER
NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East
9/29/10
620
FOLDER TITLE
[6]
Lebanen Kawait Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31,
[3 of 3]
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
Policy
commercial or financial information.
B. National security classified information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
an individual's rights.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
208
report
Intelligence Information Cable
9/29/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/11 14p95
Exempted peR sec. 3.3(b)(i); .9/29/10
209
telegram
Amemb Beirut to Sec. State
1/28/70
B
MANUFANTIZED REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/12 3p95
PERSEC. 3.3(b)(1), Hr. 7/19/2010
212
telegram
Amemb Beirut to Sec. State
12/29/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09.11/13 1p9.
DECLASSIFIED peritr 2/19/2010
214
telegram
Amemb Beirut to Sec. State
12/10/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/14 sp95.
DECLASSIFIED peritr. 2/19/2010
248
cable
DIRNSA to White House
8/15/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST LN0911/15 1p9.
Exempted PeR sec. 3(b)(1),HR. 9/29/10
249
cable
CIA to White House Situation Room
11/20/69
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East
620
FOLDER TITLE
Lebanon
[6] Kuwait Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31,1970
3 of 3]
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
Policy
commercial or financial information.
B. National security classified information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
an individual's rights.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
145
telegram
Amemb Beirut to CN
1/6/69
B
MANDATORY SANITIZED REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-11/1 lp.
PERSEC. 3.3(b)(1), Hr.2/19/2010
199
Report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/28/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUESTNLN REQUESTNLNO9-1/2 3pas
200
Report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/25/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09.11/3 3pgs
201
report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/25/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/4 2p9s.
202
report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/25/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/5 3p95
203
cable
CIA to White House Situation Room
11/20/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN0911/6 2p9s.
204
Report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/28/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NCN 09.11/1 3pas
205
Report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/28/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-11/8
3p9s
206
report
Intelligence Information Cable
10/28/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/9 4p95
207
repoMANDATORY Cable
10/26/69
B
NLN0911/10 2p9s.
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
620
NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East
FOLDER TITLE
[6] Lebanen Kuwait Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31,1970
[3 of 3]
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
Policy
commercial or financial information.
B. National security classified information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
an individual's rights.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
208
report
Intelligence Information Cable
9/29/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/11 14p95
209
telegram
Amemb Beirut to Sec. State
1/28/70
B
MANDATORY SANITIZED REVIEW REQUEST
NLNO9-11/12 3p95
PERSEC. 3.3(b)(1), Hr. 7/19/2010
212
telegram
Amemb Beirut to Sec. State
12/29/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09.11/13 1p9.
DECLASSIFIED peritr 2/19/2010
214
telegram
Amemb Beirut to Sec. State
12/10/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN109-11/14 sp95.
DECLASSIFIED peritr. 2/19/2010
248
cable
DIRNSA to White House
8/15/69
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST N LN0911/15 1p9.
249
cable
CIA to White House Situation Room
11/20/69
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
620
NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East
FOLDER TITLE
Lebanon
[6]
Kuwait Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31,1970
[3 of 3]
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
Policy
commercial or financial information.
B. National security classified information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
an individual's rights.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
SANITIZED
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRA
SECRET
943:
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00153 061859Z
45
ACTION SS: 30
INFO /030 W
035647
RI 0617462 JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO CNI
HC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6732
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
S ECRET BEIRUT 0153
30
EXDIS
PER SEC 3.3(b)(1)
SUBJECT: TRIAL OFI EL ALI PLAN SABOTEURS.
10 ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US:
INTERROGATION BY GREEK AUTHORITIES OF
THE TWO MEN WHO PERPETRATED ATTACKI ON ELI ALI AIRCRAFT DEC 26
APPEARS CONFIRM LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S CONTENTION IT NOT IN-
VOLVED IN ANY WAY IN THE AFFAIR. FOR VARIETY OF REASONS,
GREEK GOVT HAS NOT CONSIDRED IT APPROPRIATE OR ADVISABLE
TO RELEASE PUBLICLY OR, IN FACT, PRIVATELY TO INDIVIDUAL
GOVTS THE RESULTS OF THEIR INTERROGATION OF THE TWO MEN.
CONSEQUENTLY, ISRAELI CHARGES OF GOLMS COMPLICITY IN THE
AIRCRAFT ATTACK AREI PERMITTED TO GAIN CREDENCE DESPITE ALL
GOL'S DISCLAIMERS OF COMPLICITY OFFFORE KNOWLEDGE.
2. IN INTEREST OF JUSTRUECE WE SUGGEST THAT CONSIDERATION
BE GIVEN TO PERSUADING GREEK GOVT TO MAKE KNOWN TO INTERESTED
GOVTS, INCLUDING ISRAELI, THE DETAILS OF TESTIMONY AT THE
TRIAL OF TWO ARABS INVOLVED so THAT TRUE FACTS OF THE IN-
CIDENT WILL BE REVEALED. IF IT IS CONSIDERED INAP-
PROPRIATE FOR: USG TO APPROACH GREEKS ON THIS MATTER, WE SUGGEST
THAT A THIRDSOOVT WITH LEGITIMATE, IF PERIPHERAL, INTEREST
(SUCH AS EGYPT , JORDAN OR FRANCE) BE INDUCED TO RAISE MATTER
WITH GREEK GOVT WITH ABOVE IN VIEW.
3.WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE GREAT INJUSTICE IFI ISRAELIS ARE
PERMITTED TO CONTINUE JUSTIFY THEIR DEVASTATING RAID ON
BEIRUT AIRPORT BY FALSE CHARGES: OFI LEB GOVT COMPLICITY IN
EXCES
EL AL AIRCRAFT ATTACK. PORTER
SECRET
NOT DECLASSIFIED TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN 09-11/ I per sec 3.3(b)(1), Itr. 2/19/2010
Reproduced at the Richard SANITIZED Library
Rv
AM
NARA Date 11/15/2010
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES MAMES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 026
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00887 281916Z
51
ACTION SS 70
SUMMARY
INFO CIAE 00,/070 W
025551
R 281627Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6952
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN 779
S E CR E T BEIRUT 0887
SUBJ: LEBANESE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR UN FORCES IN ME
REF: STATE 12434
LIMDIS
i. I TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT HELOU (THROUGH MICHEL
KHOURY JAN 281 POINTS MADE REFTEL. I STRESSED USG UNDERSTOOD
AND WAS SYMPATHETIC TO HELOU'S CONCERN SANITIZE
LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, THIS SEEMED
AT MOMENT IMPOSSIBLE IN TERMS IMPOSITION UN FORCE.
? I ASKED KHOURY WHETHER LEBANESE HAD PUT SAME
PROPOSITION RE UN FORCES TO FRENCH. HIS REPLY WAS STRONG
NEGATIVE. APART FROM TRADIONAL FRENCH OPPOSITION UN
DEACEMAKING MACHINERY, LEBANESE WERE AWARE DE GAULLE WOULD
NOT PROPOSE OR SUPPORT SUCH AN ACTION WHICH WOULD MEET STRONG
OPPOSITION OF ARAB STATES. HELOU HAD MADE HIS SUGGESTION To
USG BECAUSE OF OUR CONSISTENT POSITION FAVORING UN PEACE-
KEEPING MACHINERY AND IN ADMITTEDLY RATHER DESPERATE HOPE
WE MMIGHT FIND WAY WORK OUT ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE. HELOU,
THOUGH DISAPPOINTED, WOULD UNDERSTAND REASONING
REHIND OUR NEGATIVE REACTION.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00887 281916Z
3. KHOURY ELABORATED ON HELOU'S REALISTIC VIEWS ON FRENCH
SSISTANCE TO LEBANON. HELOU UNDERSTANDS FRENCH DO NOT
CONTEMPLATE SENDING TROOPS OR REACTING MILITARILY IN EVENT
SRAELI ATTACK. FRENCH MOTIVATIONS FOR CURRENT PRO-ARAB - ARAB
STAND ARE LARGELY SELFISH, DESIGNED IMPROVE FRENCH COMMERCIAL
INTERESTS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN ME AS WELL AS PROVIDE SOME
SOME WESTERN ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIET DOMINANCE IN AREA. LEBANESE
INTEND TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE FRENCH PRO-LEBANESE ATTITUDE AND
WILL CONTINUE SEEK ALL POSSIBLE MANIFESTATIONS OF FRENCH
PUBLIC SUPPORT WHICH MAY HAVE SOME EFFECT BOTH IN REDUCING
RADICAL ARAB PRESSURE ON LEBANON AND GIVING ISRAEL some
PAUSE.
4. IN MEANTIME SAID KHOURY, FRENCH HAVE BEEN PERFORMING
WELL IN THEIR OFFERS OF ARMAMENTS TO LEBANON. THEY HAVE
REEN OUTGOING IN THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE VARIETY OF
ARMS AVAILABLE, AND CREDIT TERMS ARE MOST LENIENT.
LEBANESE HAVE NO INTENTION COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO ARMS
PURCHASES OF ANY MAGNITUDE BUT THEY WILL REQUEST FRENCH
ARRANGE EARLY DELIVERY (LARGELY TO BOLSTER INTERNAL
CONFIDENCE) OF MODERATE AMOUNTS OF ANTI AIRCRAFT AND
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, AND OF LIGHT EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL BE
EFFECTIVE IN RIOT CONTROL. IT QUITE CLEAR TO HELOU, SAID
KHOURY, THAT LEBANON CANNOT AFFORD GET INVOLVED IN ME ARMS
RACE. HE ADDED THAT PRIMIN KARAME, WHO ALSO WEARS SECOND HAT
AS MINFINANCE, FULLY UNDERSTOOD LEBANESE TRASURY COULD NOT
STAND SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL ARMS EXPENDITURES. PORTER
SECRET
29
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
641/40/9999
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL 004
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00886 281905Z
SUMMARY
49
ACTION NEA 15
INFO EUR 15,10 13,CIAE 00,GPM 04 H 02,INR 07 L 03, NSAE 00.NSC 100P 04,
RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20, USIA 12,SAH 02 , AID 28, NIC 01.CU 04,COM 08,
E 15,LAB 06,SIL 01,RSR 01,/174 W
025502
R 281532Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6951
TNFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN 778
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
DIA
C ONFIDENTIALI BEIRUT 0886
SUBJECT: CHAMOUNIST OPPOSITION TO THE KARAME GOVERNMENT
i * RAYMOND EDDE'S DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE CHEHABIST
BLOC (BEIRUT 08551 RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTIC ACCLAIM FROM ALLIANCE
PARTISANS IN CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. PLENARY SESSION OF TRIPARTITE
ALLIANCE (EDDE, GEMAYEL, AND CHAMOUN) SCHEDULED FOR
JANUARY 30 IS EXPECTED TO ENDORSE MOST ELEMENTS OF
FDDE STATMENT EXCEPT HIS INDELICATE ATTACK ON PERSON OF
FUAD CHEHAB. CENTRAL QUESTION IS WHETHER ALLIANCE WILL
YIELD TO URGING OF ITS ACTIVIST MEMBERSHIP, WHICH IS
ADVOCATING STRIKES, RALLIES, DEMONSTRATIONS AND WHATEVER
OTHER EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY ACTION IS REQUIRED TO BRING DOWN THE
KARAME GOVERNMENT (BEIRUT 07951. EDDE HIMSELF IS CONTINUING
TO ADVISE THE ALLIANCE TO CONFINE ITS ACTIONS TO
PARLIAMENT, BUT THE ACTIVISTS ARGUE THAT THE ALLIANCE'S
35 DEPUTITES ARE IMPOTENT IN A 99-MAN PARLIAMENT
WHICH THEY FEEL IS NOT TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF MAJORITY
PUBLIC OPINION. SOME PHALANGIST STUDENTS HAVE ALREADY GONE ON
STRIKE. ULTIMATE DECISION PROBABLY RESTS WITH CAMILLE CHAMOUN,
WHO IS FAR AND AWAY THE MOST POPULAR CHRISTIAN LEADER.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00886 281905Z
2. IF CHAMOUNISTS GO ON STRIKE, IT WILL PROBABLY BEGIN
JANUAR 30 8 WHEN NEW GOVERNMENT COMES UP FOR
PARLIAMENTARY VOTE OF CONFIDENTCE. SITUATION WILL REQUIRE
ALL KARAME'S STATECRAFT. EVEN IF CHAMOUNISTS DECIDE
AGAINST EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY ACTION, HE MUST DRAFT A
SOLOMONIC POLICY STATEMENT THAT WILL BE SIMULTANEOUSLY
PRO-ARAB ENOUGH TO SATISFY THE MUSLIMS AND NEUTRAL ENOUGH
TO REASSURE THE CHRISTIANS. MEANWHILE, NOTING JANUARY 27
MEETING OF HELOU'S KARAME. AND CINC BOUSTANY AT HELOU'S
NEW RESIDENCE IN BAABDA, PRESS SPECULATES THAT GOVERNMENT
WOULD RESPOND TO ANY CHAMOUNIST ATTACK OUTSIDE PARLIAMENT
BY IMPOSING STATE OF EMERGENCY, WHICH WOULD PERMIT
PRESS CENSORSHIP AND SUMMARY ARRESTS.
3° IN ESSENCE, PRESENT CHAMOUNIST-CHEHABIST
CONFRONTATION IS MERELY LATEST PHASE IN VENDETTA WHICH
BEGAN IN 1957 CURRENT POWER STRUGGLE IS STRONGLY
INFLUENCED BY THE INTOXICATING EFFECT THAT THE APPROACH
OF THE 1970 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS HAVING ON MARONITE
POLITICIANS LIKE CHEHAB, CHAMOUN, GEMAYEL, EDDE,
AND FRANGIEH (WHO IS PRESENTLY ORBITING SOMEWHERE
IN SPACE BETWEEN THE CHAMOUNIST AND CHEHABIST BLOCS).
HOWEVER, THESE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE POLITICAL RITES ARE
TAKING PLACE IN THE SHADOW OF LEBANON S GROWING INVOLVE-
MENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT WHICH CAN ALWAYS ASSUME
CONFESSIONAL OVERTONES. IN 1969, AS IN 1958, WE FEAR THAT
EBANON CANNOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF PLAYING CONVENTIONAL
POLITICS, AND THEREFORE WE ARE COUNSELING CAUTION. PORTER
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 3/ Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
0711/40/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
O
SECRET 108
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00751 240728Z
21
ACTION SS 70
INFO CIAE 00,1070 W
002594
R 231643Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6920
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1230
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
S ECR E T BEIRUT 0751
LIMDIS
REF: BEIRUT 514
SUBU: FRENCH SUPPORT FOR LEBANON
i) FRENCH HAVE BEEN MAKING SUBSTANTIAL HAY IN LEBANON IN WAKE
OF ISRAELI ARMS EMBARGO. THERE HAS BEEN OUTPOURING OF AFFECTION
FOR FRANCE AND ADMIRATION FOR DE GAULLE TOGETHER WITH
SIGNIFICANT GROUNDSWELL FOR GOL AND BUSINESS COMMUNITY
TO FAVOR FRANCE IN COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS.
21 PRIMIN KARAME REFLECTED GENUINE SENTIMENTS MOST LEBANESE
TN LA MONDE INTERVIEW WIDELY PUBLICIZED LEBANON JAN 23.
HE QUOTED AS SAYING LEBANON WILL ACCEPT FRENCH MILITARY AID
AND PREPARED BENEFIT FROM ALL POSSIBILITIES FRENCH ASSISTANCE
IN MILITARY FIELD. HE REFERRED TO CURRENT TALKS IN BEIRUT
WITH FRENCH THREE-MAN MILITARY DELEGATION WHICH WILL DEFINE
LEBANON'S DEFENSE NEEDS.
31 ON OTHER HAND, MICHEL KHOURY IPRES HELOU'S CONFIDANT) TELLS
ME FRENCH ARE BEING VERY CAREFUL IN MAKING ANY COMMITMENTS TO
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
#
Department of Siate
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00751 240728Z
LEBANON, EXCEPT AGREEMENT SELL ARMS. LEBANESE HOPED FRENCH
DEF MIN MESSMER WOULD FOLLOW UP HIS SAUDI ARABIA-KUWAIT TRIP
WITH VISIT LEBANON BUT MESSMER TURNED DOWN LEBANESE INVITATION.
HELOU IS ANNOYED BY THIS REBUFF AND HAS HAD REAFFIRMED HIS
AWARENESS LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN FRENCH CAPACITY ASSIST LEBANON ®
HE ALSO AWARE FRANCE DOES NOT INTEND GET TRAPPED INTO ANY
PRE-COMMITMENTS. THIS IN TURN VERIFIED BY MESSMER KUWAIT STATE-
MENT JAN 22 THAT JOINT DEFENSE PACT WITH LEBANON NOT BEING
CONSIDERED.
4) NONETHELESS FRENCH PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, SAID KHOURY
HAS PROVIDED HELPFUL DETERRENT TO ISRAEL AND AT LEAST KEPT
ISRAEL GUESSING AS TO FRENCH REACTION SHOULD LEBANON BE ATTACKED
LEBANESE ARE NOT ASSUMING THEY WOULD GET FRENCH MILITARY SUPPORT
WHICH THEY KNOW IS NOT REALISTICALLY AVAILABLE BUT THEY FEEL
CONFIDENT FRANCE WOULD ATTEMPT IMPOSE ADDITIONAL SANCTUONS
AGAINST ISRAEL IN RESPONSE ISRAELI AGGRESSION ON LEBANON.
51 HELOU REPEATED TO ME THROUGH KHOURY HIS UNDERSTANDING AND
GRATIFICATION THAT US INTERVENTION WITH ISRAEL PLAYED
MAJOR ROLE IN LAST THREE WEEKS TO RESTRAIN POSSIBLE ISRAELI
MILITARY ACTION. HE REEMPHASIZED HIS HOPE US WOULD
CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS. ABOVE ALLIHELOU DID NOT WISH USG TO
BELIEVE LEBANON EXPECTED FRENCH TO HAVE COMPARABLE DETERRENT
EFFECT ON ISRAEL AS US CAN HAVE. EVEN THOUGH GRATEFUL TO
DE GAULLE FOR HIS RECENT PRO-LEBANON ACTIONS,
HELOU UNDERSTANDS ARMS EMBARGO HAS DESTROYED POSSIBLE FRENCH
INFLUENCE ON ISRAELI POLICY.
61 IN SAME VEIN AS PARA 4. PARIS 976, KHOURY EXPRESSED PERSONAL
BELIEF THAT DE GAULLE'S PRESENT PRO-ARAB STANCE WAS OF BENEFIT
TO ALL THE WEST, PARTICULARLY USe IN COMBATTING SOVIET INFLUENCE
a
IN ARAB WORLD. IT ALSO PROVED, HE ASSERTED, THAT ARABS WERE
NOT BASICALLY ANTI-WEST, AS THEIR EAGER EMBRACE OF DE GAULLE
SHOWED. THEIR EXPRESSION OF ESTEEM FOR DE GAULLE WAS ALMOST
TRANSPARENT REACTION OF RELIEF THAT THEY ALSO COULD CLAIM
SOME NON-COMMUNIST FRIENDS AND SUPPORTEKS.
PORTER
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SUMMARY
SECRET
314
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00733 232135Z
83
ACTION IO 15
INFO NEA 13,EUR 15,CIAE 00,DODE 00, GPM 04.H 02,INR 07,L C?.NSC 10,
P 04,RSC 01 SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,NSA 02SAH 02 AID ACDA :5,
SA 01,RSR 01/158 W
130764
R 231431Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6910
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
US MISSION USUN NY 0679
S E CR EI T BEIRUT 0733
REF: TEL AVIV 267
1. ISRAELI TURNDOWN OF PROPOSAL FOR STATIONING UN OBSERVERS
ON ITS SIDE OF LEBANON-ISRAELI BORDER IS INDEED DEPRESSING
DEVELOPMENT. INPERFECT THOUGH PROPOSAL IS,IT APPEARS TO US
TO REPRESENT A SMALL STEP FORWARD IN ACHIEVING LEBANON- ISRAEL
COOPERATION FOR MAINTENANCE OF A QUIET BORDER. IT IS, IN
OUR VIEW, A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE BETWEEN SEVERAL IMPOSSIBLE
CHOICES WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE FOR VARIOUS REASONS TO ONE OR
BOTH PARTIES INVOLVED. ISRAEL'S REFUSAL OF PROPOSAL WILL BE
VIEWED BY LEBANESE AS ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL WISHES
RETAIN ITS OPTION TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANON WHEN
AND IF IT SUITS ISRAEL'S INTERESTS.
2. WE PARTICULARLY ARE ATTRACTED TO AUGMENTED UN OBSERVER
PROPOSAL BECAUSE IT COULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT QUICKLY AND BE-
CAUSE IN OUR VIEW IT WOULD ENHANCE LEBANESE ARMY'S ABILITY
AND WILL TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. CONTRARY TO ELIZUR'S
CONTENTION THAT PROPOSAL WOULD LESSEN GOLDS FEELING OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN, WE BELIEVE THAT
WITH UN OBSERVERS LOOKING OVER THEIR SHOULDER LEBANESE
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Tix Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
MANA
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00733 232135Z
RMY WILL BE EVEN MORE VIGILANT IN CARRYING OUT ITS OBLIGA-
TION TO DENY FEDAYEEN USE OF LEBANESE TERRITORY TO ATTACK
ISRAEL. TRADITIONALLY, OBSERVERS ALSO SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO
BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON PART OF BOTH ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE
(AS WELL AS USG) OF WHAT ACTUALLY GOES ON IN BORDER AREAS,
THUS HOPEFULLY REDUCING THE CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES
WHICH ARE CHARACTERISTIC OF PRESENT SITUATION.
3. ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT LEBANON PARTICIPATED IN JUNE 1967
WAR AND HAS MAINTAINED BELLIGERENT POSTURE AGAINST ISRAEL
US A CANARD NOT JUSTIFIED BY FACT. IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY
ACT OF BELLIGERENCY IN THE GOL-GOI RELATIONSHIP, IT HAS BEEN
RECENT ISRAELI ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT. AFTER HAVING EXECUTED
THAT ATTACK, THEREBY FORCING LEBANON FROM ITS POSITION OF
NON-INVOLVEMENT TO A MORE STRONGLY PRO-ARAB POSITION, ISRAELIS
NOW EXPECT LEBANESE EAT ADDITIONALI CROW BY DEMANDING DIRECT
NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL AT BORDER WITHOUT ANY PROTECTIVE
UN PRESENCE. THIS US MANIFESTLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY LEBANESE
GOVT TO ACCEPT AND ISRAEL MUST CERTAINLY BE AWARE OF THAT FACT.
4.° LEBANESE ARE PERHAPS ONLY MIDDLE EASTERNERS LEFT WHO STILL
CAN TALK TO ISRAELIS AND THEY WANT TO DO so. TO DENY THEM
THE UN FACADE BEHIND WHICH SUCH TALKS CAN OCCUR CAN ONLY MEAN
THAT TALKS CAN NEVER TAKE PLACE. ISRAEL's IN OUR VIEW, IS
INDULGING IN DOUBLE TALK. IF THERE ARE INCIDENTS IN ISRAEL
CLEARLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO FEDAYEEN ACTION IT HARD TO ARGUE
THAT LEBANON'S CASE WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IF UN OBSERVERS
ARE ABLE TO ASCERTAIN FACTS AND PLACE BLAME ON LEBANON. WE
CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT ISRAEL PREFERS DECIDE IN HER OWN
INTERESTS WHEN AND HOW BORDER INCIDENTS SHOULD BE REVEALED
LEAVING REST TO US IN DARK AS TO HOW TO ASSESS BLAME.
5. WE AGREE WITH EMB TE AVIV'S FINAL COMMENT THAT EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE MUST BE DONE FACILITATE MEETINGS BETWEEN LEBANON AND
ISRAEL AT BORDER. WE MUST REPEAT, HOWEVER, THAT GOL CAN
ONLY PARTICIPATE IN SUCH MEETINGS WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK AND
WITH UN PRESENCE. THERE NO OTHER BASIS ON WHICH ANY LEB
GOVT WHICH COULD POSSCALY BE FORMED COULD ACCEPT TO HAVE
DEALINGS WITH "THE ENEMY". WE CANNOT FORGET THAT IT IS ISRAEL
NOT LEBANON WHICH KEEPS INSISTING THAT STATE OF WAR EXISTS
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MAKE UNITED AMERICA STATE 40 DEPARTMENT
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 00733 232135Z
6. IF WE ARE UNABLE TO CONVINCE ISRAEL OF THE DESIRABILITY
OF ACCEPTING THIS ONE SMALL CONTRIBUTUON TO PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DENY THE LEBANESE AS-
SERTION THAT ISRAELI IS NOT IN FACT SEEKING PEACE.
PORTER
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT CRINK OF STATE
SUMMARY
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM.
CONFIDENTIAL 911
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00662 212019Z
47
ACTION NEA 15
INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSC 10,P 04, RSC 01,SP 02.
SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02.10 13, ACDA 16,AID 28, RSR 01/140 W
117020
R 211716Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6892
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
C ONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT 0662
SUBJECT: LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CRISIS
REF: BEIRUT 0570
10 TWO MORE MEMBERS OF KARAME CABINET (MALOUF AND MAJDALANI)
RESPONDED TO TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE PRESSURE BY RESIGNING JANUARY 21.
TWO OTHERS (MURR AND ZEIN) ARE VACILLATING. ZEIN'S BROTHER TELLS
US HE IS RELUCTANT TO FOLLOW HIS ALLIES OUT OF GOVERNMENT BECAUSE
HIS MUSLIM CONSTITUENCY WOULD INTERPRET HIS RESIGNATION AS
RESPONSE TO CHRISTIAN DISCIPLINE.
20 WITH 11 MINISTERS HAVING REPORTED FOR DUTY, KARAME GOVERNMENT
CONTINUES TO LIMP ALONG, ALTHOUGH IN CHRISTIAN SKYES IT IS A
BASKET CASE BECAUSE KARAME SO FAR HAS BEEN UNABLE TO RECRUIT
REPLACEMENTS FOR THE TWO MARONITE SEATS VACATED BY EDDE AND
GEMAYEL. EVEN CHEHABIST MARONITES JEAN AZIZ AND QABALAN AL
KHOURY HAVE DECLINED.
4° HOWEVER, KARAME IS AN ASTUTE POLITICIAN AND MAY YET PATCH
UP HIS GOVERNMENT.
PORTER
CONFIDENTIAL
47
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
241
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00224 01 OF 02 082323Z
81
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
048933
R 081418Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6753
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
31
EXCLO EXCES
S E COR ET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 0224
EXDIS
1. ONE CANNOT HELP BUT VIEW WITH DISQUIET AND DEEPEST UNEASE
CONSISTENT ISRAELI REACTION TO THIS OF SITUATION IN LEBANON SUCH
AS COMMENTS BY ELIZUR IN TEL AVIV'S 74, AND AS EXPRESSED IN IN-
TEMPERATE AND BELLIGERENT TONE ESHKOL'S PROPOSED LETTER TO HELOU.
THE "FACTS" AS WE SEE THEM ARE OFTEN MARKEDLY DIFFERENT FROM
ISRAELI ALLEGATIONS AS TO WHAT HAS HAPPENED OR IS HAPPENING.
ONE SEES A NEW CHAPTER IN ME TRAGEDY UNFOLDING WITH LEBANON AND
ISRAEL EACH SET ON ITS OWN IRREVOCABLE COURSE WITH NO BEND OR
GIVE IN DIRECTION OF THE OTHER. IN LEBANON'S CASE, THE DESIRE
OF THE LEADERSHIP TO ACCOMMODATE TO ISRAEL IS THERE BUT THERE
IS NOT YET A NATIONAL UNANIMITY WHICH CAN SUSTAIN THE LEADERS
OR THE ARMY.
2. FROM HERE, ISRAEL'S POSITION APPEARS UNTENABLE, ALTHOUGH
ONE SYMPATHIZES WITH AND UNDERSTANDS CLEARLY THE SECURITY CONSID- -
ERATIONS WHICH IMPEL HER TO ACT AS SHE DOES. BUT THE UNPROVOKED
AND CONDEMNED BEIRUT AIRPORT ATTACK WAS CLEARLY AN INCENDIARY
ACTION,
AND ISRAEL, IF SHE KNOWS WHAT SHE CLAIMS TO KNOW ABOUT
THE ARAB WORLD, MUST HAVE ANTICIPATED THE CONSEQUENCES. STILL,
LEBANON
IS LEFT TO PUT OUT THE FIRE ALONE OR FACE FURTHER
ISRAEL BUFFETINGS, WHILE THE RADICAL ARAB WORLD CAN HARDLY
CONTAIN ITS GLEE AT WHAT IS HAPPENING.
3. PERHAPS IT IS MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE CITIZENS AND LEADERS OF
BELEAGUERED ISRAEL TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN NON-BELLICOSE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCERHOT Richard THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00224 01 OF 02 082323Z
MILITARILY IMPOTENT LEBANON AND THE RADICAL ARAB COUNTRIES.
PERHAPS IT EQUALLY DIFFICULT FOR THEM, LIVING IN A STATE WHERE
MINORITIES ARE UNIMPORTANT, TO UNDERSTAND THAT LEBANON IS AN
ALLIANCE OF MINORITIES WHICH IS ALWAYS MORE AFFECTED AND DIRECTED
BY EXTERNAL PRESSURES AND INFLUENCES THAN BY ITS INTERNAL CAPA-
CITIES FOR DECISION-MAKING IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. THERE IS NOT
HERE, AS IN ISRAEL, A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON WHAT PRESENT COURSE
OF ACTION BEST SERVES THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY. BUT ONE THING
IS SURE. ISRAELIS ARE WRONG IN THEIR BLAND ASSUMPTIONS, CONSTANT-
LY REITERATED, THAT LEBANON CAN CALMLY SHAKE OFF EFFECTS OF
AIRPORT RAID AND CARRY ON BUSINESS AS USUAL ROUNDING UP
FEDAYEEN AND DESTROYING THEM AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. LEBANESE
GOVT AND ARMY WOULD CLEARLY DESTROY THEMSELVES AND THE COUNTRY
IN THIS PROCESS. IN ADDITION, TWO FEDAYEEN WOULD SPRING UP
FOR EVERY ONE ELIMINATED.
4. IF LEBANESE ARE GOING TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN, THEY MUST DO IT
IN THEIR OWN WAY AND IN CONTEXT OF THEIR ENVIRONMENT.
THEY WILL NOT TOTALLY SUCCEED AND BORDER INCIDENTS WILL CONTINUE
I
ONE MUST HOPE ON A DECREASING SCALE DOWN TO NEAR ZERO, ALTHOUGH
THERE NO ASSURANCE EVEN THIS CAN COME TO PASS. WHAT IS CER-
TAIN IS THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS IF ISRAELIS CONTINUE
TO THREATEN LEBANON AND TO ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIAL ACTS OF RE-
TALIATION.
5. THE GOL'S DESIRE TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN STILL EXISTS. THE MEANS
TO DO SO DO NOT - AT LEAST TO THE DEGREE OF PERFECTION
WHICH ISRAEL DEMANDS. AND OF COURSE IT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO EVERY-
ONE, INCLUDING ISRAEL, THAT HER CONSTANT THREATS ONLY DIVERT
LEBANESE ARMY FROM ANTI-FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY TO FRANTIC AND MEANING-
LESS EFFORTS IN DEFENSE OF HOMELAND.
6. WE DRAW ALMOST SURE CONCLUSION THAT BORDER INCIDENTS WILL
OCCUR IN NEAR FUTURE SPARKING CHAIN REACTION OF ESCALATING RAID
EXPIR
AND COUNTER-RAID. AT SOME POINT ISRAEL WILL FEEL HER SECURITY
SUFFICIENTLY THREATENED THAT SHE MIGHT UNDERTAKE ATTACK AND
OCCUPY PORTIONS OF LEBANON. MERE FACT THAT MOST LEBANESE BELIEVE
SUCH AGGRESSION IS ISRAEL'S CERTAIN INTENTION LEADS TO A FORM
OF NATIONAL PARALYSIS WHICH MAKES LEBANON LESS ABLE TAKE DECI-
SIVE ACTION AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN - AN IMPERATIVE ACT OF SELF-
INTEREST WHICH SEEMS SO SENSIBLE AND NECESSARY TO US AND TO IS-
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE Reproduced the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
THE
OITASIROHTUA
Ot
THE
EXECUTIVE
SECKELVBA
STATE
Department of State
OF STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 00224 01 OF 02 082323Z
RAELIS. BUT LEBANON IS NOW LIKE THE POTENTIAL VICTIM OF THE
COBRA - RIGID WITH FRIGHT AND WAITING FOR THE STRIKE.
7. I CAN ONLY REPEAT CONCLUSION THAT ODDS HEAVILY FAVOR OUT-
BREAK REAL TROUBLE ON LEBANESE- - ISRAELI BORDER IN VERY NEAR FU-
TURE. WE MIGHT YET BE ABLE AVOID THIS IF (A) GOL CAN BE GALVAN-
EXET
IZED INTO DECISIVE ACTIVITY AGAINST FEDAYEEN BY EARLY AND DRAMA-
TIC PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, OR (B) THE USG, BY
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF OUR DETERMINATION TO APPLY SANCTIONS IF
ISRAEL DOES ATTACK, CAN RESTRAIN ISRAEL WHILE A MAJOR (HOPEFULLY
MULTILATERAL) EFFORT IS MADE TO FORCE LEBANON TO CONTAIN FEDAYEEN
ACTIVITY WITHIN TOLERABLE LIMITS. PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCEed at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
THE
EXECUTIVE
2ECKELVBA
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 744
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00224 02 OF 02 081659Z
30
42
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
046966
R 081418Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6754
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECR ET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 0224/2
EXDIS
8. IN MEANTIME I WOULD HOPE USG CAN DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOW
OUR CONCERN FOR LEBANON BOTH IN TERMS POLITICAL SUPPORT AND
TANGIBLE ACTS. WE HAVE MUCH TO PROTECT HERE, INCLUDING ONE OF
OUR LAST FOOTHOLDS IN EASTERN ARAB WORLD. SOME OF THESE TANGIBLE
ACTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERED, EG., ASSISTANCE TO LEBANESE
AVIATION IN RESTORING ITS FLEET LOSSES, SALE OF CONVENTIONAL
ANTI - AIRCRAFT WEAPONRY ON FAVORABLE TERMS, AND PUBLIC STATE-
MENT OF SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. OTHERS WILL
OCCURI TO US, BUT WE MUST TAKE INITIATIVE AND SOON, SINCE IT
BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR GOL TO REQUEST OR PERHAPS
EVEN ACCEPT ASSISTANCE FROM A USG WHICH IN THE EYES OF EVEN OUR
MANY LEBANESE FRIENDS APPEARS POWERLESS OR WORSE, UNWILLING,
TO SAVE LEBANON FROM AN ISRAELI ATTACK - AN ATTACK FOR WHICH
SUG, AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN GENERAL, WILL BE DAMNED AS PRO-
TECTOR OF ISRAEL.
9. IN MEANTIME, OUR CONTINGENCY PLANNING SHOULD ALSO CONTEM-
PLATE HOW WE WILL ACT IN FACT OF LARGE SCALE MILITARY ACTION ON
LEBANESE ISRAELI BORDER, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY IN ALL LIKELIHOOD
EXPIR
RESULT IN IMMEDIATE SHUTDOWN BEIRUT AIRPORT AND PORT AND A
BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC SECURITY. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE PLANNING FOR
NON-COMMERCIAL EVACUATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS, IN EVENT A
DEFEATED OR DEMORALIZED LEBANESE ARMY CAN NO LONGER MAINTAIN
PUBLIC ORDER. IT SHOUWA ALSO CONTEMPLATE US RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE
PLEA FOR PROTECTION FROM LEBANESE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, IN EVENT
OF CONFESSIONAL CIVIL CONFLICT FOLLOWING ISRAELI ATTACK. PORTER
SECRET 22
NOT TO BE REPRODUCEd0 at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 820
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00152 0616562
44
ACTION SS 30
INFO CCO 00,SSO 00, NSCE 00,/030 W
035130
0 061601Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6728
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
SECR E T BEIRUT 0152
30
EXDIS
SUBJECT: ESHKOL LETTER TO PRESIDENT HELOU
REF:
TELI AVIV 67 AND 68
1. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST UNWISE FOR EMBASSY BEIRUT TO
TRANSMIT ESHKOL LETTER TO PRES HELOU. VERY FACT OF OUR TRANS-
MISSION RUNS RIST OF BEING INTERPRETED AS DEGREE OF USG AS-
SOCIATION WITH CONTENTS OF LETTER, WHICH IN EFFECT ARE A DIATRIBE
AND ANINDICTMENT OF LEB GOVT. LETTER CONTAINS NOTHING WHICH HAS
NOT EITHER ALREADY BEEN MADE PUBLIC BY ISRAELI GOVT OR WHICH
HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED PRIVATELY BY US WITH HELOU AND HIS
GOVT SINCE ISRAELI ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT DEC 28. WHILE
WE MAY BE OVERLY SENSITIVE, WE WOULD HATE TO RUN RISK OF
EVENTUAL PUBLICATION BY ISRAELIS: IN JUSTIFICATION MILITARY
ACTIONS AGAINST LEBANESE FOR LATTER'S FAILURE COMPLY WITH
ALL DEMANDS MADE IN LETTER. IN ANY CASE, WE FAIL SEE HOW
TRANSMITTAL THIS MESSAGE WOULD HAVE DESIRED EFFECT OF IM-
PROVING SITUATON. IN FACT IT MIGHT WELL EXACERBATE IT TO
DETRIMENT OF USG INTERESTS.
EXQIA
2. I SUGGEST THAT, IF LETTER IS TO BE DELIVERED, IT BE
DONE DIRECTLY AT WASHINGTON, NEW YORK OR SOME CAPITAL IN
WHICH BOTH ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE HAVE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTA-
TIVES. THIS WOULD NOT APPEARTO BE TOO DIFFICULT TO ACCOMPLISH.
PORTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the TRichard Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
10.RET
OF
DRA
STATE
PHA
Folosid
Department of State
of STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
039
PAGE 01 AMMAN 00071 062025Z
51
ACTION SS 30
INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00,CCO 00,/030 W
036070
0 P 0619112 JAN 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2075
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASY LONDON PRIORITY
S ERCOR E T AMMAN 0071
EXDIS
SUBU: POSSIBLE ATTACK ON EILAT
1. VICEROY PRINCE HASSAN HAS JUST PASSED URGENT MESSAGE TO US IN
WHICH HE REVEALED GREAT CONCERN OVER THIS AFTERNOON'S BBC BROADCAST
(POSSIBLY CARRIED OTHER AREA STATIONS AS WELL) THAT ISRAELI IDF
SOUTHERN SECTOR COMMANDER HAD STATED THAT ATTACK ON EILAT WOULD BE
MET WITH IMMEDIATE ATTACK ON AQABA. ASKED US TO MAKE CLEAR TO IS-
RAELIS THAT JORDAN HAD DONE EVERYTHING IT POSSIBLY COULD To PRE-
VENT INCIDENTS IN AQABA/EILAT AREA.
2. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND WE MAKE REPRESENTATIONS: To ISRAELIS IN
WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV POINTING OUT: A) WE CONVINCED GOU HAS
INDEED DONE EVERYTHING IT CAN TO PREVENT INCIDENTS IN THIS AREA:
B) KING HELD MEETING WITH TOP SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND JAA
AUTHORITIES SATURDAY, THE 4TH, TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT NO PRECAUTIONS
WERE OVERLOOKEDI (AND INCIDENTALLY TOLD BRITISH THAT JAA AREA
COMMANDER IN AQABA HAD BEEN REPLACED): AND CI BOTH GOU AND US
DISTURBED BY RECENT THREATENING, ALMOST INFLAMMATORY STATEMENTS
EXQIA
(E.G., ALLON AND IDF AREA COMMANDER) IN A SENSITIVE SITUATION
CHARACTERIZED BY WIDESPREAD ARAB EXPECTATIONS, HOWEVER UNREASONABLE
THAT ISRAELIS WOULD TAKE STRONG MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANON
OR JORDAN PRIOR JANUARY 29TH.
3 . SINCE WE ARE VERY MUCH PARTY TO THIS AFFAIR (BY PASSING EBAN
WARNING TO HUSSEIN, AND BY FOLLOWING UP AT LOWER LEVELS TO ENSURE
THAT GOJ PRECAUTIONS ACTUALLY BEPIG TAKEN, BELIEVE WE HAVE RIGHT
TO EXPECT ISRAELIS: TO ESERCISE MORE THAN USUAL RESTRAINT.
GP-3. SYMMES
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the THE Richard OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DISARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET 489
PAGE 01 STATE 017740
2
45
ORIGIN SS=45
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
'70 FEB 5 PM 5:52 52
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE house
66608
DRAFTED BY8 NEA/IAI:TAWAHL
APPROVED BY: NEA-JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/IAI-MRo ATHERTON, JR. DRAFT
nea/arn=mro seelme DRAFT
NEA-MR. DAVIES
S/S=MR. BROWN
059059
P R 051721Z FEB 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SEC R E T STATE 017740
EXDIS
SUBJECT: US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL
REF # BEIRUT 905
1 . IF QUESTION FUTURE US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL ARISES IN
YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH HELOU OR KARAME, SUGGEST YOU BE GUIDED
BY WHAT PRESIDENT SAID IN JANUARY 30 PRESS CONFERENCE AND
GENERAL LINE TAKEN BY AMBASSADOR SYMMES IN TALK WITH KING
HUSSEIN (AMMAN 528 PARA - 410
2. YOU SHOULD CAUTION AGAINST SPECULATING OR DRAWING PRE-
MATURE CONCLUSIONS RE NATURE OF DECISION WHICH PRESIDENT
SAID IN PRESS CONFERENCE WOULD BE MADE WITHIN 30 DAYS.
FYI. RE QUESTION OF LINKAGE BETWEEN RESPONSE TO ISRAELI
REQUESTS AND ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD US PROPOSALS FOR MIDDLE
EAST SETTLEMENT, YOU WILL RECALL THAT SECRETARY SPECIFICALLY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED DEPARTMENT DEP * STATES OF OF AMOUNT STATE *
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 017740
EXPIS EXPIS EXQIS
STATED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION AT DECEMBER 23 PRESS CONFERENCE
THAT THERE IS NO LINKAGE END FYI.
GP-3.
ROGERS
.10 EEB bW 2:25
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WI OUT THE AUTH ORIZATION OF T EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
8/11/40/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
EXELS
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 587
PAGE 01 STATE 014632
41
ORIGIN SS=45
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66610
DRAFTED BY8NEA/ARN/BAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA/ARN:SEELYE
'70 JAN 30 PM 4:28
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION WHITE HOUSE HOUSE ROOM
NEA/DAVIES
EVTT:LOY
INR/DDC:BUFORD
SY:LYNCH
S/S:BROWN
024640
P R 301625Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL KARACHI
SECR ENT STATE 014632
EXDIS
SUBJ 8 TREATENED HIJACKING
REF : BEIRUT 809
10 ALERT SENT TO PANAM BEIRUT BY NEW YORK HEADQUARTERS
RESULTED FROM INFORMATION CONTAINED IN CAS REPORT AND
PASSED BY DEPT JAN 28 TO SECURITY OFFICERS
OF BOTH PAN AMERICAN AND TWA. GIST OF REPORT (ORIGIN OF
WHICH PROTECTED) WAS THAT LEBANESE SOURCE HAD RECEIVED
INFORMATION THAT FATAH COMMANDOS I HAD BEEN REQUESTED HIJACK
AMERICAN AIRLINER TO IRAQ. WOULD BE HIJACKERS REPORTEDLY
1
PROMISED DOLS 12,000 TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard xon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXQIN
STATES OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 014632
2. REPORT DID NOT INDICATE WHICH AMERICAN AIRLINE WAS
THREATENED BUT, SINCE PAN AMERICAN AND TWA ONLY US:
AIRLINES OPERATING SCHEDULED SERVICES IN AREA, BOTH
WERE INFORMED. REPORT WAS PASSED WITH CAVEAT THAT THIS
WAS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION AND THAT WE HAD NO RPT NO
CONFIRMATION BUT WISHED AT LEAST ALERT COMPANIES TO
POSSIBILITY HIJACKING ATTEMPT IN ORDER THAT PRECAUTIONARY
MEASURES MIGHT BE TAKEN.
