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Saunders Memoranda - Sensitive Egypt/Hafez Ismail 1973 [1 of 5]
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Saunders Memoranda - Sensitive Egypt/Hafez Ismail 1973 [1 of 5]
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
LA
cable
Eilts to Scowcroft 2 jays.
4/24/74
B
REVIEW
REQUEST NLN 03-01/3
SANITIZED
per sec. 3.3 (6)(1)6) 2012958 Hr. AUG 2 6 2003 2
SANITIZED
PER
RAC REVIEW
1/29/2009
2
memo
HAK to Acting DCI 2 for
n.d.
REQUEST NLN 03/01/41
SANITIZED
per sec. 3.3 (b)(1) E012958 Hr. AUG
2 6 2003
3A
memo
HAK to the President 3 pro
n.d.
B
MANDATORY REVIEW
REQUEST NLN 03/01/5
per Sec. 3.3 (6)(1)(6)E012958 Hr.
AUG
2 6 2003
SANITIZED
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC FOLDER Files, TITLE HAK Office File, ,CountryFile, ME
130
3
Saunders Memoranda RESTRICTION CODES Sansitive Egypt/Hafez Ismail
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION DECLASSIFIED GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 14
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DOCUMENT withdrawal RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
LA
cable
Eilts to Scowcroft 2 jays.
MARDATORE
4/24/74
B
REVIEW
REQUEST NLN 03-01/3
SANITIZED per sec. 3.3 (6)(1)(6) 2012958 Hr. AUG
2 6 2003
2
memo
HAK to Acting D.C. 2 jess
n.d.
B
SANDAY
REQUEST NLN 03/01/41
SANITIZED
per sec. 3.3 (b)(1)(b) EO 12958 Hr. AUG
2 6 2003
3A
memo
HAK to the President 3 pr
n.d.
MANDATORY
B
REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03/01/5
SANITIZED per Sec. 3.3 (6)(1)(6)E012958 Hr. AUG
2 6 2003
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC FOLDER Files, TITLE HAK Office File, ,CountryFile, mE
130
Saunders Memoranda RESTRICTION CODES Sansitive Egypt/Hafez Ismail 1973
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
DECLASSIFIED 1989-235-084/00024
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
1A
cable
Eilts to Scowcroft 2 pass.
MANDATORY
4/24/74
B
REVIEW
REQUEST NLN 03-01/3
2
memo
HAK to Acting DCI 2 per
n.d.
B
HANDAN
REQUEST NLN 03/01/41
3A
memo
HAK to the President 3 pro
n.d.
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03/01/5
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
HAK
130
FOLDER TITLE
3
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMI Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library -084/00024
DECLASSIFIED
NA 14021 (4-85)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
IA
cable
Eilts to Scowcroft
4/24/74
B
2
memo
HAK to Acting DCI
n.d.
B
3A
memo
HAK to the President
n.d.
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
HAK
130
FOLDER TITLE
3
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S.GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Agreement
B. Heads of
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
B
SECRET (XGDS)
PRINCIPLES OF AGREEMENT
The governments of Egypt and Israel accept the following principles
and affirm their intention to conclude a peace agreement between them
putting these principles into effect:
1. The objective of the agreement is to establish a state of peace
between Egypt and Israel which will provide a basis for the
normalization of relations over time. The obligations of each side
in a state of peace will be specified in the agreement.
-Israel's position: Will press for formal peace treaty affirming
Israel's legitimate right to exist within recognized borders; will
demand recognition and normalization of relations at outset of
agreement.
Egypt's position: Will try to limit scope of agreement to
ending the formal state of war, stopping short of full normalization
of relations, The Egyptians would probably agree to a state of
peace which would allow Israel free passage through the Straits of
Tiran and the Suez Canal; end the boycott on third-party goods;
commit Egypt to prevent hostile operations from Egyptian soil and
elsewhere to the extent possible; commit each side to non-inter-
vention in each other's internal affairs, e.g. by radio; end Egypt's
practice of adding a reservation clause when it signs multilateral
agreements, saying they do not apply to Israel. This agreement
would not include exchanging ambassadors, trade, or opening
borders' for routine travel. Those steps would characterize later
normalization.
Negotiating issues: The objective here would be to gain Egyptian
agreement to a process of normalization of relations as a stated
objective of the signatories. There are two reasons for seeking
this commitment: (a) It would help meet the Israeli argument
that the Arabs do not want full peace. (b) It would define a long
transitional period to an agreed objective during which special
security arrangements might be justified.
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET (XGDS)
- 2 -
2. The state of peace will become effective with the signing
of the full agreement.
Israel's position: Signature of agreement should lead
immediately to recognition, end of boycott and all acts
associated with state of belligerence.
Egypt's position: Recognition, end of boycott, free
transit in Suez Canal will all be contingent upon stages
of Israeli withdrawal, not on signature of agreement.
Negotiating issues: Discussions with the USSR in 1969,
of which the Egyptians were aware, reached the point
where lawyers were trying to make a distinction between
de facto peace (which might come into effect when an
agreement is signed) and de jure peace (which would come
into effect at the completion of withdrawal). It would be
preferable, if possible, to avoid this kind of technical
distinction. This might be more possible than in the past
if attention is shifted from "withdrawal" to "restoration of
sovereignty. " There are two possible approaches:
-Return to the position that the state of wa ends
with signature of the agreement. If the agreement
includes concrete obligations in a state of peace and
a commitment on borders, the argument could be
made that peace is in effect and execution should be
subject to periodic reviews as new phases begin.
--A fallback would be to make peace obligations
effective when Egypt reasserts its sovereignty in the
Sinai by resuming civil authority. Israeli troops
meanwhile would have pulled back or regrouped as
part of new security arrangements.
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET (XGDS)
- 3 -
3. Egyptian sovereignty will be restored in the Sinai Peninsula.
- -Israel's position: Sovereignty must be defined in minimal
terms, allowing at most a civilian presence, but not Egyptian
military installations or major constraints on remaining
Israeli or international forces. In additión, some permanent
border changes must occur which will exempt specified areas
from Egyptian sovereignty.
- Egypt's position: Sovereignty must be given full scope
within all formerly Egyptian territory. The only restrictions
on sovereignty will involve demilitarized areas and stationing
of international peacekeeping forces at designated areas.
- Negotiating issue: It would be a major decision for the
Israelis to accept this principle, but it should be a shade less
difficult because the issue is now "restoration of sovereignty"
rather than "withdrawal. 11 This permits trying to separate
the issues of security and final borders. The objective would
be to introduce into Egyptian thinking maximum flexibility
about the kinds. of transitional security arrangements that a
sovereign Egypt might agree to.
This, of course, is the central issue. A basic question is whether to try
an alternative formulation that would be based on the assumption that Israel
will not accept restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai, at least not now.
The disadvantages of any such formulation are (a) that Egypt would not be
satisfied and (b) any weaker formulation becomes another exercise in
semantics for papering over the real territorial issue, and a negotiation
will quickly deadlock over that issue. However, just for consideration, less
categorical formulations might be:
The agreement will provide a schedule for the [early] restor-
ation of sovèreign Egyptian civil authority in the Sinai.
- --An objective of the agreement will be to establish a relation-
ship between Egypt and Israel that will lead to restoration of
Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai.
--An objective of the agreement will be to describe transitional
arrangements leading toward restoration of Egyptian sovereignty
in the Sinai.
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET (XGDS)
- 4 -
4. Withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula will be
phased over an agreed period.
- -Israel's position: Period of phasing must be long (10-20 years);
Israel must remain in control of key areas until late in the period;
each stage of withdrawal will be dependent upon full observance
of agreement in prior period.
- Egypt's position: Period of withdrawal should be short (under
one year) and Israeli withdrawal should take place according to
a fixed timetable.
- - Negotiating issues: The problem is to find a way in which the
restoration of Egyptian sovereignty and some of its symbols might
be restored relatively promptly while the actual "withdrawal" of
Israeli troops performing specified security duties might be
phased over a prolonged period. An illustrative plan might identify
three categories of Israeli military installations in various parts
of Sinai. After three years those in category one would be removed,
provided that all parts of the peace agreement were being implemented
in good faith by the Egyptians. After seven more years, installa-
tions in category two would be abandoned. Finally, after another
five years, the remaining installations would be turned over to an
international force, including both Egyptian and Israeli contingents.
The location the installations in the three categories could be
arranged. to leave the Israelis close to the Canal, at Sharm al
Shaykh and at the Bir Gafgafa base until the last phase.
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET (XGDS)
- 5 -
5. The Sinai Peninsula will become a buffer between Egypt and
Israel, with designated demilitarized regions. Each party, along
with international forces, will have specified rights and responsi-
bilities for keeping the peace and guaranteeing the demilitarized
areas. The type, level and location of armaments within the
Sinai Peninsula will be specified in the agreement.
--Israel's position: Israel will resist the introduction of any
Egyptian armed forces across the Canal and will seek to circum-
scribe the functions of international forces. A prominent role
for Israeli military forces will be required.
-Egypt's position: The areas subject to demilitarization should
be small, preferably located on both sides of the old international
frontier. Egyptian forces must be allowed across the Canal, to
be deployed in an area at least up to the passes east of the Canal.
Israeli units will only be acceptable as part of a broader peace-
keeping force.
Negotiating issue: The objective would be to provide a nominal
international umbrella to satisfy Egyptian requirements, while
preserving direct Israeli involvement in enforcing demilitarization
and assuring security. Some of the possible means include:
--colocation of Israeli and international forces at the Canal
and at Sharm al-Shaykh;
--designation of demilitarized areas, to be monitored by
sensors and mixed Egyptian-Israeli patrols under an inter-
national cover;
--open skies for reconnaisance by Egypt and Israel over
all parts of Sinai;
--establishment of early warning lines on both sides of the
Sinai, with Egyptians close to Israel and Israelis near the
Canal.
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET (XGDS)
- 6 -
6. The Suez Canal will be open to ships of all nations from the
time it is reopened following the signing of a peace agreement.
-Israel's position: As soon as the first ships pass through
the Canal following its reopening, Israel must have the right
to use the Canal.
Egypt's position: Israel's right to use the Canal cannot be
exercised until Israeli troops have withdrawn and the Pales-
tinian refugees have been offered the choice of resettlement
with compensation or repatriation.
Negotiating issue: Egypt's acceptance of Israel's early
use of the Canal will be attained more readily if Israel will
simultaneously agree to some principle of compensation or
repatriation of the Palestinian refugees. A second issue will
be what guarantees can be worked into an agreement to prevent
the interruption of legitimate Israeli traffic in the Canal. One
possibility would be to extend Israel's right to retain military
garrisons in Sinai by the amount of time Israel is prevented
from using the Canal after its reopening. Egypt will try to
introduce the provisions of the Constantinople Convention of
1888 which allow for the closure of the Canal under some
circumstances.
SECRET (XGDS) Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET (XGDS)
- 7 -
7. The principle of free passage for shipping in the international
waterways of the Strait of Tiran is affirmed. To guarantee free
passage, an international force with Israeli participation will be
stationed at Sharm al-Shaykh.
--Israel's position: In addition to the Strait of Tiran,
Bab al-Mandab at the southern entrance to the Red Sea
should be declared international waters. Israel must be
allowed to retain its own military presence at Sharm al-Shaykh.
- Egypt's position: No Israeli forces should be stationed
at Sharm al-Shaykh except as part of an international presence,
if then. Egypt would prefer leaving Sharm al-Shaykh free
of all forces.
- Negotiating issue: It may be useful to think of internationalizing,
at least regionally, the means of guaranteeing free passage.
One possibility would be a convention on shipping in the Red
Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba that would involve not only Egypt and
Israel, but also Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Yemen.
A prime objective would be to gain agreement from all riparians
that both the Strait of Tiran and Bab al-Mandab constitute
international waterways.
SECRET(XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET (XGDS)
- 8 -
8. Guarantees of the agreement by the major powers will
be welcome.
- -Israel's position: Only a bilateral security arrangement
with the United States will be seen as valuable.
-- Egypt's position: Egypt will welcome a four-power or
UN guarantee of any settlement.
-- Negotiating issue: It should be possible to develop several
levels of guarantees, from a general and vague UN or inter-
national guarant ee to a specific US-Israeli agreement, duly
ratified by the Senate.
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET (XGDS)
- 9 -
9. During a period of transition to normal relations, the two
governments may agree to special security arrangements.
-- Israel's position: Such arrangements should provide
for a sizable Israeli military presence at designated points
in Sinai over a prolonged period.
-- Egypt's position: Any such arrangements should be
brief in duration and subject to a timetable for withdrawal
of all Israeli forces.
Negotiating issue: The key element here will be to gain
Egyptian acceptance of the idea of a fairly long period during
which Israel would retain some military units in critical areas.
A second important principle to establish is that Israeli
relinquishment of military outposts will not be automatic,
but rather that it will depend upon adherence to all elements
of the peace agreement. This concession on Egypt's part
will be tied to Israel's concession to acknowledge Egyptian
sovereignty in Sinai.
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C. Security
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
May 17, 1972
EGYPT - ISRAEL
A framework for a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel could be developed
around the following elements, in addition to the general terms of peace:
--reaffirmation of Egyptian authority over the Sinai and civil authority there
.-demilitarization of the Sinai with effective early warning facilities under
a UN force with Egyptian and Israeli participation;
--assurance of passage through the Straits of Tiran in the context of Sinai
demilitarization.
The instrument for overseeing this arrangement could be a Sinai Demilitarization
Commission established by the UN Security Council and headquartered at a place
such as al Arish.
The Commission could have three members: a UN Chairman and one
representative each of Egypt and Israel. Its character would be changed
only by Security Council vote.
The Commission could have two functions: (1) It could provide a forum
for discussion of violations and referral to the governments of Egypt and
Israel for negotiation and to the Security Council if hostilities threatened.
(2) It could administer the two observer forces described below.
--The basic agreement might define the conditions under which forces
would be redeployed into the Sinai in response to violation.
Under the Sinai Demilitarization Commission, there would be two observer forces
one with responsibility for demilitarization in the Sinai; the other with respon-
sibility for maritime passage through the Straits of Tiran.
The Sinai Observer Force, headquartered at a place in the central Sinai like
Bir Hassanah, would consist of UN, Egyptian and Israeli personnel in equal
numbers under UN command. The mission of the force would be to give
Egyptians and Israelis continuing confirmation of adherence to the demilitarizatio
agreement and early warning of violation. To facilitate carrying out this mission
the Sinai would be divided into three zones--two early warning zones and a centra
administrative zone. More concretely, this might be worked out as follows:
-One zone might be defined roughly by a line from al Arish to the Gulf
of Aqaba parallel to the international border. This could be more
precisely defined to conform to topography. In this zone, Egyptian and
UN personnel would man radar, sensor and patrol facilities. A support
base would be located as convenient.
--A second zone might be defined roughly by a line running parallel to
the Suez Canal through the high ground and passes in the Sinai east of the
Canal. In this zone, Isracli and UN personnel would man radar, sensor
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 2 -
and patrol facilities. A support base would be located at Bir Jifjafah
where the Israelis now maintain a base and airfield.
--In the central zone would be headquarters, a logistical base and
observation posts at key road junctions.
--Egypt and Israel would have the right to fly air surveillance missions
over the Sinai on a stated schedule.
The Tiran Observer Force, headquartered at Eilat under UN command, would
include Jordanian and Saudi personnel in addition to UN, Egyptian and Israeli
personnel since they are also riparians of the Gulf of Aqaba.
The personnel of the Tiran Observer Force would be distributed to reflect
the particular concerns of the separate national members. For instance:
Egyptians could provide naval patrol in the Red Sea approaches, ship-to-shore
communications at Sharm al-Shaikh and civil security at Sharm al-Shaikh;
Saudis could man Tiran Island; Jordanian and Israeli observer units could
be stationed at the Sharm al-Shaikh airfield. An access road would be main-
tained from the headquarters in Eilat to Sharm al-Shaikh for use of all
members.
A joint Jordan-Israel port authority would be established to facilitate develop-
ment of the Aqaba-Eilat ports and area. The airfield at Naqb (12 miles west
of Eilat) would serve the entire port area, would support the Tiran Observer
force, would, be maintained by Jordanian and Israeli units. (A boundary
rectification might be considered to include this within the port authority
area.)
The above arrangements as well as Israeli withdrawal could be implemented
in phases and reviewed at stated intervals. After some period, it would be
possible to consider reversing national roles on the two early warning lines
so that Egyptian personnel would drop back to the line paralleling the Canal
and Isracli personnel to the line closer to the Israel border; in that case, the
central zone could become the buffer and the focus of early warning equipment.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
D. First Meeting
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Statements
E. Egyptian
ents
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
1. March 26
838 X
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET (XGDS)
February 21, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal
SUBJECT:
Background on US-Egyptian Talks
and Your Possible Role
Attached in response to your request are the following:
-At Tab A is a memorandum analyzing the present situation,
describing what is likely to be the State Department approach to
reactivating Arab-Israeli negotiations and presenting an alter-
native for your possible involvement. This memo also relates
these questions to the Friday visit of Hafiz Ismail.
-At Tab B is a more detailed description of the evolution of
US, Egyptian, and Israeli positions on the idea of an interim
settlement in 1971. The essence of this is summarized in the
memorandum at Tab A, but the fuller memo is included here
in case you want to review that background in greater detail.
Other material is also available to you in the form of two other books
for background reading:
One is the larger book which I prepared for you in November.
This contains talking and background papers from which alter-
native approaches could be developed on all the main issues.
This is the book in your office now.
There is also a book which details the US-USSR talks
in 1969, lays out the evolution of the US peace initiative
in 1970, and provides even more detail on the evolution of
the interim agreement talks in 1971. If you want this, I will
help Peter identify it SO it can be pulled out of your files.
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Impossible to determine date.
BYAUTH - Dr. Kissinger
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Tab A
838x
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET (XGDS)
February 21, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
Hal
SUBJECT:
The State of US-Egyptian Talks and Your
Possible Role
The purpose of this memo, in response to your request, is (a) to
describe the present state of US-Egyptian talks, (b) to suggest one way
you might relate to them and (c) to relate these points to the visit of
Hafiz Ismail this Friday.
The State of US-Egyptian Talks
US- Egyptian talks on an interim settlement lost momentum in the summer
of 1971 after the Rogers-Sisco visits to Cairo, the Bergus paper, the
failure of Sadat to send an emissary to Washington for follow-up talks,
and the lack of results from Sisco's July visit to Israel. At that point
these were the outstanding issues:
Sadat wanted an interim agreement linked to an Israeli commit-
ment to full withdrawal under a later agreement. The Israelis
rejected any such linkage and insisted on a self-contained agreement
on partial withdrawal.
Sadat wanted Israeli withdrawal east of the mountain passes.
Israel spoke of withdrawing only 10-15 kilometers from the Canal.
Sadat insisted that Egyptian regular military forces cross the
Canal. Israel insisted on civilians only, fearing that Soviet forces
then in Egypt would cross.
Israel wanted immediate use of the Canal. Sadat wanted to defer
Israeli use until conclusion of a final peace agreement, resulting in
full Israeli withdrawal.
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date impossible to determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET (XGDS)
- 2 -
The Israelis wanted commitment to an indefinite cease-fire,
while the Egyptians wanted limited extension. One had the feeling
that this issue might take care of itself if the others began falling
into place.
The nature of supervisory arrangements was recognized as an issue
but was not a primary one then.
That is where diplomatic exchanges on the specifics of an interim agreement
stand as suspended in mid-1971.
Recently President Sadat publicly and Hafiz Ismail privately have described
the following as the present Egyptian position:
-- Egypt is no longer interested in an "interim" agreement if by "interim"
is meant a settlement leaving the major issue of territory in abeyance.
Egyptians are concerned that the re-opening of the Canal and the
restoration of normal life in the cities along the west bank will create
a buffer against renewed military confrontation while removing the
inconvenience and danger that give the powers outside the area an
interest. In London Tuesday Ismail said Egypt "totally rejects" an
interim agreement under US auspices.
-- Egypt is prepared to make peace with Israel and respect its territorial
integrity within pre-war borders, but Egypt expects Israel to do the
same toward Egypt's borders.
- Procedures for making peace need not be an obstacle if the
substance is right. UN Resolution 242 is one guide for a settlement
but there may be others.
Egypt is ready to accept international guarantees, including
presence at Sharm al-Shaikh and demilitarized zones, but Egypt
could not accept Israeli sovereignty over one inch of Egyptian
territory.
-- There have been some recent indications that Egyptians are making
a distinction between resolving the issues which grew out of the 1967
war and those Palestinian issues which date back to 1948-49. Foreign
Minister Zayyat recently said the latter are for the Palestinians to
solve.
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A Framework: The Broad Choices
Just for the sake of sharpening the issues, it is worth stopping briefly
to note the two broad areas of choice before us as we consider ways of
reactivating efforts to advance Arab-Israeli peace negotiations:
1. Substance of a general approach.
-- The State Department approach continues to favor (1) concentrating
on an Egypt-Israel settlement, leaving a Jordan-Israel settlement
till later and (2) trying to start Egypt-Israel negotiations on an
interim agreement, establishing a commitment to negotiate later on
an overall settlement but not addressing any of the fundamental
issues like boundaries now.
The alternative would be (1) to deal with a Jordan-Israel agreement
simultaneously with Egypt-Israel negotiations, recognizing that the
US role would be quite different and (2) to address the issue of
territory, at least in terms of general principles, at the outset in
private talks with the Israelis, and eventually with the Egyptians.
The latter point could be handled on a separate track from proximity
talks, supplementing them. There are elements of both approaches
that are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
2. Style.
The State approach has normally been to begin consultations with
the Israelis and Egyptians on the basis of a formal demarche and a
fully developed formula from which the two sides would begin
negotiations. Although that formula may be presented with expression
of readiness to consult fully, this approach can have the appearance
of trying to force something of our making on Israel.
The alternative is to make a more general but still substantive
approach, speaking at first in terms of fundamental points but not
having a fully worked out formula which we are pressing on all
major issues. The initial approach would be less formal and dramatic.
The purpose would be to preserve an atmosphere of collaboration,
to minimize the appearance of pressure, to encourage the Israelis
to develop a formula, and yet to make clear the points we feel must
be addressed.
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The suggestion developed for your thought in the fuller discussion
below is that State proceed more or less openly on an interim agreement
with lower-key style while you develop a simultaneous private track on
the broader issues if and when the conditions seem right. When a
decision is made on this, the Jordanian question could be pursued
separately.
The Basic Question: Is Egyptian-Israeli Negotiation Possible?
The basic question is whether either Israelis or Egyptians are prepared
to negotiate seriously. Specifically, is either prepared to move back
from present negotiating positions in response to significant concessions
from the other side?
While the question applies equally to both sides, it is important for us
to answer it with regard to Israel before we commit ourselves to Egypt
to involve ourselves in a negotiating process. It is important to know
where Israel stands not because we want Israel to make all the concessions
but because it would be unrealistic to get very far out in front of Israel
and to let Egypt believe that we can deliver more than we can persuade
Israel to accept. It will not help to begin any effort with another crisis
of confidence between us such as the one that followed Rogers' December
1969 speech.
To put Israel first is not to dismiss the Egyptian side of the question.
Nothing would be SO helpful as background for Mrs. Meir's visit (February 27-
March 2 in Washington; March 1 with the President) as evidence that
Egypt is prepared to negotiate in the expectation of real give-and-take.
Mrs. Meir will come with a strong argument against any new diplomatic
activity until Egypt demonstrates its readiness to negotiate seriously.
On the one hand, we will not want to appear to have fallen for phony
Egyptian bait; on the other, the more Ismail shows Egyptian seriousness
of purpose, the more we would have reason to discuss negotiations with
Israel.
Thus the most useful result of Ismail's visit would be an indication that
Egypt would be prepared to discuss all possible overall solutions at
least privately if Israel would do the same--negotiate with no preconditions
on either side.
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Another aspect of this question--discussed further below--is how far
the Soviets might now be prepared to go in pressing Egypt. Again,
it seems best to establish first what is possible on the Israeli side
because the Israelis will object to Soviet involvement.
What Are the Substantive Areas for Concentration?
What seems to be the substantive areas where discussion on an Egypt-
Israel settlement would be most likely to yield progress?
One question, of course, is whether we should continue to concentrate
exclusively on an Egypt-Israel settlement, leaving a Jordan-Israel
settlement in abeyance as to the State Department is inclined to do.
Because of the immediacy of Ismail's visit, I shall leave this question
aside for the moment, although I believe there would be advantage in
encouraging parallel but separate movement on both tracks.
On the Egypt-Israel front, there seem to be two schools of thought:
1. The State Department is concentrating on finding a formula
that could get talks started on an interim agreement. The formula
they are currently considering is along the following lines [in
paraphrase]:
Israel and Egypt would agree to begin indirect negotiations
without preconditions on an interim agreement looking toward
a peace agreement in accordance with Resolution 242. Both
sides would agree to begin negotiations on an overall agreement
once execution of an interim agreement starts. No negotiating
procedure will be barred [i. negotiations could be direct].
Each side will begin these negotiations recognizing the right
of the other to negotiate from the particular interpretation of
Resolution 242 it holds but also recognizing that Resolution 242
neither endorsed nor precluded withdrawal to pre-war boundaries.
The disadvantage with this approach is that Sadat has rejected an
approach which does not provide some assurance that Israel and the
US are committed to steps beyond partial withdrawal from the Canal
which would lead to full withdrawal. He is afraid of playing his
Canal and peace cards and being left without what he really wants
in return. If he is desperate for some movement--as he apparently
was in 1971 when he broached the interim agreement idea--the State
formula might interest him, but the chances are that he will want more.
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In addition, the chances are that negotiations on a partial withdrawal
will again founder unless the two sides know what its broader
context will be.
2. The alternative would be to address some of the fundamental
issues of an overall settlement simultaneously. This could be
done on a quite separate track. With public knowledge, State
could manage discussions of a first-stage withdrawal. In private,
you might address at least the framework for an overall settlement.
The purpose of the private talks would not necessarily be to reach
a definitive understanding in advance of negotiations between Egypt
and Israel. The purpose would be to establish that both sides are
prepared to move into a negotiating mode on the key issues--that
both are prepared to consider seriously discussing solutions that are
less than their present negotiating positions suggest. This approach
has the two virtues of (a) making a major substantive contribution
and (b) making use of State Department energies for detailed
negotiations and to draw public attention.
Thus, whereas the State Department would concentrate on finding a
diplomatic formula to permit both sides to begin negotiating on an interim
agreement, the alternative approach would require that attention be given
to concepts for a final settlement. Two related ideas seem to offer the
greatest possibility for exploration:
The first is to shift the focus from Israeli "withdrawal" to
"restoration of Egyptian sovereignty" in the Sinai. This is not
just semantics. It would require a significant and perhaps impossible
Israeli decision not to change borders significantly (except for Gaza
and perhaps a little around Eilat) but would at the same time permit
an important decision by an Egypt sovereign in the Sinai to permit
stationing of Israeli security forces at agreed points in the Sinai over
agreed and extended periods.
The second idea follows at this point: The peacemaking process
should be phased over a long period, perhaps as long as twenty-five
years. The number of Israeli posts in the Sinai might be reduced at
stated intervals, and international cover might be provided at points
like Sharm al-Shaikh. The phasing would provide a framework for
development of other elements of an Egyptian-Israeli relationship
so that Israel could test whether a peaceful relationship is possible.
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You will recall that these two ideas underlay the papers we drew up
together before the Moscow summit last May. In addition, they are
developed in the larger book written for you in November.
Dealing with Hafez Ismail
One point is fundamental: The State Department through Sisco's
agreement with Rabin on February 2, 1972, is committed not to
discuss specific proposals with Egypt before consulting with Israel.
State recognizes this and sees the talks with Ismail as a listening
session and as an opportunity to probe what new elements of flexibility
there might be in Egyptian thinking about an interim agreement.
Your choice is between two courses:
1. Give Ismail a friendly hearing, say the right things about
wanting a settlement but not offer any concrete hope of further
US involvement now. This is the course the Israelis would
probably prefer. They believe the Egyptians should be left alone
to reach the conclusion that they will have to pay a price for a
settlement.
2. Give Ismail reason to report to Sadat that greater White House
involvement would be possible if Egypt were willing to negotiate
seriously. On the assumption that the Israelis might get wind of
any concrete proposal, anything that is hinted along these lines
should be consistent with what we know to be Israeli thinking. One
way of approaching the issue is to say that we need to know what
we will have to work with before we talk with Mrs. Meir. One
could be fairly direct privately in saying that we would need to be
assured that discussion could include such issues as arrangements
for stationing Israeli troops at key points over extended periods by
agreement with a sovereign agreement, ways of assuring demili-
tarization and other such issues. The key question--perhaps better
left unspoken until after talks with Israel--is whether Egypt would
agree to have Israeli troops on Egyptian soil if Egyptian sovereignty
were reconfirmed in most of the Sinai.
The Egyptians, of course, may not choose to negotiate on grounds other
than their full demands, but then there is little possibility of a negotiated
settlement now. Even if the Egyptians make that choice, the Israelis
will still have a fundamental decision to make on their readiness to
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October 28, 1969
PROPOSED JOINT US-USSR WORKING PAPER
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Israel and the UAR,
In consideration of their obligations under the
Charter of the United Nations,
Confirming their obligations under Security Council
Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 and expressing their
readiness to implement it in good faith in all of its
provisions,
Recognizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition
of territory by means of war,
Recognizing also the need to establish a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East under the terms of which
each State in this area can live in security,
Agree that their representatives under the auspices
of Ambassador Jarring will follow the procedures the
parties utilized at Rhodes in 1949 to work out without
3
delay, starting on the basis of the following provisiòns,
a final and reciprocally binding accord on ways of
implementing Security Council Resolution 242 of
November 22, 1967 to establish a just and lasting peace.
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Point 1
The parties, in reaching a final accord (contained
in n final document or decuments) on a package sattle-
ment on the basis of these Fundamental Principles, would
determine a timetable and procedures for withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces from UAR territory occupied during
the conflict of 1967 to boundaries to be delineated in
accordance with Point 3 as well as an agreed plan for
interrelated fulfillment of all other provisions of
Security Council Resolution 242.
Point 2
The state of war and belligerency between Israel
and the UAR would be terminated and a formal state of
peace would be established between them, and both
parties would refrain from acts inconsistent with the
state of peace and the cessation of the state of war.
In particular:
1. No aggressive action by the armed and other
forces -- land, sea, or air -- of either party would
be undertaken or threatened against the people or the
armed forces of the other.
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2. Both parties would undertake to do all in their
power to ensure that acts of hostility and belligerency
whether by government agencies, personnel, or private
persons or organizations will not originate from and are
not committed from within their respective territory.
3. Both parties would refrain from intervening
directly or indirectly in each other's domestic affairs
for any political, economic, or other reasons.
4. Both parties would confirm that in their
relations with each other, they will be guided by the
principles contained in Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4
of the UN Charter.
Point 3
The parties would agree on the location of the
secure and recognized boundary between them, which would
be shown on a map or maps approved by the parties which
would become part of the final accord. In the context
of peace, including inter alia agreement between the
us
parties on the establishment of demilitarized zones, on
practical security arrangements in the Sharm al-Shaykh
area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the
Strait of Tiran, and on practical security arrangements
and final disposition of Gaza, the former international
boundary between Egypt and the mandated territory of
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Palestine would become the secure and recognized
boundary between Israel and the WAR.
Point 4
For the purpose of ensuring the territorial
inviolability of the parties and guaranteeing the security
of the recognized boundary, the parties, following the
procedures set forth in the last preambular paragraph
of this document, would work out an agreement on:
(a) Zones to be demilitarized and procedures for
ensuring their demilitarization;
(b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm
al-Shaykh area to assure freedom of navigation through
the Strait of Tiran; and
(c) Practical security arrangements for and final
disposition of Gaza.
Point 5
The parties would agree and the Security Council
3
would reaffirm:
(a) That the Strait of Tiran is an international
waterway; and
(b) That the principle of free navigation for
vessels of all countries, including Israel, applies
to the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.
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Point 6
The UAR would affirm that, in its exercise
of sovereignty over the Suez Canal, the ships of
all nations, including Israel, will have the right
of freedom of navigation without discrimination
or interference.
Point 7
The parties would agree to abide by the terms
of a just settlement of the refugee problem as
agreed upon in the final accord between Jordan
and Israel, and to participate as Ambassador
Jarring may deem desirable in working out the
terms of said settlement.
It would be understood that the accord between
the UAR and Israel would be paralleled by an accord
between Jordan and Israel, which would include
agreement on a just solution of the refugee problem.
Implementation of both accords would begin only
after agreement had 3 been achieved on the entire package.
Point 8
The UAR and Israel would mutually agree to
respect and acknowledge each other's sovereignty,
territorial integrity, inviolability and political
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independence and each other's right to live in peace
within secure and recognized borders free from
threats or acts of force.
Point 9
The final accord would be recorded in a document
which is to be signed by the parties and immediately
deposited with the UN. After the parties have deposited
such a document, the Secretary General of the UN would
be requested by the parties immediately to inform
the Security Council and all UN Member States to
that effect.
From the moment of deposit, the document would
become binding on the parties and irrevocable, and
implementation and observance by the parties of
the provisions of the accord would begin. In the
implementation of the final accord, it would be
understood by the parties that their respective
obligations would be reciprocal and interdependent.
The final accord would provide that a material
breach of that accord by one of the parties shall
entitle the other to invoke the breach as a ground
for suspending its performance in whole or in part
until the breach shall be cured.
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Point 10
Both parties would agree that the final accord
would be submitted to the Security Council for its
&
endorsement.
It would be understood that France, the United
Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics would submit and support an
appropriate Security Council resolution and pledge
that they would concert their future efforts to help
the parties abide by all of the provisions of the
final accord or accords.
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CHRONOLOGY
US MIDDLE EAST POLICY
1969
January-February
President in NSC reviewed Mid East policy and decided
US should take active role in trying to move toward Arab-
Israeli settlement.
March 18-April 22
Sisco and Dobrynin held nine exploratory discussions on
the basis of a settlement. Only formal document was US
working paper presented in Four Power Talks March 24.
May 6-June 17
US paragraphs on key issues put forward (authorized April
25 NSC meeting). USSR -- after consultation with Cairo in-
cluding sending Gromyko there June 10 -- replied with a
counter-proposal on June 17.
July 15-August 25
Sisco-Vinogradov talks in Moscow, July 15-17. Sisco
presented US document revised in light of USSR's counter-
proposal of June 17. Semyenov commented in four meet-
ings with Beam July 31-August 25. US stuck with formula
that the pre-war border "is not necessarily excluded",
that final status of Gaza and security arrangements at
Sharm al-Shaikh should benegotiated.
September 22-30
Rogers-Gromyko and Sisco-Dobrynin follow-up talks
in New York. No new documents on either side. US
side thought Gromyko accepted Rhodes formula talks.
October 28
Sisco gave Dobrynin a new US formulation going finally
to what had been our fallback position on territories, i.e.
that Israel should withdraw to pre-war borders provided
adequate security arrangements could be made at Sharm
al-Shaikh, in the Sinai and in Gaza.
December 9
Rogers' speech putting October 28 formulation on public
record.
December 23
Dobrynin gave Rogers Soviet rejection of US October 28
formulation.
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1970
Late January
Soviet SAM buildup in Egypt approved, presumably dur-
ing Nasser visit to Moscow.
February-March
High level of deliveries to Egypt of SA-2, SA-3, fighter
aircraft with Soviet pilots and ground crews, new artil-
lery, communications networks, Soviet advisors.
March ll-mid June
Soviets tried to re-open dialogue. US went ahead with
peace initiative instead of picking up dialogue with USSR,
even though Soviets did offer marginally helpful points on
the timing of peace and controls of fedayeen.
April
Soviet pilots detected flying patrols in Egypt.
June 10-18
NSC meeting and discussions culminated in approval of
new peace initiative to restore the ceasefire and start talks.
June 19
Peace initiative launched through diplomatic channels.
June 25
Rogers' announcement of the initiative to "stop shooting
and start talking."
July 4
Israelis informed that US providing a package of electronic
gear to help in attacks on SAMs. Equipment used by
Israelis July 18.
July 22
"Unconditional" Egyptian "oral" acceptance of peace
initiative and less categorical written response sent by
Riad to Rogers.
July 24
President sent letter to Mrs. Meir urging Israeli acceptance.
July 26
Jordan accepted.
July 31
Israeli Cabinet decision to respond "affirmatively"
announced. President announced that "all three govern-
ments" had accepted the US proposal.
August 6
Written Israeli response changed the language of US
proposal.
August 7
Statement by U Thant announcing that all three parties
agreed to resumption of Jarring mission, using US lang-
uage. [Mrs. Meir shocked at US handling of Israeli
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acceptance. This resolved August 12. ] Ceasefire into
effect.
August 8-9
Israel charged Egyptian violation of standstill agreement.
August 10
First US U-2 flight.
August 14
$7 million US electronics package for Israel approved.
August 22
Egyptians and Soviets informed we have "incontrovertible
evidence of clear-cut violations" of the standstill.
September 3
Strong demarches in Moscow and Cairo on violations.
September 6
Israeli Cabinet decided it "unable" to participate in
Jarring talks as long as standstill not fully implemented.
[September 6
Jordan crisis began with wave of hijackings. ]
September 18
President Nixon met Prime Minister Meir, assured
Israeli requests will receive "sympathetic consideration. 11
September 28
President Nasser died.
October 15
$ 90million arms package for Israel, including anti-missile
equipment, transport and reconnaissance aircraft. Presi-
dent approved recommendation for $500million in financial
assistance to Israel for FY 1971.
November 5
Ceasefire extended three months.
December 28
Israeli Cabinet decided to return to Jarring talks.
1971
January 6
Jarring began consultations with visit to Israel. While
documents being exchanged, US received informal feelers
from Egypt on idea of partial withdrawal from Suez Canal.
February 4
Sadat speech extended ceasefire one month and surfaced
idea of partial settlement.
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February 8
Jarring memo to Israel and Egypt suggesting basis for
negotiation.
February 9
Mrs. Meir in speech kept open interim settlement idea.
February 14
Egypt replied positively to Jarring.
February 26
Israel replied negatively to Jarring: "Israeli will not with-
draw to pre-June 5, 1967, lines. 11
March 5
Sadat said he would not extend ceasefire. With that, cease-
fire entered period of de facto extension. Attention shifted
to interim agreement. Jarring talks went into suspense.
March 6
Sisco gave Rabin some "preliminary ideas" for getting
talks started on an interim agreement.
April 19, 22
Israelis and Egyptians gave reactions to US proposals.
May 5-9
Rogers-Sisco talks in Cairo and Jerusalem on interim
settlement. Main issues were linkage with overall settle-
ment, duration of ceasefire, zone of withdrawal, supervisory
arrangements, Egyptian presence east of Canal, use of Canal.
May 23
"Bergus paper" in Cairo suggested Egyptian position on
interim settlement, including a first extension of Egyptian
control beyond the passes.
June 4
Egyptians presented paper reflecting position in "Bergus
paper. 11
July
Sisco to Jerusalem. No progress.
October 4
Rogers outlined main issues in UNGA speech.
With this, overt US diplomacy lost its momentum with the exception of discus-
sion at the May 1972 Summit in Moscow; the visits in February-March, 1973, of
Meir, Hussein and Ismail; and the Washington Brezhnev-Nixon Summit.
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There is a two-track U.S. diplomatic effort of a
mutually reinforcing character which might prove feasible
and get a serious negotiating process started between Egypt
and Israel. One track would involve negotiations dealing
with an interim Suez Canal agreement, conducted quietly and
in an exploratory fashion through diplomatic channels, but
whose existence and general nature would inevitably become
known in time to the media.
A second parallel track, undertaken simultaneously
with the first track, would be completely secret U.S. con-
tacts with the Israelis and subsequently with the Egyptians
whose purpose would be to get a direct Egyptian-Israeli
negotiating process started on the detailed terms of a final
rather than an interim Egyptian-Israeli settlement. These
two tracks are described briefly in this paper.
TRACK ONE
Israel agreed last February to engage in so-called
proximity talks on an interim Canal agreement with Egypt under
the aegis only of the United States and without pre-conditions.
Egypt insists that Israel make a prior commitment to what
amounts to total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967
Egyptian-Israeli armistice lines before undertaking such
proximity talks. We have told the Egyptians time and again
such a prior commitment will not be given by Israel nor would
we press Israel to do so. At the same time, Israel recognizes,
as we do, that Sadat does not want to agree to any interim
solution which becomes a new, indefinite status quo leaving
Israel in occupation of substantial parts of Egyptian terri-
tory. A formula which makes clear that an interim agreement
would not be an end in itself, that there would be an obliga-
tion on both Egypt and Israel to engage in further negotiations
on the remainder of the settlement, and that neither side places
a prior condition as to what final line emerges from the nego-
tiations can be devised and is worth exploring with Israel in
the first instance and subsequently with Egypt. It has about
a 50-50 chance at best of breaking the impasse on interim Suez
Canal agreement talks.
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TRACK TWO
The principal obstacle to success in Track One, if
pursued in isolation, is that Sadat will probably want a
more precise linkage with the commitments and terms for a
final settlement than Israel will be willing to agree to.
While Sadat might in the end settle for something less than
an explicit commitment to total Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
in a formula dealing with interim agreement talks, he is
likely to insist on withdrawal language which would go further
than Israel is prepared to accept in the context of an interim
agreement.
Undertaking a parallel completely secret second track
would offer more hope that some progress could be made or
at least help keep the problem manageable. U.S. contacts
could be established here with the Israelis in the first
instance and subsequently with the Egyptians, their purpose
being to culminate in direct, unpublicized Egyptian-Israeli
contacts on the detailed terms of a final rather than an
interim Egyptian-Israeli settlement. In broad outline,
this second secret track would take as its point of de-
parture the October 28, 1969 Working Paper for an Egyptian-
Israeli settlement developed in the 1969 U.S.-Soviet Middle
East talks. The basic premise of that paper was that: (1)
there should be no changes, in a final settlement, in the
old Palestine-Egypt international border (which coincided
with the pre-June 5, 1967 Armistice Line except in the Gaza
sector), but (2) the questions of demilitarization, security
arrangements at Sharm al-Shaykh, and security arrangements
and the final disposition of Gaza should be left to nego-
tiations between the parties. The difficulties with that
premise were that: (1) Egypt suspected the gaps to be
negotiated left a loophole for Israel to claim permanent
rights equivalent to sovereignty in Sinai at Sharm al-Shaykh
and in Gaza; and (2) Israel suspected they left a loophole
for easing Israel out of Sharm al-Shaykh in favor of inter-
national forces and major power guarantees.
To overcome these difficulties, the U.S. could put
forward secretly proposals designed to fill the gaps in the
October 28, 1969 Working Paper. In doing so, we would start
from the basic premise of the October 28, 1969 paper -- that
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the principal issue between Egypt and Israel (unlike between
Jordan and Israel) is one of security and not of territorial
sovereignty.
Specifically, this would require our putting forth a
proposition whereby: (1) Israel would accept the international
border as the final border, thus in effect renouncing terri-
torial claims against Egypt, (2) Egypt would accept demilitar-
ization of all Sinai except for limited, symbolic police-
security forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal, plus a
long-term (e.g., 25-year*) Israeli presence at Sharm al-
Shaykh and in a corridor from Sharm al-Shaykh to Eilat, and
(3) both Egypt and Israel would agree to Israeli administration
and occupation of Gaza pending a referendum on its ultimate
sovereign status. While Israel would have problems with
such a proposal, particularly in this Israeli election year,
it would nevertheless contain a number of attractive features.
It would be reassuring to Israel in the sense that it would
make explicit the principle of a long-term Israeli presence
at Sharm al-Shaykh. This should help overcome a principal
Israeli security concern about accepting language in an
interim agreement linking the interim and final settlements ---
namely, that such language would provide the basis for later
pressures to evacuate Sharm al-Shaykh entirely. It would
have the added attraction to Israel of promising a forum for
direct Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. While this proposal
would not be acceptable to Egypt at the outset, it would
have difficulty rejecting such a proposal out of hand. And
the fact that the Track Two negotiations were secret, and
had a good chance of remaining SO under cover of the more
visible interim agreement talks, would be appealing to Sadat.
Procedurally, it would be necessary for us to explore
fully the substance and scenario for the foregoing two-track
approach with Israel before any approach to Cairo. The goal
would be to obtain a two-track proposal which we could put
to Egypt as an Israeli proposal (stress an Israeli proposal),
offering (1) talks under U.S. auspices on an interim Suez
Canal agreement, based on a formula along the lines described
in Track One; talks which would be substantively discreet
but would inevitably become procedurally visible; and (2)
secret, direct talks on an overall Egyptian-Israeli settle-
ment -- also under U.S. auspices -- which would go forward
*
for negotiating purposes, we could start with 99 years
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4
simultaneously in Washington on the basis of an Israeli pro-
posal to fill in the gaps in our October 28, 1969 paper.
Such a second secret track proposal is attached.
The advantages of adding the second secret track are
fourfold:
(1) It would assure Israel that it was not being asked
to compromise on the practical security issues of fundamental
concern to Israel -- a demilitarized Sinai and assured long-
term control over Sharm al-Shaykh and access thereto;
(2) It would assure Egypt ab initio that it was not
being asked to negotiate the question of sovereignty over
historically Egyptian (as opposed to Palestinian) territory;
it would thus give Israel the substance and Egypt the cosmetics
of what each needs;
(3) It would provide a face-saver vis-a-vis Egypt,
Jordan and the Palestinians by not prejudging the sovereignty
issue with respect to the Gaza sector of former Palestine;
(4) The Track One talks would provide a visible
negotiating cover, under a formula both sides could if they
wished contrive ways to defend, for genuinely secret
negotiations on the issues of an Egyptian-Israeli final
settlement.
Launching this two-track approach is feasible. For
maximum effectiveness, the two tracks should be launched
simultaneously, only with Israel at the outset. Only if
Israel agrees would we subsequently try it out secretly on
Egypt.
The time is ripe. On the Egyptian side, the indications
are moderately positive. The proposals on an overall Egyptian-
Israeli settlement outlined here would have been non-starters
with Nasser in 1969, but there is reason to believe they
would at a minimum not be turned down at the outset by
Sadat in 1973, given the evolution of events in the area and
in Egypt in particular over the past three years. Sadat's
options are limited, he is hurting, and he wants to survive.
Sadat needs and expects a new move, and this one would have
enough new in it to have a good chance of engaging him.
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5
On the Israeli side, the principal problem will be to
convince Israel that there is need for any initiative at
this time. It believes more time living with the status
quo will bring both Sadat and Hussein to make more con-
cessions than they are now prepared to make. Furthermore,
Israel is concerned that progress on the Egyptian aspect
will generate premature pressures to move on a Jordanian
settlement, and there is an underlying doubt in Israel
that either Egypt or Jordan is really ready to make a settle-
ment and make it stick. Finally, there is an understandable
reluctance in the Israeli leadership to open up divisive
issues in an election year, which settlement negotiations
would be bound to do. On the other hand, Israel expects
new U.S. efforts, and this one would fall sufficiently short
of Israel's worst fears, and give it sufficient assurances
of territorial security on the Egyptian front without
prejudicing specifically its position on a Jordanian and
Syrian territorial settlement, that Israel might go along
in response to a sufficiently hard sell. Our greatest
present asset with the Israelis is their confidence in
President Nixon. If it were clear he seriously wanted
progress this year and fully supported the two-track pro-
posals, and if he foreshadowed them in general terms when
Mrs. Meir comes March 1, Israel would give them careful
consideration.
The President has been understandably preoccupied with
other matters -- China, the USSR, Vietnam during the past
year. History will record for President Nixon that these
are achievements for which future generations will be
grateful and from which millions will benefit. The era of
negotiation and peace is marred by the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Some progress is possible, though a complete solution --
if ever -- is far away. Finally, it is self-evident that
whatever is done by the U.S. on the Middle East must be done
by all concerned together so that each knows clearly what
we are trying to achieve and everyone is exerting maximum
effort in the direction the President wishes.
Attachment:
Proposal
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FORMULA WE WOULD SEEK TO ENCOURAGE ISRAEL
TO ADVANCE TO EGYPT AS AN ISRAELI PROPOSAL
Egypt and Israel agree to enter secret negotiations
under the auspices of the United States Government with a
view to concluding a peace treaty between them for the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all
its parts. To this end, they agree that their negotiations
will proceed from and be based inter alia upon the following
principles:
1. Termination of all threats, acts, claims and states
of hostility or belligerency by either of them or from the
territory of either of them against the nationals or territory
of the other, and establishment of a formal state of peace
between them recognizing and respecting each other's sover-
eignty, political independence and territorial integrity.
2. Recognition of the former international boundary
between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine as the
final, recognized and secure border between the sovereign
states of Israel and Egypt.
3. Demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula except for:
(a) Egyptian police-security forces in a
limited zone on the east bank of the Suez Canal
in numbers and in a depth sufficient to maintain
the security of the Canal;
(b) Israeli security forces at Sharm al-Shaykh
and in a contiguous land link from Eilat to Sharm
al-Shaykh in numbers and in a depth sufficient to
guarantee the security of Israeli maritime passage
through the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf of
Aqaba, such forces to have a guaranteed right
to remain in said area for a period of 99 years
or until arrangements for their earlier withdrawal
are mutually agreed between Egypt and Israel.
4. Continued Israeli occupation and administration of
the Gaza Strip pending a referendum of its inhabitants to
determine its ultimate status.
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Upon notification to each other through the United
States Government of acceptance of the foregoing principles
as the basis for their negotiations, Egypt and Israel will
designate representatives to meet together under U.S.
auspices in Washington for the purpose of pursuing nego-
tiations to achieve a just and lasting peace agreement
between them in accordance with Security Council Resolution
242.
Egypt and Israel agree to maintain absolute secrecy
regarding both the existence and the substance of these
negotiations and each acknowledges the unqualified right
of the other to deny their participation if the negotia-
tions become known to others.
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Tab
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October 26, 1971
EVOLUTION OF POSITIONS ON INTERIM SETTLEMENT
Discussions since January of an interim settlement on the Suez Canal
have gradually isolated six main issues which were identified in Sec-
retary Rogers' speech to the UN General Assembly on October 4:
the relationship between an interim agreement and an overall
settlement;
--duration of a ceasefire extension;
the zone of withdrawal;
the nature of supervisory arrangements;
the nature of Egyptian presence east of the Suez Canal;
use of the canal.
In January and February, the statements on all sides were tentative
and general. It was not until March, April and May that more precise
positions on each of these issues began to emerge. The following were
the principal distillations of positions through this period:
January initial Egyptian feelers.
February 4, 9: Sadat, Meir speeches.
March 6: Sisco's personal ideas given to Rabin.
April 19, 22: Israeli paper and Sadat oral "counter" in conversation
with Bergus and Sterner. (Sadat was reacting only to press reports.)
May 5-9: Rogers-Sisco talks in Cairo, Jerusalem.
May 23: "Bergus paper"
June 4: Egyptian position paper.
-July: Sisco thoughts in Jerusalem.
-October 4: Secretary Rogers' UNGA speech.
On the pages that follow are: (a) a section immediately following on the
evolution of Egyptian, Israeli and US positions on each of the six main
issues through this period; (b) then a section on the procedural role the
US has played; (c) analysis of what has gone wrong; (d) a final page sum-
marizing these analytical comments.
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ISSUE #1
LINKAGE BETWEEN INTERIM AND OVERALL SETTLEMENTS
January -- Informal Egyptian Feeler
Egypt:
Idea of interim move broached in context of achieving some
progress towards peace before ceasefire expired February 5.
Such step would improve the atmosphere for peace talks and
open the way for other actions such as clearing the canal,
exchange of prisoners.
February 4, 9 -- Sadat, Meir Speeches
Egypt:
Sadat: "We demand that a partial withdrawal
be realized
...
as a first stage of a timetable which will be prepared later
to implement the other provisions of the Security Council
resolution
We believe that by this initiative we will be
moving Envoy Jarring's efforts from ambiguous words into
definite measures."
Israel:
Meir: "In return for the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces,
Egypt does not promise to implement the main clause in the
Security Council resolution, which is the achievement of a peace
agreement and of secure and agreed borders
....
Opening the
canal could be an expression of the desire and aim to attain
peace. However, President Sadat's proposal as presented in
his speech tried to achieve a strategic advantage
without
actual progress towards peace
It seems strange to pro-
pose the withdrawal of our forces from the canal outside a
framework of agreed arrangements for the absolute termination
of the war. 11
March 6 -- Sisco "Preliminary Ideas"
US:
"Israel and the UAR, having accepted SC Resolution 242 and
expressed their willingness to carry it out in all its parts and
in order to facilitate the task of the special representative of
the UNSYG to promote agreement in accordance with the prin-
ciples and provisions of that resolution, agree as an interim
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measure to "[accept the specific terms laid out in the US
paper]. 11 Both sides "agree to intensify their efforts" to
achieve the settlement called for in Resolution 242 "and this
interim agreement will be considered as a first step to this
end."
April 19, 22 -- Israeli Paper and Sadat "Counter"
Israel:
"With a view to facilitating the attainment of a durable peace
11
Also, "The line which the IDF will hold
is not considered
...
final. When agreement on a final boundary is reached in the
framework of the peace settlement, the IDF will withdraw to it. 11
This special agreement "shall not in any way affect the agree-
ment of the parties to pursue negotiations" under Jarring. This
agreement would imply no Israeli commitment to future Israeli
withdrawal to the international frontier.
Egypt:
Need to create necessary atmosphere to facilitate progress
toward a comprehensive settlement.
May 5-9 -- Rogers-Sisco Trip
Rogers-Fawzi:
US:
Overall objective is a peace agreement consistent with the
principles of Resolution 242. The resolution does not specify
one border or another. The US position was spelled out in
the US document of October 1969. "Differences between the
US and Egypt on territory are minor compared with differences
between the US and Israel on this point. 11 Interim agreement
would not be an end in itself but would increase chances for
overall agreement. "If the Egyptians tried in the interim
agreement to solve the final difference on territory with the
Israelis, there would never be an interim agreement. 11
Israel:
Unchanged.
Egypt:
Unchanged.
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May 23 -- "Bergus Paper"
US:
"The UAR is prepared, as a first stage in the implementation
of SC Resolution 242 in all of its parts and provisions, to
enter into an interim arrangement with Israel. 11 Both sides
will pursue negotiations under Jarring expeditiously.
June 4 - - Egyptian Paper
Egypt:
Both sides undertake to pursue expeditiously under Jarring
negotiations looking toward "the final peace agreement en-
visaged in SC Resolution 242 and the memorandum submitted
by [Jarring] on February 8, 1971. 11 Israel would undertake
withdrawal to the former international frontier. The UAR is
prepared "as a first stage" to accept a partial withdrawal
arranged under Jarring.
July -- Sisco in Jerusalem
US:
Both sides undertake to pursue negotiations under Jarring
looking toward the final agreement under SC Resolution 242.
October 4 -- Rogers' UNGA Speech
US:
Neither side can expect to achieve in an interim settlement the
terms and conditions of an overall settlement.
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ISSUE #2
DURATION OF CEASEFIRE
January -- Informal Egyptian Feeler
Egypt:
If proposed pullback took place [before February 5]
Egypt would drop a' time limitation on the ceasefire.
The two sides could negotiate via Jarring "for six
months or a year or however long it might take" with-
out pressure or threats.
February 4,9 -- Sadat, Meir Speeches
Egypt:
Ceasefire extended 30 days in context of making progress
in Jarring talks; not dealt with in context of interim settle- -
ment.
Israel:
A thirty-day extension is tantamount to a threat to renew
war on March 7.
March 6 -- Sisco's "Preliminary Ideas"
US:
Both sides continue to observe ceasefire. Both sides
reserve the right: "(a) to restore the status quo existing
on the date this agreement becomes effective if either
side fails to carry out its undertakings hereunder; and
(b) to reconsider at the end of one year their commitment
to observe the SC ceasefire resolutions in the light of the
progress then achieved toward agreement on carrying
out Resolution 242 in all its parts. 11
April 19, 22 -- Israeli Paper and Sadat's "Counter"
Israel:
Both sides to "observe the ceasefire without limitation
of time, 11 precise language to be formulated in negotiation.
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Egypt:
If Israel would agree in principle to "complete the first
phase, 11 then work on the canal would start and he would
proclaim a six months' ceasefire. [He would restore dip-
lomatic relations with the US. ] In conversation, Sadat in-
timated he might go to nine months.
May 5-9: Rogers-Sisco Trip
US:
Rogers-Meir. "Israel and the UAR will continue to refrain
from firing or other hostile acts across the ceasefire line
while pursuing the negotiations under
...
Jarring, looking
toward agreement between the parties on a just and lasting
peace. 11
Israel:
Dayan injected the idea that if the ceasefire were unlimited
or extended, the area of withdrawal might be greater.
Egypt:
Sadat "seemed interested" in Dayan's idea that the duration of
the ceasefire would affect the zone of withdrawal.
May 23 -- "Bergus Paper"
US:
Six-month ceasefire with UAR willing to entertain requests
from Jarring for limited extensions.
June 4 -- Egyptian Paper
Egypt:
Six-month ceasefire.
July -- Sisco in Jerusalem
US:
Duration indefinite. Both sides would commit themselves
to continue to refrain from firing while at the same time
continuing their negotiations. They would agree to renew
this understanding in 18 months.
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October 4 -- Rogers' UNGA Speech
US:
A permanent end to belligerency is part of a final peace
agreement. "But such a commitment is not realizable
in, the context of an interim agreement. Neither would a
ceasefire of a short duration be realistic. 11
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ISSUE #3
ZONE OF WITHDRAWAL
January -- Informal Egyptian Feeler
Israel:
Dayan had spoken earlier of mutual withdrawal a limited
distance from the Canal.
Egypt:
Israel first withdraw some 40 kilometers to (not beyond)
Mitla Pass. Egypt would follow immediately with a "thinning
out" of its ground troops to a distance of 40 kilometers also
from the Canal, though leaving their air defense units and
installations within the 40 kilometer zone. Egyptian and
Israeli aircraft would stay an agreed distance, e.g. 10 kilometers,
from the Canal.
February 4, 9 -- Sadat, Meir Speeches
Egypt:
Not specific -- "partial withdrawal of Israeli forces on the
eastern bank of the Suez Canal. 11
Israel:
Did not address on east bank. On west bank, mention of
"proposals aimed at leading to normalization of civilian life
in that area. 11 Reference to "mutual de-escalation of the
military confrontations. 11
March 6 -- Sisco's "Preliminary Ideas"
US:
Israel will withdraw "to positions approximately 40 kilometers
east of the Suez Canal ceasefire line. 11
April 19, 22 -- Israeli Paper and Sadat Counter
Israel:
"The IDF will be stationed east of the canal at some distance
to be specified
Israeli civilian maintenance teams only
will remain in the Israel defense structures along the canal. 11
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Egypt:
Israeli withdrawal of 10-17 kilometers would mean nothing.
Even US suggestion of 40 kilometers would not work. Sadat
would drop his earlier suggestion that Israel withdraw behind
el Arish but he must have the three passes [Mitla, 27 kilo-
meters from the canal; Jiddi and Sidr al Heitan about 60 km. ]
Sadat drew a line from Bir al Abd on the Mediterranean to
the southernmost tip of the Sinai, noting that this left Sharm
al-Shaikh in Israeli hands. [Comment: Sadat said his military
wanted el Mazar and he talked them back to Bir al Abd. In
mid-October, Sadat gave the Shah a map with a line starting
from el Mazar. ]
May 5-9 -- Rogers-Sisco Trip
US:
Sisco-Dayan. Would it be possible to try out a 10-kilometer
withdrawal while the canal is being cleared and withdrawal
to a further line, e.g. the passes, once the canal is in operation?
Israel:
Meir-Rogers: "Withdrawal is possible, though the area would
not be very big. 11 Dayan-Rogers: The April 19 paper is based
on the concept of a 10-kilometer withdrawal. The zone of
Israeli withdrawal might be wider if the ceasefire were ex-
tended. Meir-Rogers: The passes are too far back.
Egypt:
Sadat "seemed interested" in idea that duration of ceasefire
could affect the zone of withdrawal. Sadat still talking about
a 50-kilometer buffer zone. Riad paper referred to Israeli
withdrawal to a line from el Arish to Ras Mohamed (southern tip
of Sinai).
May 23 -- "Bergus Paper"
US:
"Upon completion of the interim arrangement, Israel will
withdraw to a line running from A to B. Israel will further
undertake to complete its withdrawal from Egyptian territory
to the agreed and secure boundary established in the final peace
agreement
As Israeli forces withdraw, Egyptian admin-
istration and control will be restored in that area of the Sinai
peninsula running from the Suez Canal to a line running from
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X to Y (east of the three passes). 11 [On May 18, Sisco had
authorized Bergus to say that Israeli withdrawal east of the
passes is not precluded.]
June 4 -- Egyptian Paper
Egypt:
Israel will withdraw to a line running from A to B. Egyptian
administration and control restored to a line running from
X to Y east of the three passes.
July -- Sisco in Jerusalem
US:
Two-stage withdrawal: (a) 10 kilometers while canal being
cleared; Egyptian civilians cross into zone of 5 kilometers;
(b) to vicinity of the passes when canal begins operation;
Egyptian military presence of 750 men with light arms to 10
kilometers.
October 4 -- Rogers' UNGA Speech
US:
There can be some withdrawal.
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ISSUE #4
SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENTS
January -- Informal Egyptian Feeler
Egypt:
Not mentioned.
February 4, 9 -- Sadat, Meir Speeches
Egypt:
Not mentioned.
Israel:
Not mentioned.
March 6 -- Sisco's "Preliminary Ideas"
US:
Overall responsibility for supervision "will be vested in an
interim commission under the command of the UNTSO Chief
of Staff, which shall include representatives of Israel and the
UAR. "
April 19, 22 -- Israeli Paper and Sadat "Counter"
Israel:
11
will be worked out. 11
Egypt:
No-man's-land between Egyptian and Israeli forces could be
filled by UN or Four Power forces.
May 5-9 -- Rogers-Sisco Trip
US:
Augmented UNTSO perhaps involving a few Americans.
Israel:
Meir and Allon suggest joint Egyptian-Israeli arrangements.
Skeptical about UNTSO.
Egypt:
Sadat-Sisco. Egyptian-Israeli joint supervisory teams not
ruled out provided they are under UN umbrella.
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May 23 -- "Bergus Paper"
US:
"Military forces or observers established by the appropriate
organ of the UN. 11
June 4 -- Egyptian Paper
Egypt:
UN force.
July -- Sisco in Jerusalem
US:
UN force with Israeli and Egyptian liaison contingents.
October 4 -- Rogers' UNGA Speech
US:
Altering and strengthening the supervisory mechanisms
which have existed in the area for the past two decades.
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ISSUE #5
EGYPTIAN PRESENCE EAST OF CANAL
January -- Informal Egyptian Feeler
Egypt:
Talked only of pullback of Egyptian ground forces 40
kilometers west of Canal.
February 4,9 -- Sadat, Meir Speeches
Egypt:
Sadat spoke only of partial withdrawal of Israeli forces,
nothing of Egyptian forces one way or another.
Israel:
Not addressed.
March 6 -- Sisco's "Preliminary Ideas"
US:
"No military or para-military forces of any kind will be
introduced into the area east of the canal ceasefire line
from which Israeli military forces are withdrawn. Civilian
administrative functions in that area, including those necessary
for the maintenance of law and order and the re-opening and
operation of the canal, will be performed to a depth of ten
kilometers east of the canal by civilian personnel of the UAR. 11
April 19, 22 --- Israeli Paper and Sadat "Counter"
Israel:
"Egyptian civilian technicians necessary for the clearing,
reopening and operation of the canal will cross [to] the east
of the canal
No UAR or any other military and/or
irregular military personnel or forces shall cross the canal
or be introduced into the area east of the canal from which
Israeli forces are withdrawn. The UAR will thin out its forces
west of the canal as specified in the agreement. 11 No bridges
to be built. No military vessels to be anchored in canal or lakes.
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Egypt:
Egyptian forces must cross the canal, but there could be
a no-man's-land between Israeli and Egyptian forces filled
by UN or Four Power forces. Sadat suggested Egyptian troops
up to north-south line from Bir al Abd to southern tip of the
Sinai and then a 30-50 km. no-man's-land.
May 5-9 -- Rogers-Sisco Trip
US:
Rogers-Fawzi. US could not accept the idea of Egyptian
forces crossing the canal in such numbers as to create a
military threat to Israel.
Rogers-Meir. UAR thin-out on west bank is a "non-starter. "
Israel:
Meir-Rogers. UAR military presence on the east bank cannot
be considered. Dayan-Sisco. Concept of limiting types of
weapons should be brought into the discussion.
Egypt:
Sadat offered personal idea of a limited number of Egyptian
troops crossing the canal with a specified limited amount and
type of arms with a 50-kilometer buffer zone with limited
arms on Israeli side.
May 23 -- "Bergus Paper"
US:
"Israel and the UAR may agree to restrictions and limitations
on numbers of troops and types of armament each side will
maintain in the zone running from the Suez Canal to the line
XY and from the line AB to the international frontier between
Egypt and Israel. 11
June 4 -- Egyptian Paper
Egypt:
Israel and Egypt may agree to restrictions and limitations
on numbers of troops and types of armament each side will
maintain in the zone from the canal to line XY and from the
line AB to the former international frontier.
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July -- Sisco in Jerusalem
US:
Two stages ending with 750 Egyptian military with light
arms.
October 4 -- Rogers' UNGA Speech
US:
There can be a compromise on an Egyptian military presence
east of the canal.
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October 26, 1971
ISSUE #6
USE OF CANAL
January -- Informal Egyptian Feeler
Egypt:
Subject not mentioned. Only thought was that Canal clearing
could begin.
February 4, 9 -- Sadat, Meir Speeches
Egypt:
If partial withdrawal of Israeli forces is "realized within this
period, we will be prepared to begin immediately to clean the
Suez Canal course and reopen it for international navigation to
serve the world economy. 11
Israel:
Sadat has not made it clear "that navigation will be free and
that, within the framework of the service that is to be rendered
to the world economy, Israel's right to free navigation in the
Canal will also be honored. 11 Israel is "whole heartedly prepared
to lend its support to the opening of the Canal to free inter-
national shipping for all states, including Israel. 11 Israel has
long made clear its "readiness to negotiate with Egypt with
regard to arrangements for operating the Suez Canal. "
March 6 -- Sisco's "Preliminary Ideas"
US:
UAR would agree to reopen "for use by all nations, including
Israel, within six months "of the effective date of the interim
agreement. Israel would agree "not to exercise its right of
free passage, pending agreement on an overall settlement in
accordance with SC Resolution 242. 11
April 19 -- Israeli Paper
Israel:
"Use by ships and cargoes of all nations, including Israel. 11
The "implementaton of Israel's part of the agreement shall
be concerted with the actual opening of the Suez Canal ---
not only with its clearing. 11
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR
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May 5-9 -- Rogers. - Sisco Trip
Israel:
Concerned that Sadat was talking about opening, not just
about clearing the canal.
Egypt:
Unchanged.
May 23 - - "Bergus Paper"
US:
UAR will undertake to clear, open and operate the canal
"for the ships of all nations except for those nations claiming
or actually exercising belligerency against the UAR. 11 The
UAR would undertake in the interim agreement to allow Israeli
passage "as soon as the final peace agreement is reached
and Israeli with drawal is completed. 11
June 4 -- Egyptian Paper
Egypt:
All nations under Constantinople Convention of 1888. Israeli
ships and cargoes will not pass until the final peace agree- -
ment is reached and Israeli withdrawal completed.
July -- Sisco in Jerusalem
US:
Alternatives: (a) no Israeli warships until final settlement;
(b) Israel not exercise its right pending final settlement;
(c) Israeli ships will pass through only after final settlement.
October 4 -- Rogers UNGA Speech
US:
Israel has the right of passage. What is at issue is the timing
for exercise of this right.
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR
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October 26, 1971
EVOLUTION OF US PROCEDURAL ROLE
Summary. The US role was initially described as one of passing messages.
Rabin specifically advised on February 8 that the US refrain from substan-
tive discussion with Cairo. But on May 23, the US representative pro-
vided "informal thoughts" in notes which became the basis of an Egyptian
position paper. Sisco went to Jerusalem in July with a variety of US
formulations to try out. Secretary Rogers in his UN speech stated views
on the six major issues.
February 8: Sisco reported to Rabin Sadat's concern that there
had been no US reaction to his proposal for partial withdrawal and
reopening the canal. Rabin replied that if the US is interested in
serious Israeli consideration, it should refrain from being engaged in
any substantive discussion of the UAR proposal on its own with the
Egyptians. Sisco replied that we had so refrained until now and talks
between the US and Egypt on this issue indicating that the US was other
than a go-between, he would recommend that the Israeli government
not be engaged in this matter. He said it would ruin any possibility
that the government of Israel could take it seriously.
March 6: Sisco presented to Rabin some preliminary ideas" to
be discussed only with Israel. He asked Israeli judgment whether
these ideas would be useful as an Israeli or a US proposal.
--April 19: Mrs. Meir, rather than responding to Sisco's ideas, gave
Ambassador Barbour a paper on Israel's own position. She said she
would expect a US reaction before the Israeli proposal was communicated
to Egypt.
April 20: In talking with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon,
Secretary Rogers cautioned that some of Israel's ideas would be
virtual non-starters in Cairo and said the US would reply shortly
with requested clarifications of the US position before Israel's pro-
posal was transmitted to Cairo.
-April 21: Ambassadors Bush and Beam were instructed to brief
U Thant and Jarring on the state of play. The main features of the
Israeli proposal were outlined.
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR
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-April 22: Ambassador Barbour was instructed to reply to the
Israeli request for clarifications and to say that we are ready to
give Egypt the Israeli document unchanged.
--April 22: Bergus and Sterner saw President Sadat who outlined
his own proposal for an interim settlement and said he wanted to
discuss concrete things with Secretary Rogers during his visit.
Sterner said Secretary Rogers would welcome Sadat's getting down
to specifics. Sadat was reacting to press reports of the Israeli
proposal. This raised a question as to whether the Israeli paper
should be delivered since in effect Sadat had already prepared his
own counter-proposal.
--April 23: Gazit in the Israeli foreign office gave our DCM a request
that the US "not deliver any document to the UAR" pending further
discussion of the US position.
May 4-5: Secretary Rogers told Riad that the US had neither a
paper from Israel to present nor a particular plan of its own. He
then stated the impression from talks with Israel that there are a
number of general areas on which there is a common concept: First,
reopening the canal. Second, some measure of Israeli withdrawal.
Third, extension of the ceasefire while these arrangements are put
into affect. Fourth, the canal's reopening and partial withdrawal
should not be ends in themselves.
-May 7: After agreeing that Sisco might go back to Cairo, Mrs. Meir
reiterated that the US should give the UAR no paper in Israel's name
and should make no mention of any Israeli decision regarding withdrawal
or the distance of withdrawal
According
to reports, Sisco described the general Israeli viewpoint orally in Cairo.
May 23: Bergus left an informal paper with an Egyptian foreign
office official which constituted suggestions for an Egyptian position
on the interim agreement.
-October 4: Secretary Rogers' UNGA speech contained very general
views on each issue which in some cases in Israeli eyes undercut
Israel on basic issues.
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR
October 26, 1971
ANALYSIS
1. State Department has taken the position with both sides that they
should not try to achieve in an interim settlement what are really
settlements to be achieved only in a final peace agreement. Egypt,
for instance, should not try to gain Israeli commitment to total with-
drawal now, and Israel should not seek a formal end of belligerency
or full passage throughthe Suez Canal as part of an interim settlement.
--At the same time State, in reiterating that an interim settlement
should be a step toward a final agreement, has repeated publicly
(Secretary Rogers to the UNGA) and privately (Secretary Rogers in
Cairo) that the US position is that a final peace agreement must re-
quire Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war Egyptian-Israeli international
border. The clear implication to Egypt has been that, even if its
final territorial goals are not written intothe interim agreement, going
along with the US on an interim settlement would be a step toward
regaining all of Sinai. Israel has been explicit that its agreement to
an interim arrangement should not be taken as its commitment to
withdraw later to the international border.
Thus while State's formal position is correct, i.e. do not seek
final solutions in an interim agreement, both Israel and Egypt have
been gratuitously led to believe that the US views an interim agreement
as a step toward Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war border.
2. The US interest lies in indefinite extension of the ceasefire. This
requires persuading the UAR that its interests will not be served by
renewing the "war of attrition, 11 which can too easily escalate. It is
understood that Egypt retains the capacity to take military action when
it feels that would achieve some result. But until Egyptian military action
poses a real threat to Israel, the threat of an expiring limited ceasefire
is meaningless and destabilizing.
Yet State, while pointing out that both a permanent ceasefire and
a short extension are unrealistic, has reluctantly gone along with
Egypt in its formulations by inserting some specific terminal point
or point of review. State has tried to "split the difference" rather
than sticking to the US interest in an indefinite extension.
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--In a more general way State has encouraged the idea of an
arbitrary deadline by saying repeatedly that 1971 is the "year
of decision. 11
3. The original idea of an interim settlement was a mutual pullback
of forces from the Suez Canal. This was true of Dayan's proposals
last fall, and it was true of the initial Egyptian feelers in January.
The US interest lay in preserving this modest character because only
modest objectives were achievable.
--State, however, adopted the Egyptian position of Israeli
withdrawal to -- and eventually east of -- the Sinai passes rather
than trying to réduce Egyptian aspirations. Sadat for his own
reasons escalated his demands, and the interim settlement immediately
achieved the character of half a final settlement. This was against
a background of Israeli statements that it would withdraw only 10
kilometers and would hold the passes.
4. The initial Egyptian feeler described Egyptian troops pulling back
west of the canal, and the first US "preliminary ideas" advanced in
March stated that "no military or para-military forces" would cross the
canal.
Yet in Jerusalem in July Mr. Sisco presented a possible position
including 750 Egyptian soldiers with light arms across the canal.
--Secretary Rogers on October 4 said there can be "compromise"
on an Egyptian military presence east of the canal. To the Israelis,
"compromise" means that there will be some military presence.
5. Rabin at the outset advised Sisco that the US should remain a simple
go-between and not become involved in discussing substantive issues with
the Egyptians. The Israelis readily admit that they would like the US to
be their advocate in effect by not putting any weight behind Egyptian positions.
Nevertheless, US conduct in this role would affect Israel's receptiveness.
Yet State began putting forward its own ideas in March, held sub-
stantive discussions in Cairo in May and publicly stated a viewpoint
in October. A US representative, with or without authority, even left
notes with an Egyptian official which became the basis of the major
Egyptian position paper of June 4.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR
DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR
October 26, 1971
SUMMARY COMMENT
1. Whereas the essence of an interim settlement is to avoid issues of
a final settlement which cannot be resolved now, State has led Egypt
in fact if not in formal position to see an interim settlement as a half-
step toward Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war international border.
While maintaining in Israel that an interim settlement would not commit
Israel to final borders, State has in Cairo and publicly reasserted US
support for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war borders.
2. Whereas the US interest lies in an indefinite extension of the cease-
fire, State has acquiesced in maintianing a limit on the extension. While
proposing an indefinite ceasefire in Israel, State in a general way has
contributed to an atmosphere of arbitrary deadline by speaking repeatedly
of 1971 as the "year of decision. 11
3. Whereas the success of an interim agreement lies in keeping the zone
of Israeli withdrawal narrow enough to preserve Israeli military access
to the canal, State adopted the Egyptian position of Israeli withdrawal to
and eventually beyond the Sinai passes rather than trying to reduce
Egyptian aspirations. Knowing that Israel would not give up the passes,
State specifically authorized the Egyptians to be told that Israeli withdrawal
east of the passes would not be precluded.
4. Whereas Israel insists that there be no Egyptian troops across the
canal, Secretary Rogers on October 4 publicly stated that there could be
"compromise" on this issue, meaning that some Egyptian troops could
cross. While State initially presented its view of an interim settlement
in terms of no Egyptian troops across the canal, in July Mr. Sisco in Jeru-
salem began talking of "750 with light arms. 11
5. Whereas Israel urged the US to remain a simple go-between and to
refrain from entering the substantive discussion in Cairo, a US representative
eventually drafted notes that became the basis of an Egyptian position paper
and Secretary Rogers discussed the possibility of compromise on specific
issues before the UN General Assembly.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified