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Henry A. Kissinger's (HAK) Office Files
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
/
Notes
Persian Gulf TALK with SAundens
10/29/?
B
4
"
IRAN [SAudi ANAbiA, IRAq, BAhRAin,
n.d.
B
MUSCAT & OmAn ]
10
dum
Seeking the President's Concernence on
10/19/70
13
General Policy For the Persian Gulf
Report
Persian GUIF
6/4/70
B
16
17
outline
Outline of Pensian Gulf Issues Paper
1/21/70
13
(dRAFt)
18
Memorand
Memorandum for Peter Rodman From
1/7/70
Do
WilliAm WAHS
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
HAK Files
16
FOLDER TITLE
3
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS Richard Nixon PresidentiabLibrary35-084/0002
NA 14021 (4-85)
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD.
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A. RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT- OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
600
Saret policy
shudbeprimany cutenion of our involvement
2 denveut schools 07 thought,
/ for activism
- inciprent instability of Gulf (vels betw.
states, stability within states) is tempting
target for Son pivatration
- Gulf region is tradeternal object of
Soviet dreams of expansion, navalpressing.
- Magnitude of Westorn ec. stake makes the
for threat a matter of orgency.
?- Son. Caution
- Diplemate complexed of Gulf politics are will
be serious restraint on USSR: It can't
forment radicalism + expandence in Hunne w/out
pergardizing its rels w- Iran
- Sor. naval capabilaties not enough for
Signit force, nobates likely hack
- for commercial involvement in oil will give
it state in stability of flow Oilcutoffto
West is improve ble,. though on
US firms is not neussarily a major US
interest.
3. Intermediate position
Arguments under 2 above are more r lausible
But flaw is that of difficultes may not
Crunter th Reproduced the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential Library Amisin may lend Non
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified BUT
moblem
Anna
N Nnd? Golf into d plainth Secret
hexim
A
blue
the
Hilmoten
Laqueur,
SOVIET POLICY- GENERAL
tind
red
of
staw
$1280
(inclust
dzilwation
Societ dilemma in Mideast Sp here building has
momentum + logic of its own, + may force Societ hand
if something untoward happens A their proteges in S,Arabia
N Syria or Egypt. Danger of being drawn in more deeply
then they wint to. loss of prestige it they hold backin
a crisis
(p.304)
Moson may face crisis as Ave b frustration grows,
Moscon doesn't help enough. (N.306)
w/il
silatud
NIE 30-1-67
Persian@ulf States
USSR's representation In Golf is limited to Basra
(Iveq) + Kuwait though it frantimato time hitils to Saudi
Arabia that it would like to establ. dipl. vels. Sourts are
trying to Court radicals anservative smottamously -
Paental in consisten eyes will make Mescon wavy of complicating
, IN
matters further bytaking any very open as direct position in
mohervering in smaller states.
If a Gulf state became vadical or it its w/c wished to avoid
dependence on rabson time by a regional power, it might see advantages
blow
in developing close relations w. USSR. USSR would probably
thcourage such a state to reduce its Westom Connections might
offer it mil and/orec aid. But USSR's course would be
complicated, +woul My require careful balancing of vegional forus., Sniets
probably in unlikely to make dramatic advances.
Millar, Paper Adelphi
TOUSSR, area is not "Middle East" but "Neav South"
Gengetum
Societ neval visits to GULF are bound to increase, whether
Canal remains closed or not To counter this presence before it becomes
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
established existing DECLASSIFIED US neval visits to Gulf parts
should certainly be Continued. Other Western powers should be
encouraged to visit Gulf ports too; these could be of mixed
nationality. (p.13)
reside
DIVOR
(Houvani) May be USSR will be content to have Gulf states sympathetic
to her but not necessarily allied to her. She would try
establish +
maintain ruch regimes as hot in ways that crould head to contranta
tion US, USSR has interest in sta biles there ; in
ease of Communications across Middle East t increasing even in
Middle Eastem oil.
(Huremite) IRBM'S launched from GULF can hit targets in USOR
like missile + space industriesin Gntral Asia; USSR will want to
neutralize any unfriendly havel presence there, esp. US
nuclear one.
(spvt)
(Georgetonn 58-60) : Russia's primary historical interest has been in preventing Western
prefencein Northirn Zier (Iran + Turkey). Stalinist policy backfired for
brought about the very situation Russia hasa/ways sought toprevent. Since
1946 then, Societ policy may be sun as attempt to remedy this,
But recently, newopportonities elsewherein Mid East have aroused
new interests in whole region, + Turkey + Ivan are no longer the
sole objects of Russian policy
(Id, 61) Land link to Gulf Could conceivably be tempting, + would
reduce Sorvict dependence on Suez Bosperus.
Gulf as "alternative to Suez route would be appealing +
meaningful only for USSR, + not to Eur states
STZZUOT
100000
lowd
Hvd
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
SOVIET POLICY
PERSIAN GULF & ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT
Memorandumto
If Suez Canal were open, USSR could use
Holders of
NIE 11-6-67
elements of Meditervanean squadron to establish
SNIE 11-9-68
(16 May/968)
at least an intermittent naval presence in support st
Societ interests in Red Sea + Persian folf
Special Memorandom
No. 3-68, New
Kuwait & Saudi Arabia supply 80% of the $250million unnual
Situationin Persinn
Gulf (1Febb8)
subsidy on Which UAR economy currently depends.
Georgetoun75
USSR is seeting to improve rels. w, non-vadical
Arab states, ind. Kuwait - butnot an SundiAvabia,
probably bec. of Syptian attitude
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
The bulf
SECRET
lontar at herps zad NAVI
absoit 100 winza) ¥ AND twing twict STZZU
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAN the bluow
Walter pussian Laquary Affairs East Enders the
ZU
Since 1765, USSR has mudi determined effect to neutralize
Muldle Foreign 301-03
Iran Turkey; Shah + Demivel have been honored guests in
Moscon. Both have now felt northern border secure have
focused attention elsewhere - Gulf + Cyprus respectively
Not
Both disappointed w. lack of Western support for their not /
aspirations but not much Sor support other Ina
crisis in Gif, USSR will not support Ivanvs. 5th,2
Arabs. But USSR might try to play honest broker, ala
Tashkent.
usste has extended $500 million credits to Iran,
Trade betw them is to quadruple in next few yrs- But
even by 1974, USSR willonly be supplying 12% 07 Iran's
imports. West + Japan will remain Iran's chief oil customer
for long time.
Soviet Union is not a great trading power, tits share of
world trade is not increasing. East bloc trade plays froming
part of economies of many Mideast contries, but only/n
Egyptis it decision.
Ivanian + Turkish suspicions of USSR have not
disappeared. (I. (zech, Mediters. fleet. But they are
adjusting selves to situation that USSR has out flanked
Northern Fir by advances in Mideast- a shift in bale of
power in the area. But they see that their freedom of action not
be reduced in USSR becomes Societ sphare of influence
Memorandum Person
Newsutva Gilf Special IEV (No.3-687 68)
Soviet involvement in Gulf, if too active + on spicuous,
would copardize good + problemble rels. n Fran.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Tersian 30-1-67 30-1-6 stater Gulf
Ivan has agreed to pipe substantial aments of natural gas to
USSR. Joint Soviet-Franian divelopment of Gspian Sea oil fields
would give USSR access to oil supplies close to existing Sruet
distribe networks.
Oilen the fulf proper would be difficult for USSR to
handle inquantity, though it could absorb output of one of the lester
producing states should of see pol advantages deriving therefrom.
Gargetown
1.51
Communications betw USSR + Ivan aremainly by sea
(from Baku to Rasht) or by air.
Railway at Julta is little used.
JUNT
they
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Gift
Secret
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAQ
Laqueur them Russia iddle East,
Foreign Affairs
Enters
Ecties recently strengthened. Bones of contention
103.3
remain: fate of Iragi Communists, failure of Ivagi govts
to give Kurds autommy USSR has closed down Fraqi
Communist radio station (from E Evr.); Ivaq recigrolated by
supporting USSR on Geeh.
Georgetorm
75
USSR is aiding in building of Basia- Baghdad railway
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Gulf
fearet
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH SOUTH ARABIA
Laqueur 1.303.04
USSR interestedin S.Avabia as land bridge to E. Africa t as
gateway to Gulf + Induan Ocean, even though closure of Canal
diminishes Aden's importance.
Disputen of Soriet arms +ground crews after withdrawal
of Egyptian trogs hasbeen decisive for Yemen.
Moscowhoped Peple's Repot Yemen would be able to
help Regulards in Yemen - but newregoble has been besetby
ec. crisis, incessant revolts + defection of left ming of the
official party (NLI), USSR supports S.Yemen govt vs.
ultra-left rebels, whom USSR suspects of Maoism
Georgetown
S.Yemen NLF has threatened to upset statuegoom
Muscat/Oman +elsehhere, but it is prepably sate notto
regard such threats Seriously Geography, aswellas
present internal situation S.Yemn, molitate us. Serious
threst (88-89)
Yemin + S.Yemen sum now to be only likely
areas in which Sorret direct assistance and intervention
will (90-91) be sun. Base facilities will be possible there
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD.
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A. RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 4 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT- OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
U.S. Policy
ME 30-1-67
18/hay/967
UK, Saudi, + Iran, will probably urge us to play greater
votein Gulf
Several Gulfstootes have clrendy approached US:
Kowait forarms, Bahraint for and in other frelds,
But UK position has been product of unrgue historical
circumstances, + is not likely to be filled by succesor.
Successor would be less acceptable, + would be drawn into
conflict betw ruling families + their peoples overpace st
pol. + Soe reforms
Gengetorm 87
Current US mil. involvement in Gulfis small, harmelly
consisting of a flagshir operating out of Bahrain + 2 destroyers
votated from us Atlante fleat. Occasionally augmented - by
ships temperarily detached from Sixth (Medit.) Fleet. Placing
of area within abit of responsibility of USArmy general in
HQin Florida is sign of wt-too-serious involvement.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
OIL
Gult's oil is exploited primarily by US+UK
NIE 30-1-67
Person Gulf States
Gulf states are Gware that they cannot market Rir oil w/out
using Western oil Companies, partic The internal unajors, + these
will probably beable to continue to operate protitably.
Gengetown 1.65
Communist bloc they become net importer of oil, as its
industrialneeds expand
Millar, Achlphi
Puper
Most of Middle East's oil goes by tanker out of Persian
Gulf. Israelt Egypt are planning pipelines from Red fea to
Mediteraneen, but these will still depend on tankers for
transport from fult to Red fen.
Middle East oil exports supply 50% of WEUr impats,
90% of Japan's, 65% of Australia's, + 83% of Africa's
Georgetown
US uses Persian Gulf oil in Southeart Asia ; + US+NATO
forces in Enge use Persian Gulfoil. (1.9)
Possibility of simultancous closure of all Gif Sources of
oil is remote. (p.12)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ARAB NATIONALISM
Gorgetown
Independence on put of small Gulf states wouldlend
to membership in And league + this would prectude any
attempt by OK to stay longer Cr 11)
Irant Auscat/Oman are areas in which internal
dissident elements would sum to be partic. can 4th.
In Oman, Sultan's w/e is tenous. G A)
(96): UK forces have generally not had internal
Security functionin small states. This makesit hander
for nationalists to claim that their countries am
under army of occupation requesting poper ruler.
(97) Initial struggleen GULF will mithoribaly be
one of revolutionaries US reactionnies; this will
be more likely it + when single Hates or or federation,
form "national armies, e.g vs larger fulf states.
In such circumstances, opportunities for can spiracy, formetic
of officer clignes + resulting coups+ counter coups
might develop.