30 WE HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS REPORT AND NO
ACTION EXPECTED OF addressees. THIS MATTER SHOULD NOT
RPT NOT BE DISCUSSED LOCALLY, SINCE IT MIGHT CAUSE UNDUE
ALARM. INQUIRIES SHOULD BE ANSWERED WITH RESPONSE THAT
WE HAVE NO INFORMATION REGARDING A SPECIFIC THREAT TO A
GIVEN AIRLINE, BUT THAT SITUATION SUCH THAT ROUTINE
PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES WOULD SEEM ADVISABLE. GP-3.
ROGERS
30
or
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESSOREORIZATION O THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIRIED
bt1/80/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
**
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA OLINO
TELEGRAM
EXELS EXQIN EXATE
SECRET 640
PAGE 01 STATE 007920
82
70 JAN 17 AM 9:59
WHITE HOUSE
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66645
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY&NEA-JOSEPH J SISCO
J/PM MR CHAPMAN (INFO)
DOD/ISA COL. CCLARK (INFO)
NEA/IAI ALATHERTON (INFO)
NEA/ARN TWSEELYE
S/S MR LEVITSKY
076463
R 170028Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
SECRE T STATE 007920
EXDIS
SUBJECT: ARMS FOR LEBANON
1. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO, DEPART-
MENT OFFICER ON UANUARY 16 INFORMED LEBANESE AMBASSADOR
KABBANI THAT WE ARE FOLLOWING LEBANON'S BORDER AND INTERNAL
SECURITY PROBLEMS CLOSELY AND HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNI TO ISRAELIS
OVER THEIR RECENT ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANON. WE HAVE TOLD
ISRAELIS THAT WE CONSIDER LEVEL AND SIZE OF THESE ATTACKS
OUT OF PROPORTION TO FEDAYEEN PROVOCATIONS. WE HAVE ALSO
INDICATED OUR BELIEVE THAT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS DOING
ALL IT CAN WITHIN LIMITATIONS OF CAIRO AGREEMENT TO
CONTAIN FEDAYEEN. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE REITERATED TO
ISRAEL OUR SPECIAL INTEREST IN LEBANON. WE UNDERSTAND
THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS OVER THE
LAST SIX DAYS.
2. DEPARTMENT OFFICER CONTINUED THAT IN ORDER BE OF
FURTHER ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON AND WITH VIEW TO HELPING
LEBANON IMPROVE ITS SECURITY CAPABILITIES, WE HAVE AUTHOR
IZED AMBASSADOR PORTER TO OFFER FOR SALE TO GOL LARGE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT UNITED * STATES OF STATE *
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 007920
QUANTITY OF M-14 RIFLES. THESE RIFLES ARE MORE THAN MATCH
-
FOR THE KALESHNIKOV AND SHOULD ADDITIONALLY PROVIDE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL LIFT TO THE LEBANESE ARMY.
ROGERS
EXPIS EXPIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE VITHOUTHE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
05//20/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET 655
PAGE 01 STATE 005147
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
92
ORIGIN SS-45
2
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66638
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA*RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/ARN:MR SEELYE
S/S:MR BROWN
Ø5435Ø
R 132005Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO USMISSION USUN NY
SECRE T STATE 005147
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 261 AND 258
1. DAVIES (NEA) RECEIVED ISRAELI COUNSELOR ARGOV
JANUARY 12 AT LATTER'S REQUEST TO REVIEW SITUATION
ON ISRAEL'S BORDERS WITH LEBANON AND JORDAN,
2. REGARDING SITUATION IN JORDAN, DAVIES INFORMED ARGOV
IN CONFIDENCE THAT HUSSEIN HAD SENT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
.
IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER CONSEQUENCES ISRAELI
SHELLING CIVLIAN TARGETS IN JORDAN. HUSSEIN STATED HE HAD INSTRUCTED
JAA NOT FIRE ON ISRAEL FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY AND TO
PREVENT OTHERS FROM DOING SO. DAVIES NOTED THAT, WHILE
WE CANNOTBE CONFIDENT OF JORDANIAN ABILITY CONTROL ALL
FIRING FROM IRBID HEIGHTS, WE WANT GOI BE AWARE OF KING'S
DESIRES AND INTENTIONS.
3. REGARDING LEBANON, DAVIES DREW ON CONTENTS REFTELS
AND EMPHASIZED LEBANESE FEARS ABOUT ISRAELI TERRITORAL
AMBITIONS SOUTHERN LEBANON. READING SELECTED EXCERPTS
FROM BEIRUT 261, DAVIES HIGHLIGHTED ADVERSE EFFECTS ON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIERET
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXPIN EXPIS EXPIS
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 005147
LEBANON OF ISRAELI ATTACKS AND GOL'S ATTEMPTS CONTROL
FEDAYEEN.
4. DAVIES ASSURED ARGOV WE FULLY AWARE DIFFICULTY POSED
BY FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE SAID,
HOWEVER, WE QUESTIONS WHETHER GOI TACTICS OF EXCESSIVE
AND INDISCRIMINATE RETALIATION ARE IN ISRAEL'S BEST LONG-
RUN INTERESTS. ARGO REPLIED THAT BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE
FOR GOL "DO SOMETHING" ABOUT FEDAYEEN. HE NOTED ALSO
THAT IN OCTOBER GOL HAD UPPER HAND AND SHOULD HAVE
PRESSED ADVANTAGE . ARGOV ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT
LEBANON AT MERCY OF ARAB STATES. IN CONCLUSION, HE
SAID HE WOULD REORT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. GP-3
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODU
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIO OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
151/40/0299
Jebann
OF STATE * UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET 212
PAGE 01 STATE 004280
89
ORIGIN SS=45
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
EXATE
66640
DRAFTED BY&NEA/ARN&TW SEELYE:DOS/ISA:COL. CLARK
APPROVED BY:NEA:RP DAVIES
J&U. ALEXIS JOHNSON (SUBS)
OSD/ISA:MRo NUTTER (SUBS)
S/S:BA FLATIN
PM/MAS:MR. SCHMELZER
NEA/RA:COL. BUNTE
039833
R 102301Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO CINCSTRIKE
SECR ET STATE 004280
EXDIS:
JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
SUBJECT: SALE OF M=14 AND/OR M=16 RIFLES TO LEBANON AND JORDAN
1. FYI. USG UNDERTAKING TO SELL APPROXIMATELY 3,000 M-14 RIFLES
TO JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AND RECENT INTEREST - EXPRESSED BY LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT IN PURCHASING M-14 RIFLES ARE AFFECTED BY FACT THAT
COLT PRODUCTION SCHEDULE NOW PERMITS COMMERCIAL SALE OF M-16S - -
INFORMATION WHICH COLT HAS COMMUNICATED TO LEBANESE ARMY.
EXQIA
SITUATION RESULTS FROM INCREASE IN COLT'S PRODUCTION CAPABILITY
AND FACT ARMY NO LONGER ACCEPTING TOTAL OUTPUT (ADVANCE DELIVERY).
THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT COULD CAST DOUBT ON CREDIBILITY OF PAST
ASSERTIONS TO BOTH
GOVERNMENTS THAT M=16 NOT RPT NOT AVAILABLE. ACCORDINGLY, WE NEED
EMPHASIZE THAT WE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND IT IS STILL TRUE THAT
M-16S NOT RPT NOT AVAILABLE FROM USG STOCKS.
2. WE APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR PORTER'S DESIRE THAT LEBANESE ARMY BE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXPIRES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 004280
FULLY EQUIPPED WITH EITHER M=14S OR M-16S AND IN TERMS OF OUR
RELATIONS WITH LEBANESE WE WOULD LIKE TO BE IN POSITION OF OFFERING
LEBANESE OPTION OF PURCHASING EITHER RIFLE IN SIMILAR
QUANTITIES. WE ARE UNABLE AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, TO AUTHORIZE
EXATE
LEBANESE PURCHASE OF M=16S PENDING REVIEW OF IMPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION OF M=16S INTO AREA. WE HOPE TO COMPLETE REVIEW
SHORTLY AND WILL INFORM POSTS OF OUR DECISION.
3. MEANWHILE, WE CAN BE HELPFUL TO LEBANON WITH REGARD TO
PROVISION OF M=14S· TOTAL OF 6»Ø00 M-14S CAN BE SOLD TO LEBANON
WITHIN TIME FRAME THREE MONTHS FROM RECEIPT OF LETTER OF OFFER BY
DIVERTING ASSETS FROM US FORCES REBUILD PROGRAMS. WE ALSO PREPARED
SEND QUALIFIED M-14 AUTHORITY FROM US ARMY FOR purpose REVIEWING
WITH LEBANESE MILITARY THEIR M=14 REQUIREMENTS. END FYI.
4. FOR BEIRUT: IN ACCORDANCE WITH FOREGOINT GUIDELINES,
AMBASSADOR PORTER IS AUTHORIZED TO INFORM HIGHEST LEBANESE
AUTHORITIES THAT USG IS PREPARED TO ASSIST GOL IN REEQUIPPING ITS
ARMED FORCES WITH MODERN RIFLES.
A.o USG CAN SELL GOL IMMEDIATELY QUANTITY OF 6»ØØØ M=14 RIFLES
FOR DELIVERY WITHIN NINETY DAYS AFTER ACCEPTANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER®
COST OF EACH RIFLE DOLS 122 PLUS SHIPPING CHARGE. FYI. IF
QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL QUANTITIES OF M=14S RAISED, AMBASSADOR
AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT WE WILL SEE WHAT WE CAN DO. IF QUESTION OF
PURCHASING M-16S RAISED, AMBASSADOR AUTHORIZED RESPOND THAT WE
WILL EXAMINE REQUEST CLOSELY. END FYI.
B. IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, USG WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISPATCH US
ARMY OFFICER KNOWLEDGEABLE WITH M=14 RIFLE TO CONSULT WITH
LEBANESE MILITARY.
C e WE ASSUME THAT GOL INTENDS TO PAY CASH FOR THIS TRANSACTION
EXPIR
AND WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION OF THIS FACT. CASH SALES
WOULD ENABLE TRANSACTION TO BE EXPEDITED. FYI. WHILE WE HAVE IN
MIND EARMARKING CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FMS CREDIT FOR LEBANON, ONCE IT
BECOMES AVAILABLE, WE CANNOT YET INFORM GOL OF THIS FACT SINCE
WE DO NOT YET HAVE AN APPROPRIATION- INASMUCH AS COST OF RIFLES IS
NOT RPT NOT PROHIBITIVE, WE WOULD HOPE GOL WOULD AGREE TO CASH
TRANSACTION AND RESERVE ANY REQUEST FOR CREDIT WHICH IT MAY WISH
C
TO MAKE FOR OTHER ARMS PURCHASES. END FYI.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITH UT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE ECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF
STATE
*
Department of State
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXAIS
OF STATES NAME AMERICA UNITED
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 004280
5. FOR AMMAN.: IF AND WHEN HE DEEMS FIT, AMBASSADOR SYMMES
AUTHORIZED TO ACKNOWLEDGE TO APRROPRIATE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES
THAT COLT INDUSTRIES NOW HAS A CAPACITY TO PRODUCE M=16 RIFLES
FOR COMMERCIAL SALE. NO SUCH RIFLES, HOWEVER, ARE AVAILABLE FROM
...
USG STOCKS AND AS YET USG HAS NOT AUTHORIZED SALE OF WEARON IN
MIDDLE EAST. MEANWHILE, USG IS PLEASED THAT IT HAS BEEN ABLE TO
MEET JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS FOR 3,000 M-14 RIFLES SINCE THESE RIFLES
ARE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE USE AND BECAUSE IN OUR VIEW M=14S ARE
MORE SUITABLE FOR USE BY GOJ'S INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES THAN ARE
M=16S.
FYI. WE ANTICIPATE SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF M-14S WILL BECOME
AVAILABLE FROM US STOCKS IN FY 71 AND COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE
FROM REBUILD 12 MONTHS FROM ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER SUBJECT TO POLICY
DECISION TO DO SO. END FYI. GP - 3.
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 194
PAGE 01 STATE 004257
89
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 PCH-10 /056 R
66640
DRAFTED BY&NEA/ARN:PJ GRIFFIN
APPROVED BY:NEA:JJ SISCO
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
NEA:MR. DAVIES
S/S:MR. LLOYD
039638
R 102050Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM BY POUCH
AMMAN BY POUCH
CAIRO BY POUCH
K
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW BY POUCH
SECR E T STATE 004257
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CALL OF LEBANESE AMBASSADOR
SUMMARY: DURING CALL BY LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI ON JANUARY 60
SISCO STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF USING PRESENT OPPORTUNITY TO GET
NEGOTIATIONS STARTED UNDER JARRING AUSPICES ON BASIS OF CURRENT
U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS. ALTHOUGH INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSE TO THESE
PROPOSALS NEGATIVE, SISCO INDICATED U.S. NOW LOOKING FOR POSITIVE
EXPIA
INDICATIONS FROM UAR IN THIS REGARD. SISCO SAID WE WOULD
APPRECIATE ANY GOL ASSISTANCE IT CAN GIVE IN THIS REGARD BUT WE
RECOGNIZE THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE IN VIEW DELICATE POSITION
LEBANON FINDS ITSELF.
SISCO SAID WE NOT AT ALL SURE WE COULD PRODUCE ISRAELIS BUT US IS
PREPARED USE ITS DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE ONCE ARAB COMMITMENTS TO
NEGOTIATE IS FORTHCOMING ON BASIS TWO US DOCUMENTS. KABBANI
STRESSED THERE HAS BEEN NO EROSION OF MODERATE ARAB POSITION AS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 004257
RESULT OF RABAT CONFERENCE AND THAT UAR AND JORDAN HAVE EMERGED
WITH MORE FLEXIBILITY TO PURSUE PEACEFUL SOLUTION. DESPITE
RECENT FLAREUPS ALONG BORDER, KABBANI SAID GOL DID NOT BELIEVE
PRESENT SITUATION WOULD ESCALATE TO POINT OF ENDANGERING
EXATE
LEBANESE SECURITY. SISCO UNDERSCORED NEED FOR LEBANESE ARMY TO
REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY IN BORDER REGION. KABBANI CONCERNED SUCH
ATTEMPT BY ARMY WOULD PROVOKE GOL-FEDAYEEN CLASH AND WONDERED IF
ISRAEL TRYING TO ESCALATE MILITARY SITUATION AT TIME WHEN ALL
OTHER PARTIES WORKING FOR PEACE. SISCO ACKNOWLEDGED FEDAYEEN
HAVE BECOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL FORCE. END SUMMARY.
1 * RABAT CONFERENCE. SISCON ASKED FOR AMBASSADOR'S OPINION ON
RABAT CONFERENCE. KABBANI SAID RESULTS WERE NOT AS BAD AS
DEPICTED, AND AT LEAST THERE HAD BEEN NO BACKSLIDING OF ARAB
MODERATES' POSITION. KABBANI EMPHASIZED THAT ARAB COUNTRIES
DIRECTLY CONCERNED TOOK MODERATE, REALISTIC POSITION AT CONFERENCE
WHICH INDICATES THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF REALITIES INVOLVED.
2. SISCO ASKED IF KABBANI AGREED WITH IDEA THAT TWO MAJOR ARAB
COUNTRIES CONCERNED -- UAR AND JORDAN - - HAD EMERGED FROM RABAT
WITH AS MUCH OR MORE FLEXIBILITY. KABBANI STATED THAT THERE NO
QUESTION THAT THEY EMERGED WITH PAZ MORE FLEXIBILITY. UAR AND JORDAN
NOW IN POSITION TO CONVINCE THEIR PEOPLE OF NEED FOR PEACEFUL
SOLUTION.
3. SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSALS. SISCO INFORMED KABBANI THAT
U.S. DOUBTS REGARDING SOVIET ROLE IN BIG POWER DISCUSSIONS HAVE
INCREASED. SISCO CHARACTERIZED SOVIET REPLY OF TEN DAYS AGO AS
BEING VERY NEGATIVE AND RETROGRESSIVE. HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IT
UNNECESSARY FOR ALL PARTIES TO AGREE TO EVERY WORD IN THESE
DOCUMENTS. OBVIOUSLY EACH PARTY WILL FIND SOMETHING THAT IT LIKES
WHILE REJECTING OTHER PARTS. WHAT IS IMPORTANT AT THIS JUNCTURE IS
THAT ALL PARTIES AGREE THAT THERE IS ENOUGH IN THE DOCUMENTS TO
RESUME TALKS THROUGH JARRING. IF WE CAN GET NEGOTIATING PROCESS
STARTED AGAIN, SISCO SAID HE FEELS CONFIDENT THERE WILL BE MORE
FLEXIBILITY SHOWN BY PARTIES THAN HAS BEEN CASE WITH RESPECT TO
BIG POWER TALKS.
4. SISCO EMPHASIZED FOLLOWING POINTS TO KABBANI: (A) THERE NO
DOUBT THAT FEDAYEEN HAVE BECOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL FORCE IN ARAB
WORLD. OPTIONS NASSER AND HUSSEIN POSSESS NOW MAY BECOME MORE
RESTRICTIVE WITH PASSAGE OF TIME. SPECIFICALLY, EACH OF ESTABLISHED
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITH UT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE ECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 004257
GOVERNMENTS MAINTAINS IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN
STATES, BUT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THIS ATTITUDE COULD CHANGE AS
OPPORTUNITIES ARE LOST. SISCO STRESSED THAT AT PRESENT WE HAVE
OPPORTUNITY BASED ON TWO U.S. DOCUMENTS TO MOVE FORWARD IN SEARCH
FOR PEACE. WE BELIEVE IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT THIS OPPORTUNITY
TO TEST SITUATION IN SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE WAY NOT BE
IRRETRIEVABLY LOST (B) SISCO CANDIDLY TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT WE
ARE NOW UNCERTAIN OF OUR ABILITY TO PRODUCE ISRAELIS ON THE BASIS
EXCLA EXAIS
OF OUR CURRENT FORMULAS. HOWEVER, IF WE CAN GET SOME POSITIVE
INDICATION FROM BOTH CAIRO AND AMMAN OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THESE
PROPOSALS, WE ARE PREPARED TO DO WHAT WE CAN WITH ISRAELIS DESPITE
THEIR NEGATIVE ATTITUDE.
5. SISCO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR RECENT STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT
HELOU TO AMBASSADOR PORTER THAT HE PREPARED TO HELP IN SEARCH FOR
PEACE. HE STRESSED THAT ANYTHING GOL COULD DO TO URGE APPARENT
MOVEMENT ON PART OF UAR AND JORDAN WOULD BE HELPFUL. HOWEVER, HE MUST
DEFER TO LEBANESE JUDGEMENT HOW BEST TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE.
NOTING THAT HELOU WENT TO RABAT WITH IDEA IN MIND TO BE HELPFUL,
KABBANI EXPHASIZED THAT HELOU, WHO HAS ALWAYS TAKEN POSITIVE,
CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, LOOKS AT U.S. PLAN FROM MOST FAVORABLE
ASPECT.
6. IN RESPONSE TO SISCO'S REQUEST, KABBANI SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO
GIVE HIS OPINION ON U.S. PROPOSALS. KABBANI NOTED THAT IT HAD BEEN
WIDELY SPECULATED THAT THE TIMING OF U.S. PROPOSALS WAS INTENDED TO
INFLUENCE RABAT CONFERENCE. TO COUNTERACT THIS IMPRESSION
KABBANI STRESSED THERE SHOULD BE NO U.S. RETREAT NOW FROM VARIOUS
POINTS CONTAINED THEREIN NOR SHOULD WE APPEAR TO SURRENDER TO
STRONG ISRAELI CRITICISM. KABBANI ALSO MENTIONED SOME RECENT PRESS
COMMENTARIES SUGGESTING THAT U.S. SHOULD DISENGAGE ITSELF FROM
ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION IN VIEW OF "POLITICAL AND MILITARY REALITIES
INVOLVED." HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT U.S. WOULD NOT BE SO SHORTSIGHTED AS
TO BE CONSIDERING SUCH POLICY. PRINCIPAL REASON GOL HAS ALWAYS
OPPOSED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES IS LIMITED
PROSPECT FOR THEIR SUCCESS. GOL BELIEVES BIG POWERS MUST
CONTINUE PEACE EFFORTS AS THIS OFFERS ONLY REALIZABLE CHANCE OF
PROGRESS. AGREEING WITH KABBANI'S ANALYSIS, SISCO SAID THIS IS
ALL MORE REASON, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF NEGATIVE SOVIET REACTION TO
OUR PROPOSAL, WHY SOME POSITIVE INDICATION FROM CAIRO IS NOW
NECESSARY. IN ABSENCE OF UAR POSITIVE INDICATION RAISON D'ETRE OF
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 04 STATE 004257
BIG POWER TALKS IS LACKING. U.S. HAS PUT FORWARD REASONABLE
PROPOSALS AND THEREFORE SHOULD LOGICALLY EXPECT SOME POSITIVE
RESPONSE TO THEM. OTHERWISE THERE LITTLE PURPOSE IN CONTINUING
EXD
BIG POWER DIALOGUE. WE UNDERSTAND JORDANIANS ARE INCLINED TOWARD
APPROVAL AND NOW WE NEED SOME WORD FROM CAIRO.
7. SISCO REJECTED IDEA ADVANCED BY SOME COMMENTATORS THAT
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 9 AND JORDANIAN PROPOSALS TABLED
IN MEETING OF FOUR WERE STRICTLY TACTICAL MANEUVERS: HE STRESSED
BOTH WERE LONG IN PREPARATION AND REPRESENTED ADOPTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL POSTURE WHICH WE CONSIDER JUST AND FAIR. HOWEVER,
WE FEEL THAT OUR VIEWS HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED AND DISTORTED BOTH
S
BY SOVIETS AND IN ARAB WORLD. KABBANI COMMENTED THAT AT LEAST
THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANYTHING NEGATIVE THUS FAR FROM CAIRO SO THIS
MAY BE READ AS hopeful SIGN. HE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS HARD LINE
SOVIET POSITION IS IN RESPONSE TO AGGRESSIVE ISRAELI ATTITUDE.
8. SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON. SISCO ASKED KABBANI FOR HIS
ASSESSMENT OF INTERNAL SITUATION. KABBANI REPLIED THAT AS OF
TWO DAYS AGO IT DID NOT SEEM SO GOOD IN LIGHT OF STATEMENT BY
PHALANGIST LEADER GAMAYEL THAT FEDAYEEN SHOULD LEAVE LEBANON.
DESPITE RECENT FLAREUP ALONG BORDER GOL DOES NOT BELIEVE
SITUATION WILL ESCALATE TO POINT OF ENDANGERING COUNTRY'S SECURITY.
HOWEVER, HE ADMITTED THAT CONTINUED BORDER TENSION COULD ADVERSELY
AFFECT PRECARIOUS INTERNAL BALANCE
9. SISCO ASKED KABBANI IF IT NOT POSSIBLE FOR LEBANESE ARMY TO
REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY ALONG BORDER. KABBANI STATED EMPHATICALLY
THAT THIS WOULD RESULT IN ARMY CLASHING WITH FEDAYEEN. AS HE
UNDERSTOOD CAIRO AGREEMENT, IT WAS BASICALLY INTENDED TO RESTRICT
FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. HE THOUGHT ARMY WAS ATTEMPTING TO DO THIS
WITHOUT, HOWEVER, RISKING OPEN CLASH. IN REPLY TO SISCO'S QUESTION
ABOUT PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS, KABBANI SAID
IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT GOL HAD THINGS UNDER CONTROL AND THAT
NO PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES WERE BEING UNDERTAKEN BY COMMANDOS.
HE SUMMARIZED THAT SECURITY SITUATION IN CAMPS HAD IMPROVED
RECENTLY.
10. KABBANI CONFIDED THAT HE HAD BEEN WORRIED FOR SOME TIME THAT, IF
IN FACT ISRAEL IS TRYING TO PROVOKE A FOURTH WAR WITH ARABS, THEN
WE COULD EXPECT THERE WOULD BE NO FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR OR
MASSIVE ASSAULTS THIS TIME, BUT GOL WOULD SIMPLY ESCALATE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITH UT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE ECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 05 STATE 004257
MILITARY SITUATION SLOWLY. KABBANI DOUBTED IF WORLD, INCLUDING
S EXAL
U.S., WOULD BE WILLING ACCEPT THIS ISRAELI TACTIC. HE WONDERED AT
POSSIBILITY THAT WHILE WE ARE WORKING FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION,
PERHAPS GOI HAS ALREADY ADOPTED PLAN FOR STEADILY RISING MILITARY
ESCALATION.
11. KABBANI SAID GOL IS WILLING TO DO WHATEVER IT CAN TO PROMOTE
A JUST AND FAIR SETTLEMENT BUT HE HOPED U.S. DOES NOT RPT NOT SEE
GOL-GOI BORDER SITUATION AS ALARMING FOR TIME BEING AT LEAST®
RESPONDING THAT WE DEFINITELY DO NOT RPT NOT WANT NEW LEBANESE
CRISIS, SISCO REPEATED WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AUTHORITY OF GOL
REASSERTED IN BORDER AREAS. NEVERTHELESS, CONSIDERING DIFFICULT
LEBANESE INTERNAL PROBLEMS WE PREPARED TO DEFER TO GOL'S
ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION ALONG BORDER. SISCO SAID THAT WHILE
STRONGER FEDAYEEN POSITION POST-RABAT MIGHT BE ARGUMENT FOR
COMPROMISE WITH THEM NOW. OVER LONG TERM GOL MUST CONTROL INTERNAL
SECURITY SITUATION. IF SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO DISCOURAGE
FEDAYEEN FROM INSTIGATING ACTS AGAINST ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE
TERRITORY, SISCO THOUGHT GOL-GOI BORDER WOULD RETURN TO QUIETTUDE
OF PAST YEARS. KABBANI EESPECIALLY PLEASED TO
HEAR FROM SISCO THAT GOI APPARENTLY HAS NO DESIGNSON LEBANESE
TERRITORY.
12° KABBANI CLOSED DISCUSSION BY GIVING HIS ANALYSIS OF RECENT
SKIRMISHES ALONG BORDER. OBSERVING ISRAELI DESIGN TO CREATE
MAJOR CRISIS WITH LEBANON, KABBANI ASKED WHY ISRAELIS HAD
SEIZED LEBANESE HOSTAGES RATHER THAN CONCENTRATING RETALIATION ON
fedayeen WHO RESPONSIBLE FOR KIDNAPPING ISRAELI FARMER. HE
ANSWERED QUESTION HIMSELF SAYING ISRAELIS DID NOT SEEK DIRECT
CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN IN ORDER AVOID CASUALITIES- KABBANI
THOUGHT KIDNAPPED FARMER WOULD HAVE BEEN RETURNED IN DUE COURSE TO
ISRAEL THROUGH RED CROSS. HOWEVER, GOI REFUSES TO DEAL WITH RED
CROSS AS WELL AS FEDAYEEN AND INSTEAD PUNISHES LEBANON BY
SEIZING DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF HOSTAGES. SISCO COMMENTED THAT
IT CLEAR ISRAELI ACTION NOT ONLY DIRECT RETALIATION BUT WAS
MEANT AS DETERRENT TO FUTURE ACTS OF THIS KING® GP-3'
ROGERS
NOTE: POUCHED BY OCT.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard SECRET Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET 556
PAGE 01 STATE 000785
EXETS EXAIS EXPIS
82
ORIGIN SS-45
70 JAN AM 8:39
SITUATION SITUATION ROOM WHITE
HOUSE
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66642
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY:NEA/RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/IAI/TAWAHL
S/S MIKE HORNBLOW
000944
R 030051Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
SECRET STATE 000785
EXDIS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HELOU'S RENEWED INTEREST IN PEACE
settlement.
REF: BEIRUT 047 AND 048
1 - WE WELCOME PRESIDENT HELOU'S CONSTRUCTIVE OUTLOOK TOWARD PEACE
settlement AND HIS DESIRE PLAY USEFUL MEDIATORY ROLE. WHILE WE
SHARE WITH YOU DOUBT WHETHER GOL IN POSITION PLAY PRODUCTIVE
ROLE, WE CERTAINLY SHALL KEEP THIS IN MIND. AMBASSADOR MAY so
INFORM PRESIDENT HELOU AND STATE THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO
OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY UPCOMING VISIT PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISER AND MICHEL KHOURI TO EXPLORE SUGGESTION FURTHER. GP-3.
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT ORION OF STATE
*
*
EXPIS
Department of State
STATES OF ARE
TELEGRAM
SECRET 204
PAGE 01 STATE 205505
82
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
66648
'69 DEC 11 AM 8:36
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE:BHBAAS 12/10/69
EXPIS EXAIS
APPROVED BY: NEA:RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA:RPDAVIES
NEA/RA:COL. BUNTE (DRAFT)
PM:RJBARNARD
DOD/ISA-MR. PRANGER
S/S-MR. BROWN
018565
R 110024Z DEC 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
SECRE T STATE 205505
EXDIS
SUBJ: ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON
REF: BEIRUT 10122
1. AMBASSADOR MAY INFORM HELOU AND OTHER APPROPRIATE GOL
OFFICIALS FOLLOWING:
A. M-14 RIFLES. USG PREPARED TO SELL LEBANON SOME 6,000
M-14 RIFLES AT COST DOLS 122 EACH WHICH USG CALCULATES
SUFFICIENT FOR MILITARY FORCE THE SIZE OF LEBANESE ARMY.
WE PLAN TO SHIP RIFLES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOLLIWING RECEIPT
POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM GOL. BECAUSE OF FACT RIFLES IN EXTREMELY
SHORT SUPPLY AND WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN FROM U.S. ARMY STOCKS,
SHIPMENT WILL BE UNDERTAKEN IN PHASES. FYI WE RECOGNIZE THAT
LEBANESE HAD ORIGINALLY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN LARGER
QUANTITY OF RIFLES. OUR FIGURE BASED BOTH ON ESTIMATED NEEDS OF
LEBANESE ARMY, TOGETHER WITH LIMITED NUMBER M-14S AVAILABLE.
END FYI.
B. CREDIT. SHOULD LEBANESE RAISE QUESTION OF CREDIT, YOU
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard SECRET Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNPARTMENT
OF
DEP
CTATE
THE
EXPIS
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 205505
MAY SAY A FORMAL REQUEST WILL BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.
FYI REGRETFULLY, WE CANNOT AUTHORIZE YOU AT THIS POINT TO ASSURE
GOL RE CREDIT AVAILABILITY BUT FOR YOUR INFORMATION WE THINK THAT
WE CAN PROVIDE DOLS 5 MILLION® END FYI.
EXPIS
C. HELICOPTERS. WE ARE PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN GOL REQUEST
FOR PURCHASE HELICOPTERS BUT WOULD NOTE THAT HELICOPTERS ARE
EXPENSIVE TO PURCHASE, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN® THEY ARE ALSO
DIFFICULT TO OPERATE AND ARE VULNERABLE. NEVERTHELESS, IF GOL
WISHES TO INITIATE PURCHASE REQUEST, WE PREPARED TO RESPOND.
UNFORTUNATELYA DELIVERY CANNOT BE ANYWHERE NEAR AS PROMPT AS M-14
SHIPMENTS AND WE ESTIMATE DELAY OF NUMBER OF MONTHS. FYI
WHILE DELIVERY DATES ON EHLICOPTERS INDICATED IN SEPARATE
DEPARTMENT ARMY MESSAGE COULD POSSIBLY BE IMPROVED, PRICES QUOTED
(DOLS 1 . 4 AND DOLS 1.8 MILLION) ARE REPRESENTATIVE: FOR HELICOPTERS
THIS TYPE AND CANNOT BE SUBSIDIZED. ALTERNATIVE HELICOPTERS WITH
LOWER PRICE WOULD HAVE MUCH SMALLER TROOP CARRYING CAPACITY,
I.E. ABOUT EIGHT MEN INSTEAD OF FORTY. SAME WOULD APPLY TO
EXPIS
OTHER THAN U.S. SOURCES. WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT GOL NOT RPT
NOT DELAY ITS DECISION TO PURCHASE M-14 RIFLES PENDING RESOLUTION
QUESTIONS THEY MAY HAVE RE HELICOPTERS IN ORDER NOT RPT NOT TO
DETRACT FROM GOOD WILL ACCRUING FROM PROMPT SUPPLY M=14'S. IF
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PRICE AND AVAILABILITY HELICOPTERS
REQUIRED, PLEASE SEND REQUEST THROUGH ORDINARY CHANNELS PUR-
SUANT TO USDAO MESSAGE 0733.
D. OTHER AID. WE HAVE NOTHING NEW TO ADD TO INFORMATION
ALREADY AVAILABLE TO YOU RE ECONOMIC MATTERS.
MA
2. YOU MAY ASSURE HELOU THAT WE WISH TO BE AS HELPFUL AS
POSSIBLE AND THAT HIS REQUESTS HAVE RECEIVED THE ATTENTION OF
HIGHEST AUTHORITIES. GP-3.
EXQIC
ROGERS
⑉02 DEC
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
951/49/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
EXEM EXATE
secret 872
PAGE 01 STATE 200895
83
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 PCH-02 /048 R
66648
APPROVED BY: NEA-JOSEPH J. SISCO
'69 DEC 3 AM 8:16
ROOM HOUSE STATE
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE 12/2/69
NEA/RPDAVIES
NEA:P:GSMITH (SUBS)
S/PRS:RJMCCLOSKEY (INFO)
S/S-MR. TAYLOR
102710
PR 030015Z DEC 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION geneva
F
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
CAIRO BY POUCH
SECRE T STATE 200895
EXDIS
SUBJ: TWA HIJACKING
REF: BEIRUT 9900
1. RE PARA 6 REFTEL, LAST WEEK DEPARTMENT INTERCEDED WITH
TOM LAMBERT OF LOS ANGELES TIMES TO PERSUADE HIM NOT RPT NOT
TO PRINT STORY OF EXCHANGE, WHICH HE HAD OBTAINED FROM
UNSPECIFIED SOURCE. LAMBERT ACCEPTED OUR VIGOROUS REPRESENTATIONS
THAT LEAK MIGHT CAUSE WHOLE DEAL TO ABORT AND THUS ULTIMATELY
PLACE IN JEOPARDY LIVES OF TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS.
2. SUGGEST YOU SIMILARLY APPROACH ANY OTHER US CORRESPONDENTS
WHO HAVE GOTTEN WIND OF DEAL. WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHO
THEY ARE.
3 . BEIRUT'S 9899 JUST RECEIVED. COMMEND YOUR INTERCESSION
WITH jesse LEWIS. GP-3.
RICHARDSON
NOTE: POUCHED BY ocT.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THEAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 145
PAGE 01 STATE 197912
EXPIC EXCLUS EXPIS
88
ORIGIN SS-45
02
INFO OCT-01 1046 R
'69 NOV 26 AM 8:53
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
66633
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA/ARN:TALCOTT W. SEELYE
J/PM:MR. BARNARD SUBS MC : MR . KAUFFMAN SUBS S/S MR. BROWN
066948
R 252253Z NOV 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
SECR ET STATE 197912
EXDIS
SUBJ: LEBANESE MILITARY PROCUREMENT IN U.S.
REF: BEIRUT 9568
1. SARKIS SOGHANALIAN MADE INITIAL CONTACT IN DEPAT-
MENT AS SUGGESTED REFTEL. SOGHANALIAN STATED THAT
LEBANSES SECURITY FORCES WOULD PREFER PURCHASE GAS
CALLED "SICKENING AGENT (DM)" RATHER THAN TEAR GAS.
THIS GAS DESCRIBED IN BROCHURE PUT OUT BY LAKE ERIE
CHEMICAL COMPANY, ROCK GREEK, OHIO. SOGHANALIAN NOT
SPECIFIC ON QUANTITIES OF GAS REQUIRED OR ON BUDGET
AVAILABLE THIS PURPOSE. HE STATED QUANTITY WILL BE
DETERMINED AFTER HIS CONSULTATION WITH LAKE ERIE
CHEMICAL AND HE INDICATED HE MIGHT BE ABLE SPEND AS
MUCH AS HALF MILLION DOLLARS. SOGHANALIAN ALSO STATED
THAT IT IMPORTANT AVOID U.S. INDENTIFICATION WITH RIOT
CONTROL GASES, AND HE SAID THAT IF PURCHASE CONCLUDED
HE WOULD ARRANGE AT SOME TRANSIT POINT SUCH AS VIENNA
TO MODIFY SHIPPING DOCUMENTS TO OBSCURE ORIGIN OF GASES.
20 SOGHANALIAN ALSO CONSULTED WITH OFFICIALS OF
POLITICALVMILITARY AFFAIRS AND MUNITIONS CONTROL. HE
WAS ADVISED OF EXPORT LICENSE REQUIREMENTS AND WAS INFORMED
THAT HIS APPLICATION WOULD BE EXPEDITED.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 197912
EXQIN EXPIS EXPIS
3 o SOGHANALIAN WAS RATHER VAGUE AND LEFT IMPRESSION
THAT HE NOT QUITE SURE OF WHAT HE WISHED TO BUY. HE
DEPARTING FOR OHIO EVENING NOVEMBER 25, AND WE ASSUME
HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH LAKE ERIE WILL SERVE TO CLARIFY
HIS REQUIREMENTS.
4. SOGHANALIAN PERSISTED IN RAISING QUESTION OF HIS
PURCHASING M-14 RIFLES FOR LEBANESE ARMY. HE WAS
INFORMED EMPHATICALLY THAT QUESTION OF SUPPLY OF
EQUIPMENT SUCH AS REFLES IS MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED
ON GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT BASIS AND THAT WE HAD
NO RPT NO INFORMATION TO GIVE HIM ON THIS MATTER.
GP-3
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
LS1/40/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT DEP OF
STATE
CLINO
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET 834
PAGE 01 STATE 196803:
39
EXQIC EXELS EXPIN EXPIN
SUMMARY
81
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 R
DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN BHBAASIEK
11/23/69
APPROVED BY NEA MR. DAVIES
S/S-0 MR. RICH
NEA/ARN seelme
055635
Z 240429Z NOV 69 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH
USINT CAIRO
SEECER EFT STATE 196803
EXDIS
REF.BEIRUT 9676
1. YOU SHOULD INFORM ICRC THAT OUR CLEAR UNDERSTANDING
WITH ISRAELIS IS THAT THEY PREPARED TO EXCHANGE WITH UAR
A NUMBER OF UAR PERSONNEL PLUS TWO SYRIAN PILOTS IN RETURN
FOR TWO ISRAELI PILOTS HELD IN UAR PROVIDED SARG RELEASES
TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS AT LEAST 48 HOURS BEFOREHAND.
WHILE WE CANNOT ULTIMATELY GUARANTEE ISRAELI PERFORMANCE
WE HAVE NO DOUBT THEY DEALING IN GOOD FAITH.
FURTHERMORE YOU MAY HAVE ICRC ASSURE SYRIANS THAT ISRAELIS
HAVE MADE IT CLEAR To USG THAT THEY WILL MEET THEIR PART
OF BARGAIN. USG FULLY EXPECTS THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR
PART OF WHATEVER ARRANGEMENT MAY BE REACHED.
2. WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR ISRAEL WITH REGARD ADDITIONAL
SYRIAN PERSONNEL NOW DEMANDED BY SARG AS PART OF EXCHANGE.
SARG SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT ISRAEL HAS MET ITS ORIGINAL
PROPOSAL (TWO ISRAELIS FOR TWO SYRIANS) AND SARG SHOULD
NOT BE THE ONE TO RENEGE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET 834
EXQIC EXQIN
PAGE 01 STATE 196803:
81
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 R
'69 NOV 24 AM 8:46
SITU TIONROOM
WHI 2 HOUSE
DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN BHBAASTEK
11/23/69
APPROVED BY NEA MR. DAVIES
S/S-0 MR. RICH
NEA/ARN SEELME
055635
Z 240429Z NOV 69 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH
USINT CAIRO
S EIC R ENT STATE 196803
EXDIS
REF.BEIRUT 9676
1. YOU SHOULD INFORM ICRC THAT OUR CLEAR UNDERSTANDING
WITH ISRAELIS IS THAT THEY PREPARED TO EXCHANGE WITH UAR
A NUMBER OF UAR PERSONNEL PLUS TWO SYRIAN PILOTS IN RETURN
FOR TWO ISRAELI PILOTS HELD IN UAR PROVIDED SARG RELEASES
TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS AT LEAST 48 HOURS BEFOREHAND.
WHILE WE CANNOT ULTIMATELY GUARANTEE ISRAELI PERFORMANCE,
WE HAVE NO DOUBT THEY DEALING IN GOOD FAITH.
FURTHERMORE, YOU MAY HAVE ICRC ASSURE SYRIANS THAT ISRAELIS
HAVE MADE IT CLEAR To USG THAT THEY WILL MEET THEIR PART
OF BARGAIN. USG FULLY EXPECTS THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR
PART OF WHATEVER ARRANGEMENT MAY BE REACHED
2. WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR ISRAEL WITH REGARD ADDITIONAL
SYRIAN PERSONNEL NOW DEMANDED BY SARG AS PART OF EXCHANGE.
SARG SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT ISRAEL HAS MET ITS ORIGINAL
PROPOSAL (TWO ISRAELIS FOR TWO SYRIANS) AND SARG SHOULD
NOT BE THE ONE TO RENEGE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE ALETHRORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon/Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED DIPARTMENT * THE OF STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET 393
PAGE 01 STATE 195787
EXEMS EXPIS EXPIC
92
ORIGIN SS=45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 R
66636
DRAFTED BY&NEA/ARNBHBAAS
APPROVED BY:J:U ALEXIS JOHNSON
NEA8MR SISCO
NEA&MR DAVIES
NEA/ARN$MR SEELYE
NEA/IAI:MR ATHERTON
NEA/UAR:MR PARKER
S/S:MR LEVITSKY
041475
O 210103Z NOV 69 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION GENEVA
S E CUR E T STATE 195787
EXDIS
DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
SUBJ: TWA HIJACKING
REF BEIRUT 9635
1. DETAILS OF THREE-CORNERED EXCHANGE SPELLED OUT
PARAGRAPH ONE BEIRUT 9635 ARE SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT.
BECAUSE OF ITS EXTREME SENSITIVITY, PROPOSAL HAS BEEN
HELD VERY CLOSELY TO DATE. FACT THAT IT PICKED UP IN
DAMASCUS AND BEING PLAYED BACK MAKES IT APPARENT THAT
LEAKAGE OCCURRING. NEVERTHELESS, WE WISH CONTINUE HOLD
IT AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE.
2° TWA AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN REPAIRED AND COULD DEPART
DAMASCUS AT ANY TIME. WE BELIEVE DEPARTURE AIRCRAFT
LETECKVW
STATE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCEDR at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF
STATE #
EXPIN
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 195787
PROVIDES EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR SARG PERMIT
DEPARTURE PASSENGTRS WITH MINIMUM FANFARE TWA ALSO
VERY INTERESTED, SINCE IT RELUCTANT REPATRIATE
AIRCRAFT AND LEAVE TWO PASSENGERS AS PRISONERS IN
DAMASCUS.
