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AUSTRALIA Prime Minister McMahon [May 1971-March 1973]
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AUSTRALIA Prime Minister McMahon [May 1971-March 1973]
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTIC
NUMBER
TYPE
I
letter
Plimsoll to HAK
11/4/72
B
3
letter
McMahon to the President
7/21/72
B
5
letter
Mc Mahon to the President
4/14/72
B
8
letter
Plimsoll to HAK
1/13/72
B
9A
letter
Plimsoll to HAK
(6pp)
9/8/71
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
B
NLN 05-38/3
DECLASSIFIED Hr. SEP 13 2007
10
Letter
McMahon to the President
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-38/4
(2pp)
7/18/71
B
DECLASSIFIED
per. 1br SEP 13 2007
11
letter
Mc Mahon to the President
n.d.
B
12
letter
Plimsoll to HAK
10/6/71
B
13
letter
Mc Mahon to the President
5/13/71
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC Presidentia Correspondence 1969-1974
748
FOLDER TITLE
5
Australia PrimeMinister McMahon [May 1971 . March 1973]
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercia! or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
or a libel of a living person.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S.GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
819
VIA LDX
March 3, 1973
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Replies to Inaugural Messages from Australian
Governor General and Prime Minister (LDX 292
and 293)
The proposed reply to Governor General Hasluck's message
contained in your LDX 293 is approved without change. The
following reply to Prime Minister Whitlam's message should
be substituted for the text contained in your LDX 292:
"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I appreciated receiving your kind message of
congratulations on the occasion of my inauguration
as President of the United States.
Sincerely,
RN"
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL/GDS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
819
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
CONFIDENTIAL
February 20, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE
JR.
SUBJECT:
Presidential Responses to Australian Governor
General and Prime Minister's Congratulations
on the Inauguration
At Tabs A and B are State's proposed responses from the President
to Governor General Hasluck and Prime Minister Whitlam in reply
to their congratulations to him on his inauguration. The responses
employ the standard language.
I believe we should send the standard reply to the Governor General,
but should send Whitlam either the tersest reply (Tab C) or none at
all. This would indicate that our dissatisfaction is with Whitlam,
not Australia as a whole, and thereby hopefully keep the pressure
on Whitlam but avoid antagonizing Australians generally.
Recommendation:
-- That you approve the reply from the President to Governor
General Hasluck at Tab A.
Approve
HK
Disapprove
- With regard to the message from Prime Minister Whitlam,
that you approve:
The reply at Tab B
The terse reply at Tab C K
No reply
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM DS 322{0CR}
UNCLASSIFIED
TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
2/16/73
EA/ANZ: JVMARTIN, JR.
EA/ANZ=WVHALL
S/S:O MR. KURZE
ROUTINE
CANBERRA
JVMQU
JVM
SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE
WH
1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON
TO GOVERNOR GENERAL HASLUCK. QUOTE: DEAR GOVERNOR GENERAL:
S/S
I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR KIND MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF
MY INAUGURATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. YOUR
THOUGHTFULN GESTURE OF FRIENDSHIP MEANT A GREAT DEAL, AND
I AM CERTAIN I CAN SPEAK FOR MY FELLOW CITIZENS IN SAYING
THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOUR COUNTRY IN
BUILDING A NEW AND LASTING ERA OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL
UNDERSTANDING FOR ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLDS.
WITH BEST WISHES, SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON UNQUOTE.
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM GOVERNOR
GENERAL: QUOTE:
ON BEHALF OF MYSELF AND THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA, I HAVE
THE HONOR TO EXTEND TO YOU WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST
WISHES ON YOUR INAUGURATION FOR A FURTHER TERM AS PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
WE LOOK FORWARD TO MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING THE
P*FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.
PAUL HASLUCK. UNQUOTE -
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED IED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM DS 322A{0CR}
UNCLASSIFIED
I n
3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE, BUT HAS NO
OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT WISHES TO DO so. PLEASE INFORM
DEPARTMENT IF TEXT RELEASED. YY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TRANSMITTED BY:
RECEIVED BY:
Date & Time Stamp)
(Date & Time Stamp)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center
LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
°73 FEB 17 AM 10: 57
371B 17 MI in 47
S/S #
SP
DX MESSAGE NO. 293 , CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
,
NO. PAGES ROCE
ESCRIPTION OF MSG. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE
ROM: RHMILLER
#
S/S
,
.
Officer
Office Symbol
Extension
Room Number
DX TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
WHITE HOUSE MRS. DAVIS
,
9
"
$
,
#
,
,
,
#
,
OR:
CLEARANCE / XX / INFORMATION / / PER REQUEST / / COMMENT /
/
EMARKS:
DRAFTER: EA/ANZ:JVMARTIN,JR.
ALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
fam
Executive Secretariat Officer
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
B
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM DS 322{0CR}
UNCLASSIFIED
TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
2/16/73
EA/ANZ: JVMARTIN, JR.
S/S:O MR. KURZE
EA/ANZ:WVHALL
ROUTINE
CANBERRA
SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE
JVM
nur
WH
1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO
PRIME MINISTER WHITLAM: QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:
S/S
WVH
Hyper
I WANT TO TO KNOW HOW DEEPLY I APPRECIATED YOUR
GRACIOUS MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF MY INAUGURATION AS
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS MEANT
A VERY GREAT DEAL, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR CONTINUED
COOPERATION AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO BRING ABOUT A NEW ERA
OF PEACE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES OF OUR WORLD.
UNQUOTE- WITH KINDEST GOOD WISHES, SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON
MINISTER: QUOTE:
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM PRIME
PERSONAL BEHALF MAY I OFFER CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION
ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND ON MY OWN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
OF YOUR INAUGURATION FOR A SECOND TERM AS PRESIDENT OF THE
IT IS MY EARNEST HOPE THAT THE GREAT INTERNATIONAL
OF JUSTICE AND PEACE FOR ALL PEOPLES. IN MAKING TOWARDS
FRUIT OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS AND HELP TO CREATE A WORLD
INITIATIVES YOU SPONSORED IN YOUR FIRST TERM WILL BEAR FULL
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECL ASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM DS 322A10CR}
UNCLASSIFIED.
12
THESE GOALS AND IN PROMOTING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO
COUNTRIES I LOOK FORWARD TO MAINTAINING CLOSE AND CONTINU-
ING COOPERATION WITH YOU. E. G. WHITLAM UNQUOTE.
3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELA*EASE, BUT HAS NO
OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT WISHES TO DO so. PLEASE INFORM
DEPARTMENT IF TEXT RELEASED. YY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DI:
RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)
(Date & Time Stamp)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center
Oreltley 17 A'l In
CENTATE
JP
LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
S/S #
*73 FEB 17 AM 10 : : 57
LDX MESSAGE NO. 992 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED SITUATION , NO. PAGES
2
DESCRIPTION OF MSG.
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE
FROM: RHMILLER
,
S/S
#
,
Officer
Office Symbol
Extension
Room Number
LDX TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
WHITE HOUSE - MRS. DAVIS
,
#
,
,
,
,
P
5
,
,
.
FOR:
CLEARANCE /XX/ INFORMATION /
/
PER REQUEST
/
/
COMMENT / /
REMARKS:
DRAFTER: EA/ANZ: JVMARTIN JR
VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
Rom
Executive Secretariat Officer
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
C
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I appreciated receiving your kind message of
congratulations on the occasion of my inauguration
as President of the United States.
Sincerely,
RN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR B
INITIAL ACTION O
MO
DA
MO DA HR
02
20
02
20
17
819
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
TO: PRES
FROM: ROGERS
UNCLAS
NO FORN
NODIS
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
kissinger
+
RICHARDSON
LOU
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
SCOWCROFT
SCHLESINGER
C
+
CODEWORD
eliot
S
sensitive
Holdily
+
TS
SUBJECT: Pres Responses To Australian Gou General $ Pm's Congratulations
on th Inauguration
S/S
other
NOT XEROXED
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION required
REC
ACTION
INFO
CY
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
(
)
FAR EAST
APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
)
DISTRIBUTION /INITIAL DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE / CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
DUE DATE:
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:
DATE
FROM
TO
S
SUBSEQUENT ACTION required (OR TAKEN):
CY TO
2/20
JAF
HAK
+
Decision (2/23)
DAVIS
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
3/3
3/3
Hellings
S
Notely S tate /HAK approval recome
Hollily
3/8
Davis pgd memo to Eliot / meg approved
Davis
NSC
C
Close file (Eddy)
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
& DATE
SPECIAL DISPOSITION)
M/F'D
BY
OR RECORD COMMENT:)
NSC / S DISP INSTR
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
MAR CYS FOR 1807 )
SA
12
)
HP
ORIG
1973
WH
CROSS REF W/
JOINED BY LOG #
TO
PA
)
SF
SEE #
FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.
)
NS
)
EP
suspense CY ATTACHED:
DESTROY)
DY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
GPO' 1973-489-668
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
818
83010
6429 LOG IN/OUT ONLY
Holdindge
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
U
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
LAIRD, M
C
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
McMahon, William S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
SUBJECT: HAK achnowledgement Visit to PEC, of Leth Kepathe Cm sensitive
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
)
FAR EAST
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
UNITED NATIONS
7
)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
ECONOMIC
SCIENTIFIC
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special 9/3 Instructions)
CONCURRENCE
(
)
DUE DATE:
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
JAR
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
9/4/72
from
Nsc/s
No further action weeking
SR055 REF
WiTH 6284
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
DATE
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
DO
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SEPO7,
INIT
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
DATE
SA,
HP,
HM
ORIG)
TO )
1972
NSC
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
RAF
WHC
all
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
GPO: 1972-455-927
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
6284
CONFIDENTIAL
6429
EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
21st August, 1972.
Dear Mr President,
In the absence of the Ambassador I have been asked
by the Australian Prime Minister, the Right Honourable
William McMahon, to pass to you the following message:-
Begins -
"My dear President,
I appreciated your letter to me of 6 July,
reviewing the general outlines and results of
Dr Kissinger's fourth visit to China. I also
value your thoughtfulness in keeping me and my
Government in touch with your thinking by sending
special representatives like Secretary Connally
and Mr Marshall Green.
The information contained in your letter
was encouraging and of great interest to us.
In particular, it seems to me that all of
us gain from frank exchanges between the United
States and China on the large matters discussed
by Dr Kissinger in Peking.
I take heart, too, from your confidence
that misunderstandings and tensions are being
reduced and that the prospects for peace and
stability in Asia and the Pacific are thereby
being enhanced.
Sincerely,
William McMahon"
Ends.
Yours sincerely,
J Thavett I
(J.L. Lavett)
Counsellor
The Honourable Richard M. Nixon,
President of the United States of America,
White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
6429
6284
PRIME MINISTER
CANBERRA
18 AUG 1972
my dea President
I appreciated your letter to me of 6 July,
reviewing the general outlines and results of
Dr Kissinger's fourth visit to China. I also value
your thoughtfulness in keeping me and my Government
in touch with your thinking by sending special
representatives like Secretary Connally and
Mr Marshall Green.
The information contained in your letter
was encouraging and of great interest to us.
In particular, it seems to me that all of
us gain from frank exchanges between the United
States and China on the large matters discussed by
Dr Kissinger in Peking.
I take heart, too, from your confidence
that misunderstandings and tensions are being reduced
and that the prospects for peace and stability in Asia
and the Pacific are thereby being enhanced.
Succenly hucan Melmaho
(William McMahon)
Historical File
The Honourable Richard M. Nixon,
President of the United States of America,
White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 U.S.A.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
8 2/82/13 MO DA
6284
LOG IN/OUT ONLY Holdudge
TO: PRES
X
FROM: ELIOT
U
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
C X
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
laird, M
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
LIVETT,J.L
'S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
SUBJECT: Fourands Mose how PM TS SENSITIVE
Lt On Last HAK Tmp to PRC
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
ACTION REQUIRED
INTERNAL ROUTING Done AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
*
CY
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
)
FAR EAST
*
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
N
(
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
COMMENTS: (Including Special street Instructions)
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
DUE DATE:
LR PLANNING
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
9/4
oron
NSC/S S
C
No further action necessary
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
SR055 REF
wiTH 6429
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
DATE
DO
803 MICROFILM DATA
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
INIT
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
SEP07, ORIG) DATE ISC
TO )
PAF
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
GPO: 1972-455-927
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
5685
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET
August 4, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE
SUBJECT:
Australian Prime Minister's Note of
Appreciation to the President for His
Letter on the Moscow Visit
At Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President attaching a
letter to him from Prime Minister McMahon thanking the President for
his letter of June 8 describing the results of his Moscow visit. McMahon
also expresses appreciation that the President reaffirmed to Soviet
leaders our intention to adhere to our treaty obligations. He also conveys
his gratitude for Secretary Connally's recent visit to Canberra.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
I
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSEHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
WASHINGTON
5685
INFORMATION
August 7, 1972
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A., KISSINGER HK
SUBJECT:
Australian Prime Minister's Note of
Appreciation for Your Letter Describing
Your Moscow Visit
At Tab A. is a letter to you from Prime Minister McMahon thanking you
for your letter of June 8 describing the results of your Moscow visit,
and expressing appreciation that you reaffirmed there our intention to
adhere to our treaty obligations. The Prime Minister also conveys his
appreciation for the recent visit of Secretary Connally.
K- I Besine that Various withing Regard Comply etc
SECRET Burnst Rogers.
for that getty JA they
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Librar DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
3 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
1 20
72615
5774
Holdridge
TO: PRES X
& U &
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
FROM: ELIOT
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
LAIRD, M
C
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
mahon, Wm.
'S
X
CODE WORD
RES DATA
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: Thanks Aixon for ltr re mtg in USSR +
welcomed Contally in australia
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY for
SIGNATURE
(
FAR EAST
X
)
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
+
(
)
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
SCIENTIFIC
DUE DATE:
8/2
(
)
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
* Cy to State
>.
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
7/26/72
JAA
Nsck
send a copy to State, otherwise
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
no farther action (However,
check trseil letter was sent
via state channel)
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
DO
MICROFILM FOM DATA
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) STale
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
JUL 311972 DATE INIT
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
2
ORIG)
NSC
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
TO )
PAF
WHO
NO
SUBF
GPO: 1972-455-927
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRIME MINISTER
PERSONAL.
CANBERRA
4th June, 1972.
My dear President.
On my own and my Government's behalf,
I want to let you know how pleased we are that your visit
to the Soviet Union has been such a success.
I have personally watched with absorbed
interest the course and results of the consultations in
Moscow; and want you to know how much I admire the
initiatives you have taken and the dedication you have
shown to the cause of peace in the interests of humanity.
We sincerely hope that your efforts have
made a real contribution to man's search for a true and
lasting peace.
With best wishes, Suncency
human
(William McMahon)
The Hon. Richard M. Nixon,
Historical File
President,
United States of America,
White House,
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20036. U. S. A.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
64
6
20
10
4933
Holdridge
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
TO: PRES X
FROM: ELIOT
U
X
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
LAIRD, M
C
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
MAHON, WILLIAM
'S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
TS
sensitive
SUBJECT:
Summit
Mc Mahon congrat whates Pres on the Seccess of the Moscow
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
CY
(
)
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
for
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
X
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
)
FAR EAST
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
LR PLANNING
DUE DATE: 6/24
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
7/3
tar
Nse/s
Gelmordedgement incorporated in President's
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
letter CS lue Cachm informing him y
HAK: recent ml L5 PRC,
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
DATE
x
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
DO
INIT Sm
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
1972
DATE
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
JUL 5
ORIG)
NSC
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
TO )
PAF X
WHC
suspense CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
GPO: 1972-455-927
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
URGENT ACTION
June 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
K
SUBJECT:
Letters to McMahon, Heath, Pompidou and Brandt
Attached are final texts of all these messages.
Procedurally, these messages are set up as follows:
-- - Heath via Cabinet Line (Tab A).
-- Pompidou, signed letter by President to be given to local French
Ambassador here with backchannel copy to Watson (Tab B).
-- Brandt to be given to Pauls here (Tab C).
-- McMahon to be sent telegraphically by State with signed copy
pouched to our Canberra Embassy (Tab D).
RECOMMENDATION
1. That signatures and dates be placed on letters to Pompidou,
Brandt, and McMahon.
Action
2. That message to Heath be given to Situation Room for transmission
via Cabinet Line.
Done
all letters sure has
fullilals he meh pet
Windord
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
B
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
C
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
D
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. Theodore Eliot
Executive Secretary
Room 7224 - Department of State
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT:
Presidential Communications
Enclosed are original Presidential letters to President
Pompidou, Chancellor Brandt and Prime Minister McMahon.
Please transmit these letters electrically to our Ambassadors
in the respective capitals for immediate delivery to the
addressees. The originals may be pouched through normal
channels. I am enclosing a copy of a Presidential message
to Prime Minister Heath which has just been dispatched via
the Washington-Whitehall hot line.
Because of the sensitivity of these Presidential communications,
it is essential that they be handled on a most close-hold basis.
/s/
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Enclosures
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
June 8, 1972
Dear Mr. President:
As I did after my return from Peking, I wanted to share
with you my assessment of the Moscow meetings. You are
already aware of the highlights from the extensive public
record and from Secretary Rogers' report to the North
Atlantic Council. There are some further impressions,
however, that I want you personally to have.
The conversations were long and intensive. They were
devoted almost entirely to major substantive issues, and
were marked by open and frank exchanges. In addition to
the plenary meetings, I had several private meetings with
General Secretary Brezhnev and also met with him, Premier
Kosygin and President Podgorny together. I would agree
with your judgment that Brezhnev is clearly the dominant
political leader. Apparently he has to take account of his
colleagues' views, and there were several meetings of the
Politburo when I was in Moscow. His freedom of action
may be somewhat limited, but by and large he has the power
of final decisions.
The final negotiations on SALT occupied the first few
meetings. Although many of the issues had already been
worked out, Brezhnev and I wanted to review some techni-
cal issues such as the distance between the two permitted
ABM sites for each side, and to discuss the terms for
constructing additional ballistic missile submarines above
the current Soviet level.
The agreements are an important first step and major
questions will be addressed in the next phase. I am con-
vinced, however, that our planned forces under both
agreements are without question sufficient for the main-
tenance of our security and the protection of our vital
interests.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
2
There is one question that I want to call to your attention
before the Congressional hearings begin. In the final
period of the negotiations, the Soviet delegation raised the
question of the French and British ballistic missile sub-
marines. They made a statement to the effect that any
increase in the combined levels of US ballistic missile
submarines plus nine submarines for the UK and France
would give the USSR a corresponding "right" to increase
its ceiling during the period of the interim agreement. Our
delegation under my instructions firmly rejected this state-
ment, and in Moscow I emphasized that there could be no
question of compensating the Soviet Union for weapons
systems held by third parties.
I have asked the Congress to give these agreements the
closest scrutiny. I feel obligated to make this exchange
with the Soviets a part of the record being sent to our
Congress. As a practical matter, this issue will not arise
for several years but in the next round of talks the Soviets
will undoubtedly revert to it, and we will need to consult
in the coming months to determine the best approach.
European security issues were given considerable emphasis
by the Soviet leaders, especially by Brezhnev. We had
agreed that the Berlin agreements were to be completed
shortly after the Moscow meetings. And in this context I
outlined a tentative timetable for multilateral preparations
after the US elections, which also would put them after the
summit of the European Community members. I indicated
our view that the Conference would require careful prepara-
tions so that it could concentrate on concrete issues. While
we did not deal with agenda or substance of the Conference,
I believe the Soviet leaders understand the need for careful
preparation.
In view of the movement toward the eventual convening of
a European Conference on Security and Cooperation, I felt
that we should not allow military security issues to be
turned aside. Thus, I suggested that exploratory discussions
concerning reciprocal force reductions in Central Europe
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
3
should parallel the preparatory talks for the European
Conference, and this was accepted in principle. As you
know, I have doubts that these discussions will yield any
immediate results and will probably involve quite prolonged
negotiations. Our Congress and the American people would
not understand, however, if we made no effort to limit the
military confrontation in Central Europe. The next step will
be to discuss the formation of a special group for exploratory
talks. The sine qua non for a successful negotiation is to
be sure the Alliance is carefully and meticulously prepared.
The question of UN membership for both Germanies was
raised by Brezhnev, and I took the position that we would
have to follow the lead of West Germany. One notable aspect
of our conversations on Europe was that the Soviet side never
challenged the US role.
We talked at great length about Vietnam and the Middle East.
The Soviets were rather restrained in their presentations
on Vietnam. Only at the end did there seem to be some
indication that they might intercede in Hanoi to promote
serious discussions, but there was no commitment involved.
I did present our position in detail on how the conflict should
be ended, and this may have some value in the coming months.
On the Middle East, the Soviets urged bilateral discussions.
As stated in the communique, we left it that both parties
would support the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is
my impression though no more than an impression
that the Soviet leaders are increasingly concerned about
the policies of their friends and may in the future be more
a factor of restraint.
I foresee another active period of East-West diplomacy,
including a second round of SALT and a European Conference.
In this period we will need to remain in close contact. It
was largely the fortitude and wisdom of our Alliance that
brought us to this point and we cannot sacrifice our unity
at a moment when an opportunity for a more stable inter-
national order may be evolving.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
4
There will now be much speculation about US-Soviet bi-
lateralism and about US disengagement from its commit-
ments. Such speculation is inevitable but totally unfounded.
In Moscow I was deeply conscious that my most valuable asset
was our combined strength. There is no intention here to
weaken our collective efforts when a breakthrough in East-
West relations may be possible.
The statement of principles governing Soviet-American
relations was one of the main accomplishments of the visit.
Although somewhat different in character from the Franco-
Soviet Declaration, it also represents an aspiration on both
sides and seeks to establish a constructive framework for
future relations. Of course, I do not expect the signature
of such a document to compel the USSR to act against its
interest. What I do hope for is that Soviet willingness to
subscribe to these principles, as well as the similar prin-
ciples in the Franco-Soviet Declaration, will point their
policy in a more constructive direction. This is not because
there was any sense of diminution of the commitment of the
Soviet leaders to their system, to values which you and I
and all our friends in the West do not accept and to goals
that may be inimical to our interests. Certain pragmatic
considerations -- stemming inter alia from the long-term
challenge of China, economic imperatives and the persisting
rumblings in Eastern Europe -- seem to be leading the Soviet
rulers to seek foreign relationships that are more stable and
less risky. Whatever their motives, we in the West have
every incentive to encourage such a trend for our own reasons.
The validity of these judgments will be tested in the months
ahead as we strive to translate paper agreements into
practical action.
Your own thoughts on recent events would be most valuable
to me. I look forward to continued discussions with you
concerning any of the particular issues of common interest.
Sincerely,
Richard Hispon
His Excellency
Georges Pompidou
President of the French Republic
Paris
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
June 8, 1972
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
I wanted to share with you my evaluation of the Moscow
meetings as I did after my return from Peking. You are
already aware of the highlights from the detailed public
record and from your conversations with Secretary Rogers.
There are some further impressions, however, that I want
you to have on a personal basis.
The conversations were lengthy and intensive. They were
devoted to major substantive issues, and were conducted
with a great deal of candor. In addition to the plenary
meetings, I met privately with General Secretary Brezhnev
several times and also with him, Premier Kosygin and
President Podgorny together. As you pointed out in Key
Biscayne, Brezhnev is clearly the dominant political leader.
He is vigorous and intelligent. Apparently, he does take
account of his colleagues' views since the Politburo was
convened several times during my visit. His freedom of
action may thus be somewhat limited, but he seems to have
the power to make the final decisions.
Strategic arms limitation was high on the agenda for the
first part of the visit. Although a great deal had already
been agreed at the working level in Helsinki, Brezhnev and
I wished to have a final review, especially on the precise
terms for constructing additional submarines above the
current Soviet level.
I have carefully considered the impact of these agreements
and I believe that our planned forces under both agreements
are without question sufficient for the maintenance of our
security and the protection of our vital interests and those
of our Allies.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
2
European matters were given considerable attention by
the Soviet side. They obviously value highly your con-
tribution to the normalization of relations in Europe,
and the prospects of treaty ratification made it possible
to settle on the signing of the Berlin accords. The Soviet
leaders were obviously gratified about the then imminent
ratification of the German-Soviet treaty. Since the
Berlin agreements were to be completed, I outlined, in
response to Soviet questions, a tentative timetable for
multilateral preparations of a Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe. The Soviet side pressed
for a Conference this year, but I suggested waiting until
after the US elections, which also would put the prepara-
tory meetings after the summit of the European Community
members. I also emphasized that the Conference would
require careful preparations so that it could concentrate
on concrete issues. I believe the Soviet leaders understand
this approach.
I felt that with movement toward the convening of a Euro-
pean Conference on Security and Cooperation we could not
neglect the military security issues which required a
different forum. Accordingly, we agreed in principle that
exploratory discussions concerning reciprocal force
reductions in Central Europe should parallel the preparatory
talks for the European Conference. There was no further
substance discussed concerning actual reductions, or about
the agenda of a Conference, which are matters directly
concerning the Alliance.
We talked at greater length about Vietnam and the Middle
East. On Vietnam, I felt the Soviet leaders were rather
restrained in presenting their position. At the end of the
visit there seemed to be some indication that they might
intercede in Hanoi to promote serious discussions, but
there was no commitment involved. These discussions
were valuable in providing an opportunity for me to express
in detail our position on how to bring the war to an end, and
I believe that this may have some value over the coming
months.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
3
On the Middle East, the Soviet interest was in further
bilateral discussions with the United States. As indicated
by the communique, we agreed to give continued support
to the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is my impression
that the Soviets are concerned about future actions by their
friends and may work for more restraint.
I believe we can anticipate another active period of East-
West diplomacy. Perhaps even more so than in the past,
we will need to remain in closest contact. Western strength
brought us to this point and we cannot jeopardize our unity
as new opportunities for a more stable international order
may develop. The harmonization of our policies will be a
major concern in this new period, since we can be certain
that the USSR will not hesitate to exploit divisions within
our ranks. This was evident when they raised the question
of an endorsement of the early admission of the FRG and
GDR to the UN.
There will now be much speculation in this country and
abroad about US-Soviet bilateralism, or even concerning
US disengagement.
I am sure, Mr. Chancellor, that you recognize such specu-
lation is inevitable, but has absolutely no foundation. During
my conversations in Moscow, there was a deep awareness on
my part that our combined strength and unity of purpose was
my most valuable asset, and there is no intention here to
weaken our cohesion at the very time when a breakthrough
in East-West relations may be possible.
One of the main accomplishments of the visit was the agree-
ment on basic principles governing Soviet-American relations.
This document represents an aspiration on both sides, but
of course, I do not expect that such a statement will compel
the USSR to act against its interest. It is nevertheless my
hope that Soviet willingness to subscribe to these principles
will point their policy in a more constructive direction.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
4
I did not sense any diminution of the commitment of the
Soviet leaders to their system and to goals that may be
inimical to our interests. But certain pragmatic con-
siderations may lead the Soviet rulers toward less
erratic and less dangerous foreign relationships. Such
a trend, whatever its motivation, is one that we in the
West have every incentive to encourage for our own
reasons.
In the months ahead, we will strive to translate paper
agreements into practical action, and as we do so, we
will test the validity of these judgments.
I would greatly value your views of recent events. We
should remain in close contact and I hope you will not
hesitate to raise those particular issues in which we are
jointly interested.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Willy Brandt
Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Bonn
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
June 8, 1972
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I would like to take this opportunity to convey to you some
impressions of my meetings with the leaders of the Soviet
Union. As you know, this visit was long in preparation.
When I first entered office, I decided that this was the
wisest course to take because I believed that the effects
of a poorly prepared meeting producing perhaps no more
than another ephemeral "spirit" would be more adverse
than the delay involved in carefully laying the groundwork
for a successful meeting. The Soviet leaders evidently
saw matters the same way.
In the event, I believe it can fairly be said that my visit to
the USSR produced substantial accomplishments. You are
of course familiar by now with the numerous agreements
and the final communique which have been published. A1-
though most attention has been given to the treaty limiting
anti-ballistic missile systems and the interim freeze on
offensive weapons, the other agreements should not be
minimized. In their totality, all the agreements reached
will I believe create a commitment not only to a further
improvement in relations but to the kind of conduct in inter-
national relations generally which will make the world a
safer place to live in for all peoples.
I am aware that when the so-called "superpowers" meet to
negotiate agreements and to discuss the great issues of our
day, concern is sometimes expressed in other countries
that matters are being settled over their heads. But I
believe one of the noteworthy aspects of the Moscow meetings
was that while both sides were naturally conscious of the
great responsibilities they bear by virtue of their power and
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET
2
extensive interests, they were equally conscious of the
fact that peace requires that the interests of all countries,
large and small, are safeguarded. In addition, I made
clear privately, as well as in the public documents, that
American obligations and alliance relationships could not
in any way be affected by agreements reached with the
Soviet Union. This was understood and accepted by the
Soviet leaders.
We spent many hours in discussions about Vietnam. As
you know from the final communique, the positions remained
apart. Yet I found it of interest and perhaps a hopeful sign
that the Soviet leaders were prepared to listen at length to
the most detailed exposition of our point of view. It is my
impression that the essence of what I said will be conveyed
to Hanoi. Only time will tell whether a more flexible Com-
munist position will ensue in Paris. The Soviets, at any
rate, can have no doubt of my firm commitment to an early
conclusion to the conflict in a way that safeguards the honor
and the interests of all the parties and, above all, ends the
anguish of the people of the region.
Finally, a word about the Soviet leaders. They are of course
totally committed to their system and there should be no
illusion that many of their values and goals remain wholly
unacceptable to us. Yet it was also clear that these leaders
can adapt to realities and that pragmatic considerations of
self-interest can lead them along constructive paths. I
found them intelligent and tough but not inflexible on practical
issues. Brezhnev is clearly in command, but both Kosygin
and Podgorny, each in his own way, are men with authority
and skill. While Brezhnev was the senior spokesman, my
strong impression is that a considerable degree of collectivity
does prevail. In my discussions, I was struck that despite
the barriers of ideology and vastly differing background, a
genuine dialogue developed. While personal relationships
should not be exaggerated, I believe the process of communi-
cation has been facilitated for the future.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
3
I am delighted, Mr. Prime Minister, that you will soon be
receiving Mr. John Connally. As you know he has just
embarked on an extensive journey to several countries at
my personal request to discuss questions of mutual concern.
In Canberra, he will be prepared to speak to you further
about the Moscow summit and to comment on any particular
questions you may wish to raise. He has my complete con-
fidence and will report back directly to me. As you know,
I greatly value your views and the intimate relationship that
is traditional between our two governments. I am therefore
particularly pleased that Mr. Connally will have the oppor-
tunity to meet with you.
Sincerely,
The Right Honorable
William McMahon
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
June 8, 1972
VIA CABINET LINE
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
It was good to receive, shortly after my return to the United States,
your very kind note of congratulations. By now you will have had an
account of Secretary Rogers' report on the main points of the Moscow
meetings, but I would like to give you some of my own impressions.
The conversations with the Soviet leaders were long and thorough.
They were devoted almost completely to major substantive issues, and
were conducted with complete frankness. In addition to the announced
plenary meetings, I met privately with General Secretary Brezhnev
several times and also with him, Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny
together. Brezhnev is clearly the dominant political leader. Apparently
he is obliged to take account of his colleagues' views and his freedom of
action is not unlimited. There were several Politburo meetings while
we were in Moscow. But within certain limits Brezhnev appears to have
the authority to make decisions and he plainly has the power to shape
the outcome of Politburo deliberations. Contrary to the views of some
Soviet experts, I found all three top leaders intelligent, well informed
and politically quite sophisticated. They should not be underrated.
The discussions on SALT occupied the first part of the visit. Many
of the issues had already been agreed at the working level in Helsinki, but
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2-
Brezhnev and I wanted to review some technical issues such as the
distance between the ABM sites, as well as the final terms for constructing
submarines above the level designated as the current Soviet ceiling.
As I informed our Congress, I am convinced that our planned forces
under both agreements are without question sufficient for the maintenance
of our security and the protection of our vital interests.
There is one point that I want to bring to your attention before the
Congressional hearings begin. In the final period of the negotiations, the
Soviet delegation raised the question of the UK and French ballistic missile
submarines. They made a statement to the effect that any increase in the
combined level of US ballistic missile submarines plus nine submarines
for the UK and France would give the USSR a corresponding "right" to
increase its ceiling. Our delegation, under my instructions, firmly rejected
this statement, and in Moscow I emphasized that there could be no question
of compensating the Soviet Union for weapons systems held by third parties.
Since I have asked the Congress to give these agreements the closest
scrutiny, I feel obligated to make the exchange of statements on this sub-
ject by the US and Soviet negotiators in Helsinki part of the record being
sent to the Congress. I do not believe that this issue will arise as a
practical matter for some time to come but the Soviets will no doubt revert
to it in the follow-on SALT talks. We will have to be in close touch in the
coming months to determine the best way to deal with it.
TOP SECRET
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-3-
As for the other substantive issues, Europe was given considerable
emphasis by the Soviet leaders. As you know, I have been skeptical of
the European Security Conference, but since the Berlin agreements were
to be completed shortly after the Moscow meetings, I outlined a tentative
timetable for multilateral preparations after the US elections, which also
would put them after the summit of the European Community members.
I also emphasized that the Conference would require careful preparations
so that it could concentrate on concrete issues. I believe the Soviet
leaders understand this approach.
I was concerned, however, that with movement toward the con-
vening of a European Conferen ce on Security and Cooperation, the
military security issues not be turned aside. As recorded in the com-
munique, we agreed that exploratory discussions concerning reciprocal
force reductions in Central Europe should parallel the preparatory talks
for the European Conference. The goal will be early negotiations in a
special forum of the countries directly concerned. I know you are quite
skeptical about these talks. But I believe that they can do some good if
they are carefully prepared and very concrete. We should work together
to prevent the Alliance from being split by generalities.
There were no specific discussions of the agenda for the European
conference or the substance of MBFR talks. This is of course a matter
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-4-
for all countries concerned. My judgment as regards MBFR is that the
complexity of the subject will make for prolonged negotiations.
Brezhnev also pressed for early UN membership for the two
Germanies, but I informed him that our position on this question was
identical to that of the Federal Republic and that the FRG should take
the lead. I did mention the need for four power agreement concerning
our rights with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole in connection
with the UN membership issue.
In general, with respect to Europe, I found it interesting that there
was at no time any attempt to question the American role.
We talked at length about Vietnam and the Middle East. The
Soviets were rather restrained in their presentations. At the end there
did seem to be some indication that they might intercede in Hanoi to
promote serious discussions, but there was no commitment involved.
We did have the opportunity to present our views on how to end the conflict
in great detail, and the Soviets now have the most detailed record of our
position. This may prove to be of some use in the coming weeks but
we will have to await developments.
On the Middle East the Soviets were interested in further bilateral
discussions. As stated in the communique, we left it that both parties
would support the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is my impression
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-5-
that the Soviets are concerned about their clients and may work for
more restraint.
If our hopes are justified, we can anticipate another active period
of East-West diplomacy, including a second round of SALT. Certainly,
in this period, perhaps even more so than in the past, we will need to
remain in close contact. It was largely Western strength and patience
that brought us to this point, and we cannot sacrifice our unity when a new
opportunity for a more stable international order may be developing.
I realize there will be much speculation about US-Soviet bilateralism
or even about US disengagement. I am sure, Mr. Prime Minister, that
you know such speculation is inevitable but totally unfounded. Throughout
my conversations in Moscow I was deeply conscious that our combined
strength was my most valuable asset, and there is no intention here to
fritter it away when a breakthrough in East-West relations may be possible.
The statement of basic principles governing Soviet-American relations
was one of the main accomplishments of the visit. It represents an
aspiration on both sides, but of course, I do not expect a piece of paper to
compel the USSR to act against its interest. What I do hope for is that
Soviet willingness to subscribe to these kinds of principles for the first
time will point their policy in a more constructive direction. I say this
not because I sensed any diminution of the commitment of the Soviet leaders
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-6-
to their system, to values which you and I and all our friends in the West
do not accept, and to goals that may be inimical to our interests. But I
would judge that certain pragmatic considerations -- stemming inter alia
from the long-term challenge of China, economic imperatives and the
persisting rumblings in Eastern Europe -- are leading the Soviet rulers
to seek more stable and safer foreign relationships. Whatever their
motives, this is a trend that we in the West have every incentive to
encourage for our own reasons.
The months ahead, when we will strive to translate paper agreements
into practical action, will test the validity of this judgment.
I would, of course, greatly value your own additional thoughts on
these recent events, and I also look forward to remaining in touch with you
about any of the particular issues in which we are jointly interested.
Sincerely,
To: Prime minister Edward Heath
TOP-SECRET
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. Theodore Eliot
Executive Secretary
Room 7224 - Department of State
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT:
Presidential Communications
Enclosed are original Presidential letters to President
Pompidou, Chancellor Brandt and Prime Minister McMahon.
Please transmit these letters electrically to our Ambassadors
in the respective capitals for immediate delivery to the
addressees. The originals may be pouched through normal
channels. I am enclosing a copy of a Presidential message
to Prime Minister Heath which has just been dispatched via
the Washington-Whitehall hot line.
Because of the sensitivity of these Presidential communications,
it is essential that they be handled on a most close-hold basis.
/s/
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Enclosures
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
June 8, 1972
Dear Mr. President:
As I did after my return from Peking, I wanted to share
with you my assessment of the Moscow meetings. You are
already aware of the highlights from the extensive public
record and from Secretary Rogers' report to the North
Atlantic Council. There are some further impressions,
however, that I want you personally to have.
The conversations were long and intensive. They were
devoted almost entirely to major substantive issues, and
were marked by open and frank exchanges. In addition to
the plenary meetings, I had several private meetings with
General Secretary Brezhnev and also met with him, Premier
Kosygin and President Podgorny together. I would agree
with your judgment that Brezhnev is clearly the dominant
political leader. Apparently he has to take account of his
colleagues' views, and there were several meetings of the
Politburo when I was in Moscow. His freedom of action
may be somewhat limited, but by and large he has the power
of final decisions.
The final negotiations on SALT occupied the first few
meetings. Although many of the issues had already been
worked out, Brezhnev and I wanted to review some techni-
cal issues such as the distance between the two permitted
ABM sites for each side, and to discuss the terms for
constructing additional ballistic missile submarines above
the current Soviet level.
The agreements are an important first step and major
questions will be addressed in the next phase. I am con-
vinced, however, that our planned forces under both
agreements are without question sufficient for the main-
tenance of our security and the protection of our vital
interests.
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2
There is one question that I want to call to your attention
before the Congressional hearings begin. In the final
period of the negotiations, the Soviet delegation raised the
question of the French and British ballistic missile sub-
marines. They made a statement to the effect that any
increase in the combined levels of US ballistic missile
submarines plus nine submarines for the UK and France
would give the USSR a corresponding "right" to increase
its ceiling during the period of the interim agreement. Our
delegation under my instructions firmly rejected this state-
ment, and in Moscow I emphasized that there could be no
question of compensating the Soviet Union for weapons
systems held by third parties.
I have asked the Congress to give these agreements the
closest scrutiny. I feel obligated to make this exchange
with the Soviets a part of the record being sent to our
Congress. As a practical matter, this issue will not arise
for several years but in the next round of talks the Soviets
will undoubtedly revert to it, and we will need to consult
in the coming months to determine the best approach.
European security issues were given considerable emphasis
by the Soviet leaders, especially by Brezhnev. We had
agreed that the Berlin agreements were to be completed
shortly after the Moscow meetings. And in this context I
outlined a tentative timetable for multilateral preparations
after the US elections, which also would put them after the
summit of the European Community members. I indicated
our view that the Conference would require careful prepara-
tions so that it could concentrate on concrete issues. While
we did not deal with agenda or substance of the Conference,
I believe the Soviet leaders understand the need for careful
preparation.
In view of the movement toward the eventual convening of
a European Conference on Security and Cooperation, I felt
that we should not allow military security issues to be
turned aside. Thus, I suggested that exploratory discussions
concerning reciprocal force reductions in Central Europe
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3
should parallel the preparatory talks for the European
Conference, and this was accepted in principle. As you
know, have doubts that these discussions will yield any
immediate results and will probably involve quite prolonged
negotiations. Our Congress and the American people would
not understand, however, if we made no effort to limit the
military confrontation in Central Europe. The next step will
be to discuss the formation of a special group for exploratory
talks. The sine qua non for a successful negotiation is to
be sure the Alliance is carefully and meticulously prepared.
The question of UN membership for both Germanies was
raised by Brezhnev, and I took the position that we would
have to follow the lead of West Germany. One notable aspect
of our conversations on Europe was that the Soviet side never
challenged the US role.
We talked at great length about Vietnam and the Middle East.
The Soviets were rather restrained in their presentations
on Vietnam. Only at the end did there seem to be some
indication that they might intercede in Hanoi to promote
serious discussions, but there was no commitment involved.
I did present our position in detail on how the conflict should
be ended, and this may have some value in the coming months.
On the Middle East, the Soviets urged bilateral discussions.
As stated in the communique, we left it that both parties
would support the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is
my impression -- though no more than an impression --
that the Soviet leaders are increasingly concerned about
the policies of their friends and may in the future be more
a factor of restraint.
I foresee another active period of East-West diplomacy,
including a second round of SALT and a European Conference.
In this period we will need to remain in close contact. It
was largely the fortitude and wisdom of our Alliance that
brought us to this point and we cannot sacrifice our unity
at a moment when an opportunity for a more stable inter-
national order may be evolving.
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4
There will now be much speculation about US-Soviet bi-
lateralism and about US disengagement from its commit-
ments. Such speculation is inevitable but totally unfounded.
In Moscow I was deeply conscious that my most valuable asset
was our combined strength. There is no intention here to
weaken our collective efforts when a breakthrough in East-
West relations may be possible.
The statement of principles governing Soviet-American
relations was one of the main accomplishments of the visit.
Although somewhat different in character from the Franco-
Soviet Declaration, it also represents an aspiration on both
sides and seeks to establish a constructive framework for
future relations. Of course, I do not expect the signature
of such a document to compel the USSR to act against its
interest. What I do hope for is that Soviet willingness to
subscribe to these principles, as well as the similar prin-
ciples in the Franco-Soviet Declaration, will point their
policy in a more constructive direction. This is not because
there was any sense of diminution of the commitment of the
Soviet leaders to their system, to values which you and I
and all our friends in the West do not accept and to goals
that may be inimical to our interests. Certain pragmatic
considerations -- stemming inter alia from the long-term
challenge of China, economic imperatives and the persisting
rumblings in Eastern Europe -- seem to be leading the Soviet
rulers to seek foreign relationships that are more stable and
less risky. Whatever their motives, we in the West have
every incentive to encourage such a trend for our own reasons.
The validity of these judgments will be tested in the months
ahead as we strive to translate paper agreements into
practical action.
Your own thoughts on recent events would be most valuable
to me. I look forward to continued discussions with you
concerning any of the particular issues of common interest.
Sincerely,
nifer
His Excellency
Georges Pompidou
President of the French Republic
Paris
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
June 8, 1972
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
I wanted to share with you my evaluation of the Moscow
meetings as I did after my return from Peking. You are
already aware of the highlights from the detailed public
record and from your conversations with Secretary Rogers.
There are some further impressions, however, that I want
you to have on a personal basis.
The conversations were lengthy and intensive. They were
devoted to major substantive issues, and were conducted
with a great deal of candor. In addition to the plenary
meetings, I met privately with General Secretary Brezhnev
several times and also with him, Premier Kosygin and
President Podgorny together. As you pointed out in Key
Biscayne, Brezhnev is clearly the dominant political leader.
He is vigorous and intelligent. Apparently, he does take
account of his colleagues' views since the Politburo was
convened several times during my visit. His freedom of
action may thus be somewhat limited, but he seems to have
the power to make the final decisions.
Strategic arms limitation was high on the agenda for the
first part of the visit. Although a great deal had already
been agreed at the working level in Helsinki, Brezhnev and
I wished to have a final review, especially on the precise
terms for constructing additional submarines above the
current Soviet level.
I have carefully considered the impact of these agreements
and I believe that our planned forces under both agreements
are without question sufficient for the maintenance of our
security and the protection of our vital interests and those
of our Allies.
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2
European matters were given considerable attention by
the Soviet side. They obviously value highly your con-
tribution to the normalization of relations in Europe,
and the prospects of treaty ratification made it possible
to settle on the signing of the Berlin accords. The Soviet
leaders were obviously gratified about the then imminent
ratification of the German-Soviet treaty. Since the
Berlin agreements were to be completed, I outlined, in
response to Soviet questions, a tentative timetable for
multilateral preparations of a Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe. The Soviet side pressed
for a Conference this year, but I suggested waiting until
after the US elections, which also would put the prepara-
tory meetings after the summit of the European Community
members. I also emphasized that the Conference would
require careful preparations so that it could concentrate
on concrete issues. I believe the Soviet leaders understand
this approach.
I felt that with movement toward the convening of a Euro-
pean Conference on Security and Cooperation we could not
neglect the military security issues which required a
different forum. Accordingly, we agreed in principle that
exploratory discussions concerning reciprocal force
reductions in Central Europe should parallel the preparatory
talks for the European Conference. There was no further
substance discussed concerning actual reductions, or about
the agenda of a Conference, which are matters directly
concerning the Alliance.
We talked at greater length about Vietnam and the Middle
East. On Vietnam, I felt the Soviet leaders were rather
restrained in presenting their position. At the end of the
visit there seemed to be some indication that they might
intercede in Hanoi to promote serious discussions, but
there was no commitment involved. These discussions
were valuable in providing an opportunity for me to express
in detail our position on how to bring the war to an end, and
I believe that this may have some value over the coming
months.
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3
On the Middle East, the Soviet interest was in further
bilateral discussions with the United States. As indicated
by the communique, we agreed to give continued support
to the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is my impression
that the Soviets are concerned about future actions by their
friends and may work for more restraint.
I believe we can anticipate another active period of East-
West diplomacy. Perhaps even more so than in the past,
we will need to remain in closest contact. Western strength
brought us to this point and we cannot jeopardize our unity
as new opportunities for a more stable international order
may develop. The harmonization of our policies will be a
major concern in this new period, since we can be certain
that the USSR will not hesitate to exploit divisions within
our ranks. This was evident when they raised the question
of an endorsement of the early admission of the FRG and
GDR to the UN.
There will now be much speculation in this country and
abroad about US-Soviet bilateralism, or even concerning
US disengagement.
I am sure, Mr. Chancellor, that you recognize such specu-
lation is inevitable, but has absolutely no foundation. During
my conversations in Moscow, there was a deep awareness on
my part that our combined strength and unity of purpose was
my most valuable asset, and there is no intention here to
weaken our cohesion at the very time when a breakthrough
in East-West relations may be possible.
One of the main accomplishments of the visit was the agree-
ment on basic principles governing Soviet-American relations.
This document represents an aspiration on both sides, but
of course, I do not expect that such a statement will compel
the USSR to act against its interest. It is nevertheless my
hope that Soviet willingness to subscribe to these principles
will point their policy in a more constructive direction.
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4
I did not sense any diminution of the commitment of the
Soviet leaders to their system and to goals that may be
inimical to our interests. But certain pragmatic con-
siderations may lead the Soviet rulers toward less
erratic and less dangerous foreign relationships. Such
a trend, whatever its motivation, is one that we in the
West have every incentive to encourage for our own
reasons.
In the months ahead, we will strive to translate paper
agreements into practical action, and as we do so, we
will test the validity of these judgments.
I would greatly value your views of recent events. We
should remain in close contact and I hope you will not
hesitate to raise those particular issues in which we are
jointly interested.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Willy Brandt
Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Bonn
TOP SECRET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
June 8, 1972
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I would like to take this opportunity to convey to you some
impressions of my meetings with the leaders of the Soviet
Union. As you know, this visit was long in preparation.
When I first entered office, I decided that this was the
wisest course to take because I believed that the effects
of a poorly prepared meeting producing perhaps no more
than another ephemeral "spirit" would be more adverse
than the delay involved in carefully laying the groundwork
for a successful meeting. The Soviet leaders evidently
saw matters the same way.
In the event, I believe it can fairly be said that my visit to
the USSR produced substantial accomplishments. You are
of course familiar by now with the numerous agreements
and the final communique which have been published. Al-
though most attention has been given to the treaty limiting
anti-ballistic missile systems and the interim freeze on
offensive weapons, the other agreements should not be
minimized. In their totality, all the agreements reached
will I believe create a commitment not only to a further
improvement in relations but to the kind of conduct in inter-
national relations generally which will make the world a
safer place to live in for all peoples.
I am aware that when the so-called "superpowers" meet to
negotiate agreements and to discuss the great issues of our
day, concern is sometimes expressed in other countries
that matters are being settled over their heads. But I
believe one of the noteworthy aspects of the Moscow meetings
was that while both sides were naturally conscious of the
great responsibilities they bear by virtue of their power and
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2
extensive interests, they were equally conscious of the
fact that peace requires that the interests of all countries,
large and small, are safeguarded. In addition, I made
clear privately, as well as in the public documents, that
American obligations and alliance relationships could not
in any way be affected by agreements reached with the
Soviet Union. This was understood and accepted by the
Soviet leaders.
We spent many hours in discussions about Vietnam. As
you know from the final communique, the positions remained
apart. Yet I found it of interest and perhaps a hopeful sign
that the Soviet leaders were prepared to listen at length to
the most detailed exposition of our point of view. It is my
impression that the essence of what I said will be conveyed
to Hanoi. Only time will tell whether a more flexible Com-
munist position will ensue in Paris. The Soviets, at any
rate, can have no doubt of my firm commitment to an early
conclusion to the conflict in a way that safeguards the honor
and the interests of all the parties and, above all, ends the
anguish of the people of the region.
Finally, a word about the Soviet leaders. They are of course
totally committed to their system and there should be no
illusion that many of their values and goals remain wholly
unacceptable to us. Yet it was also clear that these leaders
can adapt to realities and that pragmatic considerations of
self-interest can lead them along constructive paths. I
found them intelligent and tough but not inflexible on practical
issues. Brezhnev is clearly in command, but both Kosygin
and Podgorny, each in his own way, are men with authority
and skill. While Brezhnev was the senior spokesman, my
strong impression is that a considerable degree of collectivity
does prevail. In my discussions, I was struck that despite
the barriers of ideology and vastly differing background, a
genuine dialogue developed. While personal relationships
should not be exaggerated, I believe the process of communi-
cation has been facilitated for the future.
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3
I am delighted, Mr. Prime Minister, that you will soon be
receiving Mr. John Connally. As you know he has just
embarked on an extensive journey to several countries at
my personal request to discuss questions of mutual concern.
In Canberra, he will be prepared to speak to you further
about the Moscow summit and to comment on any particular
questions you may wish to raise. He has my complete con-
fidence and will report back directly to me. As you know,
I greatly value your views and the intimate relationship that
is traditional between our two governments. I am therefore
particularly pleased that Mr. Connally will have the oppor-
tunity to meet with you.
Sincerely,
The Right Honorable
William McMahon
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra
TOP SECRET
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June 8, 1972
VIA CABINET LINE
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
It was good to receive, shortly after my return to the United States,
your very kind note of congratulations. By now you will have had an
account of Secretary Rogers' report on the main points of the Moscow
meetings, but I would like to give you some of my own impressions.
The conversations with the Soviet leaders were long and thorough.
They were devoted almost completely to major substantive issues, and
were conducted with complete frankness. In addition to the announced
plenary meetings, I met privately with General Secretary Brezhnev
several times and also with him, Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny
together. Brezhnev is clearly the dominant political leader. Apparently
he is obliged to take account of his colleagues' views and his freedom of
action is not unlimited. There were several Politburo meetings while
we were in Moscow. But within certain limits Brezhnev appears to have
the authority to make decisions and he plainly has the power to shape
the outcome of Politburo deliberations. Contrary to the views of some
Soviet experts, I found all three top leaders intelligent, well informed
and politically quite sophisticated. They should not be underrated.
The discussions on SALT occupied the first part of the visit. Many
of the issues had already been agreed at the working level in Helsinki, but
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-2-
Brezhnev and I wanted to review some technical issues such as the
distance between the ABM sites, as well as the final terms for constructing
submarines above the level designated as the current Soviet ceiling.
As I informed our Congress, I am convinced that our planned forces
under both agreements are without question sufficient for the maintenance
of our security and the protection of our vital interests.
There is one point that I want to bring to your attention before the
Congressional hearings begin. In the final period of the negotiations, the
Soviet delegation raised the question of the UK and French ballistic missile
submarines. They made a statement to the effect that any increase in the
combined level of US ballistic missile submarines plus nine submarines
for the UK and France would give the USSR a corresponding "right" to
increase its ceiling. Our delegation, under my instructions, firmly rejected
this statement, and in Moscow I emphasized that there could be no question
of compensating the Soviet Union for weapons systems held by third parties.
Since I have asked the Congress to give these agreements the closest
scrutiny, I feel obligated to make the exchange of statements on this sub-
ject by the US and Soviet negotiators in Helsinki part of the record being
sent to the Congress. I do not believe that this issue will arise as a
practical matter for some time to come but the Soviets will no doubt revert
to it in the follow-on SALT talks. We will have to be in close touch in the
coming months to determine the best way to deal with it.
TOP SECRET
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-3-
As for the other substantive issues, Europe was given considerable
emphasis by the Soviet leaders. As you know, I have been skeptical of
the European Security Conference, but since the Berlin agreements were
to be completed shortly after the Moscow meetings, I outlined a tentative
timetable for multilateral preparations after the US elections, which also
would put them after the summit of the European Community members.
I also emphasized that the Conference would require careful preparations
so that it could concentrate on concrete issues. I believe the Soviet
leaders understand this approach.
I was concerned, however, that with movement toward the con-
vening of a European Conferen ce on Security and Cooperation, the
military security issues not be turned aside. As recorded in the com-
munique, we agreed that exploratory discussions concerning reciprocal
force reductions in Central Europe should parallel the preparatory talks
for the European Conference. The goal will be early negotiations in a
special forum of the countries directly concerned. I know you are quite
skeptical about these talks. But I believe that they can do some good if
they are carefully prepared and very concrete. We should work together
to prevent the Alliance from being split by generalities.
There were no specific discussions of the agenda for the European
conference or the substance of MBFR talks. This is of course a matter
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-4-
for all countries concerned. My judgment as regards MBFR is that the
complexity of the subject will make for prolonged negotiations.
Brezhnev also pressed for early UN membership for the two
Germanies, but I informed him that our position on this question was
identical to that of the Federal Republic and that the FRG should take
the lead. I did mention the need for four power agreement concerning
our rights with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole in connection
with the UN membership issue.
In general, with respect to Europe, I found it interesting that there
was at no time any attempt to question the American role.
We talked at length about Vietnam and the Middle East. The
Soviets were rather restrained in their presentations. At the end there
did seem to be some indication that they might intercede in Hanoi to
promote serious discussions, but there was no commitment involved.
We did have the opportunity to present our views on how to end the conflict
in great detail, and the Soviets now have the most detailed record of our
position. This may prove to be of some use in the coming weeks but
we will have to await developments.
On the Middle East the Soviets were interested in further bilateral
discussions. As stated in the communique, we left it that both parties
would support the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is my impression
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET
-5-
that the Soviets are concerned about their clients and may work for
more restraint.
If our hopes are justified, we can anticipate another active period
of East-West diplomacy, including a second round of SALT. Certainly,
in this period, perhaps even more so than in the past, we will need to
remain in close contact. It was largely Western strength and patience
that brought us to this point,and we cannot sacrifice our unity when a new
opportunity for a more stable international order may be developing.
I realize there will be much speculation about US-Soviet bilateralism
or even about US disengagement. I am sure, Mr. Prime Minister, that
you know such speculation is inevitable but totally unfounded. Throughout
my conversations in Moscow I was deeply conscious that our combined
strength was my most valuable asset, and there is no intention here to
fritter it away when a breakthrough in East-West relations may be possible.
The statement of basic principles governing Soviet-American relations
was one of the main accomplishments of the visit. It represents an
aspiration on both sides, but of course, I do not expect a piece of paper to
compel the USSR to act against its interest. What I do hope for is that
Soviet willingness to subscribe to these kinds of principles for the first
time will point their policy in a more constructive direction. I say this
not because I sensed any diminution of the commitment of the Soviet leaders
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET
-6-
to their system, to values which you and I and all our friends in the West
do not accept, and to goals that may be inimical to our interests. But I
would judge that certain pragmatic considerations -- stemming inter alia
from the long-term challenge of China, economic imperatives and the
persisting rumblings in Eastern Europe -- are leading the Soviet rulers
to seek more stable and safer foreign relationships. Whatever their
motives, this is a trend that we in the West have every incentive to
encourage for our own reasons.
The months ahead, when we will strive to translate paper agreements
into practical action, will test the validity of this judgment.
I would, of course, greatly value your own additional thoughts on
these recent events, and I also look forward to remaining in touch with you
about any of the particular issues in which we are jointly interested.
Sincerely,
20: Prime minister Edward Steath
TOP-SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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COPY 6 OF 12 COPIES
202-2
OF STATE
72
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
9
AM
WOOHNOIL
CONTROL: 236400
RECD: 08 JUN'72 0926P
0 0900417 JUN 72 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 8019
BT
TOPSECRETSTATE102289
NODIS
NODIS
1. FOLLOWING FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY IS TEXT OF LETTER
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON. SIGNED
ORIGINAL follows.
2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: T WOULD LIKE
TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY TO you SOME IMPRESSIONS
OF MY MEETINGS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION. AS
YOU KNOW, THIS VISIT WAS LONG IN PREPARATION. WHEN I
FIRST ENTERED OFFICE, I DECIDED THAT THIS WAS THE WISEST
COURSE TO TAKE BECAUSE I BELEIVED THAT THE EFFECTS OF A
POORLY PREPARED MEETING PRODUCING PERHAPS NO MORE
THAN ANOTHER EPHEMERAL "SPIRIT" WOULD 0E MORE ADVERSE
THAN THE DELAY INVOLVED IN CAREFULLY LAYING THE GROUNDWORK
FOR A successful MEETING. THE SOVIET LEADERS EVIDENTLY
SAW MATTERS THE SAME WAY.
IN THE EVENT, I BELIEVE IT CAN FAIRLY BE SAID THAT
202-2
MY VISIT TO THE USSR PRODUCED SUØSTANTIAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
YOU ARE OF COURSE FAMILIAR BY NOW WITH THE NUMEROUS AGREE-
MENTS AND THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED.
ALTHOUGH MOST ATTENTION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE TREATY
LIMITING ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM
FREEZE ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, THE OTHER AGREEMENTS should
NOT BE MINIMIZED. IN THEIR TOTALITY, ALL THE AGREEMENTS
REACHED WILL I BELIEVE CREATE A COMMITMENT NOT ONLY TO
A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BUT TO THE KIND OF
CONDUCT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GENERALLY WHICH WILL
MAKE THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE TO LIVE IN FOR ALL peoples.
:
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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NODIS
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICANCE
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
-2- STATE 102289 JUN 8
I AM AWARE THAT WHEN THE SO-CALLED "SUPERPOWERS"
meet TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS AND TO DISCUSS THE GREAT
ISSUES OF OUR DAY, CONCERN IS SOMETIMES EXPRESSED IN
OTHER COUNTRIES THAT MATTERS ARE BEING SETTLED OVER
THEIR HEADS. BUT I BELIEVE ONE OF THE NOTEWORTHY
ASPECTS OF THE MOSCOW MEETINGS WAS THAT WHILE BOTH
SIDES were NATURALLY CONSCIOUS OF THE GREAT RESPONSI-
BILITIES THEY BEAR BY VIRTUE OF THEIR POWER AND EXTENSIVE
NODIS
INTERESTS, THEY WERE EQUALLY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT
PEACE REQUIRES THAT THE INTERESTS OF ALL COUNTRIES,
LARGE AND SMALL, ARE SAFEGUARDED. IN ADDITION, I MADE
CLEAR PRIVATELY, AS WELL AS IN THE PUØLIC DOCUMENTS,
THAT AMERICAN OBLIGATIONS AND ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS
COULD NOT IN ANY WAY BE AFFECTED BY AGREEMENTS REAC:ED
WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THIS WAS UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED
BY THE SOVIET LEADERS.
WE SPENT MANY HOURS IN DISCUSSIONS AØOUT VIETNAM.
AS YOU KNOW FROM THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE, THE POSITIONS
REMAINED APART. YET I FOUND IT OF INTEREST AND PERHAPS
A HOPEFUL SIGN THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WERE PREPARED TO
LISTEN AT LENGTH TO THE MOST DETAILED EXPOSITION OF OUR
POINT OF VIEW. IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE ESSENCE
OF WHAT I SAID WILL BE CONVEYED TO HANOI. ONLY TIME
WILL TELL WHETHER A MORE FLEXIBLE COMMUNIST POSITION
WILL ENSUE IN PARIS. THE SOVIETS, AT ANY RATE, CAN
NODIS
HAVE NO DOUØT OF my FIRM COMMITMENT TO AN EARLY CONCLU-
SION TO THE CONFLICT IN A WAY THAT SAFEGUARDS THE HONOR
AND THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PARTIES AND, ABOVE All,
ENDS THE ANGUISH OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION.
FINALLY, A WORD ABOUT THE SOVIET LEADERS. THEY ARE
OF COURSE TOTALLY COMMITTED TO THEIR SYSTEM AND THERE
should BE NO ILLUSION THAT MANY OF THEIR VALUES AND GOALS
REMAIN WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US. YET IT WAS ALSO CLEAR
THAT THESE LEADERS CAN ADAPT TO REALITIES AND THAT
PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS OF SELF-INTEREST CAN LEAD THEM
ALONG CONSTRUCTIVE PATHS. I FOUND THEM INTELLIGENT
AND TOUGH BUT NOT INFLEXIBLE ON PRACTICAL ISSUES.
brezhnev IS CLEARLY IN COMMAND, BUT BOTH KOSYGIN AND
TOP SECRET
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NODIS
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
-3- STATE 102289 JUN 8
podgorny, EACH IN HIS OWN WAY, ARE MEN WITH AUTHORITY
AND SKILL. WHILE brezhnev WAS THE SENIOR spokesman,
MY STRONG IMPRESSION IS THAT A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF
COLLECTIVITY does PREVAIL. IN MY DISCUSSIONS, I WAS
STRUCK THAT DESPITE THE BARRIERS OF IDEOLOGY AND VASTLY
DIFFERING BACKGROUND, A GENUINE DIALOGUE DEVELOPED.
WHILE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED,
I ØELIEVE THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION HAS BEEN FACILI-
TATED FOR THE FUTURE.
NODIS
I AM DELIGHTED, MR. PRIME MINISTER, THATYOU
WILL SOON BE RECEIVING MR. JOHN CONNALLY. AS YOU KNOW
HE HAS JUST EMBARKED ON AN EXTENSIVE JOURNEY TO SEVERAL
COUNTRIES AT MY PERSONAL REQUEST TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS
OF MUTUAL CONCERN. IN CANBERRA, HE WILL BE PREPARED
TO SPEAK TO you FURTHER ABOUT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT AND
TO COMMENT ON ANY PARTICULAR QUESTIONS YOU MAY WISH TO
RAISE. HE HAS MY COMPLETE CONFIDENCE AND WILL REPORT
BACK DIRECTLY TO ME. AS you KNOW, I GREATLY VALUE
YOUR VIEWS AND THE INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP THAT IS
TRADITIONAL BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. I AM THEREFORE
PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT MR. CONNALLY WILL HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU.
SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON
END TEXT
BT 3. EXEMPT CATEGORY THREE- NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. ROGERS
202-2
#2289
Drafted By: Text Received from White House
Approved By: White House
Clearances: S/S Mr. Miller
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DERA OF STATE
*
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FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8952
'72 JUN AM 8:20 20
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
CONFIDENTIA L CANBERRA 2994
EXDIS
SUBJ: PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON
TO PRESIDENT NIXON
REF: CANBERRA 2979
1 . FOL IS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE OF JUNE 4 FROM
PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON TO PRESIDENT NIXON (MANU-
SCRIPT COPY OF LETTER BEING FORWARDED BY POUCH TO
DEPT., EA/ANZ - MARTIN). MESSAGE IS IN ADDITION TO
PRESS STATEMENT MADE BY PRIME MINISTER (REFTEL)
WHICH WAS RELEASED AT 2400 JUNE 4, AUSTRALIAN EASTERN
TIME ( 10900 JUNE 4, WASHINGTON TIME).
2. QTE MY DEAR PRESIDENT: ON MY OWN AND MY GOVERN-
MENT'S BEHALF, I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW HOW PLEASED
WE ARE THAT YOUR VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN
SUCH A SUCCESS.
QOI I HAVE PERSONALLY WATCHED WITH ABSORBED
INTEREST THE COURSE AND RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATIONS
IN MOSCOW: AND WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW MUCH I ADMIRE
THE INITIATIVES YOU HAVE TAKEN AND THE DEDICATION
YOU HAVE SHOWN TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE INTERESTS
OF HUMANITY.
QTE WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOUR EFFORTS HAVE
MADE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO MAN'S SEARCH FOR A TRUE
AND LASTING PEACE.
QTE WITH BEST REGARDS, SINCERELY, WILLIAM MCMAHON
END QTE.
GP-3.
RICE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
6
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8
200-0
OF STATE DP
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
Department of State
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
0 032330Z JUN 72
CONTROL: 0897Q
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8947
JUNE 03, 1957, 8:37PM
BT
C ONFIDENTIAL CANBERRA 2980
NODIS
'72 5 AM
JUN
SUBJ: REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO USSR
REF: STATE 096887
SITUATION RO
WHITE HOUS
ZODIS
1. IN ADDITION TO HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT BEING SENT SEPARATELY PRIME
MINISTER MC MAHON HAS ASKED THAT MESSAGE PARA 2 BELOW BE SENT TO THE
PRESIDENT.
2. TEXT OF MESSAGE AS FOLLOWS:
QUOTE
MY DEAR PRESIDENT,
ON MY OWN AND MY GOVERNMENT'S BEHALF, I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW HOW
PLEASED WE ARE THAT YOUR VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN SUCH
A SUCCESS.
I HAVE PERSONALLY WATCHED WITH ABSORBED INTEREST THE COURSE AND
RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW; AND WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW
MUCH I ADMIRE THE INITIATIVES YOU HAVE TEKEN, AND THE DEDICATION
YOU HAVE SHOWN TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE INTERESTS OF HUMANITY.
ZODIS
WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOUR EFFORTS HAVE MADE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO
MAN'S SEARCH FOR A TRUE AND LASTING PEACE.
WITH BEST WISHES
YOURS SINCERELY,
(WILLIAM MC MAHON)
RICE
BT
#2980
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT or STATE
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OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
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ANDERSON
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HORMATS
, 220745Z MAY 72
JORDEN
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
KENNEDY
11.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8891
LEHMAN
INFO USMISSION OECD PARIS
LEVINE
NEGROPONTE
ODEEN
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CANBERRA 2758
RATLIFF
EXDIS
RONDON
SAUNDERS
SONNENFELDT
FROM AMBASSADOR RICE
V.I.G.
WALSH
SUBJECT: MONETARY REFORM: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRIME
MINISTER MCMAHON
D/X
REF: A STATE 089485
pc
B. CANBERRA 5604 SEPTEMBER 30, 1971 (NOTAL)
C. CANBERR A-253 SEPTEMBER 29, 1971
Cuoler
1. PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON
DELIVERED MAY 22.
2. 1 AM CONCERNED THAT REPERCUSSIONS OF POSSIBLE
FAILURE TO INCULDE AUSTRALIA IN ANY NEW FORUM FOR
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MONETARY REFORM MAY NOT
YET BE FULLY APPRECIATED IN WASHINGTON. GOA WELL
AWARE THAT USG IN PAST HAS NOT ALWAYS SUPPORTED ITS
EFFORTS TO JOIN OECD AND GROUP TEN. SHOULD PRESENT
EFFORTS TO JOIN NEW GROUP FAIL, WE
WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BEAR LARGE SHARE OF ONUS DUE
OUR PRESUMED FAILURE AGAIN TO SUPPORT GOA.
REACTION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE HARSHER THAN BEFORE
IN VIEW LARGER MEMBERSHIP OF NEW GROUP. IN ADDITION,
FAILURE INCLUDE AUSTRALIA WOULD DEPRIVE NEW
GROUP OF REGIONAL / PARTICIPATION OF ONE
OF WORLD'S MOST DYNAMIC ECONOMIES AND,
MOST IMPORTANT, VOICE OF STRONG US ALLY IN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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S
PAGE 02 CANBER 02758 220836Z
ECONOMIC AND POLIITICAL SPHERES. GOA SUPPORT
COULD PROVE PARTICULARLY CRUCIAL IN COMING
MONTHS WHEN USG WILL BE MUSTERING BROAD
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AGAINST EC PROTECTIONISM
EXP
THEREFORE URGE THAT USG SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN
PARTICIPATION IN NEW FORUM TO FULLEST EXTENT
POSSIBLE.
DECONTROL MAY 22 1977
RICE
S
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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HORMATS
DRAFTED BY:TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
5/20/72
7
JORDEN
KENNEDY
APPROVED BY:S/S-0:JBRIMS
LEHMAN
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LEVINE
EUR/RPE:HIGGINSON
NEGROPONTE
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ODEEN
053192
RATLIFF
o 210119Z MAY 72
RONDON
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
SAUNDERS
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
SONNENFELDT
INFO USMISSION OECD PARIS IMMEDIATE
V.I.G.
WALSH
Ed
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 089485
Farrar
EXDIS
PC
PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME
MINISTER MCMAHON:
QUOTE: MAY 19, 1972. DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: YOUR RECENT
LETTER HAS REACHED ME AND I AM PLEASED THAT YOU HAVE CONTACTED
ME ON THIS MATTER.
I UNDERSTAND AND SYMPATHIZE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON REFORM OF THE TRADE AND
PAYMENTS SYSTEM. I RECOGNIZE THIS MATTER TOUCHES NOT SIMPLY
ON THE PROPOSED GROUP OF 20 BUT ALSO ON ANY PARALLEL OR SUP-
PLEMENTARY DISCUSSIONSWITHIN THE DECD.
AS YOU NOTE, ONE KEY CONSIDERATION IS KEEPING NEGOTIATING
BODIES TO MANAGEABLE SIZE WE WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP NEGOTIA-
TING GROUPS WHICH RETAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF SMALL SIZE BUT
WHICH ALSO PERMIT A MORE BALANCED REPRESENTATION THAN HAS
BEEN AVAILABLE IN THE PAST. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT AUSTRALIA
IS VERY IMPORTANT IN OUR MINDS AS WE SEEK THAT BALANCE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOULIMETEDTOFFICIALOUSEF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DICK
Department of State
UNITED STATES
TELEGRAM
OF
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PAGE 02 STATE 089485
I UNDERSTAND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THESE ISSUES MAY APPROACH
A CONCLUSION NEXT WEEK, AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE
UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP AUSTRALIA'S VIEWS VERY
MUNCH IN MIND.
WITH WARM GOOD WISHES, SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON. UNQUOTE. IRWIN
S
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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Presidential
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APPROVED BY:S/S-0:JBRIMS
EA/ANZ:MARTIN
EUR/RPE:HIGGINSON
'72 MAY 21 PM 3:58 58
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION: S/S-S:PASSAGE
053192
0 210119Z MAY 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION OECD PARIS IMMEDIATE
LIMITED OFFICIAL use STATE 089485
EXDIS
PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME
MINISTER MCMAHON:
QUOTE: MAY 19, 1972. DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: YOUR RECENT
LETTER HAS REACHED ME AND I AM PLEASED THAT YOU HAVE CONTACTED
ME ON THIS MATTER.
I UNDERSTAND AND SYMPATHIZE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON REFORM OF THE TRADE AND
PAYMENTS SYSTEM. I RECOGNIZE THIS MATTER TOUCHES NOT SIMPLY
ON THE PROPOSED GROUP OF 20 BUT ALSO ON ANY PARALLEL OR SUP-
PLEMENTARY DISCUSSIONSWITHIN THE DECD.
AS YOU NOTE ONE KEY CONSIDERATION IS KEEPING NEGOTIATING
BODIES TO MANAGEABLE SIZE. WE WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP NEGOTIA-
TING GROUPS WHICH RETAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF SMALL SIZE BUT
WHICH ALSO PERMIT A MORE BALANCED REPRESENTATION THAN HAS
BEEN AVAILABLE IN THE PAST. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT AUSTRALIA
IS VERY IMPORTANT IN OUR MINDS AS WE SEEK THAT BALANCE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTLTHIA THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
45
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICANCE
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EXX EXPIS
LIMITED OFFICIAL use
PAGE 02 STATE 089485
I UNDERSTAND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THESE ISSUES MAY APPROACH
A CONCLUSION NEXT WEEK, AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE
UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP AUSTRALIA'S VIEWS VERY
MUNCH IN MIND.
WITH WARM GOOD WISHES, SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON. UNQUOTE. IRWIN
JS WVA 51 bN 3:20
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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3338
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
May 18, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
ROBERT GENERAL HORMATS HAIG Hay for
SUBJECT:
to
Letter
from
Prime
Minister Reply McMahon Pres
Prime Minister McMahon has written the President (Tab B)
asking that Australia be included in the forum which dis-
cusses international monetary reform. At Tab A is a letter
from the President responding to McMahon's letter in a
relatively non-committal way. The letter has been approved
by Volcker, Price, and CIEP.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve for the President's signature the letter
at Tab A.
Concurrence: J Holdridge and
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 19, 1972
ACTION
May 18, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MAJ. GEN. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR
@
SUBJECT:
Reply to Letter from Prime
Minister McMahon
Prime Minister McMahon of Australia has written you (Tab B)
asking that his country be included in the forum which discusses
international monetary reform. At Tab A is a response to
McMahon indicating that we would like to develop negotiating
groups which retain the advantages of small size but which also
permit a more balanced representation than has been available in the
past, and that Australia is very important in our minds as we seek
that balance.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.
Treasury, Ray Price, and Peter Flanigan concur.
Huin
fw Pres.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 19, 1972
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Your recent letter has reached me and I am pleased
that you have contacted me on this matter.
I understand and sympathize with your government's
desire to participate in the negotiations on reform of
the trade and payments system. I recognize this
matter touches not simply on the proposed Group of 20
but also on any parallel or supplementary discussions
within the OECD.
As you note, one key consideration is keeping negotiat-
ing bodies to manageable size. We would like to develop
negotiating groups which retain the advantages of small
size but which also permit a more balanced representation
than has been available in the past. You can be sure that
Australia is very important in our minds as we seek that
balance.
I understand there is a possibility these issues may
approach a conclusion next week, and I want to assure
you that the United States will continue to keep Australia's
views very much in mind.
With warm good wishes,
Sincerely,
The Right Honorable
William McMahon
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
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DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
4 MO DA
14
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3338
TO: PRES x
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
FROM: eliot
U
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
LAIRD, M
C
X
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
SUBJECT: Sends It from Pm McMahon TS S who CODE SENSITIVE WORD aske RES
PLIMSOLL, J
DATA
REFERENCE: assistance S/S in Becoming OTHER A Mmhu NOT XEROXED of Up of 10,
APP'TS:
PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
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ACTION
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MEMO FOR HAK
(
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FOR
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STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
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FAR EAST
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
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RECOMMENDATIONS
(
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EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
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LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
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UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC
Q
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
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COMMENTS: (Including Special 4/20 Instructions)
CONCURRENCE
(
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SCIENTIFIC
DUE DATE:
LR PLANNING
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NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL Word
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FROM
TO
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ACTION Pap REQUIRED
CY TO
4/14
JHH
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transfer to Hormats
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Pres besped lt to
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DATE
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231972
ORIG)
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GPO: 1972-455-927
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
INFO
WASHINGTON
May 11, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
@
MEMO FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
WINSTON LORD
Attached is a copy of a letter from the
Australian Ambassador enclosing a
strong message of support from Prime
Minister McMahon to the President on
his May 8 speech. Mr. Williams of the
Australian Embassy delivered this to
me at 11:45 a. m. today. I thanked him,
assured him that I would get this to you
and the President right away, and stated
that I knew the President would very much
appreciate the strong Australian support.
I have sent the original to Holdridge
for staffing.
Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
ocument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declas
CONFIDENTIAL
FILE
EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
11th May, 1972.
Dear Mr President,
I have been asked by the Australian Prime Minister,
the Right Honourable William McMahon, to pass to you the
following message:
Begins -
"My dear President,
Thank you for your letter advising me of your
decision to blockade North Vietnamese ports.
I want you to know that I and my Government
fully support you in your attempt to bring about a
just settlement of this long and tragic war.
On Tuesday, 9 May, I made a statement of strong
support for you in our House of Representatives. A
copy is being sent to your office.
I want you to know also that your patient
strength in this trying situation has the sympathy
and respect of the majority of Australians.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
William McMahon"
Ends.
Yours sincerely,
f. Plinsoll
(J. Plimsoll)
Ambassador
The Honourable Richard M. Nixon,
President of the United States of America,
White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
STATEMENT IN THE AUSTRALIAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON 9 MAY
VIET-NAM
I refer to the important decisions which President
Nixon has been obliged to take in the present very serious
situation in Viet-Nam. These decisions were taken because
of the blatant invasion of South Viet-Nam by the North
Vietnamese, supported by outside governments. Not only
has there been this invasion of South Viet-Nam across the
demilitarised zone, but North Vietnamese forces have been
carrying on offensive military operations in Laos and the
Khmer Republic for a period of years.
The Australian Government strongly condemns North
Viet-Nam and its associates. It is they who must take the
complete moral responsibility for these actions.
The United States has made - with full Australian
support - every effort to bring about a negotiated settle-
ment of the present conflict. These efforts have met with
an absolute refusal by North Viet-Nam to negotiate seriously.
The United States has also tried to de-escalate the fighting
by progressively withdrawing its forces from Viet-Nam. The
response from Hanoi has been the launching of a long and
carefully planned invasion.
The Australian Government understands and supports the
decisions which the President has felt compelled to take.
In our view the United States has done everything in
its power to ensure a negotiated settlement and to maintain
the independence of South Viet-Nam and not to abandon the
people of that country. The present decisions by the
United States reflect its determination to stand by its
international obligations and alliances. The United States
must also avoid endangering the lives of its own forces in
Viet-Nam.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3010
5/32/72
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NSC/S:
attached is the aniginal of
confirming letter on which and based
our reply to ofMay 15 P.M. me Maken.
australiam Smbassy hand
delivered today
it should
with by # 3710 (all action completed.
MICROFILM DATA
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MAY 23 1972 DATE
TO
PAF
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SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassit
3710
PRIME Minister,
CANBERRA.
11 MAY 1972
my chan Presedent.
Thank you for your letter advising me of your
decision to blockade North Vietnamese ports.
I want you to know that I and my Government fully
support you in your attempt to bring about a just settlement
of this long and tragic war.
On Tuesday 9 May, I made a statement of strong
support for you in our House of Representatives. A copy is
being sent to your office.
I want you to know, also, that your patient strength
in this trying situation has the sympathy and respect of the
majority of Australians.
With very best Sweencency wishes,
Лилат heckalor
(William McMahon)
Historical File
The Honourable Richard M. Nixon,
President of the United States of America,
White House,
Washington, D.C., 20036, U.S.A.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
AUSTRALIA
PRIME MINISTER
STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON.
WILLIAM McMAHON, CH. MP, IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CANBERRA
PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISIONS ON VIETNAM
9 MAY, 1972
I refer to the important decisions which President Nixon
has been obliged to take in the present very serious situation in
Vietnam.
These decisions were taker because of the blatant invasion
of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese, supported by outside
Governments. Not only has there been this invasion of South Vietnam
across the Demilitarized Zone, but the North Vietnamese forces have
been carrying on offensive military operations in Laos and the Khmer
Republic for a period of years.
The Australian Government strongly condemns North Vietnam and
its associates. It is they who must take the complete moral
responsibility for these actions.
The United States has made - with full Australian support -
every effort to bring about a negotiated settlement of the present
conflict. These efforts have met with an absolute refusal by North
Vietnam to negotiate seriously. The United States has also tried to
de-escalate the fighting by progressively withdrawing its forces from
Vietnam.
The response from Hanoi has been the launching of a
long and carefully planned invasion.
The Australian Government understands and supports the
decisions which the President has felt compelled to take.
In our view, the United States had done everything in its
power to ensure a negotiated settlement and to maintain the independence
of South Vietnam and not to abandon the people of that country. The
present decisions by the United States reflect its determination to
stand by its international obligations and alliances. The United
States must also avoid endangering the lives of its own forces in
Vietnam.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7205988
2891
department OF state
Washington, D.C. 20520
March 31, 1972
Memorandum for: NSC Secretariat
The White House
Subject: Letter to the President
from Australian Prime
Minister McMahon
We attach an unsealed letter for President
Nixon from Australian Prime Minister McMahon,
transmitted to the Department by our Embassy in
Canberra.
We believe no reply is necessary.
DJ
Secretariat Staff
Attachment:
As stated.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRIME MINISTER
CANBERRA
22 March 1972
hey dear President.
I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending
me a copy of your third annual review of American
foreign policy and your reference to the responsibilities
which we hold in common for building a just and durable
peace.
Inevitably there is a great deal in the
review which brought to mind again our conversations
in Washington last November, bearing in particular on
the changes and opportunities facing our two countries
in the field of foreign affairs.
I also want you to know that I appreciated
your action in sending Mr Marshall Green to give us a
first hand account of your discussions with the Chinese
leaders in Peking and your own impressions of what was
clearly a most significant journey.
I share with you the earnest hope that the
initiative you have taken will promote among the
peoples of Asia and the Pacific a sense of stability
for which they all aspire.
and confidence which Succerely they have lacked for SO long and
Historical File
(William McMahon)
The Honourable Richard M. Nixon,
President of the United States of America,
White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 U.S.A.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
3
3117
2891
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT X
X
U
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER X
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
LAIRD, M
C
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
SUBJECT: PM The Mahor that TS Pres SENSITIVE In y of
REFERENCE: S/S 72059.88 OTHER
Lougs Poly Report of Marshell Mrun's reporting The My then
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
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FOR
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FAR EAST
X
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
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TO
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RECOMMENDATIONS
(
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EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
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LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
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UNITED NATIONS
ANY CONCURRENCE ACTION NECESSARY in NRN
(
)
ECONOMIC
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JAR
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No reply weeks any
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NOTIFY C. Mc Gowen S/S DATE 04/04
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APR 06,1972
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WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
* GPO: 1972-455-927
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ed.R.
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
319
PAGE 01 CANBER 01529 220520Z
16
ACTION EA-14
INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 IO-12 SA-03
RSR-01 1089 W
115285
R 2205a6Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8565
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CANBERRA 1529
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NIXON FROM PRIME MINISTER
MCMAHON OF MARCH 22
1. IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE TO PRIME
MINISTER MCMAHON OF FEBRUARY 16, TRANSMITTING A COPY
OF QTE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S: THE EMERGING
STRUCTURE OF PEACE END QTE, WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO
PRIME MINISTER MARCH 7, EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FOL
REPLY DATED MARCH 22 (MANUSCRIPT COPY BEING POUCHED):
QTE MY DEAR PRESIDENT.
QTE I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS IN SENDING
ME A COPY OF YOUR THIRD ANNUAL REVIEW OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY AND YOUR REFERENCE TO THE RESPONSIBILI
TIES WHICH WE HOLD IN COMMON FOR BUILDING A JUST AND
DURABLE PEACE.
QTE INEVITABLY THERE IS A GREAT DEAL IN THE
REVIEW WHICH BROUGHT TO MIND AGAIN OUR CONVERSATIONS
IN WASHINGTON LAST NOVEMBER, BEARING IN PARTICULAR ON
THE CHANGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING OUR TWO COUNTRIES
IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
QTE I ALSO WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I APPRECIATED
YOUR ACTION IN SENDING MR. MARSHALL GREEN TO GIVE US
A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
CHINESE LEADERS IN PEKING AND YOUR OWN IMPRESSIONS OF
WHAT WAS CLEARLY A MOST SIGNIFICANT JOURNEY.
QTE I SHARE WITH YOU THE EARNEST HOPE THAT THE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PAGE 02 CANBER 01529 220520Z
INITIATIVE YOU HAVE TAKEN WILL PROMOTE AMONG THE
PEOPLES OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC A SENSE OF STABILITY
AND CONFIDENCE WHICH THEY HAVE LACKED FOR SO LONG AND
FOR WHICH THEY ALL ASPIRE. SINCERELY, WILLIAM MCMAHON.
END QTE
DECON UPON RECEIPT.
RICE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
390
Pres's Corres
Nustrolio
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 9, 1972
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Your letter on the situation in South Asia provided much
to think about, and I was grateful to have your views. I
appreciate your government's keeping us informed on the
evolution of your thinking. My response has been delayed
until we had a clearer sense of what would be possible
for us.
You will see from the thoughts developed in detail in my
annual foreign policy message to our Congress that our
basic objectives in South Asia have not changed. In capsule,
they are to see all the nations there find stability and
develop in genuine independence. As you wrote, these
objectives are parallel with those of Australia.
I appreciate the considerations that have gone into your
decisions on the timing of Australia's recognition of
Bangladesh. We are examining our position on recognition
in relation to the broader situation in the sub-continent.
For instance, we have sought a somewhat clearer picture
of the relationship between the new regime in Dacca and the
government of India. We have also been concerned that
President Bhutto have sufficient time to develop Pakistan's
understanding with Dacca, although we are, of course,
aware of the fundamental changes in the situation since
Sheikh Mujib's return to Dacca. Finally, we have had to
think of how the Indo-Pakistani issues growing out of the
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
war will be settled. While we know that our recognition
will not be a major factor in influencing these developments,
we want it to be as constructive in its timing as possible.
We are, of course, prepared to do our share in helping to
meet the humanitarian needs wherever they may arise.
The report of the United Nations team in Dacca is expected
to report shortly on requirements there. We shall respond
promptly, and we hope others will do likewise.
As we shape our responses to the new realities, we will
have your concerns and your suggestions very much in
mind. We share Australia's interest that incompatible
elements not take over the governments in this area. You
can be sure that we will keep in very close touch through
your Embassy here in Washington.
Sincerely,
The Right Honorable
William McMahon, P. C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
Dispatche documents been Yeviewed Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
February8, 1972
390
SECRET/EXDIS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
K
SUBJECT:
Reply to Prime Minister of Australia
Prime Minister McMahon has sent you a personal message [Tab B]
expressing his concern about the potential for Soviet influence in the
subcontinent. He makes two basic points:
--It is possible that "by withholding support and encouragement
from India and the new country of Bangladesh at this time the
United States runs the risk of facilitating a massive expansion
of Russian activity in the Asian and Indian Ocean area. " India
without Western and mainly US support "is just not strong enough
to resist at least partial absorption into the Russian sphere of
influence. 11 Aid to India will not insure compliance with any
particular line of policy, but "natural disappointment when things
go awry should not obscure long-term objectives."
-- There are "grave dangers" in giving China the impression
that the US is not concerned about Soviet expansion into the
subcontinent. The Chinese are ''highly sensitive" to Soviet moves
in Asia and may well see in US coolness towards India an attempt
to set the Soviets against China, "however unjustified this obviously
is. 11 Playing off China against the USSR will produce "dangerous
domestic instability in South and Southeast Asian countries."
Australia is moving even ahead of the British to recognize Bangladesh.
The Prime Minister says he would "deeply appreciate" your personal views
on the South Asian situation.
Your reply [Tab A] is drafted to state that our fundamental objective
in South Asia is unchanged and that we will be proceeding with recog-
nizing Bangladesh in the context of our general concern for stability there.
RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the reply at Tab A.. [Text coordinated
with Mr. Price.
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
390
@
SECRET/EXDIS
January 31, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS 7thl
SUBJECT:
Reply to Prime Minister McMahon
RECOMMENDATION: That you seek the President's Rush approval
on the attached reply to Prime Minister McMahon
Concurrence: Mr. Holdridge Jpno
Feb.
Revision inserted
at Tab A.
A little fuller
- Helping in
side, Do by COB
Feb - Exphin by
delay in require
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7200766
department OF state
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET/EXDIS
January 18, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Letter to the President from Australian
Prime Minister McMahon
On January 13, the Australian Ambassador sent
Secretary Rogers a copy of a message from Prime
Minister McMahon to the President. The Ambassador
also provided you a copy of this message. The mes-
sage and a suggested reply are attached.
Rothiller for
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Message to the President
2. Suggested Reply
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/EXDIS
DRAFT REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER McMAHON
I am very glad to have your letter of January 13
giving me your views on the situation in the Sub-continent.
I share your concern over the need to dispel any impression
that we are leaving to the Soviet Union the problems of
India and Bangladesh. While recent events have caused
us to re-examine our policies in the Sub-continent, our
objective of a stable area, free of domination by any
Great Power remains unchanged.
As we shape our responses to the new realities,
we will have very much in mind your concerns and your
suggestions. In this connection, because of the fast moving
developments in South Asia, it might be preferable to keep
in very close touch through your Embassy here in Washington
rather than draw up a joint official level study.
With regard to your views on timing for
Australia's recognition of Bangladesh, I appreciate
the considerations that have gone into your policy.
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/EXDIS
- 2 -
For our part, we are examining our position on
recognition, but will want to defer any decision
until we have a clearer picture of the relation-
ship between the new regime in Dacca and India
and the role of Indian troops in the East.
We too are concerned that Bhutto has
sufficient time to explore what basis remains
for a future relationship with Dacca. We will,
of course, be examining the ways in which this
situation may have changed since Mujib's return
to Dacca.
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
390
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Letter from Prime Minister of Australia
Prime Minister McMahon has sent you a personal message [attached]
concerning his views on the situation in South Asia.
Mr. McMahon is obviously deeply concerned about the destruction
and human suffering in "Bangladesh") as well as about the potential
for Soviet influence in the subcontinent. In this regard he makes
and develops his argument around the following two basic points:
--It is possible that "by withholding support and encouragement
from India and the new country of Bangladesh at this time the
United States runs the risk of facilitating a massive expansion
of Russian activity in the Asian and Indian Ocean area. " More-
over, he fears that India without Western and mainly US
support "is just not strong enough to resist at least partial
absorption into the Russian sphere of influence. 11 He does not
think that aid to India will insure compliance with any particular
line of policy but cautions that "natural disappointment when
things go awry should not obscure long-term objectives."
- He also sees "grave dangers" in giving China the impression
that we are not concerned about Soviet expansion into the
subcontinent. The Chinese, he feels, are "highly sensitive"
to Soviet moves in Asia and may well see in US coolness
towards India an attempt to set the Soviets against China,
"however unjustified this obviously is. " It is his view that
playing off China against the USSR will produce "dangerous
domestic instability in South and Southeast Asian countries."
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
- 2 -
-Australia has made it clear to India that it is not against
recognizing Bangladesh once the government is clearly in
control and once Bhutto has had a little more time to sort
out his new relationship.
McMahon closes by suggesting a joint Australian- US study on
South Asia or perhaps our commenting on a basic paper" which
they might prepare. He also says he would 'deeply appreciate"
your personal views on this and related matters.
This is a serious letter which deserves a carefully considered
response. I will send you a suggested response soon.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
390
SECRET
January 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Harold H. Saunders Ital
Not
States
SUBJECT:
Letter from the Prime Minister of
Australia
Attached is a memorandum for you to use in sending to the President
a letter from the Australian Prime Minister on South Asia.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That you send this letter to the President via the
attached memorandum.
2. That you authorize sending the attached letter to
State for a quick draft response.
Approve
Other
Concurrence: Mr. Holdridge JANO
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RH
Lee:
May I please
have your thoughts
on the draft replies
at Tab A in each of
the attached today
Thanks.
Hal Saunders
3330
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
as been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to
SECRET/EXDIS
Tab A
DRAFT REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER McMAHON
Your letter on the situation in South Asia provided much to think
about, and I was grateful to have your views. You will see from the
thoughts developed in detail in my annual foreign policy message to
our Congress that our basic objectives in South Asia have not changed.
In capsule, they are to see all the nations there find stability and develop
in genuine independence. As you wrote, these objectives are parallel
those of
with Australia
+
on the
I appreciate the considerations that have gone into your decisions on
timing of Australia'srecognition of Bangladesh. For our part, we are
1
examining our position on recognition in relation to the broader
As we proceed in dus matter
situation in the sub-continent. We will want a somewhat clearer picture
the government of
of the relationship between the new regime in Dacca and/India. We are,
of course, aware of the fundamental changes in the situation since sheeleh
also
President
Mujib's return to Dacca, but We are n concerned that Bhutto have sufficient
although
time to develop Pakistan's understanding with Dacca. SA Finally, we must
think of how the Indo-Pakistani issues growing out of the war will be
stes
settled.
As we shape our responses to the new realities, we will have very
you can be sure that
much in mind your concerns and your suggestions, We will keep in very
close touch through your Embassy here in Washington,
Sincerely,
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
01
13
01
13
17
00390
SAUNDERS
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
TO: PRE
FROM: ELIOT
U
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
LAIRD, M
C
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
PLIMSOLL, J.
X
TS
sensitive
SUBJECT:
Forwards message to the Pres from Australian PM McMahon who expresses concern over
the India/Pakistan situation.
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
X done
CY
(
)
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
)
FAR EAST
X
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
-
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
SUB-SAHaraN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
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NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
X
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
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EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
DUE DATE:
01/16
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
program ANALYSIS
NSC planning
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION required
CY TO
1/14/72
Saunders
Holdridge
Far concurrence.
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
1/14
HAK
X
Pres In Info /Deasur (1/18)
1/19
23
Recd STate Reca 7200766
1/19
Jentua
Prace MENO Foo HAK
1/11
SAUNDERS
S
Appropriate Act (1/21)
1/31/72
Saunders
Holdwidge
for concurrence
2/1
Samlen
H.AK
Hair
X
Pres 8 594 reply (2/2)
Holding
HOCKLITS
Redo 2/8
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS/REF WITH
NOTIFY
2/8
Had
SEE LOG
Pres DISPATCH: P LETTER/MEMO seen an to DATE McMahon
DO
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE MkMaha % Via SS done
SA,
HP,
HM
8/1/1972
DATE
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
ORIG)
NSC
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
TO )
PAF
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
# GPO: 1971-412-412
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 882
PAGE 01 STATE Ø25255
19
ORIGIN SS-25
INFO OCT-01 /026 R
DRAFTED BY: NEA/PAF PDCONSTABLE:N
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY NEA CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN
"72 FEB 12 AM 8:39
S/S 0 CHTHOMAS
EA/ANZ (INFO)
TEXT AS RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
090718
R 120417Z FEB 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
SECRE T STATE 025255
EXDIS
PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON
TO PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON:
QUOTE:
DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:
YOUR LETTER ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA PROVIDED MUCH TO
THINK ABOUT, AND I WAS GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS. I
APPRECIATE YOUR GOVERNMENTJ'S KEEPING US INFORMED ON THE
EVOLUTION OF YOUR THINKING. MY RESPONSE HAS BEEN DELAYED
UNTIL WE HAD A CLEARER SENSE OF WHAT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
FOR Us.
YOU WILL SEE FROM THE THOUGHTS DEVELOPED IN DETAIL IN MY
ANNUAL FOREIGN POLICY MESSAGE TO OUR CONGRESS THAT OUR
BASIC OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH ASIA HAVE NOT CHANGED. IN CAPSULE,
THEY ARE TO SEE ALL THE NATIONS THERE FIND STABILITY AND
DEVELOP IN GENUINE INDEPENDENCE. AS YOU WROTE, THESE
OBJECTIVES ARE PARALLEL WITH THOSE OF AUSTRALIA.
1 APPRECIATE THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT HAVE GONE INTO YOUR
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF MEMBER
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 025255
EXPIS EXPIS EXBIC
DECISIONS ON THE TIMING OF AUSTRALIAS RECOGNITION OF
BANGLADESH. WE ARE EXAMINING OUR POSITION ON RECOGNITION
IN RELATION TO THE BROADER SITUATION IN THE SUB-CONTINENT
FOR INSTANCE, WE HAVE SOUGHT A SOMEWHAT CLEARER PICTURE
OF THE RELATIONSHIP between THE NEW REGIME IN DACCA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. WE have ALSO BEEN CONCERNED THAT
PRESIDENT BHUTTO HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO DEVELOP PAKISTAN'S
UNDERSTANDING WITH DACCA ALTHOUGH WE ARE, OF COURSE,
AWARE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE SITUATION SINCE
SHEIKH MUJIB'S RETURN TO DACCA FINALLY, WE HAVE HAD TO
THINK OF HOW THE INDO-PAKISTANI ISSUES GROWING OUT OF THE
WAR WILL BE SETTLED. WHILE WE KNOW THAT OUR RECOGNITION
WILL NOT BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN INFLUENCING THESE DEVELOPMENTS,
WE WANT IT TO BE AS CONSTRUCTIVE IN ITS TIMING AS POSSIBLE.
WE ARE, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO DO OUR SHARE IN HELPING TO
meet THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS WHEREVER THEY MAY ARISE®
THE REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS TEAM IN DACCA IS EXPECTED
TO REPORT SHORTLY ON REQUIREMENTS THERE. WE SHALL RESPOND
PROMPTLY, AND WE HOPE OTHERS WILL DO LIKEWISE.
AS WE SHAPE OUR RESPONSES TO THE NEW REALITIES, WE WILL
HAVE YOUR CONCERNS AND YOUR SUGGESTIONS VERY MUCH IN
MIND. WE SHARE AUSTRALIA'S INTEREST THAT INCOMPATIBLE
ELEMENTS NOT TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENTS IN THIS AREA. YOU
CAN BE SURE THAT WE WILL KEEP IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH THROUGH
YOUR EMBASSY HERE IN WASHINGTON.
SINCERELY,
RICHARD NIXON
UNQUOTE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATIO I OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
STAFF HAS ACTION
for staffing
cy up here for
Hong info
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
ocument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declas
PRIME Minister,
PERSONAL
CANBERRA.
22 DEC 1971
buy dear President
Since my return from Washington and
London I have, regrettably, been completely immersed in
domestic problems.
Now I want you to know that I have come
back with a deep sense of appreciation of your thoughtfulness
and courtesy to Sonia and me.
My talks with you were invaluable and
we will both long remember the dinner you gave us at The
White House and the visit to your own apartments.
May T say too that your initiatives in
foreign policy over such a broad front are meeting with wide
approval here and I can assure you that I appreciate that my
talks with you took place at the formative stage of decision-
making.
Thank you also for making Blair House
available to us whilst we were there. It was relaxing and the
Moschbackers and the House staff looked after us to perfection.
Particularly I want to thank you for your
robust reaffirmation of the vitality of the Anzus Treaty.
your wife.
We both Suncerely send our warmest regards to
Bice
(William. McMahon)
The Honourable Richard Nixon,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S.A.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Cd -
a letter was sent to me Mahen
in 10/12 (which you have a
Car Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
32338-X
ACTION
SECRET/SENSITIVE
October 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE
SUBJECT:
Suggested Reply from the President to
Australian Prime Minister McMahon
At Tab A is a memorandum from you to the President attaching a
proposed reply from him to Australian Prime Minister MeMahon, who
wrote the President concerning direct personal consultations with him
on China policy sometime before the President's trip. The revised
proposed reply incorporates your instruction that we informally invite,
through the Australian Embassy, McMahon here in January, which has
been done. The phraseology suggests that this may be done via a special
ANZUS meeting, as McMahon suggested but does not pin the President
down either as to the nature of the visit or the time. (If an ANZUS
meeting is ultimately decided upon, we would also wish to extend an
invitation to Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand.) The reply also
makes reference to the establishment of a secure channel of communi-
cation between the President and McMahon for continuing consultations,
and to the close consultations which are going forward between us and
the Australians on the Chirep effort.
The letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.
Recommendation:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
36330-A
ACTION
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Letter to You from Australian
Prime Minister McMahon
Australian Prime Minister McMahon has sent you a letter (Tab B) in which he
noted that secure communications have now been established outside normal
channels between you and him, and offers a number of suggestions for con-
sultations between the two of you on your China visit. These suggestions
were offered in the spirit of reducing domestic repercussions in Australia
with respect to your China initiative. They include the possibility of visits
by you to Australia, a visit to Washington, or your convening a special
ANZUS meeting at which McMahon and Prime Minister Holyoake of New
Zealand would both be present.
Of McMahon's several alternatives, I think that his visiting Washington
possibly in January would be the most practicable. This could be in the form
of an official visit, if he would not by chance be passing through en route to
another meeting, or in a special ANZUS Council meeting at the heads of state
level, in which case New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake would join us.
Any of these would be low profile, which would avoid suggesting to the Chinese
that Australia and New Zealand have a determining influence on our China
policy. I have accordingly left the wording of your reply to McMahon flexible,
both as to the form and time of the meeting.
The reply also makes reference to the establishment of a secure channel of
communications between yourself and him for continuing consultations, and to
the close consultations which are going forward between us on the Chirep
effort.
The letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.
Recommendation:
That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Your letter on consultations about my forthcoming visit to
China was most welcome. The need for direct personal
consultations has been very much on my mind, so that
your suggestions were greatly appreciated. I am hopeful
that a meeting between us can be scheduled for early next
year, and in our discussion about the format, I would
particularly like to pursue your recommendation for an
ANZUS meeting in Washington. For consultations on a
continuing basis, I am hopeful that the establishment of a
secure means of communication between us will be very
helpful in eliminating areas of misunderstanding.
I am also deeply grateful for your decision to join us in co-
sponsoring the Important Question and Dual Representation
resolutions. Your very timely backing was tremendously
helpful as we attempted to gain adequate co-sponsorship
and to organize sufficient support for the critical votes in
the General Assembly. I am pleased that our representa-
tives have continued to be in such close touch on this vital
issue, and we remain determined to make the strongest
effort possible to preserve a place in the United Nations
for the Republic of China.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
The Right Honorable
William McMahon
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
I TAB
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
32338-X
ACTION
@
SECRET/SENSITIVE
September 29, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE JAM/JAR
SUBJECT:
Letter to the President from Australian
Prime Minister McMahon
In your written comments on my memorandum of September 14 on a
draft reply from the President to Australian Prime Minister McMahon's
letter suggesting consultations on the President's China trip you indicated
a preference for a December visit here by McMahon (Tab I).
This raises certain problems in connection with the President's schedule.
King Hassan of Morocco is invited for December 2, and there is a possibility
that President Medici of Brazil will come on December 7. (We are now
exploring reversing these dates to accommodate Secretary Rogers' desire
to be present for the Medici visit.) The President may not wish to have
another high-level visitor during December, especially if it would involve
an official visit, as might be the case here if McMahon had no personal
reason for visiting the U.S.
In addition, the problem of consultations with New Zealand would remain,
and we would have to treat the matter separately from consultations with
McMahon. This thus would take us back to McMahon's other alternative --
a special ANZUS Council Meeting at the head of government level (the
regular annual session at the Foreign Ministerial level). I think we could
hold such a meeting for necessary consultations with our allies without
implying to the Chinese that our allies have a veto on our China policy.
Since the Chinese themselves have the same problem, I think we can
anticipate a measure of understanding on their part.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
Another alternative would be for the President at this time not to pick up
any of McMahon's suggestions for consultation at the highest level, but
simply to close his reply referring to our close consultations in New York
on the Chirep problem.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the President's draft reply suggest a visit by McMahon along in December.
Yes
No
That the President's draft reply suggest a special ANZUS Council meeting
at the heads of state level in December.
Yes
No
That the President's draft reply not suggest any meeting with McMahon or
Holyoake in the near future, but simply refer to our current close consultations
on Chirep.
Yes
No
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THRY
AW
MEMORANDUM
32338-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
September 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN H HOLDRIDGE
Me ralen
SUBJECT:
Letter to the President from Prime Minister
McMahon of Australia
You will recall that the President sent a letter to Prime independant Minister McMahon
come of in Peking Jewn
on August 10 which expressed regret over our inability to give McMahon
advance notice of the President's China initiative and referred to the
t
trip
possibility of setting up a channel for private and direct communications
between the President and McMahon (Tab C).
information
McMahon has now replied. In addition to stating that a secure link has now
been established through which urgent messages can be passed outside
(in
ordinary bureaucratic channels, he goes on to suggest a number of ways by
which the President might ease Australian domestic pressures arising
place
from the President's visit to China:
of ayal
Visiting Australia before the end of the year, which McMahon
still hopes might be possible.
Visiting Australia on the President's way to Peking, which
McMahon submits for the President's consideration, despite
the "obvious difficulties. 11
Convening a special Anzus meeting in Washington at the Head
of Government level which would "enable us to discuss the
agenda for your meeting and any difficulties arising out of it.' 11
McMahon believes that the Prime Minister of New Zealand
would concur.
- Having McMahon himself visit Washington when the President's
plans are settled.
Prime Minister McMahon's letter to the President is at Tab B.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
I doubt that the President would wish to be tied down to any of the courses
McMahon has suggested at this stage in the preparations for his trip. We
should also avoid anything which would suggest to the Chinese that there
is some kind of an Australian say in the evolution of U.S. China policy.
The Anzus meeting proposal might be the most acceptable. Accordingly,
I suggest that the President's reply be warm, refer to the Anzus meeting,
but be noncommittal as concerns the type of consultations we will provide
McMahon prior to the President's China trip. A draft letter to this effect,
and a memorandum from you to the President discussing it are at Tab A.
The letter has been cleared by Ray Price's office.
Recommendation:
That you approve the letter at Tab A and sign the memorandum transmitting
it to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
32338.X
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Letter to You from Australian Prime Minister
McMahon
Australian Prime Minister McMahon has sent you a letter (Tab B) in which
he noted that secure communications have now been established outside
normal channels between you and him, and offers a number of suggestions
for consultations between the two of you on your China visit. These
suggestions were offered in the spirit of reducing domestic repercussions
in Australia with respect to your China initiative. They include the
possibility of visits by you to Australia, a visit to Washington, or your
convening a special Anzus meeting at which McMahon and Prime Minister
Holvoake of New Zealand would both be present.
Of Prime Minister McMahon's suggestions, I regard the special Anzus
meeting as being the most practicable, since it would present the lowest
profile. (You would not wish to suggest to the Chinese that McMahon has
a say in your planning. ) However, I doubt that you will want to respond
to McMahon except in general terms at this stage of the planning for your
Peking visit. I have therefore drafted a letter from you to McMahon (Tab A)
which cites the establishment of secure communications, expresses
appreciation for his suggestion, indicates interest in the Anzus meeting
concept, but does not commit you. It also speaks favorably of the
consultations which we and the Australians have been holding on the
Chinese representation issue in the UN.
The letter has been cleared by Ray Price.
Recommendation:
That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Your letter comment ng on my forthcoming visit to China
and the types of consultat ons about the visit which might
be arranged between us was most welcome. The question
of consultations has been very much on my mind, and your
suggestions were greatly apprec ated. I was part cularly
taken by your thought on holding an Anzus meeting in
W shington. You may be sure that all your comments will
be givén very careful consideration as my travel plans
mature, and that there will be further communications
between US on this matter.
The establishment of a secure means of communication
between us should be verv helpful in eliminating areas of
misunderstanding. I am also pleased that our represen-
tatives have been in close contact on the question of
maintaining the
Republic of China in the
United Nations while at the same time admitting the
People's Republic of China. Your hope that an agreed
formula for an appropriate resolution or resolutions to
this effect can be determined which our two countries can
co-sponsor, is of course shared by me.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
The Right Honorable
William McMahon
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra
RN:RP:JHHoldridge:emh 9-14-71
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
EMBASSY OF australia
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Hildules 8th think September, 1971. Angus outsy Main
meding before visit
t Clina mached be worl
Dear Dr Kissinger,
appropriate Include
I attach a letter which I have received from
the Prime Minister of Australia to the President of the
United States.
Respend
I am passing it to the President through you
because of some of the references in the letter.
I
money
shall not be passing a copy of the letter to anyone
else in the Administration.
I would be glad if you would arrange for the
letter to be given to the President.
Yours sincerely,
(J. Plimsoll)
Ambassador
Dr Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs,
White House,
WASHINGTON
D.C.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED [NLN 05-38/3:2]
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
32338X
EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
8th September, 1971.
Dear Dr Kissinger,
I attach a letter which I have received from
the Prime Minister of Australia to the President of the
United States.
I am passing it to the President through you
because of some of the references in the letter. I
shall not be passing a copy of the letter to anyone
else in the Administration.
I would be glad if you would arrange for the
letter to be given to the President.
Yours sincerely,
(t. Plimsoll)
Ambassador
Dr Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs,
White House,
WASHINGTON
D.C.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 05-38/3 Date act Byr 2007
SEP 12 0007
By
[p.1 of 6]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRIME MINISTER
CANBERRA
buy dear President.
Many thanks for your messages,
passed to me through Henry Kissinger, about your
forthcoming visit to China. These exchanges,
which I am treating as being for my personal information
only, are of great value and I hope they can continue.
You will know, that because we
have traditionally been SO closely associated, any
divergences in our public positions immediately become
a matter of controversy here. If we differ, it is
best to differ in private and to present to the rest
of the world a united front. In this context the
information passed to me by Dr Kissinger through
Ambassador Plimsoll has been of particular value.
We have now established a secure
link through which urgent messages can be passed
without involving the ordinary bureaucratic channels.
In your letter which was forwarded
to me on 10 August 1971, you offered to consider any
steps which would ease the Australian dcmestic pressures
arising from your proposed visit to China.
I still hope that it might be possible
for you to visit Australia before the end of the year.
I appreciate the difficulties of fitting in such a visit,
but needless to say you will be a very welcome guest at
any time. A visit by you would, I am convinced, be most
popular with the Australian people and would have the
effect of underlining in a positive manner, the friendship
between our peoples.
I consequently suggest three possible
courses for your consideration.
The first is that you might visit
Australia on your way to Peking. I see obvious
difficulties in this course, but I submit it for your
consideration.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
[NLN 05 - 38 / 3:3
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
The second is that there should be
a special meeting of Anzus in Washington shortly before
you leave for China, at your explicit request. This
could be at the Head of Government level and would
enable us to discuss the agenda for your meeting and
any difficulties arising out of it.
I have not of course consulted the
Prime Minister of New Zealand, but I feel sure he
would concur with my suggestion.
A third possibility is that I should
myself visit Washington when the plans for your visit
are settled.
On the question of Chinese representation
in the United Nations, we are continuing detailed
discussions with your Delegation in New York.
I hope that we can hammer out a
resolution or resolutions which will maintain the
position of the Republic of China as a member of the
United Nations, while at the same time admitting the
People's Republic of China to membership, including the
Security Council Seat. We very much hope we can agree
on a formula which we and as many as possible like-minded
countries can co-sponsor.
Sueneely
American
(William McMahon)
President Richard Nixon,
The White House,
WASHINGTON.
[NL005-38/3:4]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1 October 71
Dr. Kissinger:
Action on this is apparently
required before a proper
response can be made.
Coleman
Reproduced at the Richard Jane Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be
SECRET
18th July, 1971.
Dear Mr President,
Following your announcement of your intended visit to
the People's Republic of China, I issued a public statement
endorsing this initiative without reservation and pointing
out that it was in line with my own policy seeking to
normalise relations between Australia and China. We partic-
ularly welcome your statement that the action you are taking
will "not be at the expense of old friends." My Government
also sincerely hopes that your visit to Peking will be
successful. There is no other person as capable of taking
the leadership as you are.
You should know, nonetheless, that we were placed in a
quandary by our lack of any foreknowledge of what is certainly
a dramatic step in the foreign policy of the United States:
the more so because we have attempted under all circumstan-
ces to co-ordinate our policies and support you in what you
are doing. In saying this I appreciate that the matter was
one of great delicacy, requiring complete secrecy if it were
to have any hope of success. Nevertheless, whilst details
could not be given, I believe it should have been possible to
advise your friends and allies of the broad trends in your
thinking. This applies particularly to those who have made
some contact with Peking and have kept your Government informed.
Our relations with the People's Republic of China have in
recent weeks been a matter of deep public controversy in
Australia following a visit to Peking by members of the Australian
Labour Party, including the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Whitlam.
We have felt obliged to criticise many of the things which Mr
Whitlam said and did in Peking including some quite gratuitous
attacks and criticism of our friends and allies including the
United States and indeed his reference to the need for you your-
self to change your policies or get defeated. Nothing which I
or my Ministers have said calls for any retraction on our part
but some of it would have been cast differently had we been given
an indication of changes in American policy along the lines I have
mentioned.
Although I have been able, as have several other governments,
to say that I knew of the purport of your remarks in advance, it
is apparent to the Australian press that there was no kind of
consultation between our two Governments. This has naturally led
to the assumption that our relations are not as close as they
should be, which is surely something that neither of us want.
DECLASSIFIED
..../2.
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN
SEP 13 2007
By
a
Date
3
2007
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
- 2-
Australia has for some months now been engaged in
trying to develop a dialogue with Peking through contact
with Chinese representatives in other capitals, principally
Paris, designed to normalise diplomatic relationships. We
have kept the United States informed of these contacts which,
while at the outset referred to obstacles relating to our
relations with the United States and our general attitude
towards the People's Republic of China, have basically boiled
down now to an insistence that we abandon the Republic of China
on Taiwan. There has been a growing realisation by the
Australian public that whether or not we will stand by the
Republic of Taiwan is the sticking point. But great confusion
has now been created by your announcement of 16th July. I am
being asked to explain how the United States can honourably
do things which Australia cannot do.
I hope that when Secretary Rogers sees Ambassador
Plimsoll on Monday these misunderstandings can be cleared up.
In the meantime, the question of our policy towards
Chinese representation in the United Nations remains unsolved.
The "Albanian Resolution" has already been listed and will in
the normal order of events be voted on before any resolution
which you or we may decide to sponsor. I fear that unless
we act quickly and in concert with our friends, the Albanian
Resolution will be carried and the Republic of China expelled
from the United Nations. May I once again stress to you the
desirability of the United States, Japan, New Zealand and
Australia concerting a policy on this important matter?
Yours sincerely,
WILLIAM McMAHON
05-38/4:2
-SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Kissinger handed
MEMORANDUM
Australian Ambassador
THE WHITE HOUSE
letter (JabA) aug 10, 1971
WASHINGTON
30789
mew
SECRET
ACTION
August 2, 1971
THE president HAS SEEN
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER HX
SUBJECT:
Proposed Reply from You to Australian
Prime Minister McMahon's Letter
Complaining About Our Short Notice on
Announcement of China Initiative
Australian Prime Minister McMahon wrote you July 18 (Tab B) complain-
ing strongly over the short notice we gave his Government on the
announcement of our China initiative.
At Tab A is a proposed reply from you to McMahon expressing
appreciation for his prompt and full support which he gave to our
China move, conveying your regret over our inability to give him
earlier notice on this development, and referring to the possibility
of setting up a channel for private and direct communications between
you and Prime Minister McMahon. The draft also expresses your
gratitude for his past cooperation in the area of China policy, and
states your intention to consult with the Australian Government in
our handling of the Chinese representation question.
The letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.
Recommendation:
That you sign the proposed letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Thank you for your letter of July 18, 1971, conveying to me
personally your support for my recent initiative concerning
the People's Republic of China and informing me of certain
problems that our means of announcing that initiative
unfortunately caused for you.
First, let me say that I am very grateful for the full measure
of support which you have given to this move on my part
toward Peking. I want you to know that this unstinting and
immediate support means even more to us in light of the
problems our method of announcing this development has
created for you. Your response is further evidence of the
fundamental strength of the strong bonds which exist between
our two nations as well as between us personally. You can
be sure that this magnanimous gesture on your part was
deeply appreciated.
I understand fully and regret most deeply the domestic
problems in Australia which have resulted from our inability
to consult with you beforehand. If there is anything that I
personally or my Administration generally can do at this
point to ease this burden, please let me know at your earliest
convenience.
The decision that we would not be able to inform our close
friends in advance of the China initiative was an extremely
difficult one for me to make. I can assure you that I weighed
most carefully the entire matter of who should be informed--
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
- 2 -
both within our own Government and around the world. I
finally concluded that if we were to discuss Dr. Kissinger's
trip outside the smallest possible circle of United States
Government officials, it would be virtually impossible for
him to carry out the mission successfully. Our dilemma
was compounded by the fact that, if we had decided to consult
with other governments, the first we would have had to
approach would have been the Republic of China -- an action
which would have presented obvious problems. I know you
will agree with me that the paramount importance of improving
relations with the People's Republic of China in the interest
of world peace made it imperative that we do nothing that
might jeopardize chances for the success of the mission.
However, there may very well be occasions n the future
when you or I would wish to communicate privately and
directly, perhaps in advance of actions one or the other of
us may be preparing to take. You are no doubt aware that
at my request Dr. Kissinger discussed this matter with
Ambassador Plimsoll on July 23, and suggested that a means
for such private communications be set up outside normal
diplomatic channels to obviate the chances of our exchanges
becoming public knowledge. I hope that this arrangement
will be agreeable to you, and that we can proceed with the
modalities as soon as possible.
As regards the question of Chinese representation in the
United Nations, both Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger
explained to Ambassador Plimsoll last week that we are now
awaiting the decision of the Government of the Republic of
China as to whether or not it will acquiesce in the loss of its
Security Council seat while attempting to retain a seat in the
General Assembly and membership in the specialized agencies.
As soon as we have a reply from Taipei, we will be in a
position to consult further with other governments, and to
make our final decision. Your Government will certainly
be among the first with whom we will consult at that time
and we look forward to working closely with you in the effort
to secure the maximum support possible for whatever course
we can then agree upon.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
- 3 -
Again, Mr. Prime Minister, I sincerely regret whatever
inconvenience our manner of approach on recent China policy
has caused you. I appreciate greatly your working so closely
with us in this vital area, and I look forward to effective
cooperation with you in this area in the future. The many
strong ties that unite our two peoples are of the highest
importance to us, and we will always work to minimize and
eliminate any frictions or differences that might endanger
them.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
The Right Honorable
William McMahon
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra
RN:RP:JAF:emh 7-28-71
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
30789
SECRET
ACTION
July 28, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE
SUBJECT:
Proposed Reply from the President to
Australian Prime Minister McMahon's
Letter on China Policy
Attached at Tab A is a proposed reply from the President to Australian
Prime Minister McMahon responding to his strong complaint over the
short notice we gave on the announcement of our China initiative.
Marshall Wright concurs in this draft, and the letter has been cleared
with Ray Price's office. However, the paragraph on a special communi-
cations channel between the President and McMahon was not shown to
either.
Recommendation:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
OK
HC
Let me Land to Plinnall
SECRET
one done
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
HK
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
ACTION
October 6, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Proposed Direct Personal Consultations
Between You and Australian Prime
Minister McMahon on China Policy
Australian Ambassador to the U.S. Sir James Plimsoll told me today
that Prime Minister McMahon urgently desires to visit Washington to
consult with you on China policy at the earliest practicable-date.
As you know, McMahon has been under heavy domestic political attack
from the Labor opposition aon his China policy ever since last July,
with the Labor opposition charging that he has fallen badly behind the
U.S. in his efforts to improve relations with the PRC. (Unaware of our
plans, he strongly criticized Labor Party Leader Whitlam's conduct
during Whitlam's trip to Peking in early July. He was consequently
rather acutely embarrassed at home when the plans for your trip were
announced.) McMahon believes that direct personal consultations with
you at this point will help him carry continuing opposition criticism at
home. It will also restore the image of close, cordial relations between
our two countries. To turn his request down at this critical time for him
domestically, would probably be interpreted as a serious affront on our
part.
RECOMMENDATION:
That we invite the Prime Minister to make an unofficial visit to Washing-
ton sometime next month. You could receive him for a two hour office
meeting and host a small business dinner that evening.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7110745
30789
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 23, 1971
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Prime Minister McMahon's Letter
Regarding Your Visit to China
Prime Minister McMahon of Australia has followed
up his public support for your announcement with a
letter in which he reiterates his support and wishes
you every success. At the same time he points out
that lacking "foreknowledge" of at least the broad
trends of American policies caused him to take posi-
tions from which the inference has been drawn in
Australia that there has been lack of consultation
with the U.S. An unofficial Australian Labor Party
delegation headed by the Opposition leader has just
completed a visit to Peking. This combined with
the U.S. move on Peking has been unfavorably contrasted
with McMahon's low-key efforts for a detente in their
own relations with Peking, and it is being exploited
by the Opposition for political advantage. Finally,
McMahon notes that the "Albanian Resolution" has
already been listed for consideration at the UN
General Assembly and stresses the desirability of
U.S.-Japanese-New Zealand-Australian cooperation to
assist the GRC at the General Assembly.
The suggested reply expresses appreciation for
McMahon's support, expresses regret for the difficulties
caused him by the announcement, and points out that
the sensitivity of this event made it impossible to
consult with him beforehand as would normally be the
case. In conclusion, it reassures McMahon on the
question of future consultation.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
2
Recommendation:
That you sign the attached letter to Prime
Minister McMahon.
Willind Rogm William P. Rogers
Attachment:
Draft Letter to McMahon
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SUGGESTED LETTER
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I want you to know how grateful I am to you
for the public statement you made last week endorsing
my announcement about the planned visit to Peking. I
am fully aware of the difficult position described in
your most recent letter that the announcement put you
in and I am also aware of your government's earlier
efforts to keep us so well informed about your own
contacts with Peking. Under the circumstances your
unqualified statement was magnanimous. Your support
in this as in so many instances in the past was
important to us and deeply valued.
I regret that the sensitivity of Dr. Kissinger's
trip prevented me from consulting you beforehand,
particularly since we had been consulting so closely
on the Chinese representation issue and other Chinese
policy matters. We feared that if we discussed the
trip outside the smallest possible inner circle it
would have been impossible to get Dr. Kissinger in
and out of Peking without anyone knowing. Also had
we consulted with others we would have been obliged to
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
go to the Government of the Republic of China first,
and this would have presented obvious problems. I
know you agree with me that the great importance of
improving relations with the Peoples Republic of China
in the interest of world peace made it imperative we
do nothing to jeopardize chances for success of the
mission.
Please let me reassure you that we wish to continue
consulting with you in the future on Chinese representation
and other Chinese policy related issues to the maximum
extent possible. As Secretary Rogers told Ambassador
Plimsoll at their meeting July 19 we have at this point
asked the GRC whether it is prepared to acquiesce in
the loss of the Security Council seat and at the same time
to fight to remain in the UN. We have also told the
GRC that if they are willing to do so we are prepared
to help them. We shall be discussing Chirep tactics
further with you, the New Zealanders, and the Japanese
just as soon as we have the Chinese answer.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.
18th July, 1971.
Dear Kissinger,
I have been asked to arrange for the attached
letter from the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr William
McMahon to President Nixon to be conveyed to the President
as soon as possible. I should be very grateful if you
could do so.
Yours sincerely,
J havett Lavett )
Counsellor
Dr Henry A. Kissinger,
Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
NBR
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
24
30789
Capass NITIAL ACTION OFF
23
7
9
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
X
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
U
NO FORN
NODIS
X
X
KISSINGER
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
LAIRD, M
c
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
X
S
CODE WORD
MAHON
RES DATA
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: PM McMolan 7 Australia Expresses Support for Pres visit 2
Approal towards 7110745 PLC
REFERENCE:
S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
x
)
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
FAR EAST
X
X
(
)
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
Sub-saharan AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
LR PLANNING
DUE DATE: 7/27
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
JOINED By # 30544.
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
7/24
JAF
Ace me about this the letter
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
needs to be warmed up, & other
changes made
7/28
HOLDRIDGE
HAK
X
PRES To 53N LTR To MCMAHON (on/30)
of
No Copy of Actual LTR
+
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
DATE
X MICROFILM DATA
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
DO
INIT
Strice
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
AUG 1319/1
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
ORIG)
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: No C4 OF LTR AVAILABLE
TO )
NSC PAF X
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
UNDER THIS #,
WHC
YES
NO
SUBF
* GPO: 1971-412-412
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
33531X
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
0
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
October 8, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE JAIL/JAR
SUBJECT:
Proposed Reply from the President to Australian
Prime Minister McMahon
At Tab A is a memorandum from you to the President attaching a proposed
reply from him to Australian Prime Minister McMahon's two letters
delivered September 8 and October 6. The reply, in addition to thanking
McMahon for his cooperation on Chirep and China policy in general,
suggests that he consider visiting Washington unofficially early next
month to discuss China policy.
The draft reply has been cleared with Ray Price's office.
Recommendation:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.
Hug InPus. fu H&R
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
33531X
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
October 11, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
K
SUBJECT:
Suggested Reply from You to Australian Prime
Minister McMahon
At Tab A is a proposed reply from you to Australian Prime Minister
McMahon's two recent letters to you. In the first, forwarded
September 8, he offered several alternatives for meeting with you for
direct personal consultations on China policy--your visiting Australia
on your way to Peking, a special ANZUS Council meeting in Washington
at the heads of state level just before your China trip, and his visiting
Washington when the plans for your China trip had been completed.
In the second, forwarded October 6, McMahon described recent
discussions with the Chinese on improving Australia's relations with
them. The contacts in Paris earlier this year came to naught as a
result of Chinese insistence on discussing diplomatic relations only,
and doing that only on the condition that Australia break with the
Republic of China. More recently, the Chinese have reopened the
questions through their representatives in Hong Kong, suggesting that
a junior Australian minister make a private visit to China and that the
two countries exchange trade delegations. Australia demurred on the
first, but has accepted the second, and is now readying a trade mission
which will leave for China towards the end of next month. The Chinese
have, however, noted that they look on the exchange of trade missions
as a prelude to diplomatic recognition, and that further trade "must be
based on recognition of the PRC only. "
The proposed reply expresses appreciation for Prime Minister McMahon's
keeping you informed, and suggests that he consider visiting Washington
unofficially early next month for discussions on China policy. It also
thanks him for his Government's co-sponsoring our Chirep resolutions,
and for their close cooperation throughout with us on this issue.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
The original letters are at Tabs B and C. The draft reply has been cleared
with Ray Price's office.
Recommendation:
That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 12, 1971
SECRET
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Your letters forwarded to me by Ambassador
Plimsoll on September 8 and October 6 concern-
ing my forthcoming visit to China and your own
discussions with Chinese representatives to im-
prove relations were most welcome. I appreciated
your very informative description of your recent
diplomatic contacts with the People's Republic of
China and the conditions that the Chinese are set-
ting for the improvement of relations with them.
The need for direct personal consultations between
the two of us has been very much on my mind, and
your suggestions were greatly appreciated. I
would suggest that, if agreeable to you, you might
arrange to pay an unofficial visit to the United
States early in November, during which time you
could come to Washington for discussions with me
on China. By that time Dr. Kissinger will have
returned from Peking and will have fresh impres-
sions to pass along. For consultations on a
continuing basis, I am hopeful that the establish-
ment of a secure means of communication between
us will be very helpful in eliminating areas of
misunderstanding.
I am also deeply grateful for your decision to join
us in co-sponsoring the Important Question and
Dual Representation resolutions. Your very timely
backing was tremendously helpful as we attempted
to gain adequate co-sponsorship and to organize
sufficient support for the critical votes in the
General Assembly. I am pleased that our repre-
sentatives have continued to be in such close touch
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
on this vital issue, and we remain determined to
make the strongest effort possible to preserve a
place in the United Nations for the Republic of
China.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
The Right Honorable
William McMahon
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 11 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 12 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE
USE
WASHING
July 10, 1971
SECRET Attachment
STATE SECRETARIAT
SUBJECT: President's letter to
Prime Minister McMahon
(S/S 7107231-NSC 28515)
Please dispatch the attached
letter from the President to Prime
Minister McMahon through AMEMBASSY
Canberra.
A copy for your information is
also enclosed.
stem T.Shmlu
John H. Murphy
NSC Secretariat
Reproduced at the Richard Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined
NSC 28515
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
July 10, 1971
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Thank you for your letter of May 13, 1971, con-
cerning the China policies of our two governments,
particularly as they relate to Chinese represen-
tation in the United Nations. I also appreciated
receiving earlier the preliminary analysis of the
Chinese representation issue prepared by your
Department of Foreign Affairs and members of
my government are studying it as we proceed
with our own analysis.
At present we are in the midst of consultations
with a number of countries including your govern-
ment, and I am sure that Ambassador Plimsoll has
conveyed to you our tentative thinking on how to
approach this question in the upcoming session
of the General Assembly. As soon as we have
completed these discussions, we will be taking
a final look at the problem, and I will expect to
announce my decision probably some time in the
latter half of July. Prior to this announcement,
I will plan to be in touch with you through Ambas-
sador Plimsoll as to the substance of the decision.
SECRET
Dispatched 7/10/71 through State Secretariat
Receipt 2619 to STATE
CC: Holdridge, Wright
Files: PAF, Hak Chron
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2-
This has been a particularly complicated
problem to deal with, and I have appreciated
your thoughts on it and cooperation in handling
it. I recognize the need for moving with all
deliberate speed, and look forward to working
with you as we make the final preparations
for the General Assembly session.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Richt 4
His Excellency
William McMahon
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
28515
WASHINGTON
ACTION
July 6, 1971
SECRET
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
GENERAL HAIG
@
SUBJECT:
Reply from You to Australian Prime
Minister McMahon's Letter of May 13
on Chinese Representation
Australian Prime Minister William McMahon on May 13 wrote you
asking for an early indication of our position on the question of
Chinese representation, expressing his concern over pressures at
home on his Government's China policy and recent damage to Taipei's
diplomatic position, and outlining his basic position on the China
question (Tab B).
At Tab A is a proposed reply from you to Prime Minister McMahon
which informs him that we expect to be reaching a decision on the
Chinese representation question in the near future, which we would
announce in the latter half of July.
The proposed reply has been cleared with Ray Price's office.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Les:
THE WHITE House
WASHINGTON
Attached should go to Holdridge -- literally
Date: 10/8/71
outside the system for staffing: a memo to
the President attach a proposed warm response
to McMahon (per Winston).
Ihave given Haig/HAK a xerox with one of
JACK FROEBE
TO:
your yellow slips "Staff has action - Holdridge
outside the system."
FROM:
DAVE GERGEN
Lora -- 10/6
From these materials, I assume
that you are now suggesting that
he visit in November -- and
you are giving up on the ANZUS
option for January.
Also assume that you no longer
want to thank for help on Chirep
issue.
letter as "edited
Dave &
to Holdridge -for
Action "TOTAlly outside Septem"
for
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10/9/71
Ed Roberts:
An "x" number for your files.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
SECRET
PERSONAL - TO BE
OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY.
Dr Henry A. Kissinger,
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Council
Executive Office of the President
WASHINGTON D.C.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
USTRALIAN
VT
SECRET
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF
STRALIAN
AUSTRALI
USTRAL
W
FOREIGN
AREATS FOREIGN
ASHINGTON
ACA
LAW
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
6PM
GTON
30 DEPARTMENT
30
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
28515
SECRET
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Thank you for your letter of May 13, 1971, con-
cerning the China policies of our two governments,
particularly as they relate to Chinese represen-
tation in the United Nations. I also appreciated
receiving earlier the preliminary analysis of the
Chinese representation issue prepared by your
Department of Foreign Affairs and members of
my government are studying it as we proceed
with our own analysis.
At present we are in the midst of consultations
with a number of countries including your govern-
ment, and I am sure that Ambassador Plimsoll has
conveyed to you our tentative thinking on how to
approach this question in the upcoming session
of the General Assembly. As soon as we have
completed these discussions, we will be taking
a final look at the problem, and I will expect to
announce my decision probably some time in the
latter half of July. Prior to this announcement,
I will plan to be in touch with you through Ambas-
sador Plimsoll as to the substance of the decision.
SECRET
Rewrtn at direction of Butterfield/Huntsman to change
"yourselves!" in line 2, para 2, to read "your government. "
RTK:lds:7/6/71
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Thank you for your letter of May 13, 1971, con-
cerning the China policies of our two governments,
particularly as they relate to Chinese represen-
tation in the United Nations. I also appreciated
receiving earlier the preliminary analysis of the
Chinese representation issue prepared by your
Department of Foreign Affairs and members of
my government are studying it as we proceed
with our own analysis.
At present we are in the midst of consultations
with a number of countries including yourselves,
and I am sure that Ambassador Plimsoll has
conveyed to you our tentative thinking on how to
approach this question in the upcoming session
of the General Assembly. As soon as we have
completed these discussions, we will be taking
a final look at the problem, and I will expect to
announce my decision probably some time in the
latter half of July. Prior to this announcement,
I will plan to be in touch with you through Ambas-
sador Plimsoll as to the substance of the decision.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7107231
NSC 28515
department OF state
Washington, D.C. 20520
May 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Prime Minister McMahon's Letter
to President Nixon
The Australian Embassy delivered to the Department
the attached letter to Secretary Rogers asking the
Secretary to deliver a letter to President Nixon
from Prime Minister McMahon. We have prepared a
draft reply for the President to respond to Prime
Minister McMahon's letter.
to
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
As stated.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CRET
EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA
WASHINGTON. D. C.
13th May, 1971.
Dear Secretary,
I have been instructed by the Australian
Prime Minister to have the attached message from
the Prime Minister on the Chinese question delivered
to President Nixon.
I should be grateful if you would arrange
for this to be done.
Yours sincerely,
f. Plimedl Plimsoll )
(
Ambassador
The Hon. William P. Rogers,
Secretary of State,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
28515
department OF state
S/S - 7108243
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET/EXDIS
June 4, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Prime Minister McMahon's Letter
to President Nixon
As the Secretary mentioned in his May 28 Memorandum
for the President, now that the President has reached
some tentative decisions about the Chinese representation
question, it is appropriate for his reply to Prime
Minister McMahon's recent letter to be a substantive one.
Assistant Secretary Green briefed the Australian Ambassador
June 2. Even so it is important that a reply be sent to
Prime Minister McMahon, particularly as Embassy Canberra
has reported his "keen interest" in a response to his
personal message to the President. We have therefore pre-
pared a draft reply for the President. It should be
substituted for the suggested interim reply attached to
my May 14 memorandum.
Theodore he.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Draft letter to Prime Minister McMahon
2. Eliot/Kissinger memorandum dated
May 14, 1971
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER / 13 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MW
MEMORANDUM
28515
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET
July 2, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL HAIG
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR.
W. MARSHALL WRIGHT
SUBJECT:
Reply from the President to Australian
Prime Minister McMahon's Letter of
May 13 on Chinese Representation
Dr. Kissinger asked that our earlier draft reply from the President
to Australian Prime Minister McMahon's letter of May 13 on Chinese
representation be non-substantive. Attached at Tab A of Tab I is a
re-draft which mentions only our plans for an early decision and for
consultations with Australia and other countries before announcing
that decision.
The draft reply has been cleared with Ray Price's office.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
5
14
5
IS
to
28515
HOLDRIDGE7Wright
FROM: ELIOT X
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
TO: PRES
U
NO FORN
KISSINGER
x
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
NODIS EXDIS x
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
LAIRD, M
C
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
S
X
CODE WORD
RES DATA
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: PM McMohon Summary of Austiolian Position on UN Chirys
And its entanglement in Somestic public reactions
REFERENCE:
S/S 7107231
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
memo FOR PRES
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY for Press SIGNATURE
x
(
FAR EAST
X
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
sub-saharan AFRICA
X
)
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
X
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
UNITED NATIONS
X
REFER TO STATE
(
)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
DUE DATE: 5/20
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
CY TO
5/27
HOLDRIDGE
HAK
X
ACTION Pres REQUIRED to Sgn GRto Mc Mahon (5/25)
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
C/1
HAR
Hold
S
Further Ac tion ? ( ( 3 )
6/16
How
HAK
x
Pres to sg Its to McMala (6/21)
JUN 21 1971
HAK
Hold.
S
Further actionte do w/Wright (4/25)
6/2/
JHH
JAF
S
for redo
JUL 10 1971
Pres sgd the to MeWlahon
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO DATE 55
SEE LOG
DO x EMA
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
JUL
13197A INIT
1
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
ORIG)
NSC
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
TO )
PAF X
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
* GPO: 1971-412-412
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Dr Henry A. Kissinger,
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Council
Executive Office of the President
WASHINGTON D.C.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
32338-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET/SENSITIVE
October 5, 1971
0
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE JHH/JOR
SUBJECT:
Suggested Reply from the President to
Australian Prime Minister McMahon
At Tab A. is a memorandum from you to the President attaching a
proposed reply from him to Australian Prime Minister McMahon, who
wrote the President concerning direct personal consultations with him
on China policy sometime before the President's trip. The revised
proposed reply incorporates your instruction that we informally invite,
through the Australian Embassy, McMahon here in January, which has
been done. The phraseology suggests that this may be done via a special
ANZUS meeting, as McMahon suggested but does not pin the President
down either as to the nature of the visit or the time. (If an ANZUS
meeting is ultimately decided upon, we would also wish to extend an
invitation to Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand.) The reply also
makes reference to the establishment of a secure channel of communi-
cation between the President and McMahon for continuing consultations,
and to the close consultations which are going forward between us and
the Australians on the Chirep effort.
The letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.
Recommendation:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
32338-X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A., KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Letter to You from Australian
Prime Minister McMahon
Australian Prime Minister McMahon has sent you a letter (Tab B) in which he
noted that secure communications have now been established outside normal
channels between you and him, and offers a number of suggestions for con-
sultations between the two of you on your China visit. These suggestions
were offered in the spirit of reducing domestic repercussions in Australia
with respect to your China initiative. They include the possibility of visits
by you to Australia, a visit to Washington, or your convening a special
ANZUS meeting at which McMahon and Prime Minister Holyoake of New
Zealand would both be present.
Of McMahon's several alternatives, I think that his visiting Washington
possibly in January would be the most practicable. This could be in the form
of an official visit, if he would not by chance be passing through en route to
another meeting, or in a special ANZUS Council meeting at the heads of state
level, in which case New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake would join us.
Any of these would be low profile, which would avoid suggesting to the Chinese
that Australia and New Zealand have a determining influence on our China
policy. I have accordingly left the wording of your reply to McMahon flexible,
both as to the form and time of the meeting.
The reply also makes reference to the establishment of a secure channel of
communications between yourself and him for continuing consultations, and to
the close consultations which are going forward between us on the Chirep
effort.
The letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.
Recommendation:
That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
196
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
3574
August 22, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR ROSE MARY WOODS
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
SUBJECT:
Suggested Replies to Messages to President
Nixon from Foreign Leaders
Attached are suggested draft replies and the incoming mes-
sages sent to President Nixon from the following foreign
leaders:
Australia
Former Prime Minister McMahon / 3472
Japan
Former Prime Minister Sato (Original message 3532
from Japanese Embassy)
Korea
President Park 3462
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SUGGESTED DRAFT REPLY
3472
Dear Mr. McMahon:
I am deeply grateful to you for your kind message,
transmitted by the American Consul General in Sydney.
I look back with special feelings of warmth on my
meetings with my Australian friends, and I know that the
close ties between our countries will continue under
President Ford.
Mrs. Nixon and I wish you and Mrs. McMahon the
very best in the years to come.
Sincerely,
(RN)
The Honorable William McMahon
Sydney, Australia
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
or STATE
Department of State
of STATES ORLINA AMERICA License
TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED 3998
PAGE 01 CANBER 05244 1206072
13
ACTION EA-14
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS=20 RSC-01 DRC-01 /037 W
039314
R 1205332 AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3859
INFO AMCONGEN MELBOURNE
AMCONGEN SYDNEY
AMCONSUL BRISSANE
AMCONSUL PERTH
UNCLAS CANBERRA 5244
EO 11652: NA.
TAGS: PFOR. AS, US.
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON
FROM FORMER PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON.
AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL IN SYDNEY HAS RECEIVED
FOI MESSAGE FROM FORMER PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON WITH
REQUEST THAT IT BE DELIVERED TO FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON:
QTF WE HAVE BOTH WATCHED ON TV YOURSTATEMENT OF
RESIGNATION. IT WAS A TRULY GREAT GESTURE AND ONE FOR
WHICH YOU WILL BE LONG REMEMBERED. I THINK YOU WOULD
KNOW HOW DEEPLY SONIA AND I FEEL FOR YOU AND YOUR
FAMILY. OUR PERMANENT GOOD WILL AND GOOD WISHES TO
YOU AND YOUR FAMILY. END QUOTE.
HARROP
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This_document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified