Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
470866612
label
STRATEGIC POLICY ISSUES (TS)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
470866612
contentType
document
title
STRATEGIC POLICY ISSUES (TS)
citationUrl
collections
National Security Files (Nixon Administration)
Henry A. Kissinger's (HAK) Office Files
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
470866612
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
4c98d50b9a7ef818
ocrText
TOP SECRET
STRATEGIC POLICY ISSUES
This memorandum provides a brief over-view of the strategic situation
and then considers the single issue which requires immediate attention:
should President Johnson's FY70 budget for strategic forces be amended now
and if so, how? More fundamental issues will be addressed in the six
month review.
I. The Strategic Situation
This section provides a brief over-view of the strategic situation
as background for necessary immediate decisions.
US-Soviet Force Comparisons. The present US force plan calls for
the number of ICBMs to remain constant at 1,054, the number of sea based
missiles to be held at 656 (41 Polaris submarines), and the number of
strategic bombers to decrease to approximately 300 in the 1970s. However,
US strategic offensive forces will undergo very substantial qualitative
improvements over the next five years, most importantly by MIRVs. With
these deployments, the number of independently targetable US strategic
missile warheads will increase from the current approximately 1,600 to
about 5,800 by the mid-1970s. Similarly, our strategic bomber force will
undergo substantial improvements encompassing advanced penetration aids.
The Soviets have continued their ICBM buildup and within two years
may have 1,200 of these systems operationally deployed; they could have
1,500 ICBMs and a few hundred mobile ICBMs by the mid-1970s. The Soviets
have a substantially smaller sea based force and bomber force than the US,
but they have recently initiated a new submarine construction program which
could give them a force comparable to our present Polaris fleet by the
mid-1970s. They are estimated to be about four years away from initially
deploying MIRVs on large ICBMs.
On the defensive side, the US Sentinel ABM designed against. China,
comprised of some 700 defensive missiles, will be initially operational in
late 1972 and fully deployed by 1975. The Soviet ABM program has lagged,
with completion of the small Moscow ABM (64 launchers) not to occur until
the early 70s. The intelligence community estimates that the Soviets will
probably deploy an ABM comparable to Sentinel by the mid-70s. There are
no current signs of additional ABM deployments beyond Moscow, and the
extensively deployed Tallin system is estimated to be for air defense
purposes with no real ABM potential.
Relative Effectiveness. Comparing the numbers and types of US and
Soviet strategic systems does not indicate how well the respective forces
can perform strategic missions. Effectiveness is generally measured in
terms of the ability of the forces to survive an enemy first strike and
inflict large fatalities on an adversary's population.
Our currently programmed force can maintain the ability to inflict
40% Soviet fatalities (90 million) throughout the early to mid-1970s against
the highest threat estimated by the intelligence community. If it is
determined that a greater than expected Soviet offensive and defensive
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon SECRET Presidential Library
DECLASSII
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET
2
threat is emerging, a very unlikely but possible occurance, the US has
many force improvement and addition options which can be implemented soon
enough to maintain the ability to deter the Soviets at at least the 25%
fatality level.
With estimated probable future deployments, the Soviet Union can
maintain its second strike damage potential against the US at 40% US
fatality levels throughout the 1970s (80 million). Although the Soviets
may have to work harder and spend relatively more money than the US in
maintaining their second strike capability, we can be certain that the
Soviets can and will take sufficient counteractions to retain the ability
to inflict unacceptably high levels of damage against the US regardless
of our force procurements.
In general, if one examines the outcome of strategic exchanges between
the US and the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s, both will suffer very
heavy destruction regardless of who strikes first and independent of
detailed differences in force level and characteristics.
Conduct of Nuclear Operations. Despite our efforts to prevent nuclear
wars or major crises such events may occur. If we are to secure the most
favorable possible outcome we need to be able to control forces effectively
during a crisis and to employ nuclear weapons selectively. Our procurement
decisions are based mainly on deterrence considerations and most of our
nuclear plans assume sudden very large use of nuclear weapons. Issues
requiring consideration are: (1) whether we need to pay more attention to
issues of control and selective use in procurring forces and (2) whether
we need more flexible plans for the use of nuclear weapons.
Political Implications. The US nuclear capability is a major component
of our deterrent of large conventional attacks particularly in Europe.
Europeans are concerned about US strategic forces and the US-Soviet nuclear
balance for this reason and because some of them desire and some fear US-
Soviet strategic arms limitation agreements.
The effect on the probability and consequences of nuclear proliferation
also needs to be taken into account in designing US strategic forces.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
3
TOP SECRET
II. The FY70 Budget for Strategic Forces
A. FY70 Strategic Force Program
The existing strategic program calls for substantial improvements
in our existing strategic forces over the next five years. The most
important improvements are:
(1) the introduction of MIRVs on our land and sea-based
missiles beginning in mid-1970;
(2) the deployment of the Sentinel anti-Chinese ABM
system beginning in 1972;
(3) increases in missile payloads through the replacement
of Polaris submarines with Poseidon and the replace-
ment of part of our Minuteman II force with Minuteman
III; and
(4) the modernization of our defense against bombers.
The FY70 strategic budget includes:
(1) procurement of Poseidon missile and submarines and
Minuteman III;
(2) $1.8 billion for production and deployment of the
Sentinel ABM system with maintenance of the option
to defend ICBM sites with Sprint missiles;
(3) development of short-range air-to-surface missiles
and of cruise missile decoys for deployment on our
B-52 bomber;
(4) $85 million for competitive design and testing of a
new strategic bomber; and
(5) development of an air defense package consisting of
the F-106X interceptor and full-scale development of
an airborne warning and control system, including the
over-the-horizon radar for improved early warning.
In addition, the budget contains development funds for a new
submarine launched missile-firing system, "hard rock" silos for Minutemen,
second generation improvements to the anti-Chinese Sentinel, and technology
for a possible anti-Soviet ABM.
The total FY70 budget for strategic forces and related activities
is about $19 billion, including $12.5 billion in direct costs, $1.4 billion
for research and development, and $4.9 billion for indirect costs.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
4
TOP SECRET
B. In considering possible modifications of this program there are
four kinds of changes which could be made:
(1) Move ahead with new strategic systems by approving
"contract definition" -- in effect make the
decision to procure.
(2) Increase research and development efforts for various
strategic programs.
(3) Add to or accelerate programs currently approved for
deployment.
(4) Delay approved strategic programs.
Following is a discussion of each possibility:
1. Move Ahead with New Strategic Systems
Immediate approval could be given for four new systems (the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended going forward):
(1) New strategic bomber to replace the existing B-52s
with a new bomber which could have improved penetration
capability.
(2) New ICBM to replace the Minutemen with a much larger
missile which could carry many separately targeted
warheads to penetrate Soviet defenses and destroy
military targets.
(3) New missile-launching submarine to replace existing
submarines in order to get greater missile range and
quieter operating procedures as a hedge against possible
Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability.
(4) Anti-Soviet ABM system to supplement and reorient the
anti-Chinese system with a capability designed to limit
damage in the event of nuclear war.
Decisions to procure new offensive systems should be
influenced by such considerations as:
(1) the confidence we wish to have in our deterrent;
(2) the extent to which we wish to hedge against greater-
than-expected Soviet threats;
(3) the degree to which we desire to match the Soviet
Union in specific strategic systems; and
(4) whether existing systems can be replaced by new systems
on economic grounds.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
5
TOP SECRET
Thus evaluation of the need for these new systems will be
a major concern in the strategic review. The arguments for going ahead
immediately are:
(1) In ilight of the substantial increase in the size of
the Soviet strategic offensive forces we need to show
our determination to maintain an advantage.
(2) Delays would result in increased costs and could delay
initial operating dates from those which could now
be scheduled in the mid-1970s.
(3) FY70 additional expenditures would be quite small.
The arguments for not making a commitment now are:
(1) Decisions on whether to proceed with these systems
will determine the shape of our strategic posture
for the next four to eight years. Such decisions
should be based on a careful assessment of our
strategic objectives.
(2) If we decide in six months to proceed we probably
could meet the same initial operating dates for offensive
missiles that would be possible now although at greater
cost. (The bomber schedule would slip six months.)
(3) Ultimate costs would vary depending on which systems
were procured and how many of each were purchased but
addition to strategic budget over the next five years
would be substantial.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
6
TOP SECRET
2. Increase Research and Development Efforts
for Possible New Systems
Immediate decisions could be made to increase the strategic
research and development budget, particularly for advanced development of
major strategic offensive systems. Possibilities include:
(1) Increasing advanced development budgets for advanced
ICBM technology, a new submarine launched missile
system and a new bomber by 30-50 percent from current
level of
, as proposed by the Services.
(2) Add $30 million for engineering development of the
"hard rock" missile silo to guard against very accurate
Soviet missiles.
(3) Increase development activities for large anti-Soviet
ABM.
Arguments for:
(1) Demonstrate a willingness to pursue advanced weapons
technology more rapidly.
(2) Contribute to the confidence and understanding
associated with these system and hence to our ability
to decide whether to procure them.
(3) Arguments against R&D efforts already being funded
at a high level. Increased expenditures would increase
our understanding only slightly.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
7
TOP SECRET
3. Add to or Accelerate Programs Currently Approved for Deployment
As a hedge against a possible large Soviet ABM capability
we could move to improve the ability of currently approved forces to
penetrate defenses. Possibilities are:
(1) Put 14 warheads on each Poseidon instead of 10 ( FY70
cost
,
total cost
).
(2) Improve Poseidon accuracy and add penetration aids
(FY70 cost
,
total cost
)
(3) I Convert all 1000 (instead of only 600) Minutemen to
the new Minuteman III missile (FY70 cost
total cost
) .
The argument for acting is that these relatively low cost
options increase our confidence in our ability to deter possible Soviet
defenses and hence improve our deterrent.
The argument against is that with the existing program
we can with very high confidence penetrate current and predicted future
Soviet defenses. If the Soviets move toward a big ABM system we can then
take the actions listed here.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
8
TOP SECRET
4. Delay Approved Strategic Programs
Sentinel Anti-Chinese ABM System. The approved program
calls for the deployment of a system designed to protect the US against
a light Chinese ICBM attack in the 1972-75 period at a total cost now
estimated at about $8.5 billion. The system is funded at $1.8 billion
in FY70. Cancellation of Sentinel with a vigorous R&D program could
reduce FY70 costs by $1.5 billion. Keeping Sentinel alive but
minimizing procurement would save $500 million in FY70.
(1) The arguments for proceeding on schedule are:
(a) The planned deployment schedule would provide
protection in the early 1970s when the
intelligence community estimates that the
Chinese could have as many as 10 ICBMs.
(b) The planned deployment provides a basis for a
larger anti-Soviet system.
(c) Moving ahead on schedule would increase Soviet
incentives to engage in negotiations on Strategic
Arms Limitations.
(2) The arguments for delay are:
(a) Few believe that an anti-Chinese system justifies
the current cost of Sentinel; currently estimated
cost is double estimated cost when decision was
made and costs are rising.
(b) The Chinese ICBM program is slipping. We now
estimate that the Chinese will have 10-15 ICBMs
in 1975; previous estimate was 25-75.
(c) Delay would permit a careful evaluation of the
real issue: should we build an anti-Soviet ABM
system. If we decide to proceed with such a
system we could build a system specifically
designed for this purpose.
(d) Work on the Soviet Moscow ABM system has alowed
down considerably and theSoviet system is a very
primitive one. Thus we have no reason to believe
that the Soviets may get ahead of us in ABM
capability.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified