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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET PERSONAL
December 23, 1968
PERSONAL MEMORANDUM TO HENRY KISSINGER
These should be understood, Henry, as wholly personal notes and
reflections.
I.
Set out below are some critical issues that will require decision in the
weeks and months ahead. But I should perhaps begin by saying simply that
if the new Administration is patient and steady, the following are objectives
within its grasp, looking ahead over the next 12-18 months.
- - A stable settlement in Southeast Asia.
- - Rapid progress in building the regional institutions of a new Asia.
Beginnings of normalizing our relations with Communist China.
A Middle East settlement.
The beginnings of concerted regional work in the Middle East
centering on the refugee problem, in particular, the region's
economic and social progress in general.
A surge toward unity in Western Europe, including UK entry into
the Common Market and a European consolidation of the UK and
French nuclear capabilities within the NATO structure.
Acceptance of the NPT by Japan, Israel, Germany, Italy, Brazil,
Argentina, and -- perhaps -- India.
-- Progress in missile talks with the Soviet Union.
-- Forward movement in Latin American integration.
-- A consolidation of the world monetary system in forms which would
provide monetary stability, on the one hand, and a foundation for
relatively liberal trade policies, on the other.
II. The Vietnam settlement. Here are things to watch:
-- An early reaffirmation by President Nixon of President Johnson's
instruction to General Abrams is required. President Johnson gave an
instruction to go with the ARVN absolutely flat out in a pacification offensive.
Without momentum inside South Vietnam, our leverage for a settlement in
Paris or elsewhere is minimal, Vague talk of "de-escalation" could easily
take the heart out of the Reproduced ARVN at Library affect the morale of
U.S. forces.
DECLASSIFIED DERSONAI
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET- PERSONAL
- -2-
Clarity about the general shape of a political settlement inside SVN.
Only those who have lived with a succession of SVN governments can understand
how precious the present government is, notably with its constitutional basis
rooted in the election process. The understanding with Thieu-Ky is that they
will have to face a popular front party running against them at some time.
That is why they are working to build a big national political party. * That is
why at Honolulu Thieu said that those who give up violence can "run for office
as well as vote. 11 There are all sorts of complexities that lie ahead in
negotiating this outcome; but, if we continue to extend population control on
the ground at something like the present 3% a month rate and chew away at the
infrastructure, such a settlement is, I believe, within our grasp. We achieved
a reasonably good understanding with Thieu at Honolulu. One of the most
essential first tasks of the new Administration will be to reaffirm this basic
understanding so that the struggle in Paris and elsewhere will not pull us
apart and set in motion a disintegration of the political process in Saigon.
Although we must leave the details of the negotiations to the South Vietnamese,
a fundamental understanding on where we both wish to come out inside South
Vietnam is essential.
Keep your eye on Laos. It is almost certain that Hanoi will try to
negotiate its position on the ground in Laos to the maximum. There must be
a contingency plan if they try to extend their situation in Laos down to the
Mekong. (You should know that the only rational military riposte that any of
us can think of is to seize some ground north of the 17th parallel and hold it
until they get out of Laos if they, in fact, should play this card.) In any
case, a Vietnam settlement without a Laos settlement would bring no peace
to Southeast Asia. Another anxiety is the road building by Communist China
in Northern Laos. Some of us have feared for years that the Chinese might
make a land grab in Northern Laos in the context of a Vietnam settlement.
The truth is we do not have a good feel for Communist Chinese intentions
toward a Vietnam settlement. I suspect there will be a test of will over Laos
before we're finished. The Russians may be helpful, if they are sure we'll
be tough.
Monitoring the settlement. You should bear in mind that the only new
policy made in Paris was on the first day when Harriman was instructed that
in a Vietnam settlement the governments of Southeast Asia should play a part,
in monitoring terms. We have stimulated the Thais, Japanese, Indonesians,
and others to think about their role in a settlement. Specifically, some of us
feel we need an Asian force (using the new sensors, helicopters, etc.) to
monitor against renewed infiltration. We would like to get the Japanese and
Indonesians into this role since, unlike the Indians, Canadians, and Poles, they
See me,
SECRET PERSONAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET--PERSONAL
-3-
would have an abiding interest in the stability of a settlement. The optimum
is to bring the Japanese out of the islands into a security role in Asia as part
of a multilateral peacekeeping exercise.
