Ask the Scholar
Page 10 of 47
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
Telecon
Murray Marder
3:50 p. m.
9/12/69
In discussing the B-52 decision M said this thing has created more
problems. Was there some indication that it would be worthwhile to
try this. K said there was no particular indication. We just
wanted to see. M didn't understand the partial 12 hour cessastion
and the the 36 hour suspension. What they don't understand is why
the 36 hours. Was it to see what would happen immediately after
the ceasefire and if it was temporary or not. K said yes.
M assumed when this thing broke that it was a major peace move and
produced an air of general elation. Now we are crushed by cancellation
of xxxxxxx suspension. K said people startixx using code words on each
other and suddenly
wanted to know if they were talking for background
and M said of course. M said this was a typical Johnson gimmick to
say we stop for 36 hours and when they don't respond we are basically
justified in proceeding. We heard this all through xx Johnson era.
K said we would not do this to elicit someting. They might have wanted
to continue the ceasefure longer SO we wanted to see. We are not
drawing any conclusions. We did not intend to make a big ploy of this.
M wanted to know if we expected any specific action in Paris. K said
the othe r side is very subtle. We are notclaiming they double crossed
us. M wanted to know wha t K thought of the public opinion or the
opinion of Washington. K said he hadn't had time to focus on that today.
Everyone seems SO shell shocked by Johnson. Why would we workxr
look for an excuse to continue the war. We are not under any great
pressure. Is it not conceivable that we are in good faith.
K said the President has said the only thing not negotiable is the right
of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own fate. M said he
was aware of the great weight that K and others put on the importance
of the B-52s. K said no one has ever head him say anything one way
or the other. M didn't think the B-52 capacity was going to be tossed
away lightly. K didn't think he had every presented himself as an
independent policy maker. M wanted to know if there was any validity
that this was a composition of two opposing schools of thought. K
said that was totally wrong. He was not saying we could not make
mistakes though. M referred to Ron Zieglers record and it all seemed
to becoming too ambiguous for him.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page data
- Page
- 10
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 300a541f237c5561
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 498693737
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "498693737",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498693737",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "September 1-18, 1969 [2 of 2]",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498693737",
"collections": [
"National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
"Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/498693737/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-02-10-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/498693737/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-02-10-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/498693737/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-02-10-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 47,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "498693737",
"label": "September 1-18, 1969 [2 of 2]",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498693737"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "498693737",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498693737",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "September 1-18, 1969 [2 of 2]",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498693737",
"collections": [
"National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
"Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/498693737/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-02-10-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/498693737/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-02-10-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/498693737/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-02-10-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 47,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498693737",
"naId": 498693737,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 10,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/498693737/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-02-10-010.jpg",
"mediaId": "300a541f237c5561",
"ocrText": "Telecon\nMurray Marder\n3:50 p. m.\n9/12/69\nIn discussing the B-52 decision M said this thing has created more\nproblems. Was there some indication that it would be worthwhile to\ntry this. K said there was no particular indication. We just\nwanted to see. M didn't understand the partial 12 hour cessastion\nand the the 36 hour suspension. What they don't understand is why\nthe 36 hours. Was it to see what would happen immediately after\nthe ceasefire and if it was temporary or not. K said yes.\nM assumed when this thing broke that it was a major peace move and\nproduced an air of general elation. Now we are crushed by cancellation\nof xxxxxxx suspension. K said people startixx using code words on each\nother and suddenly\nwanted to know if they were talking for background\nand M said of course. M said this was a typical Johnson gimmick to\nsay we stop for 36 hours and when they don't respond we are basically\njustified in proceeding. We heard this all through xx Johnson era.\nK said we would not do this to elicit someting. They might have wanted\nto continue the ceasefure longer SO we wanted to see. We are not\ndrawing any conclusions. We did not intend to make a big ploy of this.\nM wanted to know if we expected any specific action in Paris. K said\nthe othe r side is very subtle. We are notclaiming they double crossed\nus. M wanted to know wha t K thought of the public opinion or the\nopinion of Washington. K said he hadn't had time to focus on that today.\nEveryone seems SO shell shocked by Johnson. Why would we workxr\nlook for an excuse to continue the war. We are not under any great\npressure. Is it not conceivable that we are in good faith.\nK said the President has said the only thing not negotiable is the right\nof the people of South Vietnam to determine their own fate. M said he\nwas aware of the great weight that K and others put on the importance\nof the B-52s. K said no one has ever head him say anything one way\nor the other. M didn't think the B-52 capacity was going to be tossed\naway lightly. K didn't think he had every presented himself as an\nindependent policy maker. M wanted to know if there was any validity\nthat this was a composition of two opposing schools of thought. K\nsaid that was totally wrong. He was not saying we could not make\nmistakes though. M referred to Ron Zieglers record and it all seemed\nto becoming too ambiguous for him.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}