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    "ocrText": "MEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nIsraeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz\nMinister Avner Idan\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger\nPeter Rodman, NSC Staff pm\nDATE AND TIME:\nFriday, March 30, 1973\n12:00 -12:40 p.m.\nPLACE:\nMilitary Aide's Office\nEast Wing, White House\nAmb. Dinitz: I appreciate very much that you can see me so soon. I just\narrived last night.\nDr. Kissinger: We are going to California this afternoon.\nAmb. Dinitz: Mrs. Meir sends her regards to you. I saw her last night\nbefore I left.\nDr. Kissinger: You can be sure we will work with you with the same open-\nness that we had with your predecessor.\nRmb. Dinitz: I appreciate that, I will do as little as possible to disturb\nyou.\nDr. Kissinger: No, you should do whatever is necessary.\nAmb. Dinitz: I have a few items to raise with you. First, about the\nmeetings with Primakov. This was the third time we met him. He was in\nIsrael three years ago, when he met with the Prime Minister, the Minister\nof Defense and also myself. He said nothing of substance at that time.\nHe just said that it was good for us to have an exchange of views. Then\nthere was a more elaborate meeting that he had in Europe with Gazit\nin 1971. We told you about that. This time he asked for ameeting on his\nown initiative, not on ours. I should be more correct. Four months\nago we wrote a letter responding to their letter after the 1971 meeting.\nThey had said that it was a good meeting and they raised the possibility\nof other meetings. So we said we would be prepared if they were interested.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED TOP SECRET - XGDS (3)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nGER\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n2\nTwo weeks ago, they replied.\nThe meeting took place in Vienna. It lasted eight hours, over three different\nsessions. The instructions that the Prime Minister issued to Gazit were\nthat it was important to keep the pace of these meetings such as not to\ndisturb the efforts of Dr. Kissinger.\nDr. Kissinger: She is so eager that I succeed!\nAmb. Dinitz: We didn't value so much the contact but we couldn't say no.\nDr. Kissinger: No, you did the right thing.\nAmb. Dinitz: He came with Kotov, who had been Second Secretary in their\nEmbassy in Israel. The main point of the conversation was that they were\ntrying to tell our representative that we had to enter detailed negotiations\nwith them. \"The time is past for general remarks. We put forth proposals\nin 1969 and you didn't negotiate. \" They wanted a mandate from us for the\nSoviets to play a role in the Middle East. \"Don't assume that things can\nmove without us. \" They were particularly disturbed that we were working\nonly with the Americans. \"Don't overestimate the events of July, 1972.\nIt is not so important; we are still there, with friends and arms. \"\nThroughout this discussion there was this veil of threats.\nThey said, \"Frankly our position is in support of the Arab case, but we are\ndifferent in that we support the survival and existence of Israel. Therefore,\nwe don't support the lelements in the Middle East that want your destruction. \"\nThey wanted ourppositions and they wanted negotiations. They said they\nwere prepared to talk without prior conditions. They were SO anxious for\ntalks that they said--in the unofficial conversation-- that they were prepared\nto send an official to Israel in a secret manner. We asked about the\nidea of sending an Israeli representative to Moscow. They were not\nparticularly anxious for this. They said that an Israeli presence in\nMoscow would be an attraction to Soviet Jews.\nOn the question of Soviet Jews, he said that they were letting people out\nand no ransom was being collected. He did not think the number of Jews\nleaving would increase. He was quite reluctant to discuss the whole\nsubject.\nThis covers the discussions. You may remember that they asked Ismail when\nhe was in Moscow how the Arabs would look on it if the Soviets opened a\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n3\ndialogue with Israel. The Soviets explained it to him as something that\nwould be good for the Arabs, as a form of pressure on Israel. That is\nhow we see to embarrass the efforts we are taking with the United\nStates.\nDr. Kissinger: I don't think they know where they are going either. We have\nno objection to your talking, as long as we keep each other informed.\nWe are following the strategy I explained to your Prime Minister. We are\npushing nothing, we are wasting time. We are using the Egyptians to\nkill off talks with the Russians. The Egyptians also told them to stay\nout, so we are not under great pressure from them at the moment.\nHere was a message I received from Ismail. [Tab A] I sent him a message\nabout the Khartoum incident and this was his reply. I told you we might\nmeet again with them around April 10. This is now impossible. If they\nbehave stupidly, we can put it off until May.\nAmb. Dinitz: Is there a new date?\nDr. Kissinger: No, I am waiting for their proposal. It is now impossible\nbefore early May, just as a matter of logistics. They may get in touch\nwith us by next week, say April 5 or 6. I think it will take two or three\nweeks. Then I have to reply. Then, if I know them, they will make some\nconditions.\nThis is their dilemma. I told them I won't talk to them unless they have\nsomething new and different from the public position. You saw that even in\nthe Sadat speech. If they give me something new that doesn't lead any-\nwhere - That they have to resolve first.\nAmb. Dinitz: Did the Russians raise it?\nDr. Kissinger: They raised it, but I told them what I told you. I told Ismail\nthat he had to press the Russians not to press us on details but only on\nprinciples. Apparently he did it, because the Russians have not been\npressing us since then. So with the Russians there is practically nothing\ngoing on.\nAs for the summit, a date has not yet been set, but it will probably be this\nsummer.\nIt looks like a real dilemma for them.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY I EYES ONLY\n4\nAmb. Dinitz: Yes, and part of this dilemma is shared by the Russians.\nDr. Kissinger: I will take no initiatives. I will react in a slow-moving way\nto their proposals. If it moves slowly and drags through the summit, that\nis their problem. I am not aiming at a Nobel Prize on the Middle East.\nAmb. Dinitz: Those who aim for it don't get it!\nDr. Kissinger: But I still think you should be intellectually prepared\nAs\nyour predecessor and Mr. Idan can tell you, you have been saved by an\naccidental combination of circumstances. But at any moment it could\nAmb. Dinitz: Explode.\nDr. Kissinger: The Russians and now the Egyptians have been behaving\nstupidly, and our domestic situation has not crystalized. But you have\nto be prepared for a sudden purposeful and intelligent push. When\nyour Prime Minister was here I thought it would crestalize before the\nsummit. I was wrong then; I may be wrong now.\nI will wait for them. I will make a non-substantive reply. I am not going\nto propose a meeting. They will have to propose a date. We won't accept\nthe date they propose. And Brezhnev is going to Germany. That will\ntake his time.\nI must repeat what I told your Prime Minister and your Ambassador. You\nshould think about eventual negotiations.\nOne other matter, the Most Favored Nation business. You will really lose\nthe President if the Jewish community continues its behavior here on the\nMFN. I know your influence is not complete. We are talking to the\nRussians about the exit tax, and I hope that before I return from San\nClemente I can get authorization to tell you the assuranced they have\ngiven, but have not authorized me to tell you. We can't get a formal\nwritten commitment.\nBut I talked to teh President this morning and he is really determined on\nthis. He will not let one segment of the American public hold up American\nforeign policy.\nAmb. Dinitz: You are right that we do not have great influence. Especially\non an issue as emotional as this. Israel cannot go to American Jews and\ntell them not to be concerned.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n5\nDr. Kissinger: I talked with Dobrynin today and that is when he gave\nme these assurances. There is no dispute over the merits; I am totally\nout of sympathy with them. The issue for American Jews is whether a\nmajor American foreign policy can be wrecked. What if the President went\non television and spoke against Jewish pressure?\nThere is a second problem. I read in the paper today that some of these\ngroups are planning domonstrations against Brezhnev when he comes\nhere. When Pompidou was here and this happened, it produced an\noutburst by the President.\nBut this is all in the future.\nAmb. Dinitz: Maybe by the time Brezhnev comes it will have changed.\nThey are anxious too.\nDr. Kissinger: Believe me, we are pressing them. But if we did it in a\nformal note they would have to reject it. But we are raising it in\nmy channel. I raise it on every occasion.\nAmb. Dinitz: Yes, we appreciate it, and the President raised it too.\nDr. Kissinger: Yes.\nAmb. Dinitz: May I remind you about Houphouet-Boigny. It would be\ngood if he could come here.\nDr. Kissinger: He will definitely be invited certainly this year, in the\nsecond half of the year. He is on the list.\nAmb. Dinitz: My people say that there has been no advnace on the aircraft.\nDr. Kissinger: On production?\nAmb. Dinitz: On production it is fine.\nMinister Idan: Its all O. K.\nAmb. Dinitz: But on the purchase there has been no movement.\nMinister Idan: I inquired several times and our Military Attache has\ninquired several times.\nDr. Kissinger:\nI don't know why our military think that you will make\nonly a hundred planes!\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n6\nMinister Idan: Your people tell us they are working on a long-range\nplan for 4 years.\nDr. Kissinger: The instruction I gave was for a substantial number. I\ncouldn't give a number. You are better off with a four-year program,\naren't you?\nMinister Idan: Yes, but I think they are thinking of stretching the same\nnumber over a longer period.\nDr. Kissinger: I will check it.\nAmb. Dinitz: I have one last point. Foreign Minister Eban is coming to\nthe United States on the 9th or 10th of May. He has a meeting with the\nSecretary of State on May 9. Last time he came he missed you. He had a cold.\nDr. Kissinger: Yes, he lost his voice, and for Eban to lose his voice is\nan affliction of God, not a disease!\nAmb. Dinitz: He asked me to see if you would be able to see him.\nDr. Kissinger: Sure. Call my office and arrange it.\nAmb. Dinitz: How about breakfast on the 9th?\nDr. Kissinger: Fine. The Shoreham is slightly more convenient.\nHave you presented your credentials yet?\nAmb. Dinitz: No,and I was not sure if it was proper for me to come here.\nDr. Kissinger: It makes no difference at all to our relationship.\nAmb. Dinitz: We appreciate it. We will have for you the protocols of\nthe meetings with the Russian.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY_EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 8A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nACTION\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMay 11, 1973\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nPETER W. RODMAN June\nSUBJECT:\nYour Meeting with Abba Eban\nSaturday, May 12, 1973\nDinitz just called me to let you know that Eban knows of your Ismail contacts\nonly in the most general terms. Eban is not clued in on the communications\nbetween the White House and the Prime Minister on the subject, nor has\nhe been informed of the date of your next meeting with Ismail. Similarly,\nhe is not privy to the recent exchanges of military intelligence, including\nthe communications from Hussein.\nDinitz thus urges that if you raise any of this in your meeting, you should\nnot imply that Dinitz has had foreknowledge.\nIf you want more detailed consultation with the Israelis in advance of\nyour Paris trip, you might want a separate meeting with Dinitz next\nMonday or Tuesday. Should Campbell set aside some time for this?\nYes\nNo\nDinitz also suggested that Eban would prefer that his meeting with you be\npublicly announced. Eban had said a few times before coming over that\nhe looked forward to seeing Kissinger.\nIf you approve, I can tell Dinitz now that it is okay for them to confirm,\nafter the fact, that a meeting has taken place.\nYes\nNo\nAlso, we can then have the meeting in your office instead of the Map Room.\nYes\nNo\nCC: Scowcroft\nCampbell\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCECUSSWELLY EYES ONLY\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nB\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTab B\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nINFO\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nJune 4, 1973\nMEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nPeter W. Rodman MR\nSUBJECT: Dinitz Presentation to Sisco on Phantoms to Saudi Arabia\nSaturday Dinitz promised you a paper setting out the presentation he made\nto Sisco protesting the U.S. sale of Phantoms to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.