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TELECON
Mr. Ball/Secretary Kissinger
February 10, 1974
3:27 PM
(Missed the first part)
B: He acts as a kind of financial advisor to the oil companies. He said he
had talked with you of what was really on his mind. He asked me to get
in touch with you. The general theme was a deep speech on the position
of the Algerians and other Arabs on a better way of dealing with Faisel and
Sadat. They were very resentful of the Europeans and that of the press,
that Faisel and Sadat and the Algerians felt a kind of protector of the
weakest of the countries, therefore we feel as acting on the embargo
and the meting on the 14thth. Don't know positively what is going to come
out. It looks like no positive action would be taken on the 14th or not until
the second meeting on the 24th. He felt if in the meantime there had been
no angry response or from the U.S. following the 14th changes had been made
Syrian disengagement it was likely there would be an announcement coming
out of the meeting on the 24th. He wanted to convey to you they were
unhappy with the situation. That they felt you said a number of countries
felt it disastrous rather than beneficial. That they could see why the
Europeans themselves hoped they got something out of it themselves.
K: They'll say that after the Syrian one too.
B: I'm just passing this on without comment.
K: They told us exactly what you said. For two months I told them that
the U.S. cannot 'act under pressure. He said to me this is we must be
given something anything at all - just one kilometer Israel would want
anyway. We need the and we wish the embargo were being lifted.
Nobody even mentioned the Syrian problem to us. In the past we felt
very strongly. We, frankly, will not be able to announce plans for lifting
the embargo. They were convinced, both Sadat and Faisel that the embargo
would be lifted anything of Egyptian disengagement.
B: When I saw Sadat in Jidda he told me exactly that.
K: We were told on January 22 that it would be lifted the next day.
B: I met with Sadat the day before, and I got a totally different answer.
K: Then they said can we wait until the 14th and we said OK. The next thing
I know is now they say the Syrian business is the major problem going to
start blackmailing us. I know you're not it. I just wanted to explain to
you why we're going to be difficult to deal with.
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"ocrText": "TELECON\nMr. Ball/Secretary Kissinger\nFebruary 10, 1974\n3:27 PM\n(Missed the first part)\nB: He acts as a kind of financial advisor to the oil companies. He said he\nhad talked with you of what was really on his mind. He asked me to get\nin touch with you. The general theme was a deep speech on the position\nof the Algerians and other Arabs on a better way of dealing with Faisel and\nSadat. They were very resentful of the Europeans and that of the press,\nthat Faisel and Sadat and the Algerians felt a kind of protector of the\nweakest of the countries, therefore we feel as acting on the embargo\nand the meting on the 14thth. Don't know positively what is going to come\nout. It looks like no positive action would be taken on the 14th or not until\nthe second meeting on the 24th. He felt if in the meantime there had been\nno angry response or from the U.S. following the 14th changes had been made\nSyrian disengagement it was likely there would be an announcement coming\nout of the meeting on the 24th. He wanted to convey to you they were\nunhappy with the situation. That they felt you said a number of countries\nfelt it disastrous rather than beneficial. That they could see why the\nEuropeans themselves hoped they got something out of it themselves.\nK: They'll say that after the Syrian one too.\nB: I'm just passing this on without comment.\nK: They told us exactly what you said. For two months I told them that\nthe U.S. cannot 'act under pressure. He said to me this is we must be\ngiven something anything at all - just one kilometer Israel would want\nanyway. We need the and we wish the embargo were being lifted.\nNobody even mentioned the Syrian problem to us. In the past we felt\nvery strongly. We, frankly, will not be able to announce plans for lifting\nthe embargo. They were convinced, both Sadat and Faisel that the embargo\nwould be lifted anything of Egyptian disengagement.\nB: When I saw Sadat in Jidda he told me exactly that.\nK: We were told on January 22 that it would be lifted the next day.\nB: I met with Sadat the day before, and I got a totally different answer.\nK: Then they said can we wait until the 14th and we said OK. The next thing\nI know is now they say the Syrian business is the major problem going to\nstart blackmailing us. I know you're not it. I just wanted to explain to\nyou why we're going to be difficult to deal with."
}