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Rabin/Kissinger (Dinitz) January-July 1973 [1 of 3]
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Rabin/Kissinger (Dinitz) January-July 1973 [1 of 3]
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
I
memcon
MANDATORY REVIEW
HAK, Rabin, et. al. pages
2/5/73
B
REQUEST NLN 03-04/1
SANITIZED
per sec. 3.3(6)(6)E012958
Hr.
Jan.
25,2003
2
memcon
HAK, Rabin, et- al. S.pager
MANDATORY REVIEW
REQUEST NLN03-04/2
2/27/73
B
DEC
ASSIFI
ED per Hr. 25Jun 03
3
memcon
HAK, Rabin et- al. 4 pages
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-04/3
3/9/73
B
SANITIZED per see 3(b)(1) E012958 (br. SJun 03
4A
MANDATORY report REVIEW
First Meeting with P. 29pages
REQUEST NLN 03-04/4)
3/23/73
B
DECLASSIFIED Per Ltr. 12/17/2009 (case 03-38/15)
5A
cable
tel Aviv to Washing ton
4/13/73
B
5B
memo
Schlesinger to HAK
4/16/73
B
6
memcon
MANDATORY
HAK, Dinitz, et. al. 11 feases
4/24/73
REVIEW
B
REQUEST NLN03-A-04/1688
SANIT SANITIZED IZED per
see. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 1/31/2013
7
memcon
HAK, Dinitz, et. al. 5 jages
5/3/73
B
MANDATORY
REVIEW
REQUEST NLN 03-A-04/1689
SANITIZED
per
HR. 1/31/2013
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC FOLDER Files TITLE HAK Office Files, Country Files, Middle ast
135
4 Rabin/Dinitz Sensitive Memcons 1973
[p.1.f2]
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified Information.
financial Information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an Individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a Ilving person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
DECLASSIFIED
S.GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NA 14021 (4-85)
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
8A
brief
Dinitz to Sisco
6/4/73
B
9A
cable
Heath to the President
6/14/73
B
9B
memo
Schlesinger to HAK
6/11/73
B
[1] 10
memcon
Rodman, Dinitz , et. al. (11pp)
6/19/73
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 07-A-09/1
SANITIZED peR 3.3(b)(b); HR. 6/24/15
[2] 11
memcon
HAK, Dinitz, et. al.
8/3/73
B
DOS
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 07-0912
[3] 12
memcon
HAK, Dinitz, et. al.
8/14/73
B
DOS
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 07-0913
13
memo
Rodman to HAK
8/16/73
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSCFile, FOLDER TITLE HAK Office Files, Country Files, Middle
East 135
4 Rabin /Dinitz Sensitive RESTRICTION CODES Memcons
[p.2of2 [201
1973
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN REPROATION Nat the Richard ixon
DECLASSIFIED
NA 14021 (4-85)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
[ Envelope enclosing contents of box 48 (400) ]. ]
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TED ROBERTS
DECLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Sensitive Files (originals)
for the NIXON files
from Peter Rodman
SANITIZED COPY
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Rabin
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Rodman 1
DATE AND TIME:
February 5, 1973, 12:15 - 1:15 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
The White House
Ambassador Rabin: Everything in the Middle East is fine.
Dr. Kissinger: Allow me [he pours coffee]. You may discover oil in the
Middle East and we will have to treat you better.
Ambassador Rabin: We have a grievance against Moses: He spent forty
years in the desert and took us to the one place that has no oil. There is
another theory in Israel: that the solution to our security problem would
be to take over Saudi Arabia!
I wanted this meeting because I just came back from Israel. I discussed
privately with the Prime Minister about where we stand, and secondly, in
preparation for her visit, what we think, and thirdly, why the last meeting
with the King was the most important. Two or three weeks ago, we had
a meeting. The King had a proposal. He had a paper with the subjects
and proposals he wishes to raise. I believe you have it.
Dr. Kissinger: I haven't seen it yet.
Ambassador Rabin: She was there, Galili, and no one else. I reported
my impressions from my last meeting with the President: the President
would like to see, of course, a movement in the right, positive direction
in the Middle East. Secondly, in the discussion, the President said he had
no ideas on how to move it. Thirdly, the President would be more than glad
to hear from the Prime Minister if she had any ideas. Fourthly, the
President would understand if she did not have any.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET (3)
DECLASSIFIED
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
[p.1 of10]
NLN
By
(s)
NARA, Date SJUL07
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-2-
Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn't count on that.
Ambassador Rabin: But that's what he said. Secondly, I said, let's try
to find if there is any possibility to bringing in new ideas. We tried to sum
up where we stand and tried to analyze what can be done.
First, with respect to Egypt. The first option is an overall agreement.
This would bring a confrontation between Israel and everybody in the world,
because the main issue would be Egypt's demand for total withdrawal.
No one can discuss an overall settlement without deciding what line to go to.
The President is not blind. The whole world is against Israel on this one.
The United Nations Security Council debate confirms this.
More than that, to make any political effort in this direction is to call for
friction -- that is an understatement between the United States and Israel.
The great idea about an interim settlement is that it avoids for the time
being a collision between our two countries.
The second option is the question of an interim settlement. The main
obstacle is the Egyptian demand to ask as a precondition a commitment by
Israel to total withdrawal. Or, in disguised terms, a linkage between the
interim and the overall. Egypt will never agree to an interim settlement
without an agreement on the overall, and total withdrawal.
What is the advantage, nevertheless, of still sticking to the interim? First,
for 15 months, our two governments have created at least the impression
that it is workable. It seems that the Europeans, even if they are using it
as an excuse to stay out of it, have started to buy it. Pompidou publicly
encouraged the U. S. to try it. The Europeans will buy it, because it will
reopen the Suez Canal.
Dr. Kissinger: They will buy it if it happens.
Ambassador Rabin: Yes, but they have nothing against it. Maybe there
is no other initiative.
The third option is the status quo. And even in this one, you have to give
the other side some option that appears reasonable.
So this is the situation vis-a-vis Egypt.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
03-04/1:2]
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED COPY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-3-
Dr. Kissinger: By the way, please keep your diplomats from mentioning
my name. One of your diplomats in Europe -- harmlessly -- said that the
Arabs want Kissinger involved because he is a miracle worker.
Ambassador Rabin: Some Jewish leaders asked the Prime Minister if
Kissinger would get involved.
Dr. Kissinger: Do they want me to ?
Ambassador Rabin: My impression is yes. She said, "No one knows where
Kissinger will land the next day but I can tell you he won't land here!"
Dr. Kissinger: She is all right. The problem is that it stirs everyone up
in our bureaucracy.
Ambassador Rabin: On Jordan, there was a meeting between the Prime
Minister and the King. We exchanged information with respect to terroristic
activities. We warned them against things that were going to happen. There
is a well-developed machinery of working together.
SANITIZED
Rifai, Hassan and the King are coming.
3(b)(6)(6)
Dr. Kissinger: Rifai I know;
Ambassador Rabin:
Dr. Kissinger: Rifai is the one I talk to.
Ambassador Rabin: The King gave me a two-page paper. Jerusalem has
to be divided along the 1967 lines, basically, in terms of sovereignty, but it
can be a unified municipality in terms of reality. With only minor changes.
Secondly, Gaza and the bulk of the West Bank -- much more than the Allon
Plan practically everything except the mutual exchange of boundaries.
Dr. Kissinger: They told me they would buy the Allon Plan.
Ambassador Rabin: No. These are the two problems. We decided not to
make too much fuss about his joining the Eastern Command. The advantage
of the King, of course, is that he came out publicly against war with Israel,
and he is willing to say that Israel exists, and he keeps the Russians out.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[nw 03-04/1:3]
SANITIZED CO
sidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-4-
We would love to reach agreement with the King, but on this basis [his
paper it is practically impossible. We are all for his consolidating the
situation in the East Bank. We cooperate with him. We understand if
you sell him arms and give him economic aid. It is in the interest of
him to be seen to be doing something positive for his people. Our view
is, let him enjoy some public support in the U.S. This does not harm
Israel. Let him enjoy his trip.
Dr. Kissinger: Okay.
Ambassador Rabin: I gave my estimate to the Prime Minister that your
summit has been postponed until late summer -- that was my estimate.
I said I did not know.
Dr. Kissinger: It is not clear yet.
Ambassador Rabin: I said to her that the only thing to get the U.S. to press
hard would be in preparation for the summit. Where the Middle East is
important to the U.S. is primarily in the major power context.
With what can she come? I don't see anything, unless the King is prepared
to go away from his proposal. Not just slight changes from his proposal.
We are trying with the Christian churches to separate the religious element
and the sovereignty element. The churches never maintained any sovereign
right. We and the churches have no conflict with respect to the Holy Places;
ours and theirs do not coincide. We are ready to go far beyond what
people believe in terms of extraterritoriality for the Christian churches.
Dr. Kissinger: How about the Arabs?
Ambassador Rabin: That is more complicated. Because they raise the
sovereignty issue.
Dr. Kissinger: Why do you care about sovereignty?
Ambassador Rabin: We don't care about sovereignty over the Holy Places.
Dr. Kissinger: What's wrong with one municipality with Jordanian govern-
ment offices in the old part?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
[NWN03-04/1:4]
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-5-
Ambassador Rabin: That is more complicated. They are concerned about
citizenship. On the question of citizenship, it would have been easier if
the question of sovereignty were not as strong as it is now.
I think the Prime Minister intends to come and put to the President - -
unless you have a different idea -- and explain: (1) what has been done to
explore more avenues. Ceaucescu invited the Prime Minister and proposed
some sort of going between; the Prime Minister agreed, and he just faded
away. And all the talks with the King.
(2) As the President said about himself and Agnew, why break up a winning
team? So, why change a winning policy? In over a year since we agreed
with you, this policy -- if we are realistic -- has created the best results.
I don't see any urgent need to change it. It is time that the U.S. gives
the King what he wants. Let him talk about a political solution, give him
general support, but do not try to create illusions. It would not help even
the King to have illusions about his proposal.
When the Prime Minister comes, let's stick to the present policy unless
conditions change. Stick to the agreement on the planes.
Dr. Kissinger: It runs through 173?
Ambassador Rabin: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: My judgment of the situation is this: First, Washington is
strewn with the corpses of those who left his office thinking they understood
him. I would not attach final importance to what the President said in the mood
of the time.
^
Ambassador Rabin: I understand.
Dr. Kissinger: Two, the situation is stabilized in the last twelve months,
by our agreement at the Waldorf Astoria, but it cannot be maintained indefinitely.
It depends on creating the illusion that something is being done while we all
know in fact that nothing is being done.
Ambassador Rabin: But nothing is better, even from your point of view.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[NLN 03-04/1:5]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-6-
Dr. Kissinger: You don't have to convince me. It's been my strategy
since '69. The best way to fight the Soviets in the Middle East is to frustrate
the Arabs in any moves towards the Soviets so they have to come to us.
Now we have had another overture from the Soviets. Here is a message
from Brezhnev to the President [Tab A].
Ambassador Rabin: The question is to what extent are the Russians really going
to press the Middle East. They must, because
Dr. Kissinger: They have two objectives. One, to see if they can get
something for their clients, and two, to try to get ahead of the Egyptians
and make more extreme demands with us, so that Sadat would look like a
traitor if he settled with us.
Ambassador Rabin: The military situation has changed. Syria has been
clobbered; now they put real pressure on the terrorists. The Lebanon army
never really fights.
Dr. Kissinger: You and the North Vietnamese are the two classic proofs
that liberalism is wrong. Le Duc Tho was never warmer to me than after
the bombing!
The State Department is really anxious to get going. We cannot restrain
them indefinitely. These are the facts of life.
Third, the oil companies and their representatives are convinced that we
are going to lose Arab oil as an energy source. I am not agreeing withit; I
am telling you what the situation is.
Therefore, you cannot get the President's agreement to maintain the status
quo.
You can have her put 80% of what you said in terms of movement. A better
strategy would be: she can say the status quo is not intolerable, but do not
let her say that we should not do anything.
I have told you I am in contact with the Egyptians. You would prefer that
I would see them before she comes.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
[NLN
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-7-
Ambassador Rabin: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: She agrees?
Ambassador Rabin: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: It will become public afterwards.
Ambassador Rabin: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: They are already talking to everybody. I am convinced they
are talking. There is no way to prevent its becoming public. They want me
to come to London. There is no way that I can do that without press excite-
ment and without the British being involved.
Ambassador Rabin: They have said to others that they will not come here,
only to a third country.
Dr. Kissinger: They have said that to us, too. That's what the dispute is
about. But if they insist on a third country, that inevitably delays it.
[Rabin and Kissinger then conferred privately from 12:55 to 1:15 p.m.]
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[NLN 03-04/1:7]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Rabin
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Rodman pur
DATE AND TIME:
February 27, 1973
3:30-4:00 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
Dr. Kissinger: What is the chief significance of that document you
gave me?
Amb. Rabin: It's one of the fullest talks that covers all the issues
between the two countries on the Arab side with Brezhnev. They
reviewed the past, but talked about the future. He summed it up,
and there is the memo he prepared for Sadat after he met with
Brezhnev. And the letter.
Dr. Kissinger: You will get everything I tell them too? I said nice
things about you! I told the Egyptians how dovish you are.
Amb. Rabin: There is a letter by Brezhnev committing himself to
the MIG's--but warning them not to go to war without coordinating
with the Russians. Therefore, I would say there are efforts of
restraint on the part of the Russians. For that they will get a lot.
He mentioned ground-to-ground missiles. Secondly, there was still
a political option, but for that you have to mobilize the other Arab
states, Brezhnev said, including the use of oil. Third, they are not
against talking to you but it has to be done with very close consultation.
Then Brezhnev and Ismail discussed the political approach, which was
exactly as he put it to you.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET XGDS (3)
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
1tr.
25
Jan
03
an
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
NLN
03-04/2
per
By
BC
NARA, Date 13 Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Library
[p.10f8
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
2
The Prime Minister has read it. Her first reaction was, are they
crazy to come with such a proposal to the Americans? It's the
Russian proposal of 1969. There is nothing new here.
Dr. Kissinger: That's all there is. In our discussions there was
something about staging and so forth, which I will give you orally,
Amb. Rabin: It's the toughest Egyptian position we have ever had.
Dr. Kissinger: Let me give you my impression. The factual situation.
The position of Israel. There are not five Israelis who understand
the American position, though three million think they do. You are one
of the five.
I let him present his case. You will see the transcript. I asked
questions, saying, "You want us to do something, therefore I have
to know what you are talking about. 11 So it was mostly cross exam-
ination by me. I did not express any view of the American position,
except to say there has to be a new element. On a number of issues
he said he would study it very carefully. This summary I sent you
[Tab A] was done by Saunders.
I said there had to be some concreteness on security arrangements.
So I did discuss whether special security zones could be discussed.
He said, "What do you have in mind?" I summed up for him an
article by the son of Rafael, which was in Orbis last year. He said
he would study it.
Secondly, if I understand their proposal, they and we and you--but
obviously they mean we deliver you--
Ambassador Rabin: This is how they discuss with the Russians.
Dr. Kissinger: --on general principles. Like, for example, what
Dean Rusk said in 1967, it doesn't have to be more specific than
that. Then after that they claim they would be willing to have more
direct negotiations with Israel about the content of the principles and
simultaneously begin the negotiations on Syria and Jordan. Unlike
the Soviets. They said they would settle Egypt first and the others
could come along close behind.