\nHe delivered it today. (Tab A)\nHK\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nMinister Mordechai Shalev of Israel\nPeter W. Rodman, NSC Staff\nDATE AND TIME:\nWednesday, July 25, 1973\n10:30 - 11:00 a. m.\nPLACE:\nIsraeli Embassy\nWashington, D. C.\nMinister Shalev: As you know, there is a Security Council debate, and the\nlast time the Ambassador told Dr. Kissinger our view on the subject of the\npassage on the Palestinians in the [U. S. -Soviet] Joint Communique and its\npossible detrimental effect on the UN Security Council resolution and on\nother aspects.\nWe saw Sisco on Thursday and the subject was the Security Council debate.\nWe stressed also that any changes in 242 -- any additions, subtractions or\ninterpretations -- might result in our withdrawing our acceptance of 242.\nAlso, that it would put into question the possible visit by the UN Secretary-\nGeneral to Israel. I must say in our discussion with Sisco we were quite\nsatisfied with his responses. He said \"If they [Egyptians] want a resolution,\nwe don't want to get involved in the exercise. \" So we were fairly sanguine\nabout the American position -- which was that (1) no resolution was neces-\nsary, (2) \"a consensus\" was sufficient, and (3) all that was needed was\nsomething for the Secretary-General's trip.\nTo our dismay, the USUN delegation took two steps, neither of which we\nhad any information about until the last minute:\n-- They drafted a text of a consensus, which went a little beyond\nwhat we thought the Americans thought was necessary. But that\nwasn't the worst.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n2\nThen the new American step, only yesterday, which amounts to a\nseries of U.S. amendments to the draft resolution of the nonaligned.\nIn other words, they got involved in the exercise of drafting a reso-\nlution.\nThey didn't say they would vote for it; they said this would enable them to\nabstain. But a U.S. abstention in these circumstances now means tacit\nAmerican help. The U.S. amendments include two references to the Pales-\ntinians, which -- as you know we regard with great apprehension. The\nmain thing is the American delegation has been involved in drafting a reso-\nlution, which even with American amendments may very well mean we will\nwithdraw our support for 242. The Government of Israel is greatly concerned\nabout this, and if it is not vetoed by the U.S. there is a possibility we will\nwithdraw from 242 and there will be doubt about the Secretary-General's\nvisit.\nWe are greatly concerned on two counts:\nWe feel we have been led astray. This is not the way we have been\nkeeping our contacts the last two years, without springing surprises\non each other. This worries us about our bilateral relations with\nthe United States and the Department of State.\nSecond, it has given the Arabs a great boost. They won't agree with\nthe American changes but they will use them. Zayyat is already\nsaying in the UN corridors that they have moved the Americans\nand that there will be more of this.\nSo, our problem is with (a) going back on the assurances and (b) American\nparticipation in drafting the resolution, which will have harmful consequences.\nMr. Rodman: Even with the U.S. changes the resolution will have these\nconsequences?\nMinister Shalev: Even with the American changes. Even the U.S. UN\ndelegation says the U.S. would only abstain if the changes were accepted.\n\"Nonaligned\" of course means in effect \"Egyptian.\" It is their resolution\nbut they do it indirectly.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n3\nThere are two things -- the method, which fills us with concern, and the\nresolution itself.\nMr. Rodman: What are the references to the Palestinians in the U.S. amend-\nments?\nMinister Shalev: There are two references. In the preamble, it says: \"Con-\nscious that the legitimate interests of the Palestinians have to be taken into\naccount. \" And in the text it says: \"a just and peaceful solution should\ntake into due account the interests of the Palestinian people. 11\nAlso the resolution talks about \"no action should be taken in the occupied\nterritory which prejudices a just settlement. \" And it \"expresses apprecia-\ntion for the report of the Secretary-General and the efforts since 1967. 11\nOf course \"the report¹ includes all the Jarring memoranda and so forth.\nThere might be a vote today or tomorrow on this. What we would like is no\nfurther American initiative or action. Let the thing go through its motions,\nand cast the veto.\nOne more aspect: The U.S. position as described by Sisco was in fact the\nU.S. position last week, and it was given to the other UN delegations. Now\nthe U.S. has given in to pressure and therefore casts doubt on its own\nposition. They have started budging from it. I understand it isn't an easy\nthing to cast a veto. But in this case the veto will have a beneficial effect\nof making the U.S. position clear, so the Arabs know they can't budge us\nand have no alternative but negotiations. Second, it will save 242, which we\nhave been living with and which is the only basis for a settlement.\nThe Ambassador is out of town. I will see Atherton this afternoon. The\nAmbassador will try to see the Secretary, possibly tomorrow.\nIt was presented to us as a fait accompli. This is not the local tactical\ndecision of Scali, but comes from Washington. Scali said so himself to\nTekoah.\nI want to add one little remark on the issue of the Palestinians. Before\nJarring came up with his memorandum he was once asked, \"Why don't you\ntalk to the Palestinians? He said he couldn't because the Palestinians are\nnot mentioned in 242. This is what the Ambassador had in mind when he\nspoke to Dr. Kissinger about the Communique.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n4\nThe American effort to amend the resolution will not eventually amend\nthe resolution but it has made it easier for countries like Britain and\nAustria to vote for the resolution. The consensus idea is now dead, be-\ncause of the American effort. And this comes three days after an abusive\nanti-American statement by Sadat. Three days after such a speech, the\nU.S. allies vote for a resolution which America has to veto.\nMr. Rodman: I will see to it that Dr. Kissinger gets this right away. He\nhas been following this.\nMinister Shalev: The main point is this: Scali should stop cooperating in\ntrying to amend the nonaligned resolution and should return to his basic\nposition: That no resolution is necessary, that no change in 242 is accept-\nable, and that anything that goes beyond 242 will be vetoed by the United\nStates.\nScali talked about his amendments with the Indian delegation before telling\nthe Israelis. In effect, he submitted it before telling the Israelis.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nACTION\nJuly 31, 1973\nMEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER\n3'00 pm\nFROM:\nPETER RODMAN\nOUR\nSUBJECT:\nDinitz and Eban Would Like to See You\nFriday\nMinister Shalev called me at 4:00 p.m. to make two requests:\n1. Dinitz had lunch with Sisco today and would like\nto talk to you about their conversation.\n2. Abba Eban will be passing through the U.S. the\nweekend of August 17-19, on his way to Latin\nAmerica, and wonders if it would be possible to\nsee you. Shalev says that in your last conversa-\ntion you said you'd be glad to see Eban if he came\nby again. (I have no record of this!)\nYou will probably be in San Clemente then. I didn't volunteer\nthis to Shalev because they might start angling for a San\nClemente invitation.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you set up an appointment for Dinitz for some time\nthis week, and that you give your answer on Eban then.\nApprove He\nDisapprove\nOr, if you can't see Dinitz this week, that I tell Shalev now\nthat you regret you will have to miss Eban because you will\nbe with the President on the West Coast.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nSECRET - XGDS (3)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential ASSIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nCONFIDENTIAL\nACTION\nJOBE\n25 July 1973\nFORT\nHK\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nFR OM:\nPETER W. RODMAN PUR\nIsraeli Minister Shalev made the following presentation to me today of\nIsraeli \"dismay\" at a change in the USUN position on the question of a\nSecurity Council resolution. Shalev will see Atherton today, and Dinitz\n(who is out of town until tomorrow) is seeking an appointment with Rogers.\nThe Israelis were satisfied last week with Sisco's assurances that, in\nthe US view, (1) no resolution was necessary, (2) a \"consensus\" was suf-\nficient, to launch Waldheim on his trip, (3) no changes in 242 were\nacceptable. Shalev says that USUN has now taken two steps which violate\nthese assurances and which were presented to the Israelis as a fait\naccompli:\n- They first drafted the text of a \"consensus\" which the Israelis\nthink was unnecessary.\nThey have in effect drafted a series of amendments to the non-\naligned resolution, which include two references to \"the legiti-\nmate interests of the Palestinians. 11 Dinitz has told you of their\ngreat apprehension about this phraseology.\nThe Israelis are concerned about the way they have been led astray by the\nUSG. (Scali apparently discussed his amendments with the Indians before\ntelling Tekoah anything.) They also point to the negative consequences of\nthe American action:\n- - The US has now involved itself in the resolution-drafting exercise.\nUSUN has said that its draft amendments would only enable the US\nto abstain--but this is enough to kill the \"consensus\" idea and make\nit easier for other countries to vote for a resolution.\n- - Even with the American amendments, passage of the resolution \"may\nvery well\" force Israel to withdraw its acceptance of 242 and discourage\nWaldheim's visit.\n- It has given the Arabs a great boost. Zayyat is saying in the corridors\nthat they have moved the Americans and will do SO again.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nCONFIDENTIAL\n-2-\nThe Israelis want Scali to return to the original US position. There should\nbe no further US initiative or action. We should let the thing go through\nits motions, and then veto it if there are any changes in 242.\nThis may come to a head this afternoon or tomorrow. Should Brent call\nRush to turn Scali off immediately?\nYES\nNO\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nAmbassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel\nMinister Mordechai Shalev\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the\nPresident for National Security Affairs\nPeter W. Rodman, NSC Staff\nPher\nDATE AND TIME:\nFriday, July 20, 1973\n5:10 - 5:50 p.m.\nPLACE:\nThe Map Room\nThe White House\nDr. Kissinger: I can see the Bahamas agreed with you! [A reference to\nAmbassador Dinitz's designation as Israeli Ambassador to the Bahamas\nand his attendance at their recent independence festivities. ]\nAmbassador Dinitz: Already I forgot about it. A week of talks in the State\nDepartment made me forget about it.\nDr. Kissinger: Talks on what?\nAmbassador Dinitz: On the UN Security Council debate. Spiers [the new\nU.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas] told me you thought he was a good man.\nDr. Kissinger: How did he put it?\nAmbassador Dinitz: He said, \"Dr. Kissinger thinks I am a good man. 11\nDr. Kissinger: [Laughing] It happens to be true! But it is unusual to say it.\nIt is a waste of talent to have him in the Bahamas with his European experience.\nAmbassador Dinitz: I saw your friend Sisco on the UN Security Council.\nI told him we are concerned about the Palestinian question, and about whether\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nSECRET - XGDS (3)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential CLASSIFIED Library\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n2\nState would allow something to be said in a resolution on the Palestinians.\nWe had bad results from what your communique said.\nDr. Kissinger: I told you the origin of it.\nAmbassador Dinitz: Not from our Government, but the Palestinian terror-\nists reaction to it. There were bad results from our point of view.\nDr. Kissinger: I have sent a nonsubstantive message to the Egyptians. I\ncan let you read it. And here is their reply. It is calmer than the earlier\nones. Lets them read messages at Tab A.]\nAmbassador Dinitz: July 11. Before his trip.\nDr. Kissinger: Yes. I haven't answered it. I will in a few days. It won't\nhappen quickly.\nAmbassador Dinitz: It doesn't have a date.\nDr. Kissinger: I am supposed to propose a date.\nAmbassador Dinitz: \"We did not seek to avoid the approach at the UN. 11\nWhat is that?\nDr. Kissinger: That is what I wanted to know. Scali said to Zayyat publicly\nwhat we said privately. I think he put it in there to show they didn't initiate\nthe Scali conversation and weren't trying to substitute channels.\nAmbassador Dinitz: I notice an absence of the State Department among the\nagencies they work with! \"The White House, the United Nations, and other\ncountries. 11 Maybe State is another country.\nDr. Kissinger: Now it will take us a month to set up a meeting. You under-\nstand the strategy. He has no reason to expect a quick proposal.\nHere is the Russian note to us on their conversations with Ismail. I can let you\nread it on a very confidential basis. I can't let you have this. They read\nTab B.]\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n3\nAmbassador Dinitz: [Reads it] They are telling you that the Egyptians think\na settlement is impossible without the participation of the Soviet Union. The\nRussians think it is important to let you know the Egyptians think that!\nDr. Kissinger: I wouldn't assume everything was said that they say was\nsaid.\nAmbassador Dinitz: If we get any further information on this, we will let\nyou know.\nDr. Kissinger: We appreciate it. It will be a useful check. What is your\nimpression.\nAmbassador Dinitz: There is nothing new there. It is a restatement of their\nposition, fairly I think.\nDr. Kissinger: Yes.\nAmbassador Dinitz: They say \"we and the Egyptians think alike. 11 But then they\ncriticize you for being pro-Israeli! The tone seems very mild. \"Great con-\ncern, 11 not \"powder keg\" or \"blowing up. \" Which incidentally coincides with\nwhat we heard. But it was from secondary sources, so we didn't bother to\ngive it to you. There is a greater and greater interest of the Soviet Union in\nIraq and Syria, not in Egypt.\nDr. Kissinger: I am told by our intelligence people they are slipping in Iraq,\ntoo.\nAmbassador Dinitz: We have noticedfrom various outside sources that Iraq\nis looking for alternatives. They seem interested in some Western presence,\nlooking to even the United States. Their Minister's interview lastweek\nDr. Kissinger: Yes, I saw it.\nAmbassador Dinitz: Also Egypt is now trying to bridge the gap to the Saudis.\nThis has an impact on Soviet judgment.\nDr. Kissinger: Here is something I got from the Soviets on the Jewish\nquestion. [Tab C]\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n4\nAmbassador Dinitz: I saw this through the Jewish leaders.\nDr. Kissinger: Yes, I gave it to them. I think they are now on a reason-\nable course. If they agree to what they call a reformulation of the Jackson\nAmendment, and if MFN passes\nAmbassador Dinitz: They are the better ones. Let me say, it is not an\nimpressive list.\nDr. Kissinger: That I can't judge.\nAmbassador Dinitz: It is the same as Brezhnev presented. I have asked for\na detailed study from Israel and will give it to you. There is very little\nmovement in turning the release into reality. I have also asked my Jewish\nfriends to voice their complaints very strongly with Dobrynin. If that is all\nright.\nDr. Kissinger: That I have no problem with. I have no objection to your\nraising it with Dobrynin.\nAmbassador Dinitz: I have also told them what you told me -- that the level\nwould remain the same. But our figures show there has been a decline:\n2,000 in April; 2, 100 in May, and 1, 900 in June. If it remains so, the total\nwill be 24, 000, not 36, 000. The corresponding figures last year are higher.\nLet me raise a few other points. On the Sisco initiative.\nDr. Kissinger: That is killed.\nAmbassador Dinitz: That is killed. Good.\nDr. Kissinger: By that I mean it is not likely to emerge.\nAmbassador Dinitz: Our research people found this in the Rogers speech\nin December, 1969: \"The Security Council resolution neither endorses nor\nprecludes the armistice lines as exact boundaries. 11 It shows the new Sisco\ninitiative is a restatement of the Rogers Plan.\nDr. Kissinger: It is not likely to be done now.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n5\nAmbassador Dinitz: On the paper you gave to Dobrynin [on General Work-\ning Principles], we won't comment because it is a dead document. We will\ncomment if it becomes live.\nDr. Kissinger: It served its purpose. There is no agreed document now.\nAmbassador Dinitz: The Ismail paper seems plausible.\nDr. Kissinger: Yes. There is no ring of great intimacy. I don't have the\nsense that they are very close.\nAmbassador Dinitz: I have a few very small subjects. On the Palestinians,\nyou know we weren't happy with the paragraph in the [U. S. - Soviet] joint\ncommunique -- \"legitimate interests of the Palestinians. 11 There was\nexcitement about this in Israel, so I went to Sisco. He told me that the\nphrase' 'legitimate interests\" was meant as a limitation. But the Arabs see\nit as just the opposite.\nBut the Arabs see now they have an opening and are trying to get it in the\nresolution. We see the danger. It is one thing if it is in the President's\nState of the World message, and another if it is in the U.S. -Soviet docu-\nment, and it is a third thing if it is in a UN Security Council resolution.\nWe see it as an incitement to terrorism. You heard Arafat say, \"This is\na victory. We got this because of our armed struggle. 11 We must say in all\nfrankness you are undermining your friends.\nDr. Kissinger: How?\nAmbassador Dinitz: By antagonizing Jordan. By encouraging Bourguiba to\nmake his overture. Because the Palestinians are now the thing.\nDr. Kissinger: It is not our policy. We are going to strengthen Jordan.\nWe are going to make them spokesmen for the Palestinian people.\nWhy don't you tell State?\nAmbassador Dinitz: We did.\nMinister Shalev: Twice.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n6\nAmbassador Dinitz: One other point. When Brandt was in Israel, he said\nhe would be happy if contact was established between Israel and Egypt. So\nhe sent Lahn to Egypt to see Ismail, and then reported to us. Hafez answered\nthat he took note of this and was not surprised because it was always Israeli\npolicy Ismail said there was no sense in such conversations with the Israelis\nunless they knew in advance what the results would be and unless they knew\nIsrael was prepared to withdraw to the 1967 lines. Otherwise it only en-\nhances the status quo. When Lahn said that Golda said Israel was prepared\nfor compromises, Ismail said, \"What compromises? The very existence\nof the meeting is a compromise on the part of the Egyptians. Lahn said that\nGermany was not involved in the dispute, but was concerned because any\nconflict endangers German interests. Hafez said the whole world wants a\ndeal with the Middle East only on the basis of the status quo. Hafez men-\ntioned the Soviet Union among them. He said, \"The future of the Arabs is\nin our own hands. \"\nThis confirms what we said earlier about the lack of intimacy that was\napparent in the conversations in Moscow.\nThe last point I have: The Persian Shah is coming to the United States on\nJuly 24.\nDr. Kissinger: Yes.\nAmbassador Dinitz: We got a long paper from Israel. One operative thing\nwe are asking is this: Since we have further increased our cooperation --\non oil, technology, etc. -- if the Shah can hear from you or the President\nthat you look with favor on this\nDr. Kissinger: You can count on it.\nI would like to talk with the Ambassador alone for five minutes.\n[The Ambassador and Dr. Kissinger conferred alone for about ten minutes. ]\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nA\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nShown to Dinitz\nTab A\nJuly 20, 1973\nJuly 11, 1973\nA.\nMr. Ismail has received with thanks Dr. Kissinger's message\npassed 9 July.\nB.\nMr. Ismail would like to express the Egyptian side's welcome to\nmeet Dr. Kissinger to review the situation and evaluate the pro-\nspects of achieving progress toward peace in the Middle East.\nWhile agreeing to arrange a meeting in Madrid, the Egyptian side\nwill provide their own transportation and would like to thank the\nU.S. Government for their kind offer.\nC.\nMr. Ismail is visiting the Soviet Union, returning to Egypt on\n14 July. He hopes to receive from Dr. Kissinger by then his\nproposals about alternate timings for the meeting and any other\narrangements.\nOrally:\nA.\nWe welcomed and did not seek to avoid the approach of the U.S.\nGovernment representative in the recent UN Security Council\nDebate on the Middle East, just as we welcomed the views of the\nother countries' representatives.\nB.\nWe do not want to change Resolution 242, but we do back any\nmeasures that would advance this Resolution. Meanwhile,\nconcerning what happened before that led to stalling Jarring's attempts\nwas not Jarring's fault. It was due to the Israelis.\nC.\nEgypt is working in all open ways in the political field -- through\nthe White House, the United Nations, and with other countries.\nOur aim at the end of this process is to achieve the objective of\na just peace in the area.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nShown to Dinitz\nJuly 20, 1973\nJuly 7, 1973\nDr. Kissinger extends his greetings and best wishes to\nMr. Ismail.\nNow that the US-Soviet summit conference has been com-\npleted, the US side wonders whether it might be useful for\nDr. Kissinger and Mr. Ismail to meet again to review the\nsituation. If the Egyptian side agrees that such a review would\nbe of value, Dr. Kissinger would be happy to meet with\nMr. Ismail in Spain or at some other mutually convenient loca-\ntion. The U.S. side would be pleased to arrange secure transpor-\ntation for Mr. Ismail to a meeting site, as discussed between\nMr. Ismail and Mr. Trone in Paris.\nThe US side will await the views of the Egyptian side on\nthis matter.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nShown to Tab\nB\nDinitz\nOral Note\n(in the name of the Ambassador)\nJuly 20, 1973\nJuly 19, 1973\nI am instructed to forward the information for President\nNixon on the conversation between Leonid Brezhnev and Hafiz\nIsmail, National Security Advisor to the President of Egypt which\ntook place on July 13, 1973. This is being done in accordance\nwith established practice of confidential exchange of views between\nthe USSR and the United States at the Summit level on major\ninternational issues and, among them, on the Middle East problem.\nAs Mr. Ismail stated, he was instructed by President Sadat to visit\nMoscow to obtain first-hand information for the President about\nthe substance of the recent Soviet/American negotiations at the\nsummit level on the problem of the Middle East.\nIn the course of the talks, Leonid Brezhnev informed\nHafiz Ismail in general terms without going into details about the\nbasic points of the exchanges with President Nixon on the Middle\nEast problem. Referring to the words of the President and the\nrespective part of the Joint Communique, Leonid Brezhnev noted\nthat the American side considered the problem of the Middle East\nas a very important one. However, the statements about the\nimportance of the Middle East problem had not been accompanied\nin the negotiations by putting forward on the part of the United\nStates of concrete considerations aimed at achieving a mutually\nacceptable solution of the Arab/Israeli conflict.\nMr. Ismail was told that we didn't hear from the American\nside a firm statement to the effect that the United States supported\nthe demand for total withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the\nArab territories occupied in 1967. In respect to the method of\nnegotiation, we informed Mr. Ismail that the United States, while\nsupporting negotiations, were more inclined toward direct negotia-\ntions though, in principle, they did not rule out other forums of\ncontact between Israel and the Arab countries. They mentioned\nin this connection a so-called Rhodes Formula.\nOn the question of an overall or a partial settlement in the\nMiddle East, it was stated that as far as we understood, the American\nside, while admitting in principle the necessity of working out an\nagreement on the entire complex of the settlement, did envisage\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n- 2 -\nthe possibility of finding isolated solutions to the individual aspects\nof the settlement on the basis of priorities -- that is, in effect,\nseparately from the overall settlement.\nLeonid Brezhnev told Mr. Ismail that during negotiations\nin the United States, the Soviet side proceeded from its known position\non the questions of settlement. The emphasis was made on the great\nimportance of recognizing the principle of inadmissibility of acquiring\nterritories through the use of force which implies the necessity for\nthe withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories\noccupied in 1967. And it was noted that the solution of the problem\nof the withdrawal would facilitate reaching agreement on all other\naspects of the settlement.\nPresenting the views of the Egyptian side, Mr. Ismail said\nthat they evaluated the situation in the Middle East as very compli-\ncated and fraught with danger of serious explosion, and a situation\nof the kind which demands in the opinion of the Egyptian Government\nthe implementation of urgent measures for the prompt achievement\nof a just settlement of the conflict. Mr. Ismail stressed that on\nthe basis of the information coming to Cairo from different sources,\nthey came to the conclusion that Israel and the United States do not\nintend to modify their long-held position on the settlement and\nspecifically so with respect to the troop withdrawal. He emphasized\nalso that the United States Government would not move ahead in its\napproach to the problem of Middle East settlement and continued\nto pursue a one-sided pro-Israeli position which, to a great extent,\nprevents a settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict on a just basis.