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TELECON
Mr. Sisco/ Secretary Kissinger
March 21, 1974
6:36 PM
K: Joe.
S: Yes, Mr. Secretary.
K: I'm seeing Dobrynin, is there anything you have figured out we could do ?
S: I send you a memo and what's in it is this.
K: Where would the God-damned memo be, would you think?
you
S: I think it's probably - why don't I just get Dick to send it right into right now
rather than I - let me say just thing as to how I feel you ought to handle the
Moscow thing generally. You know, Henry, I think you've got to talk very
straight to them. They may be unhappy but from their point of view this is a
situation which is not very bad and I think you've got to say to them, look, we're
not going out of our way not to cooperate with you in the Middle East. But the
reality is that you're unacceptable to one side and we're going to try and find
ways in which we and you will keep together. We're not going out of our way to
exclude you here and we will touch base with you, not concretely what I've
suggested to you or litle nuggets. One, I think you could commit yourself to
a Geneva ceremonial exercise to put the stamp of approval on both the Egyptian -
Israeli disengagement as well as the Syrian one.
K : Once they're done.
S: Yes, once they're done. Secondly, at that Geneva conference you could also
commit yourself that you are willing to talk generally at that conference in terms
of where you go from here. In other words, kind of a non-commital sort of
general discussion at that particular reconvening of the Geneva conference.
Third, you could make a commitment that you will consult informally with them
at least once more substantively before any Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement
is achieved. And fourth, that if there is an opportunity where you feel that their
d irect intervention, particularly with the Syrians, would be helpful. That you
would bear this in mind. These are all mouses that I've come up with. Henry,
I don't think you need to give very much to the Russians on this, regardless of
how delicate it is. I think they might be irritated, but from their point of view
they could live with this situation.
K: OK, good.
S: It's in a piece of paper.
K: Thank you.
END
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