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SECRET 2 The Prime Minister noted that the President's decisions of August 15 actually only accelerated reconsiderations of Canadian policy that were going on in any event. Canada was in a tough position. She had a trade surplus but a problem with invisibles. If the U. S. was talking about a secular trend where some years the U.S. exported more and other years Canada exported more, this was one thing; but if we were saying that Canada must always be in a deficit position towards the U.S. so that the U.S. could always export capital to Canada - - then we were asking them to sell part of their country to us. The Prime Minister did not believe that a country becomes more independent by being poorer. The question for Canada then was, should she choose a common market or free trade area or political integration, or should she gear towards more independence in order to be more autonomous of fluctuations in U.S. policy? The President noted that the Prime Minister had raised the fundamental question of the U.S. Canadian relationship. We were clearly eager to have Canada close to us, and many politicians would seek their own interest. The President began with some simple propositions: (1) We all had to begin by looking at the national interest. (2) He did not look at the issue in narrow parochial terms. (3) The U.S. had a world responsibility and we expected to discharge it. We did not like the August 15 decisions but they had to be taken. A strong United States was essential to world stability; a healthy U.S. economy was crucial even to Canada. Much of our problem was due to the transition from war to peace. Henry was the saddest of all when the decisions were taken, from his political point of view. But the U.S. would be a sound and responsible member of the international community. We could get the Canadian situation into perspective by including all other countries in the solution, the President continued. Thirty per cent of all our exports went to Canada. At the same time, there was the intricate problem of reforming the whole international monetary system. The U.S. did not want to go back to convertibility. But we wanted to understand what Canada wanted. The President thought that it should be a multilateral solution; Secretary Connally had informed him, however, TOP SECRET [NLN 03-84/3:p.2 2 z4]

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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n2\nThe Prime Minister noted that the President's decisions of August 15\nactually only accelerated reconsiderations of Canadian policy that\nwere going on in any event. Canada was in a tough position. She had\na trade surplus but a problem with invisibles. If the U. S. was talking\nabout a secular trend where some years the U.S. exported more and\nother years Canada exported more, this was one thing; but if we were\nsaying that Canada must always be in a deficit position towards the U.S.\nso that the U.S. could always export capital to Canada - - then we were\nasking them to sell part of their country to us. The Prime Minister did\nnot believe that a country becomes more independent by being poorer.\nThe question for Canada then was, should she choose a common market\nor free trade area or political integration, or should she gear towards\nmore independence in order to be more autonomous of fluctuations\nin U.S. policy?\nThe President noted that the Prime Minister had raised the fundamental\nquestion of the U.S. Canadian relationship. We were clearly eager to\nhave Canada close to us, and many politicians would seek their own\ninterest. The President began with some simple propositions: (1) We\nall had to begin by looking at the national interest. (2) He did not look\nat the issue in narrow parochial terms. (3) The U.S. had a world\nresponsibility and we expected to discharge it. We did not like the\nAugust 15 decisions but they had to be taken. A strong United States\nwas essential to world stability; a healthy U.S. economy was crucial\neven to Canada. Much of our problem was due to the transition from\nwar to peace. Henry was the saddest of all when the decisions were\ntaken, from his political point of view. But the U.S. would be a sound\nand responsible member of the international community.\nWe could get the Canadian situation into perspective by including all\nother countries in the solution, the President continued. Thirty per cent\nof all our exports went to Canada. At the same time, there was the\nintricate problem of reforming the whole international monetary system.\nThe U.S. did not want to go back to convertibility. But we wanted to\nunderstand what Canada wanted. The President thought that it should be\na multilateral solution; Secretary Connally had informed him, however,\nTOP SECRET\n[NLN 03-84/3:p.2 2 z4]"
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