30 ISRAELIS EXTREMELY AGGRAVATED AT SYRIA'S BAZAAR
HAGGLING AND THERE DISTINCT DANGER THAT DEAL MAY FALL
THROUGH. DESPITE THIS, YOU SHOULD URGENTLY APPROACH
UARG AND, DRAWING ON BEIRUT 9635, URGE UAR DO WHATEVER
POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE SARG TO RELEASE PASSENGERS IN
RETURN FOR TWO SYRIAN PILOTS TO BE RELEASED INTO UAR
CUSTODY. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THIS IS WHAT SYRIANS
PROPOSED ORIGINALLY AND THEY NOW APPARENTLY RENEGING.
FUTHERMORE, UARG SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT SUCCESSFUL
CONCLUSION PROPOSED EXCHANGE IS CLEARLY IN INTEREST OF
UAR TO WHICH OVER 50 EGYPTIAN NATIONALS WILL BE REPATRIATED.
GP=3. ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
971/20/029Q
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED DIPARTMENT # STATES OF STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
EXPIN EXATE
OF
CONFIDENTIAL 791
PAGE 01 STATE 193557
47
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 R
66607
DRAFTED BY₈ NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARN - TALCOTT W. SEELYE
NEA/IAI - MR. WAHL
EVTT - MR. LOY (INFO)
S/S E - MR. BROWN
024966
0 181555Z NOV 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
CONFIDENTIA L STATE 193557
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING
1. TWA CONTACTED DEPARTMENT MORNING NOVEMBER 18 TO
REPORT THAT NEW YORK HEADQUARTERS HAD JUST RECEIVED
TELEPHONE CALL FROM TWA PARIS OFFICE WHICH PASSED CRYPTIC
MESSAGE THAT NOVEMBER 19 WOULD BE "MAGIC DATE" IN
DAMASCUS. NO FURTHER INFORMATION SUPPLIED.
2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENT YOU MAY HAVE ON THIS
REPORT.
GP=3.
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THONEUDEORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT BER OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 385
PAGE 01 STATE 191882
EXPIS EXPIC EXAIS
89
ORIGIN SS 45
02/03
INFO OCT 01/046 R
66639
DRAFTED BY:IO/UNP:TJCAROLAN
APPROVED BY:IO (2) SAMUEL DE PALMA
NEA/IAI a MR. WAHL
IO/UNP a MR. DAY
NEA/ARN - MR. SEELYE
S/S a MR. TAYLOR
IO/OIA e MR - LAWRENCE
001424
R 140111Z NOV 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USMISSION USUN NY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 191882
EXDIS
SUB: FEDAYEEN AND UNRWA CAMPS IN LEBANON
10 NOV 13 NY TIMES CARRIED FRONT-PAGE DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT
ARTICLE DATELINED BOURJ EL-BARAJNEH REFUGEE CAMP, LEBANON,
NOV 12 AND HEADLINED: "COMMANDOS RULE 14 REFUGEE CAMPS -
LEBANESE AUTHORITIES ARE OUSTED BY PALESTINIANS FROM UN
SETTLEMENTS" (TEXT BEING POUCHED). AUTHOR DESCRIBES VISIT
UNDER PFLP AUSPICES TO BOURJ EL-BARAJNEH CAMP WHICH HE
FOUND TOTALLY UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL, GUARDED AND PATROLLED
BY ARMED COMMANDOS, AND SCENE OF GUERRILLA TRAINING ACTIVITIES.
ATMOSPHERE IS DESCRIBED AS "ELECTRIC", WITH CONSTRUCTION OF
BUILDINGS "LONG PROHIBITED BY THE AUTHORITIES," INCLUDING NEW
PFLP HEADQUARTERS, PROCEEDING AT RAPID PACE. ONE YOUNG MAN
TOLD SCHMIDT OF PLANS TO HOLD ELECTIONS TO A PEOPLE'S COUNCIL.
"HE SAYS THAT EACH OF THE VARIOUS COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS IS
CARRYING ON MILITARY TRAINING SEPARATELY, BUT THAT A SYSTEM TO
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 191882
EXPIS EXQIN EXPIS EXPIRE
SHARE AUTHORITY IS BEING WORKED OUT. He OBSERVED "WE ARE HAPPY
NOW. WE WON'T ACCEPT THE RETURN OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HERE.
WE WON'T LET THE GENDARMES BACK UNLESS WE ARE ALL KILLED."
IMPLICATION IS THAT SIMILAR CONDITIONS EXIST IN 13 OTHER
REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANONo ONLY CAMP NOT UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL
REPORTED TO BE MAR ELIAS, "A FEW HUNDRED YARDS FROM UNRWA
HEADQUARTERS."
2. ANOTHER SHORT ARTICLE QUOTES MICHELMORE AS SAYING IN NY HE
WAS CONFIDENT LEBANESE AUTHORITIES WOULD BE ABLE CARRY OUT THEIR
POLICING RESPONSIBILITY® AT SAME TIME, MICHELMORE STRESSED THAT
MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER IN CAMPS IS HOST GOVT RESPONSIBILITY.
ARTICLE DRAWS ATTENTION TO FACT THAT ANNUAL UNGA DEBATE ON
UNRWA AND ARAB REFUGEES IS SCHEDULED BEGIN SOON (COMMENT:
PROBABLY NOV 17) AND THAT CONGRESS NOW CONSIDERING FY 1970 US
CONTRIBUTION TO UNRWA (COMMENT: HOUSE FLOOR ACTION ON AID
AUTHORIZATION BILL SCHEDULED NOV 19=20).
3° FOR BEIRUT: IN LIGHT OF ABOVE, DEPT WOULD APPRECIATE
RECEIVING AS MUCH DETAILED INFO AS POSSIBLE ON CURRENT FEDAYEEN
ACTIVITIES AMONG REFUGEES AND IN UNRWA CAMPS, AS WELL AS
ASSESSMENT BY AGENCY OFFICIALS OF WHAT AVENUES, IF ANY, REMAIN
OPEN TO LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO ALLEVIATE SITUATION.
40 FOR USUN: REQUEST YOU PURSUE SAME OBJECTIVE WITH
MICHELMORE, ASSURING HIM OF OUR DESIRE ADOPT AS HELPFUL AND
SYMPATHETIC POSITION AS POSSIBLE IN REPLYING TO PROBABLE
CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ON THIS SUBJECT. WE WONDER, IN PARTIC-
ULAR, IF AT SOME STAGE IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR UNRWA, WITH
GOL AGREEMENT, TO SUSPEND OPERATIONS IN ANY CAMP WHERE GOL
AUTHORITY MAY NO LONGER EXIST (AND ASSISTANCE THEREFORE PRESUMABLY
GOING TO FEDAYEEN), AND WHETHER MICHELMORE WOULD VIEW THIS AS
POSSIBLE UNDER UNRWA'S MANDATE. GP-3
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE CONFIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
791/40/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PREARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
EXCIS EXCL
SECRET 838
PAGE 01 STATE 191141
81
2
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01//046 R
66633
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:JOSEPH Je SISCO
NEA/ARN8MR= SEELYE S/S MR. TAYLOR
NEA/IAI8MR= ATHERTON
125441
'69 NOV 13 AM 8:32 32
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
R 130157Z NOV 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S E C R E T STATE 191141
EXDIS
SUBJ: JOINT US-USSR WORKING PAPER
REF: STATE 189515: BEIRUT 9199
1 - ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO CALLED IN LEBANESE AMBASSADOR
KABBANI NOVEMBER 12 TO HAND HIM COPY JOINT US-USSR WORKING
PAPER ON ISRAEL-UAR ASPECT OF SETTLEMENT®
2. SISCO TOLD KABBANI THAT, SINCE THEY LAST DISCUSSED
SUBJECT THERE HAD BEEN TWO PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS:
(A) SUBSEQUENT TO CONSULTATIONS AT UN, WE AND SOVIETS
AGREED ON RHODES-TYPE FORMULA AND (B) ON OCTOBER 28 WE
MADE MAJOR NEW PROPOSAL TO SOVIETS TO BREAK IMPASSE.
SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT FOR FIRST TIME WE ARE SAYING
CLEARLY AND CATEGORICALLY THAT FORMER INTERNATIONAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT BE OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 22Ø
PAGE 01 STATE 191690
81
02
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 R
EXATE
66647
DRAFTED BY: AF/N: FGWISNER
APPROVED BY: AFN: CWBRAY III
AF/I: MR. RUCHTI
DOD/ISA: MR. LARDNER
S/S: MR. BROWN
J/PM: MASP: MR. SCHMELZER
AID/AFR/NA: MISS VARRATI (INFO)
000689
R 132303Z NOV 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TUNIS
S E C R E T STATE 191690
EXDIS
SUBJ: TUNISIAN SECURITY DISCUSSIONS
REF: TUNIS 6475
1 - POINTS YOU RAISE ON CONDUCT SECURITY DISCUSSIONS WITH GOT WELL
TAKEN. WE REALIZE HOW RESTRICTIVE GUIDANCE SEEMS TO BE: HOWEVER,
PURPOSE OF GUIDANCE WAS TO AVOID DEVELOPMENT OF A SECURITY PLAN
WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS JOINT USG-GOT ASSESSMENT WITH
IMPLICATION US FULLY SHARED GOT ESTIMATE OF THREAT AND COMMITTED
IN ADVANCE TO FULFILLMENT OF PLAN. PARAGRAPHS 3B AND C STATE'S
170374 WERE WRITTEN WITH INTENT THAT MORE THAN NARROW TECHNICAL
DATA BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN USLOT, USAID AND RESPONSIBLE GOT OFFICES.
2. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT EMBASSY, USLOT AND USAID COULD PLAY A
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE: (A) ENGAGING IN CONTINUING DIALOGUE, OFFERING
SUGGESTIONS HOW BEST TO PREPARE PLAN AND GIVING TECHNICAL DATA,
(B) ENCOURAGING REALISTIC FRAMEWORK BY POINTING OUT FINANCIAL
PROBLEMS GOT MIGHT HAVE IN SUPPORTING FORCES AND EQUIPMENT CONSIDERED,
AND (C) POINTING OUT AS APPROPRIATE INABILITY OF USG (OR OTHER DONORS)
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
DEP
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXATE
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 191690
TO CONSIDER EXPENSIVE END ITEMS OR SUPPORTING OVERLY AMBITIOUS
FORCE STRUCTURE. IN SHORT OUR POSITION SHOULD BE THAT OF A
FRIEND WHO OFFERS ADVICE, WITHOUT BECOMING ENMESHED IN DECISION
MAKING PROCESS.
3. YOU SHOULD SUBMIT COMPLETE GOT PLAN WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS,
SEPARATELY APPENDED BUT NOT DISCUSSED WITH GOT, FOR CONSIDERATION
HERE. ONCE WE HAVE STUDIED GOT SUBMISSION AND YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS
WE WILL BE ABLE DECIDE IF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS HERE ARE ADVISABLE.
4. WE AWARE CLOWES REPORT DID NOT SEE THREAT EMANATING FROM LIBYA
BUT FEEL COUP HAS NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY MILITARY REALITIES
INVOLVED. WHILE WE APPRECIATE FULLY PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT COUP HAS
HAD ON TUNISIAN LEADERSHIP, WE DO NOT SEE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT
OF LIBYAN CAPABILITIES ON THE HORIZON THAT WOULD POSE A REAL
THREAT TO TUNISIA.
5. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE AS RESPONSIVE TO TUNISIA AS WE CAN, BUT
FUNDING OF FY 1970 WORLD-WIDE MAP PROGRAM APPEARS TO BE IN DEEP
TROUBLE IN CONGRESS. HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HAS JUST
COMPLETED MARK-UP OF PROGRAM AND HAS RECOMMENDED SUBSTANTIAL
MAP CUTS (DOLS 75 MILLION OUT OF DOLS 425 MILLION). IT WILL BE SOME
WEEKS BEFORE SENATE ACTS ON AUTHORIZATION BILL AND APPROPRIATIONS
BILL IS ENACTED BUT SOUNDINGS APPEAR OMINOUS AND WE ANTICIPATE
STILL GREATER CUTS. WE SHALL TRY TO GET MODEST INCREASE IN FY 1971
FOR TUNISIA BUT, THERE IS LITTLE HOPE THAT FY 1970 MAP COULD BE
RAISED ABOVE DOLS 3.5 MILLION.
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAURHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
+91/20/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DER VA STATE
*
Department of State
EXELS
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 280
PAGE 01 STATE 185151
83
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 R
66642
'69 NOV du AM 9:50
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
DRAFTED BY:NEA/IAI:WBSMITH
APPROVED BY:NEA/JOSEPH J SISCO
EUR: MR SWANK
S/S MR B BROWN
051300
R 010038Z NOV 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
S ECRET STATE 185151
EXDIS
SUBJECT: SISCO- TOMKINS TALK ON LEBANON
1. WHILE MEETING WITH UK MINISTER TOMKINS ON ANOTHER
SUBJECT, SISCO BRIEFED HIM ON DISCUSSION OF LEBANON
IN SISCO-DOBRYNIN SESSION OCT 28. SISCO HAD EXPLAINED
TO DOBRYNIN (1) WE VIEW SITUATION IN LEBANON SERIOUSLY
AND WITH CONCERN AND (2) WE ARE NOT ADDING TO OR SUB-
TRACTING FROM ANY PREVIOUS US STATEMENTS RE POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON AND OUR
CONCERN FOR THEIR MAINTENANCE.
2. SISCO HAD RAISED CHARGE IN TASS STATEMENT TO EFFECT
THAT US INTERVENING IN LEBANESE SITUATION OR INTENDING
TO DO so, AS WELL AS FACT THAT SOVIETS HAVE PICKED
UP ALLEGATIONS RE US CITIZENS IN ISRAELI ARMED FORCES.
TOLD DOBRYNIN US HAS NOT ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EXCHANGE
BECAUSE SITUATION IN L'EBANON DIFFICULT. SOVIETS,
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 185151
HOWEVER SHOULD NOT MISINTERPRET OUR SILENCE
3. SISCO HAD MADE CLEAR SOVIET STATEMENTS NOT HELPFUL
FOR ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING TWO POWER TALKS ON ARAB-
ISRAEL settlement. PROBLEM WAS NOT U.S. INTERVENTION,
BUT FACT THAT SYRIA BEARS MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR
BRINGING ON AND AGGRAVATING LEBANESE CRISIS. SOVIETS
SHOULD BE AWARE THAT IF SITUATION BECAME MAJOR CHALLENGE
IT LIKELY TO INVITE REACTION FROM OTHER QUARTERS WITH FURTHER
DETERIORATION IN AREA AND DIFFICULT CHOICES FOR BOTH SOVIETS AND
US * OUR ADVICE TO SOVIETS, THEREFORE, WAS TO HALT PROPAGANDA
STATEMENTS AND TO DO WHAT IS NEEDED: EXERCISE INFLUENCE,
ESPECIALLY IN DAMASCUS.
4. TOMKINS REMARKED HE DID NOT LIKE TASS STATEMENT.
ASKED IF SISCO THOUGHT IT PROMPTED BY SOVIET MISUNDERSTANDING
OF US STATEMENT RE LEBANON OF OCT 10 OR WAS INTENDED TO
COUNTER US STATEMENT.
5. SISCO REPLIED THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING WHATEVER
WITH SOVIETS. AS SISCO HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED, US
STATEMENT WAS NO ACCIDENT. MOREOVER, SOVIETS WERE PRESENT
IN AUDIENCE AND KNEW THAT US STATEMENT WAS DIRECTED
EXPIN EXPIS
TOWARD CONCERN OVER RECENT ISRAELI INCURSIONS. SUBSEQUENT
SOVIET PROPAGANDA AMOUNTS TO MANEUVERING TO GAIN CREDIT
FOR QUOTE TELLING AMERICANS TO STAY OUT UNQUOTE. SOVIETS
THUS ENGAGED IN TACTICAL POLITICAL EXPLOITATION OF TENSION.
6.SISCO ADDED THAT IN OUR JUDGMENT SOVIETS DO NOT WANT
MAJOR SHOW-DOWN IN LEBANON. ALSO, WE DO NOT BELIVE UAR
WANTS SYRIAN BAATHIST ASCENDANCY IN LEBANON. SISCO REPLIED
NEGATIVEL TO TOMKINS' QUESTION WHETHER SOVIETS HAD
INDICATED US SHOULD NOT TAKE SERIOUSLY TASS STATEMENT.
SISCO SAID HE HAD MADE DELIBERATE AND CAREFUL PRESENTATION
TO DOBRYNIN RE LEBANON, LEAVING NO CHANGE THAT SOVIETS
NOT UNDERSTAND.
7. SISCO NOTED US CONSELLING RESTRAINT WITH ISRAELIS: AND
HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT ALLON STATEMENT RE LEBANON UNHELPFUL,
WHICH IS OUR VIEW. ALLON STATEMENT, NEVERTHELESS, REFLECTS
FIRM MOOD OF ISRAELI PEOPLE. SISCO UNABLE TO FORESEEI WHAT
ISRAELIS MIGHT DO IF SUBSTANTIAL TAKEOVER OF LEBANONI
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
,
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXCELS EXQ EXPIS
PAGE 03 STATE 185151
BY SYRIANS APPEARED IMMINENT.
8. SISCO COMMENTED HE HAD IMPRESSION THAT SOVIETS MAY
SHARE OUR CONCERN THAT ISRAEL, IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES,
MIGHT TAKE MAJOR ACTION WITH RESPECTITO LEBANON. IT
APPEARED LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT SOVIETS WILL SEEK TO
EXPLOIT SITUATION ONLY UP TO A POINT. PURPOSE OF SISCO'S
CONVERSATION RE LEBANON WITH DOBRYNIN WAS TO MAKE CALM,
STRAIGHT-FORWARD STATEMENT OF OUR VIEWS. US INSTEAD COULD
HAVE MADE PUBLIC COUNTER BLAST, BUT THIS WOULD INJECT
ELEMENT OF CONFRONTATION.
9. TOMKINS ASKED IF US HAS LEFT SOVIETS IN DOUBT
ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE US REACTIONS OR MOVES IN LEBANON
SITUATION. SISCO EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS CASE TO
EXTENT THAT HE HAD NEITHER ADDED NOR SUBSTRACTED FROM
US STATEMENT ON INDPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF
LEBANON. ARAB MEDIATION EFFORTS GOING FORWARD,
MUSLIM CHRISTIAN CONFLICT HAS NOT DEVELOPED, AND SITUATION
HAS EASED SOMEWHAT. WE HAVE IMPRESSION THAT LEBANESE
OF ALL STRIPES RESENT SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT. ALSO, NASSER
WATCHING CLOSELY TO INSURE SYRIANS DO NOT GET UPPER HAND.
10. SISCO SUMMARIZED BY SAYING WE HAD ADVISED SOVIETS
BEST THING THEY COULD DO WAS EXERCISE INFLUENCE WITH
SYRIANS. IN THIS CONNECTION, SISCO OBSERVED THERE WAS
NO SOVIET OR US MEDIATION EFFORT CURRENTLY GOING ON,
BUT WE BOTH STANDING BY AS ARAB EFFORTS BEING PURSUED. GP-3.
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT DEP OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 890
PAGE 01 STATE 184687
83
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 R
EXPIS
66642
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA/JOSEPH J SISCO
NEA/ARN MR SEELY
'69 NOV | AM 9: 9:50
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
EUR/FBX MR LONG
S/S MR BROWN
050207
R 312058Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NY
SECRE T STATE 184687
EXDIS
SUBJECT: LEBANESE CRISIS
REF: STATE 182824
1. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION ON ANOTHER SUBJECT OCTOBER 30,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO BRIEFED FRENCH AMBASSADOR LUCET ON
SISCO'S OCTOBER 28 DISCUSSION WITH DOBRYNIN ON LEBANESE
CRISIS.
2. SISCO TOLD LUCET THAT HE HAD RAISED WITH DOBRYNIN FACT
THAT US. HAS BECOME TARGET OF CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT US
IN ARAB WORLD. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO FALSE ACCUSA-
TIONS REGARDING SERVICE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN IDF AS
WELL AS DISTORTIONS OF SISCO'S OCTOBER 10 STATEMENT
IN SUPPORT OF LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY.
OUR STATEMENT ON LEBANON HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTATHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT PERA OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 184687
MISINTERPRETED AS INTERFERENCE IN LEBANON'S DOMESTIC
AFFAIRS.
3. SISCO ALSO NOTED THAT HE HAD TOLD DOBRYNIN THAT,
WHILE WE DO NOT INTEND BE DRAWN INTO PUBLIC DEBATE,
to
EXATE
SOVIETS SHOULD NOT MISINTERPRET OUR SILENCE. WE VIEW
LEBANESE SITUATION WITH CONCERN AND HOPE MEDIATION
EFFORTS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE
IT OUTCOME THESE EFFORTS IS SITUATION IN WHICH ELEMENTS
OPPOSED TO PEACEFUL ARAB=ISRAEL settlement ARE STRENGTHENED.
IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SYRIA BEARS MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CURRENT CRISIS. DOBRYNIN WAS ALSO TOLD THAT WE HOPE SOVIETS
UNDERSTAND THAT SITUATION COULD EVOLVE WHICH COULD POSE
DIFFICULT CHOICE FOR BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS. SISCO
TOLD DOBRYNIN THAT, IF SOVIETS INTERESTED IN CALMING
SITUATION, THEY SHOULD TAKE FIRM LINE IN DAMASCUS.
DOBRYNIN SAID HE WOULD REPORT SISCO'S REMARKS TO
MOSCOW. GP = 3 .
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
191/20/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 910
EXPIS EXELL EXATE
PAGE 01 STATE 184395
02
81
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 R
66639
DRFAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA B JOSEPH J.e SISCO
NEA/ARN a MR. SEELYE
S/S a MR. GLEYSTEEN
041993
R 310046Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
SECRET STATE 184395
EXDIS
SUBJECT: LEBANESE CRISIS
REFs STATE 182824
1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO CALLED IN LEBANESE AMBASSADOR
KABBANI OCTOBER 30 TO COMPARE NOTES ON LEBANESE CRISIS AND TO
INFORM KABBANI OF POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN WITH SOVIETS.
2. SISCO ASKED KABBANI'S ASSESSMENT LEBANESE REACTION TO
SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN CURRENT CRISIS. KABBANI SAID LEBANESE
BASICALLY WANT TO BE LEFT IN PEACE AND WOULD PREFER HANDLE
FEDAYEEN THEMSELVES. SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IS NOT TO THE LEBANESE
A QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN, BUT OF SYRIAN INTERFERENCE
IN LEBANESE AFFAIRS. LEBANESE OPPOSED TO THIS. AS FOR MEDIATION
EFFORTS UNDERWAY CAIRO, KABBANI OBSERVED THAT FACT THAT NASSER
PROPOSED MEDIATION INDICATES HE FEELS AGREEMENT POSSIBLE.
KABBANI OPINED SOME CONCESSION TO FEDAYEEN NECESSARY a ONLY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 184395
EXEIS EXPIS EXPIS
QUESTION IS HOW MUCH. KABBANI ALSO NOTED THAT LEBANESE ARE
BUYING TIME, INASMUCH AS LEBANON WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE PROBLEMS
AS LONG AS BASIC ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUE UNRESOLVED.
3. SISCO INFORMED KABBANI THAT ON OCTOBER 28 HE HAD RAISED
WITH DOBRYNIN FACT THAT U.S. HAS BECOME TARGET OF CAMPAIGN TO
DISCREDIT US IN ARAB WORLD. SISCO SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO
FALSE ACCUSATIONS REGARDING SERVICE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN IDF
AS WELL AS DISTORTIONS OF SISCO'S OCTOBER 10 STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
OF LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY. STATEMENT ON LEBANON HAD
BEEN MADE IN CONTEXT CONCERN OVER ISRAELI INCURSIONS AND IT
DISTURBING IT TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT AND DISTORTED. SISCO
NOTED HE ALSO TOLD DOBRYNIN THAT, WHILE WE DO NOT INTEND BE
DRAWN INTO PUBLIC DEBATE, SOVIETS SHOULD NOT MISINTERPRET OUR
SILENCE. WE VIEW LEBANESE SITUATION WITH CONCERN AND HOPE
MEDIATION EFFORTS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE
IF OUTCOME THESE EFFORTS IS SITUATION IN WHICH ELEMENTS OPPOSED
TO PEACEFUL ARAB= ISRAEL SETTLEMENT ARE STRENGTHENED. IT IS OUR
VIEW THAT SYRIA BEARS MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR CURRENT CRISIS.
SICSO TOLD DOBRYNIN THAT IF SOVIETS INTERESTED IN CALMING
SITUATION, THEY SHOULD TAKE FIRM LINE IN DAMASCUS. WE ARE
SURE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THAT SITUATION COULD DEVELOP WHICH
COULD POSE DIFFICULT CHOICES FOR BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS. SISCO
ALSO INFORMED KABBANI THAT WE DID NOT RETRACT ANYTHING WE HAVE
SAID IN SUPPORT OF LEBANESE INTEGRITY.
4. SISCO ALSO STATED THAT DURING MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN WE
MADE MAJOR EFFORT TO BREAK DEADLOCK ON ACHIEVING COMMON DOCUMENT
ON ARAB=ISRAEL SETTLEMENT.
5 © SISCO QUERIED KABBANI ON IRAQI AND SYRIAN ATTITUDES IN
CURRENT CRISIS. KABBANI SAID IRAQIS WOULD NOT WANT PRO-SYRIAN
GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON. KABBANI SAID MAIN PREOCCUPATION OF
LEBANESE IS NATURE OF COMPROMISE WITH FEDAYEEN AND REACTION TO IT.
HE NOTED THAT SOME ELEMENTS, SUCH AS THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE,
WILL NOT ACCEPT MAJOR CONCESSIONS TO FEDAYEEN. HE ALSO SAID
ISRAELI FOREBEARANCE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AT THIS JUNCTURE.
SISCO NOTED THAT WE CAN BE OF HELP ON THIS. GP = 3
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
891/E0/029Q
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 245
EXPIS EXPIC
PAGE 01 STATE 182820
82
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 R
66646
DRAFTED BY&NEA/ARN:BAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA/SISCO
NEA/ARN/SEELYE
S/S&GLEYSTEEN
EUR/FBX/LONG
027181
R 290122Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
'69 OCT 29 AM 8:27
WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
SECRE T STATE 182820
EXDIS
SUBJ: LEBANON CRISIS
REF 8 PARIS 16569 AND 16586
1 - FRENCH AMB LUCET CALLED ON ASST SECY
SISCO ON OCT 28 TO CONVEY TO SISCO FURTHER COMMENTARY
FROM ALPHAND ON PROPOSAL FOR FOUR-POWER STATEMENT TO
CALM LEBANESE SITUATION LUCET NOTED THAT ALPHAND HAD
SEEN BLAKE, AND LUCET'S PRESENTATION FOLLOWED CLOSELY
POINTS RAISED IN REFTELS. LUCET REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE
FRENCH ATTACH TO RESUMPTION OF FOUR-POWER TALKS, AND,
WITH REGARD TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS, NOTED THAT ALPHAND
BELIEVES THE LESS SAID THE BETTER.
20 SISCO SAID WE ENTIRELY AGREE WITH ALPHAND THAT
FURTHER PUBLIC CONTROVERSY IS NOT HELPFUL. SISCO
WENT ON TO NOTE THAT WE AGREE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 182820
FRENCH ASSESSMENT THAT THE MAIN DIFFICULTIES IN THE
AREA ARISE FROM IMPASSE OVER POLITICAL settlement.
WE DO NOT AGREE, SISCO SAID, THAT ONE CAN LOOK AT
LEBANESE SITUATION IN ISOLATION FROM OTHER PROBLEMS IN
AREA. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE WHEN CONSIDERING THE
IMPACT AND BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF LEBANESE SITUATION
FOR OTHER ARABS AND ARAB-ISRAEL CONFRONTATION. IF
CRISIS CONTINUES AND IF SERIOUS CONFRONTATION OCCURS,
ISRAELIS MIGHT BE STIMULATED INTO ACTION AND THIS COULD
EXPLO EXPIS EXPIC
HAVE VERY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES INDEED. ULTIMATE OBJECT
OF FOUR=POWER CONSULTATIONS IS TO FIND MEANS OF BRINGING
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE AREA, AND ANYTHING THAT CAN
BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THIS LINE WOULD BE HELPFUL TO
SITUATION PREVAILING IN LEBANON.
3 ᵉ SISCO INFORMED LUCET HE HAD SEEN DOBRYNIN
EARLIER IN THE DAY AND TOLD LUCET THAT HE HAD CONVEYED
A NUMBER OF POINTS:
A o WE THINK IT VERY unhelpful THAT SOVIET PRESS
AND PROPAGANDA HAVE DISTORTED (1) ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT
OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN IDF AND (2) OUR STATEMENT IN
SUPPORT OF LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY. SUCH
DISTORTIONS ARE HARDLY HELPFUL IN FACILITATING PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT.
B ° DOBRYNIN WAS ALSO INFORMED THAT WE HAVE NO
INTENTION OF GETTING INTO PUBLIC EXCHANGE ON THE
MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION.
Co WE HAVE BEFORE US DELICATE AND SERIOUS SITUATION.
SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN, SINCE IT
COULD STIMULATE REACTIONS THAT MIGHT POSE BOTH THE US
AND USSR WITH DIFFICULT CHOICES. SOVIETS WERE URGED
TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN DAMASCUS TO ALLEVIATE
SITUATION IN LEBANON.
40 LUCET RESPONSED SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVELY THAT GOF IS
DOING ITS BEST IN DAMASCUS AS WELL AS OTHER ARAB
CAPITALS TO COOL SITUATION. SISCO COMMENTED THAT
REGARDING ALPHAND'S UNDERSCORING THE IMPORTANCE OF
RESUMING FOUR-POWER TALKS, WE WILL TAKE THE MATTER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF 7
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXPIRE EXPIS EXPIS
PAGE 03 STATE 182820
UNDER ADVISEMENT.
5 ᵒ lucet INQUIRED ABOUT LATEST SISCO-DOBRYNIN MEETING
ON MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. SISCO SAID THAT WE HAVE
BEGUN TO FOCUS ON MORE CONCRETE ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE,
INCLUDING BORDERS, AND WE ARE SEEKING COMMON LANGUAGE
FOR JOINT US/USSR DOCUMENT GP - 3 .
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNANTMENT DERA OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 397
EXEIL EXPIS EXATE
PAGE 01 STATE 182970
3
41
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01/1046 R
66607
DRAFTED BY : NEA/ARN:TJSCOTES
APPROVED BY: NEA= JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN B TWSEELYE
NEA- RODGER P o DAVIES
S/S = MR. GLEYSTEEN
032408
P R 291936Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
SECR E T STATE 182970
EXDIS
SUBJECT: US ROLE IN LEBANESE CRISIS
REF 8 AMMAN 5217, STATE 182026
1 0 DEPARTMENT HAS NO REPEAT NO PRESENT INTENTION GETTING USG
INVOLVED IN OR PUBLICLY ASSOCIATED WITH ANY COMPROMISE
SOLUTION WHICH MAY EMERGE OUT OF LEBANESE CRISIS AND
ENTAIL GOL ACCOMMODATION TO FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON.
2. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES BEST POLICY FOR USG AT PRESENT IS
TO MAINTAIN LOW PROFILE WHILE CURRENT INTER-ARAB EFFORTS
AT MEDIATION IN PROGRESS. STATE 182026 DESIGNED TO ELICIT
POSTS VIEWS ON POSSIBLE DESIRABILITY OUR RAISING OUR
PROFILE IN LEBANON SLIGHTLY AS OFFSET TO WHAT SEEMED TO
TO PUBLIC CREDIT BEING GIVEN TO SOVIETS FOR ALLEGED
SUCCESSFUL PEACEMAKING EFFORTS. AS IT TURNS OUT,
"STORY" THAT SOVIETS PLAYING KEY ROLE IN LEBANESE
MEDIATION INITIATIVES FEATURED ONLY BY CERTAIN SEGMENTS:
OF US PRESS AND NOT ECHOED EITHER IN AREA MEDIA OR,
APPARENTLY, IN SOVIET MEDIA. IN ANY CASE, WE DECIDED
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PREARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 182970
BEST CONTINUE AVOID ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT CONCEIVABLY
CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO CANARD THAT WE ARE IN COLLUSION
WITH GOL IN PLOT TO ROLL UP fedayeen.
EXPIS
3 ᵉ WE AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR PORTER'S POSTURE OF
REMAINING AVAILABLE TO HELOU IF HE WISHES TO SEE HIM. GP-3.
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
691/49/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 916
2
PAGE 01 STATE 181404
87
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01//046 R
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA: RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/ARN: MR SEELYE
EXPIS EXAIS
EUR/FBX:MR LONG
S/S- MR LLOYD
010701
P R 252155Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECR ENT STATE 181404
EXDIS:
REF 8 BEIRUT 8894
1. IN SEEKING MEANS TO TRY REDUCE SYRIAN PRESSURE ON LEBANON,
WE HAVE CONSIDERED WHICH GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE AND WILLING
EXERT SOME PRESSURE ON SARG. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THERE
IS POSSIBILITY FRENCH MIGHT BE HELPFUL.
20 WE HAVE APPROACHED GOF IN ATTEMPT PERSUADE FRENCH TO TAKE
INITIATIVE IN OBTAINING FOUR-POWER STATEMENT CALLING ON ALL
CONCERNED TO REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD DEEPEN CRISIS.
FRENCH RESPONSE WAS LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC. IT IS POSSIBLE,
HOWEVER, THAT FRENCH COULD be PERSUADED MAKE UNILATERAL APPROACH
IN DAMASCUS.
THEREFORE, WHEN YOU SEE MICHEL KHOURY SUGGEST TO HIM THAT GOL
ASK GOF APPROACH SARG IN DAMASCUS TO URGE THAT PRESSURE BY
TAKEN OFF LEBANON® YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM KHOURY WE ARE MAKING
PARALLEL APPROACH THROUGH FRENCH EMBASSY WASHINGTON. GP-3
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA MAZ UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 671
PAGE 01 STATE 180949
81
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01/1046 R
66640
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BH BAAS
APRROVED BY:NEA:RP DAVIES
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
NEA/P:MR. SMITH
S/S:MR. GLEYSTEEN
005466
P 242204Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S E CRR ENT STATE 180949
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 8846 AND STATE 180291
1. REGARDING PARAGRAPH 3 BEIRUT 8846, DEPARTMENT DID NOT REPEAT
NOT INTEND IN STATE 180291 TO SUGGEST TRIPARTITE STATEMENT. WE
BELIEVE THAT ANY MULTI-PARTY STATEMENT TO BE EFFECTIVE MUST
INCLUDE SOVIETS.
2. REGARDING PARAGRAPH 5 BEIRUT 8846, WE WILL OF COURSE AVOID
ANY IMPLICATION WE COORDINATING OUR ACTION WITH HELOU. RE YOUR
SUGGESTION THAT WE ISSUE BACKGROUNDER YOUR ATTENTION INVITED TO
NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE DATED OCTOBER 24, IN WHICH CORRESPONDENT
PETER GROSE STATES THAT SISCO STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH WARNING AGAINST
THREATS "FROM ANY SOURCE", WAS REALLY DIRECTED AT ISRAELI
REVALIATORY RAIDS AGAINST LEBANESE TERRITORY RATHER THAN MILITARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT/THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF 7
TELEGRAM
EXEMS EXCLUS
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 180949
MOVES FROM NEIGHBORING SYRIA. GP-3.
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
ILI/E0/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT BE OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 239
2
PAGE 01 STATE 180294
82
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 R
66638
DRAFTED BY:NEA/AR:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA:JOSEPH SISCO
NEA/ARN:MR SEELYE
NEA/IAI:MR ATHERTON(INFO)
EUR/FBS: (INFO)
S/S:MLEVITSKY
130476
R 240233Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
EXPIS EXPIS
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SECRE T STATE 180294
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CRISIS IN LEBANON
1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO CALLED IN FRENCH COUNSELORS
CABOUAT AND DESBANS OCTOBER 23 IN CONNECTION LEBANESE
CRISIS. SISCO OUTLINED BASIC FACTS AS REPORTED OFFICIALLY
BY LEBANESE ARMY. HE WENT ON TO POINT OUT GOL HAS FELT
COMPELLED MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER FEDAYEEN IN ORDER (A)
1
AVOID PROVOKING ISRAEL AND (B) PREVENT "JORDANIZATION"
OF LEBANON. HE NOTED THAT FEDAYEEN ATTEMPT MOVE TO
ANOTHER AREA SOUTHERN LEBANON PRESENTED DIRECT CHALLENGE
TO GOL AUTHORITIES WHICH IN TURN LED TO BLOODY CLASH.
2 ᵒ SISCO EXPLAINED THAT NOT ONLY HAVE DOMESTIC TENSIONS
BEEN HEIGHTENED BUT RADICAL STATES SUCH AS IRAQ, SYRIA
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPA
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 180294
AND UAR HAVE JOINED IN ATTACKS ON GOL. NOTING THAT
THESE EVENTS HAVE LED TO SERIOUS DETERIORATION WHICH
COULD CAUSE CIVIL STRIFE AND THREATEN WESTERN INTERESTS,
SISCO SAID IT WOULD BE helpful FOR GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE
COUNSEL NEED FOR RESTRAINT IN DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD AND
CAIRO.
3. SISCO ALSO SAID WE WOULD RAISE SUBJECT WITH BRITISH
AND WILL BE MEETING WITH UAR MINISTER GHORBAL. NO
DECISION REACHED ON WHETHER WE WILL RAISE THIS WITH
EXPIS EXPIS EXATE
SOVIETS BUT THIS IS UNLIKELY.
4. SISCO ADDED WE HAVE URGED ISRAELIS PRACTICE MAXIMUM
RESTRAINT. IN THIS CONNECTION, MORNING OCTOBER 23
ISRAELI MINISTER ARGOV PHONED SISCO TO SAY THAT WE
WERE AUTHORIZED REASSURE LEBANESE RE ISRAELI INTENTIONS
TOWARD SOUTHERN LEBANON (SEE SEPTEL).
5. CABOUAT SAID HE HAS RECEIVED LITTLE INFORMATION
FROM BEIRUT, BUT ONE CABLE FROM FRENCH EMBASSY BEIRUT
SAID HELOU TRYING PERSUADE KARAME NOT RESIGN. SISCO
NOTED WE HAVE NOT TRIED TO GIVE HELOU GUIDANCE IN ANY
ASPECT OF HANDLING CRISIS.
6. IN CLOSING, CABOUAT SAID HE WOULD REPORT IMMEDIATELY
TO HIS GOVERNMENT. GP-3
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
ZLI/EO/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 238
PAGE 01 STATE 180293
82
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 R
66641
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA- JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN- MR SEELYE
NEA- MR DAVIES
EUR- INFO
S/S MLEVITSKY
130480
P 240233Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SECRE T STATE 180293
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CRISIS IN LEBANON
1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO CALLED IN BRITISH AMBASSADOR FREEMAN
OCTOBER 23 TO DISCUSS LEBANESE CRISIS. SISCO NOTED SITUATION
PRESENTS SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ULTIMATELY
TO WESTERN INTERESTS. UNLIKE EVENTS OF APRIL, OUTSIDE ELEMENTS
CLEARLY INVOLVED. NASSER'S MESSAGE TO HELOU (SISCO NOTED HELOU'S
ANODYNE RESPONSE) AND SYRIAN ATTACK ON LEBANESE BORDER POSTS
IMMENSELY COMPLICATED PROBLEM. SISCO COMMENTED ON REPORTS
THAT LEBANESE PLANNING ON TAKING ISSUE TO ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL AND
EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT MUCH HELP WOULD COME OF IT FOR LEBANON.
2. SISCO TOLD FREEMAN WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ISRAELIS AND
THEY ALSO REGARD SITUATION AS SERIOUS THREAT TO GOL. WE TOLD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 180293
ISRAELIS THIS NO TIME FOR PROVOCATIONS FROM THEIR SIDE, AND ISRAELIS
GAVE US ASSURANCES THEY HAVE NO DESIGNS ON LEBANESE TERRITORY.
OUR OPTIONS ARE LIMITED, SISCO ADDED, BUT WE ARE ATTEMPTING
EXPLOIT DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. WE CALLED IN FRENCH EMBASSY
REPRESENTATIVES OCTOBER 23 AND ASKED THAT FRENCH GOVERNMENT USE
ITS GOOD OFFICES IN DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD AND CAIRO. WE HAVE ALSO
EXPIS EXATE
SPOKEN TO EGYPTIAN MINISTER GHORBAL. GHORBAL WAS TOLD THAT
SITUATION IN LEBANON WILL MAKE SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT,
AND WE DO NOT SEE HOW UNSETTLED CONDITIONS IN LEBANON COULD POSSIBLY
SERVE UAR LONG RANGE INTERESTS. SISCO ADDED THAT WE HAVE NOT RAISED
MATTER WITH SOVIETS NOR HAVE WE DECIDED WHETHER IT WOULD BE
WORTHWHILE TO DO SO.
3. SISCO NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT U S OFFICIAL STATEMENTS HAVE
BEEN GROSSLY DISTORTED IN EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE OF MIDDLE EAST.
HE SPECIFICALLY NOTED HOW PRESIDENT'S USE OF WORD "SUBSTANTIAL
IN ADDRESS TO UNGA HAD BEEN TWISTED. SISCO'S STATEMENT OF OUR
SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY ALSO BEING
MISINTERPRETED IN SOME QUARTERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, SISCO INFORMED
FREEMAN OUR STATEMENT MADE AT HELOU'S BEHEST. THIS FACT SOMEHOW
PICKED UP BY BBC AND GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PLAY. WE HAVE SAID NOTHING
ON THE SUBJECT AND NO QUESTIONS HAVE ARISEN HERE. REGARDING ALLEGED
SERVICE U S PERSONNEL IN IDF, UAR HAS CONDUCTED DELIBERATE
CAMPAIGN AGAINST U S POSSIBLY TO COVER THEIR BACKING OFF ON RHODES
FORMULA.
4. FREEMAN SAID HE UNABLE SAY MUCH SINCE HE HAS ASKED LONDON FOR
VIEWS BUT HAS NOT YET RECEIVED REPLY. HE SAID THAT OFF TOP OF
HIS HEAD HE BELIEVES BRITISH ASSESSMENT SITUATION LEBANON SAME AS
THAT USG. HE DOUBTED THAT BRITISH COULD BE OF MUCH HELP IN DAMASCUS
OR BAGHDAD BUT THOUGHT THERE POSSIBILITY IN CAIRO. HE SAID HE
WOULD ADVISE LONDON OF HIS TALK AND WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH
WITH SISCO FOLLOWING DAY® GP3.
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
ELI/40/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 237
PAGE 01 STATE 180292
EXPIS EXATS EXPIS
82
ORIGIN SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 R
66644
DRAFTED BY&NEA/ARN:SEELYE
APPROVED BY:NEA/SISCO
NEA:DAVIES
EUR:INFO
S/S:LEVITSKY
130451
P 240232Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
SECRE T STATE 180292
EXDIS
SUBJ: LEBANESE SITUATION
1. IN MEETING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO OCT 23 LEBANESE
AMBASSADOR KABBANI DESCRIBED DETAILS OF CLASHES BETWEEN LEBANESE
ARMY AND FEDAYEEN IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WHICH HE HAD JUST RECEIVED
FROM HIS GOVERNMENT. REPORT CORRESPONDED WITH OFFICIAL COMMUNI-
QUE THIS SUBJECT ISSUED BY LEBANESE ARMY AND IT PLACED STRESS ON
FACT FEDAYEEN FIRED FIRST. KABBANI SAID THAT "RESIGNATION" OF KARAME
HAD COMPLICATED MATTERS AND THAT COORDINATED SYRIAN ATTACKS AGAINST
LEBANESE BORDER CUSTOMS POSTS HAD FURTHER EXACERBATED SITUATION.
HE SPECULATED THAT LATTER ATTACKS INTENDED TO DIVERT LEBANESE
ARMY FROM PLACING FURTHER PRESSURES ON FEDAYEEN. KABBANI REPORTED
THAT CURFEW HAD BEEN IMPOSED IN MAIN LEBANESE CITIES.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
*
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXEL
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 180292
WM KABBANI DEPLORED FACT THAT LEBANESE REGIME HAD RECEIVED
ABSOLUTELY NO SUPPORT FROM ANY OUTSIDE ARAB COUNTRY. ON CONTRARY,
ITS ACTION HAD BEEN STRONGLY CRITICIZED BY EXTREMIST ARAB REGIMES.
IRAQ HAD EVEN OFFERED HELP OF TROOPS TO FEDAYEEN. KABBANI NOTED
THAT HUSSEIN'S POSITION, AS REFLECTED IN HIS MESSAGE TO YASIR
ARAFAT, EQUIVOCAL.
3. KABBANI CHARACTERIZED GOL'S CONVENING OF ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL
AS URGENT MEASURE DESIGNED UPSTAGE SIMILAR LIBYAN PROPOSAL AND TO
ENABLE GOL TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE, I.E., TO SUBMIT COMPLAINT. HE
THOUGHT POSSIBLE THAT GOL MIGHT seek TO PERSUADE COUNCIL MEDIATE
BETWEEN LEBANESE REGIME AND FEDAYEEN AND, AS FIRST STEP, STOP THE
FIGHTING.
4. IN DISCUSSION RE NASSER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT HELOU,
KABBANI CHARACTERIZED THIS MESSAGE AS "APPEAL" FROM NASSER TO
HELOU ON FEIGNED ASSUMPTION LEBANESE ARMY ALONE HAD TAKEN DECISION TO
CONFRONT fedayeen. IN RESPONSE SISCO QUERY RE WHAT USG MIGHT
TELL UAR AT THIS JUNCTURE, KABBANI EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT
WE SHOULD POINT OUT TO UAR THAT FEDAYEEN NOT ONLY ENDANGERING
LEBANESE SECURITY BUT UAR INTERESTS AS WELL.
5. SISCO INFORMED KABBANI THAT WE HAVE TALKED TO FRENCH AND WILL
SHORTLY BE TALKING TO BRITISH RE LEBANESE SITUATION BUT THAT WE DO
NOT RPT NOT INTEND TO WEIGH IN WITH SOVIETS. KABBANI AGREED THAT
SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL AND STATED THAT HAD SOVIETS WISHED,
THEY "COULD HAVE STOPPED THE SYRIANS BY NOW". KABBANI STRESSED
THAT HE WAS ONLY EXPRESSING HIS PERSONAL VIEWS.
6. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH DEPT OFFICER KABBANI
REGRETTED THAT HELOU HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN MORE FLEXIBLE IN DEALING
WITH FEDAYEEN IN PAST MONTHS. HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT CURRENT TURN
OF EVENTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD HELOU DONE SO. HE SAID THAT
IF LEBANON HAD TO MAKE CHOICE BETWEEN MAJOR INTERNAL DIVISIONS
OR CLOSING RANKS BEHIND POLICY OF ACQUIESCING IN FEDAYEEN EFFORTS,
LATTER PREFERABLE--EVEN IF THIS WOULD INVITE MORE FREQUENT ISRAELI
RAIDS. ARMY POSITION OF DEFENDING AGAINST OUTSIDE ADVERSARY WOULD
BE FAR MORE TENABLE THAN FIGHTING INTERNALLY AGAINST FEDAYEEN.
7 © FOLLOWING RETURN TO EMBASSY KABBANI CALLED BY TELEPHONE TO
REPORT RECEIPT NEW REPORT FROM HIS GOVERNMENT WHICH SPELLED OUT
CLEARLY SYRIAN GOVERNMENT COLLABORATION WITH FEDAYEEN IN ATTACKS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEP OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED AND STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 180292
LAUNCHED AGAINST BORDER POSTS ON NIGHT OCT 22. IN ONE INSTANCE
30 MILITARY LORRIES AND ARMORED CARS BACKED BY fedayeen, AND IN
ANOTHER INSTANCE 140 PARATROOPERS WERE INVOLVED. HE CITED THREE
EXATE
OTHER INSTANCES IN WHICH EITHER ARMORED CARS OR LORRIES WERE
DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF FEDAYEEN, AS WELL AS SYRIAN MILITARY
PERSONNEL.
GP-3.
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
M on REDBOONCE
цнол THE
THE EXECNIIA: RECEIVED
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATE STATES OF !)
TELEGRAM
SECRET 722
PAGE 01 STATE 160289
SUMMARY
81
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01,/031 R
32
66640
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:TW SEELYE
APPROVED BY3NEA:JJ SISCO
NFA RP DAVIES
S/S:W LLOYD
054637
P R 200104Z SEP 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
SECRE T STATE 160289
EXDIS
EXPIR
SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING
REF: BEIRUT 7808
CONCUR THAT PROPOSED CONTACTS WITH TWO BAATH OFFICIALS WORTH
TRYING® GP-3 ®
RICHARDSON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT
WITHOUT
DECLASSIFIED
TO
03
REPRODUCED
ATION
OF
THE
EXECUTIVE
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRETARY
OF
DEP
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 364
PAGE 01 STATE 159591
80
ORIGIN SS 30
02
INFO OCT 01,/031 R
EXATE
66640
DRAFTED BY:NEA:JJ SISCO
APPROVED BY:JJ SISCO
NEA:MR. DAVIES
S/S:MR. GLEYSTEEN
EUR:MR. SWANK
053174
R 191946Z SEP 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
'69 SEP 20 AM 9:16
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S SECOR ET STATE 159591
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING
1. BEFORE HIS MEETING TO DISCUSS ARAB- ISRAELI settlement, SISCO
TOOK DOBRYNIN ASIDE TO RAISE WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A BILATERAL
MATTER BETWEEN US. SISCO SAID WE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT SYRIA
HAS NOT YET FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO RELEASE TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS
ON HIJACKED TWA PLANE. SISCO RECALLED THAT UNDER SECRETARY
JOHNSON HAD RAISED MATTER INITIALLY WITH TCHERNIAKOV AND THAT IN
SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE WE HAD WORD FROM MOSCOW THAT SOVIET
GOVERNMENT DID NOT CONSIDER MATTER CLOSED. SISCO UNDERSCORED
IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO SOVIETS - MAKING A FURTHER EFFORT IN ORDER
TO SECURE PROMPT RELEASE OF PASSENGERS. SISCO CITED COMMON
INTEREST WE HAVE IN KEEPING AIRWAYS FREE AND DESIRABILITY OF
REMOVING THIS ISSUE AS IRRITANT. FINALLY, SISCO INDICATED VERY
INDIRECTLY CONCERN THAT IF PASSENGERS NOT RELEASED ISRAEL MAY
AT SOME POINT FEEL COMPELLED TO TAKE FORCEFUL COUNTER ACTION.
2. DOBRYNIN WAS NON COMMITTAL. HE SAID THAT SOVIETS HAD PASSED
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT DERA OF STATE
*
Department of State TELEGRAM
UNITED STATES OF 7
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 159591
OUR MESSAGE TO THE SYRIANS. SISCO DID NOT GET THE IMPRESSION FROM
DOBRYNIN THAT SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING MORE. SUGGEST
APPROPRIATE FOLLOW UP ON THIS MATTER IN MOSCOW. OUR HOPE IS THAT
SECRETARY ALSO WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE MATTER WITH
GROMYKO MONDAY EVENING. GP-3.
RICHARDSON
EXPIC
SECRET
921/40/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library O HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 023
PAGE 01 STATE 158496
83
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 R
66636
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:TJSCOTES
APPROVED BY:NEA:JOSEPH J SISCO
NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE
S/S:MR BRANDT
'69 SEP 18 AM 8:19
2
NEA:RPDAVIES
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION ROOM
WHITE WHITE HOUSE house
039527
R 180210Z SEP 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL jerusalem
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S ECRET STATE 158496
EXDIS
SUBJ: US-LEBANESE RELATIONS AND CURRENT STATUS OFI
US-USSR BILATERALS
SUMMARY: DURING TOUR D'HORIZON ON SEPT 17 WITH LEBANESE
AMBASSADOR NAJATI KABBANI, ASST. SECRETARY SISCO CONFIRMED
USG INTENTION TO CONTINUE CURRENT US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS
EXQIC
!
IN HOPE OF ACHIEVING GUIDE-LINES FOR EVENTUAL ARAB-ISRAELI
PEACE SETTLEMENT. SISCO ASSURED KABBANI USG VALUES GREATLY
ITS CLOSE TIES WITH LEBANON. MOREOVER, LEBANON'S TERRI-
TORIAL INTEGRITY AND PRESERVATION ARE OF GREAT CONCERN TO
USG WHICH HAS SO INFORMED ISRAEL AT HIGHEST LEVELS
KABBANI AGREED CURRENT BILATERAL EFFORTS HOULD CONTINUE
TO SEEK PEACE SETTLEMENT BEFORE EXTREMISM OVERWHELMS PRES-
ENT MODERATE ARAB FORCES. SISCO POINTED OUT NEED FOR
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE Ø2 STATE 158496
GREATER UAR COOPERATION IN CLARIFYING PROPOSALS BEING
DISCUSSED IN BILATERALS. AMONG OTHER THINGS, UAR SHOULD
EXPIS EXPIS EXELS
MAKE COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND DIRECT DISCUSSIONS, THEREBY
FORCING ISRAEL TO FACE UP UNEQUIVOCALLY TO QUESTION OF
WITHDRAWAL. END SUMMARY
1. IN RESPONSE TO ASST. SECRETARY SISCO'S INVITATION,
LEBANESE AMBASSADOR NAJATI KABBANI CALLED ON SEPT 17 FOR
DISCUSSION US-LEBANESE RELATIONS AND TOUR D'HORIZON ON
CURRENT STATUS OF US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS.
2. SISCO INFORMED KABBANI THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH
DOBRYNIN IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 18 TO LAY GROUND FOR
GROMYKO-SECRETARY ROGERS MEETINGS NEXT WEEK. DURING THESE
LATTER MEETINGS USG EXPECTS RENEW EFFORTS TO SEE IF WE CAN
CLOSE GAP WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN US-USSR ON PEACE SETTLEMENT.
RECENT EVENTS IN AREA COMPELLING REASONS FOR CONTINUED INTENSIVE
EFFORTS TO FIND SETTLEMENT IN AREA. US INTENDS TO DO WHAT IT
CAN. OUR PROPOSALS WITH SOVIETS ARE NOT LAST WORD. IN THIS
REGARD US REALIZES IT RELATIVELY EASY TO ESTABLISHI IN THEORETICAL
TERMS WHAT PEACE SETTLEMENT OUGHT TO BE. IN LAST ANALYSIS,
HOWEVER, MAJOR POWERS CAN ONLY PROVIDE GUIDELINES FOR USE
BY PARTIES INVOLVED. (KABBANI AGREED) US PROPOSALS,
THEREFORE, TRYING TO MEET LEGITIMATE NEEDS AND DESIRES ON
BOTH SIDES.
3. SISCO CONTINUED THAT SOME PEOPLE OVER-ESTIMATE US ABILITY
TO INFLUENCE SHAPE OF FINAL SETTLEMENT. DESPITE THIS LIMITED
ABILITY, US INTENDS TO DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK
FOR SETTLEMENT WHICH MAY NOT BE AGREEABLE TO BOTH SIDES BUT
WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE FAIR IN TERMS OF REALITIES IN AREA.
US REALIZES IT HAS BEEN AND WILL BE HEAVILY CRITICIZED BY
BOTH SIDES BECAUSE OF EVENTUAL OUTLINES OF PROPOSED
SETTLEMENT BUT US REMAINS CONVINCED THAT EFFORTS MUST CON-
TINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS, DESPITE CRITICISM.
4. SISCO ASSURED KABBANI US TIES TO LEBANON CONTINUE TO
BE INFLUENCED BY THREE FACTORS: (A) SPECIAL AND WARM
RELATIONSHIP OVER THE YEARS: (B) TRADITIONALLY CLOSE COOPER-
ATION TO SOLVE PROBLEMS IN AREA: AND (C) USG CONCERN FOR
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON. IN THIS REGARD SISCO
EMPHASIZED TO KABBANI USG ENVISAGES NO CHANGE IN PRESENT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO This BE document REPRODUCED has been reviewed WITHOUT pursuant to Executive DECLASSIFIED Order 13526 and has been-determined OF THE EXE GUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 158496
ISRAELI LEBANESE BORDER. LEBANON WAS NOT PARTY TO JUNE
1967 WAR AND THEREFORE IS NOT INVOLVED IN PRESENT EFFORTS
ATTEMPTING TO DEAL WITH RESULTS OF THAT WAR. USG HAS MADE
ITS POSITION CLEAR IN THIS REGARD TO ISRAELIS WHO ALSO
HAVE NOT MADE ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT PRESENT ISRAELI LEBANON
BORDER BE AFFECTED BY CURRENT PEACE SETTLEMENT EFFORTS.
(KABBANI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ISRAELIS HAVE NOT RECENTLY GIVEN
ANY SIGNS INDICATING DESIRE TO CHANGE BORDER, BUT IN
PROVIOUS YEAR HAD DECLARED THIS OBRDER NOT ENTIRELY
SATISFACTORY TO THEM. IT IS THESE EARLIER STATEMENTS
WHICH CONTINUE TO CAUSE LEBANON CONCERN.)
5. IN REPLY TO SISCO'S QUESTION CONCERNING PRESENT SITUA
TION IN LEBANON, KABBANI STATED LEBANON NOW GOING THROUGH
ON OF MOST DIFFICULT TIMES IN ITS HISTORY AS CONSEQUENCE
OF EVENTS IN SURROUNDING AREA® IN FACT, NOT ONLY IS LEBA-
NON'S SECURITY THREATENED BUT ITS VERY EXISTENCE. IF
EVENTS IN AREA GET OUT OF CONTROL, MANY LEBANESE FEAR WORSE.
ONE RESULT WOULD BE CONTRADICTORY REACTIONS AMONG THE
LEBANESE WITH SOME ESPOUSING EXTREMIST POSITIONS, WHILE OTHER
TRYING SUPPORT PRESENT REGIME. THIS COULD HAVE SERIOUS
EFFECTS ON LEBANON'S UNITY.
6. SISCO ASSURED AMBASSADOR USG AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES
FACING LEBANON. HE INFORMED KABBANI THAT USG AT HIGH
LEVELS HAS MADE KNOWN ITS CONCERN ABOUT DETERIORATING
LEBANESE SITUATION TO ISRAELIS. BOTH HERE AND IN TEL
AVIV WE HAVE CANDIDLY AND SPECIFICALLY TOLD ISRAELIS THAT
NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BY ISRAEL TO MAKE LEBANON'S
CURRENT PROBLEMS MORE DIFFICULT FOR ITS GOVERNMENT. ANY
SUCH MOVES WOULD BE IN INTERESTS OF NO ONE, INCLUDING
LEBANON, USG AND ISRAEL.
7* KABBANI EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THESE EFFORTS.
EXQIC
HE ADDED ISRAELIS MUST APPRECIATE PRESENCE OF FEDAYEEN IN
LEBANON SECONDARY TO PRESERVATION OF MODERATE O-WESTERN
LEBANON WHICH COULD BE HELPFUL TO CURRENT EFFORTS TO BRING
ABOUT PEACE SETTLEMENT IN AREA. IF MODERATE LEBANONI
ENGULFED BY EXTREMISM, THIS WOULD ONLY ADD EXTRA WEIGHT TO
ALREADY SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN NEAR EAST.
8. IN DISCUSSING PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, KABBANI
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRANTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 04 STATE 158496
AGREED WITH SISCO THAT MANY REFUGEES WILL NOT OPT TO RETURN
TO ISRAEL SHOULD CHOICE BE GIVEN TO THEM. IMPORTANT ASPECT
FOR ARABS, HOWEVER, IS CONFIRMATION OF PRINCIPLE OF RETURN
WHICH ISRAELIS HAVE NOT IN THE PAST BEEN WILLING TO MAKE.
KABBANI BELIEVED ARABS WOULD ACCEPT PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS
TO REFUGEE PROBLEM ONCE PRINCIPLE OF RETURN IS CLEARLY
ESPOUSED BY ISRAELIS.
EXPIS
9. DISCUSSING JORDANIAN ASPECT OF POSSIBLE ARAB ISRAELI
SETTLEMENT, SISCO INFORMED KABBANI THAT USG HAS NEVER
ENVISAGED A JORDAN LIMITED TO EAST BANK. SOCALLED ALLON
PLAN IN USG OPINION IS NON-STARTER. WE BELIEVE WEST BANK,
SUBJECT TO MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS ON RECIPROCAL BASIS,
WHOULD BE RETURNED TO JORDAN AS PART OF eventuali PEACE PLAN.
10. KABBANI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR US VIEWS ON JORDAN-
IAN ASPECT OF SETTLEMENT. HE CONTINUED IF ISRAELIS REALLY
DESIRE LONG TERM SOLUTION TO PALESTINE PROBLEM, THEY MUST
BE PREPARED TO SHARE WITH ARAB PALESTINIANS WHAT USED TO
BE PALESTINE AND NOT DEMAND ALL OF IT. ISRAEL MUST ALSO
LEARN TO LIVE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. IF IT CONTINUES TO
ASK FOR TERRITORY, ARAB EXTREMISTS IN AREA WILL POINT TO
THIS AS PROOF THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WISH SETTLEMENT. THUS,
CURRENT UNGA MAY BE LAST OPPORTUNITY FOR ISRAEL TO CONVINCE
ARABAS IT DESIRES PEACE. IF ISRAELIS ADHERE TO HUMANITARIAN
PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THIS PROBLEM, THEN ARABS WILLIBE
FORTHCOMING IN PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES.
ATTEMPTS TO ARRIVE AT SETTLEMENT BY FOCUSING FIRST ON
PRACTICAL ASPECTS, AND THEN GOING ON TO PRINCIPLES WILLI
NOT WORK.
11. SISCO ASSURED KABBANI USG HAS NEVER ENDORSED IN ITS
PROPOSALS TO SOVIETS ISRAELI POSITION ON NEED FOR DIRECT
NEGOITATIONS AT OUTSET. US DOES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THERE
MUST BE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT
SOME STATE IN JARRINGS PRESENCE. TIMING COULD BE LEFT TO
JARRING. ISRAELIS ON OTHER HAND BELIEVE DIRECT NEGOTIA-
TIONS AT INITIAL STAGE IS SINE QUA NON THAT ARABS RECOGNIZE
ITS EXISTENCE. KABBANI COMMENTED THAT ISRAELIS SHORT-
SIGHTED IN THIS REGARD CITING EXAMPLE OF FRANCE AND
GERMANY WHICH HAVE ALWAYS ENJOYED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BUT HAVE WAGED THREE MAJOR WARS AGAINST EACH OTHERI OVER
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXCES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 05 STATE 158496
LAST CENTURY. KABBANI REITERATED THAT FOR ISRAEL MOST
IMPORTANT THING IS TO BE ACCEPTED BY NEIGHBORS AND NOT
INSIST ON PAPERS WHICH CAN BE ABROGATED AT ANY TIME.
12. SISCO TOLD AMBASSADOR KABBANI WE HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT
DISTRESSED BY VIGOROUS OBJECTIONS TO OUR JULY PROPOSALS
FROM BOTH ISRAEL AND UAR WITH FORMER ACCUSING US OF MAKING
TOO MANY CONCESSIONS AND LATTER ASSERTING THAT WE ARE PRO-
ISRAELI.
13. SISCO CONTINUED USG CANNOT UNDERSTAND UAR WHICHI ON
ONE HAND HAS TOLD US NOT TO LEAVE IT EXCLUSIVELY TO
SOVIETS WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND MAKES NO EFFORTS TO HELP
US DEFINE SPECIFIC POSITIONS DURING THESE CURRENT BILATERALS.
UAR SHOULD TELL USG POINT BY POINT IN SEPCIFIC CONRETE
TERMS WHAT TO CHANGE IN OUR PROPOSALS. SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING
OUR PROPOSALS AS PRO-ISRAELI DOES NOT HELP. DOUBTLESS
UAR WOULD REACT NEGATIVELY IF USG DECIDED ON BASIS UAR'S
POSITION THAT PRESENT GAP IN BILATERALS UNBRIDGABLE
AND THEREFORE USG SHOULD CEASE PARTICIPATION IN THESE
BILATERALS. (KABBANI AGREED). IF USG DID THIS, SISCO
CONTINUED, ISRAELIS CERTAINLY WOULD BE PLEASED BECAUSE
THEY HAVE ALL ALONG OPPOSED BILATERALS. IN EFFECT UAR'S
CURRENT POSITION OF UNWILLINGNESS TO REACT SPECIFICALLY)
AND UNWILLINGNESS TO COMMIT ITSELF TO PEACE AND NEGOTIA-
TIONS, IS PLAYING IN HANDS OF ISRAELIS, WHO HAVE INSISTED
ALL ALONG THAT NO MOVEMENT WILL BE ACHIEVED IN BILATERALS.
14. KABBANI COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS UAR WOULD SAY THAT IT
HAS GONE FAR ENOUGH AND NOW IT WAITS FOR ISRAELI REACTION
15. SISCO REPLIED THAT IF UAR WOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING,
IT WOULD HELP US IN EXERTING INFLUENCE ON ISRAELIS TO GET
THEM TO COME ALONG. CERTAINLY UAR SHOULD TRY TO "TEXT"
ISRAELIS BY STATING UAR'S POSITION EXPLICITLY AND THEREBY
FORCE ISRAELIS TO DO LIKEWISE. AT present TIME, THEREFORE,
FOLLOWING MUST STILL BE OBTAINED: (A) BINDING UAR COMMIT-
MENT TO PEACE (B) UAR WILLINGNESS TO SIT DOWN AT SOME TIME
FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT AUSPICES JARRING: (C) CLEAR CUT
STATEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL# (D) CLARIFICATION OF
PRACTICAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SHARM AL SHAKYH AREA:
AND (E) AGREED LANGUAGE ON REFUGEE PROBLEM WHICH BALANCES
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 06 STATE 158496
PRINCIPLE OF FREE CHOICE AND REALITIES OF SITUATION.
16. KABBANI REPLIED THAT HE WAS RATHER OPTIMISTIC ABOUT
ARAB RESPONSE TO THESE POINTS BUT EMPHASIZED THAT TIME IS
OF THE ESSENCE PRESENCE AMONG PALESTINIANS OF RADICALS
AND EXTREMISTS CAN HAVE DANGEROUS RESULTS. ONE POSSIBILITY
IS EMERGENCE OF NEW GENERATION OF PEOPLE WHO, IN ABSENCE
OF PEACE SETTLEMENT, WOULD BE PREPARED TO FIGHT ON EVEN IF
IT MEANT THEIR SELF DESTRUCTION. THIS DEVELOPMENT NOT
TURE TWO YEARS AGO, BUT IF IT IS PERMITTED TO CONTINUE FOR
TWO MORE YEARS, SITUATION IN AREA WILL BE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT.
ISRAELIS MUST THEREFORE REALIZE THAT NOW IS TIME FOR
SOLUTION BEFORE TOO LATE.
17. SISCO REPLIED THAT HE AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR THAT
IT IS LATE. IN BASEBALL TERMS, WE ARE IN EIGHTH, IFI
NOT NINTH INNING. HOWEVER, GAME NOT YET OVER®
18. KABBANI ADDED THAT RECENT ARRIVAL IN ISRAEL OF
PAHNTOMS HAS NOT HELPED AND PERHAPS USG COULD USE FUTURE
DELIVERIES AS LEVERAGE OVER ISRAELIS.
19. SISCO REITERATED THAT ARABS, AND SPECIFICALLY UAR,
MUST GIVE USG SOMETHING TO WORK WITH, IF PRESENT BILATERAL
EFFORTS ARE TO ACHIEVE ANY MEANINGFUL PROGRESS TOWARDS
PEACE.
ROGERS
SECRET
LL//E0/0290
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
OT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TECLARIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
SUMMARY
TELEGRAM
SECRET 239
PAGE 01 STATE 152733
85
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 R
66644
26
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:SEELYE
APPROVED BY:NEA:SISCO
NEA:DAVIES
S/S:BROWN
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIC
NEA/IAI&ATHERTON
JONES SUBS
115580
P R 100004Z SEP 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN NY
S ECREE T STATE 152733
EXDIS
SUBJ: CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON
REF B BEIRUT 8524D BEIRUT 8525 STATE 151169
1 - WHEN YOU SEE SHEIKH MICHEL KHOURY EARLY THIS WEEK
YOU MAY FOLLOW UP OURI INTERIM REPLY TO PRESIDENT HELDU'S
REQUESTS (STATE 151169) WITH FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
2. TELEGRAM HAS BEEN DESPATCHED TO OUR EMBASSIES AT
JIDDA AND TEHRAN INSTRUCTING THEM TO URGE THAT THEI
GOVERNMENTS OF SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN RESPECTIVELY REVIEW
THEIR CURRENT RELATIONS WITH LEBANON IN THE CASEI OF
SAUDI ARABIA WE HAVE URGED A MORE SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE
WITH RESPECT TO GOL'S CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE CASE OF
IRAN WE HAVE ADVOCATED THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS® IF YOU BELIEVE IT WOULD BE helpful, YOU
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 152733
MAY DRAW ON MATERIAL CONTAINED IN MESSAGE OF INSTRUCTIONS
DESPATCHED TO JIDDA AND TEHRAN AT SAME TIME YOU SHOULD
URGE GOL TO MAKE ITS OWN REPRESENTATIONS SINCE IN OUR
VIEW DIRECT APPROACH BY GOL IS LIKELY TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE
THAN OUR INTERCESSION ON GOL'S BEHALF IN WAKE OFI LIBYAN
DEVELOPMENTS GOL MIGHT FIND JIDDA AND TEHRAN MORE RESPONSIVE
TO FURTHER DIRECT EFFORTS.
3° WE ARE ARRANGING FOR PUBLIC STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY
DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WHICH WOULD EXPRESS CONCERN AT RECENT
INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE ALONG LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND
STRESSING USG CONCERN FOR SECURITY AND WELL BEING OF
LEBANONe
40 WE ARE PLANNING CALL IN ISRAELI AMBASSADOR AT
HIGH LEVEL FOR PURPOSE MAKING ANOTHER DEMARCHE RE
ISRAEL EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN LIGHT OF DETERIORATING
SITUATION IN LEBANON. SPECIFICALLY, WE SHALL INDICATE
THAT PRESIDENT HELOU REQUESTS MORATORIUM ON ISRAELI AIR
ATTACKS FOR PURPOSE ENABLING HELOU AND MODERATES TO
EXQIC
IMPROVE THEIR CONTROL OVER INTERNAL SITUATION. ISRAELI
RAIDS ONLY SERVE TO STRENGTHEN EXTREMISTS AND IF MODERATES
ARE TO HAVE CHANCE TO RECOUP SITUATION, THERE MUST BE
RESPITE FROM FURTHER ATTACKS. WE SHALL ASK ISRAELI DESIST
FROM FURTHER ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANON OVER COMING FEW WEEKS,
NOTING THAT WHILE NO ONE CAN GUARANTEE AGAINST FEDAYEEN
INCURSIONS DURING PERIOD OF MORATORIUM, HELOU HAS UNDER
TAKEN TO DO ALL HE CAN TO PREVENT THEM. FYI WE PREFER
NOT TO SET SPECIFIC TIME LIMIT ON MORATORIUM. IN THIS
CONNECTION, WEI REQUEST THAT YOU SEEK TO PERSUADE GOL
TO WITHDRAW ITS CONDITION THAT IN MAKING DEMARCHE TO
ISRAELIS WE MAKE NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF PRESIDENT
HELOUS EFFORT TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. WE BELIEVE THIS
INFORMATION MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN INDUCING ISRAELIS TO
"LAY OFF"AND IN ANY CASE WOULD URGE THAT GOI KEEP THIS
CONFIDENTIAL. END FYI.
5° ADDITIONALLY, YOU AUTHORIZED CONFIDENTIALLY TO
CONVEY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT THAT GOI HAS SEVERAL TIMES
ASSURED US IT ENVISAGES NO CHANGE IN ISRAELI-LEBANESE
BOUNDARY. WE WOULD BE DEEPLY CONCERNED IF ISRAELIS
ENDEAVORED TO SEIZE TERRITORY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON®
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNANTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 152733
FYI THIS TAKES CARE OF YOUR REQUEST CONTAINED
BEIRUT 8524. END FYI.
60 IN REVIEWING POSSIBILITY INCREASING NUMBER OF UN
OBSERVERS ALONG LEBANESE- ISRAELI BORDER, WE UNDERSTAND
(PER HOUGHTON LETTER) THAT GOL RECENTLY SUBMITTED
REQUEST TO THIS EFFECT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY
FURTHER INFORMATION AS TO TERMS OF reference (E.G.
WAS THIS REQUEST LINKED TO REQUIREMENT THAT UNMOS ALSO
OPERATE ON ISRAELI SIDE OF BORDER?) AND WHETHER GOL
RECEIVED ANY RESPONSE FROM NEW YORK. WE NOTE THAT IN
RECENT CONVERSATION BETWEEN BUFFUM AND GHORRA IN NEW
YORK LATTER WAS LIKEWARM TO SUGGESTION RE INCREASE IN
NUMBER OF UNMOS USUN 2902),
GP = 3 .
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
*
*
UNITED STATES OF
Department SITUATION State
TELEGRAM
'69 SEP 10 AM 8:22
SECRET 239
PAGE 01 STATE 152733
85
ORIGIN SS 30
¥2
INFO OCT 01,/031 R
66644
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:SEELYE
APPROVED BY:NEA:SISCO
NEA:DAVIES
S/S:BROWN
EXPIS EXCLU
NEA/IAI&ATHERTON
TO/UNP $ JONES SUBS
115580
P R 100004Z SEP 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN NY
S ECORE T STATE 152733
EXDIS
SUBJ: CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON
REF 8 BEIRUT 8524D BEIRUT 8525 STATE 151169
1 - WHEN YOU SEE SHEIKH MICHEL KHOURY EARLY THIS WEEK
YOU MAY FOLLOW UP OUR INTERIM REPLY TO PRESIDENT HELDU'S
REQUESTS (STATE 1511691 WITH FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
2. TELEGRAM HAS BEEN DESPATCHED TO OUR EMBASSIES AT
JIDDA AND TEHRAN INSTRUCTING THEM TO URGE THAT THE
GOVERNMENTS OF SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN RESPECTIVELY REVIEW
THEIR CURRENT RELATIONS WITH LEBANON IN THE CASE OF
SAUDI ARABIA WE HAVE URGED A MORE SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE
WITH RESPECT TO GOLPS CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE CASE OF
IRAN WE HAVE ADVOCATED THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS® IF YOU BELIEVE IT WOULD BE helpful, YOU
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 152733
MAY DRAW ON MATERIAL CONTAINED IN MESSAGE OF INSTRUCTIONS:
DESPATCHED TO JIDDA AND TEHRAN AT SAME TIME YOU SHOULD
URGE GOL TO MAKE ITS OWN REPRESENTATIONS SINCE IN OUR
VIEW DIRECT APPROACH BY GOL IS LIKELY TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE
THAN OUR INTERCESSION ON GOL'S BEHALF. IN WAKE OFI LIBYAN
DEVELOPMENTS GOL MIGHT FIND JIDDA AND TEHRAN MORE RESPONSIVE
TO FURTHER DIRECT EFFORTS.
3° WE ARE ARRANGING FOR PUBLIC STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY
DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WHICH WOULD EXPRESS CONCERN AT RECENT
INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE ALONG LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND
STRESSING USG CONCERN FOR SECURITY AND WELL BEING OF
LEBANON
40 WE ARE PLANNING CALL IN ISRAELI AMBASSADOR AT
HIGH LEVEL FOR PURPOSE MAKING ANOTHER DEMARCHE RE
ISRAEL EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN LIGHT OF DETERIORATING
SITUATION IN LEBANON. SPECIFICALLY, WE SHALL INDICATE
THAT PRESIDENT HELOU REQUESTS MORATORIUM ON ISRAELI AIR
ATTACKS FOR PURPOSE ENABLING HELOU AND MODERATES TO
IMPROVE THEIR CONTROL OVER INTERNAL SITUATION. ISRAELI
RAIDS ONLY SERVE TO STRENGTHEN EXTREMISTS AND IF MODERATES
ARE TO HAVE CHANCE TO RECOUP SITUATION, THERE MUST BE
EXCIS EXCES
RESPITE FROM FURTHER ATTACKS. WE SHALL ASK ISRAELI DESIST
FROM FURTHER ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANON OVER COMING FEW WEEKS,
NOTING THAT WHILE NO ONE CAN GUARANTEE AGAINST FEDAYEEN
INCURSIONS DURING PERIOD OF MORATORIUM HELOU HAS UNDER
TAKEN TO DO ALL HE CAN TO PREVENT THEM. FYI WE PREFER
NOT TO SET SPECIFIC TIME LIMIT ON MORATORIUM. IN THIS
CONNECTION, WE REQUEST THAT YOU SEEK TO persuade GOL
TO WITHDRAW ITS CONDITION THAT IN MAKING DEMARCHE TO
ISRAELIS WE MAKE NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF PRESIDENT
HELOUS EFFORT TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. WE BELIEVE THIS
INFORMATION MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN INDUCING ISRAELIS TO
"LAY OFF"AND IN ANY CASE WOULD URGE THAT GOI KEEP THIS
CONFIDENTIAL. END FYI.
5° ADDITIONALLY, YOU AUTHORIZED CONFIDENTIALLY TO
CONVEY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT THAT GOI HAS SEVERAL TIMES
ASSURED US IT ENVISAGES NO CHANGE IN ISRAELI LEBANESE
BOUNDARY. WE WOULD BE DEEPLY CONCERNED IF ISRAELIS
ENDEAVORED TO SEIZE TERRITORY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON®
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNANTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
EXEIS
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 152733
FYI THIS TAKES CARE OF YOUR REQUEST CONTAINED
BEIRUT 8524. END FYI.
6. IN REVIEWING POSSIBILITY INCREASING NUMBER OF UNI
OBSERVERS ALONG LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER, WE UNDERSTAND
(PER HOUGHTON LETTER) THAT GOL RECENTLY SUBMITTED
REQUEST TO THIS EFFECT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY
FURTHER INFORMATION AS TO TERMS OF REFERENCE (E.G.
WAS THIS REQUEST LINKED TO REQUIREMENT THAT UNMOS ALSO
OPERATE ON ISRAELI SIDE OF BORDER?) AND WHETHER GOL
RECEIVED ANY RESPONSE FROM NEW YORK. WE NOTE THAT IN
RECENT CONVERSATION BETWEEN BUFRUM AND GHORRA IN NEW
YORK LATTER WAS LIKEWARM TO SUGGESTION RE INCREASE IN
NUMBER OF UNMOS USUN 2902),
GP-3.
ROGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NNNNVV EHA627
00 RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 140865 2322337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 202316Z AUG 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
1969 AUG 21 00 00
TO WHITE HOUSE
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 140865
PLEASE PASS TO SAN FRANCISCO FOR SECRETARY ROGERS AND SAN
CLEMENTE FOR DR. KISSINGER.
FOLLOWING SUMMARY MAY BE USEFUL IN DISCUSSION US VOTE ON LEBANESE
RESOLUTION. UNSC SCHEDULED MEET AFTERNOON AUG 21.
SENTIMENT IN UNSC AT OUTSET CONSIDERATION LEBANESE COMPLAINT
AGAINST ISRAEL FOR AUG 11 AIR ATTACK WAS HEAVILY SYMPATHETIC
TO LEBANON AND CRITICAL OF ISRAEL FOR WHAT WAS GENERALLY
CONSIDERED REACTION OUT OF PROPORTION TO PROVICATION. FIRST
DRAFT RESOLUTION INFORMALLY CIRCULATED WAS TOTALLY ONE SIDED
AND ANTI ISRAELI. WE DECIDED SEEK MORE BALANCED TEXT IN
ORDER PREVENT ADOPTION OF COMPLETELY ONE SIDED RESOLUTION.
ANOTHER FACTOR WAS LEBANESE CONVICTION THAT US SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION
WAS MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR IT TO MAINTAIN SOME MEASURE OF INTERNAL
STABILITY AND TO STRENGTHEN ITS HAND IN KEEPING FADAYEEN IN
CHECK.
AMBASSADOR YOST ESTIMATES THAT NO MORE THAN TWO OTHER SECURITY
COUNCIL MEMBERS WOULD JOIN US IN ABSTAINING ON CURRENT TEXT.
PARAGUAY WOULD PROBABLY DO SO AND UK MIGHT, BUT THIS NOT CERTAIN.
WE WOULD EXPECT OTHERS TO VOTE IN FAVOR.
ALTHOUGH ISRAEL, AS IN PAST, HAS COMPLAINED ABOUT FACT THAT
DRAFT RESOLUTION CONDEMNS ISRAELI AIR ATTACK WHILE DEPLORING
"ALL VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE", IT HAS
FOCUSED ITS OBJECTIONS IN PARTICULAR ON PREAMBULAR PROVISION
"RECALLING" THE 1949 LEBANESE- ISRAELI ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IF
THIS PROVISION IS INCLUDED, EBAN HAS SAID GOI WOULD PUBLICLY
STATE ISRAEL NOT HENCEFORTH BOUND BY OBLIGATIONS THEREUNDER.
HOWEVER, AS EARLY AS AUG 1967 EBAN STATED IN PRESS CONFERENCE
THAT LEBANON DECLARED WAR ON ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967 AND THUS
ABROGATED ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. LEBANON'S POSITION IS THAT SINCE
IT DID NOT TAKE PART IN HOSTILITIES AGAINST ISRAEL IN 1967,
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STILL IN EFFECT. ISRAEL HAS LONG BEEN AWARE
THAT WE DO NOT SHARE ITS VIEW AND CONSIDER LEBANESE-ISRAELI
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STILL IN FORCE, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT SO
STATED PUBLICLY. FACT IS THAT 1949 ARMISTICE AND 1967 CEASEFIRE
LINES ARE IDENTICAL AND COINCIDE WITH INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED
LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.
AMBASSADOR YOST STRONGLY DOUBTS- THAT FURTHER CHANGES OF SIGNIFICANCE
CAN BE OBTAINED IN DRAFT RESOLUTION. IN PARTICULAR, IT CLEAR
LEBANON ATTACHES MAJOR IMPORTANCE REFERENCE TO ARMISTTICE AGREEMENT,
WHICH IT CONSIDERS VITAL TO ITS POSITION. LEBANON ALSO CONSIDERS
CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI ATTACK (WHICH IS STEP BACK FROM ORIGINAL
LANGUAGE CONDEMING ISRAEL) ESSENTIAL TO MEET ITS INTERNAL PROBLEMS
AND CONTROL OF FADAYEEN Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
IF DECISION IS THAT WE SHOULD ABSTAIN BECAUSE OF STRONG LSRAELI
REACTION, AMBASSADOR YOST COULD BE AUTHORIZED MAKE FINAL ATTEMPT
PERSUADE LEBANON TO DELETE REFERENCE TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS
PRICE FOR AFFIRMATIVE US VOTE. HOWEVER, SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED
THIS COULD INCREASE LEBANESE RESENTMENT AT US ABSTENTION.
SHOULD DECISION BE TAKEN TO AUTHORIZE US AFFIRMATIVE VOTE FOR
DRAFT RESOLUTION AS IT NOW STANDS, RECOMMEND AMB. YOST SEEK
ADDITION OF FOLLOWING LANGUAGE TO SIXTH PREAMBULAR PARA, RECALLING
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT: "AND THE CEASEFIRE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTIONS 233(1967) AND 234(1967)," BEFORE INFORMING
LEBANON OF US SUPPORT FOR PRESENT TEXT.
FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED EXPLANATION IN EVENT AFFIRMATIVE US
VOTE:
"MY DELEGATION HAS JOINED IN SUPPORTING THE RESOLUTION WHICH
THE COUNCIL HAS JUST ADOPTED IN THE INTERESTS OF ENDING THE
VIOLENCE WHICH HAS HAMPERED EFFORTS TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF
PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS I INDICATED IN MY STATEMENT LAST
THURSDAY, THE ESSENTIAL TASK OF THE SC AND OF THE PARTIES AT
THIS TIME IS TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN AN ATMOSPHERE FAVORABLE
TO THE SUCCESS OF THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN PROGRESS LOOKING
TOWARD AGREEMENT ON A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
"THE RESOLUTION THAT WE HAVE ADOPTED IS NOT IN ALL OF ITS
DETAILS WHAT MY DELEGATION WOULD HAVE PREFERRED. WE VOTED FOR
IT NEVERTHELESS BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION DEALS WITH ALL TYPES OF
VIOLENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND DOES NOT SINGLE
OUT ONLY ONE PARTY FOR CRITICISM. I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS
OPPORTUNITY, HOWEVER, TO REMIND THE COUNCIL THAT WHILE IT MAY
BE NECESSARY AT TIMES TO RECOGNIZE VARYING DEGREES OF RESPONSIBILITY,
UNLESS IN CARRYING OUT ITS DUTIES THE COUNCIL TAKES INTO ACCOUNT
THE JUST CONCERNS OF ALL WHO TURN TO IT, WE CANNOT BE EFFECTIVE
OR EXPECT TO HA E OUR ACTIONS RESPECTED.
"I AM CONFIDENT THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SHARE MY
SINCERE HOPE THAT ALL CONCERNED WILL REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO
REDUCE TENSIONS AND TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN ORDER THAT CALM
CAN BE RESTORED, NOT ONLY BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL BUT
ELSEWHERE THROUGHOUT THE AREA. AS I HAVE ALREADY SAID, OUR
OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK A JUST AND LASTING PEACE AND NOT MERELY
RESTORATION OF THE ARMISTICE SITUATION. WE MUST MOVE BEYOND
THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS TO GENUINE
PEACE". GP-3.
ROGERS
BT
NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL'
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
VV EHA633
00 RUEHEX
1969 AUG 2' 00 53
DE RUEHC 140198 2321724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 201711Z AUG 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
BT
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 140198
SAN CLEMENTE FOR DR. KISSINGER
FOLLOWING IS DRAFT UNSC LEBANESE RESOLUTION WHICH I DISCUSSED
WITH YOU ON THE PHONE:
QUOTE:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
HAVING CONSIDERED THE AGENDA CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/AGENDA/
1498/REV. 1,
HAVING NOTED THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER OF THE CHARGE D' AFFAIRES
A.I. OF LEBANON (DOCUMENT S/9383),
HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF LEBANON
AND ISRAEL,
GRIEVED AT THE TRAGIC LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE AND PROPERTY,
GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION RESULTING
FROM THE VIOLATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS,
RECALLING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON
OF MARCH 23, 1949,
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 262 (1968),
MINDFUL OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
1. CONDEMNS THE PREMEDITATED AIR ATTACK BY ISRAEL ON VILLAGES
IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IN VIOLATIONS OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE CHARTER AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS;
ASTERICK 2. DEPLORES THE EXTENSION OF THE AREA OF FIGHTING;
3. DEPLORES ALL VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN. VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE
AND DECLARES THAT SUCH ACTIONS OF MILITARY REPRISAL AND OTHER
GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE CANNOT BE TOLERATED AND THAT
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER FURTHER AND MORE
EFFECTIVE STEPS AS ENVISAGED IN THE CHARTER TO ENSURE AGAINST
REPETITION OF SUCH ACTS.