\nMr. Ismail referred once again to the invariability of the\nEgyptian course aimed at streng thening the Soviet/Egyptian relations\nin all fields. Having expressed satisfaction with the Soviet Union's\nstand on the problem of the Middle East settlement directed at pro-\nmoting a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, Mr. Ismail\nstressed that the establishment of that kind of peace was, in the\nopinion of the Egyptian leadership, unthinkable without active\nparticipation of the Soviet Union. Mr. Ismail expressed a bewilder-\nment on the Egyptian side of the fact that the United States considered\nthe US formula of 2-4-2 as the basis for the settlement in the Middle\nEast and support of the Jarring mission, and at the same time do not\naccept his known memorandum of February 8, 1971. Mr. Ismail\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n- 3 -\nrecalled in this connection that the United States representatives\nused to express earlier during the four-power consultations in New\nYork their support to the said memorandum.\nDuring the conversation, Mr. Ismail expressed specifically\nthat the tolerance of the Arabs was not limitless and stressed the\ndetermination of the Egyptians to put an end to the Israeli occupation\nof the Arab territories. Mr. Ismail pointed out that, though the\nEgyptians are losing their confidence in getting the settlement of\nthe crisis through political means, they continued to count to a\ncertain extent upon assistance in the settlement from the United\nNations and the Security Council. Particularly, they expect that\nduring the second part of the discussions on the Middle East\nproblems in the Security Council, a resolution will be adopted\nwhich will move the settlement off dead-center, and they expect\nto see in this respect a more balanced attitude on the part of the\nUnited States.\nThe conversation with Mr. Ismail demonstrated once again\nthat both the Soviet Union and Egypt consistently favored a Middle\nEast settlement on the basis of the known decisions of the United\nNations Security Council and the General Assembly. They are of\nthe opinion that lasting and just peace in this area can be achieved\nonly on an indispensable condition of withdrawal of the Israeli\nforces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and on\ncondition of respect of all the lawful rights of the state and people\nin this area, including those of the Arab people of Palestine.\nIn informing the President about his conversation with\nMr. Ismail, Leonid Brezhnev would like to stress once again,\nas in the past, there exists in Moscow a serious concern in respect\nto the situation in the Middle East. Continuing presence there of\nthe hotbed of military tension can at any moment bring forth serious\nnew aggravation of the situation in this region and result in the\nworsening of the international climate in general which would accord\nStates. neither with the interests of the USSR nor with those of the United\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nB\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nC\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n145 7/11/13\nShown to Dinitz Tab C\nJuly 20, 1973\nJuly10,1973 1973\nConcerning the list transmitted by Dr. Kissinger\n- 742 names (four names are mentioned twice), so actually\nthen are 738 names in the list\n- 258 - out of that number, received permission to leave.\n- 177 - have not applied.\n- 30 - do not reside in the USSR.\n- 149 - have been denied exit permission for security\nreasons.\n- By now 10 more persons out of the list received permission\nto leave (Vasilevski, Gutman, Kamenezskaya, Levitin,\nMandelzveig, Moiseev, Baron, Brown, Perelman and Schpilberg).\n- Previously rejected applications are under additional\nconsideration.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nSimcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel\nMordechai Shalev, Minister\nHenry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President\nPeter W. Rodman, NSC Staff one\nDATE AND TIME:\nMonday, September 10, 1973\n6:03 - 6:45 p.m.\nPLACE:\nMilitary Aide's Office\nThe White House\nDinitz: I just finished an hour-long talk with Secretary Rush. It was just a\ngeneral review of the situation.\nKissinger: Who was there? Sisco?\nDinitz: Yes. Also his aide, Samuels.\nKissinger: He's good.\nShalev: Also Stackhouse, of the Israel-Arab desk.\nDinitz: I reviewed the question of terror, particularly our concern with these\nmissiles in Rome [rockets discovered by Italian police in the hands of Arab\nterrorists]. We know they' re serialized, not so the Russians must have an accounting\nof where they are located. It would / be difficult for them to trace if they wanted\nto.\nI asked Secretary Rush that you find a way to convey this concern to the Russians,\nand secondly, that in the ICAO in Rome now you will put gravity of the situation\non record and help draft legislation to deal with this situation.\nKissinger: What did he say?\nDinitz: He said you [ the USG] had been in communication with the Russians on\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nSECRET - XGDS (3)\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-2-\nadvice\nthis and that he would take our/in the ICAO into consideration, and you were\nwith us on this.\nKissinger: Can you give me the serial numbers?\nDinitz: Yes, I didn't give them to him but I can give them to you.\nKissinger: I am seeing Dobrynin on Thursday.\nDinitz: Then we talked about oil and diplomacy.\nKissinger: You noticed what the President said Saturday. It is going in the\ndirection I have pointed out.\nDinitz: I noted to Rush that much of it- -on energy- is helpful to our relations,\nbut much of the press interpretation frankly is not. He agreed. Then I called\nattention to the Sisco interview in the Jordanian paper.\nKissinger: What did Sisco say?\nDinitz: Nothing at all during this conversation. Sisco had said--spoken in terms\n-Palestinian \"rights\", not \"interests\". He called for some movement in ad-\nvance of negotiations, and third, that an initiative was coming. I asked for\nRush's cooperation on muting this sort of thing, because it just means a debate\nthrough the press, and nothing but harm to our relations could come of this.\nHe said he was very much in accord with me. He said the U.S.' and Israel's\nstrategic interests are the same. He said the U.S. is not pro-Israel, or pro-\nArab but pro-peace. (Theard this before.) But then he said the status quo was\nno good; and we had to get the negotiations off dead center.\nI said that we agreed completely; Israel wanted to convert the status quo into\npeace and security. I then went into a long discourse about how whenever\nwe came forward with a new proposal, it just postponed negotiations. I pointed\nout that the Arabs were now linking everything with Palestine. He said he\nwasn't asking us to take a unilateral step or to negotiate from a point of weak-\nness. He said he knew from his negotiations on Berlin that the only way to deal\nwas through a position of strength. He ended by asking us what our government\ncould do, in concert with to get talks moving.\nKissinger: First--let me make clear I am not talking now in my official capacity.\nWe should still meet in this restricted channel.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-3-\nDinitz: Separate it.\nKissinger: Yes. It is important for the Prime Minister to understand my\njudgment on this. All of these are just phrases the ones that assure you and\nalso those that disquiet you. You shouldn't attach too much importance to it.\nDinitz: I know, I was just reporting.\nKissinger: As I told your Prime Minister, and as I have told you before, the trend\nhere to do something is getting overwhelming. It can be delayed but it cannot\nbe arrested. If you look at the balance of individuals, and the influence of the\ncompanies\nTwo years ago I suggested to Ambassador Rabin and the Prime\nMinister that we should do something in the area of an interim settlement. You\ndidn't do too badly in following that advice.\nThe trouble is, the U.S. public doesn't understand what it really is that the Arabs\nare proposing. -- that as a precondition for a negotiation you give up all the\nterritory in exchange for an \"end to the state of belligerency, 11 which is indis-\ntinguishable from the ceasefire that exists. They think the issue is Israeli\nintransigence. Most people don't understand. So an Israeli initiative would at\nleast have the advantage that one could dramatize what the Arabs are asking. I\nhave no concrete proposal. But I exhausted Le Duc Tho last year by giving him\nin rapid succession five different proposals which were all plausible but none of whi\nwhich gave up our key position- that we would not overthrow Thieu. In case the\nnegotiations broke down, we could show he ha d rejected, not our maximum\nposition, but all these successive proposals.\nI must say our troulbes with the South Vietnamese started when we did this\nbecause they thought we were giving up something. But we weren't. Every\nconcession was at the periphery, not on the main issue. And this would keep\nthe initiative with you.\nMy second strategic concern is that we have to find a way of splitting the Arabs\nand also of splitting the pressures in this country. We can't have all the pres-\nsures here together-- the oil companies, the Arabists --against the Jews. We\ncould try to split off the Saudis. Three years ago, the oil company leaders came\nin here. The issue then was to do something about Jerusalem. They wanted a to\nto be a neutral city, and I know this is unacceptable to you. But I wonder why\nthere can't be some formula for some extraterritoriality, plus some access\nroute\nThis won't be made as an American proposal; you can count on that. But it would\nhelp with the Saudis; this is the only thing they express themselves on. It would\nhelp domestically. What the President said--even with what I told you--you\nshould not believe it might not return.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY\nEYES\nReproduced ONLY at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-4-\nshould not believe it might not return.\nNow I can use the discussions with Ismail; nothing will happen until after your\nelection. So there is no immediate pressure. I have not even discussed this\nJerusalem proposal with the President. There won't be a big initiative when I\ncome in.\nMaybe a settlement first with Jordan would do it. Maybe you have some other\ncleverer idea.\nDinitz: I noted before that your mind was moving on Jerusalem, first when you\nasked Eban about it, and second when you said before that what concerned you was\nto remove Faisal from the picture and to isolate Sadat. Incidentally, I thought\nyour sending Phantoms to Faisal would do the opposite; and only attract Sadat\nto him.\nJerusalem is of course the mos t sensitive issue with us. This is just off the\ncuff. I will of course report all of this to the Prime Minis ter.\nKissinger: Maybe she has a better idea.\nDinitz: But usually when you try to defuse an issue you try a less sensitive, less\nemotionally-laden issue. Jerusalem will be the hardest with Jordan. We have\ntried some phrases before, like \"some extra-territorial status\" for the Holy\nPlaces.\nKissinger: Please don't interpret this in legalistic terms, but in strategic terms.\nDinitz: I see the strategy.\nKissinger: I think the borders will be the most sensitive.\nDinitz: No, I think it will be easier to decide with Sadat, where the final borders\nwill be than to agree to a split in Jerusalem's sovereignty. Anyone in Israel\nwho suggested it would be shot out of office, not run out. We could agree to\na passage for the Jordanians to go to the Mosque of Omar without going through\nIsraeli checkpoints.\nLet me ask two questions, Dr. Kissinger. Do you mean something that Israel\nshould think of independently of a course of negotiations commencing?\nKissinger: There are many ways of doing it. We could tell the Saudis that we\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-5-\nheard this from you and you are willing to discuss it. Or you could make it as\na public offer. Or as a private offer, and then publicize it if it doesn't work.\nDinitz: My second question is, do you mean to say that you believe something\nlike this could move the Saudis?\nKissinger: I have no feel for the Saudis, quite honestly. I met only Yamani, when\nhe was here. And fifteen months ago I met with their prince.\nWe have informally asked Prince Fahd to come over. We did this in order to abo-t\navoid having too many of our delegations going over there. It has nothing to do\nwith Israel. He's available to come in late November or early December. That\nwould be a good occasion.\nMy strategy is to keep the Saudis out of the Arab-Israeli dispute, because any\nsettlement achievable wouldn't be satisfactory to Arabs, and it would only weaken\nthe regime to have to take responsibility for it. It might help to take some action\non the one area of their religious concern.\nDinitz: I'll pass on your thinking to the Prime Minister.\nKissinger: I have no idea what Rush has in mind when he says off dead center.\nDinitz: Nor has he.\nKissinger: It is absolutely necessary that you don't let yourself be put into the\nposition of looking like the obstacle to peace. You must keep the Arabs on the\ndefensive. The British have told us they want to talk to us about it, and the\nFrench too.\nI'm not interested in the Nobel Peace Prize.\nDinitz: I wouldh! mind seeing you win it, Dr. Kissinger. Nothing would give me\ngreater pleasure.\nKissinger: But there is no way for us to do it without brutalizing everybody. It\nwould be moved into special channels.\nDinitz: What do you mean?\nKissinger: Some special envoy will be appointed by the President.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-6-\nDinitz: To solve the Middle East crisis?\nKissinger: Yes. I really have no specific ideas.\n[to Rodman:] Have we heard from Zahedi [on his talks with Ismail in Geneva]\nRodman: Not yet.\nKissinger: Check on it.\nDinitz: Do you think you can get the Arabs off their position of demanding a\ncommitment to total withdrawal as a precondition to negotiations?\nKissinger: My strategy is to exhaust the Arabs. We have been doing it, but\nevery time, some one of our people pops off. But cannI do it? It's extraordinary\nthat the Egyptians haven't leaked my negotiations with Ismail. It shows they\nhaven't given up yet on my approach.\nDinitz: Our sources say they now think that oil will do it for them.\nKissinger: If we can figure out some way to split the Saudis off. Jordan\nis\nalready split off. The Syrians won't be. But Egypt is already willing to make\na separate peace.\nDinitz: I think the pivot of it is their oil strategy. You have today the first\nvisit by Hussein to Egypt. You could tell the King it ismot a good idea.\nKissinger: I will do that. [to Rodman: ] Is Rifai coming to the UNGA?\nRodman: I'll check.\nDinitz: When the Shah was here, did you talk to him about his con tibuting to\nJordan?\nKissinger: Yes, at great length. But he said that, while from his selfish point of\nvie W and strategically he's with you, from the tactical point of view he'd like\nsome movement.\nDinitz: But he has no idea what it should be.\nKissinger: Right.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-7-\nDinitz: I don't have as pessimistic reading of consensus in this country as you\ndo. What you describe is a feeling in this Administration, but not the country.\nIt is not just the Jews, but Congress.\nKissinger: The Congress is against whatever the Administration is for!\nDinitz: But the labor movement, and the media, and editorial pressures.\nKissinger: That I wouldn't attach too much importance to. That we can easily\nh andle if we have a platform on which to stand. We are not asking you to give\nup essential positions.\nDinitz: Yes.\nKissinger: One amazing thing about my hearings is to see the liberals attacking\nme for being too soft on the Russians! For 5 years they attacked us for being hard.\nBut in a crisis they will run.\nDinitz: Yes. They think goodwill is the solution.\nKissinger: You remember the Jordanian crisis. I've never see so effective an\nexample of crisis management. We worked well together.\nDinitz: Yes, I was on the other end.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 12 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nINFORMATION\nAugust 16, 1973\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nHK\nFROM:\nPETER W. RODMA The\nSUBJECT:\nDinitz' Final Report on Hijacking Incident\nDinitz called again at 3:45 p.m. to give us the final wrap-up on the latest\nhijacking incident.\nThe plane was hijacked over Cyprus by a Libyan citizen, carrying a Libyan\npassport and two guns. He demanded that the pilot land at Lydda. The\nIsraeli airforce escorted the plane down.\nImmediately after the landing, the hijacker stepped out of the airplane, pre-\nsumably to start negotiating. At that instant the Israeli security boys broke\ninto the plane through another entrance and then captured him.\nAll the passports were taken to the airport restaurant. One passenger slipped\non the steps and injured an ankle and was given first aid. The plane and all\nthe passengers except the hijacker were ready to take off about an hour ago.\nThe injured passenger was to decide himself whether to go with the plane or\nstay overnight. The hijacker will remain in jail. The captain has given a\npress conference in Israel and the hijacker is being brought before the press.\nThe airport has returned to normal.\nAmong the passengers was the Libyan Ambassador to Baghdad. [He t.bought\nwill return to his duties, so that next time he can raise his hand in the UN and\nvote to condemn Israel for international terrorism. (This is Dinitz' editorial\ncommenta) ]\nDinitz added the following vignette. While he was peacefully eating lunch today,\nhe got an urgent call from Sisco, who said: \"You have done it again. You took\nanother plane with four terrorists. This can't go on. There will be another\nUN meeting in an hour and we will have to vote to condemn you again. 11 Dinitz\ntold Sisco to relax.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nACTION\n16 August 1973\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nFROM:\nPETER W. RODMAN PIMP\nSUBJECT:\nEban Visit\nDinitz called me this morning to plead for reinstatement of the\nEban meeting. The cancellation was a mistake on Dinitz' part and he will\nbe in serious hot water if the meeting doesn't come off.\nAs he told you, he recieved a message yesterday from Eban in\nLa Paz saying he was heading directly back to Israel. But it turns out that\nthis message crossed with Dinitz' message to Eban informing him of the\nbreakfast. Eban has now sent a second message saying he is delighted to\ncome to breakfast. Eban is not aware of any mixup and is heading here to\nsee you.\nIf your breakfast with Schlesinger cannot be changed, a meeting\nsome time in the morning would be OK. Shall we schedule Eban for 10:30?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 13 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nE.O. 13526\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nAuthority NLN 07-09, #1 Appear\nNARA PMH JS Date 7/8/2015\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nSimcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador\nAvner Idan, Minister\nPeter W. Rodman, NSC Staff your\nDATE AND TIME:\nTuesday, June 19, 1973\n2:00 2:40 p.m.\nPLACE:\nAmbassador's Office\nIsraeli Embassy\nWashington, D. C.\n[The Ambassador made the following presentation, on the basis of a cable\nhe had just received from the Prime Minister. ]\nDinitz: First a couple of general remarks, then some specific remarks.\nThese are from the Prime Minister. We have succeeded in communicating\nwith her, and these are her remarks, after consultation with us. We\noffered some of our own ideas.\nShe is now stronger in her opinion that our original request was the correct\none, that is, that every effort should be made that there should not be a\njoint document. The effort of Dr. Kissinger to draft such a new paper only\npoints out the dangers that exist in such an exercise.\nSecondly, we continue to negate the necessity\n...\nwe continue to believe\nin the lack of necessity for a joint document between the two superpowers\nin a documented form as a contribution to the solution to our problem --\nwhich we continue to see as only through negotiations between the parties.\nThe third general remark is that all the reservations we have stated to\nDr. Kissinger in our last meeting of June 15 are valid also for any subse-\nquent remarks, and in fact they were strengthened by this development.\nTOP SEGRET XGDS (3)\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nCLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n2\nThe fourth point: We want to reemphasize that in our response to your\nrequest to give our remarks, we are not either partners to the prepara-\ntion of the document nor are we obligated in any way or form to its content.\nNow I want to add my own personal point, as number five, to relay to Dr.\nKissinger. I know it was a difficult decision for the Prime Minister to go\nahead with commenting on the matter, and I know she was guided by two\nconsiderations: She trusts Dr. Kissinger, and she didn't want to make\nhis already difficult work more difficult. And second, she did not want the\nimpression to be created that by not reacting we are in acquiescence with\nsome of the serious points we see in it.\nSo far for general remarks. Now, the particular remarks to some of the\nmost important points. We don't say that if we sat down with legalistic\neyes we wouldn't draft it differently on other points, but these are the most\nimportant. I will cover these in order of the paragraphs, not the order\nof importance.\n[The paper to which these comments are addressed is at Tab A.]\nIn paragraph four, the word \"agreement\" does appear, but to make it clearer\nwe think it must be supplemented by \"between the parties. 11 So it wouldn't\nbe thought it meant agreement among the superpowers or someone else.\nThis goes to our original philosophy that security arrangements and guaran-\ntees cannot be instead of secure borders but at best in addition to them, with\nthe agreement of the parties concerned. I would add orally that there\ncouldn't be a situation where the Soviet Union and the U.S. come to us and\nsay \"we have decided to guarantee you. 11 Security must result from secure\nborders that we will achieve in agreement with our neighbors. If there are\nany additional guarantees, it will be in addition and after agreement between\nparties.\nSecond, in the same paragraph 4 -- I told you earlier that the Prime\nMinister was concerned about a Soviet foothold in the area. A physical Soviet\npresence. You have corrected it somewhat. But the word \"participation\"\ncan have a dual meaning. You probably meant participation in the interna-\ntional negotiation, but it could mean physical presence. We suggest saying:\n\"International guarantees could include the Soviet Union and the United States. \"\nIn other words, take away \"appropriate participation. 11 We don't want them\nthere.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n3\nIn paragraph six, our remarks are very simple. We kindly request you\nomit the whole paragraph. Because the problematics of it are clear.\nYou're talking about the specific status of the Suez Canal. But you're not\ntalking about the specific status of Sharm el-Sheikh except in terms of\nfreedom of navigation. We don't think you will get a phrase about con-\ntinued Israeli control of Sharm el-Sheikh, so we are better off without it.\nIf your friends ask, \"what about freedom of navigation? 11 you can say it's\ncovered by Resolution 242 and there is no need to restate it.\nThe most serious problem is paragraph seven. This is crucial. This is\nfor us very serious. I presume you didn't even realize what a serious\nword you introduced into it. In 1972 you succeeded in preventing inclusion\nof this item because there was a reference to UN decisions, UN resolutions.\nThat was very good, very clever. But now you're taking from these UN\nresolutions the most bitter pill for us -- free choice and incorporate it\nin the document by saying in paragraph seven \"implementing the choices\nit bitterly ever since 1949.\nof the refugees. 11 This is absolutely unacceptable for us. We have opposed\nAnd this is in spite of the fact that you did incorporate the sentence \"con-\nguard. sistent with national sovereignty. 11 We don't think this is enough of a safe-\nSo we repeat our request to deal with the refugee problem in the manner that\nResolution 242 dealt with it: \"the necessity\nment of the refugee problem. 11 Period.\nfor achieving a just settle-\nIt would have been desirable to add that sentence which I gave you earlier\n[about sovereignty] -- I feel it's a good thing for both parties. But if Dr.\nKissinger has any difficulties with this, it would suffice to have only the\nof choice.\nreference to Resolution 242. But by no means can we accept this question\nRegarding paragraph eight, we really feel that such a paragraph should be\nincluded in the peace treaty and not in a general document of principles.\nSo we feel it's premature and not necessary. This is not so much a remark\nof substance but rather an observation.\n[This was the end of the Ambassador's comments on the paper at Tab A.\nHe then raised a few other matters. ]\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n4\nOther Matters:\n1. Qadhafi: You had asked if they had any information on Qadhafi's\nmedical and psychological condition. Dinitz gave me the paper at Tab B,\nfor which I thanked him.\nShould I pass this on to CIA through Tom Latimer? OK\nNo\n2. Jordan/West Germany: Dinitz raised a matter which he said was not\nurgent and which he had thought of saving for his next meeting with you.\nIsrael is interested in helping Jordan with its economic problems in the\ninterest of stability. Dinitz asked how you would view financial assistance\nfrom West Germany to Jordan. Israel was contemplating whether to offer\nJordan help in mobilizing and obtaining funds secretly in West Germany\nthrough banks, government, whatever, but secretly -- but the Prime Minis-\nter first wanted to know your thoughts on the matter. I will remind you of\nthis question before you see Dinitz next.