TOP
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
03-04/2:2]
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
3
Amb. Rabin: That is nothing new.
Dr. Kissinger: I am just telling you. It's new to me but that doesn't
make it new.
On the first day he took a hard line on the Palestinian issue. On
the second day he retreated and said that the Jordanians could
settle it, but he left it open that Egypt could raise the Palestinian
issue within Jordan.
My impression is that in the context of total withdrawal they would
agree to
Amb. Rabin: To whatever stages of implementation.
Dr. Kissinger: They would not insist on demilitarized zones on the
Israeli side, I think.
Amb. Rabin: Symbolic zones, it said.
Dr. Kissinger: But I think they would accept. On Sharm el-Sheik,
he tried to indicated some flexibility on that. In the context of
total withdrawal. Israeli international observers.
Amb. Rabin: He said that to Sisco two years ago.
Dr. Kissinger: You look at the transcript when we get it done. The
major point we have to come to some understanding on before you
meet with the President is not to get into your Prime Minister's head
that this is a triumphal tour of the United States. This is not how he
is approaching the problem. Long speeches about how the status quo
is the best will not help you. You do what you want, but I am telling
you the facts.
Amb. Rabin: In the long run, I think she will say that we should try
the lines we have tried. Of course, she will raise maintenance of the
balance.
Dr. Kissinger: Continuation of the deliveries of planes?
Amb. Rabin: Yes, for 1974 and 1975. And the question of production.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
[NLN 03-04/213]
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DECLASSIFIED
Breznev to the readiness of
the President expressed in the message of December 18, 1972 to
continue the discussion of the questions of the Middle East
settlement, which the President quite justly rank among the
foremost foreign policy tasks, which demand the exertion of
efforts on the part of our states is this 1973.
Consequently, we on our part repeatedly raised the question
concerning the necessity of seeking a constructive settlement
of the Middle East conflict and suggested to resume an active
discussion of this question, particularly through the confi-
dential channel.
However, in reply to our appeals we were told that
the US were totally absorbed in the Vietnamese affairs and
therefore could not for a while pay due attention to the
subject of the Middle East.
Speaking about this question, it is necessary to emphasize
that time is passing while the situation in the Middle East
remains complicated and dangerous. If effective measures are
not taken the events there can get out of control. There is no
doubt that if hostilities in the Middle East errupt once again
then - taking into account existent ties with this area of
other states including major powers - there could develop
quite unwelcome consequenses for the cause of international
security, and it is difficult to envisage what would be the
end of it and for how long these complications would persist.
As is known, in the course of the Soviet-American exchange
of opinion, including that on the highest level, a thought has
been repeatedly stressed that the United States and the Soviet
Union should not allow that the development of events in that
area would lead to a confrontation between our countries;
it was stressed that it is necessary and possible to find a
solution answering to the interests of all states in the
Middle East, to the interests of our states and the interests
of peace in general. This has been pointed out personally by
President Nixon as well, who not once spoke about his readiness
to use his influence for the solution of the Middle East
problem in this very spirit.
[NLN 03-04/1:8] 03
We think that both the USSR and the US really can use
their influence, their weight, and nature of their ties with
the countries - participants in the conflict in order to
finally bring the whole matter to the liquidation of the
military hotbed in the Middle East.
In this connection a postponement of the exchange of
views between us on this important problem seems to be
unjustified. There can be of course an order of priority in
the solution of problems, but there are problems which can
and should be solved in parallel with other urgent international
issues. We believe that in the interests of big policy it is
exactly in this way that we should approach the solution of
the Middle East problem.
As for the Soviet Union, we are prepared for a confiden-
tial exchange of views with the American side on this problem.
The President knows well the essence of the Soviet position.
We have consistently proceeded and proceed from such provisions
of principle, which are contained in the known resolution of
the Security Counsil.
The key question of a settlement in the Middle East is,
undoubtedly, the question of Israeli troops withdrawal from
all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. If it is solved,
then there can be no doubt that there will be no special
difficulties in solving other questions of the settlement as
well, such as providing for the security and independent
existence of the state of Israel and of other countries of
that area; establishing demilitarized zones, providing for the
freedom of navigation of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal
and in the Gulf of Aqaba, respect for the rights of the people
of Palestine etc. Of course, the whole complex of the Middle
East settlement should cover not only Egypt, but Syria and
Jordan as well.
We have expressed those thoughts to the President more than
once. Some time ago we have already forwarded to the US Govern-
[NLN 03 -04/1:9 -
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DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ment concrete proposals on this matter as well. We still believe
that these proposals constitute an appropriate basis for
agreement.
Now as never before the time factor has become of
decisive importance in the question of political settlement
in the Middle East. We are well aware of the feelings of the
Arabs. Further existence of the deadlock in the settlement,
for which Israel is to blame, cannot but force the Arab
countries to seek a way out along the lines of using military
methods to solve the lingering crisis no matter what would be
the attitude of others to it.
Only substantial progress in the settlement through
political means can prevent such a dangerous turn of affairs.
We hope that in accordance with the results of the negotiations
in Moscow we can start in the near future an exchange of views
aimed at working out joint agreement on the settlement of the
situation in the Middle East.
understanding
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R - EO ]
A
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Tab A
SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION
This memo describes (1) Ismail's position as it evolved over two
days of talks and (2) the process he envisages over the coming
months.
Ismail's Position
A.
Urgency of An Overall Settlement
First day: He emphasized the importance of a settlement in
1973. The Middle East cannot stand waiting for 15 years while new
relationships evolve, as some Israeli leaders recommend.
Second day: He outlined procedures which if followed through
to their logical conclusion could take well beyond the end of 1973 to
complete, although by his timetable fundamental principles of an
agreement would have been agreed by this September (see description
of procedures below).
He said he had absolutely rejected an "interim settlement" on the
Suez Canal, but he readily agreed that the ideas represented in that
approach could be used as the opening phase of a broader process.
B.
Long-term Objective
First day: He spoke in terms of wanting to see develop a Middle
East of strong, healthy, cooperative, independent states. He implied
Israel could be among them if Israel recognized itself as a Middle Eastern
state. A peace settlement could be a basis for normalization of relations,
but that would take a long time. Normalization of relations will depend
on, among other things, a refugee settlement.
Second day: In informal conversation, he felt that even talking
about the prospect of normalization of relations with Israel is a new
element in the Egyptian position.
C.
Recognition of Israel
First day: He said an Egypt-Israel agreement would establish
a state of peace. This would end the state of war but would not be "full
peace. 11
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2
-- This agreement would produce a situation different from the
Egypt-Israel relationship before 1967 in that it would:
- allow Israel free passage through the Straits of Tiran
and the Suez Canal;
- end the boycott on third-party goods;
- commit Egypt to prevent guerrilla operations from Egyptian
soil and elsewhere to the extent possible;
- end Egypt's practice of adding a reservation clause when it
signs multilateral agreements, saying that they do not apply
to Israel;
- commit each side to non-intervention in each other's internal
affairs, e.g. by radio.
-- This agreement would not include exchanging ambassadors,
trade agreements, borders open for routine travel. Those
steps would be characteristics of later normalization.
Second day: He volunteered that in the transitional period between
the ending of the state of war and the achievement of full peace that there
could be the beginning of some practical normal contacts between Egyptians
and Israelis developing out of day-to-day situations.
He was uncertain about the timing of recognition, whether it should be tied
to signing of the Syrian and Jordanian agreements. He rather thought so.
D.
Main Aspects of a Settlement
First day: He said there are two main aspects of a settlement:
-- First is the question of restoring Egyptian sovereignty over
Egyptian territory. This requires Israeli withdrawal to pre-war
borders.
-- Second is the issue of Palestinian rights. This problem should
be reduced to the size of Arab and Jewish communities within
the area of mandated Palestine deciding how to divide that
territory and live together. He said:
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- Egypt would pose no objection if Hussein negotiated with
Israel to get the West Bank back and then gave the West
Bank Palestinians a chance to determine their own future.
This would then become an internal Jordanian problem.
He was reluctant at first to commit himself that Egypt
would regard Jordan's solution as a solution of the
Palestine problem for all Arabs.
- Gaza must have self-determination. Egypt will handle
the negotiation on this in the first instance.
- A refugee settlement is necessary.
Second day:
-- He spoke of the problem of regaining Egyptian sovereignty
over the Sinai in terms of reconciling Egypt's sovereignty
with legitimate Israeli security concerns.
-- Egypt is prepared to let Hussein negotiate his own agreement
with Israel, including border changes (even a security corridor
down the Jordan River) but probably not major concessions in
Jerusalem. Egypt would consider whatever Hussein works
out with the West Bank Palestinians as an internal Jordanian
matter, not an Arab-Israeli matter.
-- Gaza's self-determination should be worked out under UN
auspices. An Egypt-Israel agreement should contain these
principles: (1) Israel should agree to withdraw in principle
so that (2) Gazans could freely exercise their right of self-
determination (3) under UN auspices. This would also have
to be related to a Jordan settlement. Gaza could become part
of Jordan if the Gazans wished.
-- A refugee settlement would have to be in accordance with UN
resolutions. This agreement might be worked out by the UN.
-- The question of a Syria-Israel settlement is more serious to
Egypt than a Jordan-Israel settlement because Syria is a
member of the Egypt-Syria-Libya confederation. A Syrian
settlement must be based on the same principles as Egypt's.
[NLN 03-04/2:7] 03
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-4-
E.
Meeting Israel's Security Concerns
First day: Egypt would be willing to meet Israel's "legitimate"
security concerns, which include international guarantees and Egyptian
peace commitments (spelled out in C above).
Second day: In a fairly detailed discussion, he indicated the
following position:
-- Demilitarized zones can vary in size on the two sides. Israeli
zone can be symbolic. International observers would inspect
these zones.
-- An international force could be stationed in areas of special
importance like Sharm al-Shaikh.
-- There could be big-power guarantees.
-- There might be interim security arrangements at some points
during a transitional period, but he had not really considered
this. For instance, he would consider whether there might be
transitional security arrangements during the period between
the end of the state of war and the advent of full peace. As he
began to understand this proposition he said: "If the issues of
territory and sovereignty could be put aside, we could be
open-minded."
F.
Settlement by Stages and Sectors
First day: The Arab-Israeli problem can be settled by stages and
sectors, but they must be linked so as to lead to an overall settlement.
There must be a full settlement; Egypt cannot accept a partial withdrawal
"left hanging". He did not commit himself on whether a Jordan-Israel
or Egypt-Israel settlement should come first.
Second day: He felt that agreement first on the principles of an
Egypt-Israel settlement would help later to "start the motors in other
places". He saw the Syrian and Jordanian negotiations running one step
behind the Egyptian negotiations. Egypt could sign a separate agreement
with Israel provided Syrian and Jordanian negotiations were then in train.
[NLN 03-04/2:8]
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SANITIZED COPY
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE-
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Rabin
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff TAR
DATE AND TIME:
March 9, 1973
6:00 - 6:20 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
Dr. Kissinger: When do you leave?
Amb. Rabin: Tomorrow night.
Dr. Kissinger: Really!
Amb. Rabin: It's time to go home!
Dr. Kissinger: You are one of the few people I will genuinely miss. I
don't say this just to be polite. Your successor is not in your league,
frankly. Tell him what we don't need is a clever Israeli. I mean, you are
as JUN03
clever but steady.
Amb. Rabin: You want me to tell him this.
Dr. Kissinger: Tell him don't be cute, don't try to maneuver around town.
You were reliable.
NARA, Date SJULO7
Amb: Rabin: I maneuvered when I had to!
If you ask me what I worry about, it is the preparation for the Summit--the
Middle East on one side and MFN.
Dr. Kissinger: I tell you, if the Jewish community blocks MFN, there will
be violent reaction from the President.
E.O. 12958, as amended, DECLASSIFIED Sect
By 3.5
Amb. Rabin: I keep telling them at home, the security problem and the
boundaries is not the issue. Relations with the U.S. and the whole
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philosophical problem, is the real issue we will face. If the President
had not raised it with the Prime Minister, she would not have realized it.
Dr. Kissinger: Does she realize it now?
Amb. Rabin: I think so. I will tell my successor this is what he will face.
Dr. Kissinger: Did you see Marquis Childs today?
Amb. Rabin: Yes, and the Jackson people have 70 Senators.
Dr. Kissinger: If I were the Israeli Ambassador I would pray to lose this one.
Amb. Rabin: I will tell my successor this is what he will face.
On the aircraft, Rogers called Mrs. Meir and repeated the commitment.
Dr. Kissinger: I told you all that.
Amb. Rabin: Yes, but it was a good call. I got it in writing on production
now. There is no clear-cut definition of what and what. But I lunched with
Sisco. I asked him, "Are you going to sue it for blackmail?" He said,
"There is no politics, this is the spirit of the instruc tions from the
White House. " On the planes, he had nothing in writing, but he repeated
the commitment. Sisco said they were working on a projection for more
than two years ahead.
Dr. Kissinger: I told him to do that.
Amb. Rabin: So it would take a few more weeks to do. I said fine.
On the political issue, what will happen?
Dr. Kissinger: That's what I want to talk to you about. I have told you
what the situation is.
Amb. Rabin: I understand it, I understand it.
Dr. Kissinger: Does she understand it?
Amb. Rabin: Yes, she understands.
Dr. Kissinger: I have briefed you twice.
Amb. Rabin: Yes.
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Dr. Kissinger: You must not squander it. I have now defused the issue
for you. When there is a Summit-- it will probably be in June; this is for
your information only. Dobrynin came back and brought great pressure
on the Middle East. I used the Egyptian thing against him: "The Egyptians
don't want you in it. As long as we are talking to the Egyptians, we can't
get into detailed negotiations with you without total confusion."
But they put it at the top of the agenda.
Amb. Rabin: Higher than trade?
Dr. Kissinger: Trade they regard as already settled. It's our obligation now.
Amb. Rabin: Yes.
SANITIZED
3(b)(1)
Dr. Kissinger: Let me show you the impressions
You might take a look at it. [Rabin
reads it.
This doesn't mean anything in itself, but.
[Rabin continues
reading, and hands it back. ]
Let me tell you what my thinking is.
Amb. Rabin: I understood you would like
Dr. Kissinger: I would like to have come out of the summit the same
principles that came out of Moscow-- or better ones. I would like to sell
them the same principles again. But this time they may have to be public.
This is an excuse, first of all, to stay out of detailed negotiations, and it
could be an excuse for you and the Egyptians to have an interim agreement.
This will take us through the fall. Then, given their reluctance to have
full peace, we can have interim security arrangements--which I tried to
tell them, and if we can believe this, has at least sunk in. This takes us
to 1974.
Amb. Rabin: What we lose is the commitment of the United States to the
sovereignty of Egypt. You use to say "rectification" in your principles.
Knowing Egypt, rectification means no Gaza.
The Prime Minister asked you and she asked me--what do the Russians
have on the Americans? What is it they have on you?
Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, you will lose something. But you will
gain time. You will not be able to maintain for the next four years the
position that you can do nothing, that you can just stay where you are. I
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Soo
am being hit from every direction. When I get hit this much, it means the
President is being hit ten times as much. But you can try the gamble.
Amb. Rabin: To come with principles publicly, say July or August, will
be very unpleasant to the Prime Minister. That is two or three months
before our election.
Dr. Kissinger: There is no countervailing influence on the President.
The only thing restraining things is the belief that I will come up with some
solution.
Amb. Rabin: But there is the belief that the U.S. has to make a serious
effort to find a sloution.
Dr. Kissinger: Nothing will happen until April 10 when Ismail comes back.
He has never dealt with me; I can make him feel he's part of a profound
operation. I can use him to kill the Gromyko talks but not to kill everything.
You can come in tomorrow to read through the transcripts. Y ou will see
that I just asked questions and evaded answers.
One thing which you should tell your successor he should not do is try to
check up on me around town, or try to be clever.
Amb. Rabin: Oh no, we know your role. The Prime Minister knows your
role. And we have no reason to destroy the one channel we can rely on.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but Dayan, for example, thinks he can manipulate
everybody.
Amb. Rabin: One question the Prime Minister wanted to raise with you is
Africa. Houphouet-Boigny sent a message to her saying that Africa will
be lost unless the U.S. will do something.
Dr. Kissinger: He is coming here and the President will see him.
Amb. Rabin: So everything is fine.
For the next temminutes Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred alone.
End of Memcon
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DECLASSIFIED
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March 22,1973 1973
Dr. Kissinger has received Mr. Ismail's message of March 21.
He agrees that this channel should only be used for discussion of
measures that will lead toward a speedy settlement. An exception
was made in the case of the Khartoum incident because the U.S. did
not want to make an official representation which would become public,
but did want the Egyptian Government to understand the intense
emotions in the United States which resulted from that unfortunate
affair.
As for the rest, Dr. Kissinger is proceeding with an earnest
examination of the issues. He is conducting discussions with other
interested parties without revealing the content of his discussions
with Mr. Ismail. He looks forward to hearing the detailed reactions
promised by Mr. Ismail at the last meeting and his proposals for a
suitable date for the next meeting.
Dr. Kissinger wishes to reiterate his gratification with the
manner in which the last meeting was conducted.
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march 30,1973 1973
Dr. Kissinger wishes to comment further to Mr. Ismail on the
reflections on his visit to the United States contained in his message
of March 20.
The primary point of the U.S. side is to see if we can find an
Egyptian position sufficiently different from previously established
positions to enable the U.S. to present its views seriously to other
parties.
The U.S. side wishes to assure the Egyptian side that the news
stories on continuing military supply for Israel were not inspired by
the U.S. Government. The U.S. side is not so naive as to imagine
that such a move could serve to induce additional flexibility in the Israeli
position. However, it is the U.S. view that flexibility in the Israeli
position will depend on the content of the diplomatic positions presented.
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Dr. Kissinger: What did Richardson say?
Amb. Rabin: We are meeting you first, before we see him. We met
Schlesinger over our house. With our CIA man.
Dr. Kissinger: How did it go?
Amb. Rabin: I think he is not committed to anything.
Dr. Kissinger: The practical question the Prime Minister should
focus on now is whether we can develop again a concrete strategy
as we did in January.
Amb. Rabin: I asked myself, why do we need a new strategy?
Dr. Kissinger: Because there will be the Brezhnev meeting. One is
the Egyptian strand; he will be back in touch with us.
Amb. Rabin: It is interesting in here: Brezhnev mentioned his
talks with the United States-- he did not say at what level-- and
wondered if the Soviets could continue contacts with the United
States. He said he got the President to agree to 242 last year,
in the communique.
Dr. Kissinger: The Egyptians told me they had or would tell the
Russians that they did not want the Russians to get into detailed
negotiations with us, only give general support.
What you have to think about tomorrow morning is this: I can see
some advantages in being in touch with the Egyptians and keeping
the Russians out until summer. This is separate from what we talk
about to the Egyptians.
Amb. Rabin: Did they say that as long as we are in touch you should
not supply arms to Israel?
Dr. Kissinger: They didn't put it that crudely. He said it would be
a big contribution.
[At this point Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred alone for
the last five minutes. ]
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Peter Rodman, NSC Stafff/M
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, April 18, 1973
6:15 - 6:40 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
The White House
Dr. Kissinger: I haven't heard from the Egyptians yet. We certainly
won't pressiit. It is probably impossible now to meet on May 10.
But I want to talk with you about the President's meeting with Senate
leaders on MFN. He communicated to them the two Soviet communica-
tions he had received.
We have told you we have dealt with Brezhnev on this law. He gave us
a statement--not as a Brezhnev statement, but as a Soviet leadership
statement--to the effect that they would not collect any taxes except
normal duties. Here, [Hands over Tab A] I asked Dobrynin, is this
an official statement? Is there a time limit on it? And he gave me
these four answers. [Hands over Tab B]
Amb. Dinitz: Thank you.
Dr. Kissinger: The President then invited the Congressional leader-
ship in. The regular leadership--Scott, Mansfield, and so on--were
impressed with it, but Jackson, Ribicoff and Javits were not. Now it
is hard for Javits and Ribicoff to be less Jewish than Jackson. What
Jackson is now raising is not the law but the whole treatment of Jews
in the Soviet Union.
The President was beside himself. This is why I took the liberty of
calling you. He feels he committed his personal prestige with the
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Soviets on an issue which he regarded as a domestic Soviet matter and
obtained a result which could only be regarded as a success, and now he
is asked to go further and try to lower the Iron Curtain. And if he tries
that, his whole foreign policy is destroyed.
Tomorrow he is meeting with American Jewish leaders. I must tell you
it will affect our relations with Israel.
I have been asked by him to tell you that he will cancel the plane deal.
Or I should say, rather, that he was so angry that that was what he said.
He even asked me to write it down.
We achieved more than frankly, I thought we could ever get.
Amb Dinitz: You know my position. It is not different from Yitzhak's
position. We both feel very indebted to the President, and the Prime
Minister feels very indebted to the President. The last thing in the world
we want to do would be to harm or impede Presidential policy. But the
thing is of such intense interest, and rightly so, that it is a mistake to
think we can control it. I won't hide behind the excuse that it is an inter-
nal U.S. matter. It is a Jewish matter and we have a stake in a Jewish
matter. I know the Jewish leaders will meet with the President and I
will be meeting with them.
Dr. Kissinger: I believe that this [the Soviet note] effectively suspends
the law. The question is, will the Jewish community now go beyond this
and ask for more? This will meet substantial resistance. The President
wanted to cancel the meeting.
Amb. Dinitz: Why, because of the reaction of the Jewish Senators?
Dr. Kissinger: Because of the reaction of the three Jewish senators--
Jackson, Javits and Ribicoff! Jackson generalized it; he is now interested
in the Ukrainians and Germans in Russia.
Amb. Dinitz: Jackson doesn't trust the Soviets.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't trust the Soviets.
Amb. Dinitz: We know that.
Dr. Kissinger: You have to keep in mind the wider context. We have
managed to keep the Soviets quiet in the Middle East for two years. This
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is notaa quid pro quo.
Amb. Dinitz: Of course.
Dr. Kissinger: You have to look at Brezhnev's position. We got his
help in Vietnam, and his troops out of Egypt. He only got MFN--and if
now he loses that, I could make a good case against him in the Politboro.
On every visit by me or the President to the Soviet Union we raised the
issue. We contributed to annot ideal, but not impossible situation of
40, 000 leaving a year, or whatever the exact number is.
Amb. Dinitz: 30, or 36, 000.
Dr. Kissinger: But now if we are asked to ask them not just to abrogate
the law but to change their whole emigration policy, we can't justify this
as an aciotn of American foreign policy.
There are two things. Tell the Jewish leaders to treat the President
gently, not to attack him, and to thank him for what he achieved. He
is under great strain because of domestic problems. On the longer term,
your ultimate position on MFN, we don't need an answer tomorrow.
Frankly, the President called the meeting because he thought they would
be grateful. At least have them say this tomorrow.
Amb. Dinitz: In this document are there assurances that they won't fool
us?
Dr. Kissinger: In the clarifying answers.
Amb. Dinitz: May I raise something?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Amb. Dinitz: I have been seeing State Department people on the UN
Security Council resolution [condemning Israeli raids on Lebanon].
We have asked them to veto the resolution of the Lebanese, as modified
by the British and the French. I got notified that they would use the
veto. Now there are severe pressures by the Lebanese on the British
and the French to get you not to use the veto if there are made some
cosmetic changes that don't mean anything, such as speaking of "other
issues" instead of sanctions against Israel, and deleting the clause
against assistance to Israel. State tells us they are still with us, though.
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Dr. Kissinger: [to Rodman] Tell Brent we expect a veto unless they
get special authorization from us.
Amb. Dinitz: On the planes, you have no answer yet?
Dr. Kissinger: It is not a good time to raise it.
Amb. Dinitz: I checked with Jerusalem on whether there is any evidence
on the other matter [Egyptian military intentions].
Dr. Kissinger: I had our people check. They see no indication. Our
people think it is a bluff. Here, you can see all the things our people
found. [ Shows him Schlessinger memo at Tab C]
Amb. Dinitz: Maybe the late March business is the source of it.
Dr. Kissinger: That is all I have.
I just had a meeting, at their request, with one of the royal Saudi princes,
the one who handles oil matters, and Minister Yamani. They asked me
to inject myself into the negotiations. They said that if we did not make
progress they would regulate their oil supply to us. They said it was
worth more to them in the ground. Conversely if we did pressure Israel
they would guarantee our supply. I told them never to talk to me in that
way again. If they had a foreign policy proposition to make I would
listen to -but not as a commercial proposition.
Amb. Dinitz: You know we have a complaint against Moses.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, heetook you to the wrong place in the Middle East.
Amb. Dinitz: It would have been shorter too. It wouldn't have taken
40 years.
[ Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred for a last five minutes
alone.
]
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Dinitz of Israel
Avner Idan, Minister of the Embassy of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
0m
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, April 24, 1973
5:05 - 5:30 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
The White House
Ambassador Dinitz: We have gotten from Israel an intelligence assess-
ment of the situation. [Hands over Tab A]
Dr. Kissinger: Can I show it to our people?
Eo 13526
Ambassador Dinitz:
3.3 (b)(1)
There are some concrete facts and some assessments, and there is even
a contradiction to some extent, because the information is more serious
that the visible physical situation in the area -- but we have information.
Dr. Kissinger: But you could easily handle this?
Ambassador Dinitz: Easily. It is not a problem for us in the military sense,
therefore there is low probability. But as our people say, logic does not
always prevail in our region. Sadat knows what the situation is. We will
pass on any further information.
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CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
WMT8
Youthery Review
[g.10f 11] [p of "]
0.00 NLN 03-A-04
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Dos. 5
E.O. 13526
Authority N.N 03-A-04 #5 Appeal
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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
2
Dr. Kissinger: Our intelligence people will have this.
Ambassador Dinitz: Right.
An additional thing. There are 18 Mirages and 16 Hunters going to Egypt,
and the possibility of delivery of Lightings from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Dr. Kissinger: On the Mirages, we received three years ago a personal
assurance from Pompidou that they would not be transferred. Through the
Presidential channel we will protest. It will be written, not through diplo-
macy.
Ambassador Dinitz: We showed this to the French Ambassador. Second, on the
planes.
Dr. Kissinger: There was another proposition from the departments, which
we again sent back. So you would not want to see it. Both in numbers and
in terms of how they did it. The numbers were wrong, and there were
smaller numbers in the first years. I have sent it back. So if you can be
patient another two weeks. I haven't formally sent it back; I am negotiating
orally with them. But I won't put it to the President in this form.
We have heard from our friends. You will see it is an answer. [Tab B]
You will notice they drop the reference to Rogers when they talk about
Resolution 242.
Ambassador Dinitz: [Reading] "State of legitimacy"?
Dr. Kissinger: I said it was not enough to end the state of war; there had
to be a state of peace. I asked them to explain the difference between a
cease-fire and an end to the state of war.
I am now going to propose
practically now, I am going to move it to
the 18th, closer to the Summit.
On substance, the last paragraph is of course very tough. If they maintain
that position, that would end it. On security they are deliberately ambiguous.
They don't define "freedom of action. 11 And "international" means "under
Security Council auspices. 11 Whether it means Israel, I don't know. I doubt
it, but I don't know.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[N40 03 - c4/5 :2]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
3
Ambassador Dinitz: May I offer my comment?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Ambassador Dinitz: It is a unique document. It does refer to Resolution
242 but not uninterpreted. It refers to the four powers but this includes
the Rogers plan.
Dr. Kissinger: But the last one added an American interpretation.
Ambassador Dinitz: It is the same thing, but the American interpretation in
the Big- Power arrangement in October 1969 was Rogers.
Then, on security, not only are they hinting at sovereignty versus security,
but that security should somehow be parallel. Zayyat said on TV here that
there should be demilitarized zones on both sides equally. That would take
us to Iraq!
On guarantees, that is no hint about Israeli troops in it as far as we are
concerned.
On legitimacy, we have the Yiddish word, "chutzpadik. 11 This means we
etc. are to cut all ties with the world Zionist movement, end all immigration,
Dr. Kissinger: I didn't think you would accept.
I will talk one more day. If they stick to this position, I will move it into
the diplomatic channels. They will blame me for whatever goes wrong.
Ambassador Dinitz: If I may say, I wonder even from the point of your pres-
tige whether you should negotiate on the basis of this paper.
Dr. Kissinger: I won't on this paper. I will say I am prepared to meet
once again to hear any specific ideas on the heads of agreement, and after
this we will decide in what forum it should be handled.
Ambassador Dinitz: He sort of presupposes that in February you had
known his position and is surprised.
TOP SECRET,
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
w 03 - 04/5:3]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
4
Dr. Kissinger: The Egyptians are unlike anyone I have ever dealt with.
The North Vietnamese lied, but at least they had a framework. On the
specific points, they said the last time they would come up with specific
ideas.
Ambassador Dinitz: That is what you told us.
Dr. Kissinger: I see no basis for proceeding very far down this road,
unless this is just a propaganda paper.
Ambassador Dinitz: And in this channel. It is worse than they talk on
television.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, if I refuse now, they will use this as a pretext. If
I come, and tell them I will let them know in two weeks. Then it is June,
and then there is the Summit. So it gets us through the Summit. I am
anxious to have this not come up at the Summit.
Ambassador Dinitz: No.
Dr. Kissinger: They are actually very stupid. They have given us nothing
even tempting.
Ambassador Dinitz: And nothing even making you come with something on
your own.
Dr. Kissinger: But I have never even been thinking of doing that.
Ambassador Dinitz: You wanted our guidelines from your ideas.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, still I would like some idea of your thinking. I would
like a sense of the nuances of it not written down, just for my thinking.
In any event I won't take any position.
Ambassador Dinitz: Before you go, I will have the Prime Minister's think-
ing on the matter.
Dr. Kissinger: Just to give me an idea. There are no subtleties in that
paper.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[NLN 03 - 04/5:4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
5
Ambassador Dinitz: One more item. You told us the President intends
before the end of the year to invite Houphouet-Boigny. But the Prime
Minister heard from Houphouet-Boigny that he hasn't heard anything
yet. Could you let him know in principle?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
TOP NSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[NW] 03 04/5:5]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TabA Hann at 1.1
TOP STORE#
April 22, 1973
EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
./..
E.O. 13526
Authority NLN 03-A-04 #5 Appeal
TOP SECRET
Date 3/26/2013
[NAN 03-04/5:6_
NARA so
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOD SECRET
- 2 -
EO 13526
3.3 (b)(1)
./..
TOP SECRET
[NLN 03-04/5:7]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET
-- 3 -
EO 13526
3.3 (b)(1)
TOP STADES
[NLN 03-04/5:8] 04/5 :8]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Tab B
Message to Dr. Kissinger
A. Mr. Hafiz Ismail thanks Dr. Kissinger for his message
dated April 12, 1973 and he agrees to meet him in Europe around the
ninth of May 1973. He would like to reach a final agreement con-
cerning the date and location SO as to enable him to finalize the
details of a proposed visit to France.
B. We shall be pleased to receive Mr. Trone in Cairo to
discuss the detailed arrangements of the meeting. We hope that
Mr. Trone can arrive in Cairo before the end of this month. All
necessary measures to maintain the secrecy of his visit will be taken.
C. As for our talks in general, our position continues to be
the maintenance of their secrecy. It will be possible to handle any
sources of leakage, although with the development of meetings this
might in itself represent a risk through the widening circle of those
who know about them.
D. Two points arise out of Dr. Kissinger's message:
First: that the White House has not yet
decided 'whether it can play a useful role' in
the Middle East conflict.
Second: that the U.S. Government is not
certain about Israel's reaction since it has
sought to avoid 'theoretical' discussions.
E. It has been our understanding since Dr. Kissinger's first
message of last July 1972, that the Middle East question has become
of special concern to the White House, an understanding confirmed by
I
President Nixon's declaration about the top priority of this problem
during his second term of office. The Egyptian side has, during last
February's round, presented a comprehensive understanding for a
settlement in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 242,
its interpretation by the Big Powers, and the world community as a
whole. The Egyptian presentation included a general framework for
an overall settlement as well as a constructive and practical concept
of the development of such settlement and Egypt's position vis-a-vis
the elements of settlement and its phases.
[NLN NAN 03 - 04/5:9]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 2 -
F. We thought that this plan as presented by the Egyptian
side, which in our opinion goes beyond mere 'theories', has
encouraged the U.S. Government to take a final decision in that
respect; unless the U.S. Government's discussions with Israel have
produced a negative result, in which case the question arises whether
it would be worthwhile going into detailed discussions of the Egyptian
position already presented.
G. We have, during the February round, discussed the 'question
of security'. We would like to define the general principles that govern
our thinking regarding this matter.
First: that security is a question which
interests Egypt as much as Israel, and on the
same footing. Therefore it would be unacceptable
for us to agree to the establishment of security
measures to the advantage of Israel, i.e.,
neutralizing the effectiveness of our forces,
while at the same time permitting the Israeli
forces a wide liberty of action against us.
Second: that the security arrangements
should be both transitional in nature, and inter-
national (by forming the observation elements,
and emergency forces on an international basis
under Security Council auspices).
Third: that the termination of the state of
war concurrent with the final withdrawal from
Egyptian territories, and the peace commitments
presented by the Egyptian side, as well as the
guarantees of the Big Powers and the Security
Council. All this adds weight and assurance to
the security measures offered already.
H. Dr. Kissinger referred during our last meeting to the
question of legitimacy. This is a legal as well as a political matter
tied to the Palestinian question which is the source of the conflict
in the area. Egypt's position in this respect depends on the realiza-
tion of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. To include this
[NLN 03-04/5:10] 03
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
&
- 3 -
question of legitimacy among the security considerations equals,
on our part, and with similar significance, the continuance of
Israeli ties with World Zionism and Israel's special relations with
many foreign countries. This will be a matter for further discussion
in our forthcoming meeting.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED COPY
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Dinitz of Israel
Avner Idan, Minister of the Embassy of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
0m
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, April 24, 1973
5:05 - 5:30 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
The White House
Ambassador Dinitz:
SANITIZED
Dr. Kissinger: Can I show it to our people ?
3.3(b)(1)
Ambassador Dinitz:
There are some concrete facts and some assessments, and there is even
a contradiction to some extent, because the information is more serious
that the visible physical situation in the area -- but we have information.
Dr. Kissinger: But you could easily handle this?
Ambassador Dinitz: Easily. It is not a problem for us in the military sense,
therefore there is low probability. But as our people say, logic does not
always prevail in our region. Sadat knows what the situation is. We will
pass on any further information.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
DECLASSIFIED
[p.10f1]
NLN E.O. 12958, B 03-04/5 as amended, Sect 3.5 5J 25JUN03
By
NARA,
Date
roduced at the Richard Nixon
SANITIZED COPY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED COPY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
2
Dr. Kissinger:
SANITIZED
3.
3
Ambassador Dinitz: Right.
(6)(1)
An additional thing. There are 18 Mirages and 16 Hunters going to Egypt,
and the possibility of delivery of Lightings from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Dr. Kissinger: On the Mirages, we received three years ago a personal
assurance from Pompidou that they would not be transferred. Through the
Presidential channel we will protest. It will be written, not through diplo-
macy.
Ambassador Dinitz: We showed this to the French Ambassador. Second, on the
planes.
Dr. Kissinger: There was another proposition from the departments, which
we again sent back. So you would not want to see it. Both in numbers and
in terms of how they did it. The numbers were wrong, and there were
smaller numbers in the first years. I have sent it back. So if you can be
patient another two weeks. I haven't formally sent it back; I am negotiating
orally with them. But I won't put it to the President in this form.
We have heard from our friends. You will see it is an answer. [Tab B]
You will notice they drop the reference to Rogers when they talk about
Resolution 242.
Ambassador Dinitz: [Reading] "State of legitimacy"?
Dr. Kissinger: I said it was not enough to end the state of war; there had
to be a state of peace. I asked them to explain the difference between a
cease-fire and an end to the state of war.
I am now going to propose
practically now, I am going to move it to
the 18th, closer to the Summit.
On substance, the last paragraph is of course very tough. If they maintain
that position, that would end it. On security they are deliberately ambiguous.
They don't define "freedom of action. 11 And "international" means "under
Security Council auspices. 11 Whether it means Israel, I don't know. I doubt
it, but I don't know.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[N40 03 - 04/5 : 2]
SANITIZED COPY SANITIZED CO residential
Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
3
Ambassador Dinitz: May I offer my comment?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Ambassador Dinitz: It is a unique document. It does refer to Resolution
242 but not uninterpreted. It refers to the four powers but this includes
the Rogers plan.
Dr. Kissinger: But the last one added an American interpretation.
Ambassador Dinitz: It is the same thing, but the American interpretation in
the Big- Power arrangement in October 1969 was Rogers.
Then, on security, not only are they hinting at sovereignty versus security,
but that security should somehow be parallel. Zayyat said on TV here that
there should be demilitarized zones on both sides equally. That would take
us to Iraq!
On guarantees, that is no hint about Israeli troops in it as far as we are
concerned.
On legitimacy, we have the Yiddish word, "chutzpadik. 11 This means we
are to cut all ties with the world Zionist movement, end all immigration,
etc.
Dr. Kissinger: I didn't think you would accept.
I will talk one more day. If they stick to this position, I will move it into
the diplomatic channels. They will blame me for whatever goes wrong.
Ambassador Dinitz: If I may say, I wonder even from the point of your pres-
tige whether you should negotiate on the basis of this paper.
Dr. Kissinger: I won't on this paper. I will say I am prepared to meet
once again to hear any specific ideas on the heads of agreement, and after
this we will decide in what forum it should be handled.
Ambassador Dinitz: He sort of presupposes that in February you had
known his position and is surprised.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
XCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
[NLN 03 - 04/5:3] [NLN
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
4
Dr. Kissinger: The Egyptians are unlike anyone I have ever dealt with.
The North Vietnamese lied, but at least they had a framework. On the
specific points, they said the last time they would come up with specific
ideas.
Ambassador Dinitz: That is what you told us.
Dr. Kissinger: I see no basis for proceeding very far down this road,
unless this is just a propaganda paper.
Ambassador Dinitz: And in this channel. It is worse than they talk on
television.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, if I refuse now, they will use this as a pretext. If
I come, and tell them I will let them know in two weeks. Then it is June,
and then there is the Summit. So it gets us through the Summit. I am
anxious to have this not come up at the Summit.
Ambassador Dinitz: No.
Dr. Kissinger: They are actually very stupid. They have given us nothing
even tempting.
Ambassador Dinitz: And nothing even making you come with something on
your own.
Dr. Kissinger: But I have never even been thinking of doing that.
Ambassador Dinitz: You wanted our guidelines from your ideas.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, still I would like some idea of your thinking. I would
like a sense of the nuances of it -- not written down, just for my thinking.
In any event I won't take any position.
Ambassador Dinitz: Before you go, I will have the Prime Minister's think-
ing on the matter.
Dr. Kissinger: Just to give me an idea. There are no subtleties in that
paper.
TOP SECRET
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
03 - 04/5:4
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
5
Ambassador Dinitz: One more item. You told us the President intends
before the end of the year to invite Houphouet-Boigny. But the Prime
Minister heard from Houphouet-Boigny that he hasn't heard anything
yet. Could you let him know in principle?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
(NW0 03 - 04/5:5 03 - 04/5:5]
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DECLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
A
[NLN 03-04/5:5A 03 SA]
SANiTIZED COPY
Dinity 5/24/73
TOP SECRET
April 22, 1973
SANITIZED
./..
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard-Nixon SPECIONTIAL Library
[NAN NAN 03-04/5:6]
DECL
CEIED
EXEMPT
MR NLN 03-04/5 p. 7.8 of 11 pp.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
[NS: 5/40-80 CMN]
Я
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Tab B
SANITIZED COPY
Message to Dr. Kissinger
A. Mr. Hafiz Ismail thanks Dr. Kissinger for his message
dated April 12, 1973 and he agrees to meet him in Europe around the
ninth of May 1973. He would like to reach a final agreement con-
cerning the date and location SO as to enable him to finalize the
details of a proposed visit to France.
SANITIZED
B. We shall be pleased to receive
in Cairo to
3.3(b)(1)
discuss the detailed arrangements of the meeting. We hope that
can arrive in Cairo before the end of this month. All
necessary measures to maintain the secrecy of his visit will be taken.
C. As for our talks in general, our position continues to be
the maintenance of their secrecy. It will be possible to handle any
sources of leakage, although with the development of meetings this
might in itself represent a risk through the widening circle of those
who know about them.
D. Two points arise out of Dr. Kissinger's message:
First: that the White House has not yet
decided 'whether it can play a useful role' in
the Middle East conflict.
Second: that the U.S. Government is not
certain about Israel's reaction since it has
sought to avoid 'theoretical' discussions.
E. It has been our understanding since Dr. Kissinger's first
message of last July 1972, that the Middle East question has become
of special concern to the White House, an understanding confirmed by
-
President Nixon's declaration about the top priority of this problem
during his second term of office. The Egyptian side has, during last
February's round, presented a comprehensive understanding for a
settlement in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 242,
its interpretation by the Big Powers, and the world community as a
whole. The Egyptian presentation included a general framework for
an overall settlement as well as a constructive and practical concept
of the development of such settlement and Egypt's position vis-a-vis
the elements of settlement and its phases.
SANITIZED COPY
[NLN 03-04/5:9]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 2 -
F. We thought that this plan as presented by the Egyptian
side, which in our opinion goes beyond mere 'theories', has
encouraged the U.S. Government to take a final decision in that
respect; unless the U.S. Government's discussions with Israel have
produced a negative result, in which case the question arises whether
it would be worthwhile going into detailed discussions of the Egyptian
position already presented.
G. We have, during the February round, discussed the 'question
of security'. We would like to define the general principles that govern
our thinking regarding this matter.
First: that security is a question which
interests Egypt as much as Israel, and on the
same footing. Therefore it would be unacceptable
for us to agree to the establishment of security
measures to the advantage of Israel, i.e.,
neutralizing the effectiveness of our forces,
while at the same time permitting the Israeli
forces a wide liberty of action against us.
Second: that the security arrangements
should be both transitional in nature, and inter-
national (by forming the observation elements,
and emergency forces on an international basis
under Security Council auspices).
Third: that the termination of the state of
war concurrent with the final withdrawal from
Egyptian territories, and the peace commitments
presented by the Egyptian side, as well as the
guarantees of the Big Powers and the Security
Council. All this adds weight and assurance to
the security measures offered already.
H. Dr. Kissinger referred during our last meeting to the
question of legitimacy. This is a legal as well as a political matter
tied to the Palestinian question which is the source of the conflict
in the area. Egypt's position in this respect depends on the realiza-
tion of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. To include this
[NLN NW 03 - 04/5 : 10]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 3 -
question of legitimacy among the security considerations equals,
on our part, and with similar significance, the continuance of
Israeli ties with World Zionism and Israel's special relations with
many foreign countries. This will be a matter for further discussion
in our forthcoming meeting.
[NW03-04/5:11]]]]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Dinitz of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Adviser
to the President for National Security
Affairs
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff
DAR
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, May 3, 1973
6:30 - 7:15 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
The White House
Amb. Dinitz: We got a message from our neighbor Hussein. The
Prime Minister asked me to bring this to your attention
The King says: "A major international military fiasco in the area is
inevitable. Algerian ground units will soon be in Egypt. The Sudanese
will also be in Egypt. Morocco will send forces to Syria. Libyan
Mirages are already in Egypt. Considerable Iraqi forces will be in
Iraq very close to our borders under a united command.
"If Jordan's fate were in the hands of the Iraqi Commander, Iraqi
Lightnings would be in Jordan now, but probably they will end up in
another theater. This is the alarming outline I see. 11
Dr. Kissinger:
EO 13526
Amb. Dinitz:
3.3 (6)(1)
Our remarks are that the information in the King's message generally
confirms our information from other sources. It doesn't match every
detail but it generally checks.
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
TOP
[p.lofs]
CLASSIFIED BY: MERRY A. KISSINGER (3)
NLNS
Mandatory Review
Cabe NLN 03-A-04
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
E.O. 13526
Doc. 6
Authority NLN 03-A-04 #6 Appeal
NARA So Date 3/26/2013
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
2
We also know Syrians have a major function in any military act. We
also know the Syrians began military preparations.
We also call attention to the fact that Jordan will find itself under
pressure from Egypt, Syria and possibly also Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
These are the questions I am supposed to ask you: Do you have such
information?
Dr. Kissinger: Not yet.
Amb. Dinitz: I am to ask whether the King has given you such information.
Dr. Kissinger: I will have to check.
Amb. Dinitz: The third question is whether the Syrians and the Iraqi
forces will try to enter Jordan against the will of the King, but unlike
1970, not against his regime but to take positions against Israel.
Dr. Kissinger: What do you think?
Amb. Dinitz: We think the King tends to exaggerate, to be alarmist.
But what concerns me is that what this message says we also have
similar information.
My concern is whether Syria would do such a thing without the encourage-
ment of the Russians. And there is no evidence of the Russians encourag-
ing this.
Dr. Kissinger: It is not plausible before the Summit.
Amb. Dinitz: Right.
Dr. Kissinger: Egypt is also part of this.
Amb. Dinitz: It seems like part and parcel of the whole strategy, in
which Syria will play an important part. Where Egypt might take action
independent of the Russians, Syria is much less likely to because of the
flow of Soviet arms. It doesn't seem likely.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[NLN 03- 04/6:2]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
3
If in your absence this develops, whom do I see?
Dr. Kissinger: Scowcroft. You don't think it is so imminent that we
should make contingency plans? I should be here.
Amb. Dinits: Within a month.
EO 13526
Dr. Kissinger:
3.3 (b)(1)
Amb. Dinitz: Sisco wants to have lunch with me, alone, on something
he heard from the White House. Would this be Russian Jews?
Dr. Kissinger: Maybe the Ismail talks, because the Egyptians leaked
it to our Interest Section. If he raises Ismail, you can say you got
a brief account from the White House On the Russian Jews, it is up
to you.
Amb. Dinitz: If it is in regard to Russian Jews, I won't talk to them in
the same way as to you,
Dr. Kissinger: I really must implore you --
Amb. Dinitz: I really tried hard before the meeting with the President.
Dr. Kissinger: I knew, I could tell.
Amb. Dinitz: It is really difficult here, because of the guilt feeling here
because of the holocaust. In Israel it is a big issue because Golda has
not come out for the Jackson Amendment.
May I say that a meeting between Jackson and the President should
take place.
Dr. Kissinger: A private meeting?
Amb. Dinitz: Yes. The Senator is upset that he did not see the
President alone.
Dr. Kissinger: I saw him alone. He is the only one who got advanced word.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[MLN 04/6:3]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
4
Amb. Dinitz: I have reason to know that if he gets a private meeting
he might be willing to redraft the amendment along the lines you sug-
gested more monitoring than preventive, and eliminate the harass-
ment provisions. It is easier for the Jews.
Dr. Kissinger: I saw Jackson last night and I think he will be reasonable.
I wanted to show you my last message to Ismail. [Tab A] As you see,
I have not committed myself to anything. Just a few general statements.
Amb. Dinitz: Well, there are many many pitfalls along the way.
Dr. Kissinger: Nothing can happen. It is too complex.
Amb. Dinitz: Very interesting his last speech. Total withdrawal from
any reasonable diplomatic approach. To warn the Soviets against falling
into the trap of the U.S. proposal when it was their proposal.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think they have any serious interest. Last March,
and November, there were no proposals but at least there was some
interest. Now it takes weeks to get an answer
Maybe we should take an initiative, just to make it concrete.
Amb. Dinitz: Along the lines of negotiations.
Dr. Kissinger: I know your domestic situation, but just to make a
concrete proposal.
Amb. Dinitz: There are dangers. It prejudges you in negotiations.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but doing nothing has its dangers too.
Amb. Dinitz: The onus is on them, because we have accepted the two
proposals from State put to us.
Dr. Kissinger: It can't go on indefinitely.
Amb. Dinitz: In Moscow will it come up?
Dr. Kissinger: We will get a two-hour speech.
TOP SECR SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[N403-04/6:4]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
A
"1. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's message of April 20.
Because of other commitments, it now appears that it would be most
convenient for him to meet.about May 18. If that is acceptable to
Mr. Ismail, Mr. Trone will come to Cairo to discuss the various
possibilities for a meeting.
"2. Mr. Ismail's presentation at the last meeting was very much
appreciated. It is Dr. Kissinger's understanding from the last meeting
that the Egyptian side proposed proceeding as follows: It would be the
immediate objective to develop possible heads of agreement which could
lead to simultaneous negotiations on arrangements for withdrawal from
the Suez Canal and on a final settlement. It was his understanding that
the Egyptian side would present its more detailed views as to the
contents of these heads of agreement at the next meeting.
"3. The US has repeatedly stated that it attaches great importance
to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. However, it is still to be
decided which channel would be most effective whether the White House
should directly conduct the negotiations or whether they should be
conducted through diplomatic channels under White House supervision.
In either case, the White House will maintain an active interest.
"4. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's reassurance on efforts
to maintain the security of these meetings. That security is absolutely
essential if there is to be any possibility of a fruitful outcome from
these discussions. 11
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED COPY
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Dinitz of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Adviser
to the President for National Security
Affairs
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff DMR
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, May 3, 1973
6:30 - 7:15 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
The White House
SANITIZED
3.3(6)(1)
Our remarks are that the information in the
generally
confirms our information from other sources. It doesn't match every
detail but it generally checks.
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[p.lofs]
TOP SECRE XSSS
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER (3)
DECLASSIFIED
NLN E.O. 03-04/4 per natak see. .TUL 3.3(b)(1) Reproduced at Hr. 25JUN the Richard SANITIZED Nixon Presidential Library COPY
12958, as amended, Seet 3.5
NADA
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED COPY
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVEL EYES ONLY
2
We also know Syrians have a major function in any military act. We
also know the Syrians began military preparations.
We also call attention to the fact that Jordan will find itself under
pressure from Egypt, Syria and possibly also Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
These are the questions I am supposed to ask you: Do you have such
information?
Dr. Kissinger: Not yet.
Amb. Dinitz: I am to ask whether
has given you such information.
Dr. Kissinger: I will have to check.
SANITIZED
B.3
Amb. Dinitz: The third question is whether the Syrians and the Iraqi
forces will try to enter Jordan against the will of the King, but unlike
1970, not against his regime but to take positions against Israel.
Dr. Kissinger: What do you think?
Amb. Dinitz:
to be alarmist.
But what concerns me is that what this message says we also have
similar information.
My concern is whether Syria would do such a thing without the encourage-
ment of the Russians. And there is no evidence of the Russians encourag-
ing this.
Dr. Kissinger: It is not plausible before the Summit.
Amb. Dinitz: Right.
Dr. Kissinger: Egypt is also part of this.
Amb. Dinitz: It seems like part and parcel of the whole strategy, in
which Syria will play an important part. Where Egypt might take action
independent of the Russians, Syria is much less likely to because of the
flow of Soviet arms. It doesn't seem likely,
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[NLN 03-04/6:2]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon
SANITIZED COPY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SANITIZED COPY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
3
If in your absence this develops, whom do I see?
Dr. Kissinger: Scowcroft. You don't think it is so imminent that we
should make contingency plans? I should be here.
Amb. Dinits: Within a month.
SANITIZED
3.3(6)(1)
Amb. Dinitz: Sisco wants to have lunch with me, alone, on something
he heard from the White House. Would this be Russian Jews?
Dr. Kissinger: Maybe the Ismail talks, because the Egyptians leaked
it to our Interest Section. If he raises Ismail, you can say you got
a brief account from the White House On the Russian Jews, it is up
to you.
Amb. Dinitz: If it is in regard to Russian Jews, I won't talk to them in
the same way as to you.
Dr. Kissinger: I really must implore you --
Amb. Dinitz: I really tried hard before the meeting with the President.
Dr. Kissinger: I knew, I could tell.
Amb. Dinitz: It is really difficult here, because of the guilt feeling here
because of the holocaust. In Israel it is a big issue because Golda has
not come out for the Jackson Amendment.
May I say that a meeting between Jackson and the President should
take place.
Dr. Kissinger: A private meeting?
Amb. Dinitz: Yes. The Senator is upset that he did not see the
President alone.
Dr. Kissinger: I saw him alone. He is the only one who got advanced word.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[NLN 03 04/6:3]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 1 esider MPY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
4
Amb. Dinitz: I have reason to know that if he gets a private meeting
he might be willing to redraft the amendment along the lines you sug-
gested more monitoring than preventive, and eliminate the harass-
ment provisions. It is easier for the Jews.
Dr. Kissinger: I saw Jackson last night and I think he will be reasonable.
I wanted to show you my last message to Ismail. [Tab A] As you see,
I have not committed myself to anything. Just a few general statements.
Amb. Dinitz: Well, there are many many pitfalls along the way.
Dr. Kissinger: Nothing can happen. It is too complex.
Amb. Dinitz: Very interesting his last speech. Total withdrawal from
any reasonable diplomatic approach. To warn the Soviets against falling
into the trap of the U.S. proposal when it was their proposal.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think they have any serious interest. Last March,
and November, there were no proposals but at least there was some
interest. Now it takes weeks to get an answer.
Maybe we should take an initiative, just to make it concrete.
Amb. Dinitz: Along the lines of negotiations.
Dr. Kissinger: I know your domestic situation, but just to make a
concrete proposal.
Amb. Dinitz: There are dangers. It prejudges you in negotiations.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but doing nothing has its dangers too.
Amb. Dinitz: The onus is on them, because we have accepted the two
proposals from State put to us.
Dr. Kissinger: It can't go on indefinitely.
Amb. Dinitz: In Moscow will it come up?
Dr. Kissinger: We will get a two-hour speech.
TOP SECR SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
[New03-04/6:4]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
V
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
.
Tab A
"1. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's message of April 20.
Because of other commitments, it now appears that it would be most
convenient for him to meet about May 18. If that is acceptable to
Mr. Ismail, Mr. Trone will come to Cairo to discuss the various
possibilities for a meeting.
"2. Mr. Ismail's presentation at the last meeting was very much
appreciated. It is Dr. Kissinger's understanding from the last meeting
that the Egyptian side proposed proceeding as follows: It would be the
immediate objective to develop possible heads of agreement which could
lead to simultaneous negotiations on arrangements for withdrawal from
the Suez Canal and on a final settlement. It was his understanding that
the Egyptian side would present its more detailed views as to the
contents of these heads of agreement at the next meeting.
"3. The US has repeatedly stated that it attaches great importance
to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. However, it is still to be
decided which channel would be most effective -- whether the White House
should directly conduct the negotiations or whether they should be
conducted through diplomatic channels under White House supervision.
In either case, the White House will maintain an active interest.
"4. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's reassurance on efforts
to maintain the security of these meetings. That security is absolutely
essential if there is to be any possibility of a fruitful outcome from
these discussions. 11
[Nin 03-04/6:5]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
In reply to certain supplementary questions, the Soviet Government
provided the following information.
a. The above statement should be regarded as an official one.
b. The phrase in the statement that "only such normal duties -- - -
which were also collected before the decree of August 3, 1972 -- are
being collected and will be collected" has no time limit attached to it,
and any interpretation implying the existence of a time limit would not
correspond to the position of the Soviet Government.
c. The exemption from the requirement to refund state educational
expenses is being granted on the basis of the terms of the decree of
August 3, 1972, itself and of a subsequent decision taken in accordance
with that decree by the USSR Council of Ministers. In the Soviet view,
this situation obviates the need for suspending or repealing the decree
of August 3, 1972.
d. The President and members of the Administration are free to
transmit the contents of the official Soviet statement and these addi-
tional explanatory points to the Congress.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
002 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
K/01321 100 e
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 5A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 5B ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
B
V
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Tab A
15 May 1973
POINTS FOR CONVERSATION:
1. PM is aware of negative developments that may emerge
from the dialogue between K. and CH both from the point
of view of a rupture between them aswell as from a
negative content regarding Israel.
2. PM reaffirms that we are not participating in the dialogue
between the Americans and the Egyptians on a position of basis
of
principles (oral or written) which were unacceptable to us.
At the same time we are aware of the negative likelihood
that the subject will be transferred to the State Department.
3. The PM reviewed the Soviet papers, the "Egyptian propaganda"
paper as well as the summary of conversations which were
held with Hafez at the end of February in the States and
came to the conclusion that the other party still rejects
categorically the Israeli proposal to conduct real
negotiations and it is still engaged in handing dictates
and conditions. On some topics the Soviet-Egyptian proposals
are worse than the Jarring memo (the Palestinian point and
the refugees) worse than the Egyptian reply to the Jarring
memorandum; and worse than the Rogers Plan.
4. Due to the wide gap that exists between Egypt and Israel
on the overall settlement the PM thinks that it is preferable
to concentrate on the Suez Agreement. On this the statement
that the Ambassador delivered to K at the last meeting is
intact. To the extent that the Egyptians would want to break
the deadlock it is possible following this course of action.
PM is satisfied that this is also K's approach.
5. Since K asked whether we can recommend a formula connecting
the interim to the overall settlement, PM suggests that he
might offer the following formula, of course as his own
initiative and not one of Israel's (along the lines of the
conversation between K and PM on 10 December 1971).
In the preamble it can be said:
"In order to achieve peace in accordance with (or within
the framework of) Resolution 242 we agree on the Suez
Canal Agreement as follows:"
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
POINTS,
page 2.
6. PM will be very happy if a movement out of the deadlock can
be achieved which would facilitate opening of discussion,
without any prior conditions, using the good offices of the
US, regarding a Suez Agreement. Israel is also prepared for
talks on the overall agreement, without any prior condition,
but we believe that negotiations on the overall agreement
cannot help to progress on the interim agreement because of
the wide gap between the positions of both parties. If
negotiations on the interim and overall agreements will be
carried simultaneously, the negotiation on the interim
might be stuck because of lack of progress on the overall,
and every difficulty on the interim agreement will find
its expression in the negotiation of the overall settlement.
The PM appreciates very much K's efforts to prevent rupture
with the Egyptians. Even if rupture is absolutely necessary
it is preferable that it will not take place before the
summit.
7. PM appreciates K's transfer 802 her own information the document
of 28 May '72 and will honor his request for absolute secrecy.
It is important to know every detail in that document. PM's
first reaction at the time Rabin reported on it was that it was
unacceptable to us. Moreso now after reading the document and
finding there reference to the stationing of UN personnel in
Sharm el Sheikh.
Regarding Sharm el Sheikh Secretary Rogers asked the PM whether
we intend to have sovereignty or control thru lease. The fact
that the document of May 172 talks about UN personnel in Sharm
el Sheikh indicates a worsening of American position in this
regard. PM reserves our remarks regarding this paper to
further discussion before the Summit.
8. The new Soviet document is extremely negative. PM notes
with satisfaction that K negates the document and defines
it as worse than the Soviet document of '69 amended in '70.
This document amounts to unconditional surrender for Israel
and it is worse than 242 on the question of borders and on the
question of the Palestinians.
9. PM noted Shaul's intention to arrive at Heads of Agreement.
She would appreciate further details on this intention in
order to be able to remark on it.
10. PM considers the last reply of OH to K as a propaganda piece
which deserves no analysis but complete rejection.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
"Egypt, in making this contact with the US Government,
is acting independently and is considering Egyptian national
interests within the general framework of Arab interests.
For a long time Egypt has shouldered the responsibility for
the independence and development of Arab countries. In the
future Egypt sees itself as a partner in the Arab community
of states. Egypt believes that a good settlement is one
that is defensible both with Egyptian public opinion and
Arab public opinion.
"What we are trying to achieve is the formation of
those conditions which will help to establish a stable peace
in the area. This is the point of starting these contacts
and the point from which these contacts must start. Egypt
can see different ways of moving towards this objective.
But Egypt does not wish to take steps into the dark and lose
its way. Egypt is therefore starting these discussions with
both eyes open, looking for opportunities that can be a basis
for normalization of the Middle East situation.
"If Egypt thinks that there is a good solution that
meets at least the minimum requirements of its people and
the people of the area, it will go ahead with it and will
not allow it to be vetoed by anybody. Only in this way can
the problem be settled so that both we and you are helped.
"Egypt appreciates the constructive attitude shown by
the US Government. I personally am highly honored to be
received by President Nixon. I am sure I will carry to him
a message from President Sadat. I am looking forward to
seeing Dr. Kissinger and hope our discussions will lead to
further meetings in a way appropriate. We sincerely hope
our contacts will be characterized by an early settlement."
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Official Communication of the Soviet Government
Applications of Soviet citizens who wish to leave the USSR for
permanent residence in other countries are considered, and decisions
concerning such applications are made on an individual basis, taking
account of concrete circumstances. As a rule these requests are
granted. For example, with regard to persons who in 1972 expressed
the desire to go to Israel permission was received by 95. 5% of those
who applied. A similar approach will be maintained in the future.
(It may be noted that more than 2000 persons who received permission
to leave for Israel in 1972 did not in fact make use of that permission.)
As regards the refunding of state educational expenses by Soviet
citizens leaving for permanent residence abroad, the decree of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of August 3, 1972, and a deci-
sion taken in accordance with it by the USSR Council of Ministers,
provide that Soviet citizens who receive permission to emigrate can be
exempted fully from refunding the expenses mentioned above. Accord-
ingly, Soviet authorities, in considering the applications of Soviet
citizens wishing to emigrate, have the right to decide that only state
duties normal in such cases be collected from such persons. The
authorities are now being guided by this right. Consequently, only such
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 2 -
normal and insignificant duties -- which were also collected before
the decree of August 3, 1972 -- are being collected, and will be
collected, from those persons who are leaving the Soviet Union for
permanent residence in other countries.
It goes without saying that as is true with other states, there
are cases in the USSR, and there may be such cases in the future,
where citizens are denied permission to go abroad for reasons of
state security.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
Mr. Avner Idan, Minister of the Israeli
Embassy
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
pm
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, April 11, 1973
6:20 - 6:50 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
The White House
Amb. Dinitz: We have two things to give you. One is the protocols of the
meetings with the Russians. / Tab The other is a book Yigal Allen asked me to
give you. He deliberately kept the dedication short--in case you had to show
it to someone.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't have to show it to anyone.
Amb. Dinitz: Perhaps he wanted you to show it to people!
Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to talk about the Egyptian discussions and where we
stand now. The best thing has been shown to you. What did I show you last
time?
Amb. Dinitz: The reply by Ismail that the terror should be discussed in other
channels.
Dr. Kissinger: Here are the messages since then. [Tab B] I have not sent an
answer, but I want to tell you what I will now tell him. [Dinitz and Idan read. ]
The main point I wanted to make to him in my message was that it depends on
what is in the Egyptian position whether there is any flexibility in the Israeli
position, not what we do on arms or otherwise. Here is what I will reply.
1) The White House has no commitment to engage itself. What we are
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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SECRET - XGDS (3)
DECLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-2-
trying to do is see if there is any chance for progress. Only then will we
engage ourselves. That is the purpose of discussion with him.
2) We don't know what the Israeli position is, because we have not been
given anything to transmit to Israel for their consideration. We can give no
assurances of the Israeli position.
3) If he wants to meet in Europe, it cannot be before May 9;when I have the
possibility of being in Europe.
I am trying to push it closest to the Summit.
Also another point, which does not concern you; is their leaking all over the
Middle East of their version. Has your intelligence picked this up?
Amb. Dinitz: No.
Dr. Kissinger: Anyway, the Saudis claim the Egyptians told them I was brutal--
that I said you were on the Canal and therefore there was no need for anything new.
I was brutal, but I did not say that. I said that the standard phrases should go
to Sisco. I wanted to discuss strategy, not tactics.
We have this problem, as I explained to Rabin and to your Prime Minister. The
more I operate within the framework of our understanding, the easier it looks.
But just because it looks easy, it does not mean it can be done indefinitely. I
have been stringing along the Russians for 18 months and the Egyptians for 10
months. I can do it another month or two. The Egyptians could not get them-
selves organized to get it done by May 9 or 10. Assuming it takes place then--
but that is not the problem- it then takes two or three weeks to assess. But
then two things could happen--the Soviets could put tremendous pressure, or the
Egyptians could start a but with the attitude of getting so much oil blown
up that there is tremendous pressure on the United States, coupled with a
Libyan boycott of Europe. This is what Sadat told deBorchgrave. Plus the
pressures here.
My concern, as I explained to Rabin and the Prime Minister, is that you are in
a very precarious situation here. In this government, there is almost no sup-
port here. If the Arabs generate a general crisis, on energy- it is not clear
they can do it, but the only thing that is holding them back is that they expect
that something can be done.
Ismail proposed that he and I agree on "heads of agreement, 11 that is basic prin-
ciples. Once these are accepted by Israel, they are prepared to have an interim
agreement to open the Canal, and simultaneously begin less indirect and more
direct talks with Israel on the substance of the agreeme nt summarized in the
"heads of agreement 11 I wonder if it is possible to get the heads general SO
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-3-
you and they could accept. I once thought of this in connection with the Summit--
so the United States and the USSR could agree and present it. You remember
last year I showed Rabin the general principles from last year.
The only advantage is that the Soviets could not back off them. The alternative
is to leave the Soviets out of it and have an agreement with them on heads. I
assume that when negotiations start, the pace is more under your control
than under ours. Second, I certainly explained our idea of Israeli security.
Maybe you have your ideas. They complained.
Amb. Dinitz: About yours or ours?
Dr. Kissinger: It is interesting in the Sadat interview, he referred to the
President's distinction between sovereignty and security and did not totally
reject it.
Amb. Dinitz: You should bear in mind that Borchgrave tends to shift the tone.
Dr. Kissinger: But in no case have they ever rejected--even here when we
ask for new proposals--they refer to Resolution 242, which does not mean a
hell of a lot.
Amb. Dinitz: But they cite Rogers' Plan.
Dr. Kissinger: True, but I won't accept that. I will reply "of course, 242. "
I will show you our reply. If you have any comments, of course we will take
them seriously. We will call you tomorrow and show you the reply.
Amb. Dinitz: Good.
Dr. Kissinger: I know it is an election year for you, and a hard time for a
decision. But I would like some idea of your strategic conception, whether we
can get some heads of agreeme nt that could give us some breathing space--
by, first, getting an interim agreement.
Amb. Dinitz: I will get the Government to look at this again.
Dr. Kissinger: This should be as closely held as possible.
Amb. Dinitz: Of course.
You said the situation could develop in which they would use the oil situation
and start a war, though they could not win, and generate pressure here.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-4-
There is no change in the substance of the Egyptian position.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. It would be harder to resist on our part. It would be
easier if a negotiating process were going on that if they can plausibly say
they are totally frustrated. I fear from our intelligence that they are trying
to maneuver me into being the cause of the frustration.
Amb. Dinitz: Our intelligence says they are trying systematically to create the
impression of an imminent war--but not only is there no prospect of accomplish-
ing it, but there are no concrete preparations. It is threats with an empty gun.
Especially on the eve of the Summit, they seek to put great pressure on the
United States to pressure Israel. This explains Sadat's speech of the 26th of
February and the deBorchgrave interview.
Whether they can use the oil situation, I don't know. Maybe if they were better
organized, but we know there are difficulties between the countries with the
oil and the countries who want to use the oil for political purposes but don't
have the oil.
It will be a sad thing if we are required to make concessions which won't be
matched.
Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, you are in an odd period of tranquility. You
have made your own assessment--but the reason for the absence of pressure
on you now is because I have not permitted anyone to move. I have told Rabin--
you have to be prepared.
I understand your problem. If you tell what you are prepared to do in extremis,
it is practically done.
Egypt may have the same problem. The smart thing for them would be to
talk directly.
Amb. Dinitz: That is our position.
Dr. Kissinger: There is no reason to press you now, but if I could have some
ideas
I will propose May 9 or 10. What I need is, (1) an idea of how the
process could get started, (2) how it could be prolonged, and (3) interim solu-
tion that could defuse the situation by showing movement and that we could
use as the next phase to gain more time.
Amb. Dinitz: Let me explain the mixup in our telephone conversation about
Elizur. It was a question of our eagerness to act on the instructions of the
Foreign Minister, before Eban could stop him.
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Dr. Kissinger: Our cables show it worked out very well.
[The Ambassador and Dr. Kissinger talked for the last five minutes alone. ]
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A
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Tab B
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Apr.7,1973
"a. Mr. Ismail thanks Dr. Kissinger for his
two consecutive messages. Mr. Ismail wishes to
share Dr. Kissinger's gratification with the manner
in which their last meeting was conducted.
"b. Mr. Ismail feels that the Egyptian-U.S.
relations are undergoing a transitional stage dur-
ing which we might be faced with difficulties of
the kind he referred to in his last message of
March 20, 1973. Such difficulties have to be over-
come in a spirit of moderation and by a mutually
sincere desire to achieve progress.
"c. Dr. Kissinger's last message states that
the issue for the U.S. Government is to see if it
can 'find an Egyptian position sufficiently dif-
ferent from previously established positions to
enable the U.S. to present its views seriously to
the other parties.' In this respect, Mr. Ismail
wishes to reaffirm that the Egyptian diplomatic
position is fully based on Security Council Re-
solution 242 and is in accordance with the inter-
pretation given by the Big Four Powers to said
resolution, including the U.S. Government inter-
pretation embodied in the U.S. plan of October 28,
1969, as well as Ambassador Jarring's memorandum
of February 8, 1971.
"d. Mr. Ismail welcomes Dr. Kissinger's readi-
ness to continue the dialogue which has been estab-
lished. In doing so, Mr. Ismail assumes the follow-
ing:
"(1) That the White House has in fact
decided to engage itself directly with the
Middle East problem, thus reaffirming the
message indicating such intention which was
conveyed to us during the summer of 1972.
"(2) That the U.S. side as a result of
explorations with Israel feels that there are
sufficient encouraging indications SO as to
render useful the Egyptian-U.S. dialogue. In
other words, Israel has shown to the U.S. side
its readiness to achieve substantial progress
towards an overall settlement during the next
few months.
"e. With this understanding Mr. Ismail proposes
that the next meeting, as has been previously suggested,
takes place during the current month of April in a third
country. He welcomes hearing from Dr. Kissinger his
proposals regarding two alternative dates for holding
such a meeting according to his convenience. Upon re-
ceiving Dr. Kissinger's suggestion, Mr. Ismail will in-
form him immediately of our preference in this regard."
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Israeli Ambassador Dinitz
Israeli Minister Avner Idan
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff our
DATE AND TIME:
Sunday, May 13, 1973
10:00 - 10:55 a. m.
PLACE:
The Map Room, The White House
Dinitz: I wanted to thank you for the meeting yesterday [with Eban], both
for having the meeting and for the skillful way you were able to swim between
the props!
Kissinger: It was easy -- he did all the talking!
I wanted to talk to you about Zavidovo, and to say a few words about
where we go from here. Because I don't share the Foreign Minister's
optimism. Because whatever it is objectively, it won't necessarily be
perceived this way.
About Zavidovo: Brezhnev made a very strong and quite violent statement
about the Middle East. He thought there were signs of imminent conflict.
He was afraid things were partly out of control, certainly over a period.
For domestic reasons he can't afford an outbreak now. He said they
can't afford a humiliation before or after the Summit.
So I started stalling. We discussed the general principles, as I have
been doing. They gave us these new principles [Tab A]. You can keep
them if you promise they won't surface.
Dinitz: They are worse than 1969.
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-2-
Kissinger: Oh yes. They give a much bigger role to the Palestinians.
Brezhnev was at that point so emotional that I met with Gromyko separately.
Issaid to him, "What's the difference from the Egyptian position? If we
are going to accept Egypt's position, we can do it ourselves directly.
If you want to do something with us, there has to be some difference."
He said, "Would you accept 100% Israeli withdrawal if we guaranteed
100% security?" I said, "I ve never heard of 100% security, even for
you. So that's a theoretical discussion."
He said, "How can we get a negotiation going?" I said, "We should have
some general principles that are so vague that both sides can interpret
them differently, but we can use them as an excuse for a Rhodes-type
negotiation. 11 He said a Rhodes-type negotiation was not excluded.
It's certain they will come back insistently after I see Ismail, and they
will be insistent at the Summit.
My personal judgment -- the President's would be more extreme -- is
that we're getting to the end of just delaying actions. With Connally coming
in, it's more true.
Supposing something like these principles of 1972 [Tab B] could be
submitted to the two parties, with the suggestion that negotiations would
begin on both an interim and an overall settlement, wouldn't this be the
best time-buying action?
The British, too, when I was in London, wanted us to join with them in
some interpreation of 242.
Dinitz: From what I saw of this last year, they were unacceptable to us.
Kissinger: They are no more unacceptable than 242.
Dinitz: Then why not stick to 242? If it's vague enough language.
Kissinger: I'm not your problem. I promised you six months respite
and we got 20 months.
Dinitz: I'm not complaining, Dr. Kissinger.
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Kissinger: In my view, we are running out of time.
You don't have to take a position now.
Dinitz: I'll pass this to the Prime Minister.
Kissinger: Can you make sure there is no possible leak? I'm sure the
Egyptians haven't seen this.
Dinitz: I have one or two remarks. We are not thinking on different lines
in trying to find a way the deadlock can be broken. I know some people
think we are trying to freeze the situation. We know the situation can't
last. But we are really at a loss. I had some exchanges with the Prime
Minister. Of the interim and overall, the interim has the greater chance
of reality.
Kissinger: Of course.
Dinitz: We know the Egyptians fear it will be frozen. In April, we had
language to assure them. We can go further. We can give you a mandate
to assure them we will go further in negotiations. You know our position;
we won't commit ourselves to a final position but we won't hold them to
one either.
Kissinger: We need some document that looks like a new set of principles
that can give them a face-saving way to proceed.
I have no illusions. The differences may in fact be unbridgeable. But
once negotiations begin between the parties, it is hard for outside parties
to impose any formula.
My expectation is that the interim settlement negotiation would be concluded
first. I frankly see no basis for an overall solution. I'm looking for
another two years time-wasting. I can see an interim solution, with
the negotiations on the overall continuing.
Dinitz: The Prime Minister wasn't clear about this when she was here.
Kissinger: It wasn't concrete then.
They want "heads of agreement. 11 We won't do it now either. But if we
can get sufficiently vague "heads of agreement, 11 they said they would
be prepared for negotiations on the interim and on the overall and for more
direct contact between you.
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-4-
Dinitz: They want to tie in the interim with the final. But I don't see
why they should be simultaneous. If you have the terms of reference
for a final, why discuss the interim at all?
Kissinger: Because the advantage of the interim, in my view, is that
it's something attainable.
Dinitz: I still don't understand how one can negotiate simultaneously.
Negotiating the final means negotiating the borders when there is peace;
what reason is there to negotiate then on withdrawal from the Canal?
Kissinger: Because the interim is the only thing attainable. They want
a negotiation on borders, but with skill we can get an interim settlement
but overall negotiations could go on for years.
We negotiated with the North Vietnamese for four years.
If I were conducting the negotiations, I'd propose two separate groups, one
to work on the interim and one on the overall. I have great confidence in
your skill.
Dinitz: What they have now done is attach the condition of total withdrawal
to the interim agreement. Automatically, this demand becomes part and
parcel of the negotiations on the interim. But what you had in mind was
that one will advance the other.
Kissinger: What I have in mind is to play for time. To get it so complex
Dinitz:
that no one knows what is going on. What I'm really
seriously concerned about is -- in all the moves on the interim agreement
there was no a single move on the part of the Egyptians. The last paper
they gave you was pure propaganda. It is worse than before.
Kissinger: Could you give me a written analysis of why it's worse -- before
I leave Wednesday?
Dinitz: Yes, it was a hardening of their position. They proposed proximity
talks.
Kissinger: No, Sisco proposed proximity talks.
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Idan: They accepted it.
Kissinger: When Sisco gives a half-hour speech and the other guy is
silent, he reports it as the other man's views.
Dinitz: Sisco gave a speech on the Israeli 25th anniversary celebration.
He said the Six-Day War was a myth, based on misunderstanding. I had
to get up and answer. Len Garment and Arthur Goldberg were there.
They said I did the right thing. If I hadn't said something, Sisco would
have thought I agreed with him.
Now they tie in also the question of the Palestinians to the interim.
Kissinger: I know. But I believe it is extremely useful to get some talks
started that you can manage, rather than that we manage, or the Russians,
or the British or French.
Dinitz: That is so.
Kissinger: I'm going to see Ismail now. We will probably meet for one
or two morning. I don't know what we're going to talk about, frankly, for
two mornings.
Dinitz: It's up to him to show what is new.
Kissinger: If I have a disciplined staff with me, I will go at a slow pace!
Dinitz: The onus should not be on Israel or the United States.
Kissinger: The objective pace of events is that by this time next year you
will face massive international pressure. The US will go along with it;
the British and French will join it -- and the Russians will organize it.
Dinitz: Because of oil?
Kissinger: It may be. It's a question of style how you deal with pressure,
whether to yield or confront it. It will be strong in this country.
You don't have to answer now. But your assessment of Ismail's last position
would be helpful.
And some statement of your position on the connection between the interim
and the overall. Can you give me some formal statement?
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-6-
Dinitz: By that time, Israel will be able to empower you to state in
the most formal way that Israel does not want to freeze the situation.
[Idan gives him a copy of a cable. ] The Prime Minister says to me
here it would be good if you can tell Hafez that the concern of Egypt
that a new line to which the Israeli Defense Forces will withdraw in
the framework of a Suez Canal settlement will turn into a permanent
border is a subject worth dealing with. You can say you are convinced
you will get from Israel a public and official clarification that it is not
the intention of the Government of Israel to turn this line into a permanent
line. This is in addition to what is in the agreement, which might be
a secret agreement. The most unequivocal public commitment of
Israel to withdraw to the final peace border. We know this is important
to Egypt to sell it to their people. The US will be able to give Egypt
assurance that this Israeli position is absolutely credible.
This is what I had in mind. We tried to consider what disturbs the Egyptians
and came to the conclusion it wasn't free passage, etc. but the fear of a
new status quo. We really don't want a new status quo.
Kissinger: My estimate of what you want is a straight line west of El Arish.
Dinitz: It might not be a straight line, because of the roads and the terrain.
To tell the truth, there are three different lines. But in general terms
you are right. In strategic terms we need sufficient depth to make it
secure. But three-quarters of Sinai would go back. And what we'd keep
is really of no value -- no ports, no towns. I really think it is reasonable!
Kissinger: Why couldn't you take it in the form of security zones instead
of annexation?
Dinitz: If someone else is sitting there, it's no good.
Kissinger: No, if you're sitting there. If you could get a formula that
gave you what you want substantively.
Dinitz: That could be considered.
Idan: I want to protect him. This is a private conversation.
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Kissinger: Of course. And I'm not insane enough to try to negotiate this
myself.
Dinitz: We distinguish between Sharm el-Sheik and the rest of the border
question.
On Sharm, when Rogers talked about a lease arrangement, the Prime
Minister said it wasn't offered to us so we don't have to take a public
position. On something like this, if the arrangement gave us military
control, there is a good chance it would pass the government. On the
borders, it entails a change in sovereignty. There was a government
decision.
There are theories. Allon once lectured to you about three defense zones:
One zone around Arish, Sharm and the airfield. But once we start negotiations,
our mind is open. We don't want to mislead you or the Egyptians.
Kissinger: You can't mislead me. In 1971, I told you if we started on the
interim you would gain nine months. We gained two years. Now I say
we need a new basis. You're not unresourceful in diplomacy. If we can
shift to a negotiation, you can take it.
Dinitz: We are resourceful, but they are not. They didn't give us a basis
for showing any flexibility.
Kissinger: In this round with Ismail, not much has to be done concretely.
But this will be the last one at which I can do this. What we have to avoid
is to allow him to use this to say the Americans let him down. This
would have domestic consequences. I'll be elliptical enough not to give
him a pretext for a break-off. The main problem is what the Russians
will do when they are here.
Dinitz: I have a clarifying question. I recall that last year there were seven
points in these principles, with two reserved. This says eight and one reserved.
Kissinger: But the eighth point wasn't agreed to. We've never accepted it.
Dinitz: I see. In the conversation Eban had in State, he raised the question
of arms. They told him in the most official matter that it rests with the
White House and the White House doesn't have the time to consider it.
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Kissinger: That is total nonsense. They've sent over a proposal which
was too much like their last one. I've made them redo it.
I told Saunders to get an option with more planes in the beginning of the
package. Option C.
Then I'll get it approved.
[Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred for the last ten minutes alone. ]
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translation
Tab 1
A
Draft
May 7,1473
Principles of Middle East Settlement
1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict
should be comprehensive, embracing all parties concerned and
all issues. This means the elaboration and implementation of a
set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighbouring
Arab countries directly involved in the conflict.
In the process of working out agreement on the whole complex
of questions relating to the settlement the possibility is not
precluded of this agreement being implemented by stages, or that
some questions may be resolved on a priority basis, while
remaining an integral component of the whole settlement.
2. The agreements should provide for the complete with-
drawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied in
1967, in conformity with the principle of the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by war.
The withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories
may be carried out by stages, within mutually agreed time-limits,
under international control.
3. The international lines of demarcation, which existed
between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries as of June 4,
1967 shall be recognized as the final boundaries between them.
4. The agreements should lead to the termination of the
state of belligerency and to the extablishment of peace among
the States Parties thereto on the basis of mutual acknowledg-
ment of and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity,
inviolability and political independence.
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2.
5. Measures should be provided for to meet the legitimate
rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The Palestine refugee
problem will be solved on a just basis and in accordance with
existing UN resolutions on the subject.
6. Measures to ensure on the basis of reciprocity the secu-
rity of Israel and the Arab. States Parties to the agreements may
include the extablishment of demilitarized zones, the temporary
stationing of UN personnel at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and the most ef-
fective international guarantees of the boundaries defined in the
agreements and of the settlement as a whole. The Soviet Union and
the United States would be prepared to participate in such
guarantees.
7. Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and
the Bay of Aqaba should be assured and the principle of the
freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal for vessels of all
countries, including Israel, should also be observed in confor-
mity with the Constantinople Convention of 1888.
8. Failure by either Party to implement any part of the
agreement would give the other party the right to refuse
respectively to implement its own obligations.
9. The Soviet Union and the United States proceed in their
policy in the Middle East from the assumption that all the
countries of the area are entitled to independent existence
and development as sovereign states in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations. Respect for the
sovereign rights of every state in the area is one of the basic
principles on which the settlement of the problems of the Middle
East should be Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Conformed text
B
Evening of 28 May 1972
General Working Principles
1. The agreement should be comprehensive, covering all parties
and issues. This does not preclude that the implementation occurs in
stages or that some issues are resolved on a priority basis.
2. The agreement should contain provisions for the withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied in 1967.
3. Any border rectifications, which may take place, should result
from voluntary agreement among the parties concerned.
4. Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized
zones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh,
and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate
participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency
and the establishment of peace.
6. Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez
Canal should be assured. This is fully consistent with Egyptian
sovereignty over the Canal.
7. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in
the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on
which the settlement must be based.
8. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a
just basis and in accordance with the appropriate UN decisions.
(Reserved by the US side)
The US position is that completion of the agreements should at some
stage involve negotiations among the signatories.
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff our
DATE AND TIME:
7:00 p.m. - 7:45 p.m.
Tuesday, May 15, 1973
PLACE:
Dr. Kissinger's Office
The White House
Amb. Dinitz: I have three short items, I got a reaction from the Prime
Minister on the material you passed to me.
First of all, she wants me to tell you she's aware of the negative develop-
ments that may emerge from the dialogue between you and Hafiz, both in
terms of a possible rupture between you and him and also a negative con-
tent regarding Israel.
Dr. Kissinger: That is not possible.
Amb. Dinitz: Nevertheless, she appreciates the advantage of keeping
negotiations with you and not in the State Department. Third, she has
reviewed the Soviet papers, Hafez's "propaganda paper", as we call his
last reply, and the summary of your conversations with him. She has
come to the conclusion that Egypt is not ready to engage in real negotia-
tions. On some points, these principles are worse than the Jarring
memo (on the Palestinian point and refugees), worse than the Egyptian
reply to the Jarring memo, and worse than the Rogers' plan.
Dr. Kissinger: I agree.
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Amb. Dinitz: Fourth, due to the wide gap between Egypt and Israel on
the overall, it is better to concentrate on the Suez agreement. The
statement I read to you at our last meeting stands, and she reconfirms
it.
As to your request for a formula for linking overall and the interim, you
can propose, as your own proposal.
Dr. Kissinger: Of course.
Amb. Dinitz:
the formula she used with you in the conversation of
December 1971. In the Preamble it can be said "In order to achieve
peace in accordance with (or in the framework of) Resolution 242".
Dr. Kissinger: Is this new to them?
Amb. Dinitz: Yes. We've never said that.
Dr. Kissinger: Can I say we're prepared to recommend this to you?
Amb. Dinitz: Yes. The Prime Minister would be happy if a movement
out of the deadlock can be achieved.
Dr. Kissinger: Can I read that? [The talking paper from which Dinitz
was reading is at Tab A.]
Amb. Dinitz: All right.
[Dr. Kissinger reads it. ]
Dr. Kissinger: If her only criticism is the UN personnel in Sharm, that
could be fixed.
Amb. Dinitz: I told her not to concentrate on this paper.
Dr. Kissinger: The only point on which I differ with you is this: I still
think if we can get heads of agreement that are satisfactory to you--which
will be so vague, and we wouldn't proceed without your concurrence-- and
get simultaneous negotiations going, if you're right, and the two negate
each other, you're still on the Canal. So what? If we get an interim
agreement, we've gained something. And you would gain time.
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We got another letter today from Brezhnev in which he was insistent
on discussing the Middle East at Summit. Let me read it to you: "As
for the international problems we always believed one of the most critical
issues is the Middle East. And now great dangers are in wait of us in
the Middle East. The developments there can take such a turn which
neither we, nor -- I believe -- you would like to happen. We frankly
expressed to Dr. Kissinger our appraisal of the present situation. Our
statements might have sounded quite blunt to Dr. Kissinger, yet the
bluntness is dictated by the explosiveness of the situation itself.
"In the conversation with Dr. Kissinger it was said -- and I would like
to repeat it to you personally -- that if the main question of withdrawal of
Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, is settled,
then all the other questions, including those of the security of Israel,
can be solved; frankly speaking, they will not then be an obstacle for the
settlement. And it is the leaders of Israel themselves who constantly
maintain, that those are the very questions, i.e., the questions of
security, which concern them. 11
You remember I told you Sunday he said if you withdraw 100 percent
they would guarantee 100 percent security. I told him not even the Soviet
Union had 100 percent security.
"Dr. Kissinger also offered a number of considerations on how, in the
U.S. opinion, it would be possible to act further on the questions of the
Middle East settlement. Certain ideas, expressed by him, went, in
our view, in the direction of facilitating the search of a solution. But,
frankly speaking, there is a lack of completeness here. We hope that
necessary clarity will be added to the U.S. position on this question
when we receive the communication from you on that matter, as was
promised by Dr. Kissinger, within two weeks after his return to
Washington."
I told him I couldn't until I saw Ismail.
"We, on our part, are prepared to work on the Middle East problem,
sparing neither time nor efforts, before my visit to the U.S. There may
not be any doubt that the fixation at our meeting on exact and clear under-
standing between ourselves regarding the ways of the Middle East
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settlement on a just and solid basis would be another major milestone
both in the relations between our countries and in the normalization of
the world situation as a whole. I believe that this is a feasible task
and the achievement of such mutual understanding would undoubtedly
give a due impetus to the peaceful settlement."
Amb. Dinitz: What do they want from you in two weeks?
Dr. Kissinger: I said we needed general principles- but I didn't tell
them what they'd be.
Amb. Dinitz: They want your principles?
Dr. Kissinger: I said they could be related to what we discussed in
May 1972 but I didn't spell them out.
If we can come up with principles you find acceptable, and if Egypt could
accept--which may be impossible, frankly--then the fact that negotiations
are simultaneous shouldn't be a problem.
Amb. Dinitz: There are two problems: If they are based on the 1972
paper, in present form they're unacceptable.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand.
Amb. Dinitz: You say simultaneous negotiations. You can see from the
paper that she doesn't believe in it.
Dr. Kissinger: But if it doesn't work, you stay on the Canal.
Amb. Dinitz: You think it can work better.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think it would work better, but if Egypt can use
this as an excuse to say they got simultaneous negotiations and a new set
of principles- which would have to be acceptable to you--it's not a defeat.
Amb. Dinitz: But the 1972 paper is not acceptable.
My difficulty also in simultaneous negotiations, regardless of heads of
agreement, is: in the sense that if there is a block with the overall,
they [the obstacles] would project themselves also on the interim.
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Dr. Kissinger: But so what?
Amb. Dinitz: You say the onus wouldn't be on us?
Dr. Kissinger: I'd rely on your skill to protract this for a long time.
Amb. Dinitz: But we would also protract the Canal settlement. The
Prime Minister's view is that the interim would be blocked by con-
cessions we don't make in the overall.
On arms, in the provision as you said for one a month, then 48 is okay.
I recommended to the Prime Minister that we accept this. To take it
away from all possible things that could evolve-the summit, the U.N.
debate, the oil crisis.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Amb. Dinitz: I am instructed officially to tell you to go ahead on that
basis.
One last item--I would prefer you not to take notes.
I have been meeting with Jewish leaders, not so much on the trade ques-
tion as on Brezhnev's visit, to try to make sure there is no trouble.
Dr. Kissinger: Good.
Amb. Dinitz: But it would be helpful if you could meet with three of them
when you get back from Paris. It's one thing for me to know you received
these assurances from the Soviet Government about not applying the exit
tax and allowing a flow of 36, 000 a year. But I can't tell them I got it
from you. Some are walking around saying they haven't heard anything
from the White House because nothing has been done.
Dr. Kissinger: You know that for me to become the focal point for them
would be a disaster.
Amb. Dinitz: Or someone else in the White House. Just so they are told
what is being done.
[Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred for the last few minutes alone. ]
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Rabin
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Rodman
DATE AND TIME:
February 22, 1973, 3:30 - 4:00 p.m.
PLACE:
Military Aide's Office
The White House
Ambassador Rabin: Sisco talked to me this morning and yesterday. I
said to him as to you about the Libyan business
Mr. Kissinger: Basically, it's a bore to me, unless you have something
for me that is not previously known. It is the sort of problem that will go
away in a few days.
Ambassador Rabin: I said that to Sisco. I said this meeting with Ismail
and President is something new. Let's at our own level distinguish between
the basic issues and incidents like this.
"
Mr. Kissinger: What did Sisco want?
Ambassador Rabin: Something on the airplane incident.
My people did not follow my advice. They are holding lots of press conferences,
with the pilots and so forth, to defend themselves.
Mr. Kissinger: That's a mistake. It keeps the issue alive.
Ambassador Rabin: I said they were fools. I said to them, the more detail
you give the more it becomes clear that more and more people were involved,
for a longer time, at a higher level. The basic issue then is a higher-level
decision to open fire on a civilian airliner.
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Mr. Kissinger: Right, why did they do it?
Ambassador Rabin: They are fools. I told them to pipe down.
Mr. Kissinger: What worries me is if the Arabs learn that at every crisis
Sisco goes into his usual pattern, there will be more crises.
Ambassador Rabin: I said to Sisco, let's talk about the two visits. He
said the two visits will be under the shadow of the incident. I said, yes,
publicly, but it should not be so on a government-to-government level.
Secondly, I asked him what do you have on Ismail? Sisco said there was
a report on Ismail's talks in London but he had not read it. I said, come
on, Joe. I told him I was suspicious about Ismail's pressing to come
prior to the Prime Minister's visit.
Mr. Kissinger: That's not fair to me.
Ambassador Rabin: I asked Sisco, how did Ismail manage to insert his
own visit before Golda? He said they would like to prevent the President
from committing himself to Golda to give us planes.
I said to Sisco: what he'll bring with him in terms of political ideas I don't
know. Will he agree to an interim settlement? Will he agree to an interim
if it is linked to an overall settlement? I said I thought he would try to
link beginning negotiations with U. S. military assistance to Israel. This
is the only reason he would have to insert his visit before Golda. Sisco
said "I cannot say you are wrong, I think they will."
Mr. Kissinger: That's a pack of lies. We are right back where we were
before. In London Ismail was so intransigent that even the British thought
there was no hope for any progress.
Ambassador Rabin: He said the same things to Greene, too.
Mr. Kissinger: That does not exclude that he will give me something.
But in London he refused to agree to any direct talks with Israel, he refused
any discussion of the interim settlement -- only a total settlement. Like
in this Yugoslav paper, it all had to be linked. Even the British felt there
was no hope at all for any negotiation.
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Ambassador Rabin: Sisco refused to give us any information at all about
Greene and Ismail -- because of the kind of a position that Ismail took.
Mr. Kissinger: That's right.
Ambassador Rabin: I have never heard any Egyptian talk in such a brutal
uncompromising way as he talked to Greene before he went to Moscow.
Mr. Kissinger: But since he is now dealing on two tracks, it makes sense
to keep tough with State and to make any concessions -- if there are going
to be any concessions -- to me. He was totally intransigent with the British.
He was even tougher than with the Yugoslav. I can assure you that our
report from the British is that he was totally intransignet, and Home
concluded that there was no hope whatever, and that there was nothing
they could support in the way of any negotiation.
The British know from the Heath visit that I am seeing Ismail alone. So
I yesterday asked Cromer for a special report.
I am seeing Ismail Sunday and Monday in a suburb of New York. I will
present nothing. I will present no proposal of any kind. My line will be --
and this will quickly find out what his line is -- that I have absolutely no
contribution to make if they continue the pattern that has been going on.
I will suggest that if there is nothing new they can continue to talk to State
and in the United Nations.
Ambassador Rabin: I think he will stick to the same line.
Mr. Kissinger: What is the line? Let me show you the message he sent
to me. [Tab A, Statement made by Ismail to Trone in Cairo on February 13]
Ambassador Rabin: That says nothing. That says nothing.
Mr. Kissinger: That's all I know about the subject.
Ambassador Rabin: Practically nothing, because it stresses the Egyptian
leadership role. This means he has to meet Egyptian national needs as
well as the overall Arab world requirements. This is a tough beginning.
I am more involved than you are in studying these Arab formulations.
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-4-
Mr. Kissinger: I know. I will tell him that right away.
Ambassador Rabin: The most uncompromising formula was the one
Sadat gave to Jarring in February 1970. It cleverly distinguished between
an agreement between Israel and Egypt, the essence of which is total
withdrawal, but without committing Egypt on the issues that are really
necessary for peace. Their basic strategy is to distinguish between the
two phases of the struggle -- Nasser called it land and people.
Eliminating the consequences of aggression is one part of it. This is
the difference between Syria and Egypt. For Syria the struggle is one
protracted war, and there is no distinction between Golan and the rest.
And he says it here.
Mr. Kissinger: You mean the three kinds of countries, the confrontation
states and the other kinds of states?
Ambassador Rabin: That's the way they would like to mobilize their Arab
friends.
You see how they lie to the Jordanians.
Mr. Kissinger: And to the Yugoslavs, too. They lied to the Yugoslavs.
I have reviewed the record of our contacts. They started it in April, not
we.
Ambassador Rabin: I explained that to the Prime Minister.
What I meant was, they state their intentions here [Ismail-Miskovic mem-
con, Tab B]. Their objectives are to weaken the link between the U.S. and
Israel. They say there is no possibility of having peace unless after the
solution of the armed struggle. After the Israelis withdraw from the
territories, then there will be a peace conference. You see these terms
"Israeli entity" and "Palestinian entity. 11 This is very clever use of the
concepts you use in Vietnam. It's what you are accustomed to.
Mr. Kissinger: I am accustomed to negotiations on the basis of reality.
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Ambassador Rabin: Basically they have found a new formula which you
used in your press conference; namely, the separation of military and
political issues. The military issues will be the territories, and the
political issue will be the settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.
Mr. Kissinger: That works in your favor.
Ambassador Rabin: If the people who are going to discuss this with Ismail
are clever.
Mr. Kissinger: They are not clever.
You have a massive problem, in that there is great desire here to achieve
another spectacular success.
Ambassador Rabin: I do not know why the Prime Minister allowed the raid
into Lebanon. When I was Chief of Staff, whenever we were trying to achieve
something from the United States in the political arena, I piped everything
down.
Mr. Kissinger: What do you think is the reason for these moves?
Ambassador Rabin: Frankly I think the only motive is Dayan's desire to
prevent a successful visit by the Prime Minister. Because his chances
are better if she retires before the election. It is a political year.
Mr. Kissinger: My strategy with Ismail will be to say next to nothing,
or to speak at such a level of generality that it doesn't mean anything.
Chou En-lai was asked at a press conference about me and he said the only
man who can talk a half hour to the press without saying anything is Henry
Kissinger. I mentioned this to Chou. He said, no not a half hour, an hour
and a half.
I will start this way: "I want a serious talk with you, I don't know anything,
I have not dealt with the Middle East lately. I've been preoccupied with
Vietnam as you know. I have not had a chance to prepare myself adequately.
If you think I am a miracle worker, remember that every negotiation I
have been involved in took years to complete. The Vietnam negotiations
took four years. The SALT negotiations took three years. So there cannot
be a quick solution. Secondly, I promise nothing that I cannot deliver,
therefore I can promise nothing. Thirdly, from a viewpoint of an outsider,
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I see no hope whatever in the normal methods -- the United Nations,
Resolution 242. If you think there is hope in these methods, pursue them
through the State Department. If you have something new, I will listen
to it. "
I will make no proposals to them, no promises. I may make philosophical
statements, such as that any settlement in the Middle East will inevitably
leave both sides equally unhappy, and that running back and forth trying
to trick two sides into an agreement by some procedure only leads to
disaster. [Laughter] But as to concrete solutions, I will have nothing to
present to them.
Ambassador Rabin: So you will stress these themes: that you are a new-
comer, that you are not prepared and that you are not a miracle worker.
Mr. Kissinger: Right. First of all, I do not have a plan. I will never
propose a plan that I have not discussed with you and have your approval
on -- since any solution has to have your approval anyway.
Take my negotiations with Le Duc Tho. First, I controlled all our assets.
Here, my position is not as strong as it was when dealing with Vietnam.
Secondly, in any time frame, my strategy is totally different from the
Sisco strategy. My strategy is to give them just enough to keep them
talking but never to give them much until they make a massive move.
With Le Duc Tho three years were spent in abstract discussion. This
summer we discussed possible approaches to a political settlement which
I knew were unacceptable -- until they dropped the whole idea of a political
settlement.
Nothing will come out of this meeting unless they come in with a new
proposal. And if they do that, I will tell them I will study it. My guess
from these papers is that they will not have a new proposal.
After this I will leave it that we will stay in touch and see if we should
have another meeting.
Contrary to Rogers and Sisco, I believe I should sell my involvement only
in return for something from them. At this meeting I have to let them feel
we are taking them seriously; otherwise there would not be enough to fill
two hours, let alone two days.
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-7-
I do not know what's going to happen. I will be seeing you Wednesday
morning.
Ambassador Rabin: Can I see you before then?
Mr. Kissinger: Sure. Maybe Tuesday or Monday afternoon.
Ambassador Rabin: Because I would like to get something from you before
Wednesday morning, so the Prime Minister and I can consider it.
Mr. Kissinger: I will do it no later than Tuesday. Where will you be, in
New York?
Ambassador Rabin: Here in Washington.
Mr. Kissinger: If I get back Monday afternoon, I will talk to you Monday
afternoon. If I get back Monday night, I will see you Tuesday.
Ambassador Rabin: She will want to discuss with you after thinking over
the meaning of what happened with Ismail.
Mr. Kissinger: On Vietnam, I knew what I wanted. Here I would not know
how to speed up the process even if I wanted to. I do not want to speed it
up, so you need not worry about something coming out of this meeting.
Ambassador Rabin: There will also be meetings with Rogers and Richardson.
With Richardson there are three items: self-sufficiency in production, the
Phantoms, and reciprocity.
Mr. Kissinger: What is reciprocity?
Ambassador Rabin: Waiving the Buy American Act.
Mr. Kissinger: What do you want to take up with the President?
Ambassador Rabin: The political issue, and planes and numbers, to get a
commitment after 1973 of on-going supplies of planes to Israel. Let us
stick to the present policies, maintenance of the balance, until and unless
there is a change in the policy of the other side.
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-8-
I hope the production question will get a positive response from Richardson.
Mr. Kissinger: Let me know.
Ambassador Rabin: On production I will let Richardson be the good guy.
For the President, then there would remain only discussion of the political
issue and the question of the principle of maintaining the balance.
Mr. Kissinger: My advice is do not give him a lecture that nothing can be
done. Mention the interim settlement, mention the principles you gave to
me last January, those five principles.
Ambassador Rabin: Yes.
Rush wanted to cut our credit. It is so stupid. What Israel gets from the
United States Government is $300 million in credits in the Military Sales
Act, out of the total of $400 million. We are a cover for the U. S. Govern-
ment; because of us they get these credits from Congress. It effectively
releases $150 million for the United States Government for credits for
other countries, mainly Southeast Asia. I tell Rush, do you want us to
tell the Congress the deal we worked out?
Mr. Kissinger: At the meeting there will be Dinitz, you and the Prime
Minister?
Ambassador Rabin: Yes.
Mr. Kissinger: On our side it will be me and Rodman. One other thing.
In China for the first time there was a discussion on the Middle East.
Their only interest is keeping the Russians out of the Middle East and
their whole strategy is for that. They said they are not meddling. I
said, "Yes, but we have one difference, you are against the existence of
Israel. 11 He said, "No, we just raise the moral issue of the Palestinians. "
After a long discussion, Chou said that if Israel goes to the 1967 borders,
they are prepared to recognize it. "We are against imperialism, not
against Israel. In any case, we will do nothing to distrub the situation. 11
Ambassador Rabin: That's very interesting.
Mr. Kissinger: It's a beginning.
[From 4:15 to 4:30 Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred privately. ]
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
Minister Avner Idan
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff
pm
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, April 12, 1973
1:30 - 1:45 p.m.
PLACE:
Military Aide's Office
The White House
The meeting was arranged so that Mr. Rodman could show the Ambassador,
as Mr. Kissinger had promised, the US draft reply to Mr. Ismail [Tab A].
The Ambassador and Minister Idan read the draft and returned it. Minister
Idan took about a half page of notes on his note pad.
The Ambassador then raised the following subjects.
Dr. Kissinger had promised at their last meeting that he would be able to
meet Foreign Minister Eban for breakfast on May 9. However, the
draft reply to Ismail suggested a possible meeting with Ismail in Europe
on May 9. Did this mean the breakfast with Eban was off? Mr. Rodman
replied that it was all tentative at this point, and he asked how long
Foreign Minister Eban would be in this country. The Ambassador replied
that Eban would be in this country from the 8th to the 20th of May, and
he volunteered that another date could probably be arranged if necessary.
The Ambassador then stated that he had received a cable from the Prime
Minister in response to his report of yesterday's meeting with Dr.
Kissinger, at wheih Dr. Kissinger had outlined the likely substance of our
reply to Ismail. The Prime Minister had asked the Ambassador personally
to convey to Dr. Kissinger, that he would appreciate an opportunity to
comment on our proposed reply. Dr. Kissinger had said the day before
that he would take any Israeli comments very seriously; therefore, she
would like to have a chance to make her own comments. At the latest
we would have her comments by early the next morning. The Ambassador
wondered if this was satisfactory to Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Rodman said
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2
he would check immediately.
The Ambassador then said he had his own personal comment to make on the
draft reply. Dr. Kissinger in the draft message to Ismail said that the
heads of agreement "would of course be based on Resolution 242. " Normally
such a reply would be sufficient. But since the Egyptian message had
explicitly referred to 242 as interpreted by the Four Powers and in the
Rogers Plan, Dr. Kissinger's refusal to comment on that might be read as not
challenging it. The Ambassador suggested some language such as "Resolu-
tion 242, but not according to any interpretations that have been given, " or
any other language that makes the same point. This would be more in
line with Dr. Kissinger's ple.dge elsewhere in the message "not to mislead
Egypt. "
The Ambassador also expressed the hope that if Ismail did send us preliminary
"heads of agreement¹ before the next Kissinger-Ismail meeting, it would
be useful if the Israelis could see them. "Maybe it would help us formulate
our own suggestions or thinking on the matter, 11 the Ambassador suggested.
Mr. Rodman said he would check this with Mr. Kissinger also.
TheAmbassador also asked as a favor if they could have another look at
Ismail's message of April 7, which Dr. Kissinger had shown them yesterday.
They would just appreciate another chance to take a few notes on it. This
could wait until the next day, i.e. when they brought the Prime Minister's
comments. Mr. Rodman said he would look into that.
Finally, the Ambassador raised the question of airplanes once again, which
had been discussed with Dr. Kissinger at the last meeting before he went
to California. Mr. Rodman assured him that we had not forgotten. Immedi-
ately after the previous day's meeting with Dr. Kissinger had asked
General Scowcroft to check with the bureaucracy on where this stood, and
we would let them know.
[The meeting thereupon ended. Ambassador Dinitz spoke with Dr. Kissinger
by phone the next day after receiving the Prime Minister's comments.
See telecon at Tab B.]
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Tab A
Shown to Dinitz
12/4/73
1.
Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's thoughtful message of
April 7.
2.
Dr. Kissinger agrees that US-Egyptian relations require patience,
moderation and wisdom on both sides. For its part, the US will make a
sincere and serious effort to put this relationship on a new basis.
3.
With respect to Mr. Ismail's assumptions, the US position is as
follows:
a. The White House has engaged itself in a serious effort
to determine whether it can play a useful role. It will not mis-
lead Egypt, but promise only what it believes it can deliver.
b. The United States is not certain about Israel's reaction
since it has sought to avoid theoretical discussions. Dr. Kissinger's
understanding was that the next meeting would involve a discussion
of what Mr. Ismail called heads of agreement which could serve as
a link to the opening of the Suez Canal as well as the overall
agreement. These would, of course, be based on Security
Council Resolution 242.
4.
Within this context, the US affirms its serious interest in movement
toward a peace agreement. To provide for a fruitful discussion, the US
side assumes that the Egyptian side will be prepared to put forward its
precise ideas on the issues raised at the last meeting. As discussed then,
it might be useful if some of those could be sent in advance.
5.
Dr. Kissinger would welcome another meeting. He would prefer
to meet in the US and would find it difficult to make a special trip to Europe
at this time. However, there is a possibility that he may be in Europe
for other business and that he could arrange to meet around May 9 or 10.
If Mr. Ismail agrees, Dr. Kissinger will send Dr. Trone to Egypt to work
out modalities.
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