(97-98) What my ultimately keep non Peninsolar
Arabs at of Gult-area conflicts is the histerial-50cial-
cultural seperation betw peninsular trubs the
very different peoples of Fertile Crescent + Nite Valley,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
The Gulf
rutNI
STUGH
Gengetour Study stow to stool Hod
.lio
110
I
of
of
nd
Iraq 1/3 ura.
Basva, 2/3 piped
Western interest oil + bal of In (p.9) : How important
to hedit
is strategic interest in Gulf trelf, as oppised to states
Ivan all shipped
via Gulf
around it ? Zet hon many states have other routes to
Kuwait all
ship their oil out ? Hen much, admideast oil is at mercy of the
Saudi: next piped
shipped
Never that Controls the Gulf route ?
70+%
from fult
parts
Russian interest "defense of Baku (p.10) : How good is
Soriet land access to the Gulf area ? (eg USIR
RR routes parallel Ivanian barder OneRlink in west, roadin unpaved East)
(nominal)
Soviet navel presence in Gulf -dependent on opening 57
Socz Canal Cp 17) Really ? Yes
Military balance
See p.81
Ivan's navy (will be only havyin area on a UK
leaves) not much to it.
India + Tak are dependent in Gulf oil (USSR-
Indian link
)
Any in umpatibility betu. Smiet- Iran link + Soriet-
Indian link ?
Canal opening would reduce Iran importance
frightens Ivan
to USSR, + free Egypt's foreign articy - which
US has flagship + 2 destroyers from US Atlantic ffeet
Jahnein is home put.
castemally augmented from Sixth Flect (g.87)
South Yemen is out to shakey Musaft Oman- but
IS too precarious internally, + is blocked by extremely
difficult Communications to M&O. (g.89)
Smet wavel presence in Indian Ocean is extremely
difficult while Canal is closed (p.90)
Egypt 's vote Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential st Library Subsidies from Menarchs,
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Interests
we
/. Gulf as a body of water hast key as shipping route
for 70% of all MidEast oil.
Could be bottled up by : Tio
a Souet naval presence
fran
b. Hostility of one of pour states at the straits:
Problem of Bahrain persists even 7 Shah renomes
claim + reaches understanding w Feisal. 76 Bahrain
becomes independent + then vadical regime takes over, could
Irant Saudi afford to squash it ?
3 threats to Gulf stability (p.88) 5ml
/ Disruptanot existing regimes by gpposing donstic factions,
with a n/out external encouragement + assistance
2. Outside intervention by USSR, + possible, Egypt, mainly to
achieve pol. rather than ec. goals.
3. Regional disputes resulting from ethnic+ religious
differences + territorial claims. + asgivations
State
waiterI
hot
2nd
2U
Ex
wtvo?
not
tome
(of
INWN
trustals
K/0016/03/008
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
McGany +
lewis
conversation
Gulf
25Nov.1965
- Tows on Fran.
- Key question is whether there will be vacoum whichwill
befilled by hostile forus
- Paper anticipates changing US perceptions over next
5 yrs , perceptions of our interests
- Policy Options
Possible instabilities
- Iran's desire to close off the Gift (literally),
to build prtsin fouthern Glf, +
"bypass" Iraq reoil
(Bandarabbais opened up as major Framan
will be
part; shipyard + 3000 hog sin area,
t probable later resettlement in pepulation
into area.)
Levers : he Iran / - some mil. supplies, T support vs. USSR
- ec. assistance Cprivate enterprise),
Iran wants it
- US. willingness to conterbalune
USSR in Indian Ocean
- air defense vs Iraq.
Drek
Another option: closer vels. n. FAA states regardless
of our vols. n. from
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD.
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A. RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 10 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA KITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT- OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
COMPICI YTIRUCTY JANOITAN
HAK wants
JE\
good paper imel Which
Tells When we want
togoin wet 5yrs 7,
dr.
than to get there
Arab-Ismeli conflict
impuct of
Iran's ties hi Ands. on
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to
Strategy
national SECURITY COUNCIL
Mr. was want 7 90
How subsystime
Iran- saudi
MidGast
UK
world
Isham
Not
Mr
382/-1361
, A
Classified
K/0016/ 03/ DECLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to
7. Persian Gulf
Subject
The Persian Gulf region is arguably an area of great importance
politically (because of its possible pivotal position in the Middle East),
economically (because about 70% of the Middle East's oil is shipped
through the Gulf), and militarily (because of the strategic naval signifi-
cance of the Indian Ocean).
The Gulf region is a likely incubator of crises over the next 3-5 years
because of the certainty of British withdrawal by 1971. The prospect
of a sudden power vacuum is dangerous because of the unique coincidence
of tensions and volatile elements in the immediate vicinity:
(1) the numerous border disputes and territorial claims dividing
the states in the Gulf region;
(2) the internal instability and uncertain political futures of many
of the states in the region, especially the new political entities;
(3) the interrelation of the politics of all the states in the region;
(4) the connections with the Arab-Israeli conflict and with the
ideological tensions dividing the whole Arab world;
(5) the increasing assertiveness of Soviet naval diplomacy, and
the opportunities for Soviet political penetration.
All the foregoing implies that the Gulf is a matter of urgent concern,
and that the United States should take an active interest in the future of
the region following British withdrawal. But all these premises should be
scrutinized and tested. In particular, the potential for Soviet mischief-
making should be investigated and not assumed; it is possible that Soviet
access to the region by land and sea is not as easy as supposed and that the
extension of Soviet access and influence in the area poses no threat to vital
American interests. The consequences in the Gulf area of a Middle East settle-
ment, or of a lack of settlement, should be examined, as well as the conse-
quences in the Middle East of certain kinds of upheaval in the Gulf region.
Both these sets of issues may be relevant to current operations.
It will be useful to attempt to define and articulate U.S. interests in
the region, to gauge the prospects of deterioration, and to set forth the
alternative possible U.S. approaches.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
-2-
Method of Study
This subject can best be managed as a Staff study on the order of a
think-piece. But the utility or nature of the study depends on the quality
and scope of the regular NSSM on the Gulf.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
d. encouragement of, and assistance to, a possible U.K.
retention of strategic commitments in the Gulf, of the kind that could
be supported by short-notice redeployment of U.K. forces stationed
West of Suez in an emergency involving an external threat? (Is this
feasible militarily? financially? politically, in the Gulf and in the
U.K. ?)
9. What precisely is the U.S. concerned about in the Gulf area?
Can the dangers we fear be handled or contained with the kind of U.S.
posture recommended?
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 23, 1969
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR HAL SAUNDERS
FROM:
Peter W. Rodman
SUBJECT: Some Questions on the Persian Gulf
I'm sorry to have pestered you while you were occupied with the
Shah's visit. I still hope we can discuss the IG draft, at your convenience.
In the meantime, I thought I would put some of my questions down
on paper.
The Planning Staff is interested primarily in general conceptual
aspects and long-range implications of current operational issues.
Dr. Kissinger has asked us to keep an eye on the Gulf.
1. What, in general, would we want the Gulf political situation
to look like five years from now?
2. Are current developments leading in that direction?
a. What is the current state of Saudi-Iranian relations?
b. What are the current prospects for the Union of Emirates?
c. Will Saudi Arabia continue to smile on the Union of Emirates
when the latter really begins to act as an independent state?
3. Assuming Iran and Saudi Arabia reach an understanding on
Bahrain, what could they do if a radical regime ever came to power in
Bahrain?
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
4. Can the U.S. rely, over the next five years or longer, on the
continued survival of the friendly regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia?
bal. otpp.
5. The IG paper talks as if we already have a major U.S.
presence in the Gulf area, which cries out for measure to safeguard
it. Is this an accurate characterization of our activity there? Or is
the issue rather one of whether or not to establish a U.S. presence capable
of replacing the U.K. (or whether or not to construct a substitute for
a U.S. presence)?
6. The paper talks as if the Soviets have easier access to the
Gulf than we do, even while the Canal is closed. How true is this?
How easy is the USSR's physical access to the Gulf area -- by road,
by rail, by air, and by sea (with and without the Canal)?
7. What, in general, are the USSR's realizable objectives in
the area? Are there political limitations on what the USSR can achieve?
E.g., could the USSR ever acquire a satellite in the Gulf without
alarming Arab nationalists? Can the USSR continue to flirt with a
conservative regime like Iran while encouraging the radicals? Would
a crisis in the Gulf present the USSR more opportunities than dilemmas?
8. I doubt that the policy options stated in the draft exhaust the
whole range of possible U.S. postures. What are the pros and cons,
and problems and prospects, of such postures as the following:
a. a greater U.S. naval presence? (Would home ports be
necessary? Could we build one? Would Iran offer one?)
b. a greater U.S. political presence (e.g., active promotion
of a regional economic development organization; active promotion of
Iranian-Saudi political and military collaboration; -- in addition to the
measures listed in the paper)?
c. reliance on indirect U.S. influence (e.g., sounding out
the USSR on mutual naval noninvolvement; keeping the Canal closed)?
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Authority to think plan for
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Mission and also instruction to
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
June 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Harold H. Saunders Hal
Richard T. Kennedy
SUBJECT: Review Group--Persian Gulf
There are three subjects to be covered at this meeting:
1.
What should be our general strategy toward the Gulf? [Options
2 and 3 of State paper. ]
For the sake of argument the paper poses four possible options: (a)
assuming the UK's role as protector; (b) backing either Iran or Saudi
Arabia as the key to stability; (c) pressing Saudi-Iranian cooperation;
(d) actively promoting a regional security pact. We can assume that
the first and the last are impractical.
The logical strategy lies in marrying what is already in fact extensive
support for Iran as the unquestioned power in the area with the logic of
cooperation between a strong Iran and a weak Saudi Arabia. We are not
likely to diminish our relationship with Iran; we do not want to have to
choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia; Saudi-Iranian cooperation is the
optimum.
That means that the real choice is not really a choice as long as there
is no trouble and Saudi-Iranian cooperation continues to grow. The real
choice will come when, for instance, the Iranians look as if they are
preparing to seize the small Arab-held islands at the mouth of the
Persian Gulf. In circumstances like that, we will have to ask ourselves
how much political capital to spend with the Shah to restrain Iran.
The first objective in this meeting therefore is to determine whether
there is general consensus on the following strategy: The logical U.S.
strategy is to promote Saudi-Iranian cooperation in the first instance
but to recognize that Iran is the real power in the Gulf and to pursue the
fullest feasible U.S. -Iranian relationship in that context. [This is a
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- 2 -
counter to those who argue, for instance, that our military credit
assistance is making Iran too powerful.
]
In arriving at that working view of our strategy, we should avoid
relaxing and pinning all our hopes on Saudi-Iranian cooperation on Iran.
Cooperation may break down, and Iran may prove a heavy-handed
peace-maker. This brings us to the second question.
2.
What kind of presence can the U.S. develop in the Gulf? [State
paper, pages 34-41. ]
If the above is a logical view of U.S. strategy, the U.S. still has an
interest in making the Arab participants in this cooperation more
effective and stable partners.
The general issue to be discussed is: Can the U.S. - given present
restrictions on technical assistance relations with countries that have
their own money and limitations on funds for scholarships, not to
mention low USIA appropriations realistically talk about an active
U.S. presence on the Arab side of the Gulf?
The fact is that U.S. does not now have programs and appropriations
geared to an area like the Gulf with its own money. Yet the area
desperately needs U.S. technical and educational assistance. At present,
it is kidding ourselves to talk about an active U.S. role in the shaikhdoms
without at the same time talking about increasing our cultural exchange
budget for the area or providing organized backstopping for a technical
assistance effort (mainly using private U.S. experts for whom the shaikhs
would pay).
One outcome of the discussion might be to ask State to draw up now for
possible use in connection with the FY 1972 budget a comprehensive U.S.
program- cultural exchange, trade promotion, technical assistance,
diplomatic representation- which would represent the most imaginative
U.S. effort in the Gulf.
As a side point you may recall that the final paragraphs of the President's
foreign policy message to Congress alluded to the need for new policies
and programs in order for us to relate to areas like this which have their
own capital resources. The Persian Gulf is the classic case. It is
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- 3 -
therefore worth pushing the above suggestion if for no other reason
than to push the staffing of a problem which the President has identified
under his signature. See Tab marked "Programs."
3.
Should we maintain our small naval force in the Persian Gulf
based on Bahrain?
Everyone agrees this is more a psychological presence than a very
useful military force. There has been some argument for removing it
on grounds of its low military value. There has even been some hint
that the Shah is not especially anxious to see us stay on. However,
there has also been a feeling that now is not the time to reduce our
presence even though we'may be ready to concede that the force is not
necessarily going to be welcome for any extended period.
The operational problem is this: If we wish to keep the force there,
the British will have to arrange with the Bahrainis for us to go on using
a small port facility with a U.S. flag over it. We would want to sound
out the Shah in more detail.
The decision required is a decision in principle not to reduce our
presence at this time. That would trigger the necessary feelers to
determine feasibility.
B
While it is difficult to see the force having great utility, on balance it
does seem the wrong moment to remove it.
Outcome of the meeting. We recommend that you propose a short memo
for the President (which we would draft) seeking his endorsement of:
1.
the general U.S. strategy proposed;
2.
in principle not reducing our naval force (if that is the
judgment of the Group);
3.
drafting a plan for fuller U.S. representation in the shaikhdoms.
We would then put out an NSDM.
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June 4, 1970
TALKING POINTS
1.
There are three subjects to discuss:
- --general U.S. strategy toward the Gulf;
- the kind of presence the U.S. can have there given present
U.S. programs and resources;
specific decisions like whether to continue our naval force
and if SO whether to base it at Bahrain.
2.
General strategy. The real choice seems to lie between:
- backing Iran and
- -pressing Saudi-Iranian cooperation. Do we really have a
choice. with interests on both sides? Do we have to choose
between these approaches now? To what extent can we do both?
Is it realistic to have a policy which presses for Saudi-Iranian
cooperation but which goes on building up Iran in the meantime?
Is the following a fair statement: The U.S. strategy should be
to promote Saudi-Iranian cooperation as the cornerstone of Gulf
stability but in that context to pursue the fullest possible rela-
tionship with Iran and to do what we can to develop a working
relationship with the new political entities on the Arab side of
the Gulf?
3.
U.S. presence. [You should play the "devil" on this one as
hard as you can. We are kidding ourselves to think we can do
anything serious in the Gulf with present programs.
]
What kind of presence can we have in the Gulf with present
programs?
- Can we have any impact by offering 2-3 scholarships? Should
we think about a sharp increase in the cultural affairs budget
since AID is not applicable?
- - What mechanism do we have for searching out technical
assistance needs and for finding American experts to meet
them?
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- 2 -
Is the following a fair way to proceed: State with AID, Defense,
USIA cooperation to provide within 30 days a blueprint for a
U.S. presence in the Gulf- not just plans for staffing an embassy
but an optimum U.S. program and presence. If this is reasonable,
it might be looked at in the context of preparing the FY 1972 budget.
You might note that the President's message to Congress identified
the problem of devising new policies and programs for areas like
this which have money of their own.
4.
Should we keep our naval force in the Gulf?
-- What is its military value?
- Do the Arabs want a U.S. military presence? Does it help the
ruling family on Bahrain to appear to be under U.S. protection?
- Does Iran want the force there?
- Could we operate there if we could not use the port in Bahrain?
- - What would be the consequences of pulling the force out next
year?
5.
Handling of this paper. Propose that a memo be prepared (by NSC
staff) for the President transmitting the basic paper, reporting
Review Group discussion and seeking general approval for the
following:
- -general strategy as stated above;
--in principle, not reducing our fleet unless local soundings reveal
sharp opposition from friends;
- drawing up a detailed plan for a U.S. presence and programs in
the Gulf.
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