-- U.S. troop withdrawals. Don't be too surprised at some stage if
Hanoi and Moscow indicate they do not want total U.S. troop withdrawals from
SVN. There is some body of intelligence which suggests they may want a U.S.
military presence in South Vietnam (as well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia)
as a counter to Chinese Communist pressure on Hanoi.
III. Asia. Here are some of the forthcoming key issues in the rest of Asia.
Aid post-Vietnam. War expenditures have generated throughout
Southeast Asia a major boom. It is essential to our interests and we keep that
momentum as war expenditures slacken off. The Special Fund of the Asian
Development Bank should be put through Congress promptly and we should
begin talking to the Japanese, Australians, and others about the post-Vietnam
aid picture including orders of magnitude to be generated on a multilateral
basis. At some stage, an Asian and Pacific meeting on this subject -- going
beyond the troop contributing countries and bringing in the Japanese -- will
be in order. In the meanwhile, make sure Indonesia gets enough aid and
continues to pull out of the swamp.
-- Group and consolidate the regional institutions. As you know, we have
ASPAC on the political side and ASEAN. We also have a series of ad hoc
functional groups working in education, communications, banking, etc. The
Asian leadership should consolidate these on a political-economic basis --
perhaps like the OAS or OAU in Africa. Australia and New Zealand should be
wholly in. We need not be in; but we should encourage Asian thought and
leadership in this direction. We must lead, however, on the security side.
One of the most subtle and challenging tasks in the time ahead is to develop
post-Vietnam an Asian security system without adding to the number of U.S.
treaties: an Asian security structure which would put Asian military forces in
mutual support, notably with respect to ground forces. Our existing treaty
commitments, if maintained, are a sufficient base for our participation.
Planning work on this problem -- already under way -- should proceed
vigorously.
-- Mainland China. Finally, starting on 20 February there is the
intriguing task of finding out if mainland China is about ready to come to
terms for a while with the rest of Asia and the U.S. and concentrate on its
domestic development.
SECRET - PERSONAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET PERSONAL
-4-
IV. Europe.
-- The French are evidently thinking about a new nuclear relationship
with the U.S. and are suggesting various concessions to us on the NATO
security side. There is no suggestion that de Gaulle has softened on UK
entry into the Common Market. That remains, however, the key to a stable
Europe that will be able to relieve us of disproportionate anxieties and
burdens. Properly played, however, I believe that the Germans and ourselves
have enough leverage vis-a-vis the French to bring UK entry into the Common
Market, if we play our hand patiently and if the British also play their hand well.
-- The consolidation of the French and UK nuclear capabilities into some
kind of European force, linked to us via NATO, will raise the extremely
sensitive issue of the German relationship of that force. We will be up against
the old problem of the "loose" European nuclear entity. It will take some
managing; but I believe it can be managed.
-- Urgent and fundamental for the stability of NATO is a long-term
offset agreement with the Germans, for which we have laid the ground. With
the Czechoslovak invasion as a memory, I believe we can hold the U.S. role
of NATO in the Congress -- if but only if we get a satisfactory long-
term offset agreement with Germany.
V.
Latin America.
- - The central task of Latin America in the years ahead is to move on
with economic and physical integration; laying the basis thereby to handle
productively more advanced industries, needed at the present stage of growth;
that is, metalworking, chemicals, electronics, etc. In this connection, we
have an opportunity to encourage Latin American businessmen in the private
sector to begin to form big units on a continental basis which would damp down
the danger that U.S. firms would dominate a Latin American Common Market.
Special attention should be given to this possibility which centers -- at the
moment -- on a Mexican industrialist, Bruno Pagliai. We want to avoid a
Latin American Servan-Schreiber, if possible.
If, as we hope, we see a new phase of European consolidation, we
should work to bring Europe closer to Latin America and begin to give sub-
stance to the old idea of a South Atlantic triangle. This could be accelerated
if Europe were willing to give their aid to Latin America via a European
development institution rather than bilaterally, on a country-by-country basis.
SECRET--PERSONAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET--PERSONAL
-5-
VI. Middle East. The Middle East is, of course, urgent and right at the top
of the list. For what it is worth, here are my reflections.
-- The Israelis will make important concessions to the extent that the
end of the road looks more like a peace treaty and less like the 1957 "chewing-
gum-and-string" truce.
We simply do not know about Nasser's political situation inside Egypt.
We do not know if and when the UAR will be in a position or a mood for a firm
settlement. But a maximum effort should be made to get an Israeli settlement
with Jordan in which the Jordanians, essentially, grant a peace treaty while
the Israelis make further concessions on Jerusalem and drop the Allon plan
for the West Bank.
The Israelis are obviously putting themselves in a position to have a
nuclear option. This is just about as dangerous to them and to us as anything
could be. I have a feeling, however, that they may be bargaining with the
USSR and the US on the signing of the NPT. I do not see clearly the end of
the road here. I doubt that there is a Congressional base for a bilateral
security arrangement with Israel. But it may be that some form of
Congressional resolution -- stronger than anything we now have -- backing
a Middle East settlement, plus Israeli signing of the NPT -- might be helpful
at some stage.
We are nursing along the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia
not merely because of its implications for the Persian Gulf, but also because
of its latent possibility as the core of a regional Middle East grouping which
might eventually pull Turkey and Iran into the area to balance the disproportionate
and disruptive influence of the UAR. In any case, President Nixon should in
my view, at an early stage -- hold up the vision of a Middle East regional
organization for economic and social development. The Middle East is the only
major region in the non-Communist world that is not so organized. That
regional framework is not only the proper basis for a long-term refugee
settlement, but the foundation for a structure that might prove resistant to
Soviet and other outside disrupting pressures for the long pull. As Hussein
and I once agreed, it is the only viable basis for the Arabs finding a role of
dignity inthe world.
VII. U.S. and USSR. The NPT and the missile talks are critical here and
obvious. In addition, we may find some interesting possibilities for parallelism
in Soviet policy in Southeast Asia as we already have in South Asia -- Tashkent,
etc.
SECRET PERSONAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET--PERSONAL
-6-
VIII. Development Policy. I won't go into the foreign aid picture in general,
but, putting aside the special case of India, the development business is not
in bad shape at all if we can keep the momentum and encourage the key
countries to get at the population problem. Much to our surprise, we have
bought some very important time by the surge in agricultural production.
IX. Domestic Policy. The critical unsolved problem in the U.S., so far as
foreign policy is concerned, remains the problem of reconciling a high rate
of growth with a steady price level. I happen to believe that we must find a
way to educate our society -- and other democratic societies -- to wage
guidelines geared to productivity. You will find that most economists disagree
and will argue either for slowing down the rate of growth or accepting a
"tolerable" degree of inflation. In any case, this is a domestic issue with the
greatest significance for our foreign policy since a lack of wage-price
discipline is morelikely to erode our world position than any other single
factor.
X. Final observation. I am assuming that the new Administration will wish
to pick up and further develop the theme with which I closed my Texas A&M
speech; namely, that the U.S. is looking not to isolationism but to partnership
and fair shares. The President-elect and the Republican platform are in that
mood.
W.W.NTRostow
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library L
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
23 December 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Potential Foreign Policy Problems for the
US over the Next Few Months
1. Expansion of Arab/Israeli Conflict Involving
USSR: Although the Soviets are anxious to keep ten-
sions at a controlled level, the danger of their in-
volvement, through overly aggressive action by either
the Israelis (e.g. a raid against Aswan) or the
Egyptians (e.g. a raid across the canal inducing
retaliation against Port Said and Soviet anchorage)
remains. By Spring, the Soviet Mediterranean squad-
ron will return to a high of about 50 ships; this
could be a dangerous period.
2. Crises in France: De Gaulle's government
is scarred by last Spring's disorders and by weak-
ness of the franc. Difficulties could come again
from any one of a number of quarters or in combina-
tion. It would not be uncharacteristic for the Gen-
eral to displace his troubles by making dramatic
moves which would involve other nations (e.g. a
drastic devaluation forcing reciprocal action else-
where or possibly an international conference).
West German interest in exploiting any decline of
French status and prestige will be an important
factor in Europe. If the French crisis was severe,
powerful reverberations would be experienced in the
Common Market.
3. Soviet Military Pressures on Rumania and
Yugoslavia: Rumania appears to have agreed to hold
a Warsaw Pact exercise on Rumanian soil in the Spring
of 1969, but will attempt to prevent the permanent
stationing of Soviet troops in Rumania. Such a So-
viet move could result in a direct military confron-
tation. Less likely would be direct military pres-
sure on Yugoslavia; dangers would increase if the
Pact exercise were held near the Yugoslav border.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
Given the latent unrest flowing from the Czech crisis
any of these events would generate further instabil-
ity. Soviet failure to use restraint could force
NATO and the US to define more sharply the meaning of
the recent statement of warning to the USSR.
4. Request by Yugoslavia for Economic Assistance:
An issue related to the preceding item flows from
Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia to induce it to moder-
ate its criticism of the Russian occupation of Czech-
oslovakia. Also, the Russians have failed to renew
orders for Yugoslav ships and railroad cars. If this
economic pressure becomes more severe, the Yugoslavs
may well ask for economic assistance from the United
States.
5. East German and Soviet Pressure on West
Berlin: The West Germans intend to hold their Presi-
dential election in West Berlin on 5 March 1969. The
Communists have already begun a strong propaganda
campaign against this. The East Germans will prob-
ably urge Moscow to let them do something more than
talk. Interference with access and other forms of
harassment stopping well short of military action
are possible. How hot the situation is allowed to
become will depend on Moscow's view of the wider
picture of East-West relations at the time.
6. UK Role in NATO: Questions about Britain's
will and ability to maintain its military commit-
ments, particularly to NATO, could arise in the wake
of a new sterling crisis. The ingredients are fa-
miliar but the military and financial aspects of the
problem have not arisen simultaneously before, at
least not with any intensity. The problem might be
further complicated by French financial problems.
7. Korea: The situation in Korea is brittle.
If the North Koreans manage to conduct additional
raids like the latest one, the South Koreans might
be provoked into retaliating with large-scale hit-
and-run raids of their own. Tension on both sides
would increase and the chances of escalation into
more open hostilities would grow. Although South
Korea has reportedly shelved retaliatory plans un-
til Spring, it could be easily provoked into dusting
-2-
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
them off again. At the least Seoul will continue to
press the US hard for additional funds and hardware
to strengthen its capability to deal with North Ko-
rean harassments. The estimated MAP level for FY1969,
$139 million compared to $165.8 million in FY1968
and $149.7 million in FY1967, will go almost en-
tirely to support existing forces. Seoul, however,
is receiving $100 million in additional new equip-
ment to cope with the armed North Korean subversive
threat.
8. Chinese Communist Missile Developments:
The Chinese Communists in the first half of 1969
may be able to demonstrate new strategic missile
capabilities. They will have completed modifica-
tions to their initial facility for the launch of
large boosters. They might be able to orbit a
small payload and announce or otherwise demonstrate
the initial flight test of a long-range missile.
9. Pressures from Japan: Prime Minister Sato
plans to initiate preliminary soundings with the new
US administration early in 1969, with emphasis on
devising a formula which would return Okinawa to
Japan two or three years after the security treaty
hurdle is passed in 1970. The Japanese may also
seek to impose further limitations on the use and
number of US bases in Japan, SO as to steal thunder
from the left which is already campaigning against
the Japan-US security treaty and the presence of
145 US bases in Japan.
10. Persistent Pressure on Laos: Of the three
countries on the periphery of Vietnam, Laos offers
the most potential for a serious crisis over the
next several months. Despite the recent government
victory at Thateng, we still estimate that the North
Vietnamese, if they are willing to expend the ef-
fort, can take just about anything they want to in
Laos. With little or no advanced warning, for ex-
ample, the North Vietnamese could cut across the
narrow Laotian Panhandle and take one, if not more,
of the Mekong border towns. Although our best guess
is that Hanoi will not risk such actions until they
have played out their game in South Vietnam, we do
-3-
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
believe that a Communist military offensive, well
short of a march to the Mekong, but one that may give
Vientiane some bad moments, is not at all unlikely
in the next few months.
11. Cambodia--Support for Viet Cong: The prob-
lem of Cambodia's role in supporting the Communist
effort in South Vietnam is also likely to get worse
before it gets better. Accumulating evidence that
Cambodia has become a major source of arms and ammu-
nition for Communist forces in southern South Vietnam
will increase pressures for the extension of the war
to Cambodian territory.
12. Thailand Insurgency: The government is get-
ting a bloody nose in the north and north-central re-
gions at the hands of Communist-led tribal insurgents.
This may cause Bangkok to ask the US for additional
material assistance, particularly aircraft, helicop-
ters, and M-16 rifles. Bangkok is likely to press
hard for conclusion of a Status of Forces Agreement,
which has been under sometimes acrimonious negotiation
for a year. The Thai may also push for a bilateral
defense pact with the US, or at least a restatement
of the 1962 Rusk-Thanat accord. Much will depend on
how the Paris talks go, which Bangkok is watching
with a close and wary eye.
13. Australia--Assurances on US-Asian Commitments:
Prime Minister Gorton has expressed a desire for talks
with President-elect Nixon at the latter's convenience
but hopefully in March or April. His particular in-
terest will be to ascertain the scope and duration of
US military commitments in Southeast Asia. Australia
is reviewing its own defense policy and troop deploy-
ment in the light of Britain's planned withdrawal from
the area in 1971. Australia apparently intends to re-
tain some forces in Malaysia and Singapore in the
post-1971 period.
14. Foreign and US Aid to Indonesia: The Inter-
governmental Group (IGG), a consortium of Western
donor nations led by the United States and Japan, is
scheduled to meet again in the Netherlands on 28-30
April to make pledges of economic assistance to In-
donesia for 1969. The Indonesian Government has re-
quested US $500 million but it seems unlikely the
-4-
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
agreed total will reach this amount. A figure closer
to the approximately US $325 million which was pledged
last year seems more realistic. For the past two years,
the US has provided one third of the total assistance.
15. The Possible Fall of King Husayn: The little
King has been in a perilous position for some time
and could suddenly be deposed by Fedayeen maneuvers,
possibly with Iraqi complicity. He could be in great
peril if the Israelis made any further territorial
acquisitions on the West Bank. Husayn's disappear-
ance would eliminate a key friend of the US in the
Middle East.
16. India-Pakistan: There has been little nor-
malization since the 1965 war; Kashmir remains an in-
transigent problem. Border incidents, which could es-
calate rapidly, are always possible. Any major new
arms aid deal to either country with the USSR (and in
the case of Pakistan with China) would have immediate
implications for US military assistance policies.
17. Cyprus Communal Hostility: The US is back-
ing current intercommunal talks, but these are making
little progress. If they fail, another major inter-
vention or threat of intervention could come quickly.
Even quite small sparks could upset the present tran-
quillity at any time.
18. Biafra: The most immediate problem in the
stalemated war is the food shortage in Biafra. It
almost certainly will get worse during the next three
or four months as the Ojukwu government tries to cope
with a population swollen by a large influx of refu-
gees since May 1968. Available information, although
incomplete, implies that the average caloric intake
could drop by as much as one third when the region's
normal "hungry period" occurs during February-May
1969. The United States will have to decide whether
it will provide substantial food deliveries to Biafra,
perhaps 600 tons per day.
19. Peru: In October 1968, the new military
government of Peru seized the refinery of International
Petroleum Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of
-5-
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
New Jersey), and has taken no positive steps to com-
pensate the company. The generals in charge show no
sign that they are considering such steps. Under the
terms of the Hickenlooper amendment and a similar
amendment to the Sugar Act, the United States is ob-
liged to cut off all economic assistance to Peru and
to cease importing Peruvian sugar unless it is satis-
fied that Peru will make prompt and adequate compen-
sation for the expropriated property. A decision
whether to invoke these amendments will have to be
made during the first several months of 1969.
20. Brazil: Outright military dictatorship has
suddenly been imposed on Brazil, traditionally the
strongest and closest US ally in Latin America. This
will probably create serious frictions in US-Brazilian
relations in the months to come, not only because the
Brazilian leadership crisis is not yet resolved but
also because many of the most influential new leaders
are men of narrowly nationalistic views. If the US
does not enthusiastically accept the new moves--for
example, if we reduce aid or fail to provide requested
military equipment--they are likely to exhibit hurt be-
wilderment followed by open antagonism.
21. Guatemala: In Guatemala, any one of several
possible developments, or a combination of them, could
have serious implications for the US. These include
the assassination of the new US Ambassador or of a
high ranking Guatemalan official such as President
Mendez, or a new outbreak of Communist insurgency
which could prompt a rightist-military coup.
22. Congressional Restrictions on Arms Sales:
Present legislation restricts sales of US-manufactured
military equipment, especially "sophisticated" weapons
such as jet aircraft, submarines, and missiles. The
legislation also imposes sanctions, including cuts in
US aid programs, if foreign countries purchase arms
from other than US sources. The major Latin American
nations are currently involved in replacing worn out
or obsolete military hardware, and these restrictions,
if applied, could cause a serious deterioration in re-
lations between our major Latin allies and the US.
-6-
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
23. Panama: New friction over the Canal Zone could
develop. The National Guard leadership seems well established
under commander Colonel Torrijos and his chief of Staff
Colonel Martinez against any effort by ex-president Arnulfo
Arias to regain his position. Strains in the relationship
between Torrijos and Martinez could develop, however, and
a power struggle between the two might conceivably carry
nationalist appeals relating to the Panama Canal; it is al-
ways possible that such a struggle would spill over and im-
pact on the Zone.
-7-
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified