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-2- Haig/ Oct. 6 H: Right. K: If the Soviets do not cooperate with us and whole heartiedly back back the Arabs on the immediate issue of the fighting we, in my judgment, have to lean toward the Israelis. H: Right. K: For these reasons: 1) In order to get the fighting stopped; 2) to prevent the Soviets from coming in at least with (bluster and get a cheap shot? and 3) to put some money in the bank with the disassociation with the Israelis in subsequent efforts to get a settlement. All depends now on the Soviet reaction. Then after we get the fighting stopped we should use this as a vehicle to get the diplomacy started. Now there is no longer an excuse for a delay. The return to the ceasefire will have two aspects. If today the problem means the Arabs would have to give up a little territory - my estimate is that starting tomorrow evening the (Arabs) will have to give up territory. My view is if the Israelis make territorial acquisitions we have to come down hard on them to force them to give them up. You see. H: Yes. K: We have to do that in case of the Arabs but I think it is an embarrassment xaxid we won't have very long. H: Yes. Unless we have had a terrible erosion there. K: That is the strategy that I am proposing. I think we have no choice. I think the worst thing we could do is to now take a sort of neutral position while the fighting is going on, unless the Soviets take a neutral position with us. If they take one with us, we should take a neutral position. That is ideal. If they don't join us and go to the other side we have to tilt. H: Sure. K: You see what I mean? H: Absolutely.

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    "ocrText": "-2-\nHaig/\nOct. 6\nH: Right.\nK: If the Soviets do not cooperate with us and whole heartiedly back\nback the Arabs on the immediate issue of the fighting we, in my\njudgment, have to lean toward the Israelis.\nH: Right.\nK: For these reasons: 1) In order to get the fighting stopped; 2) to\nprevent the Soviets from coming in at least with (bluster and get a\ncheap shot? and 3) to put some money in the bank with the disassociation\nwith the Israelis in subsequent efforts to get a settlement. All depends\nnow on the Soviet reaction. Then after we get the fighting stopped we\nshould use this as a vehicle to get the diplomacy started. Now there is\nno longer an excuse for a delay. The return to the ceasefire will have\ntwo aspects. If today the problem means the Arabs would have to give\nup a little territory - my estimate is that starting tomorrow evening\nthe (Arabs) will have to give up territory. My view is if the Israelis\nmake territorial acquisitions we have to come down hard on them to force\nthem to give them up. You see.\nH: Yes.\nK: We have to do that in case of the Arabs but I think it is an embarrassment\nxaxid we won't have very long.\nH: Yes. Unless we have had a terrible erosion there.\nK: That is the strategy that I am proposing. I think we have no choice.\nI think the worst thing we could do is to now take a sort of neutral position\nwhile the fighting is going on, unless the Soviets take a neutral position\nwith us. If they take one with us, we should take a neutral position. That\nis ideal. If they don't join us and go to the other side we have to tilt.\nH: Sure.\nK: You see what I mean?\nH: Absolutely."
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