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Mr. President:
Attached is the memorandum for
distribution to the departments
JSE
which you requested.
le past two weeks at
Washington and Paris
Henry A. Kissinger
position.
: statement on Vietnam
vernmentally approved
of April 1, 1969. Further,
ats dealing with troop
Henry
letter
SECRET/NODIS
PRESERVATION COPY
I
File
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
/
REWIND
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
I have become increasingly disturbed over the past two weeks at
the confusing press stories emanating from Washington and Paris
which may undermine our Paris negotiating position.
Consequently, I hereby direct that any public statement on Vietnam
be carefully checked for consistency with governmentally approved
policy, especially that contained in NSDM 9 of April 1, 1969. Further,
for the time being, I want all public statements dealing with troop
withdrawals on any basis to be terminated.
SECRET/NODIS
PRESERVATION COPY
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL
April 22, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Richard Sneider
SUBJECT: SEATO Meeting
I reviewed last week wi th the Department preparations
for the SEATO and Troop Contributors meetings at Bangkok
scheduled the week of May 19. There is attached the first draft
of the Scope Paper covering both meetings for your background.
It is unexceptionable, if a bit pallid.
The basic objective of the exercise will be to reaffirm
and reassure on our commitments to the area, but in general
terms. The key problem at the meeting will be the degree to
which we are prepared to consult in a meaningful way on our
policies with respect to Vietnam. This of course relates
particularly to the question of unilateral troop withdrawals and
the extent to which such withdrawals take place including also
the troops of our allies.
I have requested that a memorandum be sent over to the
White House outlining to the President our general plans for the
SEATO and TCC meetings and recommending the policy decisions
that need to be made prior to the meetings. I will keep after this
one so that it arrives reasonably ahead of time.
Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SAIGON VISIT/SEATO/SEVEN-NATION/CENTO MEETINGS
SAIGON/BANGKOK/TEHRAN
May, 1969
Scope Paper
1. The Secretary's visit to the 14th SEATO Council Meeting
and the Seven-Nation (troop-contributing) Meeting in Bangkok
will provide Asian leaders with their first opportunity, with
the exception of the brief and hectic exposure some of them
received at the funeral of General Eisenhower, to meet with
the new Administration. The representatives of the six
Asian countries (Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines,
Thailand and Viet-Nam) with whom he will be meeting in Saigon
and Bangkok will be listening anxiously and probing for
indications of the Administration's intended course with
regard to the Paris negotiations and our posture and involve-
ment in a post Viet-Nam East Asia.
2. Awareness of the critical importance of U.S. intentions
to these countries has been heightened by the background of
Viet-Nam dissent and disenchantment in the United States and
the fear that the United States is embarked on a course of
SECRET
GROUP 3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2.
disengagement from direct involvement in Asian affairs.
Most recently the President's visit to Europe has been
parochially interpreted in some sectors in the Far East
as suggesting that the President may have relegated East
Asia to a secondary position in terms of U.S. interests.
3,
Against this background, the following questions will
be central to the discussions in Saigon and Bangkok:
a. What are the prospects at Paris?
b. What are the minimum U.S. conditions for a
negotiated settlement of the Viet-Nam war?
C. What will be the U.S. role in Southeast Asia
after the settlement?
d. What degree of determination and involvement
will the United States attach to this role?
4.
The key objective is to be responsive to the need
for reassurance felt by the countries of Southeast Asia
without extending U.S. commitments and without creating
an atmosphere of overconfidence which will set back our
objectives of increased responsibility, self-help and
cooperation on the part of the nations of the area them-
selves. The Secretary's task will be complicated by the
variety of circumstances, concerns and special interests
represented by the nations at the two meetings. Much of
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3.
refining and tailoring of the reassurance must come during
the bilateral discussions he will hold.
5.
Specifically, our overall objectives are:
a. to make clear that our commitments in the area,
which we fully intend to honor, are a reflection of our
national interest in a Southeast Asia of viable free nations;
b. to make clear that we intend to continue to play
a role in the area in pursuit of this interest. We consider
the nature and extent of our present commitments adequate
for this role;
C. to assure our Asian allies of our determination
to hold firm in Viet-Nam and Paris until a settlement is
secured giving the people of South Viet-Nam the opportunity
to determine their future without external interference;
d. to stress the importance which we attach to
meaningful consultations with our allies;
e. to emphasize our conviction that a meaningful
solution to the problem of the area can only be found through
the cooperative efforts of the nations of the area; and
f. to reaffirm our intention to support, to the extent
possible, the constructive programs of the mations of the
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
4.
area for improving their internal strength and viability
and for helping one another.
SAIGON VISIT
1. This will be not only the Secretary's first visit to
Viet-Nam but the first visit by a Secretary of State since
December, 1966. As the ranking member of the new Adminis-
tration to visit that country, he can expect to receive
particular attention from the Government of Viet-Nam and
from the large world and South Vietnamese press contingent
in Saigon. Secretary Lairdvisited Viet-Nam on March 6-10, 1969.
2. The Secretary's visit will give him an important oppor-
tunity to meet and become acquainted with the leaders of
the GVN and, incidentally, of our own U.S. Mission in Saigon.
It will give him the opportunity to follow up on the National
Security Council discussions of the Viet-Nam problem held
in April during. Ambassador Bunker's visit. Finally, he will
be able to expand upon the discussions which Vice President
Ky had with President Nixon, the Secretary, and Mr. Richardson
during Ky's attendance at the Eisenhower funeral.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
5.
3.
Vietnamese government officials will be eager to inform
him of the progress they have made, particularly in the
political field. This includes the establishment of con-
stitutional government, the election of national leaders,
the functioning of a bicameral legislature and Supreme Court,
the election of hamlet and village leaders, and renewed
political party activity looking toward the creation of a
possible two-party system.
4. The Vietnamese will be anxious to receive the Secretary's
reassurance of the continuing commitment of the United States
to support them. In addition, they will want his pledge to
continue regular close consultation between the GVN and USG
on Vietnamese affairs.
SEATO MEETING
1.
SEATO Council Meetings are normally largely of symbolic
importance. However, the May 20-21 meeting and particularly
the attendant bilaterals provide the first comprehensive
opportunity for our Asian allies to meet the Secretary and
the new Administration. It will furnish them the chance
to probe regarding the new Administrations East Asian
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
6.
policy, and similarly will provide the Secretary with a
major opportunity for creating an impressiom conducive
to furthering our objectives.
Marcos ann has cooled fairly this . 2.
Our allies' probing will take a variety of forms. For
instance, Philippine Foreign Secretary Romulo has told us
he will wish to discuss with the Secretary the replacement
of SEATO by a more effective organization. Some may take
the line of inquiring about possible policy changes by the
new Administration toward Communist China. Others will
want to hear his views on the Manila Communique and the
Thais will certainly be interested in his views on Laos and
on the Rusk-Thanat Communique.
3.
Principal U.S. objectives are to demonstrate continued
United States interest in the security of the area, to fore-
close speculation that the United States is moving away from
wholehearted support of SEATO, and to forestall related
efforts to precipitate changes in SEATO which would be
directed, in all probability, at seeking more specific
commitments from the United States. The following points
are designed to accomplish these objectives=
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
7.
a. reaffirming our support for SEATO as an effective
force in being and as an organization that can grow and
change to meet new conditions as they arise;
b. stressing the importance we continue to attach to
SEATO as a vital multilateral defense organization for the
area and as a demonstration of the desire on the part of
the member nations of the area to provide for their own
defense;
c. placing the United States on record as maintaining
our support for SEATO in the constructive role we believe
it must play in Southeast Asia's future; and
d. emphasizing the growing importance of SEATO's
efforts to assist nember nations in combating internal
subversion.
SEVEN-NATION MEETING
1. The Foreign Ministers of the seven nations contributing
troops in Viet-Nam will meet at Bangkok for the first time
since the Paris talks began. The seven participants --
representing Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines,
Thailand, the United States and Viet-Nam -- last met: in
Wellington in April, 1968. The seven nations' Foreign
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
8.
Ministers are supposed to consult annually on the implementa-
tion of the Manila Communique of October 25, 1966 per
Article 30.
2.
As the host, Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat has
indicated his belief that the Seven-Nation Meeting should
be highly substantive and meaningful, and has added a second
day to the meeting which required only one last year in
Wellington. He also wants a more substantive communique
than previous meetings have generated.
3.
The other participating governments will be most inter-
ested in getting a firsthand report on the Paris meetings.
They will also be eager to discuss with us future strategy
and tactics in the negotiations. Up until now we have kept
the troop-contributing governments informed as to progress
in 'Paris through our Missions in the various capitals. This
has been largely an information exercise and has not pro-
vided an opportunity for the other governments to comment
on or influence the direction in which the talks were
moving. This meeting will be their first opportunity for
the other governments to comment on or influence the direction
in which the talks were moving. This meeting will be their
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
9.
first opportunity to exchange with us and the other member
governments ideas regarding the form of a final settlement.
4.
The military situation on the ground in Viet-Nam. will
also be of primary interest to the seven nations. They will
welcome an authoritative up-to-date briefing on this subject
and can be counted upon to discuss progress in the military
sphere. They will also be interested in any plans we may
have regarding troop withdrawals and reduction, particularly
as it may affect their own forces in South Viet-Nam.
5. Since this is the only meeting in which the Koreans
will participate, they will want to play an important role.
Their forces in Viet-Nam are exceeded only by those of the
United States and the Vietnamese themselves. They, like the
Thais and Filipinos, are already thinking about their post-war
position in Viet-Nam and are particularly anxious to obtain
economic concessions from us and the Vietnamese.
6.
The Filipinos' participation in this meeting is likely
to reflect domestic political problems to a greater extent
than the Thais' or Koreans', particularly since this is an
election year in the Philippines. As indicated, they are
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
10.
very interested in obtaining an important economic role in
down alrog to
post-war Viet-Nam. Domestic political pressure may force
them to change the nature of their contingent in Viet-Nam
to a civilian, medical group, which would bring into question
their eligibility for membership in the seven-nation "club. "
7. As the other participants in the Seven-Nation Meeting
are likely to be less reserved and formal than during the
SEATO Meeting, they will probably expect the Secretary to
be the same. They will be eager to hear his assessment of
the Paris talks and will give particular attention to his
remarks on post-war planning.
8.
We should view the Seven-Nation Meeting primarily as
an occasion for reassuring our allies, especially the
Viętnamese and Thais, about our intentions in Viet-Nam and
Asia, and also for demonstrating to the other side and the
world at large the determination of all the allies to
attain our mutually agreed objectives in Viet-Nam. We will
also wish to reaffirm our commitment to the concept of close
consultation among the allies.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
11.
9.
At the same time, it is difficult to see how we will
be able to produce a truly substantive communique acceptable
to all the allies (from the hawkish Koreans to dovish
Filipinos) and which will not be interpreted by the other
side and by the world at large as a hardening of our position.
We will, therefore, have to pay particular attention to the
drafting of the communique.
10. Even though the Seven-Nation Meeting will be considerably
less formal than SEATO, completely frank discussions will
still be hampered by the size and composition of the dele-
gations. Last year there were about seven delegates plus
staff advisers on each delegation, far too many for intimate
give-and-take. In addition, the Korean and Philippine Foreign
Ministers, and perhaps also the Vietnamese, will not be fully
briefed on Paris. For these reasons, the most sensitive and
significant discussions will have to take place in private
bilateral meetings with the Foreign Ministers.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
12.
BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
1.
The bilateral discussions with three key countries
(Thailand, Korea and the Philippines) offer the opportunity
for tailoring the reassurance regarding the Administration's
view of Southeast Asia and the Viet-Nam negotiations to
their particular concerns. Thailand will view Laos as the
key issue in terms of Thailand's own security. Our objective
will be to reassure the RTG that if the situation in Laos
should result in identifiable external Communist aggression
against Thailand the United States would, in accordance
with our intent to fully honor our SEATO obligations take
appropriate measures as may be required to meet the situation.
In addition, Thailand will seek a reaffirmation by the new
Administration of a bilateral commitment within the SEATO
context to the defense of Thailand.
2.
In the case of the Philippines, we will wish to dis-
courage initiatives regarding a revision of SEATO, believing
these to be inspired more by interest in probing U.S.
intentions than by a constructive interest in strengthening
Asian participation in Asian regional security arrangements.
We would also not wish to see any watering down of Philippine
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
13.
participation in the defense of Viet-Nam, but will not
wish to succumb to Philippine pressure to pay the entire
cost.
3. With the Koreans, we should recognize the important
role they are playing in Viet-Nam. We will want to reassure
them that this recognition encompasses acceptance by the
United States of the need for meaningful consultations on
Viet-Nam and recognition of their security and economic
interests. Additionally, if they express their concern over the
Okinawa reversion, we will wish to discourage them from
publicly involving themselves in the issue.
4. The other bilaterals will be routine, with the minor
exception of New Zealand. New Zealand has not enjoyed the
same degree of contact with the new Administration that our
other Asian allies, notably Australia has had, and particular
warmth on the part of the Secretary would be welcome and
useful.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
361
HAK did are
INFORMA TION
SECRET
April 30, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Richard L. Sneider
SUBJECT: TCC Meeting
Attached is a telegram sent out to the field for comment
setting forth tentative plans for the Troop Contributing Countries
meeting in Bangkok following the SEATO session. I have had
some fairly extensive discussions with EA on this meeting and I
think that the proposed format looks good. It sticks to our game
plan and basic position on Vietnam. I thought, however, you would
want to look it over. We will have another crack when comments
come in.
Attachment
SECRET
Cy pint Anesder 5/7/69
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENTS
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
GRANG
VOIRSITY
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
SECKE
758
C
PAGE 01 STATE 066205
41
3
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 R
DRAFTED BY: EA/VN:HFMATTHEWS, JR.
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
C = - MR. PEDERSEN S/S - MR= BROWN EA/VN = MR. BURKE
EA c WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN
050069
R. 291550Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY
SECRE T STATE 066205
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE
REF: STATE 62693
1. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO MATTERS
DISCUSSED IN PARA 3 REFTEL. THIS TELEGRAM SETS FORTH OUR
TENTATIVE IDEAS ABOUT CONTENT OF TCC COMMUNIQUE AND TIMING OF
OUR CONSULTATIONS ABOUT IT WITH OTHER TCC COUNTRIES
2. TIMING. SINCE AT PREVIOUS TCC MEETINGS IN WELLINGTON
IND WASHINGTON HOST COUNTRY HAS PRODUCED A FIRST DRIFT OF
COMMUNIQUE, WE ASSUME THAIS PLAN TO PRODUCE DRAFT 480 ARE
PROBABLY WORKING ON IT NOW. WELHOPE THAT UNGER WILL BE ABLE RISCUSS
IDEAS EN THIS CABLE WITH THANAT THIS MEEK AND SECURE HIS EXPOY
AGREEMENT TO THEM IN GENERAL TERMS. WE RANT THEM TO
FIRST DRAFT INCORPORATING AGREED US/THAI IDEAS WITH BUI DIEM
HERE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AROUND MAY 7 FOR SANSON *:
COULD CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY IN SAIRONA
AND WE WOULD HOPE TO FIRM UP AGREEMENT ON X DRAFT DUPING
SECRETARY'S VISIT MAY 14-19. NE WOULD PLAN TO KEEP
AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS INFORMED IN GENERAL TERMS HERE AS
WELL AS THAIS IN BANGKOK: BUT WOULD WAIT TO DISCUSS !TH YOREINS
AND FILTHINOS UNTIL FORMATION OF COMMUNIQUE 00 CRASSING
00
SECREF
29
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NOTTO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF
STATE
Department of State
CLINO
MAERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 066205
IN BANGKOK, PRESUMABLY BEGINNING MAY 19.
3.0 CONTENT OF TCC COMMUNIQUE, (THIS OUTLINE FOLLOWS THE
ROUGH ORDER OF THE APRIL 1968 COMMUNIQUE AT WELLINGTONW
A o INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH LISTING PARTICIPANTS AND DATES.
B. PURPOSE OF MEETING
(A) REVIEW OF SITUATION IN VIET-NAM
(B) WAYS TO IMPROVE TCC EFFORTS
IC! REVIEW OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
ID) EXAMINATION OF SECURITY SITUATION IN ASIA, REFERENCE
TO BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AMONG TCC'S AND ENDORSEMENT OF
CONTINUING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION.
C : SITUATION IN VIET-NAM DESCRIPTION OF STATEMENT BY VIET-
NAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER COVERING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
MILITARY SITUATION, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MEASURES OF GVN
ENDORSEMENT HERE WOULD BE MADE OF THIEU'S STATEMENTS GF MARCH 25
AND APRIL 7, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO ESSENTIALITY OF SETTLEMENT
OF POLITICAL ISSUES BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND TO WILLINGNESS
OF GVN TO TALK TO NLF ON THIS ISSUE. BEGIN FYI. WITHOUT
SPECIFICALLY ENDORSING THIEU'S SIX POINTS OF APRIL 7, THIS
SECTION WOULD INCLUDE A GENERAL STATEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THOSE
POINTS, BUT PHRASED IN TERMS WHICH WOULD NOT FORECUOSE DIFFERENT
FORMULATION CF SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS. END FYI, MILITARY SECTION
WOULD INCLUDE REFERENCE TO "YIETNAMIZATION OF THE WARG"
DESCRIBING VIETNAMESE EFFORTS AT MOBILIZATION, MODERNIZATION AND
ACCEPTANCE OF GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES: THIS SECTION WOULD
ALSO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO SUPPORT OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FOR
POLICIES OF GVN, THEIR REJECTION OF COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND
TACTICS AND THEIR BASIC DESIRE FOR PEACE
D : TCC EFFORTS REFERENCE TO MILITARY BRIEFING BY ADMIRAD
MCCAIN AND MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY US AND OTHER TOOIS TO IMPROVE
VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AS PART OF
"VIETNAMIZATION" OBJECTIVE, ALLUSIONS TO DETERMINATION OF
TOGAS TO MAINTAIN THEIR SUPPORT OF GVN UNTIL IMPROVEMENT
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been détermined to be declassified.
OF STATE
ULINA
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 066205
CAPABILITIES: REDUCTION OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION OR PROGRESS
IN PARIS PEACE TALKS PERMIT REDUCTION IN THEIR TROOP CONTRIBU-
TIONS. ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN VIET-NAM IN TERMS OF
PERMITTING VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT
EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE
E : EFFORTS FOR PEACE. TCC ENDORSEMENT OF PROPOSALS MADE BY
UnS. AND GVN IN PARIS REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, OBSER-
VANCE OF DMZ, RESPECT FOR AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA,
AND RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WARK REFERENCE To WITHDRAWAL OF
FORCES WOULD INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUS COMMENCEMENT: REQUIREMENT FOR
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM
AND FROM SANCTUARIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND HO CHI MINH TRAIL)
PLUS NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF 80TH MITHORAWAL AND CES-
SATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF FORCES, IBEGIN FYI. THIS
SECTION WOULD BE STATED IN TERMS OF SECRETARY'S APRIL 21 SPEECH
RATHER THAN IN MANILA COMMUNIQUE TERMS. END FYI, TCC AGREEMENT
ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAMALS WOULD BE INCLUDED, AND MUTUAL
WITHDRAWALS AS RESULT OF AGREEMENT WITH THE ENEMY WOULD BE
DISTINGUISHED FROM REDUCTION IN ALLIED FORCES PERMITTED BY
RVNAF IMPROVEMENTS THIS SECTION WOULD GIVE A GENERAL ENDORSE-
MENT TO OUR PARIS NEGOTIATING POSTURE AND WOULD ALSO INCLUDE
STATEMENT OF DESIRE FOR PEACE ON PART OF TCC'S.
F , POST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES. THIS SECTION WOULD
AFFIRM TCC DESIRE TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA AFTER CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES)
INCLUDING REFERENCE TO THUC/LILIENTHAL REPORT. IT WOULD ALSO
REFER TO NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION BOTH FOR ECONOMIC AND ROCIAL
ADVANCEMENT AND TO PRESERVE SECRUTY OF THE AREA (BEGIN FYI.
THE LANGUAGE OF THIS SECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE
TO AVOID IMPLICATION OF ANY NEW COMMITMENTS) BUT AT SAME TIME
CULD NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT KOREAN, THAN AND SOUTH
VISTNAMESE DESIRES FOR SOMETHING APPROACHING INTERNATIONAL
"GUARANTEES! OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. END FYI.)
G. SOUTHEAST ASIA. REFERENCE HERE WOULD BE MADE TO MEED FOR
INCLUSION OF PROBLEMS OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN ANY PEACE SETTLE-
MENT
H, KOREA. SOME REFERENCE SUCH AS IN LAST YEAR'S COMMUNIQUE
TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN KOREA STHOUT EMPLYING DIRECT
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOWARTMENT OF
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 04 STATE 066205
S
CONNECTION BETWEEN SITUATION THERE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.
I: CONCLUSION. FINAL ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE EFFORTS THERE AND
IN PARIS IN CLOSE COORDINATION.
GP-4. ROGERS
CC
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
HAK
361
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
SECRET
April 30, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Richard L. Sneider
SUBJECT: TCC Meeting
Attached is a telegram sent out to the field for comment
setting forth tentative plans for the Troop Contributing Countries
meeting in Bangkok following the SEATO session. I have had
some fairly extensive discussions with EA on this meeting and I
think that the proposed format looks good. It sticks to our game
plan and basic position on Vietnam. I thought, however, you would
want to look it over. We will have another crack when comments
come in.
Attachment
SECRET
Cy Reproduced pent 5/7
at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIFANTMENT OF STATE
*
CHING
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
to
SECRET
768
PAGE 01 STATE 066205
41
3
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 R
DRAFTED BY: EA/VN:HFMATTHEWS, JR.
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
C - MR. PEDERSEN S/S a MR. BROWN EA/VN = MR. BURKE
EA C WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN
050069
a 291550Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
ALLEN
BERGSTEN
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY
CHAPIN
HALPERIN
SECRE T STATE 066205
HOUDEK
KEENY R
LEMNITZER
EXDIS
LYNN
MOOR
SUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE
MORRIS
SAUNDERS
REF: STATE 62693
NEIDER
SONNENFELDI
VAKY
10 WE HAVE BEEN GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO MATTERS
DISCUSSED IN PARA 3 REFTEL THIS TELEGRAM SETS FORTH OUR
TENTATIVE IDEAS ABOUT CONTENT OF TCC COMMUNIQUE AND TIMING OF
OUR CONSULTATIONS ABOUT IT WITH OTHER TCC COUNTRIES.
2% TIMING. SINCE AT PREVIOUS TCC MEETINGS IN WELLINGTON
AND WASHINGTON HOST COUNTRY HAS PRODUCED A FIRST DRAFT OF
COMMUNIQUE, WE ASSUME THAIS PLAN TO PRODUCE DRAFT AND ARE
PROBABLY WORKING ON IT NOW. WE HOPE THAT UNGER WILL BE ABLE RISCUSS
IDEAS IN THIS CABLE WITH THANAT THIS WEEK AND SECURE HIS EARLY
AGREEMENT TO THEM IN GENERAL TERMS. WE WANT THEN TO DISCUSS A
FIRST DRAFT INCORPORATING AGREED US/THAI IDEAS WITH BUI DIEM
HERE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AROUND MAY 7 FOR SAIGON HE AND BUNKER
COULD CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY IN SAIGON
AND WE WOULD HOPE TO FIRM UP AGREEMENT ON A DRAFT DURING
SECRETARY1S VISIT MAY 14-19. WE WOULD PLAN TO KEEP
AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS INFORMED IN GENERAL- TERMS HERE AS
WELL AS THAIS IN BANGKOK, BUT WOULD WAIT TO DISCUSS WITH KOREINS
AND FILIPINOS UNTIL FORMATION OF COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING CONMITTEE
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA CLINO
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 066205
IN BANGKOK, PRESUMABLY BEGINNING MAY 19.
30 CONTENT OF TCC COMMUNIQUE. (THIS OUTLINE FOLLOWS THE
ROUGH ORDER OF THE APRIL 1968 COMMUNIQUE AT WELLINGTON.
A o INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH LISTING PARTICIPANTS AND DATES.
B. PURPOSE OF MEETING
(A) REVIEW OF SITUATION IN VIET-NAM
(B) WAYS TO IMPROVE TCC EFFORTS
(C) REVIEW OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
(D) EXAMINATION OF SECURITY SITUATION IN ASIA. REFERENCE
TO BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AMONG TCC'S AND ENDORSEMENT OF
CONTINUING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION.
C o SITUATION IN VIET=NAM DESCRIPTION OF STATEMENT BY VIET-
NAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER COVERING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
MILITARY SITUATION, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MEASURES OF GVN
ENDORSEMENT HERE WOULD BE MADE OF THIEU'S STATEMENTS OF MARCH 25
AND APRIL 7, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO ESSENTIALITY OF SETTLEMENT
OF POLITICAL ISSUES BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND TO WILLINGNESS
OF GVN TO TALK TO NLF ON THIS ISSUE. BEGIN FYI. WITHOUT
SPECIFICALLY ENDORSING THIEU'S SIX POINTS OF APRIL 7, THIS
SECTION WOULD INCLUDE A GENERAL STATEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THOSE
POINTS, BUT PHRASED IN TERMS WHICH WOULD NOT FORECLOSE DIFFERENT
FORMULATION OF SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS. END FYI. MILITARY SECTION
WOULD INCLUDE REFERENCE TO "VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR
DESCRIBING VIETNAMESE EFFORTS AT MOBILIZATION, MODERNIZATION AND
ACCEPTANCE OF GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES THIS SECTION WOULD
ALSO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO SUPPORT OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FOR
POLICIES OF GVN, THEIR REJECTION OF COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND
TACTICS AND THEIR BASIC DESIRE FOR PEACE
Do TCC EFFORTS. REFERENCE TO MILITARY BRIEFING BY ADMIRAL
MCCAIN AND MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY US AND OTHER TCC'S TO IMPROVE
VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AS PART OF
"VIETNAMIZATION" OBJECTIVE. ALLUSIONS TO DETERMINATION OF
TCCSS TO MAINTAIN THEIR SUPPORT OF GVN UNTIL IMPROVEMENT IN RNNAF
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
GLINO
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
S
PAGE 03 STATE 066205
CAPABILITIES, REDUCTION OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION, OR PROGRESS
IN PARIS PEACE TALKS PERMIT REDUCTION IN THEIR TROOP CONTRIBU-
TIONS. ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN VIET-NAM IN TERMS OF
PERMITTING VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT
EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE
E : EFFORTS FOR PEACE. TCC ENDORSEMENT OF PROPOSALS MADE BY
U.S. AND GVN IN PARIS REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, OBSER-
VANCE OF DMZ, RESPECT FOR AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA,
AND RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL OF
FORCES WOULD INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUS COMMENCEMENT: REQUIREMENT FOR
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM
S
AND FROM SANCTUARIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND HO CHI MINH TRAIL
PLUS NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF BOTH WITHDRAWAL AND CES-
SATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF FORCES (BEGIN FYI. THIS
SECTION WOULD BE STATED IN TERMS OF SECRETARY APRIL 21 SPEECH
RATHER THAN IN MANILA COMMUNIQUE TERMS. END FYI.) TCC AGREEMENT
ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE INCLUDED, AND MUTUAL
WITHDRAWALS AS RESULT OF AGREEMENT WITH THE ENEMY WOULD BE
DISTINGUISHED FROM REDUCTION IN ALLIED FORCES PERMITTED BY
RVNAF IMPROVEMENTS. THIS SECTION WOULD GIVE A GENERAL ENDORSE=
MENT TO OUR PARIS NEGOTIATING POSTURE AND WOULD ALSO INCLUDE
STATEMENT OF DESIRE FOR PEACE ON PART OF TCC'S.
F . POST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES. THIS SECTION WOULD
AFFIRM TCC DESIRE TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA AFTER CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES,
S
INCLUDING REFERENCE TO THUC/LILIENTHAL REPORT, IT WOULD ALSO
REFER TO NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION BOTH FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
ADVANCEMENT AND TO PRESERVE SECRUTY OF THE AREA (BEGIN FYI.
THE LANGUAGE OF THIS SECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE
TO AVOID IMPLICATION OF ANY NEW COMMITMENTS, BUT AT SAME TIME
WOULD NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT KOREAN, THAI AND SOUTH
VIETNAMESE DESIRES FOR SOMETHING APPROACHING INTERNATIONAL
"GUARANTEES" OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. END FYI.)
G : SOUTHEAST ASIA. REFERENCE HERE WOULD BE MADE TO NEED FOR
INCLUSION OF PROBLEMS OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN ANY PEACE SETTLE-
MENT.
H. KOREA. SOME REFERENCE SUCH AS IN LAST YEAR'S COMMUNIQUE
TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN KOREA WITHOUT IMPLYING ANY DIRECT
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
STATES AMERICA UNITED * state 40 DEPARTMENT
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 04 STATE 066205
S
CONNECTION BETWEEN SITUATION THERE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.
I. CONCLUSION. FINAL ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE EFFORTS THERE AND
IN PARIS IN CLOSE COORDINATION.
GP-4. ROGERS
S
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NOTIO RF PEPPODICED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EVECUTINE
Kissinger
ACTION
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
May 7, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Richard L. Sneider
SUBJECT: Rogers' SEATO Trip
We received late this afternoon a memorandum of
recommendations to the President on issues likely to arise
during Rogers' trip. They cover virtually the same points
that were in my briefing memorandum for the meeting with
Rogers. Attached is a memorandum to the Presidents endorsing
most of Rogers' recommendations, with the exception of those
on the Rusk-Thanat Communique and Vietnamization of the war.
the positions that I have recommended for you, I believe, are
consistent with your previou S memos to the President.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at
Tab A.
Attachment
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
RLSneider/pmh (5/7/69)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ACTION
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
May 7, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Secretary Rogers' Trip to Asia
Secretary Rogers has sent you the attached memorandum outlining his
plans for his Asian trip and asking your approval for recommendations on
the major policy issues likely to arise during the trip (Tab A). Most of
the points discussed in Rogers' memorandum are covered in the memo-
randa I sent to you prior to the meeting with Rogers on May 7 (Tab B).
Rogers has recommendations on five policy issues, in addition to requesting
you to sign a letter to President Thieu which has been sent separately for
your consideration along with other letters to government leaders at the
capitals he is visiting. My views on his recommendations areaas follows:
1. Reaffirmation of our SEATO commitment. Rogers recommends
and I concur that he be authorized to reaffirm U. S. support for SEATO and
determination to meet our obligations under the Treaty.
Approve
Disapprove
Other
2. Reaffirmation of Rusk-Thanat Coramunique. The Thais are
expected to seek a bilateral defense treaty with us or at a minimum a
reiteration of our commitment to Thailand under the 1962 Rusk-Thanat
Communique, which stated that our obligation under SEATO is individual,
as well as collective, and does not require agreement of all other Treaty
Parties.
Rogers' preferred recommendation is a brief statement accepting
the interpretation of the SEATO Treaty in the Rusk-Thanat Communique.
But, he requests authorization to make public, if pressed, an identical
statement to that issued in 1962. My recommendation is that we issue an
identical statement so as to leave no sense of doubt among the Thais.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
- 2 -
Your preference is requested:
Offer to issue a statement identical to the Rusk-Thanat Communique
only if pressed.
Approve
Disapprove
Offer to issue an identical statement immediately.
Approve
Disapprove
Other
Secretary Rogers also recommended that he strongly discourage a
request for a bilateral treaty. I would concur.
Approve
Disapprove
3. Vietnamization of the war. Rogers fears there may be a possibility
that MACV may not be going far enough and fast enough on Vietnam to meet
political requirements in the United States. He plans to discuss this
thoroughly with Bunker and Abrams and has asked your authorization.
I recommend that Rogers not push too hard on this issue and take the
position in Saigon that we wish to move ahead with Vietnamization but only
on the basis of well-considered plans and not to the point of leaving the
impression that we are pulling out too rapidly, thereby endangering the
security of the South Vietnam or the American forces remaining in the
country.
Approve
Disapprove
4. Post-war Guarantees. Rogers anticipates that some of the Troop
Contributing Countries may seek a new American commitment to guarantee
any future settlement in Southeast Asia. He recommends that we take the
position that the present commitments are adequate and that new Treaty
commitments are not necessary. He would argue the case on philosophical
and public opinion grounds.
I agree we should not make any new Treaty commitments but only on
the grounds that the present commitments are adequate. Stress of public
opinion reasons might increase current Asian anxiety about our post-Vietnam
war posture in Asia.
Approve
Disapprove
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
- 3 -
5. Manila Communique. Rogers anticipates that at the Troop
Contributors meeting some of the members may wish to refer to the Manila
Communique on mutual troop withdrawals. He intends to restate our
position in accordance with the mutual withdrawal paper approved by you
and now concurred to, in general terms, by President Thieu. However,
if pressed, he asks to be authorized to accept a reference to the Manila
Communique without spelling out its terms. I agree.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
7050
May 7, 1969
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Issues Which Will Arise
During My May Trip to Asia
I am leaving May 12 on a trip which will take me to
Saigon for talks with our Mission and with the Government
of Viet-Nam; to Bangkok for the SEATO and Seven-Nation
Meetings; to India and Pakistan for brief meetings with
Indian and Pakistani leaders; to Afghanistan for a brief
meeting with the Prime Minister and possibly the King;
and to Tehran for the CENTO Meeting and a meeting with
the Shah. I plan to return to Washington on May 29.
Saigon
The purposes of my visit to Saigon are:
1. To learn as much as I can about the problem on
the ground and from our senior officials there, with
emphasis on the prospects for Vietnamization of the war.
2. To meet President Thieu and other senior
Vietnamese and American officials whom I do not know.
3. To consult with President Thieu on our negoti-
ating position in Paris, with particular emphasis on the
matters of mutual troop withdrawals, internal political
settlement and our over-all strategy.
4. To consult with the GVN on our objectives and
tactics at the Seven-Nation Meeting.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2.
During my meetings with Vietnamese officials I
intend to outline your policy on the war, including the
relationships between American public opinion, Vietnam-
ization of the war, and the pressure of time. At the
same time, I would hope to deliver to President Thieu a
letter (enclosed) from you which reaffirms the commit-
ment of the United States Government to its objective
of assuring that the South Vietnamese people will be able
to determine their own future without external inter-
ference. I intend to discuss the question of mutual
withdrawal of forces in some depth with President Thieu
who has just given his concurrence in our policy as
approved in the National Security Council.
SEATO Council Meeting
My objectives at the SEATO Council Meeting will be:
1. to reassure the member nations of United States
support for the treaty;
2. to reassure the member nations of continued
United States interest in the security of Southeast Asia;
-3. to reassure the regional members regarding our
over-all strategy in Viet-Nam and our negotiating position
in Paris; and
4. to meet, in many cases for the first time, the
foreign ministers of our SEATO allies.
Bilaterals
The important bilateral conversations I will hold
will be with the Filipinos and the Thais. In the case
of Secretary Romulo, I will be:
1. listening to the views he wants to express on
the future of SEATO;
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3.
2. discouraging him from proposing any substantive
changes in SEATO at the Council Meeting; and
3. seeking to obtain a continuation of PHILCAG on
the present basis.
In the case of Prime Minister Thanom and Foreign
Minister Thanat, my objectives will be:
1. to reassure them that your Administration sup-
ports our SEATO commitment to Thailand; and
2. to reassure them regarding our intentions in
Viet-Nam and at the Paris talks.
Seven-Nation Meeting
Our objectives at the Seven-Nation Meeting would be:
1. to present to our enemies, to our allies and to
the world at large a picture of allied unity, determined
to proceed toward the objective of a negotiated settle-
ment of the war under conditions in which the people of
South Viet-Nam will have the right to choose their own
political future free of external pressure from anyone;
2. to obtain the concurrence of our allies in our
over-all strategy and our negotiating position in Paris,
including a specific endorsement of the public proposals
we have made on mutual troop withdrawal, the DMZ, Laos
and Cambodia, and prisoners of war.
3. to show to interested public opinion that the
allies are consulting together; and
4. to provide as genuine an opportunity for con-
sultation as security considerations will permit.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
4.
Problems
The pitfalls related to Viet-Nam along the path
include attempts by the press to exaggerate such differ-
ences in outlook as exist among the seven allies, ranging
from the hawkish Koreans to the dovish Filipinos. More-
over, major substantive problems will face us in Saigon
and in both the SEATO and Seven-Nation Meetings.
One of these is the desire of some of our allies,
most notably the South Vietnamese, for an American com-
mitment to "guarantee" any future settlement in Southeast
Asia. I propose to take the position that the United
States intends to live up to its present commitments,
which are adequate for the maintenance of the security
of the area; that, as we have amply demonstrated, we are
as interested in the security of Southeast Asia as our
allies; but that we do not intend to make any new treaty
commitments to the area for both philosophical and public
opinion reasons.
Another issue is the already evident desire of the
allies, and especially the Vietnamese, for a specific
reaffirmation of the terms of the Manila Communique con-
cerning mutual troop withdrawals. This we will try to
avoid by restating our position as we have in the Paris
talks; but, to avoid alarming our allies about our in-
tentions, we may have to accept a reference to the Manila
Communique without spelling out its terms.
There is the possibility that we may have some diffi-
culty in persuading MACV, in connection with Vietnamization,
to go far enough and fast enough to meet the realities of
the political requirements in this country. I plan to go
into this thoroughly with Ambassador Bunker and General
Abrams.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
5.
India
The primary objective of my visit to New Delhi is
to signify the importance we attach to India in our view
of Asia, and our desire to keep in close touch with its
leaders on matters of broad common interest.
Pakistan
My objectives in visiting Pakistan are to demon-
strate continuing United States interest in Pakistan;
to take the measure of President Yahya, Chief of the
Martial Law Regime; to assess the chances of his returning
the country to a more representative system of govern-
ment; and to get a feel for future decisions on two
important policy questions: U.S. military sales policy
and future AID levels.
Afghanistan
My stop in Kabul will indicate to the Afghans and
to King Zahir that the United States remains interested
in their country's independence and welfare. This is
important to them in their efforts to maintain an inde-
pendent foreign policy despite their heavy dependence on
the U.S.S.R.
CENTO Meeting
The main objective of my visit to Tehran is to
signify to the regional members of CENTO, particularly
Iran and Turkey, that we continue to be deeply inter-
ested in the future of our relations with them. The
collateral objective is a "holding action" on CENTO
itself while we seek a clear idea of the value the mem-
bers attach to the alliance and while we reassess its
future.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
6.
Bilaterals with the Shah and Other Iranian Officials
During my Tehran visit I will also meet with the
Shah of Iran, with the Iranian Foreign Minister and with
other members of government. These meetings continue
our efforts to maintain our close ties with Iran. Our
interests in Iran have been increasing as a result of
the announced British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf
in 1971, continuing instability and Soviet inroads in
the Arab world, and difficulties we have encountered in
maintaining our communications and intelligence facil-
ities in neighboring countries.
Policy Issues Likely to Arise
Specific policy questions which will arise are as
follows. I include my recommendation on each.
Reaffirmation of Our SEATO Commitment
SEATO and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty symbolize our concern with the security of the
area, serve as a basis for our military actions re-
lated to Viet-Nam and assistance to Southeast Asian
nations, provide us with flexibility of action without
explicitly committing us to any specific course, and
encompass our only formal security link with Thailand.
Recommendation:
That I be authorized to reaffirm United States sup-
port for SEATO and determination to meet our obligations
under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.
Approve
Disapprove
Thailand
I anticipate that the Thais may request a bilateral
defense treaty, but at a minimum will wish a public re-
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
7.
iteration of our commitment to Thailand. I believe I can
satisfy the Thai needs without in any way extending our
existing commitments by making the following statement:
"I accept the interpretation of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty set forth in the
Rusk-Thanat Communique of March 6, 1962 as being,
under international law, the proper interpretation
of the Treaty.'
Recommendation:
That I be authorized to make publicly the statement
quoted above.
Approve
Disapprove
If the Thais press for a more specific statement of
our position, I would propose to make publicly the
following statement, which is identical to the operative
language used in the March 6, 1962 Communique:
"I assure you that in the event of direct
Communist aggression against Thailand, the United
States intends to give full effect to its obliga-
tions under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty to act to meet the common danger in accord-
ance with its constitutional processes. This ob-
ligation of the United States does not depend upon
the prior agreement of all other Parties to the
Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual
as well as collective."
Recommendation:
That I be authorized to make publicly the statement
above, if necessary:
Approve
Disapprove
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
8.
That I strongly discourage any request for a bi-
lateral treaty with Thailand on the grounds, inter alia,
that such a treaty would be unnecessary and redundant.
Approve
Disapprove
Viet-Nam
I recommend that I be authorized to make the following
actions:
1. With GVN leaders: I intend to spell out in
fairly frank detail the policies adopted by the National
Security Council, especially with respect to the Vietnam-
ization of the war.
Approve
Disapprove
2. With our TCC allies as regards U.S. "guarantees"
for any future settlement in Southeast Asia: I propose
to take the position that the United States intends to
live up to its present commitments, which are adequate
for the maintenance of the security of the area; that,
as we have amply demonstrated, we are as interested in
the security of Southeast Asia as our allies; but that
we do not intend to make any new treaty commitments to
the area for both philosophical and public opinion
reasons.
Approve
Disapprove
3. With our TCC allies with regard to the Manila
Communique: We will try to avoid a specific reaffirma-
tion of the terms of the Manila Communique concerning
mutual troop withdrawals by restating our position as
we have in the Paris talks; but, to avoid alarming our
allies about our intentions, we may have to accept a
reference to the Manila Communique without spelling out
its terms.
Approve
Disapprove
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
9.
4. Letter to President Thieu: I have separately
proposed to you the text of a letter to President Thieu
for me to deliver when I meet with him in Saigon.
President Thieu may desire to release the text of the
letter.
Recommendation:
That you authorize me to agree to the release of the
text of the letter should President Thieu so request.
Approve
Disapprove
I know of no other major policy questions which are
likely to arise and which should be brought to your at-
tention.
wm
Willian P. Rogers
Enclosure:
Proposed Letter to
President Thieu.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ACTION
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Secretary Regers' Trip to Southeast Asia
Background:
Trip Schedule: Secretary Rogers départs on May 12. He will first
visit Saigon, May 14 - 19. He will then be in Bangkok May 19 - 23 for
the SEATO meeting on May 20 - 21, the meeting of the Troop Contributing
Countries on May 22 - 23, and for bilateral meetings with the Thais and
other participating countries.
Proposed Objectives:
Overall Objectives in Southeast Asia:
(1) To reaffirm US treaty commitments in Southeast Asia,
particularly SEATO, and to reassure the countries con-
cerned of continued US interest in Southeast Asia's security.
(2) To affirm that the US objective in Vietnam is to assure that
South Vietnamese people will be able to determine their own
future without external interference.
(3) To consult meaningfully with our allies on Vietnam and
other common security issues.
(4) To obtain the views and hopefully the support of our allies
for current US strategy in Vietnam and at the Paris peace
negotiations.
(5) To stimulate greater self-help efforts on the part of the
Southeast Asian countries without creating anxiety about
the credibility of US commitments.
SECRET
RSneider:pas:5/5/69
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
SECRET
Additional Specific Objectives:
(1) Saigon: To consult with senior Vietnamese and American
officials on negotiating strategy and the Vietnamization of
the war and to gain a general familiarization with Vietnam.
(2) SEATO: To discourage embryonic efforts to revise or
otherwise amend the treaty and current SEATO arrangements.
(3) Troop Contributing Meeting: Tb consult on negotiating
strategy and in particular to discuss the concerns of some
countries with respect to the Manila Communique and
unilateral US troop reductions.
Issues for Decision and Recommended Positions:
(1) Reaffirmation of Existing Commitments: Throughout the trip,
the countries involved in Southeast Asia will be seeking both
reaffirmation of US treaty commitments and the basic US com-
milment to Vietnam.
Recommended Position: That Secretary Rogers be authorized
to reaffirm both of these commitments.
(2) New Commitments: Pressure for new US commitments may
arise in two specific cases. First, both the Thais and the
Philippines have been discussing strengthening and revising the
SEATO commitment, while the Thais have also refurbished their
past request for a bilateral treaty with the US to replace SEATO.
Second, it Is possible that some of the allies, particularly the
South Vietnamese, may seek a new American commitment to
guarantee any future settlement in Southeast Asia. In both cases,
our current treaty commitments appear for the present adequate
to meet the legitimate security concerns. of the Southeast Asians,
while any new commitments would raise Congressional problems.
The Thais, however, will probably find reassuring a reaffirma-
tion of the 1962 Rusk-Thanant Communique in which wa stated that
our obligation under SEATO, in the face of communist armed
attack on Thailand, is individual an well as collective and does
not require prior agreement of all other treaty Parties.
Recommendation: That you authorize Secretary Rogern to reaffirm
the Rusk-Thanent communique in linguage generally similar but
otherwise not 80 beyond a reaffirmation of current US treaty
commitments.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
SECRET
(3) Troop Reduction: US intentions to reduce its forces in Vietnam
unilaterally will be intensively probed both in Saigon and Bangkok.
There are indications that Korea and the Filipinos, but not the
other troop contributing countries, would particularly desire to
withdraw some of their forces if we decided to reduce our forces
in Vietnam.
Recommended Position: That Secretary Rogers assure the troop
contributors of full consultation with them If we decide to reduce
the US forces in Vietnam, and inform them that no decisions have
as yet been made, and that troop withdrawals will depend on
three circumstances -- an agreement on mutual withdrawals, an
improvement in the military situation, and/or an improvement in
South Visinamese military capabilities. He should also seek to
discourage parallel reductions by other troop contributors, but
leave the door open for possible token withdrawals, particularly
on the part of the Koreans, If we decide to reduce the US forces
in Vietnam.
(4) Manila Communique: Since the troop contributing countries parti-
cipated in and are committed to the Manila Communique language
on withdrawal, there is concern among some of them about a
possible US repudiation of the communique.
Recommended Position: That Secretary Rogers stress the new
US position on mutual withdrawal as approved by you and concurred
in by President Thicu, but, if pressed by the troop contributors,
accept a reference in the final communique to the Manila Commu-
nique without spelling out its terms.
Other Talking Points:
In addition to setting forth your views on the above issues, it is
suggested that you make the following additional points to Secretary Rogers:
(1) Your strong personal interest in Asia and conviction that over the
next decade Asia will provide the major opportunity for constructive
American foreign policy approaches.
(2) Your desire to maintain as close as possible rapport with the
leaders in South Vietnam, and consult fully with our Asian allies.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
(3) Our confidence that we can outlast Hanol, If It chooses not to
negotiate a fair settlement, and that time works more in our
favor than in Hanoi's. Therefore, It is to Hanoi's advantage
to enter now into meaningful negotiations.
(4) We seek peace in Vistnam, but it is essential that we not appear
overanxious to either Hanoi or our allies.
(5) We wish to move ahead with Vistnamization of the war but only
on the basis of well-considered plans. We are looking forward
to the recommendations of Saigon on Vieinamization.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ACTION
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Secretary Rogers' Trip
The issue that fundamentally concerns the countries of Southeast Asia is
whether the end of the Vietnam war will result in a major disengagement
of the United States from that area. The Thais are particularly concerned
that our treaty commitment under SEATO will become so hedged and
watered down that it will be ineffective and useless. They fear that this
is the very objective of the pressures manifested in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee today. Therefore, they -- with the support of the
Filipinos and others -- are seeking to strengthen and amend SEATO.
Even deeper concerns of the same fundamental nature are evident in South
Vietnam. There, the current issue centers on the rate of unilateral US
troop withdrawals. The South Vietnamese fear that we will put out
American forces more rapidly than warranted by the military situation or
the state of their preparedness. As a result, they would be left seriously
disadvantaged in the face of the North Viemamese and the VC.
For this reason, I suggest that in discussing with Secretary Rogers the
details of this trip (covered in the attached memorandum), you stress the
following points:
1. Your Administration intends to fulfill US commitments in South-
east Asia fully, without continuously looking over its shoulder at domestic
critics In a manner that will vitiate the credibility of these commitments.
2. US troop reductions from Vietnam will be decided on the basis of
well-considered military plans and we will not push Vietnamization to the
point of endangering the security of either South Vietnam or the American
forces remaining in South Vietnam.
RSneider:pas?5/6/69
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
May 6, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Guidance for Secretary Rogers' Visit to Saigon
Secretary Rogers has requested your guidance for his visit to
Saigon on May 14-19. I suggest the following points:
Basic Elements of U.S. Policy
1. The U.S. objective in Vietnam is to assure that the
South Vietnamese people will be able to determine their own future
without external interference. The U.S. will not agree to any
proposal for Vietnam peace which does not meet this objective.
2. In all elements of U.S. policy toward, Vietnam, the U.S.
will consult fully with the Vietnam leadership and maintain the
closest possible rapport.
Negotiating Policy
1. Our posture on the pace of the talks should be ready
but not eager. We want to avoid giving Hanoi the impression we
are acting from weakness or under pressures.
2. In the private talks, we visualize separate discussions
between the U.S. and Hanoi and between the South Vietnamese
Government and the NLF, but are prepared to undertake private
talks including all four participants if proposed by the Communists.
3. During the present stage of private talks, we skould:
a. Stress mutual withdrawal based upon the plan
agreed to by President Thieu. Mutual withdrawal
should include provisions for:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
(1) Verification of supervision of withdrawal;
(2) Withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces all
the way back to North Vietnam;
(3) Measures to maintain the agreement.
b. Secondary but significant emphasis on restoring
the DMZ.
c. Keeping after the question of primoners.
d. Entering into no de-escalation agreements except
as an outgrowth of mutual troop withdrawal.
4. While the U. S. would focus on mutual withdrawal,
discussions of the settlement of political structure in the south would
be left to the South Vietnamese Government, In this connection, we
wish to urge the South Vietnamese to develop negotiating positions on
political structure and coordinate closely with them.
Vietnamization of the War
1. We attach major importance to Vietnamization of the war
and are looking forward to receiving plans developed by our senior
officers in Saigon to accomplish this objective in coordination with the
GVN.
2. You anticipate some unilateral troop withdrawals, possibly
as early as this summer, but this will depend on the military situation
and the state of preparedness of the South Vietnamese armed forces.
3. We must do nothing to give the Vietnamese the impression
that we are using Vietnamization of the war as an excuse for a pull-out.
4. Vietnamization of the war, if it is accomplished as an
act of strength rather than weakness, will enhance our negotiating position
in Paris. Hanoi is concerned about Vietnamization, and therefore we
should do everything to convince Hanoi that it is to its advantage to enter
into meaningful negotiations now rather than trying unsuccessfully to
outlast us.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Haig
W It
Department of State
UNITED STATES or AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
7.
CONTROL: 6 8 3 3 Q
P 290525Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
APR, 29, 1969
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3730
2:50 A.M.
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET CANBERRA 2286
0
NODIS
REF: STATE 62693
SUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE
1. CONCUR STATEMENT REFTEL THAT AUSTRALIA PREPARED
LIVE WITH SOME REDUCTION IN US FORCES IN VIETNAM
WHILE RETAINING ITS FORCES AT PRESENT LEVEL. PRIME
MINISTER, DEFENCE MINISTER AND ARMY MINISTER HAVE
SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY (CANBERRA 1996, 2035 AND 2136).
THEIR POSITION IS THAT PRESENT AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN
VIETNAM ARE WELL-BALANCED UNIT AND ANY REDUCTION
WOULD MATERIALLY REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS. ALSO THAT,
IN ANY CASE, TOTAL NUMBERS ARE SMALL IN COMPARISON
OTHER CONTRIBUTING POWERS.
2. GOA OFFICIALS HAVE NOT INDICATED EXTENT THEIR
INTEREST IN SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE, BUT GOA CLEARLY
PLACES FAR MORE IMPORTANCE ON GORTON VISIT TO
WASHINGTON WHICH PRECEDES SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE
BY ABOUT TWO WEEKS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY
WILL NOT EXPECT TO LEARN ANYTHING NEW FROM US AND
THEY CERTAINLY WILL HAVE NOTHING OF IMPORTANCE TO
TELL US OR OTHERS THAT WASN'T ALREADY THOROUGHLY
COVERED IN WASHINGTON TALKS. FREETH, WHO WILL HEAD
GOA DELEGATION, IS NOT - PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL AND IS
STILL PRETTY GREEN TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO AND
WE DOUBT HE WILL PLAY VERY ACTIVE ROLE. PLIMSOLL,
WHO WILL BE TRAVELING TO WASHINGTON WITH GORTON, TOLD
CHARGE HE HOPES TO AVOID TCC MEETING AND SEND SOMEONE
ELSE FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS PERHAPS
INDICATIVE OF DEGREE OF GOA INTEREST IN FORTHCOMING
MEETINS.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
PAGE TWO, CANBERRA 2286, CONTROL 6833Q
3. ALTHOUGH GOA IS UNLIKELY TAKE ANY INITIATIVE AT
MEETING, IT WILL DEFINITELY WISH TO KNOW IN ADVANCE
WHAT WE PLAN TO SAY AND WHAT WE HOPE WILL COME OUT OF
MEETING. WE BELIEVE THEY EXPECT THAT QUESTION OF TROOP
WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE MAJOR SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION (IN
WHICH, APART FROM OUR SPECIAL SITUATION, THEY WOULD
URGE OTHERS TO HOLD THE LINE) AND THAT DETAILED
BRIEFING PARIS TALKS WOULD BE GIVEN BY US AND GVN
REPRESENTATIVES. THEY MAY ALSO WISH TO GET INTO
SUBJECTS OF POST-VIETNAM PEACE- KEEPING OPERATION,
DISCUSSION OF INSURGENCY IN. THAILAND AND LAOS, AND
POSTWAR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. GOA WILL WISH
TO HAVE A STRONG JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT DEMONSTRATES
FIRM SOLIDARITY AND INTENT ALL TCC'S TO STAND BY
BASIC OBJECTIVE. CRONK
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Seven
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
May 22, 1969
FOR THE PRESS
P.R. No. 132
COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT CONCLUSION
SEVEN NATIONS CONFERENCE
Bangkok, Thailand
May 22, 1969
The Minister for External Affairs of Australia, Mr. Gordon Freeth;
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Kyu Hah Choi;
the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of New Zealand, Mr.
Keith Holyoake; the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Mr.
C arlos P. Romulo; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Mr. Thanat
Khoman; the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. William
P. Rogers; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam,
Mr. Tran Chanh Thanh met in Bangkok, at the invitation of the Royal Thai
Government, on 22 May 1969.
PURPOSES
The meeting was held to permit the Ministers to continue their prac-
tice of regular consultations on important matters of mutual interest. Specifi-
cally, they wished (1) to review the current situation in Viet-Nam, (2) to
consider the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, (3) to dis-
cuss ways in which their governments might strengthen their efforts to help
the people of Viet-Nam, (4) to examine the security situation in Asia.
SITUATION IN VIET-NAM
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam described
the important developments which had taken place in his country over the past
twelve months. He emphasized the broadly based representative nature of the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and noted the successful establishment
of the new and elected institutions, such as the Supreme Court of Justice and
the Inspectorate called for by the Vietnamese Constitution. He also described
the current efforts of Vietnamese non-Communist political parties to unite to
further their common goal. The Ministers expressed their gratification at the
continued strengthening of Vietnamese political institutions, in particular the
effective functioning of the elected National Assembly.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam also out-
lined the efforts being made to raise the standard of living of his countrymen
and to bring them greater social well-being, making particular reference to
his Government' S new land reform program and rural development policy.
He described the increased autonomy and financial resources given to local
authorities to foster a functioning democracy for the benefit of the people. He
underlined the achievements of the pacification program, which have made
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed possible pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
PR 132
possible the election of additional village councils and hamlet chiefs.
He described how urban housing projects had been put into effect to
resettle the victims of Communist indiscriminate shellings. He pointed out
that, in spite of the ravages of war, primary, secondary, and higher education
had progressed at a remarkable rate.
The Minister further indicated that the open arms policy had brought
fruitful results with growing numbers of enemy cadres and officers rallying to
the national community.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam stressed
the strong desire for peace of his Government and of the people of Viet-Nam.
The Ministers made it clear that the peoples of all seven nations desired a
just and lasting peace at the earliest possible time. They welcomed the
willingness of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to hold private
talks with what the other side called the NLF as demonstrated by President
Nguyen Van Thieu's statements of March 25, and April 7, 1969.
The Ministers examined the military situation and received a briefing
from Vietnamese and American military commanders. They were encouraged
at the progress being made by allied forces and the increasing difficulties
encountered by the other side. They agreed that the failure of the other side
to achieve their objectives should convince them of their inability to gain a
victory by military means. The Ministers noted the modernization and improve-
ment of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, welcomed their determination to assume
greater responsibilities for the defense of their homeland, and commended the
progress they have already made in that direction. They noted with appreciation
the substantial increase in the strength of the armed forces contributed by
Thailand to the defense of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Ministers expressed
their admiration and gratitude for the courage and devotion of the allied soldiers
serving in Viet-Nam.
The Ministers emphasized that their forces were in Viet-Nam to help
the Vietnamese people defend themselves against outside aggression and
to ensure that such aggression shall not be rewarded. They reaffirmed that their
objective was to bring about a peace in which the people of South Viet-Nam are
able to exercise their unconditional right of self-determination free from
external interference and terrorism. The Ministers of the seven nations re-
affirmed their determination to help the Vietnamese people resist this aggression
and accordingly to continue their support of the Republic of Viet-Nam. They
recognized that this support will be related to the progress of the peace negotia-
tions, the level of offensive actions by the enemy, and the relative strength
of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam and their capability of taking
over an even greater share of the fighting.
The Ministers viewed with grave concern the continuing presence of a
large number of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and their use of Laotian
territory in violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements.
EFFORT FOR PEACE
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PR 132
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EFFORT FOR PEACE
The Ministers also reviewed the developments in the negotiations
taking place in Paris and welcomed the proposals which had been made
there by the governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United
States concerning mutual troop withdrawals. They agreed that withdrawals
could commence simultaneously and proceed expeditiously on the basis of
a mutually acceptable timetable; that all externally introduced forces
would have to be withdrawn not only from South Viet-Nam but also from
Laos and Cambodia; and that the further introduction of forces must be
prohibited. They also agreed that a clear need existed for adequate
verification and supervision of compliance with both the withdrawal of
forces and the prohibition against further introduction of forces.
The Ministers also noted with approval the proposals put forward by
the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States for observance of the
Demilitarized Zone, the release of prisoners of war, and full compliance
with existing international agreements on Laos and Cambodia.
The Ministers examined the positions the other side has taken in
Paris. In contrast to the reasonable nature of the proposals put forward
by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States, the other side has
demanded unilateral and unconditional withdrawal of the allied forces
assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam and destruction of the democratic
institutions and procedures which have been emerging there during the past
several years. From these positions the Ministers concluded with regret
that the other side was still intransigent and was seeking to wear down
the resistance of the allied nations and to impose upon the Republic of
Viet-Nam a totalitarian regime contrary to the wishes of its people.
They reiterated their common resolve to reject any attempt to impose
upon the Republic of Viet-Nam any system or program, including the spurious
coalition government demanded by the other side, without regard to the
will of the people of South Viet-Nam.
The Ministers agreed that all possibilities leading to peace and
national reconciliation should be thoroughly explored, and they endorsed
the efforts in this direction of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United
States. They welcomed the comprehensive statements by the President of
the Republic of Viet-Nam on April 7, 1969, and the President of the
United States on May 14, 1969, as important contributions to this effort.
They agreed that all of the nations which are making available armed
forces to help defend the Republic of Viet-Nam must participate in the
settlement of the conflict.
The Ministers discussed the need for international cooperation to
support economic reconstruction and development in Viet-Nam after the
cessation of hostilities. They noted in this regard the great potential
for economic and social progress revealed by the recently released joint
development group report prepared at the request of the United States
and the Republic of Viet-Nam. They agreed to consult closely on the
important goal of assisting the people of South Viet-Nam to achieve the
better future their sacrifices have earned. They expressed the hope that
North Viet-Nam will come to realize the advantages of living in peace-
ful cooperation and friendly harmony with its neighbors rather than in
confrontation with them; and that North Viet-Nam will take advantage of
arrangements for regional cooperation for the benefit of its own people
and for the progress of Southeast Asia as a whole.
The
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PR 132
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The Ministers also agreed that a general settlement in Southeast
Asia will reugire the participation by Asian powers in measures to assure
peace and security for this part of the world. They considered it de-
sirable that the Asian countries themselves should have the primary re-
sponsibility for their own future well-being and peaceful development.
They agreed that the Asian countries mightin exercise of this responsi-
bility assume certain duties in connection with a peace settlement for
Viet-Nam, possibly under the aegis of the United Nations. Again, closest
consultation among the interested parties could be beneficial in this
connection.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea gave an
account of the continuing and intensified acts of provocation and
aggression against the Republic of Korea perpetrated by the North Korean
Communists, as evidenced by the series of infiltrations by armed raiders
into the Republic of Korea and the increased violation during the past
year of the Armistice Agreement of 1953. The Ministers expressed their
indignation over these continuing and intensified acts of provocation
and aggression, and renewed their previous agreement that such acts by
the North Korean Communists are a matter of grave concern and directly
threaten the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and the area
surrounding it.
The Ministers reaffirmed their support for the Republic of Korea in
resisting such North Korean aggression. The Ministers welcomed the in-
tention of the Republic of Korea to keep them and other interested
governments informed of any future developments through ambassadors in
Seoul.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES
The Ministers noted that actions taken in pursuance of the policies
herein stated should be in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes.
CONCLUSION
The Ministers of the seven nations reiterated their continued
support to the Republic of Viet-Nam to preserve the unconditional right
of the people of South Viet-Nam to decide their own destiny by demo-
cratic and peaceful means and without outside interference. The Ministers
stated their determination to continue their efforts towards this goal,
while a just and peaceful solution to the conflict is pursued through the
Paris Meetings. Finally, in view of the situation in Korea and Southeast
Asia, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the Declaration on
Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific promulgated at the Summit
Conference in Manila in October 1966, and agreed to continue the close
cooperation which has existed among the Seven Nations.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 21, 1969
FOR THE PRESS
NO. 126
FINAL COMMUNIQUE
OF THE
FOURTEENTH SEATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
BANGKOK, THAILAND
MAY 21, 1969
The Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization held its
Fourteenth Meeting in Bangkok from 20 May to 21 May 1969, under the
chairmanship of His Excellency Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Thailand.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The Council agreed that the most significant development during the
past year has been the prospects for peace in the area opened up by the
Paris Meetings and by the determined efforts of the United States and the
Republic of Viet-Nam in close consultation with their allies to bring.
about a peaceful and just solution to the Viet-Nam conflict.
The Council noted that economic and social progress had continued
during the past year within the Treaty area. The Council agreed that
this progress had been achieved mainly by the individual efforts of the
countries in the region, and by the further strengthening of regional
cooperation which reflects a growing consciousness of mutual interests.
The Council also noted that this achievement had been made without
sacrifice of human liberty and fundamental freedoms.
The Council noted that these political, economic and social advances
would not have been possible without the shield which the Manila Treaty
has helped to provide over the past fourteen years.
The Council agreed that aggression, both overt and by subversion,
infiltration and terrorism, instigated or supported by external communist
movements, remains a major threat to the peace and security of the area.
The Council expressed its conviction that the threat in the Treaty area
cannot be considered in isolation from problems of international peace
and security, and that the outcome of the struggle now going on against
such aggression in Southeast Asia will have profound effects throughout
the world. The Council expressed its determination that this aggression
must not be allowed to succeed.
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE
The Council commended the determination of the Republic of Viet-Nam,
and the governments helping to defend it, to bring a peace in Viet-Nam
under which the people of South Viet-Nam will be assured of their right
to determine their own future, free from outside interference and terrorism.
The
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NO. 126
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The Council noted with approval the proposals which have been made
by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States for the mutual with-
drawal of external forces from South Viet-Nam, for respect for the
Demilitarized Zone, for full implementation of the 1962 Geneva Agree-
ments on Laos, for respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality
and territoiral integrity of Cambodia and for the release of all
prisoners of war. The Council noted that these proposals not only
recognize the realities of the situation in Southeast Asia today, but
are firmly based on the precedents of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements.
The Council noted that the Paris Talks have been going on for a year and
expressed the hope that the other side would now respond constructively
to the proposals.
The Council expressed its conviction that serious negotiations
based on the above proposals would lead to an end of hostilities and to
peace and reconciliation in Viet-Nam. The Council noted that the
fundamental allied objective in Viet-Nam is to ensure the unconditional
right on self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam. The
Council agreed that, whatever the difficulties, the intensive search for
a just and lasting peace must continue until this objective is attained
and stability and security are assured.
VIET-NAM
The Council heard with deep interest a statement by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Council expressed
its concern and sympathy for the Vietnamese people who have suffered
so long. It affirmed its admiration for the courage with which the
government and people of the Republic of Viet-Nam are defending their
freedom.
The Council noted the commendable progress being made by the armed
forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam in improving their ability to with-
stand the armed aggression and to counter subversive activity. The
Council warmly welcomed the expressed determination of the Government of
the Republic of Viet-Nam progressively to assume responsibility for the
defence of its territory.
The Council also welcomed the continued progress that has been made
by the Republic of Viet-Nam in the political, economic and social fields,
in particular, the evolution and strengthening of democratic and
representative government.
The Council noted with deep concern North Viet-Nam's continuing
aggression by means of armed attack against the Republic of Viet-Nam.
The Council deplored the conduct of North Viet-Nam, particularly while
peace negotiations are in progress, in continuing indiscriminate attacks
on the civilian population. The Council noted with regret that this
aggression is sustained by a heavy flow of weapons and supplies from
other communist regimes.
The Council noted with appreciation the increases during the past
year in the military, economic and humanitarian assistance by member
governments to the Republic of Viet-Nam, in fulfillment of or consistent
with their obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defence
Treaty. The Council also noted with appreciation the substantial
assistance
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
NO. 126
assistance which the Republic of Viet-Nam has continued to receive from
the Republic of Korea and other countries which are not members of SEATO.
The Council stated its conviction that the effective defence of the
Republic of Viet-Nam in its current struggle is essential to the security
of Southeast Asia and will demonstrate that communist expansion through
aggression of this kind will not be permitted.
The Council noted that reconstruction in Viet-Nam, which awaits
the achievement of peace, will open the way to a new era of development
and progress for the peoples and nations of the entire region. The
Council noted the intention of the member nations of SEATO to continue
their aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam and to contribute to the work
of reconstruction.
The Council welcomed the expressions of intent by other nations
around the world to participate in this urgent task.
LAOS
The Council noted with grave concern that North Viet-Nam, in
violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements, continues to maintain military
forces, including large units of its regular army, in Laos, to commit
armed attacks on the forces of the Royal Government of Laos, and to use
Laotian Territory for infiltrating troops and supplies into the Republic
of Viet-Nam and to support insurgency in Thailand. The Council reiterated
its call for full implementation by all signatories of the 1962 Geneva
Agreements on Laos and expressed support for the earnest efforts of
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the Royal Government of Laos to
secure peace and to preserve the sovereignty, independence, neutrality,
unity and territorial integrity of Laos.
PHILIPPINES
The Council was pleased to note the recent successes achieved by
government forces against insurgents in Central Luzon and the vigorous
efforts by all agencies of the Government of the Philippines, with
support of member nations, to implement an integrated socio-economic
programme designed to eliminate the root cause of the complex insurgency
problem in Central Luzon. Since one of the causes of agrarian unrest
among the masses is the land problem, the Council also noted with
approval the efforts of the Philippine Government to accelerate the
implementation of the land reform code. The Council further noted the
achievements of the Government of the Philippines in the development of
its rural areas and expressed its gratification at the continuing high
priority given to irrigation, feeder roads , health, electrification,
credit and agricultural productivity programmes.
The Council noted proposals by the Philippines for a youth volunteer
corps, a special problem office, a university of Southeast Asia, a rural
health training centre, and refugee rehabilitation.
THAILAND
The Council noted the Royal Thai Government had increased during the
year the major contribution it is making to the defence of the Republic
of Viet-Nam. In addition to air and naval units already in Viet-Nam,
it dispatched a division of ground forces to aid in the struggle. This
was done despite the continued threat of communist-inspired insurgency
within Thailand itself.
The
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4-
No. 126
The Council was gratified by the determined endeavours of the
Royal Thai Government and people to encourage economic and social develop-
ment and to counter subversive activities directed from outside Thai
borders. Their efforts have continued under the newly formed government
following the national elections held early this year.
The Council expressed concern at the increase in communist in-
filtration and terrorist activities particularly in remote areas of
North and Northeast Thailand. The Council noted with satisfaction the
intensive efforts of the Royal Thai Government to provide greater
security and a higher standard of living for the rural population and
the vigorous measures taken by Thai authorities to eliminate the threat
of communist insurgency. The Council reiterated its determination to
continue to assist Thailand in meeting this threat.
COUNTER-SUBVERSION
The Council again affirmed its support for SEATO activities designed
to aid member countries in the Treaty area to counter communist sub-
sersion. It noted the high degree of success achieved by the Secretary-
General in the provision of such assistance and requested him to continue
his efforts in this field.
AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS
The Council welcomed as a substantial contribution to the security
of the area the decisions of the Governments of Australia and New
Zealand to maintain military forces in Malaysia and Singapore at the
request of those governments.
The Council also welcomed the proposed consultations in Canberra
between the Governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore
and the United Kingdom.
THE ORGANIZATION
The Council reaffirmed the importance which it attaches to the
organization as a deterrent to communist aggression and as a source of
support to member nations in the area in countering communist subversion.
The Council was convinced that greater emphasis should be placed
on political consultations, counter-insurgency, and economic and
and cultural cooperation, to make the organization's role more effective
and more responsive to the new communist tactics being employed to
undermine the stability and orderly progress of free societies. The
Council expressed its support for cooperative endeavours to this effect.
The Council noted the report of the military advisers and commended
the work of the Military Planning Office during the past year, in
particular the excellent work done in keeping plans up-to-date and in
designing military exercises.
The Council expressed its satisfaction at the progress achieved by
the organization in programmes related to economic development, cultural
affairs and medical research. It commended the efforts of the organiza-
tion to keep these programmes under review to ensure that they proved
complementary to programmes for counter-insurgency and civic action. The
Council agreed that the value of these programmes has been fully
demonstrated and that they deserve the active support of all members.
Pakistan
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NO. 126
-5-
PAKISTAN
The Pakistan delegate wished it to be recorded that he did not
participate in the drafting of the communique and that the views expressed
in it do not necessarily reflect the position of the Government of
Pakistan.
NEXT MEETING
The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Government
of the Philippines to hold its Fifteenth Meeting in the Philippines
in 1970.
EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE
The Council expressed gratitude to the Royal Thai Government and
the people of Thailand for their generous hospitality and warm welcome,
and its appreciation for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting.
LEADERS OF DELEGATIONS
All member governments, except France, participated. The Republic
of Viet-Nam, a protocol state, was represented by an observer.
The leaders of the delegations to the Fourteenth Council Meeting
were:
AUSTRALIA
Honorable Gordon Freeth, M.P.
Minister for External Affairs
NEW ZEALAND
Right Honorable Keith Holyoake,
C.H., M.P.
Prime Minister and Minister of
External Affairs.
PAKISTAN
H.E. Mr. M. Hayat Junejo,
Ambassador to Thailand
PHILIPPINES
H.E. General Carlos P. Romulo,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs
THAILAND
H.E. Mr. Thanat Khoman
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
UNITED KINGDOM
Right Honorable Lord Shepherd
P.C.,
Minister of State, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office.
UNITED STATES
Honorable William P. Rogers
Secretary of State.
REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
H.E. Mr. Tran Chanh Thanh
(Observer)
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
#
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL 940
PAGE 01 STATE 076647
85
ORIGIN EA 15
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00,NSCE USIE ØØDCIAE 00,DODE 00 JPM 04,H 02' INR 07 ,
03, NSAE ØØ,NSC 10.P 04,RSC ø1,SP 02,SS 20, UPW 01 AID 28,10 13,
/111 R
66646
DRAFTED BY EA/K BCROWBERG
APPROVED BY EA/K RBPETERS
DOD/ISA-LT COL BAXLEY
WHITE HOUSE MR SNEIDER
S/S MR BROWN
EA/RA MR FRIEDMAN
Ea
015725
0 R 142339Z MAY 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
amembassy TOKYO
CINCPAC
COMUSKOREA
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 076647
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
SUBJECT: US-ROK DEFENSE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE
REF: WH 9653-SECTO 12
10 IN RESPONSE TO ROK PROPOSAL DECISION TO HOLD ANNUAL
MEETINGS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL BETWEEN US AND ROK DEFENSE
MINISTRIES "TO DISCUSS AND CONSULT ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY
MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND COMMON CONCERN" WAS MADE
DURING COURSE OF VANCE MISSION TO ROK SHORTLY AFTER SEIZURE
OF PUEBLO AND BLUE HOUSE RAID. DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED IN
KOREAN-US JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 15, 1968°
CONFIDENTIAL
45
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
AMERICA STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 076647
2. FIRST ANNUAL MEETING WAS HELD IN WASHINGTON MAY 27-28»
19680 ROK MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CHOI YONG=HUI AND
DEPUTY SECRETARY PAUL NITZE PARTICIPATED. TO MOLLIFY ROKS,
WHO HAD HOPED THAT SECRETARY CLIFFORD WOULD PERSONALLY
PARTICIPATE LATTER HAD PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH CHOI FROM
US VIEWPOINT 1968 MEETING WAS PRIMARLY MEANS OF REASSURING
ROKS IN WAKE OF PUEBLO AND BLUE HOUSE RAID® NYTZE SAID
ATTTIME THAT SUCH MEETINGS ARE FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND WILL
NOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTITUTE FOR NORMAL DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS.
30 MEETING WILL BE HELD IN SEOUL JUNE 3.4 WITH DEPUTY
SECRETARY PACKARD REPRESENTING US ON MINISTERIAL LEVEL
PACKARD'S PARTY WILL INCLUDE: RADM TAZEWELLI To SHEPARD
(ASDVISA), RICHARD G o CAPEN JR , (ASD/PA), LT. GEN FERDINAND
To UNGER (JOINT STAFF REPRESENTATIVED RICHARD B PETERS
(STATE REPRESENTATIVE) AND CAPT. (USN) JAMES B ® WILSON
(MILITARY ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY SECRETARY).
40 TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING NOW BEING PREPARED BY DOD.
FOLLOWING IS TENTATIVE AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE
A o ROK BRIEFING ON NORTH KOREAN THREAT AND CAPABILITIES
(CONVENTIONALI AND UNCONVENTIONALI TO INCLUDE CHICOM REINFORCE-
MENT CAPABILITIES: DISCUSSION, INCLUDING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN
AREA.
B o BREIFING ON CAPABILITIES OF ROKE TO MEET THREAT
INCLUDING ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES, HOMELAND DEFENSE
RESERVE FORCES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Co USFK BRIEFING ON CURRENT STATUS OF US FORCES
IN KOREA®
Do BRIEFING BY WASHINGTON MEMBERS OF GROUP ON VIET-NAM
SITUATION AND ON CHICON THREAT.
E lo DISCUSSION OF STATUS, FUTURE, AND ROLE OF US: AND
ROK FORCES IN VIET-NAM IN POST-HOSTILITIES SITUATION
Fle USFK BRIEFING ON INCREASING 0&M COSTS OF ROK
FORCES.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT DEP OF
*
UNITED STATES
OF STATE *
Department of State
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03: STATE 076647
G. ROK BRIEFING ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
Ho DISCUSSION OF I MAP FUNDING
I. DISCUSSION ON FUTURE OF FREE WORLD AND US IDEAS AND
CONCEPTS FOR SECURITY OF FREE ASIA.
40 TALKING POINTS COVERING ITEMS: E G , AND I ARE INCLUDED
IN BILATERAL TALKING PAPER FOR SEVEN-NATION MEETING. SUGGEST
THAT IF CHOE RAISES OTHER QUESTIONS RELATING TO DEFENSE MATTERSA
HE BEI INFORMED THAT BETTER FORUM FOR DISUCSSION THESE SUBJECTS
IS FORTHCOMING DEFENSE MINISTRIES MEETING. RICHARDSON
CONFIDENTIALI
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXE™S EXCES
SECRET 271
PAGE 01 140408Z
16
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,000 00,550 00, FILE 01, NSCE 00 W
1969 MAY 14 009975 3 07
KISSINGER'S OFFICE
RECEIVED
0 142200Z MAY 69
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
TO AMEMB BANGKOK
INFO DEPT OF STATE
AMEMB SAIGON
2
SEC R El T EXDIS WH9650
FROM MCCLOSKEY ABOARD SAM 86971
SECTO 7
REF BANGKOK 6055
BANGKOK 6053
BANGKOK 5973
I APPRECIATE NATURE OF PROBLEM YOU HAVE ENCOUNTERED
WITH THANAT AND WITH THAI SENSITIVITIES ABOUT DRAFT TCC
COMMUNIQUE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND YOUR STRONG
POSITIVE RECOMMENDATION/ I AGREE TO ACCEPT THANAT'S BREAKFAST
INVITATION FOR MAY 21 AND WOULD HOPE THAT I CAN SET MOST OF
HIS CONCERNS AT REST DURING THAT SESSION. I AM COUNTING ON
YOU TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR THIS MEETING, BUT AM SURE YOU
REALIZE THAT WE CAN NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE THANAT FULL SATISFACTION
PAGE 2 RUEADWW 1161 SECRET EXDIS
ON ALL HIS DESIRES, AS WE WANT TO PRESERVE A COMMUNIQUE
EXCES
POINTING TOWARD PEACE AND AVOIDING AS MUCH HARSH LANGUAGE
AS POSSIBLE.
2. AS FOR THE COMMUNIQUE, YOU CAN TELL THAIS WE CAN
OF COURSE ACCEPT A NUMBER OF THEIR PROPOSALS, INCLUDING SUCH THINGS
AS THE MENTION OF THEIR TROOP AUGMENTATION AND THE REJECTION OF AN
IMPOSED COALITION AND ASSURE THEM WE WANT TO BE COOPERATIVE AND
BELIEVE AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY.
HOWEVER (REF 59731 WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT FURTHER EFFORT TOWARDS
DETAILED NEGOTIATION CF LANGUAGE BE DEFERRED UNTIL OUR ARRIVAL
IN BANGKOK. WE WILL, IN THE MEANTIME ,, HAVE WORKED OUT SOME UNDER-
STANDINGS WITH THE VIETNAMESE IN SAIGON. ALSO, WE ASSUME THAT DEPT.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESARORITATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 1404082
WILL CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND
REPRESENTATIVES.
3. I WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
AFTER OUR ARRIVAL IN BANGKOK, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR,
BIRABHONGSE, FREEMAN MATTHEWS AND GEORGE ALDRICH MEET IN A
WORKING AND DRAFTING SESSION TO TACKLE AN AGREED VERSION OF OUR
DIVERGENT TEXTS. IF WE CAN ENTER THE TCC MEETINGS WITH AS
COMPATIBLE CONDITIONS AS POSSIBLE, IT WILL, I AM SURE, IMPROVE
PAGE 3 RUEADWW 1161 S ECRET EXDIS
THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETINGS THEMSELVES AND WILL
CERTAINLY EASE YOUR BILATERAL PROBLEMS WITH THANAT.
BT
SEPRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
076253
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
SECRET
37: B
OR OC/T USE ONLY
Classification
Origin
ACTION:
Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY
I 4 MAY 69 20 02%
Info:
STATE
076253
NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS
SUBJ:
Seven-Nation Meeting - Withdrawals
REF:
Saigon 9313
having
Your assumption is correct, and we have no objection to gaving GVN
provide withdrawal paper to Foreign Ministers of TCC countries in
their capitals just before Bangkok meeting, preferably not before
Friday, May 16, Saigon time.
GP-1
END
RICHARDSON
H.
wg
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
EA: HIsham:pb 5/14/69
2831
EA - Mr. Green
classification approved by:
Clearances:
S/S - Mr. XXXXX
Walsh
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
8-65 FORM DS-322
1. Sent OF STATE
7. TO:
WH
(Msg. No.) 345
3. Transmitted by: BP Belin
4. Received '69 MAY by: 8 AM 11 08
Date & Time: 1100
Date & Time:
5. Description:
Tel to Saigon re Seven Nation Meeting
TOP SECRET/NODIS
6. Cisin & Controls:
7. No. of Pgs.
2
8. Precedence
IMM
9. Validated by: RLBrown
10. Deliver to: Dr. Kissinger
For: Clearance
XX
The White House
Information
ATTN: Mr. Sneider
Per Request
Aneider cleared
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
BEFORE THE IELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243
ITGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
CATE: COLLECT
ARGE to
TOP SECRET
69 MAY 8 AM
Classification
FOR OC/T USE ONLY
08
igin
ACTION:
Amembassy SAIGON
IMMEDIATE
STATE
NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER
SUBJECT: Seven Nation Meeting
1. We have been considering how we should handle question of
US troop reductions (in context of President's three points in
his April18 press conference) in the TCC Meeting. We are con-
cerned that some of the TCC's will read too much into what we
may say on this subject, especially in light of excited press
speculation. It has occurred to us that the problem could be
put in its proper light if the GVN were to take the lead in
noting
discussing the prospects for such reductions in the context of
increased RVNAF capabilities and as a demonstration of confidence
in their abilities to take on added responsibilities. If Thanh
could include a statement along those lines in his prepared
remarks at the TCC Conference, with perhaps additional support
from General Du, the Secretary would have a very useful peg on
which to hang his own remarks on the subject.
red by:
Tel. Ext,
Telegraphic transmission and
A/VN:HFMatthewsJr./fm1o
8731
classification approved by:
EA - William H. Sullivan
ranses:
C-Ambassador Pederseny
EA/VN-Mr. Burke
S/S- Mr. Brown
WH-
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
HUNS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON
ES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Rozam
GOING TELEGRAM Department of State
TE:
COLLECT
GE TO
TOP SECRET
Classification
FOR oc/T USE ONLY
ACTION:
PAGE 2 to NODIS TELEGRAM TO SAIGON IMMEDIATE
2. If you concur that it would be useful and feasible, could
you explore the possibility of setting up such a scenario with
Thieu and Thanh?
GP-1.
END
Eal. Ext,
Telegraphic transmission and
by:
classification approved by:
cas
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential. Library This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
W A
072654
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
TOP SECRET
30B
oc/T use ONLY
Classification
9 MAY 69 00 012
Origin
ACTION:
Amembassy SAIGON
IMMEDIATE
Info:
STATE 072654
NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER
SUBJECT: Seven Nation Meeting
1. We have been considering how we should handle question of
US troop reductions (in context of President's three points in
his April18 press conference) in the TCC Meeting. We are con-
cerned that some of the TCC's will read too much into what we
may say on this subject, especially in light of excited press.
speculation. It has occurred to us that the problem could be
put in its proper light 1f the GVN were to take the lead in
noting
disansaing the prospects for such reductions in the context of
increased RVNAF capabilities and as a demonstration of confidence
in their abilities to take on added responsibilities. If Thanh
could include a statement along those lines in his prepared
remarks at the TCC Conference, with perhaps additional support
from General Du, the Secretary would have a very useful peg on
which to hang his own remarks on the subject.
Drafted by:
EA/VN:HFMattnewsJr./fmlc Has/7/69
5/7/69
Tol. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
8731
EA - William H. Sullivan
classification approved by:
Clearances:
C-Ambassador Pedersen
OPP
S/S- МиххВаюки
WH-Mr.
Me. Gleysteen
fir
TOP SECRET
FORM Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-322
8-65
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
TOP SECRET
Classification
FOR oc/T USE ONLY
Origin
ACTION:
Infoi
PAGE 2 to NODIS TELEGRAM TO SAIGON IMMEDIATE
2. If you concur that 1t would be useful and feasible, could
you explore the possibility of setting up such a scenario with
Thieu and Thanh?
GP-1.
END
[ROGERS]
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approve d by
Clearances:
TOP SECRET
FORM Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This docume reviewoù pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
8-65 DS-322
INFARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
791
PAGE 01 SAIGON 09433 01 OF 03 151227Z
44
ACTION SS 30
3
INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,FILE 01,/032 W
019255
EXCES EX@
PI R 151125Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3974
S: EC R ET SECTION 1 OF 3 SAIGON 9433
EXDIS
SECTO 17
SUBJ: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE - WITHDRAWAL PAPER
A. FOREIGN MINISTER THANH HAS REQUESTED, AND WE HAVE AGREED,
THAT IN INTEREST OF SPEED, EFFICIENCY AND SECURITY, OUR COMMUNI-
CATIONS FACILITIES SHOULD BE USED TO HELP GVN REPRESENTATIVES
IN TCC CAPITALS DISTRIBUTE TEXT OF US/GVN PAPER ON WITHERAWALS TO
HOST GOVERNMENTS. ACCORDINGLY, ACTION ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT WELLING-
TON) SHOULD GIVE TEXT OF PAPER TO THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR OR
CHARGE, REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE EITHER HAS RECEIVED
FROM GVN OR WILL SHORTLY RECEIVE, TO PRESENT IT TO THE FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE HOST GÜVERNMENT BEFORE THE MINISTER'S DEPARTURE
FOR BANGKOK. PAPER WILL. BE DISCUSSED IN THE SEVEN NATION CONFER-
ENCE. THE IMPORTANCE OF SECRECY SHOULD BE STRESSED.
B. AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON SHOULD PRESENT THE PAPER TO FOREIGN
MINISTER ON BEHALF OF THE GVN, POINTING OUT THAT THIS IS AN AGREED
GVN/US PAPER AND WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE.
C. TEXT OF PAPER FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been oviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED
MAKE
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 SAIGON 09433 01 OF 03 151227Z
WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES
1. BASIC OBJECTIVES
OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES IN THE MATTER OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE:
(A) TO OBTAIN THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES AND OTHER ELEMENTS
FROM NORTH VIET NAM INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA AT ANY
TIME:
(B) TO INSURE THAT SUCH PERSONNEL RETURN ALL THE WAY TO NORTH
VIET NAM:
(C) TO GET ADEQUATE ASSURANCE, THROUGH VERIFICATION AND SUPER-
VISION MACHINERY, THROUGH THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN
THE AGREEMENT (FOOTNOTE), AND THROUGH OUR OWN RESOURCES, THAT
HANOI COMPLIES WITH THE CONDITIONS WE HAVE SPECIFIED FOR AGREED
MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS.
(FOOTNOTE) FOR EXPLANATION OF THE TERM "MEASURES NECESSARY TO
MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT", SEE THE SUGGESTED POSITION FOR ITEM 6.
2. DEFINITION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS SUBJECT TO
WITHDRAWAL
WE SHOULD INSIST, IN PRINCIPLE, UPON THE WITHDRAWAL TO NORTH
VIET NAM OF NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULAR FORCES, NORTH VIETNAMESE
SOLDIERS SERVING IN NOMINALLY VIET CONG UNITS, AND ALL OTHER
PERSONNEL (E.G., REGROUPEES) INFILTRATED FROM NORTH VIET NAM
INTO THE SOUTH AT ANY TIME, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING THE
EFFORT TO SEIZE CONTROL OF SOUTH VIET NAM.
IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT WE WILL BE ABLE, EVEN WITH A SUPERVISORY
ORGANIZATION, TO IDENTIFY ALL POLITICAL AND SUPPORTING ELEMENTS
INTRODUCED FROM THE NORTH. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF NATIVE
SOUTHERNERS. YET, DESPITE THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES, IT SEEMS
WISE TO PUT FORWARD A FIRM POSITION AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.
3. DEFINITION OF US AND ALLIED FORCES AND ELEMENTS SUBJECT OT
WITHDRAWAL
WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ALL COMBAT FORCES FROM
SOUTH VIET NAM IF HANO I MEETS SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF A MUTUAL
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library This document has been determined to be declassified
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE VO.
Department of State
UNITED EDWARD STATES OF AV
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 SAIGON 09433 01 OF 03 1512272
WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT. THESE CONDITIONS SHOULD INCLUDE PROVISIONS
FOR:
SECRET
eproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential and has been determined to be declassified
NOT 10 BE REPRODUCED AUTHORIZATION OF I AUTHORIZATION OF AUTHORIAOTE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
ORLINED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 871
PAGE 01 SAIGON 09433 02 OF 03 151345Z
KIGIS
47
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,FILE 01,/032 W
019707
PR 151125Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3975
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SAIGON 9433
EXDIS
(A) VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION OF WITHDRAWAL.
(B) THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM LAOS AND
CAMBODIA, AS WELL AS FROM SOUTH VIET NAM.
(C) MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT. OBVIOUSLY EACH
OF THESE CONDITIONS, AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY WILL BE ATTAIN-
ABLE, REQUIRES DISCUSSION. ONE QUESTION CONCERNS THE DEFINITION
OF THE TERM "MILITARY FORCES". WE WILL HAVE AN INTEREST IN NOT
FORECLOSING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF US
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES, IF THIS IS THE DESIRE
OF THE GVN. THESE CATEGORIES MIGHT INCLUDE US MILITARY ADVISORY
AND LOGISTIC PERSONNEL YET WE MUST BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO
COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF US AND ALLIED COMBAT FORCES AND UNITS IF
HANOI COMPLIES WITH THE AGREED [ CONDITIONS.
4. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ANY INITIATION OF US AND ALLIED
WITHDRAWAL
WE WOULD BEGIN PHASE-CUT OF US AND ALLIED FORCES AS NORTH
VIET NAM BEGINS ITS WITHDRAWALS AND THE FLOW OF NEW MANPOWER
HAS CEASED.
WITH RESPECT TO THE LEVEL OF VOLENCE, REMOVAL OF THE NORTH
SECRET
Reproduced BE Richard ODUCED THE ed pursuant to E.O. OF THE 13526 EXECUTIVE and has been determined SECRETARY to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 SAIGON 09433 02 OF 03 151345Z
VIETNAMESE SHOULD LOWER THE VIET CONG CAPABILITY FOR VIOLENCE.
THUS, WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF VOLENCE
IS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE INITIATION OF WITHDRAWALS,
FAILURE TO REALIZE A REDUCTION OF VIOLENCE AFTER WITHDRAWAL HAD
APPARENTLY BEEN BEGUN WOULD BE A STRONG INDICATION THAT THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE NOT CARRYING THROUGH THE WITHDRAWAL IN
GOOD FAITH.
5. ELEMENTS OF AN AGREED WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE: INITIATION,
PHASING, AND COMPLETION
WE WOULD INDICATE IN PARIS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK OUT A
WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE THAT COULD INCLUDE
(A) PHASING OF AGREED WITHDRAWALS ON EACH SIDE,
(B) SIMULTANEOUS INITIATION OF THE FIRST INCREMENTS OF WITHDRAWAL,
(C) A COMPLETION SCHEDULE UNDER WHICH NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
AND ELEMENTS WOULD BE FULLY WITHDRAWN BEFORE WE WERE REQUIRED
TO COMPLETE OUR WITHDRAWALS UNDER THE AGREEMENT.
WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONTROL THE TIMING OF THE
EXCLUS EXCLUS
COMPLETION OF OUR WITHDRAWAL, SINCE WE CAN DETERMINE IF HANOI
HAS FULLY MET THE CONDITIONS OF THE MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT.
THE KEY POINT WILL NOT BE THE TIMETABLE BUT RATHER GETTING HANOI
TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL.
60 SUBSEQUENT CONDITIONS AFFECTING PHASING AND COMPLETION OF
WITHDRAWALS
WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR, AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,
THAT WE COULD NOT CARRY THROUGH OUR WITHDRAWALS, WHATEVER THE
TIMETABLE, IF THE TOTAL PATTERN OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTIONS
INDICATED THAT THEIR WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT BEING CARRIED THROUGH
IN GOOD FAITH.
MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT MIGHT INCLUDE NOT
ONLY THE REQUIRED ASSURANCE THROUGH VERIFICATION THAT FORCES
AND ELEMENTS WERE BEING AND HAD BEEN REMOVED TO THE NORTH AND
THAT INFILTRATION HAD CEASED BUT SUCH ELEMENTS AS RESPECT FOR
THE DMZ, ABSENCE OF INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON MAJOR CITIES, AND
SECRET
Reproduced ERCHERNIXO Presidential/Library. Ohis document has been reviewed pursuant toE.O 13526 and EXECUTIVE has been determined SECRETARY to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 SAIGON 09433 02 OF 03 151345Z
ABSENCE OF ATTACKS ON US AND ALLIED FORCES BEING WITHDRAWN OR
BEING DEPLOYED FOR WITHDRAWAL.
7. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS AND PROGRESS TOWARD
A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
THE ISSUE HAS TWO ASPECTS:
ON THE ONE HAND, WE SEE NO REASON WHY WE NEED TO ESTABLISH ANY
CONNECTION BETWEEN WITHDRAWALS AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE
WOULD EXPECT AT LEAST INITIALLY TO PRESS THE ISSUE OF MUTUAL
WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT OURSELVES RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT. OBVIOUSLY, IF WE COULD OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWALS
WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THE SITUATION WOULD
BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GVN. THEORETICALLY, ONE CAN ENVISAGE WITH-
DRAWALS TAKING PLACE INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
AMONG THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.
ON THE OTHER HAND, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER IT IS UNLIKELY THAT
PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON A MUTUAL TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT IN
THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THERE
IS ALSO A LINK IN THE SENSE THAT WE WOULD NOT EXPECT TO CARRY
WITHDRAWALS TO COMPLETION IF THE TOTAL PICTURE -- INCLUDING THE
DEGREE OF AGREEMENT REACHED IN NEGOTIATIONS -- GAVE US GROUND
FOR SERIOUS DOUBT CONCERNING HANDI'S INTENTIONS. WE WOULD THUS,
FOR INSTANCE, EXPECT TO MAKE A CONTINUING JUDGMENT OF THE
SERIOUSNESS OF HANOI'S INTENT TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS FOR
WITHDRAWAL SPECIFIED IN 6 ABOVE.
EXCES EXCES
SECRET
29
Reproduced atRE REPR document AUTHORIZA pursuant THEEXECUTIVE SFCRETARY
OF STATE
*
Department of State
ORLINO STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 161
2
PAGE 01 SAIGON 09433 03 OF 03 151316Z
47
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,CCO 00, FILE 01,/032 W
020980
PR 151125Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3976
S ECR ET SECTION 3 OF 3 SAIGON 9433
EXDIS
8. THE RELATED ISSUE OF WITHDRAWALS FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA OF
NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS, WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE
EVER IN SOUTH VIET NAM
AS ALREADY NOTED, WE WOULD INSIST THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
EXAIS EXCES
AND ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIET NAM BE WITHDRAWN ALL THE WAY TO NORTH
VIET NAM. THIS WOULD INVOLVE REMOVAL OF SUCH FORCES AND ELEMENTS
FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA.
AS WE TAKE THESE POSITIONS IN PRINCIPLE, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND
THAT - - IN TERMS OF DESIRED NEGOTIATING RESULTS -- OUR FIRST
PRIORITY IS THE WITHDRAWALI OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND
ELEMENTS FROM SOUTHI VIET NAM AND CAMBODIA ALL THE WAY TO THE NORTH
OUR SECOND PRIORITY IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THOSE NORTH VIETNAMESE
FORCES AND ELEMENTS IN LAOS, CHIEFLY IN THE PANHANDLE, WHICH
OPERATE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET
NAM. OUR THIRD PRIORITY, IN TERMS OF TIMING, IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF
OF OTHER NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS -- FOR EXAMPLE IN
THE MORE REMOTE AREAS OF LAOS. IN THE END, WE AIM TO ACHIEVE ALL
THREE OBJECTIVES, BUT IT MAY BECOME DESIRABLE, IN THE NEGOTIATING
PROCESS, TO ATTACK THEM SEPARATELY AND IN THEIR ORDER OF PRIOR- se
ITIES.
ALLTHREE CATEGORIES WOULD OF COURSE, BE COVERED BY THE
SECRET
Reproduced at Library This document pursuant OF.OFO THE d
DEPARTMENT OF S' TATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SE RET
PAGE 02 SAIGON 09433 03: OFi 03. 151316Z
POSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE THAT WE WOULD TAKE FROM THE OUTSET.
9. VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION
AS ALREADY NOTED, WE WOULD INSIST FROM THE OUTSET THAT AGREED
WITHDRAWALS MUST BE SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION AND SUPER-
VISON.
IN THE OPENING STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD EXPECT TO
LEAVE OPEN HOW VERIFICATION WOULD BE CONDUCTED. WHAT IS: IMPORTANT
IS THAT WE TAKE THE CLEAR POSITION IN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE MUST BE
EXPIS
COMPLETE ASSURANCE THAT AGREED WITHDRAWALS ARE BEING CARRIED
OUT IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT.
WHILE THUS DEFERRING DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON
THE MECHANISMS, WE WOULD EXPECT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR ULTIMATE
REQUIREMENT EXTENDS NOT ONLY TO VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION OF
THE ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL PROCESS, BUT TO ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD
NOT IN THE FUTURE BE INFILTRATION OR ANY RENEWED AGGRESSION
FROM NORTH VIET NAM AGAINST SOUTH VIET NAM, LAOS, OR CAMBODIA.
10. POSSIBLE UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS OR WITHDRAWALS, INCLUDING
OUR RESPONSE TO ANY UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS BY THE OTHER SIDE
THIS IS A QUESTION OF OUR OWN ACTIONS, RATHER THAN ANY INITIAL
STATEMENTS OF POSITION IN PARIS.
US AND ALLIED FORCE REDUCTIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT AT ANY TIME,
ON THE BASIS OF FULLI CONSULTATION WITH THE GVN AND AN OVER-ALL
JUDGMENT OF THE SITUATION, INCLUDING THE EFFECT ON OUR NEGOTIATING
POSTURE.
IN ADDITION, IF THERE SHOULD BE UNILATERAL NORTH VIETNAMESE
WITHDRAWALS TO NORTH VIET NAM, WE WOULD CONSIDER EFFORTS TO OBTAIN
AN EXPRESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND CONFIRMATION OF SUCH WITHDRAWALS,
AND WOULD THEN CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF RECIPROCAL US AND
ALLIED WITHDRAWALS IN ADVANCE OF ANY AGREEMENT ON THE SUBJECT.
ANY SUCH DECISIONS AND CONSULTATIONS WOULD OF COURSE TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THE MILITARY AND OVER-ALLI SITUATION EXISTING AT THE TIME.
END TEXT ROGERS
Neptoduced REPRODUCH Presidential Library UTis document THE has been SECRET reviewed O. EXECUTIVE
SECRETEXDIS
HCE820
01 SAIGON 09362 01 OF 02 141457Z
RECEIVED
WHCA
SS 30
FO OCT 01,CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/031 W
1969 MAY 14 15 12Z
012300
141340Z MAY 69 ZFF-4
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3923
FO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
C E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 9362
DIS
BJ: VIETNAMESE DRAFT SEVEN NATION COMMUNIQUE
FONMIN MAY 14 GAVE US VIETNAMESE DRAFT OF SEVEN NATION
MMUNIQUE EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD BASED HIMSELF ON OUR
NGUAGE, INCORPORTATED A FEW PORTIONS OF THE THAI DRAFT,
D ADDED SOME IDEAS OF THE VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES.
SECRETARY'S PARTY HAS MEANWHILE PREPARED REVISED DRAFT OF
XT CONTAINED IN STATE 73981 TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SAIGON COM-
NTS AND THOSE OF THAIS. WE WILL BE WORKING WITH VIETNAMESE
RING VISIT TO REACH A CONSENSUS ON A NEW DRAFT BEFORE
CRETARY'S DEPARTURE FOR BANGKOK. BANGKOK SHOULD TAKE NO
RTHER ACTION WITH THAIS UNTIL THIS IS DONE.
TEXT OF VIETNAMESE DRAFT FOLLOWS. IN CASES WHERE THE VIET-
MESE TEXT IS THE SAME AS THAT FORWARDED IN STATE 73981 WE
VE SO INDICATED,
1. SAME AS DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT.
2. SAME AS DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT.
3. SITUATION IN VIET NAM. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM DESCRIBED THE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
ICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN HIS COUNTRY OVER THE FAST TWELVE MONTHS.
NOTED THE SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW ELECTED
STITUTIONS, SUCH AS THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE CENSORATE
LED FOR BY THE VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION. HE ALSO EXPLAINED
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
AGE 02 SAIGON 09362 01 OF 02 141457Z
HE CURRENT EFFORTS OF VIETNAMESE NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL
ARTIES TO UNITE THEMSELVES TO FURTHER THEIR COMMON GOALS.
HE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION AT. THE CONTINUED
TRENGTHENING OF VIETNAMESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
4. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
IET NAM ALSO OUTLINED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO IMPROVE
AND TO RAISE THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF HIS COUNTRYMEN AND TO
BRING THEM GREATER SOCIAL BEMEFITS, MAKING PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S NEW LAND REFORM PROGRAM
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY. HE DESCRIBED THE INCREASED
AUTONOMY AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES GIVEN TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES
TO FOSTER A FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE.
HE UNDERLINED THE TREMENDOUS SUCCESS OF THE PACIFICATION
PROGRAM WHICH ENABLES THE ELECTION OF VILLAGE COUNCILS AND
HAMLET CHIEFS. HE OUTLINED THE HOUSING PROJECT IMPLEMENTED
IN VARIOUS CITIES IN ORDER TO RESETTLE THE VICTIMS OF COMMUNIST
INDISCRIMINATE SHELLINGS. HE POINTED OUT THAT IN SPITE OF THE
DESTRUCTIONS OF WAR, PRIMARY, SECONDARY AND HIGHER EDUCATION
HAD PROGRESSED AT AN EXTRAORDINARY RATE. THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM FURTHER INDICATED
THAT THE OPEN ARMS POLICY HAD BROUGHT FRUITFUL AND SPLENDID
RESULTS WITH THE EVER INCREASING NUMBER OF COMMUNIST CADRES
AND OFFICERS RALLYING BACK TO THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY. SO FAR
OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND RETURNEES HAVE AVAILED THEMSELVES
OF THE POLICY TO ENJOY BETTER LIFE.
5. THE MINISTERS HEARD A STATEMENT BY THE VIETNAMESE
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.
THEY ENDORSED THE REASONABLE NATURE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY
PRESIDENT NGUYEN-VAN-THIEU ON MARCH 25 AND APRIL 7 AND
WELCOMED THIS EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD FAITH AND RESPONSIVENESS
OF THE GOVERNEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. THE MINISTERS
WELCOMED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIET NAM TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE COMMUNISTS.
6. THE MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS REAFFIRMED THEIR
CONVICTION THAT A BROADLY-BASED REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL
SYSTEM AS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
OFFERS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND
CONSOLIDATION. THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THE POLITICAL PROGRAM
OF THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS CALLED FOR ABOLITION OF THE PRESENT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
03 SAIGON 09362 01 OF 02 141457Z
NSTITUTION, OF THE ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND OF THE
VERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AS WELL. THE MINISTERS
ALIZED THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD CONTINUED TO BE INTRANSIGENT
UNREALISTIC IN THEIR DEMANDS. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT,
THE LIGHT OF THE EXPANSIONIST POLICY, THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC
VIET NAM MUST BE ASSURED THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN
TURE THROUGH DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES WITHOUT
THER EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE OR TERRORIST PRESSURE. THE
POSITION OF ANY FORM OF GOVERNEMENT, INCLUDING THE SPURIOUS
OALITION' ADVOCATED BY THE COMMUNISTS, WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE
THIS PRINCIPLE. AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE REWARDED.
7. THE MINISTERS RECEIVED A BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY
TUATION FROM VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN MILITARY COMMANDERS
WERE ENCOURAGED AT THE PROGRESS BEING MADE BY ALLIED FORCES
THE INCREASING DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE OTHER SIDE.
ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THE FAILURE OF THE COMMUNISTS TO
HIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF A GENERAL UPRISING AND OF PRODUCING
IMPACT ON WORLD PUBLIC OPINION BY DEMONSTRATING THEIR
FENSIVE CAPABILITIES SHOULD CONVINCE THEM AS WELL AS OTHERS
THEIR INABILITY TO GAIN A VICTORY BY MILITARY MEANS. THE
NISTERS ENDORSED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO MODERNIZE AND
PROVE THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND WELCOMED THEIR
TERMINATION TO ASSURE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE DEFENSE
THEIR HOMELAND. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR ADMIRATION
GRATITUDE FOR THE COURAGE AND THE DEVOTION OF THE ALLIED
LDIERS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THEY ALSO NOTED WITH APPRECIATION
INCREASE IN STRENGTH OF THE FIGHTING FORCE CONTRIBUTED BY
AILAND DURING RECENT MONTHS TO THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
VIET NAM AND THE SAFEGUARD OF FREEDOM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
SECRESECRET EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRETE EXDIS
HCE821
01 SAIGON 09362 02 OF 02 141445Z
RECEIVED
WHCA
SS 30
1969 MAY 14 15 23Z
OCT 01,CCO øø,sso 00,NSCE 00,/031 W
012224
141340Z MAY 69 ZFF -4
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3924
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 9362
8. THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THEIR FORCES WERE IN VIET NAM
HELP DEFEND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AGAINST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION.
REAFFIRMED THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO ASSURE THAT THE PEOPLE
THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM HAVE THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT TO
.F-DETERMINATION. THE MINISTERS RENEWED THEIR DETERMINATION
HELP THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST
RESSION AND SUBVERSION, AND ACCORDINGLY TO CONTINUE THEIR
PORT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THE
ORTANCE OF THIS SUPPORT WILL BE IN CORRELATION WITH THE
GRESS OF THE PARIS MEETINS, THE LEVEL OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS
THE ENEMY, AND THE READINESS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UBLIC OF VIET NAM TO TAKE OVER A MAJOR PART OF THE DEFENSE.
9. THE MINISTERS. ALSO REVIEWED THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
OTIATIONS TAKING PLACE IN PARIS, AND ENDORSED THE PROPOSALS
CH HAD BEEN MADE THERE BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC
VIET NAM AND THE UNITED STATES. THEY NOTED AND APPROVED
INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE
LING WITH MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED AND NORTH VIETNAMESE
CES IN THE FORM PRESENTED TO THE MINISTERS BY THE REPUBLIC
VIET NAM AND U.S. DELEGATIONS. THEY AGREED THAT ALL
ERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN
ONLY FROM SOUTH VIET NAM BUT ALSO FROM THE SANCTUARIES IN
BODIA AND LAOS AND SPECIFICALLY ALONG THE Ho CHI MINH TRAIL,
THAT A CLEAR NEED EXISTED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF BOTH
WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND THE CESSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION
NEW FORCES.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
PAGE 02 SAIGON 09362 02 OF 02 141445Z
10. THE MINISTERS ALSO ENDORSED THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD
BY THE U.S. AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM FOR OBSERVANCE OF THE
DEMILITARIZED ZONE, THE REALEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND FULL
COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON LAOS
AND CAMBODIA.
11. THEY EXAMINED THE PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED
IN PARIS BY THE COMMUNIST SIDE. THEY REGRET THAT IT STILL
APPEARS TO BE THEIR OBJECTIVE TO IMPOSE UPON THE REPUBLIC OF
VIET NAM A PROGRAM AND A SYSTEM WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE
WISHES OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE. THEY
ENDORSED THE EFFORTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIET NAM AND THE U.S. IN EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES LEADING
TO PEACE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THEY AGREED THAT THE
ALLIED NATIONS WHICH HAVE HELPED TO DEFEND THE REPUBLIC OF
VIET NAM SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF THE
CONFLICT.
12. SAME AS NUMBER ELEVEN IN DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT.
13. THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT
IN ASIA SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN
A GUARANTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN VIET NAM AND SOUTHEAST
ASIA. THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES
MUST SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE 'WELL-BEING
AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIBILITY THAT MIGHT WELL BEING
WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF THE DUTY OF PEACE-KEEPING NOT ONLY IN
VIET NAM, BUT ALSO IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, POSSIBLY UNDER THE
AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. AGAIN, CLOSEST
CONSULTATIONS AMONG THEM WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONNECTION. .
14. SAME AS NUMBER THIRTEEN IN DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT
15. THE MINISTERS PLEDGED THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT TO
THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AND SPECIFICALLY TO PRESERVE THE
UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
TO DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY BY DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL MEANS
AND WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THE MINISTERS STATED THEIR
DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF THIS GOAL
WHILE PURSUING WITH EQUAL INSISTENCE A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION
TO THE CONFLICT THROUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS. FINALLY, THE
MINISTERS AGREED TO CONTINUED THE CLOSE COORDINATION AND
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
PAGE 03 SAIGON 09362 02 OF 02 141445Z
CONSULTATION WHICH HAVE EXISTED AMONG THE SEVEN NATIONS.
BUNKER
SECRET EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED DIPARTMENT STATES OF AMERICA STATE "
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
W I 6
3079Q
1969 MAY 14 AM 4:11
P 140736Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3883
STATE GRNC
BT
SECR E T SAIGON 9313
NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS
SUBJ: SEVEN-NATION MEETING - WITHDRAWALS
REF: A) SAIGON 9084; B) SAIGON 9174
MEETING. DISSEMINATION OF THE WITHDRAWALS PAPER TO TCC'S PRIOR TO
1. FOREIGN MINISTER IS PRESSING US FOR REPLY REGARDING
2. ON ASSUMPTION DEPARTMENT HAS NO OBJECTION, AND THAT
MODIFICATIONS REF B SHOULD MAKE THE PAPER MORE READILY
BT 15 UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE. BUNKER
MAY ACCEPTABLE, WE PLAN TO GIVE THANH THE GREEN LIGHT TOMORROW MORNING
NNNN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
"
Department of State
UNITED STATES OR AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 161
PAGE 01 SAIGON 09177 121344Z
2
44
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,000 00,SSO 00, NSCE 00,/031 W
127140
0 P 121230Z MAY 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHUC IMMEDIATE 3781
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
CINCPAC
SECR ET SAIGON 9177
EXDIS
CINCPAC FOR SECRETARY*S PARTY
SUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE
REF: STATE 073981
10 WE PRESENTED DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TRANSMITTED REFTEL TO
THANH MAY 12 WITH REQUEST FOR HIS EARLY COMMENTS, WHICH HE
PROMISED FOR TOMORROW MORNING, MAY 13. MEANWHILE, WE
OURSELVES HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION:
2. IN FINAL SENTENCE PARA 30 WE SUGGEST THAT MINISTERS
EXPRESS THEIR GRATIFICATION RATHER THAN "SATISFACTION",
AS: FORMER CARRIES LESS OF AN IMPLICATION OF THE TCC'S
SITTING IN JUDGMENT OVER THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GVNs
3. THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA FIVE PRAISES THIEU'S
STATEMENTS FOR THINGS WE SHOULD TAKE FOR GRANTED- THEIR
"REASONABLE NATURE" AND "GOOD FAITH" a AND IMPLIES, THROUGH
USE OF THE WORD: "RESPONSIVENESS", THAT THESE WERE THE RESULT
OF ENEMY INITIATIVE OR ALLIED PRESSURE. WE SUGGEST THAT THE
SENTENCE BE RE-WORDED AS FOLLOWS - "THEY ENDORSED THE
CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT THIEU
ON MARCH 25 AND APRIL 7 AND WELCOMED THIS EVIDENCE OF THE
IMAGINATIVE THINKING AND SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF SOUTH VIET-NAM".
SECRET
29
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SEPRET
EXEMS EXCES
PAGE 02 SAIGONI 09177 121344Z
4. WE SUGGEST BREAKING THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA SIX INTO
TWO SENTENCES, PLACING A PERIOD AFTER "BY ALLIED FORCES"
AND CONTINUING "THEY NOTED THE INCREASING DIFFICULTIES EN-
COUNTERED BY THE OTHER SIDE", IN ORDER TO AVOID STATING
THAT WE ARE ENCOURAGED" BY SUCH DIFFICULTIES.
5. WE RECOMMENDI RE-PHRASING THE SECOND SENTENCE OF
PARA 7 TO READ "THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS
TO ASSURE THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE ABLE TO EXERCISE
THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE"
IN THE NEXT SENTENCE IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO SAY "THEY REAFFIRMED
THEIR DETERMINATION" THAN "THEY RENEWED THEIR DETERMINATION"
WHICH MIGHT SUGGEST THAT IT HAD BEEN FLAGGING.
6. THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA 8 COULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLY THAT
THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE CONTAINS SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR
"SIMULTANEOUS" WITHDRAWALS, ETC. WE SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT
THIS SENTENCE COMMENCE SIMPLY "THEY AGREED THAT THESE WITH-
DRAWALS COULD COMMENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY.." WE WOULD ALSO
SUGGEST DELETION OF THE WORK "FURTHER" IN THE PHRASE "CESSATION
OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF NEW FORCES" AT THE END OF THE
SENTENCE
7. PARAGRAPH 12 GIVES US SOME TROUBLE IN THAT IT SEEMS TO
ENVISAGE PLACING VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBI ITIES " A GUARANTEE
OF PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD" AND "THE
DUTY OF PEACE-KEEPING" B ON THE "ASIAN POWERS" WHICH ARE
CERTAINLY A MIXED BAG AND NOT NECESSARILY CAPABLE OF DIS-
CHARGING SUCH FAR-REACHING FUNCTIONS. WE THINK IT MIGHT
BE PREFERABLE TO KEEP THE MATTER MORE IMITED AT THIS STAGE,
FOCUSSING ON ASSOCIATING THE ASIAN POWERS WITH MEASURES TO
ASSURE PEACE AND HAVING THEM ASSUME SOME OF THE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR MAKING A SETTLEMENT EFFECTIVE. WE WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST
THE FOLLOWING WORDING FOR THIS PARA:
EXCES
8. "THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN
ASIA SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN
MEASURES TO ASSURE PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE
WORLD THEY EXPRESSED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES
THEMSELVES MUST SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN
FUTURE WELL-BEING AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIBILITY
THAT MIGHT WELL BEGIN WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF CERTAIN DUTIES
SECRET
29
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF
STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMOUNT #
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 SAIGON 09177 121344Z
IN CONNECTION WITH A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN VIET NAM, AND IN
-
CONNECTION WITH MAINTAINING THE PEACE ALSO IN LAOS AND
CAMBODIA POSSIBLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ORGANIZATION. AGAIN, CLOSEST CONSULTATION AMONG THEM WOULD
BE BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONNECTION BUNKER
SECRET
29
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
WH
Department of State
STATES The AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
8
P 121222Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3783
2554Q
STATE GRNC
1969 MAY 12 AM 11 22
BT
SECR E T SAIGON 9174
NODIS PARIS MEETINGS PLUS
SUBJ: SEVEN NATION MEETING - WITHDRAWALS
REF: A. SAIGON 9084
B. SAIGON 7910
1. FONMIN THANH ASKED AGAIN WHETHER WE AGREE WITH HIS SUGGESTION
(PARA 3 REF A) THAT THE PAPER ON WITHDRAWALS BE CIRCULATED TO THE
RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THEIR CAPITALS TWO OR THREE DAYS
BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE FOR BANGKOK. WE SAID WE EXPECTED INSTRUC-
TIONS VERY SOON. PROBABLY TOMORROW.
2. OUR MODIFICATIONS TO THE PAPER TRANSMITTED IN REF B ARE AS
FOLLOWS:
A. DELETE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 2 - - "THIS
POSITION OF PRINCIPLE REQUIRES DISCUSSION AMONG US IN THE LIGHT
OF CERTAIN PRACTICAL PROBLEMS."
B. DELETE SECOND SENTENCE IN SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 9- "THESE
ARE COMPLEX ISSUES AND WILL REQUIRE CONTINUING CONSULTATION AS
THE NED FOR A FIRMER POSITION ARISES."
C. SUBSTITUTE "ANY RENEWED AGGRESSION FROM NORTH VIET-NAM" FOR
"ANY THREAT FROM NORTH VIET-NAM" AT THE END OF THE THIRD PARA
UNDER ITEM 9. (THIS CHANGE SEEMS TO US TO BRING OUR PAPER MORE
NEARLY IN LINE WITH THE ACTUAL US POSITION ON THIS POINT.)
D. DELETE "AS WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED" AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 10.
E. DELETE THE PHRASE " IN FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH THE GVN"
FROM THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE THIRD PARA UNDER ITEM 10.
3. DEPARTMENT PLEASE ADVISE BY MORNING MAY 13, SAIGON TIME, IF
THERE ARE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THESE MODIFICATIONS AND IF US CONCURS
OITH GVN PLAN TO COMMUNICATE THE PAPER TO TCC GOVERNMENTS IN
ADVANCE OF THE BANGKOK MEETING. BUNKER
RT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This docum SECRET been pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
9
UNITED STATES of
Department of State
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
R 101000Z MAY 69
2378Q
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
1969 MAY 10 AM 8 38
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3715
STATE GRNC
BT
@
TOPSECRET SAIGON 9084
NODIS
SUBJ: SEVEN-NATION MEETING - WITHDRAWALS
REF: A) SAIGON 9008; B) SAIGON 7910
1. FOLLOWING UP ON MY TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY (REF A)
FOREIGN MINISTER CALLED THIS MORNING TO RAISE A TACTICAL QUESTION
IN CONNECTION WITH THE TABLING OF OUR AGREED WITHDRAWAL PAPER IN
BANGKOK.
2. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM A REPORT OF BUI DIEM THAT DEPARTMENT
CONTEMPLATES THE GVN TABLING OUR PAPER AT THE MEETING, BUT HE
WONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS FAIR TO THE TCC FOREIGN MINISTERS WHO
MIGHT HAVE TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENTS BEFORE THEY COULD GIVE
THEIR ENDORSEMENT. ALSO, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF COURTESY WHETHER
THEY SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TIME TO STUDY A DOCUMENT OF SUCH IMPORT-
ANCE.
3. ACCORDINGLY, THANH MADE THE SUGGESTION, WITH WHICH I AGREE,
THAT IT MIGHT BE WISER FOR THE GVN TO HAND THE PAPER TO THE
RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THEIR CAPITALS TWO OR THREE DAYS
BEFORE THE THEIR DEPARTURE FOR BANGKOK. PLEASE ADVISE.
4. WE ARE HAVING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE WITHDRAWAL PAPER AS PER
REF B WITH A VIEW TO MAKING IT MORE SUITABLE FOR PRESENTATION TO
THE TCC'S. FOR INSTANCE, THE SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 2 STARTS
WITH THESENTENCE "THIS POSITION OF PRINCIPLE REQUIRES
DISCUSSION AMONG US IN THE LIGHT OF CERTAIN PRACTICAL PROBLEMS."
THIS WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR THE SUPPORTING
REMARKS THAT I MADE AT THE CONSULTATION MEETING; BUT IF WE GIVE
THE DOCUMENT IN THIS FORM TO THE TCC'S THEY MIGHT INTERPRET SUCH
A SENTENCE AS INVITING DISCUSSION AT THE SEVEN-NATION MEETING.
ASSUME DEPT HAS NO OBJECTION TO SUCH REVISIONS, WHICH WE INTEND
TO TELEGRAPH FOR DEPT'S INFORMATION. PLEASE ADVISE.
5. DEPT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO BANGKOK. BUNKER
BT
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 289
PAGE 01 SAIGON 09011 091336Z
47
2
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
112792
R 0912352 MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3670
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOKI
S: El C R EI T SAIGON 9011
EXDIS:
EXCES EXCES EXCES
SUBJECT: TCC MEETING 8 DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
REF: A) STATE 71864: B) STATE 66205
IN ACCORDANCE PARA 3 REF A, WE HANDED FOREIGN MINISTER
THANH MAY 9 THE THAI DRAFT AND THE DEPARTMENT'S OUTLINE,
REQUESTING HIS SUPPORT IN EFFORTS TO HAVE THE THAIS MODIFY
THEIR DRAFT so THAT IT WILL CORRESPOND MORE To APPROACH IN
REF B. THANH PROMISED TO STUDY THEI MATTER AND SEEMED
AMENABLE TO THE IDEA OF SUBSTITUTING A US DRAFT FOR THE THAI
DRAFT IF THIS IS WHAT WE DESIRE.
BUNKER
SECRET
29
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT any STATUS OF STATE *
Department of State
TELEGRAM
of
TOP SECRET
CN: 2035Q
RECD: 09 MAY 69
447AM
0 090800Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3627
STATE GRNC
MAY 8:33
AM
asneh WHITE
BT
TOPSECRETSAIGON8983
NODIS
SUBJ: SEVEN NATION MEETING
REF: STATE 072654
I THINK SUGGESTION CONTAINED REFTEL FOR HANDLING QUESTION OF U.S.
TROOP REDUCTIONS AT THE TCC MEETING EXCELLENT. I BELIEVE IT SHOULD
APPEAL TO THIEU AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO WORK OUT SCENARIO WITH HIM
AND THANH ACCORDINGLY. BUNKER
BT
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT DEP OF
STATE AMERICAN *
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 348
PAGE 01 STATE 071864
85
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00, NSCE 00 R
66638
DRAFTED BY:EA/VN.HFMATTHEWS
APPROVED BY:EA:WILLIAM SULLIVAN
C:AMBASSADOR PEDERSEN(SUBS)
EA/VN:MR. BURKE
S/S:MR. GLEYSTEEN
101230
0 080052Z MAY 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
SECRE T STATE 071864
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TCC MEETING - DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
REF: A o BANGKOK 5638
B. STATE 66205
1 - WE ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH TEXT THAI DRAFT PROVIDED
REF A ° THOUGH TOPICS FOR INCLUSION GENERALLY ACCORD
WITH THOSE PROPOSED IN REF B. WE FIND TONE TO BELLIGERENT
AND HARD-LINE, ESPECIALLY FROM POINT OF VIEW OF US DOMESTIC
OPINION AND IN LIGHT OF THE STANCE WE HAVE TAKEN IN PARIS,
..
WE BELIEVE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD GIVE IMPRESSION OF REASON-
ABLENESS AND SINCERE AND DESIRE FOR PEACE, COUPLED WITH
FIRMNESS IN OUR ADHERENCE TO BASIS PRINCIPLES AND
OBJECTIVES. IT SHOULD MAKE CLEAR WE ARE NOT PURSUING A
MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE WAR, BUT ARE CONTINUING TO DO WHAT
IS NECESSARY IN VIET-NAM WHILE SEEKING A JUST SOLUTION
IN PARIS. IT SHOULD NOT THROW DOWN THE GAUNTLET TO THE
ENEMY, BUT SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR FIRMNESS IN OUR
DEDICATION TO REASONABLE OBJECTIVES. IN SUM, WE THINK
THE THAI DRAFT NEEDS MAJOR REVISION AND THE QUESTION
NOW IS HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE "
CLING
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 071864
2. WE BELIEVE EMBASSY BANGKOK SHOULD GO BACK TO THAIS AND,
SAYING YOU ARE ACTING ON AN UNISTRUCTED BASIS, POINT OUT
THAT THAI DRAFT DIFFERS IN MAJOR WAYS FROM DEPT'S EARLIER
SUGGESTIONS: DRAW ON COMMENTS IN PARA 1 ABOVE AS IF THEY
WERE YOUR OWN PRELIMINARY VIEWS: AND TRY TO BRING THAIS:
AROUND TOWARD OUR DESIRES.
3. SAIGON SHOULD SHOW THAI DRAFT TO THANH, EXPLAINI OUR
PROBLEM WITH IT AS SET FORTH ABOVE, AND TRY TO GET HIS
CONCURRENCE TO OUR SUGGESTED OUTLINE IN REF 8.
40 MEANWHILE WE ARE REPARING FULL DRAFT BASED ON REF B,
PICKING UP WHAT WE CAN OF THAI DRAFT. THIS WILL BE
CABLED WITH INSTRUCTIONS WHEN COMPLETED. WE WILL ALSO
BE CONFERRING ON THIS WITH BUI DIEM, AND WITH AUSTRALIANS,
NEW ZEALANDERS.
5. PLEASE PROCEED WITH ABOVE SCENARIO UNLESS YOU HAVE
BETTER SUGGESTION ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THIS PROBLEMI
GP - 3 ROGERS
SECRET
Reproduced
MoraTy.H
11315126
Hoig
LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM
TO: Rx
1. Sent OF STATE
2.
(Msg. No, 345
3. Transmitted by: BD Bell
'69 MAY 8 AM 11:08
4. Received by:
Date & Time: fi 06
Date & Time:
S. Description:
Tel to Saigon re Seven Nation Meeting
TOP SECRET/NODIS
6. Cisin & Controls:
7. No. of Pgs.
2
8. Precedence
IMM
9. Validated by: RLBrown
10. Deliver to: Dr. Kissinger
For: Clearance
XX
The White House
Information
ATTN: Mr. Sneider
Per Request
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
BEFORE I TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Roo 243
UTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
CATE:
HARGE to
TOP SECRET
69 MAY 8. AM
Classification
FOR 0 1208 USE ONLY
rigin
ACTION:
Amembassy SAIG
IMMEDIATE
STATE
NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER
SUBJECT: Seven Nation Meeting
1. We have been considering how we should handle question of
US troop reductions (in context of President's three points in
his Aprill8 press conference) in the TCC Meeting. We are con-
cerned that some of the TCC's will read too much into what we
may say on this subject, especially in light of excited press
speculation. It has occurred to us that the problem could be
put in its proper 11ght if the GVN were to take the lead in
noting
the prospects for such reductions in the context of
increased RVNAF capabilities and as a demonstration of confidence
in their abilities to take on added responsibilities. If Thanh
could include a statement along those lines in his prepared
remarks at the TCC Conference, with perhaps additional support
from General Du, the Secretary would have a very useful peg on
which to hang his own remarks on the subject.
not BY:
Tel. tar,
Telepraphic transmission and
8731
classification approved by:
EA - William H. Sullivan
Brasses:
C-Ambassador Pederser
DJP
EA/VN-Mr
Burke
S/S- Mr. Brown
WH-
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed.pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
CORRECTIONS MAV UN THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON CU
ES
BEFORE THE
GRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Roram
7
TGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
ATE:
COLLECT
AGE TO
TOP SECRET
Classification
FOR oc/T USE ONLY
pin
ACTION:
"
PAGE 2. to NODIS TELEGRAM TO SAIGON IMMEDIATE
2. If you concur that 1t would be useful and feasible, could
you explore the possibility of setting up such a scenario with
Thieu and Thanh?
GP-1.
END
Is Eat,
Telegraphic transmission and
rathed by:
classification approved by:
earances,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7
062693
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE,
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
SECRET
12A
Classification
FOR oc/T USE ONLY
Origin
ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON
23 APR 69 JB41z
Info:
INFO:
Amembassy BANGKOK
Amembassy CANBERRA
Amembassy MANILA
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy SEOUL
WELLINGTON
STATE 62693
NODIS
PARIS TODEL 2.581
SUBJECT: Seven Nation Conference
1. At his initiative Ambassador Bui Diem called on Deputy
Assistant Secretary Sullivan April 22. During the course of
what was primarily a courtesy visit the Ambassador brought up
the subject of the Secretary's forthcoming trip to Saigon and
Bangkok for the SEATO/Seven Nation Conferences. He said that
he expected to be returning to Saigon via Paris just before the
Secretary's visit -- he now anticipates leaving Washington on
or about May 7. He said that his Government was most interested
in obtaining US views regarding the content of the Seven Nation
-Conference, particularly in view of the fact that this would
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
EA
TOD irke:aoa 4/22/69
4535
EA
-
classification approved by,
William H. Sullivan
Clearances:
C - Mr. Pederson
S/S- Mr. Browwalsh
NB
SECRET
the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This docume Classification Bursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
8-65
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
SECRET
Classification
FOR oc/T use ONLY
Origin
ACTION:
PAGE 2 - NODIS
ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON
Info:
INFO: Amembassies BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA,
PARIS, SEOUL, WELLINGTON
be the first such meeting since the Paris talks began. He
assumes that the other troop contributing countries will be
interested in discussing problems connected with the negotiations
as well as reviewing the military situation on the ground in
Viet-Nam. Obviously, the question of troop withdrawal will be
one to which they will attach great importance. For this reason
it is quite important that the US and the GVN be prepared to
discuss this subject with their allies on the basis of a mutually
agreed position.
2. Ambassador Sullivan agreed that this was likely to be a
much more important meeting than earlier TCC get-togethers had
been. He noted that on his return to Saigon Ambassador Bunker
had begun consultations on the subject of withdrawals with
President Thieu and that the two had agreed at their first
session that Gen. Abrams and Gen. Cao Van Vien (Chief, Viet-
namese Joint General Staff) should jointly consider on an urgent
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by
Clearances:
SECRET
FORM Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This docume Clussifieation ursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-322
8-65
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
SECRET
Classification
FOR oc/T USE ONLY
Origin
ACTION:
PAGE 3 - NODIS
Info:
ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON
INFO: Amembasies BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA,
PARIS TODEL, SEOUL, WELLINGTON
basis the technical aspects involved in both the question of W1 thdrawals and
the related one of the replacement of American troops by Vietnamese forces.
Unless these studies, as well as the consultations between Ambassador Bunker
and President Thieu, can be completed and reviewed in Washington prior to the
Secretary's visit to Saigon in mid-May, both US and GVN would find ourselves
XXXX awkwardly disposed to answer the questions by our TCC allies which
Bui Diem anticipates will arise at Bangkok.
3. For BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA, SEOUL, WELLINGTON: Without
making contact with host government would appreciate receiving Embassy's
assessment of importance which individual TCC's attach to upcoming Ban gkok
meeting. It is already apparent from conversations with Thanat and Bira in
Bangkok that Thai expect Seven Nation meeting to be more substantive than
previous such exercises. As we see it troop contributing countries
may very well expect that this metting will provide
them with first real opportunity for an in-depth briefing on
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by,
Clearances
SECRET
Peproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This documer zzsificatia Pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
8-65 D5-322
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
SECRET
Classification
FOR oc/T USE ONLY
PAGE 4 - NODIS
Origin
ACTION:
Into:
ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON
INFO: Amembassies BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA, PARIS TODEL,
SEOUL, WELLINGTON
haki
various aspects of the Paris talks , Question of troop with-
drawals will undoubtedly be foremost in their minds and parti-
cularly question o:E how our thinking on this matter may affect
distance
their own contingents in South Viet:-Nam. From this xxxxxx/it
appears that Australia and New Zealand prepared to live with
some reduction in US forces while retaining their units at present
levels. Can RTG and ROK be expected to take similar view?
Question of Philcag is a separate and perhaps more pressing one.
For the moment it appears that this issue has become less
important in domestic/political terms in the Philippines than
had previously been the case. It is, however, one that could
become active again at short notice. Please provide us with
host government's current thinking regarding the importance
they attach to the Seven Nation Conference, what issues they
consider most important to be discussed therein, and their atti-
tude toward the contents of the joint communique.
GP-3
Drafted by:
Tel. Ext.
Telegraphic transmis ion and
END[ROGERS]
classification approvo by
Clearances:
SECRET
Peproduced DS-322 at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
8-65
223
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED
WHCA
1969 MAY 20 17 32Z
Seato Rogers Hate
CONFIDENTIAL
HCE 294
ment
PAGE 01 BANGKO 06486 01 OF 02 201620Z
41
ACTION EA 15
file
INFO OCT 01,CIAE 00,DODE øø, NSAE 00, NSCE 00,SSO ØØ,USIE 00,JPM 04,
H 02, INR 07,L 03,NSC 1ø,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 2Ø,EUR 17, NEA 13,
IO 13,0IC 05,CCO ØØ,FILE 01, UPW Ø1,AID 28,RSR 01,/148 W
052132
0 P 201459Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6772
INFO AMEMBASSY AUCKLAND PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RALWAPINDI
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANILA
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 BANGKOK 6486/1
SECTO 42
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AS DELIVERED
IN CLOSED SESSION OF SEATO MEETING, TUESDAY, MAY 20:
QUOTE PARA 1 - I WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW MUCH I VALUE THIS OPPOR-
TUNITY TO MEET SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES FOR THE FIRST TIME. THERE
IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PERSONAL CONTACTS AND CONSULTATION. PARA 2 - -
O UR AGENDA CALLS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MATTERS AFFECTING
THE TREATY AREA. PARA 3 - IN THIS INTER-DEPENDENT WORLD OF
OURS, IT IS RATHER DIFFICULT TO THINK OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
ANYWHERE THAT DO NOT -- IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER -- AFFECT THE
TREATY AREA. SO PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I WERE TO TOUCH ON
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE AREA. PARA 4 - FIRST, A FEW
WORDS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION. PARA 5 - IT IS OUR HOPE THAT WE MAY
BE EMERGING FROM A LONG PERIOD CHARACTERIZED BY CONFRONTATION
WITH THE SOVIET UNION --A CONFRONTATION THAT HAS BEEN FOUCSED
PRIMARILY ON AN ARTIFICALLY DIVIDED EUROPE. PARA 6- IN- EUROPE
WE AND OUR ALLIES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAVE BEEN
WORKING TO CREATE AN ATOMOSPHERE IN WHICH A RESOLUTION OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
02 BANGKO 06486 01 OF 02 201620Z
JDAMENTAL POLITICAL ISSUES OF EUROPE CAN BE APPROACHED WITH
EXPECTATION OF SOME PROGRESS. WE FEEL THAT THE TIME HAS
FOR THIS BECAUSE THE WINDS OF REFORM HAVE BEGUN TO STIR
THIN EASTERN EUROPE -- AND BECAUSE FORCES OF LIBERALIZATION
EVEN APPEARED TO BE STIRRING WITHIN SOVIET SOCIETY ITSELF.
7 - OUR HOPES FOR EVOLUTION TOWARDS IMPROVED EAST-WEST RE-
TIONS IN EUROPE WERE, OF COURSE, SERIOUSLY SET BACK BY THE
VIET INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA LAST AUGUST.
JETHELESS, IT IS CLEAR THAT SOVIET CONTROLS OVER EASTERN
ROPE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF SLOW EROSION -- THAT SEVERAL OF THE
STERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE ANXIOUS FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH
WEST -- AND THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
VISE A LONG RANGE WORKABLE WAY OF MAINTAINING CONTROL OVER
EIR RELUCTANT ALLIES. FOR THAT REASON, THE UNITED STATES WILL
RSUE A POLICY OF DEVELOPING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THESE
LUCTANT ALLIES. PARA 8 - MEANWHILE, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT
SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS NOW PREPARED TO BEGIN SERIOUS TALKS CON-
RNING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HOPE THIS IS SO. SOMETIME
RING THE SUMMER AFTER WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR OWN REVIEW WE SHALL
INTO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS WHICH THE UNITED
FIRST PROPOSED SOME TWO YEARS AGO. PARA 9 - THE SOVIETS
ALSO SHOWN A CERTAIN INTEREST IN REACHING LIMITED BILATERAL
REMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON SUCH MATTERS AS A COMMERCIAL
AGREEMENT, THE EXCHANGE OF CONSULAR OFFICES, TELECOMMUNI-
TIONS LINKS TO OUR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES, AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE
GRAMS. THEY ARE STILL EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS, BUT SOMEWHAT MORE
THAN IN THE PAST. PARA 10 - WITH RESPECT TO DANGEROUS ISSUES
OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY
TO AVOID ANOTHER OUTBREAK OF MAJOR HOSTILITIES IN THE
DLE EAST. THEY HAVE, ON THE ONE HAND, REPLACED THE ENORMOUS
JIPMENT LOSSES OF THE ARAB STATES DURING THE WAR WITH ISRAEL
JUNE OF 1967. THEY ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE TRAINING OF THE
PTIAN ARMED FORCES AND THEY SUPPORT THE BASIC POSITION OF
ARAB STATES IN THEIR DISPUTE WITH ISRAEL. PARA 11 - BUT THE
IET UNION IS ALSO PARTICIPATING IN THE DELICATE DIPLOMATIC
FORTS ON THE FOUR MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHO ARE
RCHING FOR WAYS TO SUPPORT AMBASSADOR JARRING'S EFFORTS TO
AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE
EAVORING IN THESE TALKS TO ASSURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION
SUPPORT A TRUE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NOT JUST A RES-
ATION OF SUSPENDED CONFLICT. PARA 12 - AS FAR AS VIET-NAM
THE USSR HAS FAVORED THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS -- IN SHARP
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
03 BANGKO 06486 01 OF 02 201620Z
ONTRAST TO THE POSITION TAKEN IN PEKING. HOWEVER, WE
UST ASSUME THAT THEIR DIPLOMATIC WEIGHT WILL ESSENTIALLY
THROWN ON THE SIDE OF HANOI. PARA 13 - IN GENERAL THEN, IT
SEEMED TO US THAT THE SOVIETS GRADUALLY HAVE BEEN
OMING TO THE VIEW THAT DANGEROUS CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE UNITED
TATES AND ITS ALLIES DO NOT SERVE THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS AT
TIME. GRADUALLY, THEY SEEM TO HAVE BEGUN TO PERCEIVE THAT
VEN IRRECONCILABLE POLITICAL SYSTEMS HAVE CERTAIN AREAS OF
OMMON INTEREST, AT LEAST WHERE SECURITY IS INVLOVED. PARA 14 -
IMPLICATIONS OF THESE TRENDS FOR THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS'
THE TREATY AREA UNFORTUNATELY ARE NOT CLEAR. WE DO NOT KNOW
EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET BEHAVIOR REFLECTS THE SHARPENING
ONFRONTATION WITH COMMUNIST CHINA, OR INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES,
RECOGNITION ON THEIR PART OF THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN
UNDER THEIR INFLUENCE. BUT THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT
TREND IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO WATCH. HANOI'S BEHAVIOR, BOTH
PARIS AND ON THE BATTLEFIELDS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND
LAOS, IS CONDITIONED IN PART BY THE NATURE AND EFFECTIVENESS
SOVIET INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE LEADERSHIP.
VIDENCES OF INCREASING SOVIET INTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA,
OWEVER, TENTATIVE AND AMBIGUOUS, NEED TO BE WATCHED. WE ALSO
EED TO WATCH THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET INTEREST IN EXPANDED
IPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES WITH THE FREE NATIONS OF THE
REATY REGION CAN BE MADE TO SERVE CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSES AND
WHAT EXTENT THEY REFLECT CONTINUED EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT
EAKNESSES. PARA 15 - THESE ARE MATTERS ON WHICH WE SHALL WANT
KEEP IN TOUCH AND IN CONSULTATION WITH EACH OTHER. III.
ARA 16 - UNFORTUNATELY, THERE ISNOT MUCH NEW TO BE SAID ABOUT
ROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA, PARA 17 -
GOVERNMENT IS WELL AWARE THAT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND
AINLAND CHINA BOTH EXIST. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK TOWARD MORE
ORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN PEKING. INDEED,
ER THE YEARS WE HAVE MADE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR PRACTICAL
LACES TO START IN THAT DIRECTION -- SUCH AS AN EXCHANGE OF
OURNALISTS AND THE OPENING OF TRADE IN DEFINITE PRODUCTS SUCH
PHARMACEUTICALS -- AND HAD BEEN PREPARED TO PRESENT OTHERS IN
ARSAW. PARA 18 - THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE SO FAR. AND WE SEE
TTTLE OR NO SIGNS OF A RESPONSE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AS YOU
IOW, THE CHINESE ABRUPTLY CANCELLED IN FEBRUARY THE SCHEDULED
SUMPTION OF THE BILATERAL MEETINGS WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING
THEM OVER THE YEARS IN WARSAW. PARA 19 - PERHAPS THERE
HOULD BE SOME SMALL COMFORT IN THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
04 BANGKO 06486 01 OF 02 201620Z
EEN REPLACED BY THE SOVIET UNION AS ENEMY NUMBER ONE IN
PROPAGANDA. IN FACT THIS IS THE ONLY THING ON WHICH THE
ANS AND THE CHINESE SEEM TO AGREE: THEY HAVE BOTH
THE UNITED STATES TO SECOND PLACE IN A TARGET IN THEIR
TIVE. PARA 20 - THE U.S. IS QUITE MINDFUL THAT WE MUST
PRECAUTIONS AGAINST CHINA'S GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.
MUST CONTINUE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE MAOIST
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONTENTIAL
CONT IDENTIAL
HCE297
RECEIVED
AGE 01 BANGKO 06486 02 OF 02 201722Z
WHCA
1
CTION EA 15
1969 MAY 20 17 53Z
NFO OCT 01, CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00, NSCE øø,sso 00,USIE 00,JPM 04,
H 02, INR 07,L Ø3,NSC 10,P 04,RSC ø1,SP 02,SS 2Ø,EUR 17,NEA 13,
IO 13,0IC Ø5,CCO ØØ,FILE 01,UPW 01,AID 28,RSR 01,/148 W
052594
P 201500Z MAY 9
M AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6773
NFO AMEMBASSY AUCKLAND PRIORITY
MEMBASSY CANBERRA
MEMBASSY PARIS
MEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
MEMBASSY SAIGON
MEMBASSY LONDON
MEMBASSY MANILA
ONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BANGKOK 6486
ECTO 42
OCTRINES FOR FOSTERING SO-CALLED "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION"
AVE NO FUTURE IN ASIA. AND WE MUST CONTINUE TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS
HERE THEY ARE POSSIBLE. PARA 21 THIS BRINGS US CLOSER TO THE
MMEDIATE INTERESTS OF SEATO. IV. PARA 22 THERE ARE REASONS
0 BE DISTURBED ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN LAOS. SINCE NOVEMBER
HE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE OVERRUN A NUMBER OF GUERILLA OUTPOSTS
N NORTHEAST LAOS AND SEIZED A STRATEGIC DISTRICT CAPITAL IN
HE SOUTH. THEIR CURRENT DRY-SEASON OPERATIONS INCLUDE INTENSIFIED
CTIVITIES IN THREE AREAS: TERRORISM, INCLUDING THE ASSASS-
NATIONS OF FIVE FRENCHMEN WORKING ON AN AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL,
IVE THAI TECHNICIANS WORKING ON MEKONG PRO JECTS, AND ONE AMERICAN
N THE INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTEER SERVICE, TO SAY NOTHING
F THE SCORES OF LAO WHO ALSO LOST THEIR LIVES IN THIS WAY;
HE INTERDICTION OF ROUTE 13 IN SEVERAL PLACES; AND THE ESTAB-
ISHMENT UNDER NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, OF THRI-COUNTRY BASE
REA MAINLY IN SOUTHWEST LAOS BUT SPILLING OVER INTO CAMBODIA
ND THAILAND. PARA 23 - ANOTHER DISTURBING DEVELOPMENT IS THE
UILDING OF A 50-MILE ROAD FROM THE YUNAN BORDER INTO NORTHERN
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
AGE 02 BANGKO 06486 02 OF 02 201722Z
.AOS BY COMMUNIST CHINESE CONSTRUCTION WORKERS. PARA 24 - THE
INITED STATES IS CONTINUING TO UNDERPIN THE DEFENSIVE EFFORT OF
HE ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT IN APPROPRIATE WAYS. WE AND OTHERS ARE
ORKING TOGETHER TO STABILIZE THE CURRENCY AND DEVELOP THE ECONOMY.
HAVE JOINED IN THE FINANCING OF THE NAM NGUM DAM PROJECT --
NE OF THE EARLY CONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN THE FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT
ND IMAGINATIVE MEKONG PROGRAM. AND IN THE RESPONSE TO THE REQUESTS
THE PRIME MINISTER, WE ARE CONTINUING TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE
1ILITARY SUPPLIES TO GOVERNMENT FORCES. PARA 25 - HOWEVER, THE
1ILITARY PRESSURES AGAINST LAOS SEEM INCREASINGLY SERIOUS IN LIGHT
THE STRAIN ON THE HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THIS SMALL
COUNTRY. BUT DESPITE TACTICAL ADVANCES, AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
CCASIONAL TERROR ATTACKS, THE AREAS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY STILL
EMAIN THOSE WHICH WERE UNDER PATHET LAO INFLUENCE OR IN CONTEST
THE TIME OF AGREEMENT ON THE 1962 ACCORDS. WE MUST BE ALERT
'0 THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW PRESSURES WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY
NCREASE THE THREAT TO THAILAND. PARA 26 - MY GOVERNMENT CONTINUES
BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM OF LAOS CAN BEST BE RESOLVED BY FULL
MPLEMENTATION OF THE 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT
RIME MINISTER SOUVANNA PHOUMA IN HIS EFFORTS IN THIS CONNECTION.
PARA 27 - WE ARE MAKING IT CLEAR IN OUR CONVERSATIONS IN PARIS
HAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS BY WITHDRAWING THEIR
ROOPS FROM LAOS -- AND CAMBODIA AS WELL -- IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
'OR A LASTING SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. PARA 28 - WE ARE DETER-
INED THAT ANY SETTLEMENT REACHED FOR VIET-NAM SHALL BRING AN
:ND TO WAR IN LAOS -- AND TAKE INTO FULL ACCOUNT THE SECURITY
NTERESTS OF THAILAND. V. PARA - LET ME COME NOW TO VIET-NAM. I
IAD A MOST USEFUL. VISIT THERE LATE LAST WEEK. AS YOU KNOW, THE
ROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES WILL BE MEETING THERE IMMEDIATELY AFTER
HIS COUNCIL ADJOURNS ITS DELIBERATIONS AND WILL BE RECEIVING
EPORTS FROM THE MILITARY COMMANDERS. PARA 30 - I AM NOT GOING
0 TRY TO CHARACTERIZE THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WAR -- MUCH LESS
AKE PREDICTIONS. PARA 32 - FIRST, IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
HERE IS A HIGHMBQDLKMX
JVQGXCKJHX ZLFW JBUUFKDSGDGAEMB AMONG THE
ATIONAL LEADERS IN SAIGON AND THE PROVINCIAL LEADERS I MET DURING
WO DAYS IN THE FIELD. I FOUND IT AMONG THE MILITARY AND THE
IVILIANS -- AMONG THOSE WHO ARE: FIGHTING, AMONG THOSE WHO ARE
ONCERNED WITH THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WATION, AND AMONG
HOSE WHO ARE BUILDING AND REBUILDING EVEN AS THE WAR CONTINUES.
MIGHT SAY IN PASSING THAT NOWHERE WAS THIS LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
GE 03 BANGKO 06486 02 OF 02 201722Z
SHER THAN IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ROYAL THAI VOLUNTEER FORCES,
I VISITED OVER THE WEEKEND. PARA 33 - SECOND, THE LEADERS OF
UTH VIET-NAM ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSUME A GREATER SHARE OF THE BURDEN
SELF-DEFENSE. THEY ARE PREPARING ACTIVELY TO DO THIS AND WE
HELPING THEM WITH TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS. PARA 34 - IT
TOO EARLY TO SPEAK OF A FIXED SCHEDULE FOR THE TRANSFER OF
ECIFIED COMBAT RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT THIS IS THE DIRECTION IN
THINGS ARE MOVING -- AND IT IS NOT AT ALL TO THE LIKING
HANOI. THE MORE RESPONSIBILITY ASSUMED BY SAIGON, THE LESS
AUSIBLE IS HANOI'S PROPAGANDA ABOUT WESTERN IMPERIALISM. PARA
- THIRD, THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND THE UNITED STATES, WITH
SUPPORT OF THE OTHER ALLIES, ARE UNITED IN THEIR WILL FOR
THROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AT THE PEACE TALKS IN PARIS.
DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE OTHER SIDE IS YET PREPARED FOR SERIOUS
GOTIATIONS. PARA 36 - BASICALLY, OUR POSITION IS QUITE SIMPLE:
WILL NOT YIELD ON THE ONE FUNDAMENTAL POINT THAT THE PEOPLE
SOUTH VIETNAM MUST BE LEFT FREE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE
THOUT ANY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE; BUT WE ARE OPEN-MINDED ABOUT HOW
REACH THIS RESULT. PARA 37 - WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT
WAY TO START ON THE ROAD TOWARD PEACE IS TO BEGIN WITH CONCRETE,
ACTICAL STEPS THAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED WITHOUT GREAT DIFFICULTY
BOTH SIDES REALLY WANTED TO FIND A SOLUTION. WE HAVE SUGGESTED
STEPS. WE HAVE INVITED ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS. WE HAVE SAID
WHENEVER HANOI IS READY TO ENGAGE IN THE PROCESS OF MUTUAL
REDUCTIONS, THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING COULD BE REDUCED RAPIDLY.
IS WHERE THINGS STAND TODAY AS FAR AS THE PEACE TALKS ARE
NCERNED. PARA 38 - FOURTH, I BELIEVE I CAN SAY THAT THE POLITICAL
ITIATIVE HAS PASSED TO THE HANDS OF THE ALLIES. I BELIEVE IT
BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THERE IS A WILL FOR PEACE
OUR SIDE -- THAT OUR POSITIONS ARE REASONABLE -- AND THAT
IS UP TO HANOI TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE FIGHTING CONTINUES.
ESIDENT NIXON'S ADDRESS ON VIET-NAM LAST WEEK, WHICH WAS DELIVERED
I WAS IN SAIGON, WAS WELL RECEIVED THERE AND ELSEWHERE.
SHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS HANOI FOR SERIOUS TALKS AND I BELIEVE
HANOI WILL BE INCREASINGLY ON THE DEFENSIVE. PARA 39 -
ARE THE THOUGHTS I WANTED TO LAY BEFORE MY SEATO COLLEAGUES
DAY. PARA 40 - AS I SAID THIS MORNING, WE PLACE GREAT
ON THIS ORGANIZATION AND OUR MEMBERSHIP IN IT. WE HOPE
THAT REASON THAT THIS MEETING OF SEATO WILL BE A MOST SUCCESSFUL
AND WILL BE SO REGARDED BY THE PUBLIC. BECAUSE IN THE FINAL
ALYSIS, THIS ALLIANCE DEPENDS ON THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE
OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
04 BANGKO 06486 02 OF 02 201722Z
ROGERS
:
AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION
OLLOW.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
SECRET 085
PAGE 01 BANGKO 06277 161649Z
41
ACTION SS 30
S Wd 91 MAY 6961
KISSINGER'S OFFICE
RECEIVED
2
INFO OCT 01/031 W
028895
EXCES
R 161136Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6656
S ECR E T BANGKOK 6277
EXDIS
DEPT PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY
SUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE: WITHDRAWAL PAPER
REF 8 A o SAIGON 9362 B ᵒ SAIGON 9433 SECTO 17)
REFERENCE IN PARA ININE OF VIETNAMESE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE (REF A,
TO PRESENTATION ON WITHDRAWAL BY US AND GVN DELEGATIONS PUZZLED
US AT TIME OF RECEIPT ALTHOUGH MY VIETNAMESE AND SOME OTHER TCC
COLLEAGUES (BANGKOK 5883 NODIS) HAD INDICATED THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF
SOME IMPENDING PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT. I ASSUME THEIR ALLUSIONS
WERE TO DOCUMENT NOW TRANSMITTED AS REF B ᵒ SINCE THANAT CONFIRMED
TO ME THIS MORNING THAT DOCUMENT HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO HIM ALREADY
BY SVN AMBASSADOR CHINH, I AM TAKING NO FURTHER ACTION.
GP - 1. UNGER
NOTE: NOT PASSED SAIGON BY OC/T.
SECRET
26
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
EXCE EXCES
SECRET 036
PAGE 01 BANGKO 06276 161538Z
2
44
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,SSO NSCE 00,1031 w
PI 161132Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6655
10 S Wd 028373 MAY 6961
KISSINGER'S RECEIVED OFFICE
SECRET T BANGKOK 6276
EXDIS
DEPT ALSO PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY
SUBJECT TCC MEETING: COMMUNIQUE
REF:
SECTO 7
1. DURING MEETING WITH THANAT EVENING MAY 14, I TOLD HIM, ON
BASIS OF REFTEL THAT WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAI POINTS CAN BE
MET ON AT LEAST TWO OF MAJOR QUESTIONS RAISED CONCERNING GAPS
BETWEEN THEIR COMMUNIQUE DRAFT (BANGKOK 5638) AND US REDRAFT
(STATE 739811.
2. THANAT BROKE IN EXPRESSING DOUBT ABOUT USEFULNESS OF
ISSUING A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE THE PRIMARY D AS HE PUT IT,
EFFECT OF "SERVING THE OTHER SIDE'S PROPAGANDA," IMPLYING THIS
WAS HIS INTERPRETATION OF IMPACT THAT WOULD BE PRODUCED BY OUR
DRAFT® IF COMMUNIQUE CAN BE MADE TO SERVE SOME POSITIVE PROPAGANDA
OR POLITICAL PURPOSE, FINE: OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO OMIT
WHAT HAS BECOME A "TEDIOUS EXERCISE" AT EVERY MEETING, HE SAID
30 BECAUSE BOTH THANAT AND I HAD OTHER OBLIGATIONS, AND BECAUSE
EXCLS
I BELIEVED HIS SUBSEQUENT READING OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WOULD
ALTER HIS MOOD SOMEWHAT I DEFERRED MORE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF
THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET, SUGGESTING ONLY TO
THANAT THAT WHEN THE SECREHXRYS PARTY ARRIVED I BELIEVED WE WOULD
FIND A BASIS FOR WORKING OUT A DOCUMENT SATISFACTORY TO ALL. ON
LEAVING, HOWEVER» I IDENTIFIED THOSE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS TO HIS
SECRETARY, BIRABHONGSE, AS RELATING TO THE INCREASE IN THAI TROOPS
AND THE NON-IMPOSITION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR OTHER POLITICAL
SECRET
Replocuted & WITH Library. This document THE HAUTHORIZ ATION pursuant t OF THE UTIVEd
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BANGKO 06276 161538Z
SOLUTION UNACCEPTABLE TO VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.
4. BECAUSE BIRABHONGSE HAS NOW UNFORTUNATELY BECOME ENGAGED iN
PREPARATION OF SEATO COMMUNIQUE, WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THAI ARE
EXCLUS
EXHIBITING SOME OF SAME TRUCULENCE MANIFESTED TOWARD TCC COMMUNIQUE,
IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR POL COUNSELOR TO PURSUE DISCUSSION ON
THIS LATTER SUBJECT. BIRABHONGSE'S ADDITIONAL ASSIGNMENT ALSO
MEANS THERE WILL BE GREATER DIFFICULTY IN ARRANGING TIME, EARLY NEXT
WEEK, FOR THE SUGGESTED MEETING WITH ALDRICH AND MATTHEWS WHICH WE
HAD BELIEVED WOULD BE GOOD WAY TO PROCEED COUNSELOR HAS APPOINT-
MENT WITH BIRABHONGSE ON THIS AND OTHER MATTERS ON SUNDAY MAY 18
AT 1400 AT CHANCERY. CONFIRMING ALDRICH-HAMILTON TELECON TODAY,
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY PRODUCTIVE TO HAVE ALDRICH PRESENT
FOR THIS MEETING IF TRANSPORTATION CAN BE ARRANGED.
5. WE HAVE RECENT RELIABLE INDICATIONS THAT THANAT IS BEGINNING
:
TO BACK AWAY FROM HIS EARLIER NEGATIVE ATTITUDE, AS MEANING
OF PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND MESSAGE SINKS IN. I BELIEVE, AS I
INDICATED TO HIM THE OTHER EVENING, THAT WE WILL FIND OUR WAY TO
AGREEMENT ON A USEFUL DOCUMENT TO EXTENT OUR REVISION OF COM-
MUNIQUE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT SOME VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE TAKEN FROM
INITIAL THAI DRAFT (SAIGON 93621 THE ROAD WILL OBVIOUSLY BE
SMOOTHER.
GP - 3
UNGER
NOTE: : NOT PASSED SAIGON BY OC/T.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 033
PAGE 01 BANGKO 06261 161532Z
2
44
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00/031 W
P 161026Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
EXATS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6647
1969 MAY 028321 PM 5 01
KISSINGER'S RECEIVED OFFICE
S: ENT BANGKOK 6261
EXDIS:
DEPT ALSO PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY
SUBJECT: SEATO MEETING: POLITICAL CONSULTATION
REF:
SECTO 7
1. I AM MOST GRATEFULI FOR THE SECRETARY'S PROMPT ATTENTION TO
PROBLEMS :: HAD RAISED CONCERNING THANAT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FORTH-
COMING MEETINGS AND FOR THE DECISIONS REPORTED REFTEL.
2. I INFORMED THANAT LAS EVENING OF THE SECRETARY'S ACCEPTANCE
OF HIS INVITATION FOR THE RESTRICTED BREAKFAST MEETING, MAY 21,
AND HE IS NOW PROCEEDING TO ARRANGE IT. THE HOUR HAS NOT BEEN
FIXED AND, IF NECESSARY, THE SECRETARY'S PROSPECTIVE CALLION
GVN FONMIN THANH WILL BE ADJUSTED APPROPRIATELY HIS PLANNING,
I BELIEVE IS TO INVITE ONLY THE BANGKOK AMBASSADORS TO ACCOMPANY
THEIR MINDSTERS (US, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND UK AND
PHILIPPINES) I CONCURRED IN HIS: INCLINATION NOT TO INCLUDE
SECGEN VARGAS.
3. THANA CONFIRMED THE BILATERALI PRIVATE STAG DINNER FOR
MONDAY, MAY 19, TO WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD BRING TWO OR
THREE OTHER THAI (I RECOMMEND THAT, IN ADDITION TO SECRETARY AND
MYSELF, PEDERSEN AND SULLIVAN BE INCLUDED ON OUR SIDE, AND ALSO MY
DEPUTY HANNAH IF THIS DOESN'T APPEAR TO MAKE OUR REPRESENTATION TOO
HEAVY).
4. IN THE COURSE OF THE ENSUING CONVERSATION THANAT RETURNED TO
AN EARLIER THEME (BANGKOK 5893 AND 59711 ABOUT A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS
SECRET
26
Reproduced
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
EXEMS EXCES
SECRET
PAGE 02 BANGKO 06261 161532Z
IN SEATO WHICH WOULD GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO POLTICAL CONSULTATION
AND SOMEWHAT LESS TO SUCH MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS EXERCISED WHICH
HE TENDS TO REGARD AS HAVING LIMITED UTILITY. THANAT MENTIONED
AGAIN THAT IN THE COURSE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, THE BRITISH
FRENCH AND EVEN THE PAKISTANI MIGHT MAKE USEFUL CONTRIBUTIONS ON
MATTERS: OF INTEREST TO THE
TREATY AREA AND ALSO MOREI BROADLY. POSSIBLE SUBJECTS OF FRUITFUL
COMMON DISCUSSION WHICH WE IDENTIFIED INC. UDED THE LIKELY SOVIET
ROLE IN SEA: CHICOM INTENTIONS TOWARD INDIA IAND THE SOVIET ROLE
THERED. BURMA AND THAILAND: IMPLICATIONS FOR SEA IN PARTICULAR OF
THE TREND IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: AND THE GROWING SOVIET
INTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND ITS SEARCH FOR FACILITIES THERE
AS WELL AS THE US/UK EFFORTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE.
5. I POINTED OUT TO THANAT THAT THE MONTHLY MEETING OF THE SEATO
COUNCIL REPS OFFERS A POLITICAL CONSULTATION FORUM AND THAT
FRANKLY I WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH RESULTS THERE, IN SPITE OF MY
OWN EFFORTS TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE
THAI COUNCIL REP CONTRIBUTED AS LITTLE AS ANYONE. THANAT TENDED
TO BRUSH THIS ASIDE, IMPLYING THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE FRENCH AND
PERHAPS OTHERS INHIBITS ANY SIGNIFICANT EKCHANGE. WHEN I PRESSED
HIM ON THE CONTRADICTION THIS POSED TO WHAT HE HAD BEEN PROPOSING
BEFORE, HE DREW DISTINCTION BETWEEN COUNCILI REPS MEETINGS AND "AN
APPRAISAL OF PROBLEMS BY COMPETENT MEN AT A HIGH LEVEL WHO ARE
FREE TO SPEAK THEIR MINDS". HE THOUGHT PERHAPS A GET-TOGETHER
TWO OR THREE TIMES A YEAR OF A RESTRICTED GROUP, SUCH AS HE
CONTEMPLATES FOR THE "BREAKFAST MEETING" NEXT WEEK, WOULD BE
APPROPRIATE: ANOTHER OCCASION MIGHT BE WHEN MINISTERS ARE
PRESENT AT THE UNGA IN THE FALL. WE DID NOT PURSUE THIS FURTHER,
ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE IT WAS CLEAR TO BOTH OF US THAT HIS PROPOSAL
REMAINS SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS. (COMMENT: THANAT MAY SEEK TO REFINE
HIS IDEAS IN PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY, BUT
I WILLIBE SURPRISED IF THEY ULTIMATELY COME TO ANYTHING MORE THAN
AN EFFORT TO ADOPT SOME KIND OF LOOSE SCHEDULE FOR A PERIODIC
BUT WIDELY SPACED MINISTERIAL LEVEL, ONE SESSION MEETINGS OF
MOST (OR CONCEIVABLY ALL OF THE SEATO MEMBERS FOR A TOUR D''HORIZON).
60 THANAT DID NOT IN THIS CONVERSATION REFER TO POSSIBILI TY OF
NEW MEMBERS IN SEATO AND COMMENTED THAT IN HIS VIEW WE SHOULD
ALLOW PAKISTANIS TO "JUST SIT". HE FORESAW NO EARLY MAJOR CHANGE
IN FRENCH ATTITUDE OR BEHAVIOUR WHILE THE VIETNAM WAR CONTINUES.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOU THE AUTHORIZATION Or THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
EXPIS
SECRET 033
PAGE 01 BANGKO 06261 161532Z
2
44
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00,CCO ,NSCE 00/031 W
028321 1969
P 161026Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6647
MAY PM 5
KISSINGER'S RECEIVED OFFICE
SECR E T BANGKOK 6261
10
EXDIS
DEPT ALSO PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY
SUBJECT: SEATO MEETING: POLITICAL CONSULTATION
REF:
SECTO 7
1. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE SECRETARY'S PROMPT ATTENTION TO
PROBLEMS [ HAD RAISED CONCERNING THANAT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FORTH-
COMING MEETINGS AND FOR THE DECISIONS REPORTED REFTEL.
2. I INFORMED THANAT LAS EVENING OF THE SECRETARY'S ACCEPTANCE
OF HIS INVITATION FOR THE RESTRICTED BREAKFAST MEETING, MAY 21,
AND HE IS NOW PROCEEDING TO ARRANGE IT. THE HOUR HAS NOT BEEN
FIXED AND, IF NECESSARY, THE SECRETARY'S PROSPECTIVE CALL ON
GVN FONMIN THANH WILL BE ADUUSTED APPROPRIATELY HIS PLANNING,
I BELIEVE. IS TO INVITE ONLY THE BANGKOK AMBASSADORS TO ACCOMPANY
THEIR MINDSTERS (US, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND UK AND
PHILIPPINES). I CONCURRED IN HIS: INCLINATION NOT TO INCLUDE
SECGEN VARGAS.
3. THANA CONFIRMED THE BILATERAL PRIVATE: STAG DINNER FOR:
MONDAY, MAY 19, TO WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD BRING TWO OR
THREE OTHER THAI - (I RECOMMEND THAT, IN ADDITION TO SECRETARY AND
MYSELF, PEDERSEN AND SULLIVAN BE INCLUDED ON OUR SIDE, AND ALSO MY
DEPUTY HANNAH IF THIS DOESN'T APPEAR TO MAKE OUR REPRESENTATION TOO
HEAVY).
4. IN THE COURSE OF THE ENSUING CONVERSATION THANAT RETURNED TO
AN EARLIER THEME IBANGKOK 5893 AND 59711 ABOUT A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS
SECRET
26
Reproduced
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 BANGKO 06261 161532Z
IN SEATO WHICH WOULD GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO POLTICAL CONSULTATION
AND SOMEWHAT LESS TO SUCH MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS EXERCISED WHICH
HE TENDS TO REGARD AS HAVING LIMITED UTILITY. THANAT MENTIONED
AGAIN THAT IN THE COURSE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, THE BRITISH
FRENCH AND EVEN THE PAKISTANI MIGHT MAKE USEFUL CONTRIBUTIONS ON
EXCES
MATTERS OF INTEREST TO THE
TREATY AREA AND ALSO MORE BROADLY. POSSIB_E SUBJECTS OF FRUITFUL
COMMON DISCUSSION WHICH WE IDENTIFIED INC. INCLUDED THE LIKELY SOVIET
ROLE IN SEA: CHICOM INTENTIONS TOWARD INDIA (AND THE SOVIET ROLE
THERE ) . BURMA AND THAILAND: IMPLICATIONS FOR SEA IN PARTICULAR OF
THE TREND IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: AND THE GROWING SOVIET
INTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND ITS SEARCH FOR FACILITIES THERE
AS WELL AS THE US/UK EFFORTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE.
5. I POINTED OUT TO THANAT THAT THE MONTHLY MEETING OF THE SEATO
COUNCIL REPS OFFERS A POLITICAL CONSULTATION FORUM AND THAT
FRANKLY I WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH RESULTS THERE, IN SPITE OF MY
OWN EFFORTS TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE
THAI COUNCIL REP CONTRIBUTED AS LITTLE AS ANYONE. THANAT TENDED
TO BRUSH THIS ASIDE, IMPLYING THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE FRENCH AND
PERHAPS OTHERS INHIBITS ANY SIGNIFICANT EKCHANGE. WHEN I PRESSED
HIM ON THE CONTRADICTION THIS POSED TO WHAT HE HAD BEEN PROPOSING
BEFORE, HE DREW DISTINCTION BETWEEN COUNCILI REPS MEETINGS AND "AN
APPRAISAL OF PROBLEMS BY COMPETENT MEN AT A HIGH LEVEL WHO ARE
FREE TO SPEAK THEIR MINDS". HE THOUGHT PERHAPS A GET-TOGETHER
TWO OR THREE TIMES A YEAR OF A RESTRICTED GROUP, SUCH AS HE
CONTEMPLATES FOR THE "BREAKFAST MEETING" NEXT WEEK, WOULD BE
APPROPRIATE: ANOTHER OCCASION MIGHT BE WHEN MINISTERS ARE
PRESENT AT THE UNGA IN THE FALL. WE DID NOT PURSUE THIS FURTHER,
ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE IT WAS CLEAR TO BOTH OF US THAT HIS PROPOSAL
REMAINS SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS. (COMMENT: THANAT MAY SEEK TO REFINE
HIS IDEAS IN PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY, BUT
I WILLIBE SURPRISED IF THEY ULTIMATELY COME TO ANYTHING MORE THAN
AN EFFORT TO ADOPT SOME KIND OF LOOSE SCHEDULE FOR A PERIODIC
BUT WIDELY SPACED MINISTERIAL LEVEL, ONE SESSION MEETINGS OF
MOST (OR CONCEIVABLY ALLD OF THE SEATO MEMBERS FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON).
60 THANAT DID NOT IN THIS CONVERSATION REFER TO POSSIBIL TY OF
NEW MEMBERS IN SEATO AND COMMENTED THAT IN HIS VIEW WE SHOULD
ALLOW PAKISTANIS TO "JUST SIT". HE FORESAN NO EARLY MAJOR CHANGE
IN FRENCH ATTITUDE OR BEHAVIOUR -- WHILE THE VIETNAM WAR CONTINUES.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOU THE AUTHORIZATION Or THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF
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Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BANGKO 06261 161532Z
7. PROBLEM OF COMMUNIQUE, IN LIGHT OF REFTEL, REPORTED SEPARATELY.
GP- 3
UNGER
NOTE: NOT PASSED SAIGON BY OC/T.
EXQIC
SECRET
24
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
EXCE
ORTINA STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
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64
PAGE 01 BANGKO 06053 131558Z
42
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,FILE 01/032 W
1969 MAY 13 PM 2 004768 59
KISSINGER'S OFFICE
RECEIVED
2
PRI 131230Z MAY 69
EXC=S
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6525
CINCPAC 2410
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON
$ ECREE T BANGKOKI 6053
EXDIS
CINCPAC TOSEC
SUBJECT: TCC CONFERENCE - COMMUNIQUE
REF: A. STATE 73981
B o BANGKOKI 5973
C. SAIGON 9177
1. REQUEST GUIDANCE FROM DEPT OR SECRETARY*S PARTY ON HOW WE
SHOULD PROCEED FROM THIS POINT WITH RESPECT To WORKING TOWARD
AGREED COMMUNIQUE, IN ADVANCE OF SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL IN BANGKOK.
SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS CONCERING COMMUNIQUE DISCUSSED SEPTEL.
2° THAI HAVE JOINED WITH US IN DESIRE TO AVOID ANY LAST MINUTE
PROBLEM, BY MOVING AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARD INFORMAL CONSENSUS
EVEN BEFORE CONVENING OF COMMUNIQUE COMMITTEE ON MAY 22 (THOUGH
WE ARE NOT INFORMED OF EXTENT TO WHICH MFA HAS NOW DISCUSSED IDEAS
OR DRAFT WITH OTHERS). AS HOST, THEY PREPARED FIRST DRAFT AND
INVITED COMMENTS, WHICH WE PROVIDED IN FORM OF COUNTERDRAFT (REF A)
THAT PREDICTABLY FELL SHORT OF THAI DESIRES. PRELIMINARY COMMENTS:
ON OUR DRAFT WERE OFFERED PROMPTLY (INDEED PRECIPITOUSLY B REF B)
WITH INVITATION TO COMMENT ON THEIR OBJECTIONS.
3. WITHOUT FULLER SENSE OF WASHINGTON NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS, I
HAVE NOT AUTHORIZED MY STAFF TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC LANGUAGE AND
FEEL SOME RELUCTANCE IN ENGAGING THANAT IN THE DISCUSSION HE WILL
PROBABLY SEEK SOON. THEREFORE REQUEST ADVICE WHETHER IT IS DE-
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
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PAGE 02 BANGKO 06053 131558Z
SIRED THAT I UNDERTAKE TO NEGOTIATE OUT POINTS OF DIFFICULTY OR
WHETHER WE SHOULD CONFINE OUR ACTIVITIES TO RELAYING DEPT COMMENTS
AND REPORTING THAI REACTIONS. AS NOTED REF B, THAI EXPECT TO
RESPONGMORE FULLY TO OUR DRAFT BY THURSDAY, AND THEY SEEM TO
ANTICIPATE SITTING DOWN TO GIVE-AND-TAKE DISCUSSION.
40 SECOND ASPECT CONCERNS MANNER OF WEAVING IN DESIRE OF OTHER
TCC MISSIONS AND GOVTS. WITH RESPECT TO SAIGON COMMENTS REF C,
EXCES
FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE DIFFICULTY FROM THAI PERSPECTIVE ON TWO
POINTS:
A o THAI WILLFIND INCOMPREHENSIBLE OUR SOLICITUDE FOR
FEELINGS OF OTHER SIDE THROUGH SUGGESTED DELETION IN PARA SIX OF
US DRAFT OF IDEA WE ARE "ENCOURAGED" BY DIFFICULTIES OF OTHER SIDE
(REF C, PARA 41. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD FIND SAIGON'S WORDING
APPROPRIATE HADI QUESTION NOT ARISEN, THAI WILL CERTAINLY BRIDLE AT
FURTHER WEAKENING. THEY BELIEVE SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT CAN BE
NEGOTIATED ONLY IF MILITARY PRESSURE CONTINUES AND IS EFFECTIVE
AND ARE UNDOUBTEDLY SENSITIVE TO OMISSION IN OUR DRAFT OF THANAT'S
EMPHASIS THROUGH SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS ON CONTRAST BETWEEN ALLIED
POSTURE AND ACHIEVEMENTS AND COMMUNIST MISDEEDS.
B. RE REF C PAR 70 HOPE THAT SUBSTANCE OF US DRAFT PARA 12
( CARRIED FORWARD FROM THAI DRAFT) CAN BE PRESEVED. THANAT HAS NO
NOTION THAT ASIAN NATIONS CAN BE THEMSELVES UNDERTAKE TO "GUARANTEE"
PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE REGION, BUT WE THIN IT IMPORTANT TO EN-
DORSE HIS (AND SOME OTHERS') DESIRE TO RECORD IMPORTANCE OF ASIAN
PARTICIPATION IN THAT TASK. A BETTER CORRECTIVE WOULD BE TO CHANGE
WORDS SHOULD BE BASED ON" IN FIRST SENTENCE OF US PARA 12 TO
"WILL REQUIRE".
5. THIRD PROBLEM CONCERNS COORDINATION WITH MY TCC COLLEAGUES HERE.
AT EARLIER STAGE, WHEN THAI INITIAL DRAFT RECEIVED, WE PLAYED COY
AND WERE EMBARRASSED WHEN NEW ZEALANDERS DISCLOSED THEY INFORMED
BY THEIR EMB WASHINGTON THAT THIS EMBASSY HAD TRANSMITTED DRAFT
WHICH THEN PASSED TO THEM. ASSUMING SINCE THEN THAT CONSULTATION
CONTINUED AT LEAST WITH AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS AS WELL AS
GVN, I NOW FIND AUSTRALIANS AMB MCNICOL UNINFORMED OF US DRAFT
(WHICH MAY, OF COURSE, BEI DUE TO LIMITED INTERNAL AUSTRALIAN
COMMUNICATION) . TO CARRY ON USEFUL CONSULTATIONS WITHIN PROPER
LIMITS HERE, I NEED TO KNOW CURRENT PATTERN OF DISCUSSION WITH
ALLIES -- WHERE AND WHAT INCLUDED.
GP-3. UNGER
SEPRET
28
Repro
the
Nixon
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EOF.
OF STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
шкать
UNITED STATES OF
SECRET 336
PAGE 01 BANGKO 05973 121524Z
421
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01 000 00/031 W
127766
PI 121156Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6475
2
CINCPAC 2406
S: ECR E T BANGKOK 5973
EXDIS
CINCPAC TOSEC
SUBJECT: TCC CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE
REF: Ao STATE 73981 Be BANGKOK 5778 C. STATE 71864
10 POL COUNSELOR PASSED COPY OF US: DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TO SECRETARY
TO FONMIN (BIRABHONGSE) THIS MORNING. COUNSELOR USED PRIOR REVIEW
OF 16TH PARIS MEETING TO STRESS IMPORTANCE OF NLF 10-POINT PROGRAM
WHICH, EVEN BEFORE COMPLETE ANALYSIS POSSIBLE, CLEARLY REPRES-
ENTED AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN CONSIDERATION OF COMMUNIQUE. POINTED
OUT THAT, HAVING IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF USING TCC MEETING TO
FURTHER FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF MOVING TOWARD PEACE, DEPARTMENT
CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT TO AVOID LANGUAGE THAT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL
IN THIS CONTEXT EVEN WHILE REAFFIRMING COMMON OBUECTIVES WHICH
WRITTEN LARGELY FROM PRIOR THAI DRAFT. EXPRESSED HOPE THAI WOULD
FIND THAT US DRAFT, ON WHICH WE WOULD WELCOME THEIR SUGGESTIONS
IN HOPE OF WORKING TOWARD CONCURRENCE, DIFFERED FROM BIRA'S
PRIMARILY IN TONE AND MANNER OF PRESENTATION. AFTER SKIMMING
DRAFT QUICKLY, BIRA SAID ONLY THAT THAI WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE SOME
COMMENTS AND HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MEET AGAIN BY
EXPIS
THURSDAY HIS MANNER REFLECTED SOME DISMAY.
2. FOLLOWING A LUNCHEON (SEE BELOW), BIRA TOOK COUNSLER ASIDE AND
DELIVERED FOLLOWING "PRELIMINARY COMMENTS" WITH A PRECISION AND
FIRMNESS WHICH SUGGESTED TO US THAT HE HAD TAKEN PRE-LUNCHEON
INTERVAL TO OBTAIN FONMIN THANAT'S INITIAL REACTIONS. HE MADE
FIVE POINTS:
SECRET
Reproduced-at the RighardNEPR Dbraty AUTHORIZATION OF AUTHORIZATION WIHORIZATION OF THE WTHORIZATION.OF.THE WTHOBIZATION.OF.TI WIHOBIZATION.OFTI has EXECUTIVE been determined SECRETARY to be declassified.
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PAGE 02 BANGKO 05973 121524Z
A) RTG CANNOT BE so CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH PARIS TALKS "OF WHICH
WE ARE NOT A PART". THERE ARE SOME STATEMENTS (IN US DRAFT) WHICH
THAI CAN ENDORSE, OTHERS WHICH THEY COULD ONLY "NOTE".
BI) IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT us DRAFT BRUSHES ASIDE so BRIEFLY THE
MANILA COMMUNIQUE. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT PARA 2 OF US DRAFT
ON THIS SUBJECT WAS TAKEN FROM BIRA'S OWN, HE SAID REFERENCE
SHOULD BE REPEATED AND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO RELATE ALL ALLIES
TO PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT: "THAT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO US AND SOME
OTHER PARTICIPANTS".
CO THERE WILL NEED TO BE SOME REPETITION OF LAST YEAR'S DISMISSAL
OF THE COMMUNIST "SPURIOUS COALITION" DEMAND's THIS NEED NOT BE IN
SAME LANGUAGE BUT CLEAR REFERENCE IS IMPORTANT. (COMMENT: THIS
WAS: ONLY ONE OF BIRA'S POINTS RELATED TO THANATIS EARLIER STRESS
- - - BANGKOK 5506 ON EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF CONTRASTING ALLIES
CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS WITH COMMUNIST OBSTRUCTION.
EXCES
DI BIRA DEPLORED DELETION OF REFERENCE TO INCREASE IN THAI TROOP
STRENGTH IN VIETNAM "AS HOST TO CONFERENCE, WE DESERVE THIS AND
NEED IT FOR OUR OWN PEOPLE." (COMMENT: BELIEVE THAT INCREASE TO
FULLI THAI DIVISION IS ONLY SIGNIFICANT NEW CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIED
DEFENSE OF VIETNAM SINCE WELLINGTON MEETING AND THAT EVEN THOUGH
WE WISH TO AVOID "BUILD-UP" IMAGE, REFERENCE TO THAI ACTION MUST
BE INCLUDED.)
E ) CONCLUDING SENTENCE CONCERNING COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION
IS TOO CATEGORICAL "WEI CANNOT ACCEPT ENDORSEMENT OF CONSULT-
ATION THAT DOES NOT REALLY EXIST." BIRA SAID THAI HAVE BEEN VERY
PATIENT, RECOGNIZING PREPONDERANT ROLE OF US AT PRESENT STAGE
OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO DENIGRATE AMBASSADOR'S
EXPIS
EFFORTS TO KEEP RTG INFORMED BUT IT HAD BEEN INFORMATION ONLY, NO
REAL CONSULTATION OR DISCUSSION. BIRA CONCLUDED THAT THANAT WILL
NOT PROTEST DURING TCC MEETINGS, THAT PATTERN OF CONSULTATION
AMONG ALLIES CAN LEFT AS TACITLY UNDERSTOOD BUT THAT IF
"ENDORSEMENT* (PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO WORDS "WHICH HAS EXISTED")
IS PUT IN WRITING RTG WILLIHAVE TD ENTER A RESERVATION IN WRITING
WHICHWILL BE HARMFUL! TO ALL
3. WHEN WE CONFIRMED TO BIRA THAT THAI DRAFT HAD BEEN PASSED TO
GVN, HE INQUIRED WHETHER US DRAFT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH BUI
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
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PAGE 03 BANGKO 05973 121524Z
DIEM (WHICH WE COULD NOT CONFIRMI) AND SAID HE PRESUMED SO AND THAT
VERY WELCOME PRECISION IN PARAS 3 = 5 HOPEFULLY THEREFORE REFLECTED
WHAT THANH PLANNED TO SAY
40 BIRA USED INTERVENING LUNCHEON WITH PROFESSOR SCOTT THOMPSON
OF FLETCHER SCHOOL (CA-1519) MARCHI 11) AND POL COUNSELOR FOR A
VIRTUOSO PERFORMANCE IN WHICH HE TALKED AT THOMPSON BUT CLEARLY
TO EMBASSY ABOUT THAI EXPECTATIONS AT FORTHCOMING TCC MEETING.
ALTHOUGH RELEVANT TO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS, WE BELIEVE HIS:
REMARKS ALSO BEAR ON RTG REACTION TO DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. WHEN THOM-
PSON INQUIRED WHETHER BIRA THOUGHT PROBLEM OF VIETNAM SETTLEMENT
WOULD, OVER COMING YEAR, BE A LEGITIMATE FOCUS OF INTEREST FOR A
PART OF HIS STUDY ON THAI-US RELATIONS, BIRA SAID HE THOUGHT IT
WOULD AND HE IMMEDIATELY REFERRED TO IMPORTANCE OF FORTHCOMING
SEATO AND TCC MEETINGS: HERSAID THAI WILL WANT TO HEAR WHAT ARE
THE PROSPECTS FOR SETTLING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OR EVEN ANY SERIOUS:
NEGOTIATION ON THEM IN PARIS. "WE CANNOT ACCEPT UNDUE EMPHASIS ON
PARIS, FROM WHICH AT THIS STAGE WEI ARE EXCLUDED AT SOME STAGE
IN PARIS OR ELSEWHERE, ALLIES WILLI HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN DEVISING
FORM OF SETTLEMENT. "WE HAVE ONLY A SMALL POLITICAL CLAIM TO PARTI-
CIPATED BUT WE WILL NEVER GIVE IT UP. (COMMENT) THE LANGUAGE IS
PURE THANAT.)
50 BIRA CONTINUED THAT THAI OF COURSE APPRECIATED PRIMARY ROLE US
MUST PLAY AT PRESENT. THAI CAN ACCEPT A LIMITED TROOP WITH
.
DRAWAL "BECAUSE WE RECOGNIZE IT IS NECESSARY TO ASSUAGE US PUBLIC
OPINION" so THAT THE EFFORT IN VIETNAM CAN CONTINUE FOR A FURTHER
TIME. BIRA COMMENTED THAT THAI NATIONALI INTERESTS DICTATE CON-
CURRENT CONCERN WITH VIETNAM LAOS, AND "PEKING" REFERRING TO
RECENT DEBATE IN THAILAND OVER THANAT'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO
TALK WITH CHICOMS. HE SAID THAI CANNOT GO BACK ON UNDERTAKING TO
SUPPORT GVN THROUGHI TO REALIZATION OF ITS GOALS. THAI HAVE DONE
EXCES
THEIR PART, INVITING us AIRMEN TO THAI BASES TO FIGHT VIETNAM WAR.
HE THEN VEERED OFF INTO FAMILIAR COMPLAINT ABOUT US PRESS, SOME
ELEMENTS OF WHICH HE BELIEVES HAVE ENGAGED IN DELIBERATE EFFORT
TO WEAKEN THAILAND ANDI US> THAI TIES BY SPURIOUS COMPARISION OF
THAI INSURGENCY TO VIETNAM.
60 I WILL BE PREPARED TO PICK UP WITH THANAT AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY
DISCUSSION OF THOSE POINTS IN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE HE SEEMS TO FIND
TROUBLESOME AND 1 RATHER ANTICIPATE WE WILLI RECEIVE SOME SUGGESTED
LANGUAGE CHANGES ANDI ADDITIONS FROM THAI BEFORE END OF THIS WEEK.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Department of State
EXEL
DIPARTMENT UNITED * STATES OF STATE *
TELEGRAM
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PAGE 04 BANGKO 05973 121524Z
MEANWHILE WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE REACTION FROM SECRETARY'S
PARTY AND WASHINGTO TO POINTS MADE BY BIRA, AND ESPECIALLY TO
THOSE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THAIS AS FOUND IN PARAS 2c. 20,
AND 2E ABOVE.
GP-3. UNGER
61:3 Wd 21 MAY 69.
ROOM SITUATION
WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richerd RODUCED Ohis document basbeem tOEFO
DIPARTMENT
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*
*
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PAGE 01 BANGKO 05778 081430Z
2
41
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
105283
P 081215Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6364
S E C R E. T BANGKOK 5778
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TCC MEETING: DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
REF: A . STATE 071864
B. BANGKOK 5638
1. PURSUANT TO PARA FIVE REFTEL As WE SUGGEST SOME MODIFICA-
TION IN YOUR SCENARIO.
2. SINCE WE ARE IN THE DARK AS TO WHAT US FULL DRAFT WILL
LOOK LIKE, AND WE WILL NOT HAVE THIS INFORMATION UNTIL DRAFT
CABLED WITH INSTRUCTIONS 7 AS NOTED PARA 4 REFTEL A, ANY SPECIFIC
REDRAFTING WE TRY TO WORK OUT WITH THAIS NOW MAY WELL BE
WASHED OUT BY WHAT YOU ULTIMATELY PROVIDE US. FURTHERMORE, WE FEEL
WE WILL BE IN MORE FAVORABLE POSITION TO NEGOTIATE DRAFT WITH
THAIS WITH OUR NEW TEXT IN HAND THAN SIMPLY BE RAISING UN-
PALATABLE OBJECTIONS TO THEIRS.
3* WITH THIS IN MIND, A BELIEVE WE SHOULD GO NO FARTHER AT THIS
TIME THAN SPEAK TO THE THAIS ALONG LINES OF PARA ONE REFTEL A ,
INDICATING THAT WHILE WE ARE WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS, THIS
IS OUR UNDERSTNADING OF WASHINGTON VIEWS ON BASIS OFI TONE AND
MANNER OF PRESENTATION RELECTED IN STATE 66205 AND OTHER INDICA-
TIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED.
4. JUST TO MAKE SURE WE JNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS IN THAI DRAFT
WHICH YOU REGARD AS MOST OBJECTIONABLE, WE QUOTE SEVERAL EX-
AMPLES BELOW (KEMED TO DRAFT TEXT QUOTED IN REFTELIBI, AND
ASK YOU TO CORRECT US IF THESE ARE NOT RPT NOT ILLUSTRATIVE OF
WHAT YOU WISH TO AVOID:
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUSTERRIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE: SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
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PAGE 02 BANGKO 05778 081430Z
A) IN PARA THREE OF QUOTED TEXT, SECOND SENTENCE BEGINNING
"HE ALSO DESCRIBED
B) IN PARA FOUR, REFERENCE IN SENTENCE TWO TO "TOTALITARIAN
COMMUNIST REGIME" AND FOLLOWING SENTENCE ENDING" PEACE ON ITS
OWN TERMS".
C ) IN PARA FIVE, THE PHRASE IN SENTENCE TWO" AND EXACTED
HEAVY TOLL OF COMMUNIST CASUALTIES. "
D) IN PARA EIGHT, SENTENCE i. THE PHRASE BEGINNING" THE
ADAMANT ATTITUDE ETC.". ALSO ALL OF SENTENCE THREEI BEGINNING "
THEY NOTED, IN CONTRAST
5. WE REALIZE, OF COURSE THE DIFFICULTY YOU HAVE WITH LANGUAGE
OF THIS NATURE VIS-A-VIS AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. YOU UNDOUBTEDLY
REALIZE THE DIFFICULTY THAT WE CAN ENCOUNTER WITH THE THAIS AND
PERHAPS OTHER ALLIES IF WE SEEM TO BE IN ANY SENSE ACQUIESCING
IN THE COMMUNIST INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS OR FAILING TO MAKE AT LEAST
REASONABLE USE OF THE STRENGTHS OF OUR POSITION: THIS, IN FACT,
IS SOMETHING REGARDED HERE AS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY AMERICAN
PUBLIC OPINION ISAS ADVERSE AS IT IS. TO EXTENT GVN WISHES
TO MAKE TO THAIS POINTS SIMILAR TO OUR OBJECTIONS, IT WILL
OF COURSE BE BETTER THAN IF WE DO SO.
GP = 3.
UNGER
SECRET
Reproduced BERichER This document has been lassified.
DIPARTMENT
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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SECRET 638
PAGE 01 BANGKO 05638 01 OF 02 061748Z
47
ACTION SS 30
2
INFO OCT 01,000 00,SSO 00 NSCE 00,/031 W
091234
EXCES
0 P 061439Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6276
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY
S ECRE T SECTION I OF 2 BANGKOK 5638/1
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TCC MEETING: DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
REF: A) STATE 66205: B) BANGKOK 5506
1 . THAI CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUE, QUOTED IN FULL BELOW,
WAS PROVIDED LATE TODAY BY SEC TO FON MIN (BIRABHONGSE) »
EMPHASIZING QUALIFICATION WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT IS A
"WORKING PAPER" SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE THAI ALTERATION EVEN
THOUGH THANAT HAS REVIEWED IT. BUILT ON AND EXPANDED FROM
LAST YEAR'S COMMINQUE, IT GENERALLY CONFORMS TO PATTERN SET
FORTH REF A. PER REF B, RTG UNDERSTANDS IT WILL BE DISCUSSED
WITH BUI DIEM AND CARRIED BY HIM TO GVN, AND THAI THEREFORE
WITHHOLDING IT FROM GVN AMB HERE DESPITE HIS REQUESTS. IN
VIEW BUI DIEM'S TIMING, WE ARE FORWARDING DRAFT WITHOUT
COMMENT.
2. BEGIN QUOTE:
1. THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA, MR. GORDON
FREETH: THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREAD
MR. KYU HAH CHOI: THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OF NEW ZEALAND, MR. KEITH HOLYOAKE: THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE PHILIPPINES, MR. CARLOS P. ROUMLO: THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THAILAND, MR. THANAT KHOMAN: THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, MR. TRAN CHANH THANHS AND THE
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: MR. WILLIAM P.
ROGERS, MET IN BANGKOK, AT THE INVITATION OF THE ROYAL THAI
GOVERNMENT, ON 22 AND 23 MAY 1969.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
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PAGE 02 BANGKO 05638 01 OF 02 061748Z
PURPOSES
2. THE MEETING WAS HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CALL FOR
CONTINUING CONSULATATION TO CONSIDER WAYS IN WHICH THE SEVEN NATIONS
MIGHT STRENGTHEN THEIR EFFORTS TO HELP THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM TO RESIST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, TO REVIEW THE PROSPECTS
FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, AND TO EXAMINE THE
SECURITY SITUATION IN ASIA. THE PARTICIPANTS RENEWED THEIR
COMMITMENT TO THE GOALS OF FREEDOM PROCLAIMED AT MANILA:
1. TO BE FREE FROM AGGRESSION:
2. TO CONQUER HUNGER, ILLITERACY, AND DISEASE:
3. TO BUILD A REGION OF SECURITY, ORDER, AND PROGRESS:
4. TO SEEK RECONCILIATION AND PEACE THROUGHOUT ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC.
SITUATION IN VIETNAM
30 THE MINSTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF EVENTS IN HIS COUNTRY DURING THE PAST YEAR,
PARTICULARLY THE STRENGTHENING OF ITS REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO DESCRIBED THE ATTEMPT BY THE COMMUNISTS, BY
MEANS OF THE FOURTH OFFENSIVE AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIAN POPULATION
QUARTERS IN CITIES AND TOWNS AND OF INTENSIFIED POLITICAL
MACHINATIONS TO WIN SUPPORT FOR A "PEACE CABINET" SYPATHETIC
TO THE COMMUNIST CAUSE, TO DESTROY THE COMMENDABLE ACHIEVEMENTS
OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. HE
OUTLINED THE MEASURES TAKEN BY HIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE PROTECTION
AND RELIEF OF THE POPULATION. HE POINTED OUT ALSO THE SERIOUSNESS
S
OF THE RELATED SITATION IN LAOS WHERE MORE THAN 40,000 NORTH
VIETNAMESE TROOPS AREOCCUPYING MORE THAN HALF OF THE LAOTIAN
TERRITORY, IN VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1962. HE OBSERVED
THAT COMMUNIST ARMED ATTACKS ARE BEING MOUNTED AGAINST NOT ONLY
THE NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT OF LAO BUT ALSO THE GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA.
4. THE MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS REAFFIRMED THEIR
CONVICTION THAT A BROADLY-BASED REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM
AS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OFFERS THE
BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONSOLIDATION.
THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THE POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST
AGRESSORS CALLED FOR ABOLITION OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION, OF
THE ELECTED NATIONAL ASEMBLY, OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SECRET
31
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13526
been
determined
OF STATE
#
Department of State
ORITING STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 BANGKO 05638 01 OF 02 061748Z
OF VIETNAM AS WELL, AND FOR THEIR REPLACEMENT AS SOON AS FEASIBLE
BY A TOTALURIAN COMMUNIST REGIME. THE MINISTERS REALIZED THAT
THE COMMUNISTS HAD CONTINUED TO BE INTRASIGENT IN THEIR DEMANDS
BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAM WANTS NOTHING LESS THAN COMPLETE DOMINATION
OVER THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND BY WAGING TERRORISTIC
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE DEFENSELESS CIVILIAN POPULATIONAND
INDI MRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST VARIOUS CENTERS, IT HOPES TO WEAR
DOWN THE PATIENCE OF THE ALLIED NATIONS AND COMPEL THEM TO CONCLUDE
PEACE ON ITS TERMS. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF
THIS IMPERIALISTIC POLICY, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE MUST BE
ASSURED THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE THROUGH DEMOCRATIC
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES WITHOUT EITHER EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE
OR TERRORIST PRESSURE. THE IMPOSITION OF ANY FORM OF GOVERNMENT,
INCLUDING THE SPURIOUS "COALITION" ADVOCATED BY THE COMMUNISTS
AND SOME OTHERS, WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THIS PRINCIPLE AND,
THEREFORE, COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE
5. THE MINISTERS ALSO RECEIVED REPORTS ON THE MILITARY
SITUATION DURING THE YEAR, AND NOTED THE SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS
AND INCREASING ROLE ASSUMED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM IN THE DEFENCE OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THEIR EFFORTS,
EXC-0
TOGETHER WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
AND OTHER ALLIED COUNTRIES, FRUSTRATED THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPT TO
SUSTAIN ANATION-WIDE OFFENSIVE EARLY THIS YEAR AND EXACTED A
HEAVY TOLL OF COMMUNIST CASUALTIES. AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THE
FAILURE OF THE COMMUNISTS TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF A GENERAL
UPRISING AND OF PRODUCING AN IMPACT ON WORLD PUBLIC OPINION BY
DEMONSTRATING THEIR OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES SHOULD CONVINCE THEM
AS WELL
AS OTHERS OF THEIR INABILITY TO GAIN A VICTORY BY MILITARY
MEANS. THEY HAD, FURTHERMORE, EXPOSED ONCE AGAIN THE EMPTINESS OF
THEIR PRETENSIONS TO REPRESENT THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
UNGER
SECRET
3
Reproduced a
pursuant
been
declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 549
PAGE 01 BANGKO 05638 02 OF 02 061703Z
2
47
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01,000 00,SSO 00, NSCE 00,/031 W
090860
EXCES
0 PI 061439Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6279
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY
SECRE T FINAL SECTION OF 2 BANGKOK 5638/2
EXDIS
60 THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION OF THE CONTINUING
ASSISTANCE RENDERED BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES TO THE
GOVERNEMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN THEIR MILITARY
STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNIST ARMED AGGRESSION. THE MINISTERS NOTED
WITH APPRECIATION THE INCREASING AVAILABILITY OF MODERN EQUIPMENT
FOR COMBAT USE BY THE FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WHICH WILL
FURTHER IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS TO
DEFEND THEIR OWN HOMELAND, AND COMMENDED THE ACTION OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT ON THIS SCORE. THEY ALSO NOTED WITH APPRECIATION
THE INCREASE IN STRENGTH OF HE FIGHTING FORCE CONTRIBUTTED BY
THAILAND TO THE DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO A DIVISION.
THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD CONTINUE TO
ASSIST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN THEIR DEFENSE AGAINST ARMED
AGGRESSION.
EFFORTS FOR PEACE
7. THE MINISTERS REVIEWED THE CONSISTENT EFFORTS FOR PEACE
BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS, AND NOTED IN PARTICULAR THE SERIES OF
IMPORTANT INITIATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNEMTN AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FURING THE PAST YEAR:
1. DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON 31 MARCH
1968 TO STOP THE BOMBING OF MOST OF NORTH VIETNAM:
2. DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON 30 NOVEMBER
1968 TO HALT TOTALLY THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM:
3. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON....
4. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU ON 25 MARCH 1969...
5. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT THIEU ON 7 APRIL 1969.00
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 021 BANGKO 05638 02 OF 02 0617032
8. IN OPPOSITION TO THE CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS PEACE TAKEN BY THE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, THE MINISTERSOBSERV-
ED WITH PROFOUND REGRET THE ADAMANT ATTITUDE AND UNREASONABLENESS
OF THE COMMUNISTS IN THEIR UNRELENTING PURSUIT OF AGGRANDIZEMENT AT
THE EXPENSE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THE MINISTERS RECALLED ALSO
THE PROPOSAL MADE BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT SAN ANTONIO ON 29
SEPTEMBER 1967, WHICH OFFERED A WAY TO PEACE THAT ALL REASONABLE
MEN COULD ACCEPT. THEY NOTED, IN CONTRAST, THE PERSISTENT REFUSAL
ON HANOI'S PART TO MAKE ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TOWARD A REASONABLE
SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD UPHOLD THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM AND RESPECT THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN WAY
OF LIFE IN PEACE AND FREEDOM. INSTEAD, NORTH VIETNAM HAS, ON THE
ONE HAND, ESCALATED THEIR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST BOTH
POPULATION CENTERS AND ALLIED POSITIONS AND, ON THE OTHER, IT
CONTINUES TO INSIST ON IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL
AND OTHER UNACCEPTABLE DEMANDS PUT FORWARD BY HANOI
AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.
9. THE MINISTERS NOTED WITH REGRET THAT THE PEACE TALKS
IN PARIS WERE HAMPERED BY THE INTRANSIGENT AND UNYIELDING STAND
OF THE COMMUNISTS ON SUCH CONSILIATORY PROPOSALS AS MUTUAL
WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, OBSERVANCE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AND
MUTUAL RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR. SIMULTANEOUS COMMENCEMENT
OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES ON BOTH SIDES, WITH ADEQUATE
VERIFICATION TO PREVENT FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF FORCES, AND
COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA ARE THE ESSENTIAL
PREREQUISITES FOR AN EFFECTIVE AND ENDURING SETTLEMENT OF THE
CONFLICT. ABOVE ALL, THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT,
TO BE ENDURING, MUST RESPECT THE WISHES AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
SHOULD BE A FULL PARTICIPANT IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS DESIGNED TO
BRING ABOUT SUCH A SETTLEMENT: AND THAT THE ALLIED NATIONS WHICH
HAVE HELPED TO DEFEND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SHOULD PARTICIPATE
IN ANY FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.
10. THE MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMON DETERMINATION TO
SPARE NO EFFORT IN SEARCH OF AN HONOURABLE AND DURABLE PEACE IN
VIETNAM AS WELL AS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE
THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL START TO RESPOND IN A WAY THAT WILL
PERMIT MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, AN END TO THE
BLOODSHED AND THE SUFFERING OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE: THAT
SECRET
31
Reproduced
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SEPRET
PAGE 03 BANGKO 05638 02 OF 02 061703Z
NORTH VIETNAM WILL SEE ADVANTAGES IN LIVING IN PEACEFUL COOP-
ERATION AND FRIENDLY HARMONY WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS: AND THAT NORTH VIET
NAM
WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF REGIONAL
COOPERATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS OWN PEOPLE AND FOR THE PROGRESS
OF SOUTH EAST ASIA AS A WHOLE.
0-0xm
POST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES
11. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT SOME THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
THE PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRIES
RAVAGED
BY THE WAR, AND TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CONCERTED ACTION BY THE SEVEN
NATIONS TO ASSIST IN THIS REGARD, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CLOSEST CONSUL-
TATION AMONG THEM NOT ONLY, TO EXPLORE ALL AVENUES OF ASSISTANCE BUT
ALSO TO FORMULATE A WORKING PLAN AND A TIME-TABLE FOR AN EARLY
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN.
12. THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN ASIA
SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN A GUARANTEE
OF
co-0xm
PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THEY WERE CONVINCED
THAT
THE ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES MUST SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THEIR OWN FUTURE WELL-BEING AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIB-
ILITY
THAT MIGHT WELL BEGIN WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF THE DUTY OF PEACE-
KEEPING
IN VIETNAM, AND PERHAPS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, POSSIBLY UNDER THE
S
AEGIS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZAITON. AGAIN, CLOSEST CONSULTATION AMONG
THEM WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONNECTION.
KOREA
13. (TO BE INSERTED)
14. IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN KOREA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA, THE
MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE DECLARATION ON PEACE AND
PROGRESS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC PROMULGATED AT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
IN MANILA IN OCTOBER 1966. END QUOTE GP-3.
UNGER
SECRET
3)
TB526
declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Tharland
Department of State
STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 927
PAGE 01 BANGKO 05506 021306Z
2
54
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
070034
P 0212032 MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6204
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY
SECRET T BANGKOK 5506
1969 MAY 2 PM 5 09
KISSINGER'S OFFICE
RECEIVED
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE
REF: A. BANGKOK 5304 B. STATE 68534 C. STATE 66205 D SAIGON 8386
1. AS FORESHADOWED IN REF (A) I MET WITH THANAT THIS MORNING TO
PURSUE FURTHER OUR DISCUSSION OF THE TCC COMMUNIQUE. I HANDED
THANAT A PAPER CONTAINING MUCH OF THE TEXT OF REFTEL (C), MINUS
FYIS, AND INDICATED THAT IT REPRESENTED WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND.
AFTER HE HAD COMPLETED READING THE PAPER, HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS
IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH HIS OWN IDEAS ON THE CONTENT OF THE
COMMUNIQUE. AT THE SAME TIME HE NOTED THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF
EMPHASIZING THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE ALLIES® CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS:
FOR PEACE AND THE OTHER SIDE'S OBSTRUCTIVE STAND. THE ALLIES, E.G.
HAVE PRESSED IN PARIS FOR A GENERAL REDUCTION OF HOSTILITIES,
WITNESS THE OFFER OF WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES FOR STABILIZING THE
DMZ AND OTHER CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS. THIEU HAS PROPOSED TALKS WITH
THE NLF. THESE STEPS SHOULD BE CONTRASTED TO THE OTHER SIDE'S
RIGIDLY NEGATIVE POSITION IN PARIS AND THEIR CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE
ACTIVITY ON THE GROUND IN THE FORM OF CONTINUED SHELLINGS OF
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OF THE UNPROTECTED CIVILIAN POPULATION
IN THE CITIES.
2. I EXPLAINED TO THANAT OUR INTENTION OF DISCUSSING A FIRST DRAFT
WITH BUI DIEM PRIOR TO HIS CEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON ABOUT MAY 7
FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CONSULTATION IN SAIGON, AND ASKED
THANAT THE STATUS OF THE THAI DRAFT OF THE COMMUNIQUE, IMPRESSING
UPON HIM THE UTILITY OF HAVING IT IN TIME FOR TRANSMITTAL TO
WASHINGTON SO THAT IT COULD BE DISCUSSED THERE WITH BUI DIEM BEFORE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REFRODUCED WITHOUT THE UTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
ORIZND STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
BELOKE
SECRET
PAGE 02 BANGKO 05506 021306Z
HIS DEPARTURE. HE AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL MECHANISM FOR
COORDINATING OUR THOUGHTS ANDINSTRUCTED HIS SECRETARY (BIRA) TO
PREPARE THE DRAFT OVER THE WEEK=END. THANAT ASSURED ME THAT THE
DRAFT WOULD BE READY BY TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY OF NEXT WEEK, AND
THAT HE WOULD MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO ME AS SOON AS IT WAS READY. HE
EXCES
ALSO INDICATED THAT MATERIAL I HAD PROVIDED WOULD BE HELPFUL TO
THEM IN THEIR DRAFTING.
3. I ALSO LEFT WITH THANAT A COPY OF SECRETARY ROGERS® ADDRESS OF
APRIL 21' NOTING ITS RELEVANCE TO THE COMMUNIQUE DISCUSSION OF
WITHDRAWAL (PARA 3E REFTEL C) AND SUGGESTING IT MIGHT BE USEFUL
IN DRAFTING ON THAT PARTICULAR POINT. I TOOK OPPORTUNITY ALSO TO
MENTION GVN DECISION TO SEND GENERAL NGO DU AS ITS MILITARY REP-
RESENTATIVE (REF D1.
4. IF ALL GOES WELL YOU SHOULD HAVE BY OPENING OF BUSINESS WED-
NESDAY A THAI DRAFT COMMUNIQUE ALONG LINES OF OUR OWN THINKING FOR
DISCUSSION WITH BUI DIEM BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.
GP-3. UNGER
STATE
SEPRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Harg
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET 090.
PAGE 01 BANGKO 05304 3009482
16
ACTION SS 30
2
INFO OCT 01,/031 W
054836
P 3007202 APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6086
SECRE T BANGKO 5304
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE
REF: STATE 066205
1. FOLLOWING MEETING WITH THANAT AND AMBASSADOR WALSH AND BOB
MILLER THIS MORNING, I RAISED WITH THANAT SUBJECT REFTEL. I
SAID I PRESUMED ON BASIS PAST PRACTICE THIAS WERE PLANNING PREPARE
FIRST DRAFT FOR
COMMUNIQUE. THANAT CONFIRMED THIS AND SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION
COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE QUITE CONCISE THISYEAR. I AGREED BUT SAID
I PRESUMED WE WOULD NOT WISH TO FAIL TO BRING OUT POINTS WHICH
WILL ENHANCE PUBLIC SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION. BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION
I REFERRED TO PRESIDENT THIEU'S RECENT SIGNIFICANT STATEMENTS
ABOUT GVN WILLINGNESS TO TALK WITH NLF, ETC. THANAT ACCEPTED THIS
POINT AND SAID IN FACT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE ESSENTIALLY A
POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DOCUMENT AND SHOULD AVOID LENGTHY
ENUMERATION OF FACTS AND EVENTS.
2. SINCE THERE WAS NO TIME TO PURSUE MATTER FURTHER, WE AGREED TO
MEET AGAIN ON FRIDAY WHEN THANAT SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO
HEAR OUR THOUGHTS ON SUBSTANTIVE POINTS TO BE COVERED IN COMMUNIQUE.
FOR FRIDAY CONVERSATION WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE INDICATION DEPT'S
THINKING HOW US CONSULTATIONS WITH BUI DIEM IN WASHINGTON AND
LATER IN SAIGON WILL BE COORDINATED WITH THAIS AS COMMUNIQUE DRAFT- -
ERS AND HOSTS.
3. IN ADDITION TO COMMUNIQUE MATTERS, BELIEVE DISCUSSION ON
FRIDAY MAY ALSO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO STEER THANAT
AWAY FROM ANY THOUGHTS HE MAY HAVE ABOUT CALLING FOR: A RESTRICTED
SESSION DURING SEATO MEETING TO DISCUSS VIETNAM SITUATION AND
FUTURE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY. SEEMS TO ME THIS CAN BE MORE
Reproduced the Library. his document has been E.O. XF been
DISASTMENT c STATE OF STATE u
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
SECRET
PAGE 02 BANGKO 05304 300948Z
FRUITFULLY PURSUED IN TCC FORUM AND I WILL TRY TO MOVE THANAT'S
THINKING IN THAT DIRECTION UNLESS DEPARTMENT DISAGREES. AT SAME
V
TIME WE WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBILITY HIS SEEKING
A
RESTRICTED SEATO SESSION FOR PURPOSE DISCUSSING ORGANIZATION'S
FUTURE ROLE.
1
GP - 3,
UNGER
NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. QUINN S/S-O.
S
V
A
Reproduced NOT at TO the Richard BE REPRODUCED Nixon Presidential
ibrary
THIS
dogument
has
been
E
and
torbe declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
UNITED
STATE AMERICAN *
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET 485
PAGE 01 BANGKO 03948 011313Z
42
02
ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W
011545
R 011225Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5358
S E C R ET BANGKOK 3948
EXDIS
SUBJECT: SEATO AND TCC MEETINGS
REF: A . STATE 48793: B. STATE 48858
1. DISCUSSED PLANNING FOR MAY MEETINGS AGAIN APRILI 1 WITH
SECRETARY TO FONMIN (BIRABHONGSE). CONVEYED PER PARA 3 REG A
ASSURANCES OF BASIC IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO TCC MEETING AND TO
OPPORTUNTIY IT OFFERS FOR VERY RULG AND FRANK PRIVATE DISCUSSION.
INDICATED THAT PLANNING FOR SECRETARY SCHEDULE NOW ENVISAGES
ARRIVAL IN BANGKOK MAY 19 TO PERMIT BEGINNING BILATERAL TALKS
AND WOULD PERMIT EXTENDING TCC MEETINGS AND ACCOMPANYING SOCIAL
FUNCTIONS THROUGH LUNCHEON MAY 23R
2. BIRA EXPRESSED GREAT PLEASURE WITH THIS NEWS. SINCE WE HAD
BEEN ASKED TO DETERMINE WHETHER SECRETARY WOULD ACCEPT INVITATION
FROM
HIS MAJESTY IF EXTENDED, WE ASSURED BIRA THAT SECRETARY WOULD
ATTEND LUNCHEON WITHIN THIS TIME PERIOD. HE SAID THAT PLANNING
NOT YET DEFINITE, MFA PREFERS AND WILL BE TRYING TO CONFIRM
ROYAL AUDIENCE AND LUNCHEON FOR FRIDAY, MAY 23, BUT THAT TCC
MEETING MAY HAVE TO BE INTERRUPTED ON 22ND FOR THESE FUNCTIONS.
EXCES
3. HAVING IN MIND DEPARTMENT'S THOUGHT OF TELESCOPING SEATO
MEETING, PARA 2, REF As WE INQUIRED WHETHER FURTHER
PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN SCHDULING OF TWO MEETINGS, NOTING
THAT ALTHOUGH DISCUSSION AMONG SEATO COUNCIL RERS HAD ENVISAGED TWO-
DAY AESSION WE WOULD NATURALLY CONSIDER ANY ADJUSTMENT HOST
GOVERNMENT
MIGHT HAVE IN MIND. BIRA SAID ONLY THAT PLANNING NOT VERY FAR AD-
SECRET
11
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
Department of State
ORLING
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 BANGKO 03948 011313Z
VANCED.
4. HE DID HOWEVER,G ON TO REFER ONCE AGAIN TO POSSIBILITY OF
A "SEMI-PUBLIC" TCC SESSION WHICH HE INDICATED MEANT A BRIEF
FINAL SESSION OPEN TO PRESS THOUGH NOT TO THE PUBLIC. WE THEREFORE
EMPHASIZED US BELIEF (REF B) THAT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD SPEAK LARGELY
FOR ITSELF. BIRA ACKNOWLEDGED THIS POINT BUT SAID THERE MIGHT BE SOME
MINISTERS WHO WOULD WISH TO COMMENT ON IT, WE REPLIED THAT PERIOD
OF MEETINGS WOULD CERTAINLY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ANY PARTICI-
PANT TO MEET WITH PRESS IF HE FOUND IT IN HIS AND GROUP'S GENERAL
INTEREST. COMMENT: IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT RTG INTEREST IN SOME
SORT OF PUBLIC SESSION REFLECTS PRESSURE FROM ELSEWHERE AND
THIS PROPOSAL MAY DIE HARD: WE WILL KEEP AFTER IT.) BIRA DID
SAY HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT GVN REP WOULD BE INVITED TO PRESENT
COMMUNIQUE TO THE PRESS, AS AT WELLINGTON, BUT THIS NOT YET
DECIDED.
5. BIRA RECALLED THAT ADMIRAL SHARP HAD GIVEN BRIEFING ON MILITARY
SITUATION AT LAST YEAR'S MEETING AND INQUIRED WHETHER CINCRAC
PLANNING TO PROVIDE THIS BRIEFING AGAIN. ASKED WHETHER RTG WISHED
THIS
AND WHETHER HE BELTEVEDOTHER PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO BIRA INDICATED
THIS WAS A PERSONAL SUGGESTION AT THIS STAGE BUT THAT HE THOUGHT IT
WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AT BEGINNING OF TCC SESSIONS HE SAID HE ASS-
UMED GVN REP WOULD AGAIN BE INVITED TO REVIEW POLITICAL ASPECTS OF
VIETNAM PROBLEM BUT THAT MILITARY PRESENTATION MIGHT APPROPRIATELY
COME FROM US. WE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT HIS INTEREST AND SAID WF FELT
SURE USG WOULD WANT TO MEET WISHES OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS. (COMMENT:
BELIEVE A FORTHRIGHT MILITARY BRIEFING WOULD PROVIDE ONE OF IMPORT-
ANT BENCHMARKS FOR TCC DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMEND ADMIRAL MCCAIN BE
ASKED
TO PROVIDE IT.)
6. COMMENT: I HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY SQUARING OBSERVATION IN PARA 1.0
REF B. THAT ONE DISADVANTAGE OF A PUBLIC SESSION WOULD BE TO DE
TRACT FROM TCC JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH CAUTION IN PARA 3, REF A & CON-
CERNING DOUBTS ABOUT ATTEMPTING TO PREPARE AND ISSUE "A MAJOR
COMMUNIQUE OF SUBSTANCE". ALTHOUGH WE MUST OBVIOUSLY AVOID
PITFALLS OF PREJUDGING OR CONSTRICTING SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN PARIS, I THINK IT QUITE CLEAR THAT A COMMUNIQUE DEVOID OF
SUBSTANCE WILL DEPRIVE THE TCC MEETING OF THE MEANING PARTICIPANTS
WILL SEEK AND OF THE IMPACT WE SHOOLD WISH FOR ON HANOI AND THE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT UNITED STATES STAY OF OF AMERICA STATE #
Department of State
TELEGRAM
EXEMS EXCES
SECRET
PAGE 03 BANGKO 03948 011313Z
WORLD AT LARGE.
7. DEPT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE
GP-3. UNGER
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZED ATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
EXCIS EXAIS EXQIN
SECRET
610
PAGE 01 STATE 073981
2
87
ORIGIN SS: 30
INFO OCT 01,SSO ØØ,NSCE 00,1031 R
66648/66633
DRAFTED BY8 EA/VN: HFMATTHEWS
APPROVED BY8 EA 8 WHSULLIVAN
EA/VN MR BURKEI
C 8 AMB PEDERSEN SUB (COMMUNIQUE IN DRAFT)
St8 THE SECRETARY
S/S: WALKER (COMMUNIQUE IN DRAFT)
122128
0 102144Z MAY 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
SECRE T STATE 073981
EXDIS
SUBU® TCC CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE
A. FOLLOWING IS OUR DRAFT TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE. IT SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED A WORKING DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES
IT HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BUI DIEM WHOSE REACTION WAS THAT IT
SEEMED TO COVER ESSENTIAL POINTS ADEQUATELY, BUT HE THOUGHT
HIS GOVERNMENT MIGHT WISH TO REPHRASE THE HANDLING OF THE
MANILA COMMUNIQUE IN PARAGRAPH 8 ° HE THOUGHT GVN COULD
HAVE ITS COMMENTS READY BY TIME SECRETARY ARRIVES MAY 14.
OUR TREATMENT OF THE NLF TEN-POINT PROGRAM IN PARAGRAPH
10 IS PARTICULARLY TENTATIVE AND FINAL VERSION WILL HAVE
EXPIS
TO DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND MAY 22%
B. BANGKOK AND SAIGON SHOULD NOW PROCEED TO DISCUSS DRAFT
WITH RTG AND GVN AND ASK FOR THEIR SUGGESTIONS AND
CONCURRENCE WERWILL BE DISCUSSING WITH AUSTRALIAN AND
NEW ZEALAND EMBASSIES HERE MAY 12.
Co YOUR COMMENTS ALSO WELCOME. REPEAT ALLI MESSAGES ON
THIS SUBJECT TO CINCPAC TOSEC AFTER 0500 WASHINGTON
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXPIS
UNITED
STATES
OF
SEPRET
PAGE 02 STATE 073981
TIME MAY 11.
Do COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWS:
10 THEI MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA,
MR. GORDON FREETH THEI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
EXQIS
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, MR . KYU HAH CHOI: THE PRIME MINISTER
AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NEW ZEALAND MR ® KEITH
HOLYOAKE THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MR. CARLOS P lo ROMULO 8 THEI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THAILAND's MR o THANAT KHOMAN8 THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM MRIo TRAN CHANHI THANH: AND
THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
MR. WILLIAM P. ROGERS 8 MET IN BANGKOK THE INVITATION
OF THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT's ON 22 AND 23 MAY 1969.
PURPOSES
2% THEI MEETING WAS HELD TO PERMIT THEI MINISTERS TO
CONTINUE THEIR PRACTICE OF REGULAR CONSULTATIONS ON IM-
PORTANT MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST SPECIFICALLY THEY
EXPIS
WISHED (1) TO REVIEW THE CURRENT SITUATION IN VIET-NAM
(2) TO CONSIDER THE PROSPECTS FORI A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF THE CONFLICT, (3) TO DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH THE SEVEN
NATIONS MIGHT STRENGTHEN THEIR EFFORTS TO HELPI THE PEOPLE
OF VIET-NAM (4) TO EXAMINE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN
ASIA. THE PARTICIPANTS RENEWED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE
GOALS OF FREEDOM PROCLAIMED AT MANILA
(A) TO BE FREE FROM AGGRESSION®
(B) TO CONQUER HUNGER ILLITERACY, AND DISEASE B
(C) TO BUILD A REGION OF SECURITY, ORDER, AND PROGRESS
(D) TO seek RECONCILIATION AND PEACE THROUGHOUT
ASIA ANDI THE PACIFIC
SITUATION IN VIET-NAM
30 THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
EXQIN
DESCRIBED THE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN HIS
COUNTRY OVER THE PAST YEAR. HE NOTED THE SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUCH AS THE SUPREME
COURT, CALLED FOR BY THE VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION. HE ALSO
EXPLAINED THE CURRENT EFFORTS OF VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS
TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES POLITICALLY TO FURTHER THEIR COMMON
GOALS. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION AT THE
SECRET
Reproduceda the Richard RODUCED WHITH QU document hALbeen ORIZATION tofo. TibbE6 denassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
EXCIS EXQIS
STATES
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 073981
CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF VIETNAMESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
40 THE MINISTER ALSO OUTLINED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO IMPROVE
THE LOT OF HIS COUNTRYMEN ECONOMICALLY AND TO BRING THEM
GREATER SOCIAL BENEFITS, MAKING PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO HIS
GOVERNMENT'S LAND REFORM PROGRAM HE DESCRIBED THE INCREASED
AUTONOMY AND FINANCIALI RESOURCES GIVEN TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
TO FOSTER A FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE
PEOPLE.
5% THE MINISTERS HEARD AN ELOQUENT STATEMENT BY THE VIETNAMESE
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE ON THE PART OF
HIS COUNTRYMEN AFTER so MANY YEARS OF WAR. THEY ENDORSED THE
REASONABLE NATURE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT THIEU ON
MARCH 25 AND APRIL 7 AND WELCOMED THIS EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD
FAITH AND RESPONSIVENESS THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM THE
MINISTERS NOTED THAT INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES WERE A MATTER
FOR DETERMINATION BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND WELCOMED
THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHI VIET-NAMI TO TALK TO
THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT ABOUT THESE ISSUES.
6. THE MINISTERS RECEIVED A BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION
FROM VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN MILITARY COMMANDERS AND WERE
ENCOURAGED AT THE PROGRESS BEING MADE BY ALLIED FORCES AND
THEI INCREASING DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE OTHER SIDE.
THEY ENDORSED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE
THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND WELCOMED THEIR DETERMINATION
TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE DEFENSE OF THEIR
HOMELAND THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR ADMIRATION AND GRATTTUDE
FOR THE COURAGE AND DEVOTION OF THE ALLIED SOLDIERS ON
THE BATTLEFIELD
7 ° THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THEIR FORCES WERE IN VIETNAM TO
EXPIS
HELP DEFEND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AGAINST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION
THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO ASSURE THAT THE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT OF SELF-
DETERMINATION, AND ARE ABLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT
EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE THE MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS
RENEWED THEIR DETERMINATION TO HELP THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
DEFENDI THEMSELVES AGAINST AGGRESSION BY ARMED ATTACK AND ACCORDINGLY
TO CONTINUE THEIR SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAM THEY DECIDED TO
RELATE THIS SUPPORT TO THE PROGRESS OF THE PARIS PEACE TALKS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
leproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SEPRET
PAGE 04 STATE 073981
THE LEVELII OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS BY THE ENEMY ANDI THE READINESS
OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES TO REPLACE THEM.
EFFORTS FOR PEACE
8. THE MINISTERS ALSO REVIEWED THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE IN PARIS AND ENDORSED THE PROPOSALS
WHICH HAD BEEN MADE THERE BY THE GOVTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES. THEY NOTED AND APPROVED THE
EXSIS EXQIN
INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE
DEALING WITH MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED AND NORTH VIETNAMESE
FORCES IN THE FORM TABLEDI THERE BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND
U.S. DELEGATIONS. THEY AGREED WITH ITS SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
THAT THESE WITHDRAWALS COULD COMMENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY, THAT ALL
EXTERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN NOT
ONLY FROM SOUTH VIETNAM BUT ALSO FROM THE SANCTUARIES IN LAOS
AND CAMBODIA AND ALONG THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, AND THAT A CLEAR
NEED EXISTED FOR ADEQUATEI VERIFICATION OF BOTH THE WITHDRAWAL
OF FORCES AND THE CESSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF
NEW FORCES.
9% THE MINISTERS ALSO ENDORSED THE AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE
PROPOSALS FOR OBSERVANCE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, THE
RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA.
10. THEY EXAMINED THEI PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED
IN PARIS BY THE OTHER SIDE. THEY REGRET THAT IT STILLI APPEARS
TO BEI THEIR OBJECTIVE TO IMPOSE UPON SOUTHI VIETNAM A PROGRAM
AND A SYSTEM WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF THE OVERWHELMING
MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE THEY AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT ALLI
POSSIBILITIES LEADING TO PEACE AND NATIONALI RECONCILIATION
SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY EXPLORED, AND ENDORSED THE EFFORTS OF THE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS IN THIS DIRECTION.
POST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES
11. THE MINISTERS: DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION
TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM
AFTERI THE CESSATION OFI HOSTILITIES. THEY NOTED IN THIS REGARD
THEI GREAT POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC ANDI SOCIAL PROGRESS ENVISIONED
BY THE RECENTLY-RELEASED JOINT DEVELOPMENT GROUP REPORT PREPARED
SECRET
Reproduced NOT TO at BE the REPRODUCEDWITHOUT documentAl determined to classified.
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE #
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
EXEIS EXAIS
SECRET
PAGE 05 STATE 073981
AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
GOVTS THEY EXPRESSED THEIR AGREEMENT TO CONSULT CLOSEL ON
THE BROAD QUESTION OF ASSISTING THE VIETNAMESE TO ACHIEVE THE
BRIGHT FUTURE THEIR SACRIFICES HAVE EARNED. THEY EXPRESSED
THE HOPE THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL SEE ADVANTAGES IN LIVING IN
PEACEFUL COOPERATION AND FRIENDLY HARMONY WITH ITS NEIGHBORS:
AND THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXISTING
FRAMEWORK OF REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS OWN
PEOPLE AND FOR THE PROGRESS OF SOUTH EAST ASIA AS A WHOLE.
120 THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN ASIA
SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN A
GUARANTEE OF PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD.
THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES MUST
SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE WELL-BEING
AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIBILITY THAT MIGHT WELL
BEGINI WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF THE DUTY OF PEACE-KEEPING
IN VIETNAM, AND PERHAPS IN LAOS: AND CAMBODIA, POSSIBLY UNDER
THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. AGAIN CLOSEST
CONSULTATION AMONG THEM WOULD BE BENEFICIALI IN THIS CONNECTION
KOREA
130 THE MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GAVE
AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONTINUING AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA PERPETRATED BY NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST ARMED
RAIDERS. THE MINISTERS RECORDED THEIR CONCERN OVER THESE
DEVELOPMENTS. THEY AFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC
OF KOREA IN RESISTING SUCH AGGRESSION AND UNDERTOOK TO KEEP
IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS SITUATION
CONCLUSION
EXQIS
146 THE MINISTERSI OF THE SEVEN NATIONS PLEDGED THEIR CONTINUED
SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND SPECIFICALLY TO PRESERVE
THETUNCONDITIONAL RIGHT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DECIDE
THEIR OWN DESTINY WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE® THE MINISTERS
STATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS IN SUPPORT
OF THIS GOAL WHILE PURSUING WITH EQUAL INSISTENCE A JUST AND
PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT THROUGHI THE NEGOTIATIONS
IN PARIS. FINALLY, THE MINISTERS AGREED TO CONTINUE THE CLOSE
COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION WHICH HAS EXISTED AMONG THE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED DIPARTMENT * STA OR OF AMERICA STATE #
Department of State
TELEGRAM
TBS
SECRET
PAGE 06 STATE 073981
SEVENI NATIONS. GP - 4 - ROGERS:
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS EXQIS
SECRET
Reproduced Richard Nixon Presidentiel-brary. This dogument been reviewed PZATION THE has been determined to be declassified
Hary
OF STATE
*
Department of State
GILINO
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET 051
PAGE 01 STATE 068534
81
02
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO OCT 01,SSO 00, NSCE 00,/031 R
66642
DRAFTED BY:EA/VN:HFMATTHEWS
APPROVED BY:EA/WHSULLIVAN
C-MR PEDERSEN PHONE
EA/VN: MR BURKE
EA/RA8 MR CLARK PARA 2
S/S WSSHEPARD
066664
S
0 020029Z MAY 69 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
SECR E T STATE 068534
EXDIS:
SUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE
REF: BANGKOK 5304
10 WITH REGARD TO POINT RAISED PARA Tho REFTEL, WE WOULD PLAN
TO LET YOU KNOW OF ANY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THINKING THAT
S
EITHER WE OR VIETNAMESE HAVE WITH THAI IDEAS. DO THAI PLAN TO
GIVE US DRAFT IN ADVANCE? IF SO, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE
FORTHCOMING VERY SOON FOR US TO BE ABLE TO CONSULT
ON ACTUAL LANGUAGE CHANGES BEFORE ARRIVAL BANGKOK. WE WANT TO
NARROW DIFFERENCES IN THINKING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BEFORE
MEETINGS BEGIN IN BANGKOK, BUT IT MAY WELL BE THAT DRAFTS
WILL BE PROPOSED BY SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN LATTER EVENT WE WILL
HAVE TO TRY TO MARRY THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS, AND HOPE THAT THE
PRODUCT OF THIS SHOTGJN WEDDING WILL E.E A LITTLE HANDSOMER
THAN THE ONE LAST YEAR FROM WELLINGTON.
2. WE CONCUR WITH YOUR PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION IN PARA THREE
GP - 3, ROGERS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
W Id
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
7
CONTROL: 6833Q
P 290525Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
APR. 29, 1969
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3730
2:50 A.M.
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRE T CANBERRA 2286
NODIS
REF: STATE 62693
SUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE
1. CONCUR STATEMENT REFTEL THAT AUSTRALIA PREPARED
LIVE WITH SOME REDUCTION IN US FORCES IN VIETNAM
WHILE RETAINING ITS FORCES AT PRESENT LEVEL. PRIME
MINISTER, DEFENCE MINISTER AND ARMY MINISTER HAVE
SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY (CANBERRA 1996, 2035 AND 2136).
THEIR POSITION IS THAT PRESENT AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN
VIETNAM ARE WELL-BALANCED UNIT AND ANY REDUCTION
WOULD MATERIALLY REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS. ALSO THAT,
IN ANY CASE, TOTAL NUMBERS ARE SMALL IN COMPARISON
OTHER CONTRIBUTING POWERS.
2. GOA OFFICIALS HAVE NOT INDICATED EXTENT THEIR
INTEREST IN SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE, BUT GOA CLEARLY
PLACES FAR MORE IMPORTANCE ON GORTON VISIT TO
WASHINGTON WHICH PRECEDES SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE
BY ABOUT TWO WEEKS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY
WILL NOT EXPECT TO LEARN ANYTHING NEW FROM US AND
THEY CERTAINLY WILL HAVE NOTHING OF IMPORTANCE TO
TELL US OR OTHERS THAT WASN'T ALREADY THOROUGHLY
COVERED IN WASHINGTON TALKS. FREETH, WHO WILL HEAD
GOA DELEGATION, IS NOT PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL AND IS
STILL PRETTY GREEN TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO AND
WE DOUBT HE WILL PLAY VERY ACTIVE ROLE. PLIMSOLL,
WHO WILL BE TRAVELING TO WASHINGTON WITH GORTON, TOLD
CHARGE HE HOPES TO AVOID TCC MEETING AND SEND SOMEONE
ELSE FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS PERHAPS
INDICATIVE OF DEGREE OF GOA INTEREST IN FORTHCOMING
MEETING.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
PAGE TWO, CANBERRA 2286, CONTROL 6833Q
3. ALTHOUGH GOA IS UNLIKELY TAKE ANY INITIATIVE AT
MEETING, IT WILL DEFINITELY WISH TO KNOW IN ADVANCE
WHAT WE PLAN TO SAY AND WHAT WE HOPE WILL COME OUT OF
MEETING. WE BELIEVE THEY EXPECT THAT QUESTION OF TROOP
WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE MAJOR SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION (IN
WHICH, APART FROM OUR SPECIAL SITUATION, THEY WOULD
URGE OTHERS TO HOLD THE LINE) AND THAT DETAILED
BRIEFING PARIS TALKS WOULD BE GIVEN BY US AND GVN
REPRESENTATIVES. THEY MAY ALSO WISH TO GET INTO
SUBJECTS OF POST-VIETNAM PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION,
DISCUSSION OF INSURGENCY IN. THAILAND AND LAOS, AND
POSTWAR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. GOA WILL WISH
TO HAVE A STRONG JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT DEMONSTRATES
FIRM SOLIDARITY AND INTENT ALL TCC'S TO STAND BY
BASIC OBJECTIVE. CRONK
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
418
PAGE 01 MANILA 05021 160755Z
2
11
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
025658
PR 160703Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 5121
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 8831
SECRET T MANILA 5021
EXDIS:
SUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCEI 9 WITHDRAWAL PAPER
REF: SAIGON 9433 (SECTO 17)
1. TEXT WITHDRAWAL PAPER DELIVERED BY CHARGE PERSONALLY
TO LE HUY NAM, TEMPORARILY IN CHARGE GVN EMBASSY, AT
NOON TODAY. (MINISTER LOC, REGULAR GVN CHARGE, IS OUT
OF TOWN).
2. NAM HAD JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM SAIGON
RELATIVE TO PRESENTATION TO ROMULO, WHICH CORRESPONDED
WITH OURS, AND WAS SEEKING APPOINTMENT WITH ROMULO TO
EFFECT DELIVERY PRIOR TO ROMULO'S DEPARTURE TOMORROW
AFTERNOON, MAY 17, FOR BANGKOK.
3. CHARGE OFFERED TO BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE IF DIFFICULTIES
ENCOUNTERED IN SEEING ROMULO.TOOK OCCASION TO STRESS
AGAIN HIGHLY SENSITIVE NATURE OF PAPER. WILSON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THESAUTHORIZ ATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DIPARTMENT UF STATE
stay
HAR 7
Department of State
UNITED STATES OR AMERICA
TELEGRAM
R 240647Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
SECRET
Q
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8394
STATE GRNC
5 6 8 3Q
BT
1.969 APR 24 AM 3:03
SECRE T MANILA 4156
NODIS
SUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE
REF: STATE 62693
1. GOP THUS FAR HAS CONCENTRATED ON SEATO ASPECTS OF
FORTHCOMING BANGKOK MEETING AND WE HAVE SEEN NO INDICATION
OF SPECIAL PREPARATION FOR TCC. AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT
PHILIPPINES WILL BE INTERESTED IN TROOPS WITHDRAWAL,
PARIS NEGOTIOTIONS, AND MILITARY SITUATION (IN THAT
ORDER).
2. WITH ELECTION NOW SIX MONTHS AWAY MARCOS
JUDGES
EVERYTHING IN TERMS OF ITS EFFECT ON HIS REELECTION
CHANCES. BELIEVE IT LIKELY HE HAS DECIDED THAT IN
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT PHILIPPINE PARTICIPATION
IN VIETNAM COULD HURT HIM BUT CANNOT HELP HIM. THE
LESS ATTENTION THEREFORE TO PHILCAG THE BETTER. TROOP
WITHDRAWALS ARE FOR THIS REASON PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE.
3. AT THE SAME TIME MARCOS SEES LONGER RANGE BENEFITS
TO THE PHILIPPINES FROM A CONTINUING PRESENCE IN VIETNAM
(MANILA 3106) AND RECOGNIZES THAT A PRECIPITATE WITH-
DRAWAL OF PHILCAG MIGHT PRODUCE A NEGATIVE US RESPONSE
THAT COULD HURT HIS ELECTION CHANCES. THEREFORE, UNLESS
THERE IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH AT PARIS AND A MAJOR
REDUCTION OF BOTH US AND ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM,
BELIEVE MARCOS WILL TRY TO STICK IT OUT WITH PHILCAG,
AT LEAST UNTIL NOVEMBER.
4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ROMULO WILL PROBABLY BE
INSTRUCTED TO LIE LOW AT THE TCC, GET AS SHARP A LINE
AS HE CAN ON US INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY ANY INDICATIONS
OF US POLICY TOWARDS MAINTAINING A FUTURE POSITION OF
STRENGTH IN ASIA, AND WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION
THAT WOULD DRAW PHILIPPINE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO CONTINUED
PRESENCE OF PHILCAG.
WILSON
BT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been SECRET Irsuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT UP STATE
WH
7
Department of State
of STATES the AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
R 240647Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
SECRET
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8394
STATE GRNC
5683Q
BT
1969 APR 24 AM 3:03
SECRETMANILA4156
NODIS
SUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE
REF: STATE 62693
1. GOP THUS FAR HAS CONCENTRATED ON SEATO ASPECTS OF
FORTHCOMING BANGKOK MEETING AND WE HAVE SEEN NO INDICATION
OF SPECIAL PREPARATION FOR TCC. AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT
PHILIPPINES WILL BE INTERESTED IN TROOPS WITHDRAWAL,
PARIS NEGOTIOTIONS, AND MILITARY SITUATION (IN THAT
ORDER).
2. WITH ELECTION NOW SIX MONTHS AWAY MARCOS
JUDGES
EVERYTHING IN TERMS OF ITS EFFECT ON HIS REELECTION
CHANCES. BELIEVE IT LIKELY HE HAS DECIDED THAT IN
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT PHILIPPINE PARTICIPATION
IN VIETNAM COULD HURT HIM BUT CANNOT HELP HIM. THE
LESS ATTENTION THEREFORE TO PHILCAG THE BETTER. TROOP
WITHDRAWALS ARE FOR THIS REASON PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE.
3. AT THE SAME TIME MARCOS SEES LONGER RANGE BENEFITS
TO THE PHILIPPINES FROM A CONTINUING PRESENCE IN VIETNAM
(MANILA 3106) AND RECOGNIZES THAT A PRECIPITATE WITH-
DRAWAL OF PHILCAG MIGHT PRODUCE A NEGATIVE US RESPONSE
THAT COULD HURT HIS ELECTION CHANCES. THEREFORE, UNLESS
THERE IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH AT PARIS AND A MAJOR
REDUCTION OF BOTH US AND ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM,
BELIEVE MARCOS WILL TRY TO STICK IT OUT WITH PHILCAG,
AT LEAST UNTIL NOVEMBER.
4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ROMULO WILL PROBABLY BE
INSTRUCTED TO LIE LOW AT THE TCC, GET AS SHARP A LINE
AS HE CAN ON US INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY ANY INDICATIONS
OF US POLICY TOWARDS MAINTAINING A FUTURE POSITION OF
STRENGTH IN ASIA, AND WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION
THAT WOULD DRAW PHILIPPINE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO CONTINUED
PRESENCE OF PHILCAG.
WILSON
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED DIPARTMENT STATES OF AUTHORIZED STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 099
PAGE 01 SEOUL 02532 160410Z
2
12
ACTION SS 30
INFO OCT 01/031 W
024441
PR 160345Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 6291
S E CRR E T SEOUL 2532
EXDIS
SUBJ: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE - WITHDRAWAL PAPER
REF: SAIGON 9433
TEXT OF THE PAPER HANDED TO VIETNAMESE CHARGE,
SEOUL, ON MAY 16. CHARGE ADVISED HE HAS JUST RECEIVED
HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND IS REQUESTING APPOINTMENT
EXCES EXCES
FOREIGN MINISTER CHOE TO DELIVER TEXT, GP-4
PORTER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMINT
OF
STATE
WH
7
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
R 251000Z APR 69
SECRET
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5950
60690
STATE GRNC
BT
1969 APR 25 AM 5:47
SECRET SEOUL 2110
NODIS
SUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE
REF: STATE 062693
1. WE BELIEVE THAT ROKG, LIKE OTHERS ATTENDING, ATTACHES
CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE BOTH FOR
REASONS GIVEN REFTEL AND BECAUSE CONFERENCE PROVIDES GOOD
OPPORTUNITY FOR ROKG TO PUSH ITS IDEAS ON SEVERAL ADDITIONAL
MATTERS AS WELL AS TO OBTAIN US AND OTHER REACTIONS TO THEM.
FOR ROKG VIEWS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL SEE SEOUL 2033 (LIMDIS)
WHICH CROSSED WITH REFTEL.
2. AMONG OTHER SUBJECTS WHICH ROKG OFFICIALS PROBABLY PLANNING
TO DISCUSS WITH US AND OTHER NATIONS ARE:
A) ROK VIEWS ON IMPORTANCE OF US KEEPING UNRESTRICTED USE OF
OKINAWA BASES.
B) ROK PATO CONCEPT WITH WHICH DEPARTMENT ALREADY FAMILIAR.
C) US INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO ITS SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN
EAST ASIA AND SPECIFICALLY IN REGARD TO KOREA.
D) OUR PLANS FOR VIETNAM IN ADDITION TO PARIS TALKS AND
TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND REACTION OF SVN AND OTHER NATIONS TO
THESE PLANS.
E) ROKS MAY TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PLUG WITH US THEIR NEED
FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
3. ROKG PROBABLY HOPES THAT FINAL COMMUNIQUE WILL CONTAIN SPECIFIC
REAFFIRMATION OF MANILA COMMUNIQUE, INCLUDING FULL CONSULTATION,
AND PERHAPS A GENERAL REAFFIRMATION OF US INTENTION MAINTAIN
ITS SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN AREA.
GP-3 PORTER
BT
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMANT UP STATE
W H ?
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
R 240615Z APR 69
CONTROL : 5677Q
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
RECEIVED : APR 24, 1969
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2393
2AM
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRE T WELLINGTON 696
NODIS
DEPARTMENT DISTRIBUTE AS DESIRED
SUBJ: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE
REFS: (A) STATE 62693
(B) WELLINGTON 642
(C) WELLINGTON 575
(D) WELLINGTON 336
1. ALTHOUGH GNZ STILL STEWING OVER LEVEL OF REPRESENTA-
TION AT SEATO-TCC SESSIONS IN BANGKOK, AND NO FIRM INDICA-
TION YET AS TO WHETHER PM HOLYOAKE WILL ATTEND, IT IS QUITE
CLEAR FROM CONVERSATION WITH EXTAFF OFFICIALS FROM TOP ON
DOWN THAT THEY REGARD TCC PORTION OF MEETING AS FAR MORE
IMPORTANT THAN SEATO PORTION.
2. WHILE NO RPT NO INDICATION THAT GNZ NOW CONSIDERING
REDUCTION IN NZ UNIT IN VIETNAM, REDUCTION IN U.S. FORCES
WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY CAUSE THIS QUESTION TO BE RAISED
BY ANTI-VIETNAM GROUPS IN NZ. FURTHER, IF LABOUR PARTY
SHOULD WIN NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, WITHDRAWAL OF NZ CONTINGENT
WOULD BECOME STRONG LIKELIHOOD REGARDLESS OF WHAT ACTION
U.S. TAKES.
3. RE LAST SENTENCE REF A, EMBASSY BELIEVES IT WOULD BE
USEFUL TO PURSUE THESE MATTERS FURTHER WITH GNZ. HAVING
IN MIND FIRST SENTENCE PARA 3, REF A, DOES DEPARTMENT
PERCEIVE OBJECTION TO OUR DOING SO?
GP-1. HENNING
BT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This documsecret reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.