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    "title": "November 11-17, 1969",
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        "Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)"
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    "ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n1.\nTELCON\nHAK AND MARSHALL GREEN (1p.)\n11/12/69\nA\n2.\nTELCON\nHAK AND STUART SYMINGTON (1p.)\n11/12/69\nB\n3.\nTELCON\nHAK AND STUART SYMINGTON (lp.)\n11/13/69\nB\n4.\nTELCON\nHAK AND MR. YOSHIDA (2pp.)\n11/15/69\nA\n5.\nTELCON\nHAK AND YOSHIDA (2pp.)\n11/15/69\nA\n6.\nTELCON\nHAK AND WILLIAM ROGERS (2pp.)\n11/17/69\nB\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKISSINGER TRANSCRIPTS - TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS\n3\nFOLDER TITLE\n1969 11-17 NOV,\n2\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED\n*U.\nS.\nGPO:1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Yoshida\n11/11/69 9:05 a. m.\nY said that in addition to their conversation of yesterday evening,\nthere are a few things he wanted to ratify: 1) on the joint commun-\nique he understands that draft #1 is not acceptable. Draft #2 is\nmost prefereble to Y's friend at home. There is a definite prefer-\nence of draft 2 to drafts 3, 4, or 5. There is a significant difference\nof implications between 2 and 3, 4, and 5. Y said he is sure K under-\nstands this; drafts 3, 4, and 5 contain the rather dubious phrase\nK said he understood. Y said his friend would be most grateful if K\nwould get draft 2 through. K said he might get a preliminary draft 3\nand we can fix it when Y's friend comes here. That way it will be\nhis achievement when he comes here.\nY said equally important is the\nitself. He has absolute con-\nfidence in K and would like to ask him again to help them get it through.\nY said he prefers the word \"consultation. \" K said our people will say\nthis doesn't mean anything in a crisis. Y said he would also like to\nhave word \"dire\" for \"extreme emergency. Y said they noted in an\nearlier proposal on minimum repairments? we thought that this might\nbe feasible from K's point of view.\nY said by the time he comes tomorrow, he would like it if K could get\nfrom State the detailed schedule of his friend's visit next week. They\ncan then work out the technicalities of interpreters, etc. K said okay.\nK said we would deal with his problem with the sympathy their relation-\nship deserves. K said we do not want to make life difficult for Y; we\nare trying to help him. We will approach it in a constructive spirit.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Pac kard\n9:30 a. m.\n11/11/69\nK indicated that Symington said copies of the contingency plan were left\nin their office. Packard said he hadn't heard that -- he thought the plan\nwas just shown to them. K asked him to find out what he could.\nK said he talked to Laird in Key Biscayne and thought we ought to have\nmeeting of Defence Review Committee before Pac kard leaves. Baxxbage\nPac kard said he wouldn't have anything substantive until early December\nbut would be prepared to discuss the preliminaries. He said he would be\nback on Wed or Thur (Nov. 23 or 24). K said he would have someone in\nthe office get back to Packard as to when the meeting would be setup.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMarshall Green\n10:15 a.m.\n11/11/69\nK said on the Okinawa business, he wanted Green to send over what he\nconsiders an acceptable formulation for communique purposes. K asked\non \"prior consultations\" with Korea, how wasxthalx that was formulated.\nGreen said he would get the exact wording for K.\nGreen said the British Ambassador just left his office. They are going to\nsend the message. Green made it clear on the points that K suggested.\nHe told the Amb. that we welcome the support.\nkhatxwex. The Amb. told Green that he must understand they were doing\nthis because of representation from Annenberg. Green indicated that he\nwanted the Amb. to be aware that there was no pressure from us for him\nto do this. Green didn't think it would do any harm but it probably wouldn't\ndo much good ieither. K felt the same way and just didn't want to get\ninvolved in this. Green said they want to feel that they have discharged\nsome duty or oblegation to us.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Pac kard\n10:25 a.m. 11/11/69\nOn the Thai papers, Packard said the proplex papers were shown to the committee\nmembers on Nov. 7. K indicated that Symington said he had it in front\nof him when he called us yesterday. K asked if they could have made\ncopies. Packard said Mr. Pinkus was allowed to see the papers on Thursday\nevening. Gen. Glick met with members of the staff of Foreign Relations\nCommittee at 9:00 on Nov. 7. Mr. Pinkus and one other member of the\nstaff spent time going over the papers. K asked if someone waspresent\nwith them at all times. Packard said yes. The staff had gone over the\npapers and they brought out various aspects. They might have made notes\nof the document but it is a Xixixxxp thick paper and they probably had no\nchance to reproduce it. Packard said he would check that aspect further.\nK said as a general rule we will never let any contingency plan out of the\nPentagon. K said he was at the meeting where the fact that Symington had\nthe notes arose. Symington wants testimony now and we aren't going to\nhave it. Symington came back saying he already had the plan so why can't\nwe explain it to him.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nDavid Rockefeller\n10:35 a.m.\n11/11/69\nRockefeller was calling from Houston (connection was very bad\nand he kept fading out)k\nRockefeller had reports that the explosions in New York, the one at Chase\nManhattan Bank caused considerable damage, was somehow linked with an\nanamous letter in which the author indixxxxxx confessed to the bombings because\nof his feelings and in protest to the Vietnam War. Rockefeller's name was\nmentioned in the letter. He, asked if there was anyone other than the FBI,\nwhich he was sure had the letter, who should be involved it this. K said\nthe CIA should also benotified.\nRockefeler said he would be meeting with friend from Egypt and would like\nto know if there is any message K would care to have passed on. Rockefeller\nindicated that the friend thought Nasser's speech was completely distorted\nby the New York Times. K didn't feel there was any urgency in when R\nmet with the Egyptian but he would see if there is anything R could use.\nRockefeller was meeting with heads of oil companies. They are concerned\nabout the American attitudes and the things that were discussed in the meeting\nbetween Rockefeller and K. They are anxious to register their concern to\nthe President and asked if K would like to have a letter. K said that would\nbe helpful. Rockefeller said he would have them address the letter to the\nPresident but send it to K.\nRockefeller asked if there had been any more developments with the Soviets.\nK said not yet. Rockefeller asked that Joe Sisco aor K let him know.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nGeorge Franklin\n11:00 a.m.\n11/11/69\nGiven K's schedule, he was wondering just what the procedure would be\nat the Dinner on Wednesday. Franklin said usually the speaker talks\nfor 1/2 xx3xxxx hour with questions for 3/4 of an hour.\nX\nHe said if\nK wanted to speak for less time it would certainly be o.k.\nK said he would have to speak extemporaheously which F thought would\nalso be fine, in fact, he said thtat most of the speakers did so.\nK said he would probably talk on SALT and Vietnam.\nFranklin said he would meet K at the airport. K said he would have his\noffice call when he left the White House so Franklin could gage his arrival\ntime.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Rogers\n11/11/69\n12:45 p.m.\nR said on the Nigeria-Biafra thing, they' re going to issue it in R's\nname tomorrow, but he doesn't think K has to bother the President\nwith it. K said yes, as long as it doesn't prejudge any potential\nnegotiation with Biafra. R said he had taken the assurances for\nBiafra out-said we are sorry Biafra rejected the recent proposal.\nR said the Jerry Smith backgrounder is a good example of how the\nPresident can be mislead by what he reads. R said in the first place\nit was scheduled a long time back, and secondly, Ron said he didn't\nknow about it, but that was his fault--we sent a memo over. What\nJerry said was that we didn't have any specific proposals for this\nmeeting. K said that Ziegler was madder than the P about that- it\nwas not an issue in txbrex which the P was violent. What got the P\nwere stories about the White House being lukewarm, and conflict\nbetween the JCS and everybody else. The P thought these were some\nof the most thorough studies ever made on disarmament. R said\nwe knew the JCS would be against; what he was saying was that no-\nbody told them that\nK asked if there had been any official\ncomplaints. R said Ron called, and that it was unfair to McCloskey\nbecause he's the most careful guy around. R said also that Jerry\ndidn't do anything. He was to tell them who was on the list, where\npeople are staying. He said the meeting was exploratory, no specific\nproposals. R said that he thought that was a good thing. It was nothing\nthat wasn't expected. R said that the two stories that came out were\nnot the same. Finney, NYT, is nuts on the story. K said that was the\nstory that hurt. K said he would make sure to present this to the P.\nXxx R said it's important for the P not to pick\nout people and then treat them like they' re not playing the game--it's\nnot fair to Jerry.\nK said what really got him on Jerry was the way he handled the Seabed\nTreaty. J told the P he would wait for 3 or 4 years on that, and then\nhe came back to the P 3 weeks later and told him he was morally commit-\nted. K said he knew W how that happened--we didn't think the Soviets\nwould respond. K said his own impression of Jerry is that he's an\nhonorable guy and that he plays the game. R said he will if we let him.\nR said that in the meeting, the P didn't like what Jerry was saying so\nhe cut him off. K said he had not been watching that. R said on the\nSoviet thing, if you are careless on your recollection, you might conclude\nas K [not K personally, but K and the P, I did. What J said was that\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSec. Rogers\n11/11/69 12:45 p.m. p. 2\nif we were in a position of doing something we don't like, we can delay\nit. R said he doesn't think there's anything wrong with the Seabed\nTreaty. If we're going to have an era of negotiation, it's a good thing.\nK said he agreed, and that on every decision that came to the White\nHous e, we x sided with Jerry. R said that when Jerry talked about\ndelaying 3 or 4 years, he was talking about if it was unsatisfactory,\nbut it didn't happen. R said if he were President, he would say he\nwas glad Smith worked that out. R said it will be some time before\nthe treaty will be a treaty, another 3 or 4 years. K said he didn't\nthink there was any basic damage done, but he would do what he could\nto keep it quiet. R said on the Smith thing, tell the P the delay could\nhave been invoked, but the Soviets moved in our direction--we\nthought they would move the other way. And also tell the P that it\nis going to 3 or 4 years till it is a treaty. K said he didn't even\nthink he would raise it with the P, it wasn't that important.\nR said he wanted to see the notes K took on the plane coming back from\nKey Biscayne. K said he never does anything with them--he doesn't\nshow them to the P. R said are you going to write a book? K said no,\nhe was never going to write a book. K said he just takes the notes SO\nif the P should ask about something, he could refer to them. R said if\nhe does ask, on the key points, he'd like to have a chance to express\nhis views to the P, if it's of any consequense K said he doesn't quot\nwhat R says at a meeting- it never comes up that way. K ixfx said if\nR would be more comfortable if K didn't take notes\nK said\nusually he just puts down the main topics.\nR said he had mentioned his Mansfield-Scott resolution thoughts to\n, and it came out to the P differently from what he had\nintended. He made it appear that R proposed a cease-fire. R said he\nis not proposing a cease-fire. But R said he would talk with K about\nthat on Saturday. R said he had a long talk with McGee.\nR said Bill Sullivan had lunch with Bui Diem and BD said he thought the\nnext redeployment of troops should be announced by Thieu rather than\nNixon. [K laughed. ] R said it's not so crazy from his standpoint--h\ntheory is that Thieu would announce that the GVN is prepared to\nrepossess (?) and then the US would acquiesce. R said that's going to\ngo over like a lead balloon with the P. K said he would let R raise that.\nK said it should be headed off; the P won't agree. R said Thieu and Ky\nare both getting itchy--we ought to be careful in discussions with them.\nK said we don't have any with them. K said he doesn't see Bui Diem, and\nthat there are no withdrawal discussions going on with Thieu that he is\naware of.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nGerard Smith\n1:00 p.m.\n11/11/69\nSmith said he had a call from Sen. Gore's man saying he would like to have\nhearing tomorrow on SALT position. Smith's understand was that the\nPresident might be doing the briefing and in that case would turn Gore off.\nHe wanted to know if he would be safe in saying that frankly to Gore. K\nwas under the same impression but asked if he could have until 3:30 to\nget back with an answer. Smith said he would wait for the call.\nSmith asked if there was any further guidance as to where we go from here.\nK said he would be able to do that this afternoon also. He indicated that\nthe President was going to let him know of his decision and that he would\nissue an NSDM. Smith saidit would be helpful to have his thoughts.\nSmith said he hoped the newspapers didn't cause too much tourbd trouble\nthis morning. K said Ziegler was beside himself and the President was\na little upset but things aad quited down. Smith said that nothing was said\nabout MIRV agreement. Roberts just put two things together. K said thats\nwhat happens when you give backgrounders.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Packard\n3:30 p.m.\n11/11/69\nPackard was very much concerned about the publicity that came out on SALT.\nK saw it and was very unhappy. He asked that Packard keep his people from\nleaking back. Packard said he would do that but he wanted K to know that\nthey would like to do whatever would be helpful. K said the law would be laid\ndown to Smith. Packard though this was a hell of a way to get started in this\nbusiness. K akked Packard's advice. Packard thought that Henkin(?) and\nFriedheim should get together with some of K's people and figure out where\nto go from here. K said he was going to get some p.r. people headed by\nZiegler together tomorrow. Pac kard apologized and said they would take\nthe blame for this. K said that Defence has played this very square.\nPackard thought it would be helpful to get some guidelines to Nitze and he\nshould be instructed to follow those. K said he would draft some instructions\nand run them by Nitze. on an informal basis.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMrs. Mitchell\n11/11/69 p.m.\nMrs. Mitchell called to advise K that the P should be out of Washington\nover this coming weekend. She said that nothing the P could do would\nbe right as far as the press is concerned, but she thought he would do\nbetter to be away from Washington, show that he didn't care. She asked\nK if he agreed with her, K said no. She said she felt very strongly about\nthis - - he will already be in Florida, he could stay there, or he could go\nanyplace else. Mrs. M wanted K to bring this up with the P. K said he\nknew Mrs. M must feel strongly about this - she had never called K about\nanything like this before. Mrs. M said she knew K trusted her judgment\nand respected her opinions, and that's why she was calling, to express\nthem. K thanked her and wished her a pleasant week.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe Vice President\n11/11/69\n5:40\np.m.\nVP had called about his proposed trip to the Far East. He has a\ncouple of problems. First he doesn't seem to be able to get State\nto come up with a commitment of logistical support. K said there\nis no question about -I'll order it. VP said they can't commit\nthemselves to take care of advance; Stanley says they keep raising\nquestions about funding. K said it would be settled by this time\ntomorrow afternoon. K said this is an absurdity; if the VP travels,\nhe gets the full support of the government; it's not even open to\ndiscussion. K said he would have it done and there would be no\nfurther appeal to the VP.\nThe VP said the other problem is because of his inexperience and\nlack of experienced staff support. VP was wondering if K could\nlet him have one of his people. K said let me ask the P. K said\nhe was short-handed, and his good people were already working\n18 hours a day, but he would bend every effort. VP said if he\ncouldn't take one X of K's people along, he wondered if K could\nrecommend someone in whom he had complete confidence. VP\nsaid he didn't want to make any mistakes he wanted to have some-\none who could answer questions and know the situation. K said he\nwould see if he could spring someone, but he would certainly give\nthe VP x briefing books. VP said he would like the\nbriefing books as soon as possible; he doesn't want to read them on\nthe airplane on the way over. VP is leaving the 27th of December.\nK said we do have time. K said VP could consider the logistical\nproblem settled.\nVP said about his itinerary, he is going to Manilla, Taipei, Kuala\nLampur, Bali, Cambarra, Wellington. VP said he is afraid the\nreaction in the press might be that it is an innocuous junket. K\nasked if VP was going to Vietnam. VP said yes, but it's not being\nadvertised. He's going for one day. VP said they cut Thailand out-\nK said he didn't see any reason for that, it wouldn't hurt the allies\nto see a sturdy American once in a while. VP said they cut Laos\nout- K said he could understand that. VP said they cut Hong Kong\nout, but he guessed that wasn't so important anyway. Both agreed\nthat he shoula go to Thailand. K said he would see what he could do\nabout that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nGerard Smith\n11/11/69\n6:20 p.m.\nS asked K if he had heard from the Secretary on German assurances\nin connection with NPT. K said not yet, but he's inclined to go along\nwith it sight unseen. K asked if S could give him until tomorrow\nmorning. S said yes, but Germans are pressing pretty hard though.\nK said he doesn't know what to tell S about Congressional Consultation.\nK said he can't get the P to tell him if he's going to have it tomorrow.\nK said it must be tomorrow if S is going to be there. K asked if S\nwould mind if we did it without him. S said no, he'd prefer it that\nway; he would send Worley. K said Helms would do the strategic\npart; he [K] would to the verification and Farley would tell how it\nall hangs together. S said he thought it would be well if Wheeler\nwere there. K said yes, he saw what S meant - Wheeler would be\nthere.\nS asked if K would tell him more about guidance. K said it takes S's\nlanguage. It sticks in a sentence about S's being authorized to talk\nabout reductions, and a part was put in about area defense - - the\nminimum area defense they think is necessary. K said otherwise\nit doesn't have any awful aspects.\nS said they have two alternative takeoffs Thursday; they' re shooting\nfor a Thursday morning takeoff. K said he is trying to get an ap-\npointment for S with the P tomorrow. S said that was good; he would\nlike a few minutes with him along and he thinks the other members\nof the delegation should have a picture taken with the P. K said he\nwould set that up. K said he would would also get a letter for S\nsigned by the P saying that the P is behind S. S said first rate.\nGood.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nMr. Yoshida\n11/11/69, 8:12 p.m.\nK asked if he could check one thing with Y on the Minute in the last\nsentence where they have \"in the event of such consultation. 11 K asked\nhow about \"when such consultation takes place. 11 K said it doesn't\nmake any difference -- just better English. Y said fine.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n/\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\nContains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Rogers\n11/12/69 12:15 p.m.\nR said he was sending over to K, and wanted to talk with the P about a\nspeech he prepared on SALT. R wants to think it through, but can give\nit tomorrow night at a meeting of retired foreign service officers. R\nsaid the purpose of the talk would be to indicate that we are not negative\non the talks and underscore the things R said at the press conference.\nR said he's saying we've got to be realistic. R thinks it's a good talk,\nthat it will educate the public a little bit. R said he wanted K's reaction,\nand then wanted to talk to the P. R said he wants not to seem negative,\nbut doesn't want to say definitely that SALT will succeed; went to say\nwhatever happens, we will have some success; want to set the tone for\nit. K asked if it would be released to the press. R said yes, it would\nbe for public consumption--say we realize it may fail, but we think it's\nworth a try. R said he would send it over.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMarshall Green\n2:50 p.m.\n11/12/69\nTo follow up their conversation of this morning, Green talked to Alex and\nAlex had reservations about the approach. Alex would like to play around\nwith the language, and didn't want to tip their hand by giving formula\nwhich would indicate how they could get off the hook. Alex feels that we\ncould go further along the lines of the earlier telegram where we would dtell\nMayer to call on Sato. K asked how he would propose to negotiate this when\nthey get here. Green indicated they could ask the Ambassador to ask Sato\nwhat his views were before he left Tokyo. Green didn't have the copy in\nfront of him and he was confused as to which draft K was talking about.\nHe said he would call back when he had a copy.\nMarshall Green\n3:10 p.m.\n11/12/69\nGreen said he could go ahead with it. K indicated it was para 2 they were\ntalking about. Then we will show para 3 to him when he comes. Green said\nthey would have some time since there would probably be a telegram and the\nlanguage could get straightened out. K said para 3 would not be produced\nin telegram. Green agreed.\nGreen hadn't been in on the language which\naccounted for his confusion.\nGreen said he would send out para 2 and that\nwould start him thinking. K said along the lines of the other business particularly\nlet me check it with the President. K said he would talk with Alex about it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAlexis Johnson\n4:00 p. m.\n11/12/69\nK said for Johnson to go ahead. and proceed as Johnson suggested on this.\nK asked for recommendations on language along the lines Johnson has.\nK said the President is a little edgy on the confidential business. He didn't\nwant that all over State and wo 1d like Johnson to kill that take Green\noff of it. The Secretary could know. Johnson understood. K said he\nthought Johnson would agree that it is very touchy business. K said the\nPresident is more worried about the other side.\nJohnson asked if K had anything further on the Congressional leaders.\nK said he only had about 10 minutes and didn't have time to discuss that.\nK told Johnson he liked the point about joint SALT/Okinawa negotiations\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n2\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\nContains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Rogers\n11/12/69\n3:26 p.m.\nR was just wondering whether K had a chance to look at R's speech.\nK said yes, and he had given his suggestions to Ted Eliot; K doesn't\nthink they should give R any trouble. R said nothing could give him\nany trouble. K said he changed slightly a few factual points, and on\nR's treatment of nuclear sufficiency K deleted a few sentences.\nOtherwise, K thinks it's a constructive speech. R asked if K wanted\nto talk to the P. K said he had talked with the P and the P said it was\nall right if K thought it was all right. R said he wanted K to read it\nparticularly because sometimes when R reads it over it may be he's\nmissed something. K said almost all the changes he made were in\nthe first 7 pages, and they were almost all deletions. K said R should\nlook at what Ted Eliot has. K said if it gives R any trouble, they could\nhave a word about it. R said he didn't think it would; R thinks it sets a\ngood tone on the whole. K said at the end where R quotes Podgorny, K\nwould quote the P at the UN, no sense in giving Podgorny the credit.\nR said that was a good idea. R said there is an occasion at the State\nDEpt tomorrow night where he could just go up and read it. R asked\nK if he thought he might want to bother the P with it. K said if R\nwanted him to.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Packard\n8:15 a.m.\n11/13/69\nPackard asked what K wanted to discuss at the Defense Program Review\nCommittee meeting today. K thought whatever conclusions Packard had\non the strategic forces. Packard asked if he wanted to discuss the other\nforces. K said not unless P was ready. P said there wasn't much on the\nstrategic forces.\nK said maybe a few words about ABM. P said he would have something\nput together.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nRichardson\n11/13/69\n11:00\na.m.\nK welcomed R back. R thanked him and said it was a good trip. K\nsaid Healy told him he was impressed, and what K picks up here is\nvery favorable. R said he thought it was worthwhile; the meeting in\nRome was especially successful and useful.\nR said about the meeting of the Defense Review Committee today at\n2:30; is it on the question of phase two of ABM? K said no, it's a\ngeneral review. R said he asked because he's come back more than\never convinced that it's important we bend every effort to head off? ]\n[the Mansfield resolution ? R said he's heard that Aiken agrees to\ncosponsor, and R thinks he should go up to see Aiken and ask Alex\nto go to this meeting. Would that be okay? K said he are having a\ntough time getting Defense to cooperate. K said he wanted to get\nsome issues on the table. K said he would be delighted to see Alex,\nbut his major concern is to see some principles established. R said,\nyou'd like me to be there? K said yes. R said Johnson is working\nmore directly with Defense currently than R is. J is setting up a\nway to deal with these things on a day-to-day basis. R said he's got\nto take time to talk with Senators about the NATO situation- R thinks\nit's of key priority. K said he couldn't promise that this would be a\ngreat meeting-- just ask wants to establish some principles. R said\nhe thought he would SEND Johnson to go. K said he thought R would\nbe tending in that direction. K said he hoped to see R soon. They\nagreed to have breakfast on Saturday.\nR said meanwhile, on the NSDM on US policy toward Greece--Seamans\nis due to visit Athens before Tasca it to arrive--he's due to be there\nWednesday. R said we think it important that a policy statement not be\nmade by Seamans, but by Tasca when he gets there. K said he didn't\nthink Seamans should get into it. R said it's important to tell him not\nto. The only alternative is to tell him not to go to Athens, and that\nmay be going further than necessary. K said we would tell him that\nif asked he should say our Ambassador will discuss that.\nR said they are also concerned about the possibility of leak on this\ndocument, especially in light of paragraph 2--the first part shouldn't\nget into critical hands. K said he would have to see what distribution\nit gets; what's its classification. R said Secret/Nodis; it was distributed\nat State to the Secretary, R, Johnson, Samuels,\nand the\nSecretariet. R said they could try to hold X it down.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nRichardson\n11/13/69 11:00 a. m. p. 2\nK said the last time he and R talked, K was going to talk to Cargo about\nthe President's annual report; then he went off with R. K asked if R\ncould follow it up with Cargo; see whether there are still some problems.\nR said he would do that right away.\nR said one other thing on Tasca--we are concerned about whether he\ngets confirmed at all. R said they have a commitment to Congress txx\nabout consultation on decisions made on policy XXX toward Greece. R\nthinks the best thing to do is to push for confirmation of Tasca, and\nthan to consult. K agreed; should state that Tasca is instructed to\nurge constitutional forms in return for which we are willing to\nR said this forced the decision\nhe's going to do it anyway.\nR said he hoped to have it in two bites, to press for it without reaching\nthe question of what we would do and and at a later date\nK said\nthis is not what the P wants, but it can be managed this way. R skjar\nsaid if State can keep the lid on it and K can keep the lid on it over here,\nthat will be good and maybe we can get Tasca confirmed.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nU. Alexis Johnson\n11/13/69 11:15 a. m.\nK said that he couldn't get the President's decision on Congressional\nbriefing until K knows what J wants K to say. J said that is in the\ntypewriter now and should be over to K in an hour.\nK said there is to be no further discussion about the secret minutes.\nR said he understood. K asked if R could keep Packard quiet. R said\nthat is his problem- it arises in the Presidential briefing paper. K\nsaid you can't say it to Congress. J said he was talking about Packard's\nbriefing paper on how the President is to handle visitors. J asked how\nwe are going to handle Packard. K said he would tell Laird we want\nnothing on paper. J said that would cover him. J asked how he was to\nexplain that we don't exxiting mention nuclear issue in briefing paper.\nK said he would take care of that. K said he would call Laird this\nminute. K told J to let him have, privately, his text of the communique\nand his suggestions, strictly as Alex Johnson. K said he didn't\nwant that coordinated. J said he thought he ought to tell K that through\nyesterday there has been some coordination. K said he would get it\nkilled- K said that's going to leak; we were never cut in on that. K\nasked how J had handled the secret understanding on the Korean busi-\nness. J said that was seen by Defense. K said well, this is more\nsensitive. J said those boys will say we've sold them down the river.\nK said he would take care of it- he would tell Wheeler and Laird to\nkeep quiet. K said he just wanted J to know he doesn't always push\nState around. J said that was all he needed to know. J said he would\nhave the talking points over in an hour, and the other paper over this\nafternoon. J said this is the right way to proceed as long as he can\nbe sure they don't talk to armed services committees.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Alsop\n11/13/69 4:35 p.m.\nA was calling about the A's invitation to K to come to dinner tonight.\nK said he was having dinner with a friend. A invited the friend to\ncome too; K said he would try to reach her, but he didn't know if\nthey would be able to come--he would be back in touch with A.\nA said he wants to get off in a corner in the next few days with\nK. K said it probably wouldn't be until Monday. A said that\nwould be okay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nDon Marron\n11/13/69 5:30 p.m.\nM asked if K was bearing up. K said yes, he has secret service\ngoing around with him now. M thought that was progress; he was\nworried about that last time. K said yes, but it ruins his private\nlife.\nM called about two things: first he understands K is speaking at\nthe Bullock Forum on Monday, and M would like to get K to talk\nwith \"us. \" K asked if Bullock was a competitor; M said yes,\nsort of. M wonders if K would come down to his office after the\nBullock Forum and sit around and talk for awhile--for about an\nhour. K said that would be impossible; that thing is over at 5:00\nand he has another commitment in NY at 7:00. M said really 20\nminutes would do; it is sort of embarrassing for M to have K\nspeaking to the Bullock group and not his. K said he would let\nM know tomorrow; M should call his office tomorrow and talk\nwith Commander Howe--he would have an answer.\nSecondly, M wanted to schedule the dinner he wants to have for\nK. After lots of going round and round, they decided on Monday,\nJanuary 12, but K asked if they can keep it open for time and\nplace. (They also decided to have it in New York because K can't\nstand the social gossips in Washington.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 3 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\nContains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nFarley\n11/13/69\n5:45 p.m.\nF wanted to check on Congressional consultation on SALT. K said he\nis aiming for 8:30 Monday morning. K would like F, himself and\nHelms there to do essentially what they did before NSC boiled down.\nF asked if this was the leadership group. K said yes. F asked if\nthere weren't some arrangements to keep committees informed. K\nsaid the P told Fulbright that he is not eager to do it until there is\nsome movement, and Fulbright said he understood. F said no addi-\ntion to Fulbright in the subcommittee- House Foreign Affairs and\nAtomic Energy Commission- we'll try that line. K said he would\nraise it with the P again. F said he has no zest for spending more\ntime on that than is needed. F said Rogers promised to keep them\ninformed. F said maybe we should take a sounding and see if the\nP's line has calmed this down. F said it is easier to keep it cool\nby discrete regular briefings than to wait until it gets big.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAlexis Johnson\n5:02 11/14/69\nK wanted Johnson to know that the President wouhdn't do the Congressional\nbriefing until after the Sato visit. K asked if Johnson would be getting\nbriefing books together. Johnson was going to the Sec. just then with them\nand would have other pieces first thing in the morning. K said he was\ntrying to set something up for Johnson with the Pres. on Tuesday.\nJohnson said if he wasn't going to have the meeting, hw would have to write\nsomething out. K suggested that he write it out anyway since the President\nlikes to absorb it by reading. Johnson said he would bring it over with him\ntomorrow. They settled on 12:45 in Ks office\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSec. Laird\n5:45\np.m.\n11/14/69\nK indicated that the Chinese Ambassador came in to see him with a\npersonal letter to the President about the two destroyers which are\ngoing off station soon. They understand the problems but they wonder\nwhether we could delay it for 2 or 3 weeks. Laird indicated that this\nis part of the State Department move toward China. They came in to\ntalk to Laird also. They equate this to the new policy toward the\nMainland. They are trying to get us to go along with a few F4s for\nthem. They only want to buy 8 or 9 of them. K asked what Laird\nthought about that. Laird said it was o.k. with him but they want us to\nmake credit arrangements for them. It is difficult for us to negotiate\ncredit with all thekproblems now. K said as he understood that the\nAmbassador was aware that the circumstances werextoxbe weren't to\nbe disputed but the point *bexwx K wanted to raise was that if it is true,\nand so the destroyers would not simply disappear without having the\nchance to talk, we we can delay it 2 or 3 3 weeks. K said he hadn't\nhad a chance to get to the President yet on this. Laird said we don't\nwant them to get the idea that this is a negotiable item. K said it would\nhave bo be made clear for budgetary reasons. How about giving them an\nextention of three weeks. Laird said he would like K know in the morning.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmb. Unger\nMr. Kissinger\n6:50 p.m., 11/13/69\nU asked what K could tell him about Symington. K said Symington\nsays Fulbright is the guy with whom to deal with and we can't get\nto him until Monday morning. U asked if Symington will be out of\ntown on Monday, and K said yes. U asked if K felt he could work\nthis out with Fulbright and K said yes. K said Symington said he\nthought it would be alright and that K should tell Fulbright that. K\nalso said he talked to Dick Helms about it. U said the reason he\nwas calling because he will be leaving town shortly thereafter and\nK said you will have to wait until we talk to Fulbright. U said yes,\nof course.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoseph Alsop\n3:20 p. m. 11/14/69\nAlsop said he had been talking to Rabin and he mentioned Golda Meir's\nletter to the President about Vietnam. Rabin said as far as their side\nwas concerned, the President could release the letter. Alsop asked if\nit had been released. K said he was sure it was released in Key Biscayne.\nIt is now public domain and Also could use it. Alsop said it was inconceivable\nthat a letter from Meir in support of the President was not on the front page.\nK reminded Alsop of the 300 senators who signed letter in support of the\nPresident that never appeared in the New York Times. Alsop said his business\nhad gone crazy.\nAlsop asked if someone on K's staff could call him with the text of the Meir\nletter and K said he would have it done in 15 minutes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAttorney General\n4:10 p.m.\n11/14/69\nThey discussed the moon launch which K had just attended. and the briefness\nof the show. They also discussed the moratorium and how it seemed to be\ngoing.\nK said he talked to the President about the meeting tomorrow. The Pres.\ndoesn't want to be pre-empted by the Senators Resolutionx letter which\ntaks steam out of the Senate Resolution. If the conversation comes aronnd\non how to handle Senate Committee, the Pres. wants, on ceasefire, that\npeople say they are sticking to the President's policy and not give Mansfield\nground for new initiatives. Thats the line the Pres. wants to play. State is\non a different track. Mitchell said if you get control of it, its fine. K said\nthe President wants to go further. State has done an endrun. They have sent\nstudy paper to Saigon and Paris that urgest them to take up with Governments\nconcerned. x It forces us to come out for it. Mitchell asked how this fit in\nwith K's study paper. K said hes was more neutral. He said he would get\nHaig to send it over. The major point is that we don't want to generate a new\nset of overtures. We think we are in a good position now with the demonstrations\nof public support and are sticking to our position.\nK asked if Mitchell could come in at 10:00 so K could give him the Pres's\ncurrent thinking on troop withdrawals. The Pres. is not willing to nail\nhimself to one plan. Mitchell didn't think he should. K said Rogers said he\nwould have to testify that there is no plan. Mitchell said if this was strongly\nthe President's position, he didn't feel X Rogers would have the guts to testify.\nMitchell thought thxox this should be put on the table.\nMitchell mentioned that Ed Walsh wanted to resign from the delegation and thought\nthat the timing could be when Lodge leaves. K said he would work that out.\nK asked if Mitchell had a chance to look into Gullian matter. Mitchell hadn't\ngotten the report back yet.\nMitchel said Harlow was talking about Cooper and asked him to do some research\non salary increase business. This was for Cooper to go to Paris huxxo as\nAmbassador. K said Harlowmust be doing this on his own since the Pres. was\ninterested in Scranton for that. K said he couldn't figure Scranton out. We have\noffered him several jobs and he has come in physically in tears. But this might\nappeal to his snobbism. K said he would like to pass it by the Pres. once more.\nThey both thought he would agree to instructions.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmbassador Pauls\n5:55 p.m.\n11/14/69\nPauls called to tell K that he was sending over a letter from the Chacellor\nto the President on the occasion of the beginning of SALT. with a few good\nwishes. Pauls said he would like to come in and see K alone next week\nif possible. K said he would be glad to.\nK asked where Schmidt was now. Edauls Pauls indicated that he had\ngone back yesterday. K asked if Pauls thought Weiner would like to come\nover. Pauls thought it would be a good idea. Schmidt intended on talking\nwith Weiner(sp). P was certain Weiner would come but not too early.\nThey are tight in Parlimant now. After the beginning of next year the\nParliament situation would be easier. Pauls said they could talk about\nthat.\nK said he wooked forward to seeing Pauls next week.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Laird\n7:00 p. m.\n11/14/69\nK wanted to give Laird, for his own information, the current thinking'\nof the President. The Pres. feels that he is in pretty good shape on\nVietnam and doesn't want to get triggered on dramatic initiatives. He\nthinks he has the doves for once. He would like to avoid anything\ndramatic until later. He would like to see impact of unity on Hanoi.\nHe doesn't want to make ceasefire look as if it is a hot new item. Just\nsay he has mentioned it but not have it come out of the Senate as a\ndramatic new proposal. Laird agreed with all of that and said everything\nshould but put in the context of the Pres. May 14 speech. K agreed.\nLaird said he would take the position that the President wants\nOn the next increment, K said the Pres. is still playing against smaller\nfigure for the reasons Laird originally gave. Laird said we weren't\npressed on the big one now. K said the Pres. is beginning to lean for\nthe smaller one and the bigger one in March and give them another slug\nin September. Laird said we could go 40 or 50. and thought from the stand-\npoint of where we are now that would be o.k. K said if we had 50 to April\nhow would that work. Laird thought that would be fine. Laird asked if\nhe should build that up. K said he was leaning toward it. K said, he felt\nthat if we do this big one, then it may look as if the Pres. is doing what the\nDoves want. If we do the other one, we are moving at our own pace.\nLaird wanted the Pres. to know that he could go either way. K indicated\nthat the Pres. didn't want a timetable set for the bigger one. He will want\ntwo alternative plans. K's judgment was, and he may be proved wrong,\nthat the Pres. won't agree to nailing himself to one plan. Laird said he\nhad two plans all along. K asked if Laird thought he would have any trouble\ngoing to the Senate with this. Laird said no, he has a maximum and a\nminimum plan. K said he would like to see Laaird soon privately on\nOkinawa next week. K said he would go over there. They would check on\na time tomorrow.\nOn the destroyers, Laird said they were ordered to leave on the 15th and\nit is already the 15th there but they can't get much further than 100 miles.\nK thought it would be good if we could give them 3 weeks. Laird was sure\nit was a bargaining thing. K said at least we can say we have done something\nfor them. Laird said that the Draft Bill when through and will be passed next\nweek. K said that would help with the colleges.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nThe President\nMr. Kissinger\n7:00 p.m., 11-14-69\nP said with regard to the Fulbright thing. Fulbright wants to have an\ninformal conversation with you. P said I am inclined to have you do it\nprovided it is done on an informal basis. Should do it on a trade-off\nbasis. This thing of Rogers is very hard. I suppose I should call him\nand tell him but I hate to. P asked, if K had any problem with Laird.\nK said I have no problem with Laird. Laird is perfectly happy to\ndelay. K said it is impossible for two Cabinet Members to precede\nthe President. P said I think what has to happen - you raised it with\nBill, what did he say? K said he raised it yesterday and he wanted to\n;think about it. In connection with that, he said he wanted to think\nabout it. Then he said to Laird this morning he was going to take\nit up with you this morning.\nP said I will get him in after the NSC tomorrow. P said what time\nis the NSC. K said 10:00 a.m. P said I will get him tomorrow on that.\nI will put it right to him. We can't screw around with it. P said I\nthink we have got a good play. What did they say?\nK said it is a cheap appeal to the American people. What they said was\nthe October 15 thing is primarily an appeal to the conscience of America\nand cannot be avoided by cheap appeals to Americanism. P said they\nare going to hear a lot more appeals. You cannot do it on the basis Rogers\nand Laird have suggested - that we buy time by troop withdrawals. K\nsaid that was a reasonable idea originally. I thought it would buy us\nsome time. As far as organizers work, they would be at us just as\nhard. P said I think there is a much deeper conspiracy than any of us\nrealize. K said they related Pham to some of the things that happened this\nsummer.\nP\nsaid\nI\nthink\nvan Dong thing is a plus for us. Don't\nyou think so? K said yes I do. P said, incidentally I am going to use\nit on the 3d. I will have to nail people. I am going to say the protestors\nwill delay the war. K said I think you have no choice.\nP said the other point is looking at our hard road where Lodge will\nmake his sharp rejoinder. The way you have changed it is fine. Then\nyou change him and say rather than walk out, move for an adjournment,\nthen you don't have to tell Rogers. Another thing about this - we have\nto look at these things. Maybe this thing coming - they are triggering\nus. It is something that - take Laird. Don't you think this moratorium\nshakes him? K said yes I do. I think these opponents are out to get\nthe Presidency and you. P said one thing for sure, I will be here three\nyears - don't worry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK said I think if we get through this alright, we will be OK. P said\nas a matter of fact, I think you will have something before the 3d\nif we hang tight. K said we are already getting inquiries as to why\nour plans are not flying. P said would you not agree that there is\na chance that they will make some sort of a move. K said I think\nthere is a 30-40% chance that we will hear something before the\n3d. P said the casualties were 66 last week? K said yes, but they\nare up to 99 this week. But still when we came in they were 250 a\nweek. P said they are still less than 100. Henry, remember I told\nyou yesterday that they are not infallible. They do make mistakes.\nP said I think this was a great mistake. I don't think Ho Chi Minh\nwould have made this mistake. K said maybe they over-estimate\nthe peace movement. K said in 65 and 66 they already banked heavily\non it when it was not very strong. K said whatever the reason, none\nof these people - none of the new leadership know the foreign countries.\nThey have never been outside of Vietnam.\nP said OK Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHelecon\nSecretary Laird\n7:20 p.m.\n11/14/69\nOne point Laird forgot to gring up. which he didn't want to bring up at the\nmeeting tomorrow was on SALT. There was information out that the\ndelegates have been authorized to share certain secrets with the Soviets.\nLaird couldn't believe that was true and asked if the State Dept. said\nanything.\nK said that Laird could indicate that was totally untrue and would never\nbe authorized.\nAbout the Defense Rrogram Review Group we are not getting into any\nweapons systems analysis things. The only things we are looking at\nare with political implications. The meeting went very well and he\nthanked Laird for everything he had done. Packard did an excellent\njob. Of the issues they came in with, three were selected. Laird said\nMayo didn't feel it was good idea because it compromised his position.\nK said the President talked to K about that and he doesn't want Mayo to\nnit-pik Laird on these things.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 4 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\nContains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Stans\n11/15/69\n2:45 p.m.\nK said on that business they were talking about; they've accepted S's memo\njust as is. S said wonderful. K said he had gotten a call from the guy and\nhe wants to know how we face the Geneve business with\nthis. S said the Geneva talks are okay; they indicate what is going on and\ngive us a chance to discuss. K said, but you want the secret talks to be\nthe determining ones? But keep the Geneva ones going? S said yes, for\nbuilding public image. S said if we have the secret ones in December,\nwe may need the public ones at the same time. K said they don't want to\ndo it at the cabinet level; they want S to designate a junior fellow. S said\nStanley Nemur is very good. K said trustworthy? S said yes, extremely.\nK said we want an extension until December. We don't want a total. com-\nmitment until December 15. But they've accepted it just as S wrote it.\nAnd K said for S's information, he's going to commit himself in a public\nspeech here on trade liberalization--liberalize by June 1. K said he told\nhim we have to have something to show our industrialists- we can't wait\nuntil June 1.\nS said he plans to be away from Washington from December 15 through the\nholidays won't be here for any negotiations. K said that's there\nwon't be any. S said we must have K or someone have a discussion with\nState on the fact that they must hold the line, not to give ground. S is\nafraid in these discussions, in Geneva and others, they'l begin to weaken\nagain, and give the Japanese the feeling that they can negotiate a better\ndeal. S said to make sure the State Dept. holds tight. K said S should\nsend him a memo; say we want to make sure State holds tight. K will\napprove it\ngixex get the P to XXXXXX and send it over to State. K said if he gets in-\nvolved in textiles, they'll know something is fishy. S said okay, that\nwould be fine. K said he's the greatest negotiator in the world if you give\nhim an island to barter away. Both agreed that it had to be done.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmbassador Chow\n11/15/69\n3:10 p.m.\nK wanted to tell C that we have put two ships into Formosa--not the same\ntwo--for an interim period of 5 days to see about the outcome of Packard's\ndiscussion with C's president. C said his president said they would talk\non the 16th. K said yes, they are going to talk in the next day. K said we\nhave two ships there until Thursday, and we will make a dicision during\nthe week whether to leave them there longer.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Laird\n11/15/69\n3:15p.m.\nK said he had told the Chinese what K and L discussed, that we have ships\nthere for 5 days and we are waiting to hear about the discussions. K said\nL should inform Packard about our general attitude and see if he can find\nout what they really want. L said he had already told him that we have 2\nships there, and perhaps we will want to extend for 30 days. K said he had\nmade it clear that we can't go beyond that. L said they would have an\nanswer Monday or Tuesday.\nK said that memo to Wheeler was a mistake. It kappx hadn't happened\nbefore and won't happen again. L said he understood, but he thought it\nwas better. K agreed.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelephone Conversation\n11/15/69\n4:10 p.m.\nDr. Kissinger and Dr. Doty\nDr. Doty: How was the blast-off.\nDr. K. : I only saw it for about two seconds. The clouds were very low,\nat about 500 feet. It was very impressive. You want to go sometime?\nWell, I will get you an invitation sometime.\nDr. Doty: I would like to go.\nDr. K: I very much appreciated the letter you sent me. I was really\nvery touched. I took the liberty of showing it to the President, It\nactually helped in many ways. We may do a lot of things wrong but\nnothing in the whole letter when we followed up meant anything. We\ntook the whole letter and said screw you because nothing would have\npleased us more than to have something in them. In fact if you look at\nthe UN speech and put it next to the whole letter, you may see some things.\nDid they ever make a date for you and your colleagues next Wednesday.\nI will have to do it on Monday because my staff is not here today.\nDr. Doty: Good. Monday will be fine. Somewhere around 5:00 (on Wednesday?)\nor 6:00 or maybe 6:30 to 7:30.\nDr. K: Will you come?\nDr. D: Yes. If I come, it will be a special trip.\nDr. K: Could you do that? How are things otherwise.\nDr. D: Very quiet here.\nDr. K: Very quiet here too. You know there was a fairly big group.\nDr. D: What about Dupont circle?\nDr. K: Yes, there was trouble. But while it was unpleasant it wasn't out\nof control. Will you tell the others how very moved I was by the letter.\nDr. D: Yes, I will.\nDr. K: It was a compassionate letter and I certainly agree with your last\nparagraph. We have no interest in any victories over troubled people. We are\ntrying to move without tying ourselves to a timetable.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nDr. D: I would like to see you a few minutes before when we come.\nDr. Kissinger: Good, come in 15 minutes before the others.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n5\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\nContains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President\n11/15/69 8:00 p.m.\nThe P had an idea that would be helpful in the hearings. Why doesn't\nK have his people prepare a Q and A on Vietnam - - sort of the obvious\nquestions people are going to ask. The P said he could say he had pre-\npared some briefing material that would be useful in your hearings.\nK said they would think K had put him up to it, whereas if the P writes\na letter\nThe P said he would be glad to write a letter, but he\nthought. K said he should cover two points: 1) ceasefire, and 2)\nthe commitment to Vietnam. The P said he thinks he should say he\nhas a plan that we aren't discussing, in the letter also. The P said\nyes, maybe the letter's a better idea - -I think maybe you're right,\njust a little note. The P said he wouldn't need it until Tuesday, if K\ncould have it up by Monday afternoon it would be plenty of time.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmbassador Freeman\n9:30 a.m.\n11/17/69\nK said the earlies we could have the visit of the Prime Minister would\nbe Jan. 27 and 28. The President won't be back from California until\nthe 10th and it will be the State of the Union week. The Turkish P.M.\nwill be coming the following week but the President will see Wilson\nanyway. Before it is announced, K wondered when the State Dept.\nshould be brought into this. Freeman said he would phone London\nand then the State Dept. would become involved.\nK said he could assure the P.M. that the visit would be successful and\nwarm.\nK said he would plant a question on the other point.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Blake - Paris Embassy\n9:35 a. m.\n11/17/69\nBlake was asked to attend meetings to discuss the forthcoming trip of\nPompidu. Blake hadn't see anything particular which the President or\nK wanted to say and wondered if there was anything. K said no. Blake\nthought he would is say that we hope to make the trip pleasant and\nproductive, maximum exposure to the American people, we are not in\nany way pressuring for ceremonial functions asked if that would suit\nK. K said that would be fine. Blake could tell them we want to make\nthe trip a success and they should feel comfortable about it. Blake\nindicated that they were being pressured by different groups to attend\nbanquets. K said we should ask them what they want to do and not to\nlet any group say they are representing us.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nProf. Doty\n11/17/69\n9:35\na.\nm.\nD was sorry about Saturday he felt that he wasn't very useful, but\nthere was someone else in the room, and he really couldn't talk. K\nsaid that was all right--he thought D was watching the football game.\nK said he wanted to tell D how much he appreciated the letter. K said\nhe took the liberty of showing it to the President, and it is this kind of\nletter that makes our policy possible. D said he remembered even\nMoynihan saying he never gets a single letter from the academics.\nK said they would meet at 6:00 on Wednesday; D should come at about\n20 minutes of 6:00. D said that was good; he thinks this is a crucial\nbusiness, and people who can still offer advice should. K said he was\ngoing to bring Larry Lynn in on it. The more K can keep DuBridge\nout of it, the better; he doesn't add anything for the President. But\nK is eager to keep that contact.\nD said how are things in Helsinki? K said he hadn't heard anything\nyet. K doesn't know if he expects anything spectacular. K is going to\nthe Hill for a briefing tomorrow. K said the Kleiman news stories are\nas wrong as they can be. D said, you mean Finney? K said yes, but\nKleiman too. What he says is just nonsense. What good is what we\ncall option 3? K said you cannot talk about MIRVs without freezing new\ndeployments. K said if they have to trade some of their present force\nfor untested MIRVs, we have got a problem. K thought Bundy's article\nwas good. K said the trouble with Hoopes (?) is that he isn't at the\nright level to know what's going on. K said there was just too many\nlacuna there. Basically K doesn't think Hoopes and we disagree all\nthat much. K said basically, what's the disagreement?\nK asked if D was going to the Galbraith thing tonight. K said he was going\nto try to get to it. D said great. But K said he is in tough shape about it.\nK said if he can't come he hopes D will tell Galbraith of his firm intention\nof getting there. K said for some reason he is fond of this cynic. G keeps\nchopping K up, but K is fond of him.\nK said he thinks on CBW we are moving in the right direction; he will\nbring D up to date on that on Wednesday.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nProfessor Doty\n9:55 a. m.\n11/17/69\nK said he had a talk with Joe Kraft. He had dinner with him Friday night\nand mentioned in passing and not for his use, that he had a letter from\nDoty's people and how touched K was by it. K said when he spoke of\npolarization, he should mention that the two sides\nwhat was\nlacking was movement in the intelligence community. Kraft called K and\nsaid that he (Kraft) had talked to some of Doty's people about the letter\nand they were upset that Kraft knew about it. K wanted txx Doty to let\nthem know that he would not mentions it to any newspaper men and\nconsiders Kraft a personal friend and one of us. Doty said he would speak\nto them today. K said for Doty to give them his word that he would not\ntake advantage of the letter. It will not be released.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nGovernor Harriman\n10:00 a.m.\n11/17/69\nK discussed Harriman's speech over the weekend and the reaction the press\ngad. Harriman said he has made more friends and Nixon has helped him.\nHarriman said he would send him a copy of the speech. K wanted H to know\nthat his door remains open. Harriman didn't understand why the Administration\ndidn't follow some of the advice of the people who got us into this great\ndifficulty.\nK mentioned H's invitation to dinner and asked if it would be convenient\nfor H on Tuesday, Nov. 25. Harriman said that would be fine. They\nsettled on 8:00 but K hoped that H would understand if he was a few mintues\nlaté.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nWalt Rostow\n10:10 a.m\n11/17/69\nK said that he hand't heard from Johnson City in so long, we were getting\nworried, and probably rightly so, that they were mad at us. Rostow said\nhe would be in Washington on Dec. 29. He had agreed to talk to the\nAmerican Historical Association on Asia and would be in again in January.\nK said he would like to get him here before that on a consultant basis and\nRostow should have his secretary work on some dates.\nK wanted to say one word about a part of the speech which K heard rumors\nthat they were unhappy about. K wanted R to know there was nothing in the\npre-inaugurah correspondence with Hanoi. It was a general expression that\nwe would negotiatie seriously and said nothing to them about waiting until\nNixon got in office before negotiating. Rostow said he couldn't speak for\nJohnson on this. Some observations were made that were untrue which made\nit painful. He was speaking about the passage in the beginning of the speech.\nR said only Nixon can made judgments as to what political requirements he\nhas. R said he would never second guess a President who bares this\nresponsibility. R would say that the speech wasn't wholely accurate. It did\nnot throw Johnson into sax a state to make war but it had its costs. Rostow\nfelt it was unfortunate. R repeated that only a President can decide what to do.\nHe hated to see the relationships between the two President's strained. K\nagreed and said we have SO many enemies that we should do what we can for\nour friends. Leaving aside the passage, K thought that the speech would have\npleased Rostow. Rostow was pleased and said he has been around the country\nand deeply believes that the people will sweat it out under the new leadership.\nRostow said he didn't know enough about the situation in Vietnam to know whether\nthe President is doing right or wrong. The thing that worries him most is\nthe damage of political fragmentation. K said it was a religious article at\nFoggy Bottom that unless you have humilitated Thieu, the day hasn't been\nworthwhile. R thought they were losing politically in Vietnam and they will\nlose in the U.S. if the President holds steady. They only way they will survive\nis if they hang together. The political elite has to stand together. R said that\nhe has been talking around the country and despite the media, people of this\ncountry have enough sense and character that they don't want to walk away from\nit.\nRostow said that Valentine Zorine(sp) of the Soviet Academy of Sixe Science\nwill be visiting the President Johnson tomorrow and would like to know if there\nwas anything K wished to be passed on. K said anything the President could say\nto support Nixon and also that when the chips are donw, the people will support\ntheir President. This would be a great opportunity for the Soviet Union to get\nthe war wound up and move to our basic relationships. Rostow said that would\nhave been his instinct.\nK asked him again to make arrangements to come\ndown in early December.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nPhilip Farley\n10:25 a.m.\n11/17/69\nFarley said in going ahead with the backstop work following NSDM, they\nhad only run into one issue. His feeling is it should be shouldn't be an\nissue though. It depends on what the NSDM means. It has laid out that\nwe are committed to one component(?) on Safeguard. (Missed a couple\nof sentences here). Farley thought this seemd dubious to him and X\nK agreed. It would be a mistake to and he would oppose it. Farley said\nwe can protect the full thing.\nK asked if he could see whatever it is that goes out. He XXXIX mentioned\nthat Jerry Smith had shown him something before he left which was now\nOBE. Farley said he was preparing a number of backup statements and\nK's people have been sitting in on it. K will get a copy via LDX but he\nwill also make sure everyone knows K is interested in the ABM part.\nK said the briefing would be at 9:00 on the Hill. It will be a larger group\nand Helms will brief then Facley will explain how we prepared for it\nand Farley will sum it up.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nProf. Elliott\n11/17/69\n11:45\na.\nm.\nK was sorry he hadn't seen E but he'd been working about 18 hours a\nday. And handling it quite well, E said. K said he always had to see\nthe people who are soft and weak and E doesn't belong to those.\nE said he wanted to talk about the books he is trying to put out- he is\nhaving trouble on that front. E hopes the President has got that book\nE sent him, talking about the impact of television on American culture.\nE wanted to talk with K about a few things before he goes to see Joel\nBlocker. K said he thought E could be as informative on himself as\nanybody else. E said he had done this before and SO has Kraemer.\nK said E should tell Blocker whatever he thinks best.\nE said he thought he could be helpful on how K developed and what had\nbeen heppening to him. E said K has had the broadest background of\nanybody who could have been picked out, and his foreign policy interests\nmade him an exceptionally good choice. K said, and philosophical inter-\nests.\nE said those books he is writing, he's got two finished and would be glad\nto put them into K's hands. One of the 11\nbases of American\nForeign Policy\" and \"The Fruits of False Freedom, 11 on the SDS, black\npower, and weathermen, etc.\nK said E had been such an important influence on K's life. E hopes to\ncontinue to be. E said Louise asked E to send K her love. K said some-\ntimes, E has found things in K--K thought E had lost his mind. E said\nthere had never been a time when there was a worse need for someone\nto set the tone, and K is doing it well. E said that he thinks K is using\nthe Vice President brilliantly. K said he would go easy on that with\nBlocker.\nK said the one thing he doesn't discuss is his divorce. E said the only\nthing he could say about that is that is helped to deepen him. E went\nthrough it himself- it is a testing experience. E said he had written K\nabout his happiness that K keeps in touch with the children. K said he\nadores them--he doesn't just do that out of duty. That's one of things\nthat E hopes K will continue in. K said he feels very strongly about E.\nE said some day he wants to talk with K about the seminar--they were\ngoing to disperse all the records, and that's stupid.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSenator Fulbright\n11/17/69\n12:07\nK said he was calling because Ehrlichman and Symington are not here--\nK said he was acting more as messenger than as principal in conveying\na message about the Symington hearings. K said there was some discus-\nsion about who was to testify about the supposed Thai activities in Laos.\nK said we recommend that F call Helms--the one who knows the situation\nbest, and Unger can be present to go into the political aspects. K said he\nhad talked to Symington Thursday, and he suggested K call S today.\nF said he was expecting Unger this morning; why didn't he come? K said\nhe didn't know, he guessed Unger was waiting to get it clear about who was\nto testify. F said they asked Helms about 2 or 3 points, and he said he\ndidn't know. F said they asked about the arrangement we made with the\nThais for sending their troops into Laos; F said we know we have such an\nagreement. Unger said he simply was not aware. F said 'you shouldn't\nhave your ambassadors doing this--it's bad enough for Hoffa to do it--\nshouldn't have ambassadors doing it. F said they asked Helms, and he\ndidn't know. F said Unger claimed executive privilege; F didn't think he\ncould do that. K said he really wasn't in a position to talk about this; he\nhadn't followed it with that precision. F repeated that he thought Unger\nwas coming this morning, then asked if Unger was available to come this\nafternoon. K said we would see that he does. K said he would see to it\nthat Unger and Helms were there.\nF said he would like to see Helms, but Unger should testify by himself.\nK said his understanding with Symington was that it would be all right if\nHelms and Unger came together. K said this decision had been made by\nthe committee chaired by Ehrlichman. F said it was all right for them to\ncome together part of the time, but F wants Unger part of the time by\nhimself.\nK said he understood only that the contingency plans weren't to be discussed.\nF said he didn't care to ask further about water over the dam.\nLaird took care of that in a most satisfactory manner. F said what he would\nlike is to have Unger come over along this afternoon. K said let them start\nout together and then see what happens. K said those were his instructions.\nF said when you send Helms in and it throws a cloak of secrecy about the\ntestimony. F said sending Helms back intrudes upon his time, but if K in-\nsists, that's okay. But F insists that Unger come by himself. F thinks we\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nFulbright\n11/17/69\n12:07\np. 2\ncan get rid of it in an hour or an hour and a half, and it will be more\nbother to everybody the other way. K understood, but his problem is\nthat this is not in his jurisdiction. K was calling F because Symington\nis out of town, and before he left he asked K to call. K said that in\nareas in which he has discretion F would find him more helpful than\nthose in which he is just carrying messages.\nF said Unger first pleaded executive privilege, then said he would take\nit under advisement. K said the only thing he is aware of is that there\nwas to be no discussion of contingency plans. The rest, K is not even\nbriefed on. F said what he wanted to ask Unger he already asked\nHelms, and he said he didn't know. But F does want Unger there before\nhe goes back.\nK said Helms and Unger could come together that's the only thing K is\ninstructed to tell F. K said he understood that F was telling him that\nthis doesn't foreclose having Unger alone. K said F's committee was pri-\nmarily the Secretary of States responsibility, but we want to do everything\nfrom this building to be helpful.\nF said they could have a meeting with Unger tomorrow afternoon- - F wants\nhim, for a brief period at least, alone. K said why didn't he sent both\nthis afternoon. If F then feels that he must see him along for a brief\nperiod, we will do our best to be helpful. F said if K does his best, he\nknows they can do it.\nF said he didn't know why they bother K with this. F said this is the first\ntime they've had an ambassador say he can't talk about what's happening\nin his own country. K said he was learning one thing from this conversa-\ntion the next time he is talking to F he is going to make damn sure that\nhe is well briefed and he is not going to pass messages again. F said\nthis is bad business like the Fitzgerald thing with the Pentagon- it\nleaves a bad taste in the mouth. K said he was sure of that. K said he\nhadn't found F unreasonable; K has enjoyed working with F and he's just\nsorry he's been so unresponsive. K said he would send them there at\n3:00 today.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nColonel Borman\n11/17/69\n3:50 p.m.\nB wondered if K had two minutes; B always feels guilty talking to K be-\ncause he knows K is so busy. K said no, B is one of the few people he\nenjoys talking with.\nB said he was calling about two things, both having to do with Vietnam.\n1) At Cape Kennedy, the President asked B if he would talk with K about\ngoing to Vietnam in the rather immediate future--visiting the troops and\nsaying a lot of people recognize why they are there, and appreciate it.\nB said we also talked about the possibility of a trip to Hanoi concerning\nthe prisoners. K said no. K said they wouldn't let B go, but he doesn't\neven want to offer it. B said somewhere the P is going to have to make\nit clear that we're trying with various avenues of approach. K said we\nare trying. B said he knew we were; he doesn't just mean on the pri-\nsoners--he means in all things. B is afraid from talking with the P--\nB doesn't want him to get static on the whole thing over there. B said\nhe doesn't want to seem like he's talking out of line, but he saw this\nhappen with Johnson. K said on the trip to Hanoi idea, first they wouldn't\nlet B in; second they would use it against us. K said he just is not going\nto play that game. B said he thought maybe he could go to Paris. K\nsaid he would think about Paris. K said if he could figure out a way of\ndoing it, he would let B know. But K said we strongly support the trip\nto Vietnam. B asked if he could go ahead and schedule the trip to Viet-\nnam for some time before Christmas; K said yes, that was an excellent\nidea.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoseph Kraft\n5:30 p.m.\n11/17/69\nK said it was a very pleasant evening at Kraft's.\nK wanted Kraft to know that he had not mentioned the letter from the Doty\ngroup to any other newspaper man and he didn't mean for Kraft to usd it\nin his column. It was something that touched K and he didn't take it as\nan unqualified endorsement. At this stage of the game, understanding is\nalmost as important as an endorsement. K said he was surprised that\nthey ******* went as far as they did go. K said he would not make any\npublicity of this and he showed it only to the President. Kraft said they\nasked him to get this mesaage to K. K said he talked to Doty. K said if\nKraft felt like calling Doty to explain it would help. If Kraft could abso\nassure them that it wasn't made to them in any since as a means of getting\npublic support.\nWhen K talked to Kraft, it was just social.\nKxx Kraft said he would call Doty.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 6 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\nContains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJoe Alsop\n2:30 p.m.\n11/17/69\nAlsop said there were alot of things he wanted to discuss with K and\ninvited him to dinner either tonight or tomorrow. K said he would have\nto do one of his usual things about tonight. He has an unbelievable\namount of work and he may have to talk to the President about Okinawa.\nK asked if he could call back. Alsop said there is no reason why he\ncan't come to a family dupper and then go back to work. K said he\nwould call back by 5:00.\nAlsop\n5:28 p.m.\n11/17/69\nK said he thought he had better not try to make it tonight but he appreciated\nthe invitation. K invited Alsop to come to the office at 5:30 on Tues.\nAlsop agreed.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Laird\n6:10 p.m.\n11/17/69\nLaird wanted to check a couple things before the NSC meeting\nHis people were somewhat concerned about interpretation that is being\nplaced on our delegation. K said he was sending a paper out now tb\nremove any doubt. K. Said Farley called and asked\n(missed)\nK said he was notifying them that the President has approved Phase 2 and\nthat they should guide themselves accordingly. Laird thought that would be\nthe best way to do it. K said he (L) should guide any instructions accordingly.\nLaird said the only thing is we may take our time in make it go all the way.\nWe should go for all the sites. K said he thought it was purely tactical.\nK said he would draft the instructions now.\nOn the Okinawa business that K discussed with Laird, he asked Laird if we\nneeded Eongressional briefings before we issue the communique on Friday.\nWe can't mention that particular thing. Laird said that they have almost\nbeen promised a briefing. K asked if Laird and Gen. Wheeler could come\nand give us strong support. Laird said he would. K said they could say\nthey feel they can live with txxixx the arrangements that have been made.\nLaird said some of our friends will raise hell. K asked if we should let\nRussell in on it. Laird didn't think in all the arrangements unless the\nPresident wants to do ti quietly. Laird has found him reliable but the\nPresident should do it alone with W Russell. Laird said we couldn't tell\nRivers. We will just have to take the heat from him.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nElliot Richardson\n6:15 p.m.\n11/17/69\nK wanted R to know that he checked into the Middle East business and\nSaunders tells him that he did this\nThey don't want to repeat\n******* all the agency positions of last year on the Phantoms. The\nreport on that goes to Sisco. The I. G. will get into the act. The\nintention was to prevent a State/Defense confrontation. K said he\nwasn't present when they were discussing the Phantom exercise but\nbut they didn't want to repeat the same problem. This is one of those\ncases where there is no White House interestix. K wanted to tell R\nthat he (K) took it seriously. R said he appreciated it.\nR mentioned something about a 24 hour slippage on the Biafra paper.\nHe thought he would send over status of the report and what we are\nproposing to do. On the relief, R thought we should put in in the form\nof a report on what he proposed to do but ixix with enough of a lag so if\nthere was a problem, they could feel it out. K said it made no great\ndifference. K thought R had the general guidance. R said he only\nasked for a report on where we go from here. K said as long as R\nlets Morris sit in on it. R said Morris met with the group the other\nday.\nK said he wouldn't be able to lhave lunch on Thursday since he has to\ntalk to the Foreign Service Association. R said that would be a good\nopportunity to tell how well the operaition is going. K said he intended\non doing that. K suggested beeakfast on Saturday.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Laird\n7:00 p. m.\n11/17/69\nLaird wanted to check a couple of items. naxthe before the NSC meeting\ntomorrow. He thought the public affairs part of these discussions had\nbeen completely over looked in the paper. X He said biological research\nis something that that can be supported but biological warfare cannot be\nsupported by anyone. K asked if that wasn't the purpose. Laird said\nas far as the paper is concerned, they would miss(?) the public affairs\nimpact. Kthought Laidd should make that point at the meeting. K said\nthat would be the thrust.\nOn Geneva protocol, Laird thought they could go along with that provided\nthat there is the reservation on 14B (teargas). These are agents that we\nuse right here. We should xy tie that reservation but support everything\nelse. K said these papers are written so that everyone can say he has\nhad far hearing. That would be K's recommendation and where he hopes\nthe President will come out.\nLaidd said he had a meeting with the Chinese and asked if K saw the wire\nthat the Embassy sent. (K hadn't) They will buy this program that was\noutlined by Packard(? and McCain. K said then Laird doesn't have to keep\nthe ships there. Laird said they would be left there for 5 days and they have\nthe 15 transit ships in there. K said thats the only interæst we had.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Rogers\n7:05 p.m.\n11/17/69\nK said he talked to Helms. K said he din't quite understand the entire\nsituation. He said he didn't believe we should head into a confrontation\non this issue. K said he couldn't make a decision but the best course\nwould for for Rogers to go talk to these people on the grounds of national\ninterest. Rogers couldn't very well tell the Foreign Relations committee\nthat they can't know about something an Ambassador negotiated and you\nC an't shift that into intelligence. Rogers asked if K would call Ehrlichman\non this and K said he would.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJohn Ehrlichman\n7:45 p.m.\n11/17/69\nK said the play blexw blew up today at the Symington Committee and said\n\"back to the old drawing board. 11 Fulbright asked if Unger was trying\nto be a wise guy when he testified. Fulbright asked if we were trying\nto put everything that an Ambassador does into CIA. Now it is dead\ncenter. K said Symington should come up and talk with the President\nagain. K suggested that we let Rogers take a crack at it. Ehrlichman\nthought this would be the place to make a stand. K said if the Sec. goes\nin there, at least he will show a position of concern. Ehrlichman said\nhe was sorry it didn't work.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Rogers\n8:05 p.m. 11/17/69\nK said he had talked to Ehrlichman and they agreed that Rogers\nshould talk to Fulbright on grounds of national security interest\nand if that doesn't work, we could get Symington to come in.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Yoshida\n8:10 p.m.\n11/17/69\nK wanted to discuss the line business -- he wanted to know if there would\nbe any public reference. Y said if it is agreeable, then his friend\nwould be prepared to insix insert this into the communique(? K didn't\nunderstand and asked \"into what''. Y said his friend was flexible regarding\nwhether to put it into communique(?) or make it public or some other form.\nY said asked if K was concerned. K said he didn't know, and said they\ncould leave that to be worked out when Y's friend is here as long as we\nmake it public. Y said he was already in touch with his friend but he was\nunabailable then. As soon as he made contact, Y would call back.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nPeter Flanigan\nMr. Kissinger\n11/17/69, 8:10 p.m.\nF said the Pope came out with a strong statement to a group of visiting\ngovernors strongly supporting the President. K asked if F knew who\nthe visiting governors were. F said he didn't know, but was trying to\nfind out. K said that was good and asked if he told the President yet.\nF said not yet and let's wait until we get the document tomorrow. K\nsaid now all we have to do is get the \"bloody Protestants\" moving. F\nsaid I told you want Mendel Rivers said? He said Mendel Rivers said\nyou can tell one thing about my church -- - - we never discuss religion or\npolitics.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Yoshida\n9:20\np.m.\n11/17/69\nY had just spoken to his friend and Y wanted to tell K how his friend felt.\nFirst, with regard to Item 2. Y's friend's present thinking is that he would\nlike to go with the present arrangement. K asked what he meant by that.\nY said that the present talk should go on and probably the one already started\nwe could hold substantial and fruitful conversations. That was his hope.\nHis friend would rather not to have another one at the same time. K said,\nthe ones that are now going on should be continued? Y said yes. Already\nhis friend has given the specific instructions to his representative and on\nsubsequent questions, however, if as K suggests as a third alternative,\nif we find that it is rather difficult then we might have some\n?\nand in the meanwhile we might have thesecond one. K said he wanted it\nclearly understood that the figures we discussed will be the outcome.\nY agreed and said his friend does understand that. His friend very clearly\nunderstands the target and was sure that the figures would be achieved.\nY's friend said he would like to think this over and asked Y to get in touch\nwith K and himself sfriend) this time tomorrow. K said that would be O. k.\nK suggested that Y call about 7:30 p.m. our time. Y said he would do that\nand in the meanwhile his friend would think it over again and then give K's\nXixx friend a clear answer of intentions so K's friend wiould have clear idem\nby the time they meet. Y said his friend was very much concerned and he\nwould make it quite clear that he cannot(?) expect the Item 2 included in the\ncommunique(? in the specific terms. K said there would be no specific\nreferences. just the reference that the discussions took place but no figures\nat all. Y said even the very term must not be mentioned that was his friends\nrequest. Y said we could use economic probbèms and said we could refer to\nItem 3 but not the specific Item 2. K said he understodd. Y asked if we could\ncooperate with him on this. K said, on the figures of Item2 and the target\nat the end of December, that was understood. Y said that was right, but\ntomorrow he would talk with his friend and and make it quite clear to him and give\nvery definite reply to K by tomorrow evening.\nWith respect to Item 1, Y said he greatly appreciates and understands what K\ntold him. X said Y should make sure that after the acceptance of Version 3,\nY's friend then goes on to raise the question of the line automatically without\nbeing invited. Y said and also he would raise Item 4. K said he was prepared\nfor that, except that we didn't want Item 4 mentioned in the talks that would\nbe handled separately. Y said that was clearly understandable and he would\nmake it clear to his friend.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}