\n3. Ambassador Dinitz will be in Atlanta at the Governor's residence Tues-\nday night and Wednesday. He will be back in Washington Thursday morning.\nHe will come back immediately if you want to see him. Or you can reach\nhim through his office, or contact Minister Idan.\n4. Minister Idan would like to invite you to dinner or lunch the week of\nJuly 8th. He leaves his post here on July 12th. He wonders if you could\nmake it the evening of the 8th\n, 9th\n, or 10th\nfor\ndinner, or the 8th\nor 11th\nfor lunch. Can we set a date\ntentatively?\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nRenroduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential I ibrary\nT A\nGeneral Working Principles\n1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be\nembodied in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the\nneighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict. They\nshould be based on Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace.\nThe completion of the agreements should at some stage involve\nnegotiation between the signatories. Separate agreements on\nspecific issues are not precluded.\n2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli\narmed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and\nrecognized boundaries.\n3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary\nagreement between the parties concerned.\n4. Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement include\ndemilitarized and other security zones; establishment of an international\nforce including participation of the signatory nations; stationing of such\na force at strategic points; and the most effective international guaran-\ntees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the\nUnited States.\n5. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the\nMiddle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which\nthe peace treaties must be based.\n6. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the\narea should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully\nconsistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.\n7. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just\nbasis which provides for registering and implementing the choices of\nthe refugees in ways consistent with national sovereignty and for\ncompensation.\n8. A material breach of the agreement by one of the parties shall entitle\nthe other to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending its perfor-\nmance in whole or in part until the breach is rectified.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLN 07-09 #1- APPEAL\nNARA PMH Date 7/8/2015\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to bei declassified\n3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)\nDECLASSIFIED IN PART\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLN 07-09, #1- AppeAL\nNARA PMH Date 7/8/2015\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)\n1 -2-\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nCONFIDENTIAL\nACTION\nJuly 16, 1973\nMEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER\nFROM:\nPETER W. RODMAN PMR\nSUBJECT:\nGolda's Message to President on Watergate\nDinitz told you on June 2 that he had passed to Len Garment an\noral personal message from Mrs. Meir offering the President her\nsympathy and understanding in his current difficulties. She hoped\nhe would be soon free to devote his time and energies to his goal\nof building peace.\nIt turns out that Len Garment's memo to the President passing on\nthis message (Tab I) was not forwarded to the President. It was\napparently treated as too routine. (apponently either 6 Kehrli decision) aa Hang\nIt occurred to me that you might want this to go forward. We could\nsend it up again, if you like.\nSend it forward\nForget it\nHE\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLN 07-09. d1 AppEAL\nNARA PMH Date 7/8/2015\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMay 31, 1973\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nLEONARD GARMENT\nIsraeli Ambassador Dinitz called on me today and delivered the\nenclosed letter to you from the Prime Minister (Tab A). He\nadded. that he was instructed by the Prime Minister to convey to\nyou the following personal message:\nThat she is saddened by the difficulties that\nbeset you and wants you and Mrs. Nixon to\nknow you have her sympathy and understanding.\nShe prays for a satisfactory resolution that will\nsoon enable you to address your time and energies.\nfully to the task of building a more peaceful world.\nThis she knows is the goal which is closest to your\nheart.\nI thanked the Ambassador and told him I would convey to you the\nletter and personal message.\nAttachment\n4\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLN 07-09, #1 -Appeal\nNARA PMH Date 7/8/2015\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nEMBASSY OF ISRAEL\nbenes\nWASHINGTON, D.C.\n29 May 1973\nMy dear Mr. President:\nI have been instructed by the Prime Minister\nof Israel to transmit to you the enclosed letter.\nWith best wishes,\nSincerely,\nSinacha Simcha Dinitz Dinitz\nAmbassador\nThe President\nThe White House\nWashington, D.C.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLN 07-09. #1 -AppeAL\nNARA PMH Date 7/8/2015\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nVN7\nTHE PRIME MINISTER\nJerusalem, 22 May 1973\nDear Mr. President,\nMay I say how moved I was to receive from Mrs. Nixon\nand yourself such kind birthday greetings.\nYour warm remarks addressed to me on the occasion of\nour 25th anniversary and on my own 75th birthday are deeply\nappreciated. They echo in our hearts the feelings of friend-\nship and gratitude which our people cherish with respect to\nyou, Mr. President, personally and to all the people of\nyour great country.\nPlease accept at this time my sincere expressions of\ngoodwill coupled with the prayer, which all Israel shares,\nthat your historic efforts in support of peace everywhere will\nspeedily be realized.\nWith warm personal regards,\nSincerely,\nHolda Meir\nGolda Meir\nH.E. Mr. Richard Nixon\nPresident of the United States\nThe White House\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLN 07-09, #1- Apperal\nNARA PMH Date 07/08/2015\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMessage from Dr. Kissinger sent 5 June and delivered to\nMr. Hafiz Ismail on 6 June:\nDr. Kissinger thanks Mr. Ismail for his message of\nJune 2.\nThe US side would appreciate it if Mr. Ismail could\nclarify whether the US side can discuss with the Soviet Union\nthe principles for a settlement along the lines outlined by\nDr. Kissinger in his meeting with Mr. Ismail, that is, principles\nof a general nature which would permit the parties to start a\nprocess of negotiation.\nThe US side would appreciate clarification by the Egypt-\nian side of this point in order to plan its course for its\nforthcoming discussions with the Soviet Union.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTab B\nMay 28, 1972\nGeneral Working Principles\n1. The agreement should be comprehensive, covering all parties\nand issues. This does not preclude that the implementation occurs in\nstages or that some issues are resolved on a priority basis.\n2. The agreement should contain provisions for the withdrawal of\nIsraeli forces from Arab territories occupied in 1967.\n3. Any border rectifications, which may take place, should result\nfrom voluntary agreement among the parties concerned.\n4. Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized\nzones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh,\nand the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate\nparticipation of the Soviet Union and the United States.\n5. The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency\nand the establishment of peace.\n6. Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez\nCanal should be assured. This is fully consistent with Egyptian\nsovereignty over the Canal.\n7. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in\nthe Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on\nwhich the settlement must be based.\n8. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a\njust basis and in accordance with the appropriate UN decisions.\n(Reserved by the US side)\nThe US position is that completion of the agreements should at some\nstage involve negotiations among the signatories.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 11 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTabC\nTelCon\nAmb. Dinitz/Mr. Kissinger\n9:20 am, June 14, 1973\nK:\nHello.\nD:\nGood morning, Dr. Kissinger, and welcome back.\nK:\nThank you, Mr. Ambassador.\nD:\nHow are you?\nK:\nNow I can take my old time to settle the Arab/Israeli dispute.\nCan you start by going back to your 1967 borders. We'll have\nanother settlement. And then settle with the Palestinians.\nD:\nAnd then '47. I called these days the 47 geography and 48\ngenography.\nK:\nThat's about right.\nD:\nHow've you been Dr. Kissinger?\nYigal Allon\nK:\nI've been fine. I'm so sorry I missed Ilam (sp). Is\nhe anywhere around. My idiots here didn't tell you you asked\nhim to stay.\nD:\nWell, I did not know when you will be coming althojgh I had a hint\nthat you are going to be back. He left yesterday morning at 10:00.\nI told him - he understood it completely--but he would have pro-\nbably waited. He went to London you see, and he thought that maybe\nhe could see you in Europe.\nK:\nI'm just mortified. I wanted to ask my people to ask him to wait,\nand I thought they knew he was an old friend of mine. I take it\nRabin has also left.\nD:\nRabin has also left, yes, he was in Washington for another day.\nLast night he had a dinner with Joe Alsop and he thought that--\nspending another night here. Is it possible Dr. Kissinger that\nsome time we have a few minutes together.\nK:\nI'll do my best.\nD:\nI will tell you why I say this. I got some reaction from home with\nregard to the big meetings that you are having. In essence, if I\nmay say it has nothing of relation of you, Prime Minister\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n2\nrepeats some of our basic points, but if you could come by and\nsee me before the\nK:\nYes, now that I will do. I cant' do it today, I'll do it tomorrow.\nD:\nThat's fine.\nK:\nBut until tomorrow, could you think about the following problems--\nyou know the strategy that I've been pursuing, and so far it has not\nbeen totally unsuccessful. But you will now face this problem--\nshould I discuss it within the framework which you know with\nGromyko.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nOr should it be left to Brezhnev and the President. In that case,\nthe consequences are somewhat more unpredictable. On the other\nhand, in my case, the consequences are more certain though you\nmay not like them. You see what I mean.\nD:\nOf course.\nK:\nBut this is the choice you have to make. If I talk to Gromyko\nit will be in the framewark of what you know, perhaps slightely\nimproved. But you may not be wild about them. If it goes into\nthe other forum, well you--so, can you think about that, and\nmaybe ask the Prime Minister before tomorrow.\nD:\nCan I ask you a clarification question? I was thinking along\nexactly this line, that this is really the choice that is confronting\nus.\nK:\nBecause you have no other choice if I can be honest with you.\nD:\nWell, at least I knew what I think will be that either it's continuous\non the 172 paper, on the lines of the '72 paper between the two of\nyou, and it goes up. And that is like a gamble. It can be either\nbetter in the sense that the paper that we don't like, as you know,\nwill disappear, or something else worse--\nK:\nIt will not disappear. What could happen is something worse, or\nmaybe they can't agree.\nD:\nYes, I understand.\nK:\nBut it's a chancey proposition. I have to be honest with you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nD:\nThis document basheen reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n3\nK:\nParticularly if there's a spirit of comraderie.\nD:\nLet me ask you then, you know to inform my Prime Minister\nmore intelligently, can I tell her that if you negotiate with\nGromyko on the basis of the '72, is there a chance for improve-\nment of the text, especially those particularly irritating points\nthat we have.\nK:\nThat is what I would put my major effort on.\nD:\nYes. As you recall, there was one point in which they did not\naccept your position.\nK:\nYeah, there was two disagreed points. One had to do with\nrefugees, and one had to do with direct negotiations.\nD:\nThat is correct. And\nK:\nNow, we will certainly--we will insist on direct negotiations.\nWe will rewrite the refugee point. In fact, when I see you\ntomorrow I will show you some playing I have done with these\nthings which I have never shown to the other side.\nD:\nI understand.\nK:\nBut it really comes down to that. In my view.\nD:\nYes. I understand. And of course the question of stationing\nof UIN forces in Sharm\n, which is something that the\nPrime Minister, even in our previous meeting, particularly\nwas concerned about because it sort of goes even beyond any\nformal proposal that we had on the\n. Negates\nthe control of\nSharm el-Shaikh\n/\n-\nK:\nI'll tell you, Mr. Ambassador, if the meeting ends next week\nwithout a reference I will not feel that I need to apologiee to\nanybody. So you do not face the problem of my seeking oppor-\ntunities to raise this issue.\nD:\nI understand, I understand.\nK:\nBut I think, if you want to be realistic, now I have--look we'd\nbetter talk--but if you are going to consult with the Prime Minister\nagain, another think you ought to know--I have no reason to believe\nthat the Egyptians will accept anything like this. In all their\nmessages to me I've asked them what their reaction would be to\nsome general principles, and they are dancing all over the lot.\nThey don't say no, but they certainly stay far away from saying\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nyes.\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n4\nD:\nOne more question. If this is accepted, would\nK:\nYou don't have to accept it, you just have to accept the process.\nD:\nI understand, I mean, I want to know what the next step is. The\nnext step is simultaneous negotiation that is also of\nK:\nWell, if the President and Brezhnev agree on something that you\nand we can live with, and I understand that you can live only with\nsomething that leaves you margins for negotiation. Then the next\nstep would be negotiation between you and the Egyptians.\nD:\nBut not necessarily simultaneous ones which particularly upset\nmy prime Minister.\nK:\nI now have the impression that they are not at all interested in\nthe partial settlement, SO that what it would lead to would be a\ngeneral negotiation.\nD:\nThat was my impression.\nK:\nAnd I you don't have the impression that your military are insisting\nthat we withdraw the canal.\nD:\nNo, we don't put it as precondition for the negotiation.\nK:\nNot a precondition for your negotiation, but you first withdraw\nfrom the canal.\nD:\nRight, that's correct.\nK:\nNow, my impression, and again from exchanges with the Egyptians,\nis that linkage which you proposed to me, they are not interested in.\nSo that the only result--I mean, the result of this would not be an\ninterim and general negotiation but only a general negotiation.\nD:\nRight. Okay, I will communicate this today, and I will ask for\nreaction before tomorrow.\nK:\nGood, and I'll meet you tomorrow.\nD:\nRight.\nK:\nAnd think about it in terms that I sent to you.\nD:\nI will tell you, Dr. Kissinger,\nK:\nThere is no way to avoid a discussion from all the communications\nwe've had.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n5\nD:\nYesterday I cabled home hoping for a meeting between us and I\nwanted some instruction. And I said in my cable that basically\nwhat I see is that pivot question now is exactly what you stated.\nEither they use negotiation on the paper, or leaving it to them.\nK:\nYou see, I had made some changes in the '72 text. I don't want\nto change it too radically because I don't them to change it too\nradically. But where it says \"agreement\", I'm trying to put\nin plural, \"agreements\".\nD:\nBut you recall, of course, Dr. Kissinger that have given you\nanother paper.\nK:\nThat I've already rejected.\nD:\nI know, but, in other words, they did try to change it very radically\nin their favor.\nK:\nYeah, but when I totally rejected that--\nD:\nIt doesn't become an instrument for negotiation.\nK:\nThat will not be discussed. That I can assure you flatly. But\n'73 paper will not be the object for discussion. The point of\ndeparture will be the '72 plus those changes I can make with it\nwithout triguring them into tabling the '73 paper. You see what\nI mean.\nD:\nYes. I see what you mean exactly.\nK:\nI will show you the changes that I have in mind.\nD:\nAnd maybe by then I will have some instructions, I'm sure I will,\nas to the approach in general and in particular.\nAllon\nK:\nGood. And can you tell both and Rabin how distraught I am\nA\nthat I missed them.\nD:\nI will do this. I will send a cable to Israel and tell them.\nK:\nGood. Thank you.\nD:\nThank you very much, and we'll see you tomorrow. Bye bye.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTab D\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 9A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTabE\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 9B ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nSimcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador\nAvner Idan, Israeli Minister\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the\nPresident for National Security Affairs\nPeter W. Rodman, NSC Staff\none\nDATE AND TIME:\nFriday, June 15, 1973\n11:05 a. m. - 12:10 p.m.\nPLACE:\nMap Room\nThe White House\nDinitz: I communicated to Yigal Allon and Rabin that you were unable to\nsee them. I have the original of the letter from the Prime Minister on\nyour birthday. [Hands over Tab A]\nDr. Kissinger: Thank you.\nWe have received a letter from Heath which I wanted to discuss with you\nbecause it brings great British pressure on you to return to the interna-\ntional lines. This is part of the international situation now.\nDinitz: I communicated with the Prime Minister yesterday, after I talked\nwith you, on the points we discussed. I just heard from her 20 minutes\nago, so my presentation is not too well prepared.\nDr. Kissinger: Is the Foreign Minister in on this act?\nDinitz: No, not at all. Just the Prime Minister. Maybe on some aspects\nof defense she brings Dayan in, and Allon on general matters.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nTOP SECRET - XGDS (3)\nCLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n2\nLet me give you some idea of our idea of the Soviet position in the\nMiddle East. In our view, indications show the Soviet Union to be\nin a better position in the Middle East than it really is. From all the\nevidence we have they are in quite a tough spot, with respect to Egypt\nand even with respect to the United States in the Middle East.\nBrandt said to the Prime Minister that Brezhnev doesn't put importance\non Watergate. He sees it as an anti-Communist plot\nDr. Kissinger: We will disillusion him next week, when all the star\nwitnesses appear! It is very patriotic.\nDinitz: Brandt says he didn't find Brezhnev concerned about Watergate.\nHe thought it was a plot of certain circles in America working against\ndetente. There is no sign that Brezhnev has the assumption he is meet-\ning a weakened President. Mrs. Meir wanted me to pass this on.\nWe have another visitor in Israel, Victor Louis.\nDr. Kissinger: Of the KGB.\nDinitz: Yes. He is seeing Gazit, my successor. He didn't see any\nCabinet level people. He related a few things. In view of his position we\nusually listen to him.\nDr. Kissinger: Is he Jewish?\nDinitz: Yes. He said that relations between the Soviet Union and Arab\ncountries are extremely complicated and are worsening from day to day.\nThe Soviet Union is grabbing, as he puts it, to maintain its hold in the\nArab world, and Qaddafi is looking for excuses to show that the Soviet\nUnion is committing treason against the Arabs.\nDr. Kissinger: Do you know anything about Qaddafi?\nDinitz: I can get you some information. The last reports I saw about\nhim said he really has clinical problems. Not just that his views are\ncrazy but that he really has a medical problem.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n3\nDr. Kissinger: Can you give us something?\nDinitz: Yes. Louis says there is a tendency of sobriety in the upper\nechelons of the Soviet Union regarding the Arab's military capacity. They\nrecognize Israeli military superiority for many years to come, and they\nare warning against any military adventures. The Arabs are increasingly\nangry over this.\nIn our own estimate the Soviet position on the Middle East has not in-\ncreased since last summer; on the contrary it has declined. This has\nmore to do with balance of power considerations not Watergate.\nDr. Kissinger: Let me say something about Watergate. You have your\nown estimate of its domestic effect; let's not kid ourselves. But we don't\nconduct foreign policy on this basis. If we admit that, we are lost.\nDinitz: I am saying we don't see any weakening of the President's position.\nDr. Kissinger: The point I've taken in negotiations with Communists is\nthat we would welcome a foreign policy crisis, which would divertattention\nfrom it! It worked with Le Duc Tho.\nDinitz: On the paper of 1972 [Tab B], I discussed it with the Prime\nMinister.\nDr. Kissinger: I was amazed. Our conclusions were almost identical.\nWe focussed on that too. [Dinitz-Kissinger telcon of June 14 at Tab C.]\nDinitz: The Prime Minister's feeling about this dilemma is, she wants\nto reiterate that we negate the document of 1972 as we've seen it. We\nsee great harm if it receives official sanction or approval. She asks the\nUnited States to do everything in its power to dissociate from the 1972\ndocument. We have serious doubts whether there is any document the\nU.S. could reach with the USSR that we could live with.\nThe 1972 document is worse than 242, for several reasons. The phrase\non withdrawal is in a harder manner, and is outside of the principle of\ngeneral agreement. It also omits \"the right to live in peace within secure\nand recognized boundaries. 11\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n4\nAlso the phrases on refugees and on international forces at Sharm el-\nSheikh weren't in 242. 242 also doesn't talk about stages but about\nagreement.\nWe don't understand why the United States at any point should agree to\na document that is worse than 242. We don't accept it at all. But out\nof a general desire to make remarks in the case a negotiation takes\nplace, we can give you the following remarks -- but not as coming from\nus and not in our name.\nDr. Kissinger: I understand.\nBefore you do that, can I interpret what you are saying? My understand-\ning of your position is this: it is clear that no Israeli Government can\nauthorize us to negotiate for it on anything. Second, no Israeli Govern-\nment will want to commit itself to principles that don't endorse its\nposition. So I construe this as saying you don't commit yourself to it\nin advance or afterward. But if your comments are taken into account,\nyou might understand the strategic necessities that brought us into the\nnegotiations, but you wouldn't commit yourself.\nDinitz: Yes, but I would add to that one sentence that the Prime\nMinister believes it is better that the U.S. dissociate itself from the\n1972 documents. So we ask first that you dissocate yourself. But\nbecause we understand your position, we say that should you find yourself\nin a negotiation, you should have our observations -- not labelled as our\nobservations.\nDr. Kissinger: If it becomes unavoidable that we have a discussion,\nyou give us your personal observations. If anything should emerge, we\nwill present it to you as a new document.\nDinitz: Our observations are as follows:\nOn paragraph one of the document, the paper of May 28, 1972, we feel\nthat the paragraph should emphasize that we are speaking here about an\nagreement between the parties based on Resolution 242, or in the frame-\nwork of 242, in order to achieve a final peace. We feel that the need for\ndirect negotiations at some stage between the parties should already be\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n5\nmentioned in the first paragraph. Because we see it as the core of the\nissue. You said it was a defect in the 1972 document that the Soviets\ndidn't accept the U.S. position about direct negotiations between the\nparties. But we see it as the basis for any agreement that evolves.\nDr. Kissinger: As we have played with these things, we think it should\nbe plural --\n'agreements'' rather than \"agreement.\"\nDinitz: Yes. I am coming to that. We are not quite clear in our mind\nwhen you talk about \"stages and priorities\" because we don't know what will\nhappen between the stages and between the priorities. So we would prefer\nno reference to stages and priorities. We should stick to the reference to\n242 and final peace.\nDr. Kissinger: We meant to allow for an interim settlement.\nDinitz: So you can say, \"an interim settlement is not precluded. \" Just\nsay it explicitly. We didn't like what you had because it reminded us of\nthe timetables in the Russian plan.\nIn Paragraph 2, the provisions for withdrawal, I already said we would\nrather have the exact phrasing of Resolution 242. Also, the phrase \"Arab\nterritories\" doesn't appear in 242; it says \"territories.\" Once you identify\nit as Arab, you are already prejudging it. Why go beyond 242 on this?\nBut the main thing in this paragraph is that it should not be separate from\nthe element of agreement and the element of secure and recognized\nboundaries in 242. Many people in 1967 accepted our opinion that \"secure\nand recognized\" means withdrawal to new boundaries that will not be the\n1967 boundaries. The 1967 boundaries certainly weren't secure and\nrecognized.\nDr. Kissinger: They certainly weren't recognized. But it is rather hard\nto maintain from the outcome of the 1967 war that they weren't secure.\nDinitz: Our army was secure! But the borders invited trouble.\nDr. Kissinger: I understand your position. There is no need to debate\nthis.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n6\nDinitz: Paragraph 3 is maintained by us, with the possibility of one\nsmall change. Where it says \"any border rectifications\" we would prefer\n\"changes\", because \"recitifications\" can have the connotation of small\nsize. This is a very important paragraph. \"Changes\" has no connota-\ntion of size.\nDr. Kissinger: That raises a tactical question. To get the key changes,\nwe may have to keep the changes in the other paragraphs to a minimum.\nDinitz: Paragraph 4 we have problems with. We would like to remove\ncompletely the mention of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh and remove\nany reference to Sharm. Because the context of the paragraph is of\nsecurity arrangements. We believe Sharm should be controlled by us --\nI am not talking about sovereignty.\nDr. Kissinger: No reference to Sharm.\nDinitz: Yes.\nDr. Kissinger: The Egyptians won't fight over that.\nDinitz: If there is no mention of Sharm, they will interpret it their way.\nThe Prime Minister says it is imperative not to give the Soviets any hold\nthere at all. There should be no physical Soviet presence there, in the\ncontext of big-power guarantees.\nParagraph 4, still, on big-power guarantees, is something the Prime\nMinister negates, except when it is a function of agreement between\nparties and not something instead of secure borders.\nDr. Kissinger: Are these typed up? Can you give us a copy?\nDinitz: I will get hell in Israel if I do that. I fought to get any remarks\nat all.\nDr. Kissinger: I understand. It is a daring course.\nDinitz: Paragraph 5 we feel would be unnecessary, not needed at all.\nIt is not that we object, but if our approach is taken with respect to\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n7\nparagraph 1 - \"agreement between the parties under 242 to achieve a final\npeace\" - then there is no need in paragraph 5 to refer also to the end\nto a state of belligerency.\nParagraph 6: again, on Sharm el-Sheikh, we don't want to mix the\nSuez Canal and Sharm -- or the Straits of Tiran, as it is referred to\nhere. Because while the Suez Canal is an international waterway and\nwe don't dispute Egyptian sovereignty -- though it should be open to all,\nand we want Israel mentioned explicitly -- but Sharm we want to insure\nthrough our own control. We don't dispute Egyptian sovereignty of the\nCanal, or control over it. But the physical control is different in the\ntwo waterways. Mention of Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal is not\nnecessary because no one disputes it, and we don't want it mixed up\nwith Sharm.\nOn Paragraph 7 we have no remarks of substance but we would rather\nhave \"peace treaties\" rather than \"settlement\".\nIn Paragraph 8, we suggest a return to the language of Resolution 242,\nwhich just says \"a just settlement of the refugee problem\". And we would\nprefer the followi ng sentence to be incorporated after every reference\nto refugees: \"In reaching an agreement containing provisions laying\ndown the obligations accepted by the parties towards a settlement of the\nrefugee problem, neither party shall be under claims from the other\ninconsistent with its sovereignty.\"\nI have two general remarks to add: One reason I was able to get such\nremarks was that you said on the phone we can only live with a paper\nthat leaves us room enough for negotiations. I saw this as a key remark,\nand I told the Prime Minister about it. She said you should know that\nIsrael can live only with a paper that leaves us room for negotiations on\nsu bstantial changes in borders -- not on the basis of no changes or only\nminor rectifications.\nThe second remark is that it is the request of the Prime Minister that\nthe United States do everything possible to dissociate from the document.\nDr. Kissinger: I understand. Peter will check with Idan on the language\nto make sure we have it.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n8\nWe have to navigate between something that is SO new that the Russians\nwill introduce new points, and something that we can use. We will put\ntogether a new set of principles. You will be making suggestions as\nour adviser, not as the Israeli Ambassador. We understand -- it is your\nsecond choice. You would prefer no document, and the only document\nwe can use is something you will be against. I just want your prime\nMinister to understand that I understand.\nHere is a long letter from Heath, that you can read. [Tab D]\nDinitz: [Reads it. ] In the third page, the screwdriver came out of the\nback.\nThe operative part is the same as the British delegate said at the\nUnited Nations. The reasoning, on the need for oil, is secret of course.\nBut on the need to go to the '67 lines, it was said at the United Nations\nthe day before yesterday. And it goes back to the Harrogate speech,\nthe original British position. [Dinitz hands back the letter. ]\nDr. Kissinger: Here is the message from the Egyptians. I sent them\ntwo messages, one telling them there would be aircraft deliveries to\nIsrael, and the second message, to which this is a reply. [Tab E]\nYou can see I told him that we would maintain a military balance.\nDinitz: You didn't tell him how much.\nDr. Kissinger: No, I wouldn't tell him that much.\nYou know that was the formula you gave me [about linkage].\nDinitz: But there was no Israeli statement about linkage. It always\nhas been our position that the interim settlement is not the final border,\nbut no Israeli made a statement about the linkage formula.\nDr. Kissinger: I have never replied to that.\nDinitz: What is this about \"the understanding on which the present\nEgyptian-American discussion is based\" and the \"objective\" of \"final\nwithdrawal of Israeli forces to Egypt's international boundaries?\"\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n9\nDr. Kissinger: The only understanding that we have is on 242. That\nis their point of view, not ours.\nWhat I will do is redraft the principles, to keep it as close as possible\nto last year's.\nDinitz: I have two more points the Prime Minister asked me to raise.\nWith respect to Soviet Jewry, we would appreciate it if the President\ncould raise with Brezhnev, first, the level of emigration, and secondly,\nthe hardship cases. On the first, there has been a decline, not an\nincrease, in recent months.\nThen I was asked to mention the Phantoms to Saudi Arabia and to Kuwait.\nDr. Kissinger: I have stopped the Kuwaiti one for the time being.\nDinitz: Anything on the Saudis?\nDr. Kissinger: I think it's going to be tough.\nDinitz: One more question. We are very much concerned with Ethiopia,\nas you know. The Emperor was here, and he tells our people he got\ncompletely a cold shoulder from State.\nDr. Kissinger: The trouble with State is that they dislike America so\nmuch that they think anyone who is friendly to us is defective. [Laughter]\nI will look into that and let you know.\n[Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador then conferred alone for ten minutes. ]\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nAmbassador Rabin\nHenry A. Kissinger\nPeter W. Rodman 1 m\nTIME & PLACE:\nJanuary 24, 1973\nThe Map Room, The White House\n6:05 to 6:22 p.m.\nAmbassador Rabin: Congratulations on the Vietnam settlement.\nDr. Kissinger: It was the best obtainable under the circumstances. In\nfact, it is better than the situation warranted. They could have held\nout another two months and we would have been in serious difficulty.\nAmbassador Rabin: It is a tremendous achievement.\nMr. Kissinger: I wanted to see you before your meeting with the President.\nAmbassador Rabin: I believe it will be a short meeting.\nDr. Kissinger: I guess a half an hour. He has nothing particular in mind.\nHe likes you. You and Freeman are the only two Ambassadors he has\ndeveloped a personal feeling for.\nAmbassador Rabin: I will make three points. First I will thank him for\nallowing Israel to get arms.\nDr. Kissinger: May I suggest something? Spend the first few minutes\nabout some other subjects, such as his courage and strength.\nAmbassador Rabin: I'll tell him that I came here in 1968. The difference\nbetween what I found here in '68 and what I see when I leave is a dramatic\nchange. People don't realize this, but I do as a foreigner. Believe me, I\nthought America was falling apart. Secondly, I will talk about arms, and\nthank him. Then I will thank him for the American posture and strength\nas translated to the Middle East, and its importance.\nTOP SECRET/SENSVE at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library ECRET - XGDS (3)\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY DECLASSIFIED CI ASSIFIED BY: HENRY A.KISSINGER\nThis document has been pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-2-\nDr. Kissinger: Such as the Jordanian crisis.\nAmbassador Rabin: Such as the Jordanian crisis and so on. And my\nopinion is that the Egyptians asked the Russians out because the Russians\nwere not ready to give them what they wanted. This is partly because of\nIsrael's strength, but it is also because of the change of posture between\nthe major powers.\nDr. Kissinger: I have learned that when you use force it is better to use\n30 percent more than is necessary than five percent less than necessary.\nAmbassador Rabin: Not gradual involvement.\nDr. Kissinger: Right. Therefore whenever we use force we have to do\nit slightly hysterically. Even the Indian/Pakistani crisis.\nAmbassador Rabin: Even Sadat has said this.\nDr. Kissinger: The Russians told Sadat that we would not stand for war.\nAmbassador Rabin: And third, that all these political solutions have come\nup mainly when there is no option for war. Only then will there be change\nand a more realistic chance for a political settlement in the Middle East.\nI will stress therefore the need to leave more to the parties to do more.\nDr. Kissinger: This he will not agree with.\nAmbassador Rabin: I know, I will do it a different way.\nDr. Kissinger: Fine.\nAmbassador Rabin: I will end with the hope that he will continue his present\npolicy, particularly the first two elements, because this is responsible for\nthe situation today.\nDr. Kissinger: He has enormous respect for you. And the more you can\ntalk as a man leaving the diplomatic service, as a man he asked to see\nLet me tell you what I have been doing, which I may not be able to do. The\nEgyptians, as I've told you, have been bombarding me with requests for a\nmeeting. I tentatively proposed February 22nd in London. I may not be\nable to do this.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYERSprOduced &t the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-3-\nAmbassador Rabin: Ismail.\nDr. Kissinger: Yes. My strategy would be to get some degree of control\nover it. Second, to see what they have in mind, if anything. And third,\nto do this before Mrs. Meir comes, so we can all discuss it. Is she\ncoming the 27th?\nAmbassador Rabin: Yes.\nDr. Kissinger: I could shift this to the 26th with Ismail.\nAmbassador Rabin: On the matter of aircraft production, let me tell you.\nThis mission from your Defense Department came to Israel. They had\nthought we wanted technical knowhow because we had nothing. They were\nshocked. They now realize we will do it either with them or without them.\nThey finished by saying they would recommend everything. We will see.\nThey started to calculate everything for us. We said we could do the\ncalculation ourselves.\nDr. Kissinger: You should crystallize it into a decision so I can act. Put\nit in a formal proposal.\nAmbassador Rabin: We have.\nDr. Kissinger: Where is it?\nAmbassador Rabin: They had a mission, they had to put it ino a report,\nbut they had no one to report to because the new Secretary was not in yet.\nThe Prime Minister will raise here first the question of arms, second\nthe question of political settlement- where we go.\nDr. Kissinger: Warn her not to get too specific.\nAmbassador Rabin: I will be going to Israel and will get back on the 5th.\nDr. Kissinger: I may go on vacation on the 7th. Let's meet again on\nthe 5th or 6th, because I may go on vacation and not be back until the 18th\nof February.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-4-\nAmbassador Rabin: We've got to know where to go. We have enough\nfrom Jordan to know now.\nDr. Kissinger: He has not proposed anything.\nAmbassador Rabin: She would be satisfied with the line agreed in\nDecember 1971 if it can be worked out for the future. After all, there is\nno need for any activity. Even the Secretary of State, when he talked about\nactivity, did not propose anything new.\nDr. Kissinger: But as you told me, every time I do anything you pay for it.\nAmbassador Rabin: They are behaving now.\nThe third point she might raise is Soviet Jewry. At present in terms of\nnumbers, it's good. In terms of ransom\nDr. Kissinger: I must tell you the President is extremely sensitive about\nthe idea of American Jewish community holding up American foreign policy\non an issue he considers a Soviet internal matter.\nAmbassador Rabin: Jackson isn't Jewish.\nDr. Kissinger: The President thinks he responds to the Jewish community.\nIt is an extraordinary sensitivity of the President. And the Russians\nbasically have no feelings. They do what they have to do.\n[Kissinger and Rabin conferred privately from 6:22 to 6:30 p.m.]\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified"
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