ASTERICK WE UNDERSTAND LEBANON WOULD BE WILLING TO REVERSE
THE ORDER OF PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3, MAKING THIS PARAGRAPH THE
LAST ONE. END QUOTE
ROGERS
BT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRANTMENT DERA of STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 092
PAGE 01 STATE 135415
84
ORIGIN NEA 15
INFO OCT Ø1,EUR 17,10 13,CCO 00,SSO ØØ,NSCE 00, CIAE 00,DODE 00, JPM 04#
H' H.Ø2, INR 07,L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10sP 04,RSC øjjPRS: ø1,SS 20, ACDA 16,
USIE 00,/114 R
66648
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:BHBAAS 8/12/69
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGER P. DAVIES
IO/UNP=MRe DAY
NEA/IAI-MR. WAHL
IO=MR= GREENE
072345
0 R 122237Z AUG 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 135415
REF: BEIRUT 6708
BEIRUT DELIVER TO CHARGE OPENING OF BUSINESS AUGUST 13
1 ᵉ WE ENDORSE POSITION CHARGE TOOK WITH YUSEF SALEM
(PARAGRAPH 3 REFTEL) REGARDING REQUEST FOR SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETING ON ISRAELI ATTACK= WE HAVE NOW LEARNED FROM USUN
HOWEVER, THAT GOL HAS CALLED FOR SC MEETING, WHICH SCHEDULED
FOR 5:00 PM AUGUST 13 € WHEN YOU MAKE YOUR FAREWELLI CALLI
ON SALEM YOU SHOULD STATE THAT WE SURPRISED DECISION ALREADY
TAKEN TO REQUEST SC MEETING. WHILE DECISION OF COURSE WILL BE
BASED ON GOL ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION, WE BELIEVE SC MEETING
CONFIDENTIAL
41
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
of
STATE
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE Ø2 STATE 135415
WILL LEAD TO ACRIMONIOUS AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE DEBATE.
2 . USG CONSISTENTLY OPPOSES ALL VIOLATIONS OF CEASE-FIRE.
IN ORDER BE CONSISTENT IN FORMULATING USG POSITIONI ON LEBANESE
COMPLAINT BEFORE SC, WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
THOSE ACTS WHICH ALLEGEDLY PROVODED THE ISRAELI ATTACK. WHILE
ISRAELI ATTACK DEPLORABLE AND APPARENTLY RESULTED IN CIVILIAN
INJURIES AND DEATHS, WE CANNOT CONSIDER IT IN ISOLATION FROM
OTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE ACROSS CEASE-FIRE LINES. IF, AS GOL
ALLEGES, ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STILL IN EFFECT, THIS CLEARLY
IMPOSES OBLIGATION ON GOL PREVENT PROVOCATIVE ACTS FROM ITS
TERRITORY, WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL IN DOTNG.
3 * YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT, GIVEN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, WE
WOULD BE UNABLE SUPPORT ONE=SIDED COUNCIL ACTION CRITICAL ONLY
OF ISRAEL AND HOPE GOL WILL NOT PRESS FOR SUCH ACTION. WE
SUGGEST THEY CONSIDER DESIRABILITY OF BALANCED CONSENSUS
STATEMENT WHICH, WHILE PERHAPS NOT FULLY MEETING ALLI GOLI DESIRES,
WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF UNANIMOUS COUNCIL OPINION BEHIND IT.
4 0 FOR USUN. SUGGEST YOU TAKE SAME LINE AS IN PARAGRAPH 3
ABOVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBANESE AND OTHER DELS, AS APPROPRIATE.
GP-3e
RICHARDSON
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
SECRET 339
PAGE 01 STATE 108201
85
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01,/031 R
66633
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA: JJSISCO
NEA: MR DAVIES
NEA/ARN: MR SEELYE
NEA/UAR: MR PARKER
S/S: MHORNBLOW
060097
R 010033Z JUL 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN NY
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
SECR E T STATE 108201
EXDIS
1. LEBANESE AMB KABBANI CALLED ON SISCO AND DAVIES: JUNE 30
E
PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE JULY 2 FOR LEAVE AND CONSULTATION IN
BEIRUT. SISCO PROVIDED KABBANI WITH FOLLOWING BRIEFING ON
STATE OF PLAY US-SOVIET BILATERAL TALKS
2. SISCO STATED WE GAVE SOVIETS NUMBER OF CONCRETEI POINTS IN
EARLY MAY INCLUDING FOLLOWING:
A. PARTIES TO CONFLICT EXPECTED AT SOME POINT MEET TOGETHER
UNDER AUSPICES JARRING.
B * IT EXPECTED THAT STATE OF PEACE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND
BELLIGERENCY ENDED.
C. ISRAEL EXPECTED ACCEPT PRINCIPLE WITHDRAWAL TO SECURE
BORDERS AND FORMER INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES NOT NECESSARILY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEP OF STATE
CHING
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 108201
EXCLUDED.
D . FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH SUEZ AND TIRAN.
E. RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ALL NATIONS IN AREA.
F . SINAI TO BE DEMILITARIZED.
G. STATUS GAZA TO BE WORKED OUT BY JORDAN, ISRAEL AND UAR.
H. PRACTICAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO BE WORKED OUT FOR SHARM
AL-SHEIKH.
I · EXPLICIT US SUPPORT UN RESOLUTIONS ON REFUGEES AND
ENDORSEMENT PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE BY REFUGEES, TEMPERED, HOWEVER,
BY PRACTICAL PROCEDURE AND COMMITMENT RE HOW MANY REFUGEES
ISRAEL COULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE BACK.
J. SISCO SAID IT DESIRABLE THAT ARAB GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO
OBLIGATE THEMSELVES TO TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT LAUNCHING OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS FROM THEIR TERRITORIES. HE NOTEDI THAT THIS
ELEMENT OF USG POSITION WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO GOL
EXPIS EXPIC
BECAUSE OF LEBANON'S SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH FEDAYEEN.
3. FOLLOWING GROMYKO'S TRIP TO CAIRO, SISCO STATED SOVIETS
GAVE US COUNTERPROPOSAL WHICH SHOWED SOME ADVANCES, BUT NUMBER
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN. ONE OF ROSITIVE ASPECTS IS
THAT SOVIETS ENVISAGE BINDING AGREEMENT AMONG PARTIES. ALSO,
WE HAVE COMMON UNDERSTANDING WITH SOVIETS ON NECESSITY OF PACKAGE
DEAL. SISCO EMPHASIZED AT THIS POINT THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF PACKAGE
MUST BE AGREEDI TO BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION BEGINS. OTHER POSITIVE
ASPECTS OF SOVIET PROPOSAL ARE RECOGNITION OF NECESSITY RESPECT
FOR SOVEREIGNTY NATIONS IN MIDDLE EAST NEED FOR PERMANENT
AGREEMENT AND ENDORSEMENT PRINCIPLE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH
TIRAN.
4. AMONG DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY SOVIET PROPOSALI ARE
INSISTENCE ON TOTAL WITHDRAWALI TO PRE-JUNE 5 LINES: AND FAILURE
ENDORSE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH SUEZ WITHOUT RESERVATION.
SOVIET FORMULA. PROPOSES ISRAELIS USE SUEZ "IN ACCORDANCE WITH
CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION OF 1888,' WHICH WOULD GIVE UAR
RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH ISRAELI SHIPPING. ALSO, SOVIETS FAILED
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduce at the THE Nixon Presidential Library OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
UNITED
STATE 4% ANERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS EXELS
PAGE 03 STATE 108201
TO BE EXPLICIT ON OBLIGATIONS WHICH FLOW FROM END OF BELLIGERENCY.
REFUGEES POINT DOES NOT CONTAIN NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS.
5. SISCO SAID THAT IN SPITE OF DEFICIENCEIS IN SOVIET COUNTER-
PROPOSAL, WE THINK THERE SUFFICIENT ADVANCES TO JUSTIFY CONTINUATION
BILATERAL TALKS. WE ARE NEITHER OPTIMISTIC NOR PESSIMISTIC,
BUT BELIEVE CONTINUATION OF TALKS IMPORTANT.
6. REGARDING SITE OF BILATERAL TALKS, SISCO STATED SOVIETS
HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED MOSCOW. FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, INCLUDING
PROXIMITY TO UN AND SITE OF FOUR-POWER TALKS, WE PREFER WASHINGTON.
WHILE WE DO NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY FEW ROUNDS OFI TALKS IN MOSCOW,
WE DO NOT FAVOR permanent CHANGE IN VENUE.
70 KABBANI QUESTIONED WHETHER ISRAELIS REALLY WANT PEACE AND
SUGGESTED THEY MAY EVEN WANT ANOTHER WAR FOR PURPOSE OF TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION. SISCO SAID HE CONVINCED BOTH ISRAEL AND UAR WANT
PEACE® FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IS FINDING TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH.
IN CONTEXT PEACE settlement, KABBANI ASKED SISCO ABOUT OUR
THINKING ON STATUS LEBANON. HE NOTED THAT LEBANON WAS NOT A
COMBATANT IN 1967 WAR AND THAT GOL REGARDED ISRAELELEBANON
ARMISTICE 2 AGREEMENT AS STILL VALID. SISCO AGREED THAT LEBANON
WAS NOT ENGATED IN THE WAR BUT NOTED THAT PEACE SETTLEMENT COULD
NOT IGNORE LEBANON. HE SAID HE WOULD GIVE THIS QUESTION FURTHER
THOUGHT.
8. SISCO NOTED THAT LAST FIRDAY'S AHRAM HAD SCATHING ARTICLE
ON US POLICY AND POINTED OUT TO KABBANI THAT, CONTRARY EGYPTIAN
ALLEGATION, USG NOT TRYING TO DIVIDE ARABS. KABBANI
DISMISSED HEYKAL WITH COMMENT THAT U.S. SHOULD NOT TAKE HIM
SERIOUSLY. GP=3 ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTHETHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE *
Leb
Department of State
GRILLED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 825!
02
PAGE 01 STATE 107369
53
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 R
66638
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA:JOSEPH SISCO
NEA:MR. DAVIES
EXQIN EXCES EXCLUS
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
NEA/IAI*MR* ATHERTON
S/S:MR. SHEPARD
IO/UNP:MISS BROWN(INFO)
051098
P 281724Z JUN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
SECRET STATE 107369
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 5255
1. WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU TEXT OF SOVIET JUNE 17 DOCUMENT
AND COMMENTS ON IT (STATE 101232 AND 101233) STRICTLY FOR
YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. IN ADDITION, WE ARE SENDING
YOU TEXT OF U.S. FORMULATIONS GIVEN SOVIETS (STATE 864651
AS BASIS FOR YOUR DISCUSSION WITH HELOU AS WELL ÀS STATE
83050 WHICH INDICATES CARE WE HAVE EXERCISED IN INFORMING
OTHERS OF OUR FORMULATIONS.
2. IN YOUR MEETING WITH HELOU YOU MAY INFORM HIM THAT WE REGARD
NOTE HANDED TO SECRETARY ON JUNE 17 BY SOVIET CHARGE AS
EVIDENCE OF SERIOUSNESS OF EXCHANGE VIEWS BETWEEN Us AND
USSR AND THAT SOVIETS ALSO APPEAR TO REGARD IT AS SUCH. BIL-
ATERAL EXCHANGE CONSTITUTES SOME PROGRESS. TOWARD MIDDLE EAST
SETTLEMENT INASMUCH AS IT HAS NARROWED DIFFERENCES: BETWEEN
US AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON CERTAIN POINTS, BUT SERIOUS
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN
3. FOREGOING SHOULD PROVIDE HELOU WITH SUFFICIENT UNDER-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MARK AMERICA UNITED * * DEPARTMENT STATE OF DEPARTMENT
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 107369
STANDING US POSITION, BUT AVOIDS GETTING INTO PRECISE
DETAILS WHICH ARE BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD IN USG.
GP-3 6 ROGERS
EXPIS EXPIS
SECRET
+81/40/0290
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASSIFIED ORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
RECEIVED
WHCA
1969 MAY 30 21 35Z
UNCLASSIFIED
MCE 162
PAGE 01 STATE 087841
83
ORIGIN SS 20
INFO OCT 01,NSC 10, NEA 13,P 04,USIE 00,SSO 00,000 00,NSCE 00, CIAE 00,
DODE 00,RSC 01,/049 R
66631
DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:JBECELIA
APPROVED BY:S/S-0:LKILDAY
123038
Z 302119Z MAY 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
UNCLAS STATE 087841
EMBASSY TEL AVIV PHONED DEPARTMENT AND REQUESTED FOLLOWING MESSAGE
BE PASSED TO YOU.
QUOTE: ENBASSY TEL AVIV NOTIFIED AT 2045 ZULU THAT TAPLINE
WAS BLOWN UP APPROXIMATELY 2030 ZULU VICINITY BANIAS. NO
OTHER INFORMATION YET AVAILABLE. UNQUOTE. ROGERS
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
RECEIVED
WHCA
1969 MAY 30 22 02Z
UNCLASSIFIED
HCE 165
PAGE 01 STATE 087844
83
ORIGIN SS 20
$
INFO OCT 01,NEA 13,NSC 10,10 13,E 15,SSO 00,NSCE 00,000 00,USIE 00,
P 04,CIAE 03,DODE 30, INT 06,RSC 01, NSAE 00, INR 07,/090 R
66631
DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:PTHEROS
APPROVED BY:S/S-O:HHEYMANN
123079
Z 0 302149Z MAY 69 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY ANMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMENBASSY KUWAIT
UNCLAS STATE 087844
REF: STATE 087841
FOLLOWING RECEIVED BY PHONE FROM TEL AVIV.
QUOTE: OIL IS BEING DISCHARGED AT A VERY FAST RATE AND
ISRAELI AUTHORITIES DID NOT SHUT OFF VALVE AT FIRST BUT NOW
DOING SO. UNQUOTE. ROGERS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 049
PAGE 01 STATE 087829
EXQIN EXEIS EXCLUS
50
25
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 R
66603:
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN&BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/ARN a MR SEELYE
IO MR DAY
NEA/IAI a MR BAHTI
S/S a MR WALKER
122516
R 3018222 MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY AMMANI
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S ERCOR ENT STATE 087829
EXDIS
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONALI SUPPORT FOR LEBANON
REF: BEIRUT 43758 STATE 750378 BEIRUT 43668 NJA 7262
1 o WE COMMEND YOUR HANDLING OF HELOU IN YOUR MAY 26 MEETING.
WE UNDERSTAND HIS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT POSSIBILITY OBTAINING
OUTSIDE HELP IN COPING WITH CURRENT PROBLEM IS SLIGHT.
WE ALSO UNDERSTAND HIS ANXIETY OVER CONSEQUENCES POSSIBLE
BREAKDOWN INTERNAL ORDER IN LEBANON, AND GIVEN LEBANESE
CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES IT NATURAL HE WOULD HOPE FOR OUTSIDE
INTERVENTION TO AVOID SUCH CALAMAITY.
20 WE NOTE HELOU SUGGESTS USG GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION
TO DEMARCHE TO USSR ONI NASSERS POSITION ON FEDAYEEN MOVE-
MENT, ESPECIALLY AS IT AFFECTS LEBANON. YOU WILLIRECALLI
THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO ASKED SOVIET AMBASSADOR
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SEPRET
PAGE 02 STATE 087829
DOBRYNIN (STATE 650391 TO CONVEY REQUEST HIS GOVERNMENT
INTERVENE WITH SARG TO RESTRAIN FEDAYEEN INITIAL SOVIET
REACTION WAS QUERY WHY GOL DID NOT APPROACH USSR DIRECTLY
IF REALLY CONCERNED. SOVIETS EVENTUALLY APPROACHED SYRIANS,
APPARENTLY AFTER REQUEST RECEIVED FROM LEBANESE IN
LIGHT THIS EXPERIENCE WE BELIEVE REQUEST TO SOVIETS THAT
THEY APPROACH UAR RE FEDAYEEN SHOULD BE MADE IN FIRST
INSTANCE BY GOLD DEPENDING ON SOVIET REACTION WE COULD
FOLLOW-UP IN SUPPORT OF LEBANESE REQUEST, ALTHOUGH SOVIETS
ALREADY FULLY AWARE OUR CONCERN
30 HELOURS SUGGESTION REI "INTERNATIONAL DECLARATION" MAY
BE WHAT PROMPTED FRENCH PROPOSALI FOR FOUR-POWER statement
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
IN SUPPORT LEBANESE INTEGRITY. THIS PROPOSAL CONVEYED IN
PARIS: 7095 TO WHICH WE HAVE REPLIED SEPARATE TELEGRAM.
40 REGARDING HELOUPS SUGGESTION THAT COUNTRIES THAT CONTRIBUTE
TO UNRWA MAKE REPRESENTATIONS SYG, WE CONCUR WITH YOUR
COMMENT. ALSO, INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN STATE 75037 STILL
VALIDO
5% WEI STRONGLY ENDORSE POSITION YOU TOOK WITH HELOU THAT
HIS DIPLOMATIC POSITION WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IN PROPORTION
TO STAND HE ADOPTS IN DEFENDING LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND
INDEPENDENCE® WE AGREE THAT FIRM LINE WITH FEDAYEEN IS
CRITICAL AT THIS JUNCTURE AND WILLIBE IMPORTANT IN OBTAINING
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IF REQUIRED.
60 REPORT CONTAINED IN NUA 72621 INTFRESTING IN THIS CONTEXT.
IF INDEED ARAFAT'S OBJECTIVE IS MERELY TO FORCE DEPLOYMENT
ISRAELI TROOPS NORTHERN ISRAEL CHANCE OF INCIDENTS MAY BE
REDUCED ALTHOUGH WE SOMEWHAT DUBIOUS FEDAYEEN WOULD IN
FACT REFRAIN FROM ALLI CROSS-BORDER RAIDS. MOREOVER, NOT ALL
FEDAYEEN ARE UNDER ARAFAT'S CONTROL AND CERTAIN ELEMENTS,
PARTICULARLY SAIQA, MAY CAUSE INCIDENTS AND THEREBY PROVOKE
ISRAELI RETALIATION
7 ᵒ REPORTING AND COMMENTARY IN BEIRUT 4366 PARTICULARLY
TIMELY AND USEFUL TO US IN UNDERSTANDING HELOU'S MOOD IN
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES
GP-3, ROGERS:
SECRET
981/49/0290
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASFEDORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT OF
# STATE
Lehnon
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 089
PAGE 01 STATE 076791
82
ORIGIN SS:30
INFO OCT 01/031 R
EXQIN
66648
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RPPAGANELLI 5/14/69
APPROVED BY: NEA=JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN&TWSEELYE
NEA*RPDAVIES
NEA/UAR:RBPARKER
S/S=MR. WALSH
016190
R 150111Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
EXQIN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S EICOR E T STATE 076791
EXDIS
SUBUS LEBANESE CRISIS
1 @ IN REVIEWING WAYS OF SUPPORTING PRESIDENT HELOU'S ANTI-
FEDAYEEN POSITION IN PRESENT LEBANESE CRISIS IT OCCURS TO US
THAT INFLUENCE OF FORMER PRESIDENT CHEHAB COULD BE DECISIVE.
EXQIN
A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY CHEHAB OF SUPPORT FOR HELOU COULD WELL
PROVIDE HELOU WITH THE AMMUNITION HE NEEDS TO ENFORCE HIS DESIRE
TO SUPPRESS THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON IT MIGHT ALSO EMBOLDEN
OTHER LEADERS TO FOLLOW SUIT AND TO STATE PUBLICLY WHAT THEY
HAVE THIS FAR CONVEYED TO HELOU ONLY PRIVATELY.
2. CHEHAB'S ASSETS MAKE HIM UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO TIP THE BALANCE
IN HELOU'S FAVOR CHEHAB IS LEBANON'S MOST PRESTITIOUS
POLITICAL FIGURE. HIS FATHER IMAGE AS THE "SAVIOR" OF
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASSIFIED ORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXPIS EXEIS
PAGE 02 STATE 076791
LEBANON IN THE 1958 CRISIS STILL HAS POTENCY. PERHAPS MORE
IMPORTANT IS HIS CROSS-CONFESSIONAL CREDIBILITY-LEBANONS
MUSLIMS CONTINUE TO REGARD CHEHAB AS THE PRESIDENT WHO DID
MOST FOR LEBANON'S MUSLIM COMMUNITY. IN ADDITION, CHEHAB IS
PERSONA GRATA WITH NASSER AND MOST VARIETIES OF ARAB NATIONALISTS.
FURTHER, CHEHAB RETAINS GREAT INFLUENCE AND A STRONG BASE OF
SUPPORT IN THE LEBANESE ARMY
30 OBVIOUSLY CHEHAB'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS COULD INHIBIT HIS
WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT PUBLICLY HELOU'S ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSITION
AS IT HAS INHIBITED OTHER LEBANESE POLITICIANS PARTICULARLY
CHRISTIANS, FROM PUBLICLY SUPPORTING HELOU. THEREFORE, SOME
STRONG URGING IS PROBABLY REQUIRED BY OTHER RESPECTED MEMBERS
OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM LEADERSHIP TO INDUCE HIM TO DO SO o
THEY WOULD NEED TO CAST THEIR APPEAL IN TERMS OF WHAT IS IN
LEBANON'S BROADER, LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND EMPHASIZE,
IF TRUE, THAT CHEHAB'S PUBLIC SUPPORT COULD MAKE THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF HELOU'S POLICY.
40 IF AMBASSADOR CONCURS IN OUR ASSESSMENT, HE MIGHT WISH
TO ENCOURAGE ELEMENTS CLOSE TO CHEHAB TO SEEK TO PERSUADE HIM
TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT SUPPORTING HELOU'S FIRM POLICY
TOWARD FEDAYEEN. IN ADDITION, AMBASSADOR MAY WISH MAKE SIMILAR
RECOMMENDATION WHEN HE NEXT SEES CHEHAB.
GP = 3 . RICHARDSON
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THSEACREHORIZATIO OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
18//20/0299
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Febanon
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 895
PAGE 01 STATE 075037
83:
02
ORIGIN SS: 30
INFO OCT 01//031 R
66637
DRAFTED BY:IO/UNP:T CAROLAN
APPROVED BY:IO:S DEPALMA
IO/UNP:MISS BROWN
NEA/ARN$MR. SEELYE
EXQIC EXAIS
NEA8MR® SISCO
S/S:MRO BROWN
130860
R 1223492 MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECRET STATE 075037
EXDIS
SUBJ: UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON
REF: BEIRUT 3868, 3881
10 POSSIBILITY OF USING SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS AS PEG FOR
UN INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANESE CRISIS WAS TIED TO US SUGGESTION
(PARA IC, STATE 653331 THAT GOL MIGHT SEEK TO HAVE SYG, IN
LIGHT UN CONCERN WITH REFUGEE PROBLEM, APPOINT REP TO VISIT
LEBANON AND REPORT ON REFUGEE ASPECTS IN PRESENT SITUATION.
ROLE OF SUCH SYG REP WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF CIVILIAN
OBSERVERS TO INVESTIGATE SITUATION IN CAMPS AND SERVE AS BRAKE
ON FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN THEM AS ENVISAGED BY HELOU. EXTENSIVE
UN SERVICES HELOU HAS IN MIND, AS EMB COMMENTS, WOULD NOT BE
FEASIBLE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.
2. IT APPARENT FROM AMB'S MAY 5 CONVERSATION WITH MICHELMORE
THAT LATTER DOES NOT BELIEVE PRESENT SECURITY CONDITIONS IN
REFUGEE CAMPS REQUIRE HIM DO MORE THAN COMMUNICATE PRIVATELY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE *
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 075037
EXQIC EXEM EXPIS
TO SYG HIS CONCERN RE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON UNRWA OPERATIONS IN
LEBANON. MICHELMORE MIGHT AT SOME POINT CONCLUDE IT NECESSARY
AUGMENT UNRWA STAFF IN LEBANON TO ENSURE CONTINUANCE OF AGENCY
OPERATIONS AND SO INDICATE TO SYG. IT SEEMS CLEAR, HOWEVER,
HE DOES NOT BELIEVE CONDITIONS HAVE REACHED POINT WHERE THIS
NECESSARY. IN ANY EVENT, SUCH ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL COULD NOT
FUNCTION AS OBSERVERS IN SENSE HELOU HAS IN MIND, AND WE SEE NO
WAY THEIR PRESENCE COULD BECOME BASIS FOR INTRODUCING UN "POLICE
TEAMS" AND EVENTUALLY ESTABLISHING UNEF-TYPE OPERATION IN LEBANON.
THUS, WHILE UNRWA STAFF IN LEBANON COULD BE AUGMENTED WITHOUT
SPECIFIC SC OR GA AUTHORIZATION, SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT MEET
HELOU'S PROBLEM®
3. MICHELMORE TOUCHED ON HEART OF PROBLEM IN STATING THAT
MAINTENANCE OF ORDER IN UNRWA CAMPS IS PRIMARILY HOST GOVT RES-
PONSIBILITY. THIS ONCE AGAIN POINTS UP KEY FACT, WHICH YOU HAVE
ALREADY EMPHASIZED TO HELOU, THAT ANY INITIATIVE FOR UN
PRESENCE IN LEBANON WILL HAVE TO ORIGINATE WITH GOL ITSELF.
WHILE UNRWA MIGHT BE WILLING ASSOCIATE ITSELF IN SOME FASHION
WITH GOL REQUEST FOR UN ASSISTANCE IN EVENT LEBANESE FEEL UNABLE
MAINTAIN SECURITY IN AND AROUND UNRWA CAMPS, WE GATHER NO SUCH
SITUATION NOW EXISTS. IN ANY CASE WE WOULD STILL FIND IT HARD TO
VISUALIZE HOW UN PRESENCE DESPATCHED FOR SUCH LIMITED PURPOSE
COULD EVOLVE INTO UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORT.
4. YOU SHOULD INFORM HELOU OF OUR VIEWS, MAKING CLEAR THAT,
WHILE WE APPRECIATE HIS DESIRE OBTAIN UN INVOLVEMENT ON GOLDS
BEHALF WITHOUT ATTRACTING UNDUE PUBLIC ATTENTION, WE REMAIN
CONVINCED GOL ITSELF MUST (A) APPROACH SYG DIRECTLY, AND (B)
OBTAIN SUPPORT OR ACQUIESCENCE OF OTHER ARAB STATES FOR SUCH
A MOVE.
GP - 3 . RICHARDSON
SECRET
881/20/0290
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DEDEASTEORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Febra
*
«
UNITED OF
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SETTE
SECRET 934
PAGE 01 STATE 075036
83
2
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT Ø1»/031 R
66640
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:TW seelye
APPROVED BY:NEA8JJ SISCO
NEA & RP DAVIES
IO8E BROWN
S/S:MR. BROWN
130916
R 122348Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SECRET STATE 075036
EXDIS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT helou AND SITUATION IN LEBANON
REF # BEIRUT 3881
WE KEENLY AWARE DIFFICULT DILEMMA FACING PRESIDENT HELOU AND
APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO STIFFEN HIS BACK RE FEDAYEEN © YOU
SHOULD CONTINUE TO DO ALL YOU CAN TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE
IMPERATIVE OF FACING UP TO THE FEDAYEEN AND LEFTIST THREAT AT THIS
CRITICAL JUNCTURE. POLICY OF CAVING IN TO FEDAYEEN CAN ONLY LEAD
TO DISASTER IN LONG RUN
EXQIN
2. WHILE IN NO WAY WISHING TO SUGGEST A DIMINUTION IN us CONCERN
AND POLITICAL SUPPORT WE BELIEVE THAT HELOU SHOULD CLEARLY
UNDERSTAND THAT LEBANON'S FUTURE RESTS essentially IN HIS HANDS
AND IN HANDS OF LEBANESE COLLECTIVELY. OUTSIDE HELP CAN BE
MARGINAL AT BEST AND HE SHOULD AVOID LOOKING TO EXTERNAL FACTORS
AS CRUTCH. THERE MAY BE POSSIBILITIES FOR A UN ROLE, ALTHOUGH
WE NOTE THAT HELOU FINDS IT POLITICALLY UNFEASIBLE TO REQUEST
SECRET
4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT EAORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
*
=2-
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 075036
EXQIC EXPIS EXEIS
AUGMENTATION OF UN FORCE ALONG BORDER, AT LEAST AT THE MOMENT a
A FORCE OF SIZE AND NATURE COMPARABLE TO UNEF, WITH SUBSTANTIAL
TROOP CONTINGENTS FROM NUMBER OF STATES, WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY
DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE AND, EVEN IF PROVED POSSIBLE, US MILITARY
PARTICIPATION THEREIN MUST BE RULED OUT. WE ARE COMMENTING IN
SEPTEL ON GOL SUGGESTION RE SENDING OBSERVERS TO UNRWA CAMPS °
3 o YOU MAY ASSURE HELOU THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO USE OUR
INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND THAT WE ARE
CONTINUING OUR REPRESENTATIONS IN CERTAIN ARAB CAPITALS RE FUNDING
OF FEDAYEEN NEITHER INITIATIVE, EVEN IF IT PRODUCED RESULTS"
HOWEVER, IS LIKELY TO AFFECT IMMEDIATE SITUATION IN LEBANON.
BEST HOPE IS FIRM GOL POLICY VIS-A-VIS FEDAYEEN, COMBINED WITH
INFORMATIONALI CAMPAIGN EMPHASIZING DANGERS TO LEBANON AND HER
OPEN, PLURALISTIC SOCIETY OF AN ALLIANCE WITH FEDAYEEN. WE NOTE
THAT GOL HAS ALREADY HAD SOME SUCCESS IN THIS REGARD BY STRESSING
SYRIAN AND SUBVERSIVE CHARACTER OF SAIQAH AND THREAT THIS
POSES TO LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY. THERE MAY BE MORE
THAT HELOU CAN DO THROUGH PUBLIC INFORMATIONAL MEDIA TO CONVINCE
LEBANESE OF PITFALLS IN FOLLOWING PATH INDICATED BY FEDAYEEN
LEADERS.
40 ONE THOUGHT OCCURS TO US, ARISING FROM IMPRESSION THAT
FEDAYEEN ISSUE IN LEBANON TODAY HAS BECOME TO GREAT EXTENT
CATALYTIC AGENT FOR LEFTIST CAUSE AND VEHICLE FOR ACCUMULATED
GRIEVANCES OF LEBANONS LESS PRIVILEGED. IN YOUR NEXT TALK WITH
HELOU WE WONDER IF IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR YOU TO EXPLORE THIS
ASPECT, AND INQUIRE WHETHER STEPS IN DIRECTION OF SOCIAL AND
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM MIGHT NOT AMELIORATE SITUATION SOMEWHAT.
OBVIOUSLY NOTHING CONCRETE COULD BE UNDERTAKEN UNTIL
GOVERNMENT FORMED BUT PUBLIC STATEMENT SIGNIFYING INTENTION TO
GRAPPLE MORE ACTIVELY WITH THESE PROBLEMS MIGHT SWEETEN PIL OF
STRONG ARM POLICY TOWARD FEDAYEEN. WE NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE THAT OF
99 MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, ONLY TEN COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS
"MODERNISTS" WITH REMAINDER FITTING IN CATEGORY OF TRADITIONAL,
OLD-LINE POLITICIANS (BEIRUT A-74). WHILE RECOGNIZING VERY REAL
OBSTACLES WHICH INHIBIT CHANGE IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE
OF LEBANON, WE THROW IDEA OUT AT THIS TIME FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH.
AT MINIMUM THERE MIGHT BE PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE IN ARRANGING FOR
NEW GOVERNMENT TO COME TO POWER ON A REFORM PLATFORM DESIGNED
TO ATTRACT MANY OF THOSE TO WHOM FEDAYEEN ISSUE HAS GREATEST
APPEAL
GP-3. RICHARDSON
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
681/20/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
OF STATES MMC AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 488
PAGE 01 STATE 070266
2
82
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/031 R
66638
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE TO:UNP:ARDAY
APPROVED BY:NEA:JOSEPH SISCO
DOD/ISA:RMURRAY (PARA 1, DI
NEA/IAI:ALATHERTON
NEA/UAR:RBPARKER
J:RSDILLON(SUB)
S/S:MR. GLEYSTEEN
NEA/ARP:WDBREWER
IO:DEPALM
S/CPR:SLKING
WH:HAL SAUNDERS
086628
O R 060118Z MAY 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
EXQIS EXPIS
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
SECRET STATE S 070266
EXDIS
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN LEBANON
REF: BEIRUT 3678 (NOTAL)
1. WE IMPRESSED BY COURAGE AND DEVISIVENESS BEING DIS-
PLAYED BY PRESIDENT HELOU AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE. HIS
DECISION 3- TO CRACK DOWN ON FEDAYEEN, WHILE A DELICATE ONE,
IS OBVIOUSLY THE ONLY COURSE OF ACTION OPEN TO HIMI IF
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard lixon Pi esidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE Ø2 STATE 070266
LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND MODERATION IS TO BE MAINTAINED.
WE APPRECIATE NEED FOR "HAND HOLDING" AND WISH TO BE
AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT COMMITING OURSELVES
TO ANY SORT OF INTERVENTION. FOLLOWING ARE OUR PRELIMINARY
VIEWS WHICH YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT
HELOU IN YOUR MEETING WITH HIM ON MAY 6° MEANWHILE,
ALL
WE ARE GIVING URGENT ATTENTION TO WHAT ELSE WE MIGHT DO
TO REASSURE HELOU OF OUR SUPPORT FOR lebanon.
2. WHILE IN YOUR LAST TALK WITH HELOU YOU ALLUDED TO A
EXCLUS EXCIS EXCLUS
NUMBER OF STEPS WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN TO SEEK TO AMELIORATE
THE SITUATION, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO RECAPITULATE
FOR HIS BENEIFIT WHAT WE HAVE DONE. ACCORDINGLY,
YOU SHOULD POINT OUT TO HIM THE FOLLOWING, NOTING THAT
YOU ARE DOING SO UNDER INSTRUCTIONS:
A . USG SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. YOU HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY
THE SECRETARY TO UNDERSCORE USG SUPPORT FOR THE FIRMI
GOL POLICY OF KEEPING FEDAYEEN IN LINE (SEPTEL). YOU MAY
AGAIN INFORM HELOU THAT USG SUPPORT FOR LEBANONS INTEGRITY
REMAINS UNDIMINISHED AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO
CONSIDER MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENT IN THIS REGARD AT
APPROPRIATE TIME IF DEEMED DESIRABLE. IN EFFORT TO MAIN-
TAIN BALANCE AND TO ASSIST IN INSURING CONTINUATIIN OF
CHRISTIAN=MOSLEM SOLIDARITY, WE ARE EXPLORING WAYS OF
DEMONSTRATING TO TRADITIONAL AND MODERATE moslem COMM-
UNITY IN LEBANON OUR SPECIAL INTEREST AND CON-
CERN IN LEBANON'S WELFARE. FYI. IN THIS CONNECTION" WE
RECALL HELOU'S EARLIER EXPRESSION OF INTEREST THAT
WE INVITE EX-PRIME MINISTER KARAME TO WASHINGTON. SINCE
KARAME APPEARS TO BE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE FOR PRIME
MINISTER IN ANY NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH IS FORMED, WEI WOULD
LIKE TO keep OPEN POSSIBILITY EXTENDING INVITATIONI TO
KARAME - - IF AND WHEN HE BECOMES PRIME MINISTER AGAIN--
TO MAKE VISIT TO US. THIS DEMONSTRATION OF OUR HIGH REGARD
FOR KARAME COULD CONCEIVABLY UNDERSCORE OUR BROAD SUPPORT
FOR LEBANON AND HELP AVOID CREATING IMPRESSION THAT IN
BACKING PRESIDENT heldu WE ARE LIMITING OURSELVES TO
CHRISTIAN SEGMENT. STRESS THAT FOREGOING FOR YOUR INFO
ONLY SINCE STILL IN EXPLORATORY STAGE. END FYI.
B. EFFORTS TO CALL OFF SYRIANS. WE ARE NOT SANGUINE
Reproduced at the Richard Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASSIFEDORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
Department of State
EXX
UNITED
AMERICA STATE
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 070266
THAT EFFORTS TO CALL OFF SYRIANS WILL BE FRUITFUL. WE NOTE,
FOR EXAMPLE, FAILURE OF EX-PRIME MINISTER YAFI TO OBTAIN ANY
SATISFACTION DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO DAMASCUS.
NEVERTHELESS AS HELOU KNOWS, WE HAVE CALLED DANGEROUS SIT-
UATION TO ATTENTION OF SOVIETS AND HAVE SUGGESTED
POSSIBILITY OF THEIR INTERCESSION WITH SARG. WE ARE
STILL AWAITING SOVIET REPLY TO OUR REPRESENTATIONS: HELDU
MIGHT BE REASSURED TO LEARN THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
INDICATE THAT SOVIETS DID NOT APPROVE OF RECENT
DEMONSTRATIONS IN LEBANON AND APPEAR TO DISFAVOR FEDAYEEN
SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS. PURSUANT TO OUR REQUEST FRENCH HAVE MADE
REPRESENTATIONS TO DAMASCUS. POSSIBLE hopeful DEVELOP-
MENT IS RECENT VISIT OF ATASSI AND ASAD TO CAIRO,
WHERE THEY MAY HAVE RECEIVED CAUTIONARY ADVICE FROM
NASSER.
C. REPRESENTATIONS RE FUNDING OF FEDAYEEN. IN CASE YOU
HAVE NOT MENTIONED MATTER TO HELOU, YOU SHOULD INFORM HIM
OF OUR RENEWED EFFORTS IN RIYADH KUWAIT AND TRIPOLI TO INDUCE
GOVERNMENTS OF SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND LIBYA TO PREVENT
FURTHER FLOW OF FUNDS FROM THEIR COUNTRIES TO FEDAYEEN.
WE HAVE STRESSED BASIC INCOMPATIBILITY OF INTERESTS
OF THESE MODERATE GOVERNMENTS WITH ULTIMATE FEDAYEEN
OBJECTIVES. / WHILE WE HAVE NOT HAD MUCH LUCK AS YET THERE IS
POSSIBILITY THAT SOME SOUL-SEARCHING IS NOW GOING ON IN
THESE CAPITALS.
D. SELECTED ARMS SHIPMENTS. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORMI HELOU
CONFIDENTIALLY THAT WE ARE ENCOURAGING SAUDIS TO CONTINUE TO
BE RESPONSIVE TO URGENT LEBANESE ARMS NEEDS. WE HAVE IN MIND
ARMS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES. RE ARMS REQUESTED OF us,
YOU MAY TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT WE ARE MOVING AHEAD AS
RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE IN OBTAINING PRICE AND AVAILABILITY
DATA AND THAT WE ARE ASSIGNING HIGH PRIORITY TO PRO-
CUREMENT OF ITEMS REQUESTED.
E ° POSSIBLE ROLE OF UN. AS HELOU KNOWS, WE HAVE
EXAMINED INTENSIVELY POSSIBILITIES OF UN ROLE CURRENT
SITUATION YOU MIGHT SUGGEST THAT, IF HELOU WISHES
PURSUE UN ROLE FURTHER, LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVE DISCUSS
CURRENT SITUATION CONFIDENTIALLY WITH UNSYG WITH VIEW
TO GETTING U THANT'S JUDGMENT ON WAYS IN WHICH UN COULD
Reproduced at the Richard® esidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ECEAORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXPIN EXQIN
SECRET
PAGE 04 STATE 070266
BE HELPFUL, LIMITATIONS HE SEES ON UN INVOLVEMENT,
ETC. (IN THIS REGARD LEBANESE MIGHT CONSIDER SENDING SPECIAL
- - - -
REP TO NEW YORK FOR THIS PURPOSE, SINCE WE UNDERSTAND
CHAMMAS HAS JUST LEFT NEW YORK TO RETURN TO BEIRUT,
AND PERMREP IS RELATIVE NEW COMER WITHOUT MUCH STATURE.) )
IN DISCUSSION WITH SYG, LEBANESE COULD EXPLORE INTERI
ALIA POSSIBILITY (A) SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE BEING
SENT TO LEBANON BY SYG AND (B) OBSERVER FORCE BEING
EATABLISHED, PERHAPS BY AUGMENTATION OF PRESENT UNITSO
COMPLEMENTISTATE 65333, PARAS 1C AND DII. YOU SHOULD MAKE
CLEAR THAT WE CONSIDER ANY SUCH FORCE WOULD OPERATE EXCLUSIVELY
ON LEBANESE SIDE OF BORDER, SINCE ISRAEL WOULD ALMOST
CERTAINLY REFUSE TO ACCEPT FORCE ON ITS SIDE. WE HOPE
THAT LEBANESE WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH AMBASSADOR
YOST IN NEW YORK IF THEY UNDERTOOK SUCH APPROACH TO
SYG.
F . REPRESENTATIONS WITH ISRAFL. AS YOU HAVE TOLD HELDU,
WE HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL ON TWO OCCASIONS:
IN THE PAST week WITH REGARD TO ABSOLUTE NECESSITY
OF EXERCISING RESTRAINT. WE HAVE ALSO CONVEYED HOPE
THAT ISRAELIS CAN STRENGTHEN THEIR INTERDICTION
CAPABILITIES ON ISRAELI SIDE OF BORDER. YOU MAY
TELL HELOU THAT ISRAELIS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COVER
WHOLE LENGTH OF BORDER BUT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS SUGGEST THAT
ISRAELIS ARE MAKING SPECIAL FFFORT TO TRY TO CLOSE OFF ROUTES
OF INGRESS THROUGH ISRAELI-HELD SYRIAN TERRITORY.
3. RE WHAT MORE WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO FOR HELOU, YOU
MAY INFORM HIM THAT WE ARE GIVING MATTER URGENT ATTENTION
AND WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM FURTHER. YOU SHOULD STRESS
- -
THAT WE ARE PUSHING AHEAD VIGOROUSLY IN OUR EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE PEACE SETTLEMENT. OBVIOUSLY, ONLY LONG-RUNI
ANSWER TO CURRENT LEBANESE PROBLEMS IS SUCH A SETTLEMENT.
YOU MAY TELL HIM THAT OUR BILATERAL TALKS WITH THEI
SOVIETS HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING.
4. FOR USUN: SUGGEST YOU EXLPORE IMPLICATIONS OF LEBANESE
SITUATION WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH, PARTICULARLY
ROLE THAT UN MIGHT PLAY. YOU MAY DRAW ON STATE 65333
FOR THIS PURPOSE.
NOT TOBE REPRODUC ROCERS WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard XORP esidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
06/08/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
"
Department of State
OF STATES MAKE UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 012
EXPIS EXPIS EXCES EXPIS
02
PAGE 01 STATE 069429
82
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 R
66633
DRAFTED BY: NEA: RPDAVIES
APPROVED BY: NEA:RPDAVIES
S/S: JHAWLEY
073985
P R 030012Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NY
SECRET STATE 069429
EXDIS
NOPORN
REF: BETRUT 3659
1 * AT LUNCH WITH BITAN, ASST DIR GEN ISRAELI FONOFF AND ISRAELI
MIN ARGOV> DAVIES (NEA) GAVE ASSESSMENT LEBANESEI DEVELOPMENTS
AND PASSED ON CHEHAB S REQUEST FOR INCREASED ISRAELI EFFORTS
APPREHEND POSSIBLE INFILTRATORS.
2. BITAN SAID GOI HAD RESPECT FOR CHIHAB AND EELT THAT IF HE
SUPPORTING HILU, THERE WAS GOOD CHANCE THAT FEDAYEEN COULD BE
BACKED DOWN BY LEBANESE ARMY. ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT LEBANESEI
ARMY WAS NOW USING ITS FULL CAPABILITIES TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN
ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL AND DID NOT WANT TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES
FOR LEBANON. PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL WAS THAT IT DID NOT HAVE
THE TYPE OF MILITARY FORCES ALONG LEBANESE BORDER TO SEAL IT
OR APPREHEND INFILTRATORS MISSED BY LEBANESE. HE PROMISED TO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
is * UNITED AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 069429
RELAY SUGGESTION TO JERUSALEM.
3. ON RECEIPT REFTEL, DAVIES CONTACTED ARGOV AND PASSED GIST
OF PARA 3 SAYING SOURCE COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED BUT WAS
CONSIDERED AUTHORITATIVE. NOTED ALSO THAT FROM TOPO MAP
AREA OF ALLEGED BUILD-UP SEEMED TO OVERLOOK LIKELY INFILTRATION
ROUTE FROM SYRIA TO LEBANON.
4. ARGOV UNDERTOOK TO PASS THIS INFO TO FOREIGN OFFICE ROGERS
EXQIN EXCLUS
161/20/0290
Reproduced the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECEASSFIEDORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEP OF
STATE *
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 026
PAGE 01 STATE 068447
EXQIC EXEIS EXCLU EXCLUS
82
ORIGIN SS 30
¥2
INFO OCT 01/031 R
66640
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BH BAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA:JJ SISCO
NEA:RP DAVIES
NEA/ARN8TW seelye
NEA/IAI8AL ATHERTON
S/S:RL BROWN
066540
R 012350Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
S ECORD STATE 068447
EXDIS:
REF: BEIRUT 3601
1. WHILE ISRAELI STATEMENT AS ENVISAGED REFTEL MIGHT HAVE
DESIRABLE EFFECT ON MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, WE FEEL THE PITFALLS WOULD
FAR OUTWEIGH ADVANTAGES. FOR ONE THING, such STATEMENT WOULD
EXACERBATE EXISTING TENSIONS, WOULD PROVIDE GRIST FOR
SOVIET AND EXTREMIST ARAB PROPAGANDA MILLS AND MIGHT CAUSE FURTHER
DETERIORATION SITUATION IN lebanon. IT MIGHT ALSO HAVE EFFECT OF
MAKING lebanese DEFENSIVE AND CONCOMITANTLY CREATE ADDITIONAL
SUPPORT FOR fedayeen. FURTHERMORE, OUR ROLE IN ENCOURAGING such
STATEMENT COULD EASILY BE LEAKED AND WOULD CAUSE US
EMBARRASSMENT IN BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON FINALLY, such ACTION
WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH OUR PAST URGINGS TO ISRAELIS TO
EXERCISE RESTRAINT, BOTH IN WORD AND DEED, AND MAKE LESS CREDIBLE
ANY FUTURE REQUESTS WE MIGHT MAKE IN THIS REGARD.
2. THEREFORE, WE CONCUR WITH EMBASSY THAT WOULD BE preferable NOT
RPT NOT ASK ISRAELIS MAKE PROPOSED STATEMENT.
GP-3. - ROGERS
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT EAORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ECBE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE *
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXCLUS
SECRET 945
PAGE 01 STATE 067131
83
ORIGIN SS 30
02
INFO OCT 01,/031 R
66633
DRAFTED BY: NEA:RPDAVIES
APPROVED BY: NEA: JJSISCO
NEA/ARN: MR BAAS
S/S: MR BROWN
058382
P 301947Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
S ERR E T STATE 067131
EXDIS
REF BEIRUT 3545
1 . DANGER OF CONFESSIONAL CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON WHILE REAL,
MAY BE REDUCED SOMEWHAT BY VERY FACT THAT MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN
LEADERS Themselves AWARE OF AND CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY
(BEIRUT 3390).
2. RISING TIDE EMOTIONALISM AND FEAR AND CONSIDERATIONS OF
RESORT TO ARMS, PRIMARILY BY CHRISTIAN GROUPS, WHILE PART OF
THE PATTERN OF LEBANON IN CRISIS, IS COUNTER TREND WHICH WE
HOPE CAN BE WEAKENED.
30 ROLE OF EMB IN SITUATION WHERE TRADITIONALLY THE VARIOUS
CONFESSIONAL GROUPINGS seek TO LINE-UP EXTERNAL SUPPORT BECOMES
EXQIC
AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THIS EVOLVING SITUATION. WE STRONGLY
ENDORSE YOUR POSITION OF COUNSELING CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO GIVE
MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT HELOU IN HIS EFFORTS TO RESOLVE
POLITICAL AND FEDAYEEN DIFFICULTIES.
4. WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD MEET PHALANGIST AND OTHER REQUESTS
FOR ARMS BY REAFFIRMING US CONFIDENCE IN LEBANESE STRUCTURE
AND MATURITY OF ITS LEADERSHIP. US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON IS FIRM
AND WE ARE WORKING QUIETLY THROUGH A NUMBER OF CHANNELS TO SEEK
Reproduced at the Richard Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASS HORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE * * UNITED AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
DJ
SECRET
EXPIN EXQIC EXPIS
PAGE 02 STATE 067131
TO ALLEVIATE PRESSURES ON THE GOVT. OUR INVOLVEMENT WITH ANY
PARTICULAR GROUPING WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY OF
SUPPORT FOR THE GOVT AND, INDEED, IN OUR CONFIDENCE IN LEBANESE
LEADERSHIP. WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS FOR ALL TO RISE ABOVE NARROW
PARACHIALISM AND TO RALLY TO SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT. GP - 3 ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODU
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIO OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
E61/20/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Libaron
UNITED DIPARTMENT * STATES BORDEN OF STATE #
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 909
PAGE 01 STATE 044798
83
ORIGIN SS 30
02
INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00#/030 R
DRAFTED BY: NEA:IAI:ALATHERTON
APPROVED BY 8 NEA: MR SISCO
S/S-08 wwoessner
66643
090964
0 PI 232052Z MARI 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USINT CAIRO
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TELI AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
SECRET STATE 044798
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 2460
1. APPREICATE TIMELY VIEWS REFTEL
20 CONCUR IN RECOMMENDATION THAT APPROACHES TO ARAB GOVERNMENT
BE DELAYED. WE WILL SEND FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING
EXQIC
CONSULTATIONS
HERE MONDAY. MEANWHILE ADDRESSEE POSTS SHOULD HOLD OFF ON
MAKING APPOINTMENTS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS FOR THIS EXERCISE.
ROGERS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASSEORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE *
*
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 909
PAGE 01 STATE 044798
EXQIC EXCE
83
ORIGIN SS: 30
25
INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00 /030 RI
DRAFTED BY: NEA:IAI:ALATHERTON
APPROVED BY 8 NEA: MR SISCO
S/S-08 WWOESSNER
66643
090964
0 PI 232052Z MARI 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USINT CAIRO
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TELI AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
S: ECRET STATE 044798
EXDIS
REF: BEIRUT 2460
1. APPREICATE TIMELY VIEWS REFTEL
20 CONCUR IN RECOMMENDATION THAT APPROACHES TO ARAB GOVERNMENT
BE DELAYED. WEI WILL SEND FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING
CONSULTATIONS
HERE MONDAY. MEANWHILE ADDRESSEE POSTS SHOULD HOLD OFF ON
MAKING APPOINTMENTS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS FOR THIS EXERCISE.
ROGERS
Reproduced at the Richard Presidential Library
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASSIFIEDORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
Department of State
:- STATES WW CHING AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SUMMARY
CONFIDENTIAL 004
page 01 STATE 011383
92
ORIGIN NEA 15
INFO EUR 15, NSA Ø2,CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02, INR Ø7,L 03, NSC 10,
P 04,RSC ø1»SP 02,SS 20.USIA 12,SAH Ø2»AID 28,10 13,/140 R
DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP BREWER
APPROVED BY NEA:HART
NEA:DAVIES
66647
001837
R 240008Z JAN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY ADEN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
i ONFIDENTIAL STATE 011383
SUBJ: US - YEMEN RELATIONS
REF BEIRUT 659
i. IN EVENT MUHAMMAD NUMAN AGAIN CONTACTS YOU PRIOR HIS
DEPARTURE, YOU SHOULD INFORM HIM USG REMAINS INTERESTED IN
ORDERLY RESUMPTION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH YEMEN ONCE
CIVIL WAR HAS BEEN LIQUIDATED. WHILE IT IS OUR IMPRESSION
THAT REPUBLICAN MILITARY POSITION MUCH IMPROVED IN RECENT
weeks, WE BELIEVE IT STILL PREMATURE FOR US CONSIDER MEETING
=ORMALLY WITH YARG REPS TO DISCUSS RESUMPTION TIES. HOW-
EVER, AS IN PAST WE REMAIN PREPARED MEET INFORMALLY WITH
YARG REPS IN NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, OR ELSEWHERE IN ORDER
EXCHANGE VIEWS AND KEEP CHANNELS COMMUNICATION OPEN.
2. FOR JIDDA: VIEW LIKELIHOOD REPUBLICAN POSITION WILL
CONTINUE GRADUALLY IMPROVE, WE EXPECT RECEIVE PERIODIC YARG
FEELERS SOLICITING RESUMPTION RELATIONS. WHILE WE WOULD NOT
WISH FOREVER TO REBUFF SUCH YEMENI ADVANCES, WE WOULD NOT WISH
UNDULY TO PROVOKE KING FAISAL. IN CIRCUMSTANCES WE WOULD
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
STATES smoke AMERICA CLINO * * STATE OF DEPARTMENT
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OR
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 011383
APPRECIATE YOUR KEEPING US CURRENTLY INFORMED AS TO YOUR
READING SAG ATTITUDE TOWARD YARG DEVELOPMENTS. WOULD ALSO
ARPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AS TO WHETHER YOU FEEL MIGHT BE USEFUL
INFORMALLY SOUND KING FAISAL OUT ON HIS READING PROBABLE
EVOLUTION developments IN YEMEN AND WHETHER NEW SITUATION
BEING CREATED WHICH WOULD SUGGEST NEW POLICIES WORTH CONSIDERING.
GP=3. ROGERS
CUNFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
961/40/0290
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 3526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
of STATES MARK AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 903
PAGE 01 STATE 002768
82
ORIGIN SS 30
29
INFO /030 R
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA:RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
S/S*WBRANDT
IO/UNp:(INFO)
66644
043382
R 080259Z JAN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRÜT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
$ E C R E T STATE 002768
EXDIS
SUBJ: GOL CONCERN OVER LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER
REF : STATE 1944
1 . LEBANESE AMBASSADOR NAJATI KABBANI AT HIS REQUEST CALLED
ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES JANUARY 7 o INI GENERAL,
KABBANI RAISED SAME POINTS HE RAISED WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HART PREVIOUS DAY (REFTEL).
2.° KABBANI MADE REFERENCE TO ESHKOL-HELOU MESSAGE CON-
VEYED HIM PREVIOUS EVENING BY DEPT. KABBANI SAID HE REAL-
IZED THAT GOL HAD RETURNED LETTER TO ISRAELIS. HOWEVER, HE
REPORTED CONTENTS OF LETTER TO HIS GOVERNMENT MERELY AS IN-
FORMATION. DAVIES NOTED THAT FACT THAT ISRAELIS DELIVERED
LETTER TO LEBANESE UNDER AUSPICES ILMAC IS TACIT RECOGNITION
OF ILMAC BY GOI, A POINT LEBANESE MIGHT KEEP IN MIND.
3. KABBANI SAID THAT HE HAS RECEIVED REPORTS OF INCREASED
ISREALI TROOP CONCENTRATION ON LEBANESE- ISRAELI BORDER DURING
PAST 24 HOURS. HE WONDERED RHETORICALLY IF THERE ANY CONNECT-
ION BETWEEN TROOP BUILDUP AND ESHKOL LETTER. HE WENT ON TO SAY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 002768
THAT PRESIDENT HELOU HIMSELF HAD PHONED FUAD BOUTROS MORN-
ING JANUARY 7 AND ASKED THAT BOUTROS CONVEY TO THE SECRETARY
HELOU.S PERSONAL CONCERN OVER THE ISRAELI TROOP CONCENTRATIONS.
DAVIES ASSURED KABBANI HELOU'S PERSONAL CONCERN WOULD BE
CONVEYED TO SECRETARY.
4. DAVIES TOLD KABBANI THAT WHILE WE FULLY SYMPATHETIC WITH
LEBANESE APPREHENSIONS, WE BELIEVE ISREAL'S PRIMARY CONCERN
AT THIS TIME IS WITH FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. WE NOTE THAT THERE
IS CONCENTRATION OF FEDAYEEN AT MT. HERMON AND THE ISRAELIS
EXPIR I
ALSO ARE AWARE OF THIS. WE WERE STARTLED TO LEARN FROM GEN-
ERAL BOUSTANY THAT LEBANESE LIAISON OFFICERS ARE ATTACHED
TO FEDAYEEN UNITS. BOUSTANY SAID THIS IS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
OVER fedayeen BUT TO ISRAELIS IT WILL APPEAR TO BE GOL COM-
PLICITY. IF TROUBLE IS TO BE AVOIDED ON BORDER GOLI MUST
FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
OF CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN AND PREVENTING ATTACKS FROM ITS TERR-
ITORY ON ISRAEL. KABBANI POINTED OUT IT VERY DIFFICULT GOL
CRACK DOWN ON FEDAYEEN AT THIS TIME AND REITERATED HOPE
ISRAELIS WOULD PRACTICE RESTRAINT AT THIS CRITICALI PERIOD.
5. DAVIES ASSURED KABBANI WE HAVE NO INDICATION ISRAELIS
PLANNING ATTACK ON LEBANON AND THAT WE HAVE MADE OUR CONCERN
OVER LEBANNON'S WELL BEING ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO GOI. WITH
REGARD ISREALI TERRITORIAL AMBITION, ISRAELIS HAVE TOLD US
OFFICIALLY THAT THEY SATISFIED WITH EXISTING BORDER. THUS,
WE HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE THEY WISH SEIZE LEBANESE TERRITORY
PARTICULARLY IN VIEW WORLD OPINION FOLLOWING KHALDEHI AIR-
PORT RAID. IN CONCLUSION DAVIES TOLD KABBANI OUR CONCERN
FOR LEBANON HAS BEEN AMPLY DEMONSTRATED IN PAST AND WE WISH
SEE LEBANON REMAIN STABLE. GP-3. RUSK
SECRET
Lb1/40/0190
NOT TO BE REPRODUC
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
856
PAGE
01
STATE
004211
10
51
29
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO 1030 R
EXPIN
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN&TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA a RODGER P. DAVIES
S/S If MR. BROWN
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION: ORIGIN NEA/ARN
058815
R 101353Z JAN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S E COR E T STATE 004211
EXDIS
SUBJ: LEBANESE VIEWS RE ILMAC AND ISRAELI LEBANESE BORDER
PROBLEMS
REF: STATE 2017
10 DURING CALL ON DEPARTMENT OFFICER JANUARY 9 LEBANESE
AMBASSADOR KABBANI REPORTED RECEIPT OF MESSAGE FROM HIS
GOVERNMENT INDICATING THAT REFUSAL OF LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVE
ON ILMAC TO ACCEPT ISRAELI MESSAGE ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE.
EXPI
GOL AUTHORITIES FELT THAT POLITICAL CHARACTER OF MESSAGE MADE
ILMAC UNSUITABLE VEHICLE FOR ITS TRANSMISSION. NEVERTHELESS,
AMBASSADOR SAID THAT GOL APPRECIATED FACT THAT DEPARTMENT HAD
AGREED PASS MESSAGE AND ALSO THAT WE HAD DONE SO ORALLY RATHER
THAN FORMALIZING EXCHANGE BY TRANSMITTING TEXT OF MESSAGE®
2° KABBANI STATED FURTHER THAT GOL HAD IMPRESSION THAT
MESSAGE CONTAINED UNDERCURRENT OF THREAT. THIS DISTURBED GOL,
WHICH BELIEVED THAT THREATS WERE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND THAT HOPE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEP OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 004211
FOR PEACEFUL BORDER LAY IN COMBINATION OF GOL EFFORTS TO
CONTROL FEDAYEEN' ISRAELI RESTRAINT AND ISRAELI RECOURSE TO
MAC MACHINERY.
3 ° DEPT OFFICER EXPRESSED REGRET THAT GOL HAD NOT SEEN FIT
USE ILMAC AS AVENUE FOR RECEIVING MESSAGE SINCE FACT GOI SOUGHT
USE ILMAC THIS PURFOSE POSITIVE SIGN. LATTER SEEMED TO
SUGGEST GOI INCLINATION ACCORD ILMAC INSTRUMENTALITY MORE
LEGITIMACY AND GOL WOULD HAVE BEEN WELL ADVISED
CAPITALIZE ON THIS DEVELOPMENT.
40 AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS REGARDING POSSIBILITY ISRAELIS
MIGHT ATTACK LEBANON WITH VIEW SEIZING LEBANESE TERRITORY®
DEPARTMENT OFFICER REPLIED THAT WE HAD MADE STRONG CASE TO
ISRAELIS BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV THAT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT
DOING ITS UTMOST CONTROL FEDAYEEN AND THAT GOL SHOULD NOT BE
HELD CULPABLE EVERY TIME FEDAYEEN SLIPPED BY LEBANESE SECURITY
FORCES ALONG BORDER. PROMPTNESS AND VIGOR OF OUR CENSURE OF
ISRAELI ATTACK ON KHALDEH AIRPORT, TOGETHER WITH OUR
FOLLOW UP REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAELIS, HAVE WE BELIEVE,
IMPRESSED ON ISRAELIS STRENGTH OF USG OPPOSITION TO FURTHER
ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON. AS TO PROSPECT SUCH ATTACK,
OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT ISRAELIS INTEND TO BE RESTRAINED.
AT SAME TIME, ISRAELIS HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT FURTHER FEDAYEEN
ATTACKS WOULD CREATE NEW SITUATION. DEPT OFFICER EXPRESSED
PERSONAL VIEW THAT WHILE SOME FORM OF ISRAELI RETALIATION AGAINST
FUTURE FEDAYEEN ATTACKS COULD BE EXPECTED, UNLIKELY THAT
ISRAEL WILL MAKE MILITARY FORAY INTO LEBANON.
5. DEPT OFFICER MENTIONED WE EXPLORING WAYS AND MEANS OF
INVIGORATING ILMAC MACHINERY ALONG ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER.
REFERRING TO MINISTER RAYMOND EDDE'S SUGGESTION RE ESTABLISHMENT
UNEF ALONG BORDER, DEPARTMENT OFFICER WONDERED WHETHER LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT MIGHT AGREE TO DEPLOYMENT UNEF FORCE ON LEBANESE
EXPIRES
SIDE ONLY VIEW ADAMANT GOI OPPOSITION STATIONING SUCH FORCE
ON ISRAELI TERRITORY. AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED VIEW THAT NEW
LEBANESE CABINET MIGHT CONSIDER EDDE'S UNEF PROPOSAL, WHICH HE
STRESSED ENVISAGES STATIONING FORCES ON BOTH SIDES OF BORDER.
WHEN DEPT OFFICER NOTED THAT UNEF FORCE IN GAZA LOCATED ONLY
ON UAR TERRITORY, AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED PRECEDENT BUT
HESITATED TO PREDICT GOL REACTION TO ONE-SIDED DEPLOYMENT.
RUSK
SECRET
861/40/0290
NOT TO BE REPRODUC Reproduced at the Richard Nixon PresidentialLibrary OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CIA
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOYED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 199 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL sheet
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised, 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/2 (3 pp.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
199
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/3 (3 pp.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
200
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/4 (2 pp.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
201
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/5 (3 pp.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
202
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/6 (2 pp.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
203
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/7 (3 pp.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
204
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/8 (3 pp.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
205
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/9 (4 pp.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
206
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/10 (2 pp.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
207
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/11 (14 pp.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
208
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
was
/5
R
REP
AF
AIRGRAM
WH
FOR RM USE ONLY
A
EUR
FE
A-55
SECRET/NODIS
EA
NO.
CU
INR
HANDLING 11 DICATOR
TO
:
P
10
Department of State
INFO :
Amembassy TEHRAN
FBO
AID
COPY NO.
9
SERIES
B
R
COM
FRB
FROM :
American Embassy, BEIRUT
DATE: January 28, 1970
T
LAB
TAR
SUBJECT :
GOL Request for Assistance in South Lebanon
₹
XMB
AIR
REF
:
MY
CIA
NAVY
D
USIA
NSA
NODIS
Michel Khoury informs me that President Helou and the Lebanese
security forces have developed a strategy to try to increase
the estrangement that is beginning to take place between the
Lebanese residents of the South and the Fedayeen.
We have been aware for sometime there has been a cooling off
in the attitude of the Lebanese public vis-a-vis the Fedayeen,
now including Lebanese Muslims as well as Christians. This
stems largely from the excesses of the Fedayeen and the armed
refugees. Villagers in the South however (predominantly Shia
Muslim, but with a substantial sprinkling of Christians) have
been generally disenchanted with their Government and have
in the past year tended to respond emotionally and favorably
to the Fedayeen cause. Now, however, with the fear of
PERSEC. 3.3(b)(1)
Israeli reprisal and a new understanding that the Fedayeen
cannot protect the Lebanese in the South, the villagers are
beginning to become disenchanted.
The Fedayeen have become a
magnet drawing Israeli retaliation rather than the staunch
defenders which they claimed to be. Also, Fedayeen have
shown a noticeable lack of courage under Israeli fire which
has also offended the border villagers.
SECRET/NODIS
FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
FORM
DS-323
X
In
Out
4-62
afted by:
AMB: DJPorter:ks
1/28/70
Contents and Classification Approved by:
earances:
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN 09-11/12 per sec 3.3(b)(1), Itr. 2/19/2010
By
AM
NARA, Date 11/15/2010
Reproduced at the Richard SANITIZED
P.1 OF 3]
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
Page 2
Beirut's A-55
January 28, 1970
The Lebanese, according to Khoury, are quiefy trying to
build up friction between the Shia villagers and the
Fedayeen - not to the point of open hostilities, but at
least to the point where the villagers will not cooperate
with the Fedayeen. The Lebanese Army is spearheading this
project and will begin providing some arms to those villages
which appear to have the best will to resist the Fedayeen.
The GOL, of course, also realizes it must provide other
assistance to the villagers in the social and economic fields
in order to regain their loyalty to Lebanon. This takes
money, which the hard-pressed GOL is trying to find.
Khoury urged that the USG participate in some way, assisting
the GOL in a clandestine manner. He would hope we could
channel funds through religious or other institutions or
directly to the Lebanese military to help out.
My answer was non-committal. I inquired whether the
Lebanese had been able to get assistance from other Arab
states. He said there was not any hope of such assistance.
Lebanon had hoped that Iran, which has had a special
relationship with the Shia population of Lebanon, could assist.
But there was no way at this point to establish the direct
contact with the Iranian government, in view of the diplomatic
break and the general deterioration in relationships. Khoury
hoped that the USG might intercede to get the Shah to provide
financial and other support, not to the GOL but direct to
the Shia community.
I said it was my frank view that, in view of the Shah's
animosity toward Lebanon as well as his recent difficulties
with Iraq, it would be extremely difficult to secure any
significant aid from that quarter. Khoury reiterated that
he was not suggesting the Shah deal directly with the GOL
but rather directly with the Shia populace, perhaps through
Moussa Sadr, religious leader of the Lebanese Shia. He
thought Sadr would use financial aid effectively and honestly
for the benefit of the Shia population. With such financial
support, together with the measures the GOL planned to take,
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
NLN 09-11/12:P.20F2
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SANITIZED
SECRET/NODIS
Page 3
Beirut's A-55
January 28, 1970
the Shia would in turn feel emboldened to stand off the
Fedayeen. I promised nothing,
COMMENT: Department's and Embassy Tehran's comments,
if any, would be appreciated. I think GOL is on the
SANITIZED
right track, and wish USG had the capacity to help. If
PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1)
we did, however, there is no mechanism we could use
As
for Iranian aid, it would seem to be a non-starter, if
for no other reason than the ineffectiveness of the
Iranian services.
PORTER
P
SECRET/NODIS
SANITIZED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
Department of State
OF STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET,
R 301630Z JAN 70
5870Q
SECRET BEIRUT 862
'70 JA 30 PM 54
9
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
1970 JAN 30 PM 1:58
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9602
BT
NODIS
SIT ATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
DEPT PASS INFO PARIS
REF: STATE 14564, PARIS 1082
1) LEBANESE REQUEST TO GOF FOR ARMS PROBABLY MADE DIRECTLY BY
EX-PRES. FUAD CHEHAB, USING HIS PRIVATE CHANNELS TO GOF,
ALTHOUGH REQUEST WOULD CERTAINLY RECEIVE BLESSING OF HELOU.
WE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED REPORT THAT GOL CONSIDERING PURCHASE
UNKNOWN NUMBER AMX TANKS AND SS-11 ANTI-TANK MISSILES. TERMS
REPORTEDLY TEN YEARS AT 3.5 PERCENT.
2) AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY GOL UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO CONSIDER
ARMS PROCUREMENT FROM SOVS AND EAST EUROPE, AND ARE AWARE THAT
THEY CAN OFTEN GET A BETTER PRICE. BUT GOL AND LEBANESE MILITARY
WISH AVOID PROCUREMENT FROM COMMUNIST SOURCES, PREFERRING
MAINTAIN TRADITIONAL WESTERN SOURCES -- IN PAST PRIMARILY
FRANCE AND US. AT MOMENT FRANCE CLEARLY POLITICALLY MORE
ACCEPTABLE IN ARAB WORLD AS SUPPLIER THAN IS USG. HELOU DURING
RECENT TALK WITH CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS POINTED OUT APOLOGETICALLY
INTERNAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY LEBANESE DESIRE PROCURE WEAPONS
FROM USG.
3) LEBANESE TREASURY IS UNABLE FUND SUBSTANTIAL NEW ARMS PRO-
CUREMENT. IT QUITE CLEAR LEBANESE HAVE BEEN HOPING SECURE MORE
FAVORABLE PRICES AND TERMS (OR EVEN GRANTS) GROM ANY WESTERN
SOURCE, AND THEY HAVE, AND WILL UNDERSTANDABLY CONTINUE To,
SHOP AROUND. IN PAST THEY HAVE RECEIVED GIFTS OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT FROM US IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND THEY STILL INDULGE IN
WISHFUL THINKING THAT SOMEHOW OR OTHER USG WILL RESPOND
AGAIN IN SAME FASHION. AS PARIS POINTS OUT THEY ALSO HOPEFUL
THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THEIR NEEDS WILL BE PROVIDED GRATIS BY
FRANCE.
4) NEED FOR PROCUREMENT ADDITIONAL ARMS IS CERTAINLY REAL.
LEBANESE PLAN TO ARM SOME OF THE BORDER VILLAGERS, PERHAPS
CREATING AN ORGANIZED MILITIA WHICH WOULD SERVE AS AUXILIARY
FORCE. THIS MUST BE GARDE NATIONALE MENTIONED PARIS TEL. HOPE
IS TO CREATE INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO FEDAYEEN IN BORDER AREAS.
NEED FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPON ALSO VERY URGENT IN VIEW OF
CONTINUOUS THREAT OF ISRAELI AIR ATTACK.
5) COMMENT: I WOULD OF COURSE PREFER TO SHOW OPEN USG SUPPORT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 3526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2- BEIRUT 862, JANUARY 30 (NODIS)
FOR LEBANON BY PROVIDING DEFENSIVE WEAPONS TO LEBANESE ARMY.
HOWEVER, MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IS TO GET GOOD ARMS FROM
ANY SOURCE QUICKLY INTO HANDS OF LEBANESE, TO IMPROVE CAPABILITY
EFFECTIVELY TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN AND DISSIDENT REFUGEES. THIS
FIFTH COLUMN IS MAIN THREAT AT MOMENT TO INTEGRITY OF LEBANESE
STATE. LEBANESE MILITARY WILL NEVER HAVE CAPACITY EFFECTIVELY
TO RESIST MAJOR ISRAELI ATTACK IF IT COMES, AND GOL HAS NO
INTENTION OF WASTING ITS LIMITED RESOURCES TO EFFECT A FUTILE
BUILD-UP OF THE ARMY FOR THIS PURPOSE. ON OTHER HAND, GOL
MUST MAKE A PUBLIC GESTURE OF SEEMING TO PROVIDE A MORE
EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST ISRAELI AIR AND GROUND RAIDS IN SOUTH
LEBANON, FOR SAKE OF ARMY AND PUBLIC MORALE.
6) IF FRANCE CAN PROVIDE ARMS TO LEBANON ON FAVORABLE TERMS AND
GET THEM HERE QUICKLY, I SEE NO BASIS FOR US OBJECTION, EVEN
THOUGH I WOULD REGRET LOSING LEVERAGE AND INFLUENCE WHICH DERIVES
FROM OUR POSITION AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF LEBANESE ARMY PROCUREMENT.
I WOULD THINK, GIVEN NATURE OF THE ARMAMENTS WHICH APPEAR TO BE
INVOLVED, THAT MATTER COULD BE HANDLED WITHOUT PUBLICITY OF THE
SORT ATTENDANT ON THE MIRAGE SALE TO LIBYA.
7) IDEALLY, US INTERESTS WOULD BEST BE SERVED IF BOTH WE AND
FRENCH (AND POSSIBLY OTHER WESTERN POWERS, SUCH AS ITALY)
WERE INVOLVED IN SUPPLYING LEBANESE NEEDS. THIS WOULD
SERVE BUTTRESS CONCEPT OF BROAD WESTERN POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR
LEBANON. NATURE OF DEFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WE ASSUME LCANESE
WILL BE BUYING SHOULD CAUSE NO ALTERATION IN ARMS BALANCE IN ME.
ALSO, MAGNITUDE OF PROCUREMENT SHOULD BE MODEST, LIMITED
ABOVE ALL BY LEBANESE ABILITY TO PAY. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF
FRENCH COULD, BY OFFERING FAVORABLE PRICES AND TERMS, FOR ONCE
DO SOMETHING TANGIBLE FOR THIS COUNTRY, FOR WHICH THEY PROFESS
SO MUCH AFFECTION. IN MY FIVE YEARS HERE, THEIR EFFORTS HAVE
BEEN LARGELY DIRECTED TO MILKING THE PLACE DRY.
PORTER
NOTE: BT NOT PASSED PARIS BY OC/T 1/30/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
WN.6 WH 6
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAN
SECRET
LEBANON
5544Q
P 291740Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 218,
JAN 29, 1970 1:20 PM
BT
SECRE T PARIS 1082
NODIS
SUBJECT: FRENCH ARMS TO LEBANON
1. DIRECTOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS DE LEUSSE
ASKED ME TO CALL JAN 28 AND INFORMED ME THAT GOVERNMENT OF
LEBANON ON JAN 20 MADE NEW REQUEST FOR ARMS NOT ONLY FOR
LEBANESE ARMY BUT FOR ITS GARDE NATIONALE WHICH IS BEING USED
TO HELP CONTROL FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH LEBANON. ARMS FOR GARDE
NATIONALE INCLUDE MACHINE GUNS, MACHINE PISTOLS, AND AUTOMATIC
RIFLES. ARMS FOR ARMY INCLUDE ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS, 20 MM,
30 MM, AND 40 MM GUNS, 12.7 AUTOMATIC RIFLES, AND ANTITANK
GUNS "LRAC." LEBANESE INDICATED THEY WOULD PREFER NOT TO PAY
FOR THESE ARMS, WHICH POSES PROBLEM FOR GOF. DELEUSSE SAID
FOREGOING REQUEST PRESENTS GOF WITH COMPLICATED DECISION. ON ONE
HAND, FRANCE MUST REPLY TO LEBANESE AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO
TURN THEM DOWN GIVEN FRANCE'S ROLE AS QUASI DEFENDER OF LEBANON.
ON OTHER HAND, FRENCH DO NOT WANT THROUGH ARMS SALES TO ESCALATE
WAR IN MADDLE EAST (SIC).
2. I ASKED ABOUT AMOUNTS INVOLVED. DELEUSSE SAID NUMBERS OF
GUNS REQUESTED WERE RELATIVELY SMALL. I COMMENTED THAT THIS
DID NOT SEEM TO BE A TRANSACTION 0 LIBYAN DIMENSIONS WITH
SAME POSSIBLE UNSETTLING EFFECT, BUT, OF CURSE, WOULD HAVE
TO BE CLOSELY CONSIDERED. FURTHERMORE, DELEUSSE SAID,
FRENCH DO NOT WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO CIVIL WAR INSED LEBANON.
3. DELEUSSE SAID OUTSIDE OF POMPIDOU, DEBRE AND SCHUMANN,
ONLY THREE PEOPLE IN FOREIGN OFFICE KNOW OF THIS REQUEST. HE
SAID, HOWEVER, THAT POMPIDOU ANXIOUS TO COORDINATE FRENCH
ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST VERY CLOSELY WITH US AND WOULD
LIKE TO KNOW: (A) WHETHER WE HAVE HAD SIMILAR REQUESTS FROM GOL
FOR ARMS AND (B) WHAT ARE OUR VIEWS ABOUT FRENCH MAKING THESE
ARMS AVAILABLE.
4. I SAID TO MAKE JUDGEMENT WE MAIGH NEED MORE INFORMATION.
DELEUSSE TOOK POINT AND SAID THAT IF WASHINGTON WISHED. HE WOURLD
TRY TO GET MORE INFORMATION BUT HE REITERATED THAT NUMBERS
OF WEAPONS WERE SMALL. DELEUSSE REQUESTED ONLY SMALLEST
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2- PARIS 1082
29 January 1970
NODIS
NUMBER AMERICAN OFFICIALS BE INFORMED LEBANESE REQUEST.
HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION NOT RPT NOT BE DISCUSSI
WITH FRENCH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AND PARTICULARLY NOT WITH
FRENCH EMBASSY IN BEIRUT, WHICH WAS NOT CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH
THIS REQUEST RECEIVED.
5. COMMENT: ASIDE FROM FACT THAT GOF HAS PREVIOUSLY COORDINATED
AND DISCUSSED WITH USG LEBANESE ARMS PROBLEM, I THINK
THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF GUILT REPRESENTED HERE OVER FRENCH
FAILURE TO DISCUSS LIBYAN ARMS DEAL AS FRANKLY AND IN AS
TIMELY A FASHION AS WOULD HAVE BEEN DESIRABLE. THERE MAY
ALSO BE AN ELEMENT OF WANTING TO BE ABLE TO SAY, IF SALE
MADE, THAT USG HAD BEEN CONSULTED. PLEASE INSTRUCT.
BLAKE
BT
Reproduced at the SECRET Mixon Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE Du # UNITED AMERICA DRUGS STATES
WD.9
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
5029Q
DEPT PASS TEHRAN INFO ROUTINE
1969 DEC 29 AM 9 13
R 291039Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9352
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 10447
NODIS
SUBJ: IRAQ -- COUP D'ETAT PLANS
REF: STATE 204979
EMBASSY APPRECIATES GUIDANCE FOR USE IN REPLYING TO SAAD JABR.
JABR DID NOT RPT NOT CONTACT EMBASSY DEC 12 AS HE HAD PLANNED,
AND WE HAVE HAD NO WORD FROM HIM SINCE. IF HE RETURNS BEIRUT,
WE WILL CONVEY SUBSTANCE PARA 3 REFTEL TO HIM.
PORTER
NOTE: NOT PASSED TEHRAN BY bc/T
DES We
BECEINED
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NL N 09-11/13 per 1tr. 2/19/2010
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
By AM
NARA, Date 11/15/2010
This document has been reviewed suant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. OF
SECRIFICASSIFIED
DEPART
OF
WH
# 10
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
P 111504Z DEC 69
CONTROL: 2388Q
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9275
DECEMBER 11, 1969
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 10151
2:10 P.M.
NODIS
REF: STATE 205505
1) I APPRECIATE EFFORTS OF PENTAGON AND DEPT IN MAKING M-14'S
AVAILABLE. IF APPOINTMENT CAN BE ARRANGED DURING LOCAL
HOLIDAY, WE WILL PRESENT M- 14 AND HELICOPTER PROPOSAL TO
LEBANESE ARMY TOMORROW (DEC 12), AND I WILL ALSO MENTION TO
PRES HELOU.
2) I HOPE I AM WRONG, BUT I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT OUR OFFERS
WILL BE ACCEPTED. FROM LEBANESE POINT OF VIEW THERE IS OF
COURSE NO ELEMENT OF AID OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN US PROPOSAL.
WHILE I UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM USG HAD IN FREEING UP M- 14
RIFLES FOR DELIVERY TO LEBANON, LEBANESE OF COURSE WILL BE
LOOKING AT THE PRICE AND TERMS. THEY ALREADY HAVE OFFERS FOR NEW
KALASHNIKOVS FROM THE CZECHS AT $90 UNIT PRICE. I AM NOT SURE
THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER M-14'S SUFFICIENTLY SUPERIOR
WEAPON TO WARRANT THE PRICE DIFFERENTIAL.
3) LEBANESE WERE LOOKING FOR A TANGIBLE GESTURE OF AID AND
SUPPORT FROM THE US. WHAT WE ARE OFFERING IS A STRAIGHT SALE
AT GOING PRICES. OUR OFFER GIVES NO POLITICAL OR FINANCIAL
ADVANTAGE TO LEBANON (PARTICULARLY SINCE WE ARE NOT YET ABLE
TO OFFER CREDIT). NEITHER DOES THE US GET ANY POLITICAL
ADVANTAGE OUT OF THIS PROPOSED SALE. LEBANESE, WHO ARE
FACING SERIOUS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND HAVE NO SUBSIDIES FROM
OTHER ARAB STATES, WILL UNDERSTANDABLY MAKE COMPARISON BETWEEN
US *BUSINESS-AS-USUAL" APPROACH AND THE LENIENT
TERMS WHICH SOVS HAVE ARRANGED IN SUPPLYING ARMS TO OTHER ARAB
STATES.
4) THE FACT IS OF COURSE THAT LEBANESE HAVE EXPECTED THAT US
WOULD BE GENEROUS IN ITS ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSISTING THE
LEBANESE MILITARY IN THIS CURRENT CRISIS. THEY WILL BE
DISAPPOINTED WHEN THEY LEARN NATURE OF OUR OFFER, AND WILL
READ INTO IT ANOTHER INDICATION THAT US INTEREST IN LEBANON'S
SECURITY IS NOT A FIRM ASSET WHICH MIGHT SUSTAIN THEM IN
RESISTING THE INEVITABLE PRESSURES ON THEM IN THE UPCOMING
RABAT SUMMIT.
PORTER
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
Classificati on
Department of State
204979
UNITED STATES OF
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
/ 0
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
w/d
0 DEC 69 6 57
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
Γ
INFO: Amembassy TEHRAN
STATE
SUBJECT: Iraq - Coup d'Etat Plans
REF: BEIRUT 10069
XXXXXXXXXXXXX NO Dis
NODIS
1. Department notes contradiction between Saab Jabr's
expression of need for assurances from USG and reports
from intelligence sources that he has already assured
his fellow conspirators that he has USG backing. Jabr's
assertion in paragraph 3 reftel that he would advise his
group abandon effort overthrow regime lacks credibility
inasmuch as this group's coup plans were never dependent
on expression of support from USG. It apparent that
cohesion among conspirators has broken down, and it also
apparent that group's cooperation with Iranian Government
and with Kurds leaves much to be desired. Jabr gives
impression of desperately casting about to gain support
to put coup d'etat back on track.
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
DRAFTED BY:
NEA/ARN:BHBaas:dmg
12/9/69
20695
NEA - Joseph J2 J. Sisco
CLEARANCES:
NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye
NEA - Mr. Davies
INR/DDC - Mr. Gardne
s/s - Mr
Eliot
ME
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
Reproduced at the Library
NLN 09-11/14 per 1tr. 2/19/2010
FORM DS-322
DECLASSIFIED
By AM
NARA Date 11/15/2010
4 68
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified0 5]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET/EXDIS
Classificati on
UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICAN
Department of State
NDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
-2-
CHARGE TO
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
FYI. Jabr intimated to Department Officer in
September 1969 that he expects be Foreign Minister
if new government formed. END FYI.
2. In any event, Jabr has already been informed in
Washington that any new moderate government in Baghdad
could expect the same consideration that USG would show
to any other friendly government. Jabr was also informed,
as example, of routine, non-political economic assistance
available, such as Commodity Credit Corporation and
Export-Import Bank credits. He was given no assurances
in this respect but merely reminded of existence such
programs and of possible availability upon application
after new government formed.
3. Upon Jabr's return to Beirut December 12, Embassy
Officer McAndrew may reply to his specific questions
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at Alixoon Presidential Library
FORM
DS-322
DECLASSIFIED
NLN 09-11/14:P
4 68
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET/EXDIS
Classificati on
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
-3-
CHARGE TO
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
as follows:
(a) We would assume that if a change of government
were to take place in Baghdad, IPC would disburse
quarterly payment check to appropriate, new beneficiary.
In the meantime, Department does not propose suggest
IPC make payment to anyone other than existing Iraqi
Government, since IPC has contractual obligation make
payment to Government. FYI. We have already received
threat to pipeline directly from Barzani headquarters.
Pipeline extremely vulnerable and there little preventive
action that can be taken should Kurds find it in their
interest to stop oil flow. END FYI.
(b) We cannot consider provision of emergency
supplies to coup plotters, nor can we make advance
commitment. As Jabr knows, we have had relief programs
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Library
FORM DS-322
4 68
DECLASSIFIED
NLN09-11/14:P.3.30F5
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
SECRET/EXDIS
Classificati on
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Department of State
NDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
-4-
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
in Iraq in past, but unțil new government formed and
until new circumstances assessed, it premature consider
such program.
(c) Department unable provide Jabr with names of
individuals with whom his group might cooperate in
staging coup d'etat or with whom they might deal after
successful coup. We assume Jabr's group has capability
of obtaining and evaluating such information.
(d) In summary, USG unable to become involved in
plotting against current Iraqi regime nor in making
advance commitments. Should new government prove to
be moderate and friendly, however, we would be prepared
to consider prompt resumption of diplomatic relations
and would certainly be disposed to cooperate within the
limits of existing legislation and our overall policy.
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
tel. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at theCRichaird AlikomPresidential Library
FORM
DS-322
DECLASSIFIED
4 68
NIN P.40F5
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED DEPARTMENT CANADA STATES OF OF STATE
SECRET/EXDIS
Classificati on
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
-5-
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
_________________________
In this connection, you may wish to review types of
limited economic assistance which might be made avail-
able (see para 2 above).
GP-3
END
[ROGERS]
7
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard MkomPresidential Library
FORM DS-322
DECLASSIFIED
4 68
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be
P.50F5
DEPARTMENT Of STATE
WH
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
12
P 091753Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
1868Q
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9268 1969 DEC 9 PM 2:12
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 10122
NODIS
FOR DAVIES (NEA)
AM SEEING PRES HELOU AFTERNOON FRIDAY, DEC 12. WOULD APPRECIATE
RECEIVING LATEST FACTS ON OUR AID AND ARMS PROPOSALS FOR DISCUS-
SION WITH HIM. INCLUDE INFO ON MAGNITUDE AND TERMS OF MILITARY
SALES CREDITS. I HOPE GET HELOU'S APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE OF BOTH
PACKAGES, SO WE CAN CREATE MOMENTUM FOR SOME DECISIVE ACTION ON
PART GOL.
PORTER
BT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT or STATE
3
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
W/d W H
1703Q
12-8-69
12:31AM
R 0815352 DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9127
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5809
NODIS
REF: STATE 203702
ASSUME FROM PARA ONE REFTEL SEELYE WILL VISIT AMMAN AND
OF COURSE WILL WELCOME OPPORTUNITY DISCUSSION OF CURRENT
PROBLEMS WITH HIM. WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED DETAILS OF
HIS ITINERARY. SINCE I WILL BE ON LONG-PLANNED FIELD TRIP
DEC 11 THROUGH 14, I HOPE SEELYE'S ITINERARY WILL NOT PUT
HIM IN AMMAN BEFORE 14TH. O'DELL HOPES SEELYE WILL STAY
WITH HIM.
SYMMES
BT
NNNN
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969-332.321
with
"CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS COPY MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES"
me
TCE
: STATES AMERICA UNITED STATE of DEPARTMENT
SECRET
!94183
Classification
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
V35-3 19 Nov 69 00 432
35.3
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
Amembassy BEIRUT
STATE 194183
SUBJECT: TWA Hijacking
REF: BEIRUT 9501
NODIS
1. For some time Israeli Government has been discussing
with ICRC possibility of exchange of personnel to secure
release two Israeli passengers detained Damascus. UARG
in late October or early November proposed three-cornered
scheme through ICRC, which GOI accepted. Under this
scheme UARG would release two Israeli pilots. Israel
would release to UAR one UAR pilot, 17 Egyptian POWs
from 1967 war, crews of two fishing vessels captured
in Israeli waters, 11 Egyptian civilians kidnapped in
recent raids and the two Syrian pilots held by Israel.
Condition sine qua non would be release two Israeli
DRAFTED BY
for
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
NEA/ARN:BHBaas:dmg
11/18/69
20695
CLEARANCES:
NEA/ARN - Mr Reproduced Seelve at RM the Richard Nixon Presidential Library S/S - Mr. Brown
NEA - Rodger Birth P. Davies
NEA/IAI - Mr. AthertODECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GOVERNMENT
1
"CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS COPY MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES"
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET/NODIS
Classificati on
UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICA
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
-2-
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
passengers held Damascus. Presumably TWA passengers
would be released first, and swap between Israel and
UAR would take place about 40 hours later. This permits
both Syrians and Israelis face saving way out of dilemma.
2. ICRC aware of impending departure TWA aircraft from
Damascus and, we understand, has called SARG attention
to this as opportunity release two Israeli passengers
with minimum fanfare. We not aware SARG reaction.
3. TWA not rpt not aware proposed exchange of personnel,
but TWA deeply worried about repercussions if aircraft
departs without passengers and will not permit aircraft
depart without first consulting with Department. While
Syrian intentions as yet unclear, we are informed that
UAR has indicated it prepared make proposed exchange of
personnel at Qantara. Israelis have agreed.
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT. X
APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1000 332.381
"CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS COPY MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES"
OF STATE
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
UNITED STATES 08 AMERICA
Department of State
NDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
-3-
CHARGE TO
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
4. Foregoing extremely delicate and should be held
very closely.
5. Regarding proposal contained Beirut 9501, we do not
believe granting license for export transceivers should
be, tied to release Israeli passengers. We planning
review licensing situation but do not feel it appropriate
do SO. at this time, in view SARG's intransigent position
on passengers.
GP-3
END
ROCERS
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL EXT.
APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
messyr recalled
by State
They use Back-
Channel also.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library oF.
DECLASSIFIED
document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declass
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
Classificati on
198158
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
14
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
NOU
0058
168.69 $ 0. 50z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY
7
STATE
SUBJECT: Internal Security Assistance for Lebanon
REF: STATE 197340, BEIRUT 9630
NODIS
NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT
1. As indicated to you in message transmitted through
special channel earlier this month, we wish know whether
lately GOL has approached or whether GOL is contemplating
approaching any other governments, particularly Italian,
for assistance in equipping and training its military
and internal security forces. We recalled in this
message that Italians had reportedly procured some
internal security assistance in past. We also recollect
that several months ago French were considering supply-
ing Lebanese Army with light military equipment.
DRAFTED BY:
N.
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
NEA - Rodger RM P. Davies
NEA/ARN:BHBaas:dmg
11/25/69
20695
CLEARANCES:
NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye
2
S/S - Mr. Brown
Rhop
NEA/RA - Col. Bunté
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM
DS-322 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Classification
UNITED X STATES OF the AMERICA
Department of State
IDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
-2-
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY
7
2. If GOL not actively pursuing these avenues, would
appreciate your evaluation of GOL receptivity to our
that
suggesting at some point/they do so in connection with
certain items which we may have difficulty in supplying.
For example, French might be better source for anti-
aircraft weapons, which are hard to obtain here.
3. Another consideration is that supply of part of
equipment from other Western sources would make GOL less
vulnerable to charge of over-identification with U.S. as
exclusive source.
4. Regarding paragraph one Beirut 9630 we awaiting
DATT's list of equipment requirements in order obtain
price and availability date.
GP-3
[ROGERS]
END
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM
DS-322
DECLASSIFIED
4 68
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has-been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT of STATE
W k W
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
12
DEPT PASS INFO ROUTINE TO AMMAN JIDDA LONDON PARIS MOSCOW TEL
AVIV USUN
0 311238Z OCT 69
Control: 7241Q
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
Recd : 31 Oct 69
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8952
7:47 a.m.
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9054
NODIS
REF: STATE 182922, BEIRUT 9041 (NOTAL); STATE 183682 (NOTAL)
1. AFTER ROCKEFELLER MEETING WITH PRES HELOU I STAYED ON WITH
PRES FOR PRIVATE TALK AND PASSED TO HIM SUBSTANCE PARA 5 STATE
182922. HELOU THANKED ME FOR INFORMATION BUT NATURE HIS RESPONSE
MADE CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD HELP HIM IN HIS CUR-
RENT DIFFICULTIES.
2. FEDAYEEN, HE SAID, WILL CONTINUE ATTACK LEBANON UNDER ANY
CIRCUMSTANCES. INDEED PROGRESS TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT,
WHICH THEY OPPOSE, MAY CAUSE THEM TO REACT MORE SHARPLY. NONE-
THELESS HELOU OBVIOUSLY GRATEFUL FOR ANY SIGN US REEMERGENCE AS
ACTIVE PARTICIPANT ME PROBLEM.
3. HELOU'S ATTITUDE, WHICH HAD BEEN REASONABLY CHEERFUL AND RA-
TIONAL WITH ROCKEFELLER, CHANGED TO ONE OF ALMOST UNMITIGATED
GLOOM DURING OUR MEETING. HE SAID HE WAS CONSIDERING ANOTHER
PUBLIC APPEAL IN WHICH HE WOULD ASK LEBANESE PEOPLE TO CLOSE
RANKS AND RESIST INSURRECTION WHICH WAS BEING IMPOSED ON COUNTRY.
HE THOUGHT SITUATION SO URGENT THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE
NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS TO HAVE EFFECT. HE REALIZED DECLARATION
COULD CAUSE INTERNAL EXPLOSION BUT THOUGHT IT ALSO HAD GOOD CHANCE
OF RALLYING LEBANESE PEOPLE TO CONTINUE RESIST THE MILITARY AND
PROPAGANDA PRESSURES NOW IMPOSED ON THEM. I RESPONDED THAT
I WONDERED WHETHER MATTER INDEED REQUIRED SUCH URGENT ACTION.
HE ANSWERED THAT HE HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO TAKE SUCH ACTION.
4. HE REPEATED THEME THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS ONLY REAL FRIEND
WAS US. HE EQUALLY UNDERSTOOD LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON HIM AND
ON US IN USING THAT FRIENDSHIP. AS HE HAD SAID TO ROCKEFELLER,
HE DID NOT EXPECT US MILITARY INTERVENTION. HE HAD BEEN SHOCKED
NONETHELESS TO READ LE MONDE REPORT ATTRIBUTED TO US OFFICIAL
SOURCES IN UN THAT US HAD NO INTENTION INTERVENING IN LEBANON.
I RESPONDED I WAS CERTAIN THIS WAS NOT AN ACCURATE REPORT AND
WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SAID BY ANY RESPONSIBLE US OFFICIAL. MORE
LIKELY IT WAS CLEVER STORY BY REPORTER WHO WAS INTERPRETING US
PUBLIC OPINION (AS HAD HELOU HIMSELF) AS. BEING OPPOSED MILITARY
INTERVENTION ALMOST ANYWHERE.
d at the Presidential Library
SSIPIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2- Beirut 9054, 31 October 1969
Control: 7241Q
5. HELOU THEN INQUIRED WHAT WOULD BE US POLICY IN TERMS POSSIBLE
MILITARY INTERVENTION IF NECESSARY PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES AND
PROPERTY IN LEBANON. I SAID THERE WAS NO YES OR NO ANSWER TO
SUCH A QUESTION. OBVIOUSLY SUCH AN IMPORTANT DECISION COULD NOT
BE MADE IN ADVANCE AND WOULD DEPEND ON CIRCUMSTANCES.
6. I ASKED HELOU IF THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE WE COULD DO AT THIS
TIME TO HELP HIM. HE SAID IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO BRING
PRESSURE TO BEAR ON RADICAL ARAB STATES - ABOVE ALL SYRIA - AND
HAD WE DISCUSSED MATTER WITH SOVS? I SAID WE HAD AND SOVS HAD
INDICATED THEY WISHED RESTRAIN SITUATION AND WERE DISCUSSING MAT-
TER WITH DAMASCUS. HE SIAD SOV AMB HAD TOLD HIM SAME THING BUT
HE COULD SEE NO RESULTS. IT WAS URGENT THAT SOVS APPLY MORE PRES-
SURE IN A HURRY. THE SAME HELD FOR ANY OTHER WESTERN STATES THAT
COULD HAVE ANY INFLUENCE IN RADICAL ARAB CAPITALS. THE FRENCH,
HE ADMITTED, WOULD NOT DO MUCH. THEY WERE TOO INTRIGUED WITH
THEIR NEW BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN ARAB WORLD.
7. IN CONTEXT MY PROGRESS REPORT ON SISCO-DOBRYNIN TALKS, HELOU
WONDERED WHETHER, IN VIEW PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THESE DISCUSSIONS
COULD NOT BE MOVED TO ANOTHER LEVEL, I.E., US-SOV CONCERTATION
TO PRESERVE THE LEBANESE STATE. HE DID NOT PURSUE THIS ANY
FURTHER.
8. I ASKED WHETHER WE COULD HELP THE ARMY IN ANY WAY. HE FIRST
RESPONDED THAT THEY MIGHT NEED ARMAMENTS, BUT THEN REVERSED HIM-
SELF AND SAID THERE WAS NOTHING WE COULD DO AT MOMENT. ECONOMIC
AID WOULD BE NEEDED LATER, HE SAID, BUT THERE WAS NO POINT
DISCUSSING THIS NOW.
PORTER
BT
Note: Not relayed Amman, Jidda, London, Paris, Moscow, Tel Aviv
or USUN by OC/T.
Reproduced SECRET Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
"CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS COPY MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES"
UNITED DEPARTMENT X STATES OF / OF STATE AMERICANT
Lebanon
SECRET/NODIS
!81399
Classificati on
Department of State
7
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
250cT69 21 48z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
PRIORITY
STATE 181399
NODIS
REF: BEIRUT 8893
Sixth Fleet
1. We are dispositions closely
but in absence хахих compelling circumstances are
reluctant to alter schedules since this would
become known and have adverse repercussions,
as you recognize. Your Naval Attache can obtain
details on fleet disposition.
2. We would be prepared to support any Lebanese
requests to the UN should in fact Syrian intrusion
take place.
ROGERS
END
DRAFTED BY RUMO
DRAFTING DATE
TEL EXT.
APPROVED BY:
Cuk
NEA: RPDavies:las
10/25/69
20324
NEA : RPDavies
CLEARANCES:
NEA/ARN: TWSeelye
S/S - WLloyd
all
TWS/N
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant Order 3526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
7
Control: 5941Q
0 251555Z OCT 69
Recd : 25 Oct 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8885
1:14 p.m.
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 8893
NODIS
1. I WOULD LIKE TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF SIXTH FLEET DISPOSITION
AND CAPABILITIES IN EVENT IT IS NEEDED PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES
IN LEBANON. THIS IS ONLY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. I AM NOT SUG-
GESTING SIXTH FLEET PRESENCE IN THIS AREA AT THIS POINT WOULD
DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN AGGRAVATE PRESENT SITUATION IN LEBANON.
2. I THINK EVENTS ARE DETERIORATING TO POINT THAT WE MUST SER-
IOUSLY CONSIDER OUR REACTION IN EVENT CIVIL WAR. CIVIL WAR COULD
PRODUCE REAL BLOODBATH WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO IG-
NORE. I WOULD HOPE WE CONSIDERING WHAT QUICK ACTION COULD BE
UNDERTAKEN THROUGH UN TO INTRODUCE INTERNATIONAL FORCES WHICH
COULD ASSIST IN RESTORING LAW AND ORDER, AND POSSIBLY AS WELL
TO DETER SYRIAN TAKE-OVER.
3. AS HELOU'S EMISSARY, MICHEL KHOURY, SAID TODAY, HELOU WILL
TRY TO BE PRESIDENT OF ALL OF LEBANON AS LONG AS HE CAN. WHEN
THIS IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE HE MUST CONCERN HIMSELF WITH FATE OF
HIS FELLOW CHRISTIANS. HIS SPECIFIC QUESTION WAS "WHAT CONCRETE
FORM OF US ACTION COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THOSE WHO CONSIDER THEM-
SELVES FRIENDS OF THE US AND THE WEST (I.E. "CHRISTIANS"). I
AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT SITUATION HAS YET REACHED THIS POINT OF
DESPERATION. BUT IT CAN, AND POSSIBLY VERY SOON. ALMOST NO CHRIST-
IAN WANTS TO SEE IT HAPPEN BUT IT MAY DEVELOP DESPITE ALL RES-
TRAINT WHICH IS BEING EXERCISED ON PART LEBANESE LEADERSHIP.
PORTER
BT
Reproduced at the SECRET Residential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
WHY
or STATE
9
have
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
4338Q
R 191315Z NOV 69
1969 NOV 19 AM 9 39
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9111
BT
SECRE T BEIRUT 9578
NODIS
REFERENCE BEIRUT 9568
1. WE UNDERSTAND FROM SARKIS SOGHANALIAN THAT DECISION PURCHASE
TEAR GAS IS VERY CLOSELY HELD IN LEBANESE ARMY AND HAS BEEN
APPROVED BY GEN BOUSTANY. ACQUISITION OF TEAR GAS SPECIFICALLY
INTEFYED GIMT ARMY CAPABILITY FOR CONTROL REFUGEE CAMPS. LEB-
ANESE CONTEMPLATING THAT GAS AGENT WOULD BE USED AGAINST CAMPS
BY HELICOPTERS, 105MM HOWITZERS OR 120MM MORTARS. PRESUMABLY
LAKE ERIE CHEMICAL CAN SUPPLY THESE VARIOUS MEANS OF DELIVERY.
2. LEBANESE ANXIOUS GET THIS EQUIPMENT SOON AS POSSIBLE, PER
SOGHANALIAN. CONTEMPLATING AIR FREIGHT DELIVERY BY AUSTRIAN
AIRLINES.
3. WE HAD HOPED LEBANESE MIGHT LOOK TO NON-US SOURCES FOR THIS
MATERIAL. HOWEVER, SINCE THEY NOW APPEAR HAVE OPTED FOR PUR-
CHAF ICIAK, WE FEEL USG SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE EXPEDITE
ISSUANCE EXPORT LICENSES, ETC., WITHOI REVEALING ANY OFFICIAL
CONNECTION WITH PURCHASE. WANT RE-EMPHASIZE THAT EMBASSY HAS NOT
DISCUSSED MATTER IN ANY WAY WITH GOL OR LEBANESE ARMY, AL-
THOUGH ARMA HAS IN RECENT PAST BEEN ASKED FOR INFO ON COMMERCIAL
AVAILABILITY OF TEAR GAS.
PORTER
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT of STATE
14
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CONTROL: 4223Q
R 181830Z NOV 69
RECD:
NOV 18, 1969
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
5:30 P.M.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9102
BT
SECRE T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 9560
NODIS
NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPT
REF: STATE 192884; BEIRUT 9485
1) BEFORE RECEIPT STATE 192884 I SPENT MUCH OF WEEKEND DISCUSSING
ARMS ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON WITH G-2 HEAD COLONEL LAHOUD AND
PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY. IN BEIRUT'S 9485 I HAVE
ALREADY REPORTED ON MY CONVERSATION OF NOV 14 ON SAME SUBJECT
WITH PRES. HELOU.
2) I AM CONCERNED THAT HELOU, IN VIEW OF HIS MANY OTHER PRE-
OCCUPATIONS, MAY NOT TAKE DECISIVE ACTION OR EVEN FOCUS ON
QUESTION OF ARMS ASSISTANCE. I THEREFORE DECIDED REVIEW PROBLEM
IN DEPTH WITH BOTH LAHOUD (ASKING HIM TO GET THE LEBANESE ARMY
COORDINATED IN ITS APPROACH) AND WITH KHOURY(SO THAT HE WOULD KEEP
THE PRESSURE ON HELOU).
3) I EMPHASIZED ABOVE ALL NECESSITY FOR CAREFULLY COORDINATED
ACTION ON PART OF GOL WITH DECISION-MAKING IN AS FEW HANDS AS
POSSIBLE. I ALSO URGED APPOINTMENT OF ONE INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD
TALK TO THE USG WITH AUTHORITY ON ALL ASPECTS. THIS POINT SEEMED
TO BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED.
4) BOTH LAHOUD AND KHOURY REEMPHASIZED POINT THAT IT WAS
CURRENTLY IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE AN OVERT INVOLVEMENT WITH USG ON
INTERNAL SECURITY PLANNING. THIS WAS POLITICAL DYNAMITE. GOL
WAS ANXIOUS TO HAVE TECHNICAL AND PERHAPS MATERIEL ASSISTANCE
IN IMPROVING ITS INTERNAL SECURITY BUT THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE
IN CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL MILITARY SALES AGREEMENT WITH USG, THE
OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE OF WHICH WAS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF
LEBANESE ARMY TO RESIST ISRAELI AGGRESSION. LAHOUD PARTICULARLY
STRESSED POINT THAT, TO THE EXTENT THAT ARMY COULD SHOW THAT IT
WAS IMPROVING ITS DEFENSIVE CAPACITY, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE
FORESTALL ATTEMPTS TO PLACE OTHER ARAB ARMIES IN LEBANON.
LAHOUD ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BEGIN WORKING QUIETLY
ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS IN COURSE OF NEGOTIATING FOR OTHER
TYPES OF WEAPONS. I EXPLAINED USG CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM
AND WAS NOT GOING TO UNDERTAKE ANY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE OR DESTRUCTIVE TO THE GOAL OF IMPROVING
INTERNAL SECURITY.
Reproduced at the SECRET Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
-2- BEIRUT 9560, SECTION 1 OF 2, NOV 18
5) I DID URGE LAHOURD TO GET THE ARMY INTERESTED IN IMPROVING
ITS INTERNAL SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IF
WE WAITED UNTIL WE HAD CONCLUDED DETAILED OVERALL AGREEMENT, IT
MIGHT BE TOO LATE. I MENTIONED AS EXAMPLE ACQUISITION OF TEAR
GAS CAPABILITY, AND SAID THIS WAS SOMETHING GOL COULD DO NOW, IN
OPEN MARKET, AND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO USG. LAHOUD SAID HE UNDER-
STOOD AND WOULD BE CONSIDERING WHAT LEBANESE COULD DO THEMSELVES,
AND ALSO IF IT POSSIBLE WORK OUT SOME QUIET MEANS OF COOPERATING
ON INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEM IN INTERIM.
6) LAHOUD ALSO SPOKE OF IMPORTANCE TO ARMY'S MORALE OF SOME
QUICK GESTURE ON PART USG. HE MENTIONED THAT EFFECTIVENESS OF
KALASHNIKOV RIFLE WHICH NOW INCREASINGLY STANDARD EQUIPMENT OF
FEDAYEEN HAD HAD BAD IMPACT ON ARMY MORALE. ARMY WAS OUTGUNNED
AND KNEW IT. HE WONDERED IF USG COULDN'T QUICKLY SUPPLY ABOUT
300 M-16 RIFLES WHICH COULD BE PLACED AT LEAST IN THE HANDS OF
THE COMBAT OFFICER CORPS. THIS WOULD SHOW THAT LEBANESE ARMY ALSO
HAD FRIENDS WHICH COULD PROVIDE IT WITH MODERN WEAPONS. THE
IDEAL OF COURSE WOULD BE TO PROVIDE ABOUT 10,000 M-16'S TO SUPPLY
WHOLE ARMY. WHEN I DOUBTED THIS WAS POSSIBLE, HE ASKED WHAT WAS
BEST ALTERNATE WEAPON THAT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. I SUGGESTED
PERHAPS NATO RIFLE AND PROMISED TO INQUIRE. IN FOLLOW-UP
EARLIER CONVERSATION, I SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE PROVIDE
FAVORABLE FINANCIAL TERMS IF DEAL WERE CONCLUDED ON GOVT-TO-GOVT
BASIS.
7) WE ARE ALREADY GETTING SOME RATHER SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR
AVAILABILITY OF HELICOPTERS, INFANTRY AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT
WEAPONS FROM THE LEBANESE ARMY. SOME OF THESE REQUESTS SEEM TO
HAVE AUTHENTICITY -- OTHERS PROBABLY ARE FEELERS ON PART OF
INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. DATT WILL REPORT BY SEPARATE MESSAGE ON
REQUESTS RECEIVED TO DATE, ALL OF WHICH INDICATE LEBANESE ARE
CONSIDERING RATHER SIZEABLE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM. I WOULD
APPRECIATE RECEIVING EARLY RESPONSE RE AVAILABILITY AND PRICING.
TIME IS OF ESSENCE, AS I KNOW DEPT UNDERSTANDS.
8) I THINK THAT AT MOMENT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE, AS STATE
192884 SUGGESTS, ON TRYING TO FULFILL BASIC NEEDS OF LEBANESE
ARMY, IN PROCESS TRYING ACCOMPLISH OUR OTHER OBJECTIVES RE
INTERNAL SECURITY, ETC. IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN, EXCEPT FOR FEW
MINOR PROCUREMENT ITEMS, THAT ARMY WILL REQUIRE LONG-TERM
CREDITS AND WILL HOPE AND EXPECT TO GET FAVORABLE PRICES.
AS WE DISCUSS THIS PROCUREMENT PROGRAM WITH LEBANESE, WE CAN
ALSO BEGIN DEVELOP MORE SPECIFICALLY HOW WE HANDLE MATTERS OF
ASSISTANCE IN INTERNAL SECURITY.
PORTER
BT
Reproduce Nixo Presidential Library
SECRE DECLASSIF
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
14
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CONTROL: 4222Q
RECD: NOV 18, 1969
R 181830Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
5:29 P.M.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9103
BT
SECRE T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 9560
NODIS
NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPT
REF: STATE 192884; BEIRUT 9485
9) BOTH LAHOUD AND KHOURY REFLECTED, AS DID HELOU, ON THE
DILEMMA CREATED BY GEN BOUSTANY'S CURRENT POSITION. BOUSTANY
STILL IS C-IN-C AND IT OBVIOUS THAT NO ONE KNOWS HOW TO DEAL
WITH HIM AND WHETKFER HE CAN BE TRUSTED. THERE IS AT MOMENT A
BREAKDOWN IN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, WHICH AGGRAVATES MY
PROBLEM IN GETTING SOME PROGRESS.
10) LAHOUD IS OF COURSE NOT INVOLVED IN ARMY PROCUREMENT. I
RAISED THIS GENERAL SUBJECT WITH HIM, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF OUR
EARLIER CONVERSATION, BUT BECAUSE HE HAS THE FINESS TO KNOW HOW
TO GET THINGS DONE AND CAN ALSO BRING CHEHAB'S INFLUENCE TO
BEAR TO GET DECISIONS. HE OF COURSE ALSO HAS SPECIAL ROLE TO
PLAY IN INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY. UNTIL GOL CAN DECIDE
WHAT IT WANTS TO DO IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO GET SPECIFIC
ANSWERS TO DEPT'S QUESTIONS ALTHOUGH PERHAPS LAHOUD CAN COME UP
WITH SOME OF THE ANSWERS SHORTLY. MY MAJOR CONCERN AT MOMENT IS
THERE IS SUCH A MALAISE AFFECTING WHOLE LEBANESE POLICY-MAKING
STRUCTURE THAT WE WILL PERHAPS BE CHASING WILL-O-THE-WISP
IN TRYING GET CLEAR-CUT DEFINITIVE ANSWER TO OUR QUESTIONS.
IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME EVEN BE ABLE FIND RIGHT PERSON TO ASK.
11) IN THAT CASE WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE OUR OWN JUDGMENTS AS TO
WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE, AND ACT ACCORDINGLY, WORKING WITH
SELECTED TRUSTED INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS LAHOUD. THE NEXT FEW DAYS
SHOULD BEGIN GIVE US CLEARER PICTURE. IN MEANTIME, I THINK WE MAY
WANT CONSIDER MAKING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO LEBANESE, PARTICULARLY
RE RIFLES, WHICH CAN SERVE AS A CATALYST TO SHAKE THEM OUT OF
THEIR CURRENT INDECISIVENESS. I HOPE TO SEND DEPT A PROPOSED
COURSE OF ACTION SHORTLY.
PORTER
BT
Reproduced SECRET at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
STATE
WIS 14
Department of Sate
UNITED STATES OF AMERICANCE
TELEGRAM
SECRET,
833Q
1969 NOV 5 AM 9 28
R 051333Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9001
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 9199
NODIS
1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH DCM
NOVEMBER 4 SAID THAT PRESIDENT HELOU WAS KEENLY INTERESTED IN
THE PROGRESS OF THE US/SOVIET TALKS ON A MIDDLE EAST SETTLE-
MENT. HE IS PESSIMISTIC AS TO THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN
LEBANON AS A RESULT OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED NEGOTIATIONS IN
CAIRO. HE EXPECTS TO BE MADE THE SCAPEGOAT AND, OF COURSE, BY
THE FACT OF AGREEING TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FEDAYEEN, HAS TO
SOME EXTENT HAD TO SWALLOW HIS MAY 31 STATEMENT. THE POINT IS,
HOWEVER, THAT HE FEELS THAT HE HAS PERHAPS BOUGHT TIME IN
CAIRO. HE CONTINUES FIRM IN HIS CONVICTION THAT THE ONLY
PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH NOW BESET LEBANON IS
A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HE WOULD THEREFORE BE GREATFUL FOR
ANY INFORMATION WE CAN PASS ON TO HIM WITH RESPECT TO
THE COURSE OF THE TWO-POWER AND FOUR-POWER TALKS.
2. KHOURY ALSO SAID THAT PRESIDENT HELOU WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE
OF THE ASSISTANCE WHICH THE USG HAD EXTENDED LEBANON IN THE CURRENT
CRISIS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL THAT THE USG HAD BEEN FRANK
WITH HIM AS TO THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION. HE
WAS CONSEQUENTLY ABLE TO FORMULATE HIS STRATEGY ON THIS CLEAR
PREMISE.
PORTER
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive DECLASSIFIED Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
*u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969-332-321
+
X
with
"CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS COPY. MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES"
14
UNITED DEPARTMENT X STATES OF OF STATE HOMELAND
SECRET
!94183
Classification
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
35.3
CHARGE TO
19 Nov 69 00 43z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
Amembassy BEIRUT
STATE 194183
SUBJECT: TWA Hijacking
REF: BEIRUT 9501
NODIS
1. For some time Israeli Government has been discussing
with ICRC possibility of exchange of personnel to secure
release two Israeli passengers detained Damascus. UARG
in late October or early November proposed three-cornered
scheme through ICRC, which GOI accepted. Under this
scheme UARG would release two Israeli pilots. Israel
would release to UAR one UAR pilot, 17 Egyptian POWs
from 1967 war, crews of two fishing vessels captured
in Israeli waters, 11 Egyptian civilians kidnapped in
recent raids and the two Syrian pilots held by Israel.
Condition sine qua non would be release two Israeli
Di AFTED BY
fr
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
NEA/ARN:BHBaas:dmg
11/18/69
20695
NEA - Rodger P. Davies
CLEARANCES:
NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye
ha
S/S - Mr. Brown
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
+
1
"CORRECTIONS ADE ON THIS COPY MUST BE MADE ON
L COPIES"
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
UNITED STATES OF the AMERICA
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
-2-
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
passengers held Damascus. Presumably TWA passengers
would be released first, and swap between Israel and
UAR would take place about 40 hours later. This permits
both Syrians and Israelis face saving way out of dilemma.
2. ICRC aware of impending departure TWA aircraft from
Damascus and, we understand, has called SARG attention
to this as opportunity release two Israeli passengers
with minimum fanfare. We not aware SARG reaction.
3. TWA not rpt not aware proposed exchange of personnel,
but TWA deeply worried about repercussions if aircraft
departs without passengers and will not permit aircraft
depart without first consulting with Department. While
Syrian intentions as yet unclear, we are informed that
UAR has indicated it prepared make proposed exchange of
personnel at Qantara. Israelis have agreed.
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
9. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1000332-321
"CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS COPY MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES"
UNITED DEPARTMENT X STATES OF OF AMERICA STATE
SECRET/NODIS
Classificati on
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
-3-
CHARGE TO
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
_________________________
4. Foregoing extremely delicate and should be held
very closely.
5. Regarding proposal contained Beirut 9501, we do not
believe granting license for export transceivers should
be, tied to release Israeli passengers. We planning
review licensing situation but do not feel it appropriate
do SO. at this time, in view SARG's intransigent position
on passengers.
GP-3
END
ROGERS
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL EXT.
APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED DIPARTMENT X STATES 1TH OF the OF AMERICA STATE
SECRET
!81428
Classificati on
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
W/d 6
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
26 OCT 69 1813z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY
L
STATE 181428
REF: BEIRUT 8890 8902
NODIS
Safehavens for planning purposes are Athens and
Rome with allowance for other possibilities depending
on transportation arrangements.
GP-3
END
ROGERS
DRAFTED BY
123
DRAFTING DATE
TEL EXT.
NEA/ARN:TWSeelye:dmg
10/26/69
22670
APPROVED NEA - BY: Joseph 298 J.
Sisco
CLEARANCES:
S/S - Mr. Lloyd is
NEA - Mr. Davies
RMD
WLG - Mr. McDonnell
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard NIXOA Presidential Library
FORM FS-413
DECLASSIFIED
4 68
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WIS 14
Department of State
UNITED X STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET,
883Q
1969 NOV 5 AM 9 28
R 051333Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9001
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 9199
NODIS
1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH DCM
NOVEMBER 4 SAID THAT PRESIDENT HELOU WAS KEENLY INTERESTED IN
THE PROGRESS OF THE US/SOVIET TALKS ON A MIDDLE EAST SETTLE-
MENT. HE IS PESSIMISTIC AS TO THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN
LEBANON AS A RESULT OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED NEGOTIATIONS IN
CAIRO. HE EXPECTS TO BE MADE THE SCAPEGOAT AND, OF COURSE, BY
THE FACT OF AGREEING TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FEDAYEEN, HAS TO
SOME EXTENT HAD TO SWALLOW HIS MAY 31 STATEMENT. THE POINT IS,
HOWEVER, THAT HE FEELS THAT HE HAS PERHAPS BOUGHT TIME IN
CAIRO. HE CONTINUES FIRM IN HIS CONVICTION THAT THE ONLY
PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH NOW BESET LEBANON IS
A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HE WOULD THEREFORE BE GREATFUL FOR
ANY INFORMATION WE CAN PASS ON TO HIM WITH RESPECT TO
THE COURSE OF THE TWO-POWER AND FOUR-POWER TALKS.
2. KHOURY ALSO SAID THAT PRESIDENT HELOU WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE
OF THE ASSISTANCE WHICH THE USG HAD EXTENDED LEBANON IN THE CURRENT
CRISIS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL THAT THE USG HAD BEEN FRANK
WITH HIM AS TO THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION. HE
WAS CONSEQUENTLY ABLE TO FORMULATE HIS STRATEGY ON THIS CLEAR
PREMISE.
PORTER
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to bei declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#12
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
r 011105Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
CONTROL: 0055
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8965
BT
NOVEMBER 1, 1969
SECRET BEIRUT 9081
7:42 A.M.
NODIS
REF: BEIRUT 9054
1) REFTEL REPORTS INTER ALIA THAT PRES. HELOU IN HIS CONVERSATION
WITH AMB OCT 31 INDICATED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE HE WAS CONSIDERING
ANOTHER PUBLIC APPEAL IN WHICH HE WOULD ASK LEBANESE PEOPLE TO
CLOSE RANKS AND RESIST INSURRECTION WHICH WAS BEING IMPOSED UPON
COUNTRY.
2) AMB TOOK OPPORTUNITY OF DCM'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL
CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY LATER IN DAY TO CONVEY AMB'S REACTION TO
PRESIDENT'S CONTEMPLATED ACTION. DCM TOLD KHOURY THAT WE WONDERED
IF NOW WAS TIME FOR SUCH AN APPEAL AND IF AN APPEAL MIGHT STIR UP
EMOTIONS RATHER THAN CALM THEM. IT ALSO SEEMED TO US THAT SUCH AN
APPEAL SHOULD BE MADE ONLY AFTER CONSULATION WITH PRINCIPAL
LEADERS OF LEBANESE COMMUNITY. EVEN IF PUBLIC SUPPORT BY SUCH
REPRESENTATIVES COULD NOT BE OBTAINED AT LEAST AN EFFORT
SHOULD BE MADE TO MAKE AN APPEAL WHICH WOULD NOT INCUR THEIR
OPPOSITION. IN MAKING THESE REMARKS DCM MADE CLEAR THAT AMB WAS
CONVEYING ONLY HIS IMPRESSIONS AND NOT SUBMITTING ADVICE TO
PRESIDENT. DECISION WAS OBVIOUSLY PRESIDENT'S HE WAS IN
POSSESSION GREAT DEAL MORE FACTS THAN WE.
3) KHOURY INDICATED HE AGREED WITH OUR REMARKS AND HIMSELF HAD
SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT UTILITY OF SUCH AN APPEAL AT THIS
PARTICULAR JUNCTURE. HE SAID HE WOULD PASS AMB'S IMPRESSIONS ON
TO HELOU.
4) COMMENT: ON BASIS OUR UNDERSTANDING CURRENT LEBANESE
SITUATION WE FEEL SUCH AN APPEAL WOULD BE PREMATURE AS WE DO NOT
CONSIDER THAT THE SITUATION HAS DEGENERATED TO POINT WHERE SUCH
AN APPEAL MIGHT BE USEFUL, WE FEEL HELOU IS FRUSTRATED AND
UNDERSTANDABLY CONFUSED BY MYRIAD OF CONFLICTING FORCES INVOLVED
IN NEGOTIATIONS OVER PRESENT CRISIS. HE OBVIOUSLY WONDERING IF
THERE ISN'T SOMETHING THAT HE HIMSELF SHOULD DO. IN OUR JUDGMENT,
BEST POLICY FOR GOL IN PRESENT COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS IS TO
CONTINUE MAINTAIN ITS COOL, HOLE FIRM TO ITS POSITION, AND BE
PREPARED TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHICH CONFLICTING FORCES
MAY PROVIDE.
PORTER
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT ship OF STATE
Department of State
W/d
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
14
Control: 1340Q
Recd : 6 Nov 69
2:04 p.m.
DEPARTMENT PASS INFO ROUTINE AMEMBASSY AMMAN.
P 061630Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9011
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 9245
NODIS
1. FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATIONS DCM HAS
HAD WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) ON
NOVEMBER 5 AND 6. AS RESULT CONVERSATIONS GOL HAS HAD
WITH LEBANON'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR IN CAIRO, GENERAL BOUSTANY,
KHOURY STATED THAT BOUSTANY EXCEEDED HIS INSTRUCTIONS IN THE
AGREEMENT HE CONCLUDED IN CAIRO. HE NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER
KARAME HIMSELF FELT THAT BOUSTANY HAD GONE TOO FAR. KHOURY
STILL HAS NOT REVEALED CONTENTS OF AGREEMENT AND WE FRANKLY
DOUBT THAT HE WILL AT LEAST FOR TIME BEING AS WE BELIEVE HE
FEARS POSSIBLE LEAKS TO THE ISRAELIS. GOL SO FAR HAS
MAINTAINED TIGHT SECURITY OVER CONTENTS AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH
KHOURY SOMEWHAT WRYLY COMMENTED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO
KEEP A SECRET IN LEBANON. HE INDICATED THAT THE GOL
WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO MAKE THE AGREEMENT PUBLIC BUT FEARED
THE REACTION OF VARIOUS GROUPS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY.
HE STOUTLY MAINTAINED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD OPERATE
ON THE BASIS OF A STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERMS OF THE
AGREEMENT.
2. KARAME MORNING NOVEMBER 6 AGREED TO TRY AND FORM A
GOVERNMENT. HE WANTS A LARGE CABINET WHICH WOULD
REFLECT THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE BODY POLITIC.
ALTHOUGH KARAMI MUST HAVE SOME HOPES OF SUCCEEDING, KHOURY
MAINTAINED THAT THE PROBLEM OF INCLUSION OF JUMBLATT AND
THE CHAMMOUNISTS IN THE CABINET PERSISTED. KHOURY ALSO
COMMENTED THAT THE FOCUS OF POWER IN LEBANON WAS NOW THE ARMY.
3. ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY THE GOL DOES NOT KNOW THE DATE,
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PLO ARE STILL COMING TO LEBANON
TO NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS. IN REPLY TO THE DCM'S QUERY,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2- Beirut 9245
6 Nov 69
Control: 1340Q.
KHOURY CONFIRMED THAT THE FATEH AND THE LEBANESE
AUTHORITIES HAD MORE OR LESS REACHED AN AGREEMENT (PRESUMABLY
IN DRAFT FORM) AT THE TIME THE RECENT TROUBLES BEGAN (EMBTEL 9178).
THIS CAUSED THE GOL GREAT CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE. THOSE WHO
INSTIGATED MOST RECENT CRISIS IN LEBANON (HE MENTIONED SYRIA AS
ONE OF THE PRINCIPALS) HAD APPARENTLY PICKED THEIR MOMENT SO THAT
FEDAYEEN-LEB AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CONSUMMATED. PRESUMABLY THEY
WOULD HAVE A COMPARABLE REACTION TO THE AGREEMENT NOW BEING
NEGOTIATED.
PORTER
BT
Note: NOT passed Amman by OC/T.
SECRET Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT of STATE
W A.
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
14
0 061625Z NOV 69
Control: 1341Q
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
Recd : 6 Nov 69
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9010
BT
2:04 p.m.
SECRET BEIRUT 9244
NODIS
1. MICHEL KHOURY, PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT (PROTECT) CALLED
DCM TO HIS HOUSE NOVEMBER 6. KHOURY EXPLAINED THAT A MATTER
HAD RISEN ABOUT WHICH HELOU HOPED USG MIGHT BE HELPFUL.
2. HE MAINTAINED GOL HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE
OF LATE FROM VARIOUS SOURCES TO DISAVOW ANY POSSIBILITY OF
USG INTERVENTION IN LEBANON. HE WAS AFRAID HELOU COULD NOT
RESIST GROWING PRESSURES TO THIS EFFECT, PARTICULARLY DURING
PROCESS OF FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT. NOW ARAB LEAGUE
DEFENSE MINISTERS WOULD BE MEETING NOVEMBER 8 IN CAIRO AND
HE EXPECTED PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE RASHID KARAMI AND ARMY
CHEIF OF STAFF GENERAL SHEMAYYIT WOULD BE LEBANON'S REPRE-
SENTATIVES AT MEETING. HE THOUGHT IT ALMOST CERTAIN THAT SOME
ARAB DELEGATIONS WOULD TRY TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION TO
INSURE THAT NO ARAB STATE WOULD ACCEPT ANY EXTERNAL SECURITY
GUARANTEES OTHER THAN FROM AN ARAB STATE OR INSTRUMENTALITY.
GOL WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT SUCH A RESOLUTION BUT
IN THE ABSENCE OF SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB STATES, WOULD HAVE
NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEDE. GOL REALIZED IT HAD NO
SECURITY GUARANTEE FROM USG AND THE LIKELIHOOD US INTERVEN-
TION IN LEBANON ALMOST NIL. NONETHELESS DOUBT IN THE MINDS
OF SUCH STATES AS SYRIA AS TO THE USG'S ULTIMAGE INTENTIONS
WAS USEFUL DETERRENT AGAINST AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS ON LEBANON.
3. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, KHOURY WONDERED IF THE USG MIGHT NOT
TALK WITH ITS FRIENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD SUCH AS MOROCCO.
OBJECTIVE WOULD BE FOR SUCH STATES TO ENDEAVOR TO TRY TO
PREVENT SUCH A CONCEPT FROM BEING INTRODUCED AT LEAGUE MEETING
AND IF IT WERE INTRODUCED, TO PREVENT IT FROM BEING ACCEPTED
BY THE COUNCIL. DCM MADE NO COMMITMENT BUT SAID WE WOULD
SEE WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WE COULD DO.
4. COMMENT: WHILE HELOU CAME UNDER SHARP ATTACK ON SUSPICION
OF COMPLICITY WITH USG RE POSSIBLE INTERVENTION IN LEBANON,
HE (AND MANY LEBANESE) NONETHELESS RECEIVED SOME SOLACE AND
A GOOD DEAL OF SUPPORT AS RESULT INABILITY SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN
TO FATHOM US INTENTIONS. WE ALSO KNOW THAT SOVS AND CAIRO WERE
PEDDLING STORY THAT US INTENDED INTERVENE IN LEBANON AGAINST
Reproduce Lat the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been, reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2- Beirut 9244
6 Nov 69
Control: 1341Q
FEDAYEEN OR SYRIAN AGGRESSION. WHETHER THEY BELIEVED IT OR NOT
WE CAN ASSUME THAT THEY USED THAT ARGUMENT IN DAMASCUS TO ASK
SYRIA TO BACK DOWN. THIS THEN IS ONE RARE SITUATION WHERE
ARAB PROCLIVITY TO BELIEVE THE WORST ABOUT US MAY ACTUALLY
HAVE HAD STABILIZING EFFECT ON LEBANESE SITUATION.
5. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT HELOU WANTS TO LEAVE HIS
APPARENT OPTIONS OPEN EVEN THOUGH HE HIMSELF IS UNDER NO
ILLUSIONS ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF US INTERVENTION UNDER ANY CIRCUM-
STANCES. ON OTHER HAND WE DOUBT THAT WE COULD HELP HIM
MUCH BY REQUESTING MOROCCO OR SAUDI ARABIA, FOR EXAMPLE, TO
BLOCK OR OPPOSE A PROPOSED RESOLUTION ON EXTERNAL INTERVENTION
IN CAIRO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING. INDEED OUR INTERCESSION
ON THIS SUBJECT WITH ANY OTHER ARAB GOVT WOULD RAISE THE
WHOLE QUESTION OF WHEN AND HOW WE MIGHT INTERVENE IN ME,
OR WHAT OUR RECENT INTENTIONS REALLY WERE.
6. THE ONLY THING THAT MIGHT WORK WOULD BE DIRECT APPROACH
TO EGYPTIANS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE RISKS WHICH DEPT MAY DECIDE
ARE TOO GREAT. IF APPROACH WERE MADE WE SUGGEST IT BE DONE IN
CONTEXT OF REVIEWING ORIGINAL INTENTION OF SISCO OCT 12
STATEMENT, THE UNFORTUNATE TWISTING OF THIS STATEMENT BY ARAB
PROPAGANDISTS (WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SYRIANS), TO IMPLY
EXISTENCE SINISTER IMPERIALIST ANTI-FEDAYEEN PLOT, AND HARMFUL
EFFECT PROPAGANDA HAD IN ALREADY TENSE LEBANESE SITUATION.
RUSULT COULD HAVE BEEN ESCALATION INTO CIVIL WAR (WHICH USG
HAS CONSISTENTLY TRIED TO AVOID) OR ATTACKS ON US CITIZENS.
EITHER ACTION WOULD HAVE HAD PROFOUND EFFECT ON US-ARAB RELATIONS
AND ON ATTEMPTS TO REACH PEACFUL SETTLEMENT.
7. WE COULD FURTHER POINT OUT SEEMINGLY DELIBERATE
EFFORTS OF CAIRO AND MOST OTHER ARAB STATES TO IGNORE THE
SEVERAL STATEMENTS WE HAVE MADE RECENTLY TO SHOW BALANCED
POSITION, SUCH AS THOSE OPPOSING EXPANSIONISM
IN ME (E.G. THE SECRETARY AND AMB YOST), AND AS WELL REITERATE
THAT OUR CURRENT ATTEMPTS CREATE BREAKTHROUGH IN US-USSR
NEGOTIATIONS ON SETTLEMENT ARE BOUND TO BE DAMAGED BY CON-
TINUATION HOSTILE ARAB PROPAGANDA AND ACTIONS.
8. WE COULD ADD THAT THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. WE
HAVE CAREFULLY KEPT HANDS-OFF IN LEBANESE SITUATION, LEAVING
THE MATTER FOR ARAB NEGOTIATIONS, DESPITE PROVOCATIVE ARAB-SOV
PROPAGANDA IMPLYING WE WERE THREATENING INTERVENTION. FINALLY,
WE WOULD HOPE DELIBERATIONS AT DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING WOULD
NOT CONTINUE AGGRAVATE TENSE LEBANESE SITUATION WHICH, IN
LARGE MEASURE THROUGH UAR EFFORTS, HAS HOPEFULLY BEGUN TO IMPROVE.
9. IT IS HARD TO BE SANGUINE THAT WE COULD ACCOMPLISH HELOU'S
OBJECTIVE THROUGH THIS APPROACH, BUT IT MIGHT BE A MEANS TO
CREATE A MORE MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH UAR AT A CRITICAL
JUNCTURE AND TO REDUCE SOME OF THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE AT THIS
IMPORTANT DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING.
PORTER
BT
Reproduced at the Richard ixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been_reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT or STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF American
TELEGRAM
SECRET
60Q
1969 NOV 1 AM 9 32
DEPT PLEASE PASS INFO AMMAN LONDON JIDDA PARIS TEL AVIV CAIRO USUN
R 011225Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8967
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9083
NODIS
REF: STATE 183593
1. WE HAVE MADE MANIFESTLY CLEAR TO PRES HELOU AND CHRISTIAN
LEADERSHIP OF LEBANON THAT US PLANNING NEITHER MILITARY INTER-
VENTION NOR SABRE-RATTLING IN LEBANESE SITUATION. WE HAVE ALSO
MADE POINT TO BOTH CHRISTIAN AND MOSLEM LEADERSHIP THAT WE
SUPPORTING HELOU AS CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT OF ALL LEBANON
AND NOT OF ANY PARTICULAR COMMUNITY.
2. AT SAME TIME, AS SISCO POINTED OUT TO RABIN (PARA A REFTEL),
IT IS IMPORTANT TO LEAVE LEGITIMATE DOUBTS AS TO US INTENTIONS
SHOULD SITUATION GET OUT OF CONTROL. IT CERTAINLY IMPORTANT THAT
SARG AND FEDAYEEN BE KEPT GUESSING AND BE SUBJECT TO SOME
DETERRENCE BY THEIR INABILITY TO ASSURE A US HANDS-OFF POLICY.
THIS INDEED MAY BE ONE REASON WHY US PRESENCE HERE HAS NOT BEEN
UNDER MORE DIRECT PHYSICAL ATTACK IN LAST TEN DAYS.
3. I REALIZE THIS IS DIFFICULT TIGHTROPE TO WALK BUT THINK
SISCO'S LINE WITH DOBRYNIN ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. SOVS MUST BE MADE
AWARE THAT LEBANESE SITUATION CANNOT BE ALLOWED DETERIORATE
TO POINT WHERE US MIGHT HAVE TO RECONSIDER ITS POLICIES OR IR
FUTURE ACTIONS.
4. WHEN CHRISTIAN LEADERS TRY PIN US DOWN ON QUESTION US INTER-
VENTION IN EVENT CIVIL WAR WE RESPOND THAT OUR RECOURSE AND
THEIRS AS WELL SHOULD IN FIRST INSTANCE BE TO SECURE AS PROMPT UN
ACTION AS POSSIBLE AND THAT SUCH INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
REPRESENTS ONLY PRACTICAL WAY TO REESTABLISH AN INTERNAL TRUCE.
WE TRY TO CONVINCE THEM THAT US INTERVENTION WOULD IN ITSELF
INFLAME SITUATION AND CREATE POSSIBILITY OF ESCALATION. THEY
FIND IT HARD ACCEPT THIS ANALYSIS, GIVEN THEIR PRESENT DESPAIRING
MOOD, AND THEIR ISOLATION IN RELATION REST OF ARAB WORLD, BUTWE
FEEL IT ESSENTIAL THEY NOT BE EMBOLDENED TAKE ANY PRECIPITOUS
ACTION. SO FAR TACTIC HAS WORKED, AND WE SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP TRYING AGGRAVATE INTERNAL SITUATION.
SECRET Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2- BEIRUT 9083, NODIS
5. WE ARE OF COURSE RECEIVING MANY REQUESTS FOR ARMS AND MONEY.
WE ARE TURNING THEM AWAY WITH REASONI NG THAT SUCH SUPPORT COULD
NOT LONG BE KEPT SECRET AND WOULD WHEN KNOWN HAVE EXPLOSIVE
EFFECT ON SITUATION. WE POINT OUT THAT ONLY MEANINGFUL SECURITY
OF CHRISTIANS AND OTHER COMMUNITIES LIES IN LEBANESE AND NOT
COMMUNITY CONTEXT.
6. IN SUMMARY, WE RECOMMEND CONTINUANCE OF POLICY OF MINIMAL
COMMENTARY AND IN GENERAL A LOW KEY, CALM APPROACH TO CURRENT
LEBANESE CRISIS. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO LEAVE DOUBTS IN MINDS OF
ARAB WORLD AND SOVIETS WHAT OUR ULTIMATE COURSE OF ACTION MIGHT
BE. THIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE DONE BY QUIET DIPLOMACY RATHER
THAN BY PUBLICIZED COMMENTARY.
7. ABOVE MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED PRIOR RECEIPT CHAFEE LONDON PRESS
CONFERENCE STATEMENT RE POSSIBLE 6TH FLEET INTERVENTION IN
LEBANON. WHAT CHAFEE SAID WAS GOOD IN TONE AND SUBSTANCE;
IT REMAINS BE SEEN WHETHER IN LONG TERM IT WILL BE A PLUS OR
MINUS TO US AT THIS SENSITIVE MOMENT IN THE LEBANESE CRISIS.
UNTIL ASSESSMENT CAN BE MADE AS TO IMPACT CHAFEE STATEMENT, WE
HOPE USG WOULD AVOID ADDITIONAL PUBLIC COMMENTARY THIS THEME.
PORTER
NOTE: NOT PASSED AMMAN LONDON JIDDA PARIS TEL AVIV CAIRO
USUN BY OC/T
SECRET Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
W kl
List
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
12
DEPT PASS INFO ROUTINE TO AMMAN JIDDA LONDON PARIS MOSCOW TEL
AVIV USUN
0 311238Z OCT 69
Control: 7241Q
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
Recd : 31 Oct 69
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8952
BT
7:47 a.m.
SECRE T BEIRUT 9054
NODIS
REF: STATE 182922, BEIRUT 9041 (NOTAL); STATE 183682 (NOTAL)
1. AFTER ROCKEFELLER MEETING WITH PRES HELOU I STAYED ON WITH
PRES FOR PRIVATE TALK AND PASSED TO HIM SUBSTANCE PARA 5 STATE
182922. HELOU THANKED ME FOR INFORMATION BUT NATURE HIS RESPONSE
MADE CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD HELP HIM IN HIS CUR-
RENT DIFFICULTIES.
2. FEDAYEEN, HE SAID, WILL CONTINUE ATTACK LEBANON UNDER ANY
CIRCUMSTANCES. INDEED PROGRESS TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT,
WHICH THEY OPPOSE, MAY CAUSE THEM TO REACT MORE SHARPLY. NONE-
THELESS HELOU OBVIOUSLY GRATEFUL FOR ANY SIGN US REEMERGENCE AS
ACTIVE PARTICIPANT ME PROBLEM.
3. HELOU'S ATTITUDE, WHICH HAD BEEN REASONABLY CHEERFUL AND RA-
TIONAL WITH ROCKEFELLER, CHANGED TO ONE OF ALMOST UNMITIGATED
GLOOM DURING OUR MEETING. HE SAID HE WAS CONSIDERING ANOTHER
PUBLIC APPEAL IN WHICH HE WOULD ASK LEBANESE PEOPLE TO CLOSE
RANKS AND RESIST INSURRECTION WHICH WAS BEING IMPOSED ON COUNTRY.
HE THOUGHT SITUATION SO URGENT THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE
NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS TO HAVE EFFECT. HE REALIZED DECLARATION
COULD CAUSE INTERNAL EXPLOSION BUT THOUGHT IT ALSO HAD GOOD CHANCE
OF RALLYING LEBANESE PEOPLE TO CONTINUE RESIST THE MILITARY AND
PROPAGANDA PRESSURES NOW IMPOSED ON THEM. I RESPONDED THAT
I WONDERED WHETHER MATTER INDEED REQUIRED SUCH URGENT. ACTION.
HE ANSWERED THAT HE HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO TAKE SUCH ACTION.
4. HE REPEATED THEME THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS ONLY REAL FRIEND
WAS US. HE EQUALLY UNDERSTOOD LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON HIM AND
ON US IN USING THAT FRIENDSHIP. AS HE HAD SAID TO ROCKEFELLER,
HE DID NOT EXPECT US MILITARY INTERVENTION. HE HAD BEEN SHOCKED
NONETHELESS TO READ LE MONDE REPORT ATTRIBUTED TO US OFFICIAL
SOURCES IN UN THAT US HAD NO INTENTION INTERVENING IN LEBANON.
I RESPONDED I WAS CERTAIN THIS WAS NOT AN ACCURATE REPORT AND
WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SAID BY ANY RESPONSIBLE US OFFICIAL. MORE
LIKELY IT WAS CLEVER STORY BY REPORTER WHO WAS INTERPRETING US
PUBLIC OPINION (AS HAD HELOU HIMSELF) AS. BEING OPPOSED MILITARY
INTERVENTION ALMOST ANYWHERE.
Reproduced the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2- Beirut 9054, 31 October 1969
Control: 7241Q
5. HELOU THEN INQUIRED WHAT WOULD BE US POLICY IN TERMS POSSIBLE
MILITARY INTERVENTION IF NECESSARY PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES AND
PROPERTY IN LEBANON. I SAID THERE WAS NO YES OR NO ANSWER TO
SUCH A QUESTION. OBVIOUSLY SUCH AN IMPORTANT DECISION COULD NOT
BE MADE IN ADVANCE AND WOULD DEPEND ON CIRCUMSTANCES.
6. I ASKED HELOU IF THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE WE COULD DO AT THIS
TIME TO HELP HIM. HE SAID IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO BRING
PRESSURE TO BEAR ON RADICAL ARAB STATES - ABOVE ALL SYRIA - AND
HAD WE DISCUSSED MATTER WITH SOVS? I SAID WE HAD AND sovs HAD
INDICATED THEY WISHED RESTRAIN SITUATION AND WERE DISCUSSING MAT-
TER WITH DAMASCUS. HE SIAD SOV AMB HAD TOLD HIM SAME THING BUT
HE COULD SEE NO RESULTS. IT WAS URGENT THAT SOVS APPLY MORE PRES-
SURE IN A HURRY. THE SAME HELD FOR ANY OTHER WESTERN STATES THAT
COULD HAVE ANY INFLUENCE IN RADICAL ARAB CAPITALS. THE FRENCH,
HE ADMITTED, WOULD NOT DO MUCH. THEY WERE TOO INTRIGUED WITH
THEIR NEW BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN ARAB WORLD.
7. IN CONTEXT MY PROGRESS REPORT ON SISCO-DOBRYNIN TALKS, HELOU
WONDERED WHETHER, IN VIEW PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THESE DISCUSSIONS
COULD NOT BE MOVED TO ANOTHER LEVEL, I.E., US-SOV CONCERTATION
TO PRESERVE THE LEBANESE STATE. HE DID NOT PURSUE THIS ANY
FURTHER.
8. I ASKED WHETHER WE COULD HELP THE ARMY IN ANY WAY. HE FIRST
RESPONDED THAT THEY MIGHT NEED ARMAMENTS, BUT THEN REVERSED HIM-
SELF AND SAID THERE WAS NOTHING WE COULD DO AT MOMENT. ECONOMIC
AID WOULD BE NEEDED LATER, HE SAID, BUT THERE WAS NO POINT
DISCUSSING THIS NOW.
PORTER
BT
Note: Not relayed Amman, Jidda, London, Paris, Moscow, Tel Aviv
or USUN by OC/T.
Reproduced at SECRET Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SPARTMENT the OF STATE
SECRET/NODIS
Classificati on
183705
OF STATES f AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
WH
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
30 OCT 69 1942z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV
STATE 183705
NODIS
REF: Beirut 9027
1. Asst Sec Sisco told Israel Ambassador Rabin that we
had report, which not confirmed and we hope not true,
that Israeli Press Attache Paris was telling French
press that there existed some kind of an arrangement
between Israel and Lebanese President Helou. If true,
this would be disastrous for Helou at this particular
juncture. Sisco asked Rabin to cable to ascertain facts,
and if true, to call off Press attache.
2. Rabin expressed doubt that report is true and said
he would have seen copy any instruction from Jerusalem
to Paris. He agreed to find out the facts.
3. Sisco said in conclusion that US attaches some
_________________________
importance to this matter.
END
DRAFTED BY
HL
GP-3
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
NEA/IAI : MCLissfelt:slb
10/30/69
22294
NEA Joseph JJ J. Sisco
ROGERS
CLEARANCES:
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton
S/S
-
Mr.
Cheysteen
AND
676
Brown
NEA/ARN:TWSeelye
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
FORM
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DS-322
4-68
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED DEPARTMENT X STATES the OF STATE AMERICA
SECRET / NODIS
Classificati on
Department of State
183682
OF
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
W 10
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
300cT69 1842z 12
INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK
STATE 183682
NODIS
REF: BEIRUT 9041, STATE 182922
You authorized pass to President Helou gist information
paragraph 5 reftel.
GP-3.
END
ROGERS
7
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
NEA/ARN:TWSeelye/mo
10/30/69
22670
NEA - Joseph J Sisco
CLEARANCES: NEA PDavies RMS
S/S - Mr. Brown fup
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM DS-322
DECLASSIFIED
4-68
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1110
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
5988Q
RECVD: 26 OCT 69
P 261123Z OCT 69
7:07AM
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE. WASHDC PRIORITY 8890
BT
SECRETBEIRUT 8902
NODIS
ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE EVACUATION OF US CITIZENS AT THIS
TIME, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES PLEASE ADVISE US THE NAMES OF THE
SAFEHAVENS. WE ESTIMATE THAT APPROXIMATELY 3500 OUT OF A TOTAL
5,000-6,000 US CITIZENS IN LEBANON WOULD DESIRE EVACUATION.
WE WOULD PLAN AND ASSUME IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO USE COMMERCIAL
AIR. IMPERATIVE SECURITY THIS REQUEST BE MAINTAINED.
PORTER
BT
NNNN
Reproduced at the SECRETon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF NTATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAN
SECRET
7
0 251555Z OCT 69
Control: 5941Q
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
Recd
:
25 Oct 69
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8885
1:14 p.m.
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 8893
NODIS
1. I WOULD LIKE TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF SIXTH FLEET DISPOSITION
AND CAPABILITIES IN EVENT IT IS NEEDED PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES
IN LEBANON. THIS IS ONLY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. I AM NOT SUG-
GESTING SIXTH FLEET PRESENCE IN THIS AREA AT THIS POINT WOULD
DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN AGGRAVATE PRESENT SITUATION IN LEBANON.
2. I THINK EVENTS ARE DETERIORATING TO POINT THAT WE MUST SER-
IOUSLY CONSIDER OUR REACTION IN EVENT CIVIL WAR. CIVIL WAR COULD
PRODUCE REAL BLOODBATH WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO IG-
NORE. I WOULD HOPE WE CONSIDERING WHAT QUICK ACTION COULD BE
UNDERTAKEN THROUGH UN TO INTRODUCE INTERNATIONAL FORCES WHICH
COULD ASSIST IN RESTORING LAW AND ORDER, AND POSSIBLY AS WELL
TO DETER SYRIAN TAKE-OVER.
3. AS HELOU'S EMISSARY, MICHEL KHOURY, SAID TODAY, HELOU WILL
TRY TO BE PRESIDENT OF ALL OF LEBANON AS LONG AS HE CAN. WHEN
THIS IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE HE MUST CONCERN HIMSELF WITH FATE OF
HIS FELLOW CHRISTIANS. HIS SPECIFIC QUESTION WAS "WHAT CONCRETE
FORM OF US ACTION COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THOSE WHO CONSIDER THEM-
SELVES FRIENDS OF THE US AND THE WEST (I. E. "CHRISTIANS"). I
AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT SITUATION HAS YET REACHED THIS POINT OF
DESPERATION. BUT IT CAN, AND POSSIBLY VERY SOON. ALMOST NO CHRIST-
IAN WANTS TO SEE IT HAPPEN BUT IT MAY DEVELOP DESPITE ALL RES-
TRAINT WHICH IS BEING EXERCISED ON PART LEBANESE LEADERSHIP.
PORTER
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CONTROL: 5150Q
RECD:
OCT 22, 1969
3:46 P.M.
R 221431Z
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY ROME
INFO SECXTATE WASHDC
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 8779
NODIS
FOR STABLER FROM AMBASSADOR
SUBJ: TWA HIJACKING
REF: BEIRUT 8778
1. DURING PRATT'S DISCUSSION WITH MAIOLINE OCT 21
LATTER WAS GREATLY CONCERNED THAT THERE WOULD BE
A LEAK OF HIS PROBING EFFORTS WITH SYRIAN OFFICIALS.
HE HAS ASKED THAT WE FORWARD TO YOU HIS REQUEST THAT
ANY INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT PASSED TO THE FONOFF
BE GIVEN TO PERRONE CAPANO ALONE FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL
INFORMATION. HE WAS ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS THAT AMBASSADOR
RICCARDI NOT LEARN ABOUT HIS EXPLORATORY TALKS UNTIL
SOMETHING CONCRETE HAD EMERGED FROM THEM. HE BELIEVED
PERRONE CAPANO COULD UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR HIS REQUEST.
2. FYI. WE KNOW RICCARDI CAN BE AN ENERGETIC
CONVERSATIONALIST. WE SUSPECT THIS IS THE
REASON FOR MAIOLINI'S REQUEST.
PORTER
BT
Reprodu SECRET Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
WH
10
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF to
TELEGRAM
SECRET
CONTROL: 7791Q
RECD:
SEP 30, 1969
R 301447Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
3:58 P.M.
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8687
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1910
BT
SECRE T BEIRUT 8074
NODIS
REF: BEIRUT 8008 AND 7933; STATE 160382
1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) INFORMED ME EVENING SEP
29 THAT HELOU HAD JUST RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM EBAN VIA
VATICAN. KHOURY SAID CONTENT AND WORDING FOLLOWED VERY
CLOSELY ORAL PRESENTATION" I HAD GIVEN HELOU OF THE
EBAN/SECRETARY CONVERSATION RE LEBANON.
2. KHOURY RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO MY QUERY WHETHER ISRAELIS
HAD APPROACHED GOL THROUGH ANY OTHER CHANNELS, E.G., CONTACTS
WITH LEBANESE MILITARY AT SOUTHERN BORDER. I WOULD ASSUME
HELOU DIRECTED HIS QUERIES TO ISRAEL THROUGH VATICAN
THEREBY RECEIVING RESPONSE IN SAME CHANNELS, ALTHOUGH
KHOURY DID NOT MENTION LEBANESE INITIATIVE. AS
DEPT AWARE HELOU IS FORMER LEBANESE AMB TO VATICAN AND
PERSONAL FRIEND POPE PAUL. HELOU IS USING VATICAN FORUM
IN MANY WAYS TO SECURE WESTERN SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, AS NEW
PAPAL NUNCIO BRUNEIRO INFORMED ME YESTERDAY. HELOU CAN
BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE ASK VATICAN TO INTERCEDE WITH USG
(AND FRANCE) ON BEHALF LEBANON.
PORTER
BT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
WH 9
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF ?
TELEGRAM
SECRET
R 261734Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8668
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1906
7015Q
BT
SE C R E T BEIRUT 8008
SEP 26 3:46 PM 69
REF: BEIRUT 7933, STATE 160382
NODIS
1) IN COURSE LONG TOUR D'HORIZON WITH PRES HELOU EVENING
SEP 25, I CAREFULLY PARAPHRASED EBAN'S COMMENTS PARA 3
STATE 160382. HELOU WAS ABOVE ALL PLEASED AT FACT THAT
SECRETARY CONTINUING MAKE REPRESENTATION TO ISRAELIS
SHOWING US CONCERN FOR LEBANON.
2) AS FOR EBAN'S COMMENTS, HELOU NOTED PARTICULARLY REFERENCE
TO "LIMITED DEFENSIVE ACTIONS" IN PARA 3C AND ISRAELI INTENTION
TAKE "MINIMUM ACTIONS NECESSARY TO DEFEND ITS CITIZENS IN PARA 3D.
HE FELT THIS SHOWED FAVORABLE NAUNCE IN ISRAELI POSITION WHICH
NOT PREVIOUSLY EVIDENT.
3) IN CONTEXT HELOU'S RATHER DEPRESSING VIEW CURRENT TREND OF
EVENTS IN LEBANON (SEPTEL) IT APPARENT HE NOT SANGUINE HE CAN
CONTINUE EFFECTIVELY CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. HE WILL CONTINUE
DO ALL HE CAN AND HOPES BORDERS WILL REMAIN AS QUIESCENT AS IN
RECENT PAST. HE HOPED THAT IF FUTURE FEDAYEEN ACTIONS BROUGHT
ISRAELI RETALIATION ISRAELIS WOULD NOT OVERREACT. HE CITED RECENT
ISRAELI RETALIATION WHERE 30 PLANES AVENGED DEATH OF ONE
ISRAELI AS EXAMPLE OF OVERKILL WHICH ONLY INFLAMES LEBANESE
AND GIVES FEDAYEEN GREATER SUPPORT AND ACCEPTABILITY. HELOU
POINTED OUT, PERHAPS MORE FOR US EARS THAN ISRAELI, THAT HE
WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CONTINUE PROTEST (PRESUMABLY
IN SC) ANY ISRAELI ATTACKS ON LEBANON, PARTICULARLY THOSE
INVOLVING LEBANESE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.
4) HELOU VOLUNTEERED THAT HE COULD NOT TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
EBAN'S MESSAGE AS DIRECT COMMUNICATION TO GOL, BUT HE VIEWED
Y REPORT RATHER AS A FRIENDLY MESSAGE FROM USG INDICATING ITS
CONCERN FOR LEBANON AND REPORTING ISRAELI REACTION TO OUR INTER-
VENTION. I DID NOT TELL HIM EBAN HAD ASKED USG TO CONVEY MESSAGE
(BEIRUT 7922), NOR DID HE SUGGEST ISRAEL HAD MADE DIRECT CONTACT
WITH GOL.
Reproduced SECRET the Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2- BEIRUT 8008, SEP 26
5) HELOU EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT EBAN WAS SERIOUS IN HIS
COMMITMENT TO USG RE LEBANON BUT BELIEVED ISRAEL WOULD
SOONER OR LATER IGNORE EBAN'S ASSURANCES IF SITUATION WORSENS
AND FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY GIVES ISRAELIS REASON TO ATTACK AND SEIZE
TERRITORY IN SOUTH LEBANON. AT THAT POINT, ISRAEL WOULD REVERT
TO LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES AND FIND EXPANSION MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN
RESTRAINT. I ASSURED HELOU AGAIN THAT USG WAS DEEPLY
CONCERNED WITH QUESTION OF LEBANESE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND
THAT I WAS SURE OUR REPEATED EXPRESSIONS OF THIS CONCERN HAD
HAD EFFECT ON ISRAEL WHICH WOULD NOT LIGHTLY BE FORGOTTEN. QUESTION
OF REPRISALS, OF COURSE, MUCH AS WE DEPLORED THEM, WAS DEPENDENT
ON RESTRAINT OF FEDAYEEN ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.
PORTER
BT
NOTE: PASSED TO TEL AVIV BY OC/T
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
$
R 241708Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 865 0
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1900
6284Q
BT
1969 SEP 24 PM 2 14
SECRET BEIRUT 7922
NODIS
REF: USUN 3124, SECTO 005, RPTD BEIRUT AS STATE 160382
1) I SUMMARIZED EBAN'S RESPONSE TO SECRETARY SET FORTH
PARA 3 REFTEL IN CONVERSATION SEP 23 WITH PRESIDENT HELOU'S
CONFIDANT, MICHEL KHOURY. KHOURY SAID HE WOULD BRIEF HELOU
SAME DAY. I WILL FOLLOW UP WHEN I SEE HELOU SEP 25.
2) I DID NOT MENTION (AND NEITHER DID KHOURY) FACT THAT
HELOU AND ISRAELIS WERE IN DIRECT CONTACT. NEITHER
DID I REFER TO EBAN'S REQUEST THAT USG CONVEY REPLY TO
HELOU. WE HAVE HAD UNFORTUNATE EXPERIENCES IN PAST WHERE
US ROLE AS LETTERDROP HAS BEEN MISINTERPRETED AFTER
SUBSEQUENT LEAKS. IN THIS INSTANCE THOUGHT IT BETTER PASS
ON GIST EBAN'S REMARKS AS THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN MADE
IN RESPONSE SECRETARY'S EXPRESSION USG CONCERN OVER LEBANESE
SITUATION.
PORTER
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
SECRET
13
STATES I UNITED AMERICA YORK STATE
Classification
9 U 5
Department of State
OF
INDICATE:
TELEGRA M
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
3-3
8 Nov 59 02 04z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY
STATE 189505
REF: BEIRUT 9244
NODIS
1. We appreciate Helou's concern over possible
resolution that might be introduced at November 8
meeting in Cairo. We agree with your analysis that
it understandable that Helou wants to keep his options
open. We share your skepticism re our ability to block
and
or oppose Arab resolution on external intervention,/ we
agree that our intercession would raise a question
about our real intentions.
2. In light of Nasser's November 6 speech, we believe
that a direct approach to Egyptians, in particular,
likely to be counterproductive. Under circumstances,
we believe USG should take no action in this respect.
fhe
GP-3
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
APPROVED BY:
NEA/ARN:BHBaas:dmg
20695
NEA - Joseph JP J Sisco
END
JOHNSON
TEL. EXT.
11/7/69
CLEARANCES:
NEA - Mr. Davies RMD This
S/S - Mr. Hawley
NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye
NEA/UAR - Mr. Parker (draft),
1mh
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM
DS-322
DECLASSIFIED
4 68
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
31-B WH
UNITED DEPARTMENT $ STATES THE OF OF The STATE AMERICAN
SECRET
8
Classification
Department of State
!80289
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
24.OcT.69 0131z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV
Amembassy LONDON
"
USUN
NEW YORK
PARIS
"
MOSCOW
USINT
CAIRO
STATE 180289
SUBJECT: Lebanese-Israeli Border
REF: USUN 3124
NODIS
In telephone conversation
told
1. /Morning October 23 Israeli Minister
Assistant Secretary Sisco, axds with reference to Eban's
statements regarding Lebanese-Israeli border (USUN 3124),
that if it would help
/8xxx we are authorized to reassure GOL that Israel has
no territorial designs on southern Lebanon.
2. You should convey to Helou, through his intermediary
Michel Khoury, this reiteration of Israeli reassurances
regarding Lebanon's territorial integrity.
GP-3
END
ROGERS
w
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
NEA/ARN:BHBaas:dmg
10/23/69
20695
NEA - Joseph J. Sisco
CLEARANCES:
NEA/ARN Mr. Seelye
S/S - MLevitsky my
NEA/IAI Mr. Atherton
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential (info)
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
BE
MADE
ON
ALL
COPIES
DEPARTMENT OF ST
SECRET/NOD
Classification
!8139
UNITED STATES OF P AMERICA
Department of State
M
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
25 OcT 69 21
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
PRIORITY
STATE 181399
NODIS
REF: BEIRUT 8893
Sixth Fleet
1. We are dispositions closely
but in absence xaMpx compelling circumstances are
reluctant to alter schedules since this would
become known and have adverse repercussions,
as you recognize. Your Naval Attache can obtain
details on fleet disposition.
2. We would be prepared to support any Lebanese
requests to the UN should in fact Syrian intrusion
take place.
ROGERS
END
DRAFTED BY RUAD
DRAF TING DATE
TEL EXT.
APPROVED BY: am
NEA: RPDavies:las
10/25/69
20324
NEA: RPDavies
CLEARANCES:
NEA/ARN: TWSeelye
S/S - WLloyd
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED /NODIS
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ùu.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969--332-321
+
2
"CORRECTIONS
DE ON THIS COPY MUST BE MADE ON
COPIES"
UNITED DEPARTMENT STATES OF OF STATE AMERICA
SECRET
Classification
I60383
Department of State
I
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
48C C 2
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
21 SEP 69 0154z
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
7 8
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
STATE 160383
NODIS
BY
SECTO 5 FROM USUN BEING REPEATED TO YOU BE SEPTEL
IN THIS CHANNEL. EMBASSY BEIRUT IS AUTHORIZED TO
CONVEY INFO IN PARAGRAPH THREE THEREOF TO PRESIDENT
HELOW.
END
RICHARDSON
any
pm - 7
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
APPROVED BY:
NEA/MR. DAVIES
9/20/69
21512
s/s-o R.G.Rich
CLEARANCES:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ADDRESSOG APH - MULTIGRAPH SYSTEMAT© MASTER PRINTED BY MCGREGOR PRINTING CORPORATION 7.66
CC RECTIONS MA ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON AI COPIES
WH
7
BEFORE THE
EGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
120387
NDICATE:
COLLECT
]
CHARGE TO
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
for oc/T use ONLY
Origin
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
PRIORITY
CAIRO
PRIORITY
/
Info:
JIDDA
PRIORITY
JUL 69 20 10z
KUWAIT
PRIORITY
INFO:
AMMAN
TEL AVIV
USUN, NEW YORK
LONDON
PARIS
MOSCOW
STATE 120387
NODIS
1. GOJ and GOI have already pressed for fill-in on Sișco's Moscow talks,
and we expect other action addressees may similarly be approached.
2. You should know that Soviets have asked us not to make text of our
counterproposal to Soviet June 17 document, which Sisco gave Soviets July 15,
available to Arabs until they have made some soundings in Cairo. To test
seriousness of Soviet intentions, about which we remain skeptical, we have
agreed go along with this Soviet request for time being. Meanwhile, we made
our text available to British, French and Israelis in their capitals July 17.
Jordanian Foreign Minister Touqan told Embassy Amman that Jerusalem Arabic
language broadcast evening July 17 and Amman broadcast following day reported
Ambassador Barbour had briefed FonOff Director General Rafael on Sisco Moscow
talks. FBIS has so far been unable find any record of alleged Jerusalem and
not
Amman broadcasts, which in any case have/made much of
a splash, and so far there have apparently been no leaks about our having given
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
NEA/IAI:ALAtherton:av 7/19/69
2942
classification approved by:
NEA - Joseph John J. Sisco
Clearances:
98W
S/S - Mr: Walsh Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
Origin
XXXXXXX
- 2 -
Info:
text of our counterproposal to Israelis.
and our agreement to it,
3. Soviet request that we withhold text from Arabs/nevertheless puts us
in something of a bind, especially if there has been publicity in Israel re
Barbour-Rafael meeting, and we may not want to withhold text for long from
UAR and GOJ. We have in fact already authorized Embassy Amman give general
oral briefing to GOJ FonMin Touqan who was agitated by alleged reports from
Israel of Barbour briefing of GOI.
4. We are repeating to addressees of this message instructions on basi
of which Embassy Amman briefed GOJ (STATE 120068). We want limit discussion
of Sisco Moscow talks and our counterproposal to generalities at this time,
emphasizing following themes:
a) Moscow talks were serious and businesslike, and US-Soviet dialogue
will continue in effort narrow gaps between us and produce common document
which two and ultimately four powers can recommend to Jarring as basis for
renewed effort by him with parties.
b) We expected no dramatic results in Moscow and there was in fact no
breakthrough. Neither was there breakdown, however, and we think each side
now better understands views of other.
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:
Clearances
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED / NODIS
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ADDRESSOGRAPH
MULTIGRAPH
SYSTEMATO
MASTER
CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
SECRET/NODIS
Classification
Origin
- 3 -
Info:
5. Action addressees should take no initiatives but if pressed by host
governments for fill-in on Moscow talks may make points in 4 a) and b) above
and in addition may draw on paras 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 (but not repeat not para
of STATE 120068. In doing so, you should change phrase "U.S. commentary" in
para 2 to read "U.S. counterproposal". If asked whether we have given text
to other than Soviet Government, you should plead ignorance.
6. Sisco will be briefing Egyptians and Jordanians here along similar
lines next week, beginning with Ghorbal Wednesday afternoon, July 23. He
will also see Israelis Wednesday morning.
GP-3
END
ROGERS'
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:
Clearances:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive CrEerR NODhTas been determined to be declassified.
6
043816
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
SECRET ****** NODIS
Classification
for oc/T USE ONLY
Origin
ACTION: Amembassy Beirut
USINT CAIRO
2
MAR 69 37 Γ
Jidda
Info:
Tel Aviv
Amman
STATE 43816
XXXXXX NODIS
FOR AMBASSADORS AND BERGUS FROM ASST. SECY. SISCO
You will note we have made attempt to report very fully
on all of our talks here. This is my intention throughout
this exercise because I feel that all of you must be as
fully informed as possible. I want ули to express my
appreciation to each of you for the careful manner in which
delicate material is being handled in the field, and in
particular distinguishing between that material to be
presented to governments to which you are represented and
those marked NK NOFORN. I am very anxious to continue
this practice of fullest possible reporting to you and I
just wanted to express my appreciation to each of you for the
highly professional manner in which sensitive information is
being handled. Thank you very much.
END
ROGERS
GP-3
Drafted by:
NEA: J PSICCO :mtb
4263
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:
Joseph JSS. Sisco
Clearances:
s/s - Mr. Brown
RUA
SECRET-EXMXX NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM
DS-322
DECLASSIFIED
8-65
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
06669
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
WH
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
SECRET
Classification
FOR oc/T USE only
Origin
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY
2 9 APR 69 22 22z
Info:
STATE 066691
REF: STATE 65333, BEIRUT 3506 and 3511
NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO
1. While, in response to Lebanese expression of interest,
we considering possible UN presence Lebanon should situation
deteriorate further, we would hope that any presence would
be no more than that contemplated by paragraphs C and D
State 65333. Since there are many major obstacles to
positive UN action on UN force, we prefer that you not
further details
get/into /this question with Lebanese leaders and that you
leave initiative with Helou. Moreover, any future discussions
should
on UN presence/be limited to possibility special representa-
tive SYG or expansion observer operation.
END
appreciat impetative III approaching tripartite
ving
bhics
[ROGERS]
R
Drafted by:
Tell Exi.
Telegraphic transmission and
NEA/ARN: BHBaas dmg 4/29/69
2700
classification approved by: NEA Joseph 28 J. Sisco
Clearances:
NEA/ARN Mr. Seelye
NEA - Mr. Davies
RM
IO/UNP - Mr. Dasf Day
s/s - Mr. Brown
DAP
the
IO - Mr. Popper
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM
DS-322
n
8-65
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CODEWORD
-
....
......
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/15 (1 p.)
EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
248
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT
OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
MLH
6/21/2011
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 249 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CLEARED CABLES
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Debanan
LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM
Msg. No.
Sont by:
2. TO:
WH
412
Transmitted by: Ment
4. Received by: WHER
Date & Time: 21/2200
Date & Time 2247
Description Telegram to Beirut (Info Paris) re Inauguration Lebanese
Earth Satellite Station
Classification & Controls: CONFIDENTIAL
ReBrown
No. of Pgs.
3 8. Precedence
IMM
9. Validated by RLBrown (hhb)
o. Deliver to:
Mr. Henry Kissinger
For: Clearance XXXXX
The White House
Information
ATTENTION:
Mr, Foster
Per Roquest
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
WHITE HOUSE
CHARGE TO
CONFIDENTIAL
SITUATION.ROOM
FOR OC/T USE ONLY
Classification
Origin
169
AUG
21 PM 9: 48
ACTION:
Amembassy BEIRUT
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Intor
INFO
Amembassy PARIS
STATE
SUBJECT Inauguration Lebanese Earth Satellite Station
REF
Belrut 6815; Beirut 6228
1. Neither President nor Vice President available August 31
for telecon with President Helou on occasion inauguration
Lebanese earth station.
2. On basis Embassy recommendation of acceptable alternates,
we contacted Governor Scranton who readily agreed receive
August 31
Helou call/at 11:00 am EDT at home in Dalton, Pa.
3. Scranton plans speak in English with interpreter present
to handle translation. To maximize psychological value of
occasion in context US-Arab relations, we believe i.t prefer™
able for Helou conduct conversation in Arabic rather than in
French. While we will be guided, of course, by Embassy's
views this subject, you may wish relay our suggestion through
Ghazel to Helou citing following: a) Extensive publicity
Dretted by,
Tal. Exi,
Telegraphic transmission and
NEA - Rodger RFD P. Davies
NEA/ARN:P ffin:gvl 8/21/69
21018silication approved by:
Classancess
NEA/ARN - Mr. Baas
White House --
USIA/IAN - Mr. Kennedy
E/TT - Mr. Loy
B.
XMB - Mr. Welk (info)
S/S - Mr. Brown
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM
Classification
8.65
DS-322
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE,
COLLECT
D
CHARGE TO
CONFIDENTIAL
FOR OC/T USE ONLY
Classification
Origin
ACTION:
H 2 $
Infor
planned for event can be made more effective in area if VOA
and USIA coverage is in Arabic; b) Among Lebanese-American
community, for whom ceremony will be particularly significant,
Arabic is more widely understood than French.
4. We agree that format of conversation should be limited
mainly to exchange of prepared statements. We preparing
brief congratulatory statement for Scranton to read in English
as well as talking points, which will be cabled to Embassy
for comment.
5. Scranton's home telephone number is area code 717,
563-1121. Telephone service is provided him by Commonwealth
Telephone Company, which has assured us of their cooperation
in facilitating Scranton-Helou satellite call.
6. COMSAT and Page reps Washington fully briefed on above
arrangements. Ulans of COMSAT advises he will be arriving
attend
Beirut next week to
earth
station inaugural.
Dietted by,
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
classification Approved by
Clasiantuse
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM
8-65
DS-322
Reproduced at the Classification Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive DECLASSIFIED Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OUTGOING TELEGRAM De artment of State
INDICATE: collect
CHARGE YO
CONFIDENTIAL
FOR OC/T USE ONLY
Classification
Origin
ACTION:
to 3 1
intos
7. Embassy requested cable soonest GOL confirmation these
arrangements, especially language Helou will use, and any
additional pertinent details re Lebanese preparations for
telecon.
END
Disfied by:
Tel. Ext.
Telepraphic transmission and
classification apploved by:
Classencess
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM
Classification
8.55
DS-322
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
#580
LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM
LOG # ASS16
1. Sont by: Department of State
.2. Receiver(s)
1450
3. Transmitted by: 191lm
(Msg. Nos. to)
at
'69 MAY PM 12: 03
Received by:
Dato and troe:
Date and time:
S. Description: Tel to BEIRUT. AMMANS. Precedence: IMMEDIATE
JIDDA, USINT CAIRO, KUWAIT TEL AVIV, USUN, MOSCOW
7. Clefn S Controls SECRETINODIS
Rowth Bizin
6. Kbr of use.
6
9. Validated by JPWalsh
10. Deliver to:
Robert Murray
For:
Clearance X
OASD/ISA/NESA
Information
Room 4D765, Pontngon
Por request
Hn) Saunders
White House
IMPORTANT
Haig say this
is tahen care of
5/8/69
mich
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
5
SECRET
$9 MAY 6 SINHIT PM 12:35 12: 86
ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy JIDDA
USINT CATRO
Amembassy KUWAIT
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK
AmEmonssy Moscow
STATE
NODIS/NOFORN
1. Department remains deoply concerned re GOL-fedayeen
confrontation and its implications for internal stability
of Lebanon. President Helou has asked what USG assistance
he can expect if situation sharply deteriorates. It clear
that Helou believes that he can curn only to USG if Lebanon's
survival at stake.
2. Wo are considering strictly on contingency basis options
open to us to shore up GOL. One option which might be
considered is move of unit of Sixth Floot into Eastern
SECRET
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-yoar intervals;
not automatically doclassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS/NOFORN
2
Mediterranean, accompanied by public announcement to this
offect. Such an announcoment would presumably specify
that action boing taken in response to GOL request and
that action indicative of continuing US support for COL.
We would not rpt not wish to imply that fleet move also
connected with present tension on cease-fire lines on
Suez Canal and in Jordan Vnlley.
3. We see following possible advantages in movement of
Sixth Fleet unit to Eastern Moditerranean:
a. Reinforcing President Helou's apparent determination
to confront the fedayeen and their radical supporters in
Lebanon. We would expect that Lobanese Christians,
traditional Muslim leaders, as well as Druze and Shia
minorities, would also cake encouragement from such USG
action.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS/NOFORN
3
ERS
b. Doterring fedayeen and their radical supports in
Lebanon from foreing All out confrontation with GOL in face
of Sixth Fleet move. These elements would recall USG
intervention in 1958 and perhaps would not wish to risk at
this time the setback of their goals and aspirations that
threat of such USG intervention would imply.
c. In possibly deterring a GOL-fedayeen confrontation,
Sixth Fleet move might buy time for further forward movement
towards an area peace settlement which hopefully would
effectively defuse GOL-fedayoen problem and threat to
viability of Lebanese state.
4. We see following possible disadvantages of Sixth Fleet
move:
8. Vociferous vocal reaction from Arab radical states,
SEGRET/NODIS/NOFORN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS/NOFORN
4
i.e., UAR, Syria and Iraq, as well as pro-fedayeen elements
within Lobanon. In this regard we could probably expect at
minimum that Arab moderates, i.e., Saudis, Jordanians and
Kuwaitis, as well as Lebanese Christians and other moderate
Lebanese elements, would not rpt not dare to support publicly
USG action.
b. Sixth Floot move could give Helou label of US puppet
and destroy what Influence he presently retains in Lobanon.
C. Sixth Fleat move could be interpreted as direct
USG-fedayeen confrontation.
d. Soviet reaction, particularly in light of Soviet
fleet presence in Moditerranean, would be uncertain and
might be in form of Soviet fleet countermove.
e. Since Sixth Floot move would be only a posturing
SECRET/NODIS/NOFORN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS/NOFORN
5
operation, possibility exists of our bluff being called.
This in turn would cast doubt on credibility US actions.
5. In contemplating movement of Sixth Fleet to shore up
GOL, we would probably wish to consult in advance with
Faisal, Hussein and Israclis. We would probably also
wish to inform Nasser and Soviets. of limited purpose of
our action. But question arises as to whether such
anticipatory action would be instrumental in cempering
predictable Arab outery. In order to assist Department in
evaluating this option, request addressees' assessment of
probable host government reactions to such move. While
their reactions to great extent would be determined by
circumstances existing at time, porhaps a pattern of
behavior can be predicted under any circumstances.
SECRET/NODIS/NOFORN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
6
It should be stressed that any Sixth Fleet move would
presumably occur only if moderate Lebanese regime in
danger of imminent collapse and likely successor regime
is inmoderate and fedayeen-oriented. We omphasize that,
at least for moment, this is a purely theoretical exercise
which has not rpt not been fully staffed out and under no
circumstances should be discussed with non-US officials.
GP-3
END
NEA/ARN:RPPagancl1i:dng 5/5/69
NEA - Joseph J. Sisco
Clearances: NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye
NEA/ARP - Nr. Brewer
NEA/UAR - Mr. Parker
NEA/IAI - Mr. Athorton
UNP - Mr. Day
NEA/RA - Mr. Sober
NEA - Mr. Handley
DOD/ISA de Mr. Murray
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.