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TELCON (San Clemente)
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
8:37 a. m. - 4/2/73
K:
Hello.
D:
Hello, Henry.
K:
Anatol, how are you?
D:
Well, you are an early bird.
K:
Absolutely.
D:
(Laughs) Well, I understand you have a busy day today. Only two
things - first, I receive from my boss the answer in connection with
our last two talks.
K:
Yes.
D:
One is that he is prepared to receive you in Moscow between May 4 to
May 7. This is exactly what you mentioned.
K:
Right.
D:
Because you gave me 4th or 20th.
K:
Oh, is that what I said?
D:
Yes.
K:
That's fine.
D:
You mentioned two possibilities: the 4th you said, 4th or 5th or 20th.
K:
All right, from the 4th to the 7th, right.
D:
From 4th to the 7th and he said that you could devote all the three or
four days entirely to the talks or maybe 2 or 3 and then it give you a
chance to break.
K:
Good. That's very nice.
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2
D:
Second, I mentioned about the possibility of your talks to the trans-
Atlantic, you know with your other Prime. Minister.
K:
Oh yes.
D:
Quite frankly he said he is concerned that maybe it is better to postpone
all this consultation until you will be in Moscow and then it will be easy
to handle it because he is a little concerned and the President thought
so himself that he is mentioning about the leak before.
K:
You mean the consultation about that piece of paper you gave me?
D:
Yes, yes, with those, you remember.
K:
Yeh, I understand.
D:
Yes, well he said maybe - he just returned the concern that you want
to express that there shouldn't be any leak, you understand?
K:
You're talking now about the matter that affects MFN?
D:
No, no, no, I'm speaking about the paper you promised to give me today.
K:
Oh, I see, I see. Right.
D:
You remember?
K:
Oh yes, I understand.
D:
So he put it this way as he said I remember that the President and Dr.
Kissinger himself express
K:
No, no, we will not have any discussions until he and I discuss this.
D:
For the time being you stop it, yeh?
K:
That's right. What I mentioned to you on Friday were just some general
considerations they gave us. It was not related to any text.
D:
Oh, I see, but that's why he was saying maybe because you ask me
how, because you express before that it could be dangerous about the leaks.
You understand.
K:
Yeh, we'll make sure.
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3
D:
OK, so it is better. Of course he mentioned about - this of course
is No. 1. He feels that when you will be back here in Washington
to continue to discuss some other things but this of course is the
primary one. I mention that you will give me today.
K:
Exactly. By the end of the day.
D:
As to exactly the date for the President I hope to receive it within
two or three days.
K:
Excellent.
D:
So this is a message to make it short because it was a long one but
I make it short.
K:
Is it an oral message that you can leave with us?
D:
No, he just send me a telegram telling me what I have to say so I just
sum up it.
K:
But you didn't give me an answer yet on other things.
D:
On the MFN matter.
K:
No, the MFN matter whether I can mention that?
D:
Yes, this I'm expecting because I send only yesterday really so I
probably receive by the end of today or tomorrow and I will give you
a call back on this because this is all I'm telling you today in connection
with our discussion on another paper.
K:
Exactly, I understand.
D:
Only it's the particularsone. As to this one I will give you immediately
call back when I receive.
K:
Right.
D:
As for the paper, when do you expect me to get it?
K:
Oh, you see I'm busy with Thieu this morning. I will call you this
afternoon and let you know, but before the end of the day. By midnight
as I promised you.
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4
D:
Through Kennedy, yes?
K:
Through Kennedy.
D:
OK, I think it's quite all right. Well, this is all I really would like
to mention to you and have a nice day.
K:
Good. Thank you. Bye.
D:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telcon - San Clemente
April 2, 1973 - 1825
Mr. Kissinger - Dobrynin
HAK: Anatole?
Dobrynin: Hello Henry, how are you?
HAK: I'm OK. I just wanted to tell you that I am sending you a draft.
Dobrynin: I already have it.
HAK: Good.
Dobrynin: Well, do you have any additional comment?
HAK: No.
Dobrynin: You see, at first glance - I just looked for two minutes at
this one and Article I is a complete disappointment to me quite frankly,
because it really changed from what even you mentioned to me on Monday -
on Friday - excuse me. On Friday, it was only a question of order of
two paragraphs, with whom should we deal would be the last one.
HAK: Yes, but we have turned it around.
Dobrynin: Yes, you turned it around, that's true, but you changed the
second or third (?) axticlexxfxthxix paragraph of this article completely.
HAK: Well, not completely. We added one clause.
Dobrynin: Yes, but you create conditions - its worse really than word what
you have me on Friday. Could we just change as you gave me on Friday but
just change the places, within the first paragraph.
HAK: Well no, one of these clauses we really need or we will have an
absolute uproar.
Dobrynin: Well, its your organization (?) I mean
HAK: No, No, boxthxx but the turning around
Dobrynin: Only, I have hear what you gave me on the 30th, on Friday.
HAK: I know.
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- 2 -
Dobrynin: So the one thing on article I which I think is more or less all
right is the development of our exchanges. It was just to change two
paragraphs in Article I.
HAK: Yes, but I told you that then the President wanted to go over this
and modify
XXXX I unfortunately don't have it here with me. XXX
Zzczizz I'm calling you from home because I didn't think that you
would already have it. I just wanted to tell you it was coming.
Dobrynin: Yes, I have it. Now in Moscow it will look like a step back from
what we already discussed two weeks ago. I am perfectly sure of this
reaction because its from the text from your declaration which was a
half a year ago. You made a suggestion, we accept first, really your
paragraph Article I and then we make suggestion to make it look more
bilateral. So you gave me on Friday which looks your version but to me
it looks more or less further development but only I rather have some
doubts because you changed the paragraphs because it begins with the short
one and then information (?). But now as you gave it, it really is quite a
development from what we gave. You just come back, cross everything
we discussed and come back to the declaration which we had in October
of last year. I'm sure Mr.
and my boss will ask me directly
what happened. Now it is exactly the text of the declaration.
HAK: Well no, it adds one phrase from the declaration, and the rest is
from the rest of the paragraph.
Dobrynin: No you see its again a question of to create conditions in conduct
of policy all this kind of thing
we accepted your paragraph as you
gave us really and then we just want to make it more clear that it should be
within not only general but bilateral kinds of things too. It was along those
lines and what you gave us looks to me like a really good XXXiXX XXpXXX
working paper on Friday, but now it looks again as if we are back where we
were
HAK: Well no. That's certainly not true because the first sentence was not
in the declaration.
Dobrynin: No, no, I mean the first paragraph, because now you change it.
HAK: The first paragraph was not in the
Dobrynin: I understand, I'm speaking about the second paragraph in article I.
HAK: The second paragraph in Article I contains only one clause that is new
or even slightly new.
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- 3 -
Dobrynin: No, it isn't new, it's a rather old one.
HAK: That's what I mean, that you hadn't seen on Friday.
Dobrynin: Yes, it's different from Firday.
HAK: That is the only one that's different. All the rest is the same.
Dobrynin: Yes, I agree with you.
HAK: I mean all the other points we put in Article 51 and I think in the
preamble we put back most of your language.
Dobrynin: Even by the end of the article you remember there
was a proposal made about
HAK: That we have our questions about.
Dobrynin: Yes, I understand. So this one would be discussed further but
this is really Article I.
and really this second paragraph of Article I
Why couldn't you take it as it was on Friday.
HAK: Because frankly because the British attach enormous importance
to that one sentence. Now they haven't seen this draft at all.
Dobrynin: ???
HAK: Well, because they always tell usbecause this is the one clause if
we ever do this. This is the one clause to which they have always attached
importance. And it therefore would make it a lot easier to sell it if the
British would join us.
Dobrynin: But really this is
I understand your point but this is the point
which really Brezhnev today tries to convey to the President.
HAK: Well, we haven't discussed that particular formulation with them.
Dobrynin: Well, that's why you really should. That's why I called you
today in the morning first we have to discuss between us and then
analyze so to speak, and then afterwards you could explain you own
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx allies view
HAK: But we have totally disregarded it. If we had taken a substantial
view of that and added to it, that's one thing. If we totally reject their view,
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- 4
I mean everything else in Article I they have never seen. You see what
my point is.
Dobrynin: I see your point, but there is another point you see.
HAK: Well, when I see Mr. Brezhnev I will tell him that you said that
you saw his point. And I'm sure he will be very pleased.
Dobrynin: He was rather impressed that we were moving forward but
nak now its backward
HAK: Well then the only thing I can do is to ask you to wait 24 hours so
that I can discuss it with the President after Thieu leave tomorrow. I
know what hell is going to break loose in NATO even with this draft.
Dobrynin: I think you can handle it.
HAK: No, we cannot handle it easily. We have no support at all.
Dobrynin: But we are asking you
HAK: I know but that is the one I told you right away on Friday afternoon
not to send.
Dobrynin: I didn't send it. I wasn't specifically complaining
HAK: Because the difficulty that arises
Cobrynin: And I am now glad that I didn't sent it because otherwise it
was quite a shock to Moscow. Now I'm really glad that I didn't send it.
It was a temptation, but then I decided to follow your advice not to send it.
HAK: Well, after all, Anatole, all we are adding is one little clause.
Dobrynin: It's not a little clause. It's rather a clause - well you know the
point we discussed several times. Well, if you feel better to wait 24 hours
HAK: Let me wait 24 hours and discuss it with the President tomorrow
afternoon.
Dobrynin: OK, I will not discuss anything.
HAK: I will call you tomorrow afternoon Anatole.
Dobrynin: You will call me tomorrow afternoon?
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- 5 -
HAK: Thieu leaves here at 1:30, that's 4:30 your time. But then I have
to have about an hour or two with the Presidant, so I'll call you around
8:00 or 9:00 your time.
Dobrynin: OK, it's quite alright. I will await your call.
And I will hold until then . - you will give me the final opinion of the
President. I do really ask you and the President to look into this
matter again and look as close as possible to your present version
but with the change of paragraphs.
HAK: OK, good.
Dobrynin: Try your best. It is better for you not to spend the time with
Brezhnev on this paragraph.there but to finish it here.
HAK: No, I like theatrical performances.
Dobrynin: Well, I am sure you will have enough other performances,
on other subjects. I'll await your call tomorrow.
HAK: Right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telcon - San Clemente
April 3 - 1830 E19737
Dobrynin - HAK
HAK: Anatole, how are you?
Dobrynin: How are you? You have a rather sad voice. Does it mean
that you are disappointed or what is it?
HAK: No, I had to run up the stairs to get to my telephone.
Dobrynin: Oh, I see.
HAK: And I am too old for so much exertions.
Dobrynin: Oh, come on, you are much younger than I am.
HAK: Yes, but I am in much worse shape. I have lost too many
negotiations.
Dobrynin: Well, you have to lost at this one, then it will be better for you
because otherwise it will be difficult for you.
HAK: About what we discussed yesterday, Here is what the President said.
He would like to submit the document as it is.
Dobrynin: As you gave it yesterday?
HAK: On the other hand, he will look with great sympathy at counter-
proposals from Mr. Brezhnev. But he feels that he must at least submit
it - that one phrase.
Dobrynin: But this phrase is three times repeated (?) now. This phrase
appears in three about - in the preamble, in article I and in article II. So
it's not just one phrase, it's three times.
HAK: Well, I can tell you that we will be very receptive to deleting it from
article I. I mean I tell you that on an informal basis.
Dobrynin: I will
?
it as it is.
HAK: Yes, I would
?
it as it is.
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2
HAK: But I will tell you informally that there is a good chance of
getting it deleted from article I. So to have it substantially back to
what it was.
Dobrynin: Was this why
???
HAK: Well, in the preamble will we have to have it.
Dobrynin: This is rather ???, as you mentioned. All right?
HAK: Right.
Dobrynin: Then second, you agree your President left Article IV
??? It is the same reason you mentioned to me and the same explanation
given to article * IV - now its article V ???
HAK: Yes, well on Article V on that we feel somewhat more strongly
but again we are really willing to listen to your counter proposal.
Dobrynin: But you made it already. This was yesterday.
HAK: Well, but we want you to consider it again.
Dobrynin: All right, if its this kind of thing. Because practically, from
what you propose to use ??? Article 51 over ??
HAK: No, we accepted
Dobrynin: There are two things - ???
HAK: Well, no and in the preamble we restored all of your language
from the preamble.
Dobrynin: ???
HAK: Well I think that what we now have is Article V
Dobrynin: XXX Henry, let me put it this way, I understand it now that
you don't want to argue because of certain practical things. It's all right.
HAK: Well, tell them that we want this is not a way to prevent it coming
to a conclusion. We really want to bring it to a conclusion. And I may
have a chance to talk to the President. I frankly did not focus on the new
Article V today with him. I may have word for you on that tomorrow or
the day after.
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3
Dobrynin: Well, I will put it this way. On article I you are prepared to
go closer to what we propose to do, yes?
HAK: That is correct.
Dobrynin: But in the preamble you prefer to ???
HAK: Well, you noticed we put into the preamble that phrase xxjxx about
third countries which you had in Article III.
Dobrynin: Yes, but we still don't understand why you took it off from
article III.
HAK: Because it really belongs more in the preamble than in - you don't
put an explanatory sentence into an article.
Dobrynin: Well, I think it is more precise and more clear for the third
country to know because in the preamble it sound rather XXXXXXMXXX
en passent but there it is more precise. You still don't want to put it
back in one way or another.
HAK: Well, I think it fits better into the preamble. WXMXXXXXXXXXXXX
Dobrynin: Well I really have no choice but to tell it - there is nothing
else really. When will you be back.
HAK: I will be back Monday and I am sure you will be back with agreement
to every word we gave you.
Dobrynin: Well you will have a lot of things to do in Moscow on the same
text.
HAK: Anatole, we have never failed to complete an agreement and we will
not fail this time. We will not fail this early in the Administration and this
late in our relationship. But we have to go through some steps and you have
to go through some.
Dobrynin: I understand. All right.
HAK: Particularly when we have to discuss the history of this at some point.
Dobrynin: I understand. All right. Well, Henry I have an answer to a
question you asked me. You remember that don't you. Well, this is
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4
a
this particular question ???? and wxbx the White House may refer to it
to the members of the congress.
HAK: Oh, all right.
Dobrynin: ??? and you other point ???
HAK: Well I can't do anything about it till I getback.
Dobrynin: OK, because there is some explanation of all the things we can
prepare for you but everything is
HAK: Well, let us discuss it on Monday or Tuesday when I return. And
then we will agree on a precise strategy also.
Dobrynin: OK, because I have
HAK: And for your information I have already told the Israeli Ambassador
that we would take the gravest view if the Israelis did not help us.
And he said if we can give him anything at all that gives him an excuse to
intervene, he would look at it very favorably.
Dobrynin: Well, our position is of course its up to you to do the
HAK: No. no, we will do it. I just have to have your authority. You don't
have to do a thing.
Dobrynin: I understand.
$6$ HAK: We will do it, I just have to have your authority. We would take
a communication from you that you authorize us to use. Your not dealing
with them, you are dealing with us.
Dobrynin: Yes, because we dont' recognize ?. on this occasion
HAK: Frankly, neither do we.
Dobrynin: I understand. You remember you asked me about what about
???
HAK: Can you give that to me on a sheet of paper too, xtokex like the other one.
Dobrynin: OK. Could I wait until you come home.
HAK: Of course.
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5
Dobrynin: ???
HAK: You can do either one. I don't think I should until I can do it
personally.
Dobrynin: OK, I will give it to you when you come back in a form just
for your information. Now I think you and the President have enough
???
HAK: We will certainly use an absolutely maximum effort.
Dobrynin: Now you have a very serious level to do this.
HAK: Well, I don't see how we can ask for more.
Dobrynin: Ok Henry, for the time being you don't have anything new.
HAK: See you seon.
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Telcon - San Clemente
April 6, 1973 - 12:37
Amb. Dobrynin-HAK
Dobrynin: Hello, Henry, how are you?
HAK: I am doing fine.
Dobrynin: I'm sure you are doing fine. How long are you going to stay
there?
HAK: I'll be back Monday. Three things. One, Semyenov keeps making
these long speeches in Geneva and that keeps generating a lot of activity
here and I wonder whether until you and I have had a chance to talk we
couldn't slow him down a little bit.
Dobryhnin: You see, I received all the telegrams but last one - last one
I guess was yesterday but I am receiving them regularly and you remember
you asked this question but I didn't want to bother you back because you
were already in California. I read his telegram dealing with this particular
question, when they have a meeting, two of them, together. And is was
quite a discussion from both ways, in connection with the summit.
Johnson was doing what Mr. Semyenov was writing to Moscow that he
was interesting but he, let me put it this way, it is a long telegram, but
he said that he had an ttraction ** but to press
because of the importance within it one or two months we have to come
to an agreement.
HAK: Johnson said that?
Dobrynin: Along those lines as it was
HAK: It's inconceivable.
Dobrynin: But the differences between them that Semyenov was rather
sayinglet's find it this time and leave it to agreements sort of ZZZZZX00
maybe egging you to find out within one or two months and the Johnson
position was no I have instructions to press as full as possible agreement
and not to divert attention to some separate agreement on separate
questions. So that was the basic differences as Mr. Semenyov a
summed up discussions with him. It was not on the plenary session.
HAK: Johnson has no such instructions.
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2
Dobrynin: Well, he said it twice. It was in two telegrams saying
that you said that well we had to do as full as possible and not to go
HAK: Oxxxxx Oh no, as full as possible, those are his instructions but
he has no instructions to raise the summit.
Dobrynin: Oh no. In this connection, he didn't press this specifically.
But he put it within these two months ???? use the word summit but the
timing which he has given which is by Semenyov he looks at this implication
about the summit. He didn't use the word summit - no. Johnson did not
use the word summit. But he (Change of Tape)
HAK:
proposal to you.
Dobrynin: OK, So I will then just - you think its useful just to send a
telegram saying that they play down this discussion.
HAK: He's made a very long statement now and let him not go beyond that
now.
Dobrynin: Yesterday they made
HAK: Semenyov - I think two or three days ago.
Dobrynin: Maybe yesterday. The latest I have which was on the third.
HAK: Mes, that's the one.
Dobrynin: XIXX XXX XXXX XXX XXXXX But ??? its official
rather ? a meeting but then by then he said ? talks with Mr. Johnson
it was a very detailed and long on which I am referring now. So they
continue to do so. OK. Well, I will put it
HAK: Yes, but he shouldn't make
he should stop talking about the
summit - that would be the most important bhing.
Dobrynin: OK, I will do it. And you will give it around two weeks.
HAK: OK. Now, let me see. You never sent me that other paper on the
Jewish question.
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xx 3
Dobrynin: Well, but yousaid when you come back.
HAK: OK, fine.
Dobrynin: I could give it today to Kennedy if you like but the question
is is it worthwhile
HAK: No, give it to me when we come bakk.
And then we can plan exactly
what to do.
Dobrynin: When do you prefer.
HAK: Monday or Tuesday.
Dobryhin: Will you wilsgive me a call?
HAK: I'll give you a call tomorrow morning. Now the third thing you
still haven't goa a date proposal. &
Dobrynin: Yes, we do not. As I said both Brezhnev and Gromyko are
puzzled by the latest draft you gave them. So that particular draft I
didn't receive any telegram from them at all. So I am just enjoying quiet
within these three days. Not a single one did I received.
HAK: Because the President is a little puzzled by first, you've made the
rather urgent proposal at the meeting and then we get no reply to what's
afterall a fairly simple technical matter.
Dobrynin: When I give you the last time answer it was a I received from
Moscow say just tell you it will be very soon for - during the last three
days I didn't have anything.
HAK: I mean we're in no particular hurry. We don't even mind shifting it
if you want to do that.
Dobrynin: I understand. I hope I will have it one way or another but thex
if you like me to mention to them the possibility of
?
I will send it to.
HAK: Well, its up to you. I mean y9u made the proposal, we have no reason
to propose shifting it. And we are prepared to continue - if it keeps going
very much longer than we have to consider where we stand. But right now
another week is not a decisive matter.
Dobrynin: Well, I think this is exactly the point. So I think we
should as vet ta 11c about it.
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4
XXXXXX X
HAK: So I don't think we should talk about it.
Dobrynin: So as of the time being this is were it stands. They owe you
answer. On this I am too standing. I will just mentione to them that
the President and you are expecting the answer. They should understand.
For me it would be a matter to make this proposals involves shifting or
no shifting because they know the situation and they have to make.
I
think they will come and say .yes. ??? But I don't know what ???
they give them. I am just using jokingly that this proposal was three
ways and complete silence. What is going to be done, I don't know yet,
but this is
NAK: Well, they areprobably in the caususes.
Dobrynin: No, they don't like to go this time of year to their caucuses.
HAK: No, they probably think it all settled and they are going to accppt it.
Dobrynin: Well, this is my impression. So maybe they are trying to find
the nicest way to accept it. Not all of them but part of it. But I am sure
that next week
HAK: But, you know you told them with what attitude we are going to go
at it.
Dobrynin: No, I mentioned it. Otherwise it was really definitely a step
back to the 6 months which you discussed.
HAK: Oh no, no.
Dobrynin: Because I looked at the text of the declaration. You managed
to put it NXX in article I. You put it the same in article II. Then you put
it even in Paxxix Article III I guess. Not to speak about the preamble.
So it's rather many things to do.
HAK: Well, let's see what they are coming back with.
Dobrynin: That's why I'm keeping quiet. Let them. look it over and then.
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5
HAK: I read somewhere that you are being recalled.
Dobrynin: There is something in UPI. Well ? minister is going on
HAK: I hope we get some advance warning because I - so that we can
leave together.
Dobrynin: Well, in this particular story it goes after the visit.
So in this case there is nothing to fear - both of us.
HAK: Well, I'm torn, because on the one hand I would like you to have
an even wider field of activity. On the other, you are almost ireplacable,
here in Washington.
Dobrynin: I have, by the way, information about the talks with Madame
Binh in Moscow. She was in Moscow for about a week. She met with
Brezhnev, with some others so I received information but I there are
things I don't want to tell by telephone. But when you get back.
HAK: Well, we will get gxrx together on Monday on no later than Tuesday.
Dobrynin: Well, you name the day and its quite alright with me.
HAK: Good, maybe breakfast on Tuesday.
Dobrynin: I have to look - I have my best friend, the Romanian Ambassador.
HAK: You have breakfast with him?
Dobrynin: Yes, he invite me. Well, we will organize something. Well,
let's do it Tuesday, how about lunch.
HAK; No, lunch I don't think I can do on Tuesday. But let me see what I have.
Dobrynin: Maybe on Monday. Or I will try to switch it - then we'll have lunch
all right.
HAK: No, I could do breakfast on Tuesday.
Dobrynin: What time?
HAK: Oh, about 8:15
Dobrynin: Make it then 8:30
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6
HAK: 8:30 for breakfast.
Dobrynin: Yes, I think this will be all right. So I will drop in to you.
HAK: To the MAP Room.
Dobrynin: Map Room, 8:30, Tuesday. I will be there and you will have
at least an hour I guess.
HAK: Oh, I have an hour and a half. I'll be back on Monday. I'll
probably talk to you on the telephone.
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TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
11:27 a. m. - 4/9/73
D:
Yes.
K:
Anatol.
D:
Ohyes, hello Henry.
K:
I just wanted to report back in.
D:
(Laughs) Well, it is my impression you are back definitely.
K:
Why should it be your impression that I am back definitely ?
D:
Well I saw already the President - who he is going to receive and so on
so I gather that you should be involved one way or another. Because
the schedule I look through. They publish it.
K:
I see. I thought you put your wire tap on me again.
D:
No, no. You now have an easy life, Henry, going to the sunny California,
Florida - really you're not very busy, my impression. So tomorrow we
see each other.
K:
We have breakfast tomorrow and we can discuss things then. I've had a
good chance to talk to the President yesterday about that agreement.
D:
Oh, you mean the Agreement. I receive it today a telegram from my boss.
It's really - I will tell you, it's rather lengthy and he - well, well, you
will listen to it - the major reason is he had a feeling we were very close
but he feels we have separated from what we started. And he really
asks some questions and so on.
K:
Let's take a look at it tomorrow.
D:
Yeh, tomorrow then.
K:
Because uh
D:
My impression is he is now he doesn't know where to go from now.
K:
Has he made any specific proposals or is he going back to his original
draft?
D:
No, he says you go back to the point from where you began. This is his
impression. From the very beginning he gets the impression after talking
with you - my talk with you - that well they are moving. And it starts to
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2
roll, but then your last draft was of course of such a nature and your economic
proposals, everything, he thought too it was exactly where it was a year
ago.
K:
Well, that's a little exaggerated because
D:
I'm telling you generally. He didn't use a year ago but he said that -
well, if you like I can read you some and some tomorrow I put in
if you like it. You have more time?
K:
Well, how long is it?
D:
It's two pages.
K:
Does he propose anything particular?
D:
Nothing, he is rather asking the President his ideas
he just ask him because it's his impression that you throw everything
back so he sounds rather puzzled but at the same time very understanding
on this important question. So he didn't propose any specific proposal
because he took really your proposal as you remember at the very be-
ginning and he make some suggestions on your proposal. And then what
really happened, you gave us .which was
really on the last proposal
on which we operated. So this way it's rather emotional I should say
outgrowth.
K:
Well, that's a little exaggerated though because all we did was to put
into that first Article one clause.
D:
Let's go over it tomorrow more precisely because really
K:
Yes, let's look at it more precisely tomorrow.
D:
Yeh, tomorrow. And Henry, on a personal basis,
would
like you if possible to work if necessary during this week on a more
extensive basis because by Sunday it looks as though I will go home.
K:
Oh, god, really?
D:
Yeh, because Brezhnev would like to discuss with me various things,
really. But I am telling you now because you should be prepared that
maybe by Sunday I would like you to have some special consultation.
For me, so to speak, to be ready to go. I could wait - maybe for a week
I will go but this is
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3
K:
May I make a suggestion to you Anatol?
D:
Yeh.
K:
Unless it's geared to some event in Moscow, I have the British coming
over next week some time.
D:
Oh, I don't like this at all.
K:
But not on this. They are coming over on MBFR.
D:
They ask me to come home in connection with this documents.
K:
Oh, well then we don't have to necessarily
D:
No, no really he ask me to come with a document and I think he rather
would like to read you where he stands now.
K:
All right. You and I will work on this this week.
D:
Yeh, I think it is better way. All right?
K:
Now in the meantime could you keep Semyenov (?) under control. The
thing has become totally unmanageable here. Let me read you a sentence -
that's really why I called you.
D:
Well, I send
a telegram quite frankly. Before I did not
mention anything but yesterday I send telegram to stop his exercises.
K:
I've told Johnson to relax, that you and I were going to talk but that
I told Johnson he should not raise summit talks.
D:
I understand.
K:
Let me read you what he replied: He said, "You can tell Dobrynin that
I do not know who is kidding whom, but there's not a meeting here that
passes in which Semyenov as well as individual members of his staff
do not push clearly the urgency of getting something ready for the Summit.
As you know I have not, and I will not mention what might be negotiated
for a Summit meeting. "
D:
No, yesterday I send a telegram in this sense.
K:
I will show you the telegram tomorrow.
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4
D:
That's all right but I know that he doesn't have any instruction, on this
I know for sure.
K:
He probably wants to get the order.
D:
No, I think he - he knows that when he left that there was an idea that
in June we'll be meeting so keeping in view this one - as you know, as
one of the objects to discuss so he tried to produce some results. But
he didn't have, I know for sure, his instructions because I read it.
K:
I tell you what we should do this week, Anatol. We should talk on a
thinking out loud basis what we should try to manage on this treaty.
D:
This is exactly, really.
K:
And then we must have some latitude to manage it with our Allies. That's -
usually when we have discussed on a thinking out loud basis it's come out
that way.
D:
Yeh. You see, with the Allies we have the same problem that you have.
And after all really, the really beginnings when the President was in
Moscow there was discussion with our le aders. Even at that time there
was some concern as though we didn't have it and it was our impression
that you didn't have it. Some maybe say something but nobody said
anything against. After all, a leading country has a right to say something
or do something. It is good for them and for their Allies. They don't
go in to deceive them so why should they be concerned about what some-
body said and so on, I mean.
K:
Anatol, what we should do tomorrow is to have a preliminary talk
going through it carefully.
D:
The two texts, yeh.
K:
Then we meet again later this week. At least once and probably twice.
And then if you go back on Sunday - what about the date though?
D:
Well, up to now I don't have anything really.
K:
That frankly is beginning to irritate the President.
D:
I understand.
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5
K:
You know as far as we're concerned
have to
D:
No, no, Henry, I understand your feelings and you/understand mine too.
They know very well there SO why the delay is I don't know. Probably
they are thinking about the
because before I receive your
draft they mentioned
K:
If he thinks it's being used as a favor
withthese
which
is
done
to
him
D:
No, no.
K:
Then I'd say let's just start again much later.
D:
No, I wouldn't go so far as that - Both of our bosses are mature enough
that nobody is playing or
it's a mutual interest. It's very, very
clear.
K:
Look I am optimistic that this will come out with something fairly close
to what we discussed in your counterdraft.
D:
Let's try to do something.
K:
But we have to go through a certain process in getting there.
D:
OK, let's try one way to do it because
not this
Summit as I mentioned to you but I didn't go into details because of the
telephone but at that time it was in the
he wanted to darify
the details of this Agreement or if you have some details they are some
questions to be discussed. So when he send the
, it was
already when he mentioned to me that
and
then I am telling you to what extent he was
; everything pressing.
And he thinks only left a few minor things and for you to come on this
.
But now it looks - OK, we will discuss it tomorrow.
K:
Anatol, I think we can
D:
It is my impression too.
K:
Actually
D:
I don't know why but the telegram I receive surprise myself. Honestly,
I warn you jokingly, but it was not joke, I expected that there would be
some - remember when I ask you to look at once again, it not because I
try to be clever but I knew how it would be this especially - rather
There are some other things too, and so this was reaction not completely
unexpected to me but I think the important thing is for us to sit down and
discuss it. This is my impression.
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6
K:
I mean after all if we don't look at it bureaucratically the difference
between this two drafts is not world shaking. I understand there are
some points there that you're sensitive to but it doesn't make them
earth shaking.
D:
No, I understand especially Article I. If you could manage to move
some of your - what you wanted - it is my impression. I don't have
really an expression on either but I am prepared to because I know
what the thinking in Moscow is.
K:
That's what I'm thinking. Frankly, Anatol, that's my thinking too.
And frankly speaking here as friends, I told you right away I have to
go through something with Article I to show that we haven't just
accepted when this thing surfaces, the first version.
D:
No, I understand. But I think if you could find out very closely on
paragraph first it would be enough to do everything. Do you understand
what I mean?
K:
Oh, of course, let's talk about it tomorrow.
D:
So tomorrow is 8:30.
K:
And as I understand it there's really only one offending clause in para-
graph 1.
D:
Second paragraph.
K:
Second paragraph the thing about the conditions that war
but it
is the only one that is really a problem.
D:
Yes, you look, maybe you'll have a chance to look before tomorrow just
for yourself, you look in our paragraph number 1 and I will look at yours
once more and then we will try to do something about it tomorrow.
K:
Exactly, but tell them to cool off in Moscow. You and I have solved
worse problems.
D:
I mention already to them and I mention to you tomorrow - I already send
telegram to Brezhnev saying that I have a date with you Tuesday morning.
So then I don't send anything today. Until tomorrow.
K:
Good, I also have something about the Egyptians to discuss with you.
D:
OK. So 8: 30.
K: Right.
D: Bye.
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TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
12:54 pm, April 10, 1973
D:
Hello.
K:
Anatol.
D:
Oh, hello, Henry, how are you.
K:
Okay. Two things, one we agree to the Voronsov meeting with
Stoessel, and we'd like to keep it at that level.
D:
Okay.
K:
We don't want it at your level and Rush, that creates too much
confusion.
D:
Okay. Second?
K:
And you can let Vorontsov get in touch with Stoessel, say after Thursday.
D:
After Thursday, okay.
K:
Second, I talked to the President and ve will take what you said very
sdriously.
D:
I think this will be very helpful, Henry.
K:
And you can certainly do something.
D:
Yeah. Around Thursday--
K:
You can tell him that by the end of the day Thursday, we will do something.
D:
In the text.
K:
In the text, yes.
D:
Okay. So I could mention to Brezhnev this one, and say by Thursday
you will make a suggestion.
K:
That's right.
D:
Okay, thank you very much.
K:
Now, thirdly, we hope you will show great restraint what you said to
the Egyptians because since we haven't communicated with them yet.
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2
D:
Oh, no. On this I can give you assurance that nothing will be said.
K:
Good, if you could do that--
D:
I give you firm assurances. Nothing will be said because when he
mentions it I always have to make appraise to say or not to say.
This one is specific not say, if only in papers for Gromyko and
Brezhnev. Nobody else knows.
K:
Right.
D:
I am speaking about your own community, so on this I grant you.
K:
Right.
D:
And Henry, this is all you said, yeah?
K:
Yeah.
D:
about this European Conference, you know, because
many of them, I mean your President, Brezhnev, Pompidou and
Brandt, involved in their many international activities,
so we've got to have some sort of schedule, for consideration of
President, Brandt and
.
I tell you this for your guidance.
Let's put it on the calendar of our bosses, so to speak, the following.
The first stage - the foreign ministers level. June 27 or 28. For
a meeting period of ten days, what do you think.
K:
Right.
D:
Second stage: This is
work. The middle of July.
K:
Right. I understand.
D:
and work until the end of September.
K:
Right.
D:
So it's July, August, September. And the third stage we come to
is of the highest level. Around October or November, this would be
schedule for the governments to participate. Roughly speaking.
K:
Okay.
D:
I tell you this right now for your own but this is what Brezhnev would
like, to tell directly to president.
K:
I'd appreciate that, we'll appreciate that, and not inconsistent with our
own thinking.
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3
D:
Just to put their minds into some kind of-because maybe they have
some changes to make in the approximate--
K:
One other thing I would like to tell you is insofar as you have any
influence on the Poles and Hungarians, we would appreciate it if
they would play a somewhat more constructive role in that inter-
national commission.
D:
What.
K:
To investigate any allegation of violation on the communist side, and
that's just impossible.
D:
On any of them.
K:
Practically any of them.
D:
I will mention to--
K:
And if the result of this is that Canada pulls out at the end of May
and the whole machinery then collapses at the end of May, that will
not be the best circumstance again for June.
D:
Yeah, I understand. I think us will write the Hungarian Ambassador
and
fallen last week or so.
K:
That's right.
D:
And to give them this
K:
That's right. And we think with your influence it would be constructive.
D:
Okay, I will look into it, I will send to Moscow.
K:
Good. I have to see your Indian ally now.
D:
It's very impressive what you are going to--oh, Indian, but I do not--
oh, you are seeing him right ngw.
K:
Yes.
D:
On Thursday I will tell you something, but it is my impressions. You
give me xxx your Indian talks.
K:
My Indian talks.
D:
Just a suggestion. You and I could tell it on my own, nobody ask me,
but some reflections which I personally care for your--
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4
K:
How about giving me a hint now?
D:
Well, I can't give you anything special something, otherwise you
know everything. So I will try to tell you Thursday.
K:
You keep my interest in stress, would be good guidance for me.
D:
I do it Thursday. On Thursday you can call me and--
K:
Exactly.
D:
Thank you very much.
K:
Bye.
D:
Bye, bye.
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TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
6:10 p. m., April 11, 1973
D:
Hello.
K:
Anatol.
D:
Hello, Henry. You should work that hard.
K:
(laughter)
D:
So I try to just to give you a break. When I call, the girls always
answer -- he's at a meeting, he's at a meeting. I was under the
impression that you decide everything youself.
K:
Of course, but I have to go through the motions of pretending.
D:
(laughter) Because always missing. I rather would prefer that he is
sitting and thinking alone, this is much more becoming. But just
meeting and meeting, you shouldn't go that far, Henry.
K:
I never --
D:
Democracy is good till you set time limit, as you know.
K:
I never think if I can help it.
D:
(alughter) I understand. Well, two rather points I would like to
mention. [I just receive telegram from Gromyko. ] Now our two
boys in Geneva decided to make a break for a vacation.
K:
Yes, which is just as well.
D:
Yeah, I think so. They will be out till -- really out till you arrive in
Moscow.
K:
Until the 30th is what I thought.
D:
No, they said until the 4th of May.
K:
Okay.
D:
That is quite all right. But there is another point -- rather two points
I really want to mention. First, I receive from Moscow the sayings
about our yesterday's talks because Brezhnev personally attaches great
importance to these particular talks so he noticed what you tell me when
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Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
2
6:10 p. m., April 11, 1973
D:
(cont'd) you called me back and he said quite all right; he just
advise the President and you will look once again and he hoped that
tomorrow by the end there will be some reaction on this.
K:
Well, we are concentrating on those two paragraphs.
D:
Yes, I understand.
K:
Article I and II.
D:
Yes, so this is really what he really --
K:
And then my suggestion is that the other Article V we leave aside
for the time being.
D:
I think it's quite all right. AT least when you will be there, you
might even want one or two minutes with Brezhnev.
K:
(laughter)
D:
(laughter) He will not accept it from me but he will accept from you
when you will present it. (laughter) Well, so tomorrow when it will
be possible for me to see you? Just making a wild guess -- 5 o'clock?
K:
How about 3 o'clock?
D:
Oh, that's better. 3 o'clock;better. So the usual place, 3 o'clock.
K:
Usual place, 3 o'clock.
D:
Fine. And now I would like to discuss with you about this state of
Brezhnev visit here.
K:
Yes.
D:
You see, I would like to know if this is -- things as following: Would
it be possible when you will be here in Moscow can you discuss with
Brezhnev all the things. Then to finally fix a concrete date of his
arrival to Washington and --
K:
Well, except --
D:
Just a minute, just a minute; I will finish and then you will -- And if it
would be that during these talks it will be not only finalized this exact
date, but at the same time could we publish joint announcement about
the date of this visit. And this could be published during your stay or
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Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
3
6:10 p.m., April 11, 1973
D:
(cont'd) immediately after you leave Moscow, it will be announced.
As far as I know, and I have some telegrams explaining for my own
information, the most probable and the most acceptable for both sides
date of his visit is that which you proposed -- really June 18th.
K:
Right.
D:
I know this really will be the most --
K:
If we have a question of how to announce it, there's no need -- We can
do it the way you suggest, as a result of my visit there.
D:
Yeah.
K:
I'm sure. I have to check with the President.
D:
Yeah.
K:
Although, you know --
D:
It could be during or when you leave. Then after, the next day or two
days.
K:
That's right.
D:
It could be done.
K:
But what we don't want is that I go there -- It will be a little more
difficult to go there if we don't have a date fixed just for our own
bureaucratic reasons.
D:
Yeah, I understand.
K:
Because
are going to say what the hell is he doing there?
D:
Who?
K:
I mean, my colleagues who --
D:
Colleagues. But you don't know. It's just really most acceptable
problem --
K:
But that's all right, we'll settle that.
D:
Is it June 18th? So it's --
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Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
4
6:10 p. m., April 11, 1973
K:
No, no; what I mean is it's one thing for me to go to prepare a
summit, which I've done before.
D:
Yeah.
just
K:
It's another to take a trip there. But let's not worry about that,
we can handle that.
D:
Yeah.
K:
The other thing is if we have a private understanding that it will be
June 18th or June 20th or something like that --
D:
Now I really understand that the most acceptable for us and for you,
as I understand, will be June 18th. This is my understanding from
all telegrams.
K:
No; give or take two or three days, that's all right. But what I cannot
have is go there and then --
D:
No, no; I understand.
K:
Have it said, oh, now you decide to come in August.
D:
Oh, no, I understand.
K:
You see what I mean?
D:
Yes.
K:
If we can agree ahead of time that it will be within a certain ten day
period, then I'm pretty sure we can settle it when I'm in Moscow.
D:
I understand. Okay. With this kind of understanding, I will then say --
Because as it looks to me, it's really most acceptable but Brezhnev
would like to finalize when you will be there. But I understand that
you would like to at least have assurances that it is June and then --
As it looks to me, it will be June 18th as you propose, really. This is
better than May, really.
K:
Right.
D:
From what I receive from different sources, including from highest,
Because they have some their own some problems but as I understand
it will be the most acceptable. I'm telling you because I know from
what telegrams I am receiving.
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Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
5
6:10 p.m., April 11, 1973
K:
Well, I noticed you said in that message about the European Security
Conference you proposed the 28th.
D:
That's for Gromyko going.
K:
Yeah, for Gromyko.
D:
It's not for Brezhnev.
in
K:
No, no; for Gromyko but that seemed to me to fit / with the other stuff.
D:
Yeah, I think this is -- That's why I probably think I have telegram
from Brezhnev and from Gromyko.
K:
Because I want Gromyko on the West Coast. I want to take him to
some parties in Beverly Hills.
D:
(laughter) You shouldn't spoil him because he is preparing for a
serious conference and you are trying to spoil him. You know what
happened when he was in Paris. Rogers really make quite a move -- his
wife, him, Mrs. Gromyko to a private club.
K:
Yeah.
D:
So it was four of them. Well, Gromyko usually doesn't go alone. It's
most unusual for him to go into a nightclub. So I was so surprised when
he told me in Moscow. I asked him, "Really, you went in a nightclub? II
He said, "Yes, I was there. 11 And then when I saw the other day Rogers
I asked is it really? He said, yes, I did. And to my surprise, he
accepted.
K:
It wasn't a nightclub; it was a public restaurant.
D:
I don't know; I don't know. He said to me it was like a nightclub but
not in a sense of a very advanced I should say but rather in between a
public restaurant and a nightclub but I never was there. It's some kind
of a --
K:
Anatol, one evening --
D:
(laughter)
K:
One evening when you're all on the West Coast, I'll take you and Gromyko
to Los Angeles.
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Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
6
6:10 p. m., April 11, 1973
D:
(laughter) Well, if this could be mentioned, I'll definitely agree
beforehand. Because I'm sure that Gromyko will think very hard
before making any decisions.
K:
Incidentally, I understand you made a very unfriendly comment about
me to Don Kendall today.
D:
Unfriendly?
K:
You said you were sure I would come to the opening of the Bolshoi Ballet
with a girl whose first name I don't know.
D:
(laughter)
Ah
It's a little between but I was in a way joking.
K:
It's true but why should you give away my secrets to an outsider?
D:
No, because you know how it happened? He at least pretended he is
a good friend of yours. I don't know whether he really is or not.
But
second,
what
he
said
He said, "Do you know what was the last
name I haven't seen you When you were the last time in a
picture I think it was a week ago. I couldn't really follow very
closely, you are usually ahead of me. There was a picture in a
magazine where you were with some girl. He said, "What was her
name?" I said, "I really don't know all the names of Henry's girls
SO I'm not so sure whether he knows himself. 11 In this connection, he
said, "And I was intending to invite him with one of those girls. " So
I said, well, I don't know whether he knows and this is how it happened
on the discussion.
K:
(laughter)
D:
And by the way, he mentioned that he came to me about his discussion --
He said that I have not had a chance it so happened to discuss with you
this ideas about
but I intend to raise it with you. Because
he asked me.
K:
Yeah.
D:
And he said, don't you know what don't I know what it might you?
I said frankly, I never discuss; I don't know really. You will have to
check with him but I
K:
Yeah, I haven't formed a clear opinion on it yet.
D:
No, no; but there is nothing really to form. There will be --
K:
I have nothing against it.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
7
6:10 p. m., April 11, 1973
D:
Yes, I haven't seen anything specific really here to be mentioned.
K:
Okay, Anatol, I must run.
D:
Okay. So we will be tomorrow meeting and this as I understand you
at least to have a --
K:
Your first and second paragraphs.
D:
Yes, it is clear.
K:
Right.
D:
Okay, till tomorrow 3 o'clock.
K:
Good.
D:
Bye, bye.
wgh
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
5:45 pm, April 12, 1973
K:
Anatol!
D:
Yes, hello Henry.
K:
On our discussions, I've talked to the President and he feels
we shouldn't say between them that really leaves the impression
that nuclear war with other countries is all right.
D:
But this is in the beginning in general. What was in our discussion
with you at the very beginning it was first the global policy of our
two countries.
K:
But at any rate he would like to think about that further.
D:
Further?
K:
Yeah.
D:
Because this is what brings back to what we discussed, because
you remember when I gave you what was a general escape phkASE form
but he gave it to you in American international- you said the
second paragraph within Article 2, just to make it between us.
This is a general statement but at the same time it will be just
between us.
K:
Why don't you transmit this as it is and we'll still have until
Sunday to see whether we can change I'll have another talk
with the President.
D:
Well fine, because up til now everything was all right, but our
major point was, you remember, in the last and Brezhnev
again said the main idea is
going to do it but in a
general sense. That's why this was main idea, just want to
settle, general policy of their object of their policy, everything
but in the second paragraph or the third Article, just
to make it your this is policy, but not in general
K:
Yeah.
D:
Because on this
in the last one I discussed withl
you the day before yesterday, you can read it ina draft which I
gave you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TelCon/page 2
K:
No, no, I see it.
D:
Yes, and the second
ib on your draft on the
you make an exclamation by article 1 which we gave it to you. It
was specifically saying that the decisive part of the document is
of course the object in mind but
the language I concur.
It covers much of the matters of relation between our two CO untries
but rather
the global approach is questionable in relation
to the war. We are prepared for ?accept of Article 1 in general
the language proposed by your side, with the understanding, however,
that this group approach
with the appropriate measure
of mutual relations which you developed--
K:
Well, let me raise that again.
D:
Yes, because it was specific question. It doesn't change very much
and this is exactly as written in the declaration.
K:
No, between them isn't in the declaration.
D:
But substantively it is, in a general thing. By the way, when he
propose to you remember, you now say USA in
major
importance to prevent but you don't really accept this one, but
doesn't matter, because you took it basically from the declaration.
Exactly what they wrote in the--
K:
Except for the phrase "Between them".
D:
Huh. No, they don't have it here, yes. As measure of impor tance
I will give it to you. Unfortunately Brezhnev is going to say "utmost
importance, you simply are saying to the utmost, I don't see any
difference, but
K:
Well I think to the utmost is stronger than
.
D:
Yeah, yes I agree with you. Of course, another they do their utmost
to
confrontation. In the second phrase, Number one
basically support. So we have both, measure of importance and
to the utmost. But I don't see any specifically difference. But as a
second
K:
I will transmit that interpretation to the President.
specifically
D:
Yes, because strategically it was mentioned in message which I gave
you.
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3
K:
Okay. Now with respect to the 2nd paragraph, Article, we propose
to follow and the two parties agreed. In accordance with Article 1
D:
Just a minute - in accordance
K:
With Article 1 and to realize it's objectives.
D:
To realize?
K:
Yes, and to achieve it's objectives to proceed from the
.
D:
In accordance with Article 1 and to their allies.
K:
Yes, it's objectives.
D:
Oh, their objectives. It is practically the same as it was but it is
more--
K:
Well, it's a little stronger.
D:
Yeah. All right, but on this
K:
I will go back to the President on the other one.
D:
Couldn't you give me the answer really.
K:
I will try.
D:
Because this really very important, but I will give the language to
Brezhnev today and then you will cover everything. Otherwise
it will look a little--again a general statement.
K:
Okay. Well let me
D:
Okay, I will wait Henry.
K:
Okay.
D:
Bye, bye.
K;
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TelCon
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
6:35 pm, April 12, 1973
D:
Hello.
K:
Anatol!
D:
Yes, Henry.
K:
Unfortunately the President has a reception at the White House and
I have to leave for a White House Photographers dinner now.
D
D:
Maybe later. I will call then tomorrow or late in the night really
because I feel it--
K:
Well, I think you'd betterhold it until tomorrow.
D:
Well I can wait until tomorrow maybe.
K:
I just can't do it with the President on the telephone at night.
D:
I understand. But when I call--really I. will not send this now
it covers everything and, you with your impressions, Anatol will
say this is most clear and so on. I would better wait then until;
tomorrow.
K:
Right.
D:
All right.
K:
Good.
D:
Until tomorrow, and you will call me tomorrow morning, yeah.
K:
Right.
D:
And you, it's not my business, but you have to look towards discussion
of Cambodia, and you look about at statements of general/on this matter.
K:
I've seen it. He will hear from us.
D:
Too strong, he condemns, and unjustifiable
on U.S. government.
Well, so I will wait until tomorrow.
K:
Right. Bye.
D:
Bye, bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
8:41 a.m. - 4/13/73
K:
Hello.
D:
Hello, Henry.
K:
Yes, Anatol.
D:
How are you? You call me already but I was upstairs. Yesterday I'
called you when I ran in again a letter the day before to
this
Article 1, and when I look through I really miss one
word you put
here. Basically the question "thereby". This is completely of course
unnecessary. Remember to avoid
K:
I know, I know it very well.
D:
Yes, because in the text of the declaration -- basic intervals -- I
just quote: "Therefore we will do the utmost to avoid military
confrontation and to prevent outbreak of nuclear war''. Four sentences
just saying about the situation capable of
.
This is exactly
from the declaration. You've got "thereby".
K:
You want to improve the declaration.
D:
to have it as good or better as the declaration, but not to make
it worse.
K:
Well that makes it worse.
D:
Of course it is. It makes a difference for some kind of nuclear war
is some kind of condition
what they have to do--
confrontation
nucleatr war point, but not to
say this and "thereby". What you suggest to do
( static on tape makes it impossible
to translate)
than the basic principle.
K:
Why is it worse, that's what I don't understand.
D:
No, no, ;no, because he just said what kind of
should be done.
And "thereby", "thereby" as if it is some kind of condition to be met
before--this kind of thing. Just enumerate it, this, this and this.
Why should we put it "thereby"
K:
Because we constantly try to improve matters.
D:
I understand.
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2
D:
it is better to improve. As it is because, I'm sure
strong objection. That's why I told you yesterday when I begin
to translate in Russian, in Russian it sounds really very strong. When
i look through I miss it, but when I gave another glance I saw it. Call me
back this evening about 7:00.
K:
K:
Well I have to call you back later today anyway.
D:
Okay, so I would like you to look into this two points mentioned.
And Henry, I just want to
but we can do next week it's not important.
K:
Right, no, no, you never mislead me.
D:
This really not important, I don't want to quite frankly.
This is rather important to have a
this particular Article
K:
All right, I understand.
D:
Well, please, call me back when
K:
Right.
D:
Okay.
K:
Okay.
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TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
4/13/73
4:18 p.m.
HK:
Anatol?
AD:
Hello, Henry.
HK:
I can only conclude that you have the telphone in the wrong place.
AD:
Why in the wrong place?
HK:
Because it takes so long to get to it.
AD:
It seems to it is in my bedroom, you know.
HK:
No, no that's all right. Look here is our suggestion now. Im sorry
it has been such a busy day for everybody and that it took so long.
AD:
Yeh.
HK:
We will move the'thereby" -have you got it in front of you
AD:
Yes, yes I ha ve it.
HK:
If we say it this way capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation
of their relations, and therefore to avoid military confrontation, which
is exactly what we have in the text in the principle--
AD:
According to this consideration and therefore and thereby
HK:
No, leave out thereby
AD:
And after their relations, what do you propose?
HK:
You say exacerbation of their relations and therefore to avoid military
confrontation--exactly from the principle
AD:
and exclude--
HK:
Exclude the outbreak of nuclear war and here is how we would propose
to say that what you want to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war
between each other and between either party and third countries.
Between each other is better in English- but if you want--
AD:
I understand
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Page 2
HK:
And between either party and third countries.
AD:
And between either party and third countries.
My first reaction on this will be this way. If you really insist on
this third countries maybe we will have to look down to put it down
in other paragraph because here as I understand the main idea of
Gromyko and Brezhnev was first Article I--the use of the danger
of nuclear war, second which we were trying to tell you let's make
what concerns us, and then maybe make the comment on third
countries maybe some other place.
HK:
Well we don't say exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between each
other -that's fine, we accept that now and between either party and
third countries
AD:
And bet ween either party and
HK:
third countries.
AD:
Hm huh.
HK:
therefore- - we can drop if you accept the other, that is not so --
AD:
I understand. Well, I have to check this one really Henry, because
this is the only objection I have because it doesn't make it very clear
on the second part to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between
themselves and between either party and third countries.
AD:
I think for the time being, Iet us leave as you propose it. But I will
off "therefore" just to make just as forceable at least to the depth
that you discussed before.
HK:
Right.
AD:
Let us put it this way- - As you gave it there is no change except the
thereby, yes?
HK:
Yes
AD:
And then the nuclear war between themselves and either party
HK:
Between either party and third oountries
AD:
Yes, yes and third countries
HK:
Right
AD:
Okay I will make an adjustment-
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Page 3
HK:
We really are making an effort Anatol, I know it is difficult.
AD:
I understand, I understand. So I will leave it for the time being
and we will check with them.
HK:
Okay.
AD:
As for the second we already discussed it--
HK:
Just read me the beginning of the second one so that we are sure we
have the same text--Article II
AD:
Two parties agree in accordance with Article I andto realize these
objectives
HK:
to proceed--
AD:
Yes, to proceed andso on.
HK:
I think this is an improvement
AD:
I think it is, the more I think about -- what is really the explanation
HK:
My explanation is that if countries say you are making it possible to use
nuclear weapons agains t third countries, we say no the same restraints
we jput against ourselves, wexhavexeithex vis-a-vis the Russians we
put on ourselves vis-a-vis others.
AD:
No between ourselves but between our and other countries
HK:
That's right
AD:
Yeh, I understand well it is explainable at least--okay Henry, I will
tell right now because they asked about it
HK:
Good
AD:
And I will call you back. Thank you very much.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
1:55 p.m. - 4/14/73
D:
Hello.
K:
Anatol.
D:
Oh yes, hello Henry, how are you?
K:
How are you?
D:
Thank you. I heard you were quite a hit yesterday.
K:
Oh, you had your man there.
D:
Of course I have to watch you.
K:
Polyakov was there.
D:
Yes, how you behave, that's why he came to me and said what was the
case and I said just dinner - why don't you go because he's a new man
and he came and he doesn't know what kind of society it is.
K:
I think it was a good idea.
D:
Yeh, yeh, he like it very much.
K:
Did he tell you what I did?
D:
Yes, he told me about some of the things you said.
K:
Did he tell you about the intelligence report I read?
D:
No, no, he didn't mention it. Because I was rather busy.
K:
I made a parody of an intelligence report - I'll let you read it.
D:
All right, I would like it. Do you have a text of your remarks?
K:
Yeh, just for you. I mean I don't want to have it circulating.
D:
No, no, no, definitely just with me only. You have sometimes quite
a points.
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2
K:
Anatol, two things. First, when are you leaving ?
D:
I have not yet quite idea, quite frankly, because Gromyko mentioned
to me that you have to be prepared to go within next day but up to now
I didn't receive
K:
Well, I just wondered whether you and your wife want to come over, if
you're still here Monday, to get your picture taken in the garden.
D:
Oh, Monday would be very nice. What time?
K:
Oh, let's say 11:30.
D:
But I do not want to interfere with the President sitting there and so.
K:
No.
D:
I do not really in any way.
K:
No, it's just a friendly visit.
D:
Oh, I think that is right, but I mean with my girls.
K:
Of course, everybody.
D:
There will be three of us, really, and you.
K:
Yes.
D:
OK, I will call you on Monday morning.
K:
We may change it by half an hour or so.
D:
I understand. Now on the
that day, I will give them
tomorrow, but in this hour let's stick to the month, OK.
K:
Good. Now the next thing is on Article II of the thing we discussed,
that reference to not encouraging third countries - if this causes you
any great difficulty we can discuss it in the same category as Article V.
D:
About the third countries, yes?
K:
Not in Article I.
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3
D:
No, I understand, where it says about encouragement in connection
with the regional forces.
K:
Right.
D:
You see in that second paragraph when you remember Gromyko said
it was taken exactly from our principles, I really didn't know why he
said it because it was just from point of view of editing.
K:
We can handle - no, I'm not talking about the second paragraph, I'm
talking about Article II.
D:
Yes, I understand.
K:
Not the second paragraph of Article I.
D:
No, no, I understand you are speaking about Article II in connection
with the forces. Not to use force.
K:
Yeh, that's right.
D:
In this connection. I remember this but I think that there was a
in Article I but you just, you remember, he just picked up the word
from the principles. But you mixed it up in the translation it looks
a bit different. It was really nothing at all.
K:
That's right.
D:
So this way I am rather surprised why you change it. And then when
you add something new, there is a kind of meaning, but you change
half a paragraph in a way this is definitely only interesting so to speak.
So probably for doing it one way or another.
K:
Right.
D:
It appears - you see I don't know whether Gromyko will give me
an assignment or not because now it's still tomorrow and he say to
be ready on the 4th - he may even delay my visit until the end of
month in order to come before you. I don't know but you see the
telegram I have he says to prepare to go on a short notice immediately
to Moscow for consultation. Until now he don't mention when I go.
So, Henry, I just wanted you to know I receive telegram from him
but
to Monday. He raised a rather
question
to the President to note - it's about his State visit. It was signed in
Moscow. You know a signed letter, it was signed and several documents
were signed - so Brezhnev ask the President in a sense, but there is a
question of Most Favored Nation - Brezhnev understands it has some kind
of problems and he asks what the President is doing. From the other side
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4
D: (con't) we gave you what you want
.
What he is asking now -
he is asking to you and the President if you could give him his ideas
or his thoughts on this question what does he think about the
timing of all this things to happen. You ask him - what he thinks
this question of Most Favored Nation will be discussed in Congress
and will be finalized. The opinion of the President, of course it's
not a firm obligation but if you could find out from the President
for Brezhnev's own private information. And a second - what kind
of an agreements does the President think can be done during
Brezhnev's visit in the economic fields.
K:
I agree with you.
D:
So this is questions he ask me.
K:
I will have to let you know on Monday or Tuesday. Monday.
D:
Monday, ok?
K:
I'll let you know on Monday the answer to both of these questions.
D:
Yes, this is all just personal - his ideas what a general timetable
could be and second what other documents or agreements could be
on trade during his (Brezhnev's) visit. You are pressured very
much, the President of course is under no obligation but his personal
ideas about this.
K:
We are prepared to proceed on something.
D:
Yes, you ask his own ideas - what is it because he doesn't know exactly
K:
I will let you know definitely. Right. Now finally, Anatol, as long
as I have you on the phone. I'm sure you've already reported the
extreme gravity with which we look at the Indochina situation.
D:
Of course you made it be.
K:
But I really want your leadership not to be surprised - I mean we're
not doing anything this weekend.
D:
What do you surprised?
K:
I'm not - but we are very seriously concerned and we are not going to
let an agreement be broken.
within three months of signing it in
such a brutal flagrant way.
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5
D:
Do you mean Vietnam or Cambodia?
K:
Both.
D:
Have you ever received a reply from
K:
No, we've never received a reply.
D:
About anything from Le Duc Tho?
K:
No, never received a reply.
D:
He hasn't answered yet?
K:
NO.
D:
Well, I've already mentioned to you - to the President your concern
K:
But I've just had a meeting with the President. He is really - it doesn't
mean he will do something in the next three days.
D:
No, I understand. This is really - I understand but you have to under-
stand one point because you know in this case do you really feel it's
necessary to help. I would propose it
for us to convey
anything because we understand the situation but they know that you can
transmit to Moscow.
K:
That's all that needs to be done. I wouldn't make no a separate demarche
on it. I wouldn't make a separate message. It's more urgent than it
was Thursday.
D:
I already made it very clear.
K:
In that case, that can stay at that. There's nothing new since Thursday.
I wouldn't allow them another weekend. Also there may be some wild
boars that may survive if you did.
D:
(Laughs) Well, it's'a consideration. I never thought of it this way but
probably you're right. Monday I will be in touch with you. Please
check with the President about his ideas. OK, Henry, thank you very much
Bye. Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
9:50 am, April 16, 1973
K:
Hello.
D:
Hello Henry. How are you. Thank 708 you very much for your
speech. Do you mind if I send it to Brezhnev?
K:
If he doesn't take it seriously.
D:
No, he '11 understand jokes. Because I like it very much. It's a
different kind of approach. (Laughter) This I think is one of your
best. He has a sense of humor.
K:
By all means, send it to himwith my personal compliments.
D:
Okay. Nowomwould like to tell you several things right now which I
received Xxxxx answers for you. First about your trip, Brezhnev
said it's quite right -- not fourth but sixth.
K:
Good, thankyou.
arms limitation
D:
Then of course we are prepared to discuss and
for this purpose if necessary to add one or two days.
K:
Good.
D:
Then of course here Brezhnev mentions - this time you and he will
keep mutual promise that you will go definitely to Leningrad.
K:
I will go to Leningrad?
D:
Yes. He thought you should go there.
K:
Good.
D:
So please keep in mind about this one. This is everything about your
trip on the sixth. Now about articles we discuss, the text.
K:
Yeah.
D:
This is Groynyko - in the second, he have two remarks as of now--
one is about article - -now why we discuss with you, but he feels
its better to delete it.
K:
All right, I'll take that up with the President.
D:
Okay, this is one. And the second part he mention is Article 1.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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2
Of course he doesn't like what you add, but for the time being I
can understand, he is thinging -- maybe he will accept it.
K:
Good.
D:
But he says not he asked me to raise with you one question only
in that--in connection with Article 1C 1. You remember in the second
paragraph in this Article 1,1ⁿᵉ says-accordingly they will do their
utmost to prevent the developmant of situations.
K:
Yes.
D:
It is English, not Russian, He prefers to say: "Accordingly they
will do everything to prevent" not "their utmost".
K:
Will you tell him I will accept his English change if he will accept
a few Russian changes for me.
D:
What Russian changes?
K:
I have a few Russian words that I'd like in the text.
D:
What Russian words. (Laughter) I prefer the English best really.
K:
No, I'm just kidding. Look Anatol, I think that's possible. Let me
just look at it.
D:
If you could please look at it, and call me back then, would you please.
K:
Cause my first reaciton is not negative. I think you won't
understand this but tell Gromyko my first reaction is not negative, he
will understand. It's a double negative.
D:
Well because I don't know really but it may be better, I don't know.
K:
It's a little stronger to say do everything to the utmost, but let me
look at it.
D:
I think it basically means the same. But he likes to put it this way.
He didn't mention any other changes in this Article 1.
K:
No, no, Anatol, we don't have any real expectations that your Secretary
General will let me off that easily when I get there.
(Laughter)
As long as we are speaking.
D:
Now it is only one question then, please look at it and I think we can
get
K:
That would be great progress.
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3
D:
Yes. Could you give me answer on this?
K:
Definitely.
D:
Okay. I guess you remember about this trade business. I now have
a telegram, you promised to look into it.
K:
I'll have an answer I hope by the end of the day or the first thing
in the morning.
D:
This is fine. Because now I have his telegram. He mentions now
that this Moscow meetng it has been done not a little in this area of
present economy as well as many others, but it is a question now
he is raising--you then naturally would like to look--not a great
economic one in this connection what is the status now of mutual
grant
because about imports which are being
in order to pass on his decision and from
our side as B
has pointed this out himself he tried
to get everything possible becuase
and now
at the same time he would like to know when is that opinion of the
President, the situation is going to be positively stopped. He wants
to know what's in the mind of the President. When he gets expression
of the President this question could be posibly solved, and second it
is important to know what the decision in trade and economic field
could be take at the forthcoming meeting between him and President
Nixon in order to make it on a high level so to speak.
K:
Right.
D:
So the questions One, what President thinking about time table of the
Moscow session, and what other economic and business could be
discussed.
K:
Right.
D:
So, I think we cover basically all, now about Fhotograph Could
they--
K:
Yes, can we do it at a quarter to three.
D:
Quarter to three, the sun will be in the right position because we
qould like to have the White House a little bit dark. All right.
K:
Let me cleck it out and I'll call you right back, with the photographer.
D:
Yes, he knows better. So you call me back then.
K:
Right. Bye.
D:
Byebye
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Tel Con
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
6:20 pm, April 17, 1973
K:
Anatol!
D:
Yes. Hello Henry.
K:
I'm sending over a paper to you of some ideas on economic things.
D:
Right now?
K:
Yes.
D:
It's very good because really it's better for him, Brezhnev, it would
like to have a more clear picture.
K:
It's not very precise but at least it may give you some ideas.
D:
Some ideas, all right.
K:
I'll send it right over.
D:
Okay.
K:
Now, on this draft, I just an running out of ideas. If you prefer to
say assert a maximum effort?
D:
They will do everything necessary, maybe?
K:
Well "everthing necessary'is then a total commitment.
D:
I think it is not really, it's a preventative development, of situation
capable, incidentally commitment on such a very nature, did you not,
laughingly. So he propose everything to do, or as second but I think
it is a very clumsy English, he gave a second but I didn't really propose
it to you. Second, I translate from Russian, in English I don't like plenty
but--they will add: "so as to prevent" or they add in such a way as
to prevent-- is it better for you.
K:
No.
D:
He gave me two possibilities. First, everything or all.
K:
Can I call you around 11:00 tonight?
D:
You let me answer--my impression they are going to have a meeting
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2
of Central Committee and Brezhnev will have some answers, that is
my impression.
K:
I will send you that economic thing now.
D:
Okay, but I definitely will until 11:00, that is no problem, it doesn't
matter.
K:
Okay, I'll call you tonight.
D:
Tonight, but of course I want to send it today.
K:
Good.
D:
We'll do whatever you say, we'll do "everything", if not--everything
you may imply, possible, everything.
K:
How about exert the maximum effort?
D:
I think you done gave better we will do maximum to prevent--maximum
what? You couldn't say maximum, no!
K:
No, that's like everything.
D:
Yeah, maximum effort, this is not really as it stands here, it doesn't
really--no--
K:
I don't know why he's wanting to change it, it's perfectly--
D:
No, I don't have no idea really, when you maybe in Moscow you may
discuss with him, for me I think utmost
until
K:
Well, we could leave it open/&xxthe time when I'm in Moscow ifworse
comes to worse.
D:
Well, but he would like to have it now, because it will be a session of
their--he willprobably make it a further plan so to speak, in this case
K:
Okay, let me see what I can do.
D:
He pressed me to get this one, tkey didn't have a question except for
this one, you can make it clear when you will be there and continue it,
but here he would like to have it because in Russian as he translate it
--I translate it differently, but he translate it in a said it's rather weak.
Possibility, in Russian it does not sound really, I like rather well, but
to translate in Russian, you will say they will do everything to prevent--
but it's really everything necessary. But the utmost you translate in
English, but in Russian it's saying everything possible, so when it is
possible it's a question he doesn't like. He doesn't like the possible
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3
in his translation. I said it's not necessary everything to sound
but he said it's definitely possible, and possible give you a - - who is
going just possible, and there's quite an argument.
K:
Well, who's gonna touch necessary.
D:
Well, too, I look up all the matter, I just trying to - saying you propose
this one, I'm not proposing really, but--I don't know what suggestion
better to make it. He ask me too to suggest, but he said one,
K:
everything to prevent, second they will act in such a way as to prevent,
X:
and for these two possibilities, I don't have any other here.
K:
Okay.
D:
So, you will call me after 11:00.
K:
Right.
D:
Okay, I will wait. Bye, bye.
K:
Bye.
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TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
11:25 p.m. - 4/17/73
D:
Hello.
K:
Anatol.
D:
How are you?
K:
OK.
D:
Now I think could be
after a nice dinner.
K:
Of course.
D:
Was Frank Sinatra all right?
K:
He was excellent - outstanding.
D:
I like him very much, really.
K:
Have you ever met him?
D:
I met him on occasion once.
K:
Oh yeh, you met him at a dinner I gave.
D:
Yes, yes, and a dinner twice - the time at Para mount you know.
K:
Anatol, on that thing we were discussing, I just haven't had a chance
for a full discussion with the President, but I think personally this:
If we leave that one phrase open - you know the phrase ''do their utmost
or everything possible" - and the other idea of Gromyko is to say
"act so as to".
D:
His other idea is to say - yes, "act so as to prevent" or "in such a way
as to prevent"
K:
Well, that too, is possible and I think we should say - you should tell
Brezhnev that we will do our really best to work something out along
these lines
either "act so as to" or "everything that is necessary"
or something like that.
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2
D:
But couldn't I tell "everything necessary"? I really.
K:
I just cannot make it firm tonight.
D:
You couldn't yet?
K:
No, but I can tell you that there is a very good chance that we will
find some formula that - you know - "do the utmost" isn't bad in
English.
D:
That's my impression too.
K:
No, no, I understand your point, but if you tell Gromyko that we will
take it very seriously.
D:
Could I just tell him as of now you are thinking of' everything necessary"
and in this proposal of second 11 will act in such a way to prevent"
K:
Yes, but I cannot make an absolutely firm commitment on it.
D:
I understand. Could you make it tomorrow, then I will save what you
are thinking for tomorrow.
K:
Well, I will try but we have a lot of other things here right now.
D:
I understand, but you would rather next week
K:
When will it be next week?
D:
I think the beginning of next week.
K:
Yeh, why don't you give me til Thursday.
D:
Thursday. It would be best tomorrow because on Thursday we usually
have a
K:
Yeh, well let me try to call you tomorrow on it.
D:
Tomorrow.
K:
Yes.
D:
But really Henry, I have never pressed on you but please try to do it
tomorrow.
K:
OK. Fine. Good.
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TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
6:28 p.m. - 4/19/73
K:
Hello.
D:
Hello, Henry.
K:
How are you?
D:
Well, how are you? I miss you for several hours I haven't chance
to speak with you.
K:
I'm glad you liked these pictures.
D:
Oh, I really do like them. My wife and I we thank you very, very
much. Really they are wonderful! Did you see them?
K:
Yes, I saw them. I thought they were really great - they turned out
extraordinarily well.
D:
Oh, very well. They are beauties. And I like - you are standing very
K:
I thought that came out very well.
D:
Yes, so I am really thankful and please send him my best or I will
call him myself.
K:
He can make as many copies as you want.
D:
Thank you very much. It's really very nice and it's a nice present.
Real nice.
K:
Oh, not at all.
D:
Yes, thank you. Henry, have you seen the paper?
K:
I have been out of the office all day, I've just looked at it. Let me
read it again and call you back.
D:
OK.
K:
I'll call you back.
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TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
7:50 p.m. - 4/19/73
D:
Yes.
K:
Anatol.
D:
Hello, Henry, I thought you are in Florida already.
K:
No, no, I'm not going to Florida.
D:
You are not.
K:
No.
D:
Oh, how you manage that? (Laughs)
K:
It's the only time I can get serious work done.
D:
(Laughs) During this vacation period.
K:
Yeh. All right. On that note you sent me, frankly I'm going to check
our intelligence people to see whether there's anything like that which
is authorized going on. And if it is I'll stop it. But if you can give me
some more facts, it would really be a big help.
D:
I will check with Moscow.
K:
If they can give me license plates of cars or any make or anything
at all.
D:
I will check with Moscow. I do not have a checklist - only what I sent
to you.
K:
Because in the abstract - you know I don't know - I am making inquiries
and it will take about 24 hours to find out
D:
Well, 24 hours doesn't make any difference, really.
K:
Or 48 hours.
to find out whether
D:
I think it is really a matter of
K:
See I am not yet aware of anything like that being done. I cannot say that
some madman isn't doing this - you're sure it's American.
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2
D:
It definitely says it is Americans.
K:
All right. Now look, if it's Americans that are in any official it will
be stopped, you can give them the assurance immediately.
D:
I understand. OK.
K:
And you can say I'm starting the most urgent investigation. It would
help us if you could give us some facts.
D:
OK.
K:
You can tell Moscow now that if it's in any way officially connected
it will be stopped.
D:
OK.
I will. Henry, what about this 5% you owe me?
K:
What 5% ?
D:
You said to me yesterday about this
95% is spent.
K:
Well, it's now 97%.
D:
(Laughs) Tomorrow is going to go to 97 1/2%.
K:
I am much more concerned with Brezhnev's position than you.
D:
I'm not concerned about his position at all.
K:
That's right because I want to build him up. Let him beat it out of me.
D:
(Laughs) No, it's much better to have a friendly conversation than to
give you beating. You don't deserve beating, do you?
K:
Let him yell and scream at me.
D:
Well, I think
a point where he may yell and scream.
K:
He's going to do it anyway. I'll let you know tomorrow. afternoon.
D:
Tomorrow afternoon, OK. Before the President is going to Florida.
K:
Yeh. Now the only other thing I'm going to tell you, Anatol, is that
if I arrive in Moscow and I find a stone statue to you in a park I know
you've taken advantage of me.
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3
D:
Oh, no.
K:
Particularly if it has Article I engraved in the bottom.
D:
Well, I'm prepared to standhalf an hour to maintain the difference
in the
of the stone. (Laughs) Monument. Until tomorrow.
K:
Right.
D:
Tomorrow then you will tell me about it.
K:
Right.
D:
OK, because Gromyko still asks me. He says please ask him so I
know. This is the only issues I press on you. I didn't press on any
other issue, that's all.
K:
OK.
D:
But this is the only paragraph and Gromyko wants to know.
K:
Yeh, but that's no help to me because if I'm any judge of Brezhnev
he'll have plenty to press on me when I get there.
D:
(Laughs) But they are not really big issues.
K:
Fond as I am of him.
D:
By the way I read in the press that Italian Prime Minister has a new
wonderful plan on the Middle East. What is up to?
K:
That Anatol is about as correct as the letter Khruschev wrote to
Phan Farney (sp. ?)
OK. We will compare that plan to Khruschev's
letter and see whether there's any correspondence.
D:
I understand. But this stands because you said about
and
so on so now I speak to XXXX Moscow that you are staying until the 10th.
So it's tenth.
hasn't changed anything plus, minus.
K:
I haven't heard anything yet.
D:
so I understand that you will stay until the 10th.
K:
That's right - I will leave on the 9th.
D:
OK, Henry, so I will call you tomorrow or you call me when you have
an answer on this. OK?
K: Right.
D: OK, Bye. Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
9:35 a.m., April 22, 1973
K:
Anatol, you just can't stay away from me.
D:
Of course not. I just received a telegram from Gromyko. Brezhnev
would like to inform the President just for his information that this
agreement reached with Brandt that Brezhnev will visit West Germany
beginning from 18th to 22nd of May.
K:
All right. 18th to the 22nd of May. We won't do any bombing in Germany
during that period.
D:
I hope you will not. And your speech will be encouraging (laughter). I
mean, Iknow tomorrow you are going to make a speech
K:
Frankly, it doesn't affect anything in East-West relations. Almost
entirely addressed to internal Western relations.
D:
Internal? Yeah, I understand, relations. Well, I think after all we have
the Year of Europe. haven't we?
K:
That's what it's about. It explains the Year of Europe.
D:
Because I think
for your ideas because they are just waiting,
waiting and they would like to know exactly. So your speech will make
it clearer for opening the way for the Year of Europe. Yes?
K:
Well, I am now in the process of placing the verbs. I've got everything
else written.
D:
(laughter) All right.
K:
Basically I don't see anything in that speech that affects the Soviet
position at all.
D:
I think you are wise to
K:
I mean, it's basically a speech that we will maintain our friendship
with Europe even though we are determined to continue on East-West
relaxation.
D:
I think the knowledge -- Seriously, I think Brandt is going to go there
in their own way but in that direction so it couldn't be American
.
K:
It's not a controversial speech.
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Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
2
D:
Yes.
K:
Particularly, as it will take them three or four days to understand what
I've said.
D:
(laughter) Well, this is the point. That is why it's like a
when you give something like a mind. You make tick, tick, tick and
nobody knows what it's up to.
what he really meant. But I
think it will give some excitement in its chanceries of the foreign offices
and prime ministers. Why not for a change?
K:
Exactly.
D:
Because sometimes they became too fat.
K:
Exactly. Good. So from the 18th to the -- Will he travel around Germany?
Yes, I know he will travel.
D:
Well, they give me only this. Because just the agreement was reached
about the date so this I mean, to tell the others.
K:
Now, Anatol, I've told the President that there is an agreement that
around the 18th of June he will come here.
D:
Along those lines, I said that finally they were going to tell you while
you will be in Moscow but
K:
Not whether, only when.
D:
Yes, when it will begun but the date will be discussed and fixed during
your visit.
K:
Yeah. But my point is I'm going on the assumption, not that it's on 18th,
but I will not arrive in Moscow and then be faced with a proposal for a
very much different date.
D:
No, I do not have this kind of information at all, which could lead to the
conclusion you just mentioned. All the information I have makes me
rather believe it will be the 18th.
K:
Right. Well, that's all right.
D:
Yes, but they agree the date, plus or minus
K:
No, that's fine plus or minue two or three days.
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Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
3
D:
Yes, yes. I am under these assumptions.
K:
Now, one other thing, Anatol, we are thinking of - I was wondering -- It
hadn't occurred to us when we spoke before whether Brezhnev would like
to go to Detroit and see some automobile factories.
D:
I will check with him. Maybe.
K:
We have no interest in it.
D:
No, no, I understand perfectly well.
K:
Knowing his interest in motor cars.
D:
No, no, I understand. Henry, I'm just thinking aloud on my own - you
have to understand e idea if maybe he would like to go -- he didn't mention
to me but suggestion of my own for him -- from L.A. then he has to go
back across again, maybe to go to Alaska through Pacific.
K:
Of course.
D:
You not have any objection?
K:
No problem whatsoever.
D:
Because I am just thinking maybe it then could be proposed -- he might
like it but I don't know.
K:
No, if he wants to go to Alaska, that might actually be a rather nice
gesture.
D:
I don't know maybe he'd rather --
K:
Or you can overfly Alaska. You can probably make it to Siberia from
L.A. without stopping.
D:
I will check.
K:
Or he can go to Hawaii and go --
D:
I understand.
K:
It's entirely up to him.
D:
I will check with him. Because when I go to Moscow, I would like to
suggest it to him because he might be excited about around the globe by
flying, so to speak. But I don't know. But I just simply would like to
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Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
4
D:
(continued) check it with you just in this case. He did not propose it.
Nobody propose me this.
K:
You let us know whether he goes to Peking.
D:
No, this
K:
Because we have to have the head of our Liaison Office at the airport.
D:
But Mr. Bruce will be there on the 1st of May on the Day of Proletarian
Solidarity.
K:
No, no.
D:
He will not be.
K:
He'll be there about the 14th.
D:
I thought he would be just --
K:
No, he's leaving here on the 7th and then he's going to Hong Kong and
then on the 14th which I think is a Monday.
D:
I didn't count it properly.
K:
But the present plan is that he'll be there on the 14th.
D:
I see. No, I thought that he may come onthe 1st of May as I mentioned
for proletarian solidarity.
K:
No, we'll miss it this year.
D:
I think it would be a good idea. (laughter) What was reaction of Israel
by the way?
K:
To our abstention?
D:
No, no, not abstention. I understand what their reaction was. But you
said that you spoke with the Ambassador about this
K:
Oh, oh, well, I told the Ambassador that we would take very serious
measures if they obstructed the MFN. And between you and me, even
going to airplane deliveries.
D:
That you mentioned him directly this waY?
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Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
5
K:
Yeah. I mean, don't publish this.
D:
No, Henry. But did you ever see anything published which we discuss
with you?
K:
No.
D:
I don't know anything we have.
K
No, but I mean, we were very tough. And if you could see the reaction
of the Jewish leaders, I think that it was not uninfluenced by them.
D:
All right, Henry.
K:
We will push it through, Anatol.
D:
It was my impression though because many Senators, which I spoke before
of, simply mentioned to me about they need some really --
K:
Maybe when I am in Russia, we can think of a few minor cosmetic
things.
D:
Yeah. It could be.
K:
But we will keep it going. We have just started.
D:
Yeah. No, I understand. My impression now --
K:
No, I'm very optimistic now.
D:
This is my impression too. Okay, Henry.
K:
Good, Anatol.
D:
Bye, bye.
K:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
6:25 pm, April 24, 1973
K:
Anatol.
D:
Hello Henry. That was a good speech you gave yesterday.
K:
about the European Security Conference.
D:
It think it was quite a speech in general. It was large scale
speech. You make a quite good presentation.
K:
Good.
D:
Henry, why I call you. When exactly did you say you were
going to leave. Is it at night you are going on the 4th.
K:
Night of the 3rd and arrive the night of the 4th. Or later
would be better for me. I can arrive the night of the 5th.
D:
Of the 5th! ! But first it was 4th, and now 5th -
K:
I'll have to leave the night of the 3rd.
D:
How exactly. - I would like to make this point and this was my
K:
Just make sure that Antonov meets me at the airport.
D:
He will be very much proud if you expect him to do that.
K:
Maybe we can leave earlier than midnight.
D:
No problem. 8:00 or 9:00 is better.
K:
Let me find out. We will plan on arriving in Moscow around
8:00.
D:
Okay, you just give me schedule of your Air Force.
K:
How about your navigator?
D:
We will check with him.
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2
K:
We can also pick him up in Europe.
D:
What place? Where?
K:
We will be stopping ah an American Air Force Base. We will
tell you where he should go.
D:
Please send short memo on your recommendations, it is better.
In Moscow there is four day holiday, that's why I am checking.
So please check on this one.
Can you talk about
K:
It was very helpful.
D:
It was good idea.
K:
I went out to Walter Reed to talk to Stennis. He signed the
Jackson amendment but told me he won't vote for it. We will
win this one.
D:
Okay, Henry, ;so tomorrow we will be in touch.
K:
When are you going to announce it?
D:
Within two days, it
K:
Maybe Friday will be good.
D:
Friday or at the latest Monday.
K:
Friday will be better than Thursday.
D:
Okay, so we will be in touch.
K:
Good.
D:
Okay, Henry, bye bye.
K:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
9:31 a.m. - 4/25/73
D:
Hello.
K:
Anatol.
D:
Hello, Henry, how are you?
K:
OK.
D:
Henry, go ahead. I would like to ask you for myself one question about
this SALT business. Are you going to give any consideration because
to be discussed in Moscow?
K:
Yes, I will let you have some papers no later than next Monday but
probably Friday or Saturday.
D:
Yeh, because they need it - Brezhnev to look at.
K:
Well, I'm bringing a Russian text with signature lines on.
D:
(Laughs) Well, exactly as you proposed on the first article - remember
you said you would like to have - you would bring an English text for
Brezhnev to sign. He doesn't know English very well. He'll have to
be with Americans more often.
K:
Anatol, I want to remind you - you're going to ask for a week's postponement
aren't you.
D:
On what?
K:
Of the resumption of the Geneva thing.
D:
Well, if necessary, yeh.
K:
Hadn't we agreed that you would ask for - so that I don't have to give
instructions to my group.
D:
Oh, you won't ask them to make a formal proposal.
K:
That you need another week and you want to resume on the 11th.
D:
OK, I will do it - no problem. But we do it through the official channel.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
K:
Oh yes, do it through the official cha nnel.
D:
Or I could tell you and
K:
No, do it through the official channel. It's better.
D:
I will do today. I will do it. No problem.
K:
And I will give you a proposal at the end of this week.
D:
On this subject?
K:
Yes.
D:
OK, I think it will help because really
K:
I will give you two variations. One is that SS-9s have to be destroyed
in the first year and the other is that half of the SS-9s and half of the
SS-11s should be destroyed in the first year.
D:
I thought only the SS-11 but not the 9.
K:
I'm just showing you my flexibility.
D:
(Laughs) You're quite flexible, as a rule Henry.
K:
I thought I might give Smirnov a heart attack before I get there.
D:
That's why I'd rather prevent his heart attack before you arrive - not
when you are there - it's much more dangerous.
K:
Now do you want to ride with me?
D:
I have to check with Moscow yet because there was an idea to have a
meeting of our Central Committee but for some reason they postpone
it so probably I will come now within the time that you're coming
because they send me a message already to come to Moscow to attend
this Central Committee meeting but up to now nothing.
K:
Now, Anatol, you can't elect me to the Central Committee - I hope you
realize it. It would look bad in America.
D:
Why ? You couldn't be elected President by the way.
K:
In America, I know.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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3
D:
Well, we could make you candidate, all right?
K:
A candidate member of the Central Committee.
D:
Yes, this is a different kind of thing.
for you so to speak.
K:
No, only if I get one of these
which I like so much.
D:
Oh well, maybe we have to do something. By the way Henry, you
promised me to think it over about some ideas for some gifts and so
on, do you have any?
K:
NO.
D:
You have to think longer.
K:
The President has been occupied with domestic matters.
D:
(Laughs) So I guess.
K:
You wouldn't like to let me read your reports about this situation.
D:
Quite frankly I've played it down because
but I like the
Zorza article. On the surface he try to be nice to the White House
but he is trying to give some ideas to some of my people at home.
You remember yesterday's article. Did you get a chance to read it?
K:
Whose article?
D:
Victor Zorza.
K:
OH, Zorza, yes. I don't know who talks to him, I never see him. Who
do you think talks to him?
D:
No, nobody from our side. Nobody from the Soviet Union and only the
day before yesterday there was an article about him in our Pravda and
K:
He's very clever.
D:
I know he is but he puts his ideas this way and this way. The idea, if
you read it, was this way that it's the time to put the White House - to
try to get compassion because it is difficult. But at the same time during
the whole article tries to put in
K:
Yeh. Yeh. Yeh.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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4
D:
Well, it's rediculous, it's stupid.
K:
But the thing is now, about your your navigators, we can pick them
up in Copenhagen or in London whichever you prefer.
D:
Okay, I will tell them what is better. I think for them is doesn't make
difference really, but I check with them.
K:
I will plaln to arrive around 6:00 or 7:00 in the evening.
D:
Six or seven in the evening on the 4th.
K:
On the 4th.
D:
Okay. You will go from here.
K:
I will go from here, I leave here around midnight, and I think that
gets me in around six or seven at night.
D:
Yeah, I think it will, but no time you left it was 1:30.
K:
Yeah.
D:
And you arrived around 11:00.
K:
Well, the schedule they showed me is if I leave at 1: 30 I get in at 8:00.
D:
Oh, I see, they gave you the schedule.
K:
Yes, they gave me the schedule.
D:
They know better then.
K:
Let's not worry about--
D:
I mean approximately.
K:
I don't want to leave after midnight, it's too tiring. So I leave here at
midnight and whenever that gets me in.
D:
It is better to know when you are there or not, so I put it this way six
or eight, okay.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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5
K:
Yeah.
D:
Okay, this is fair enough. What else we have on our schedule, you
will be
-
K:
We are announcing today that we are meeting the Northvietnamese,
that I'm sending Sullivan over to meet the NVM on the 27th.
D:
Where, in Paris?
K:
In Paris.
D:
Why not you and Le Duc Tho?
K:
Because he isn't ready to meet until May 16.
D:
Why, what happened with him?
K:
Well because they must have some politburo meeting. So I will meet
him on the 16th in Paris.
D:
Okay, and this -- when Sullivan will be there, tomorrow?
K:
Sullivan will be there Friday.
D:
And
here or in Paris.
K:
In Paris.
D:
Where will you be on the 10th, what you going to do between then and 16th.
K:
I'll come back here.
D:
But is M P. A youk ? standing by.
K:
Well, I may see him after I see the North Vietnamese.
D:
Do you think it will be encouraging for him.
K:
Well, I tell you, you think my nerøves can stand both of them.
D:
That's why I am asking you how it can be (laughter) might be good idea.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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6
K:
I want to come back here in the present situation, quite honestly.
Now Anatol, one other thing. I won't be confronted with anything
unexpected in Moscow.
D:
Not to my knowledge, and my knowledge is around say 98 percent.
K:
Okay, well, because I don't think this is a good time--
D:
No, no, no, why should you. Well I may look over my program to see
again if he may have some ideas--
K:
Oh, no, no strategic thing.
D:
No, no, no. This I give you with 98 percent.
K:
In M oscow you operate on a 101 percent.
D:
There is nothing specific else. I look about the response on your speech
it's very good in general except France.
K:
Well, has there been an official French reaction.
D:
No, they just have same. By the way when is Pompidou arriving here.
K:
Pompidou hasn't been finally set, but it will be the end of May.
D:
The President is going to be very busy I should say.
K:
He'll be very busy.
D:
Pompidou coming here or stopping in Candda.
K:
He will almost certainly not come here, but where we will meet has
not been definitely decided yet.
D:
Brandt, Pompidou, Brezhnev, well it should be quite an interesting
situation.
K:
Right.
D:
I'm sure you feel like a fish in the water.
K:
I will not be inactive, to quote Gromyko, but he can go much better
double negatives.
D:
On ;double negatives he is quite a master.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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7
K:
On double negatives he is the world's champion.
D:
I think now you really know these words, you are doing it quite naturally.
K:
No, I'm an amateur. Well tell Gromyko I will look forward personally
to seeing him.
We are planning to leave now on the 9th.
D:
From Leningrad or Moscow.
K:
Yeah. During the afternoon or evening.
D:
I understand.
K:
Okay
D:
Okay
K:
Good
D:
Bye bye Henry, if I hear something I will call you.
K:
Good, bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
10:36 a.m. - 4/25/73
D:
Hello, Henry.
K:
How did you know it was me? It might have been my secretary.
D:
When your secretary calls it has a special ring.
K:
Oh, I see. Anatol, hold off with asking for a delay. It may be
bureaucratically easier if we let our people table some sort of decision.
D:
OK. I am just sitting and writing a telegram now. You want me to
hold off?
K:
Hold off a couple of hours before you send it.
D:
OK, I will await your call.
K:
It may be better to let the delegation meet and we will table some sort
of proposal and then it give us a better opportunity to have a base from
which to compromise.
D:
I understand, but in this case you will tell them to give your proposal.
K:
I will give you in any event what our delegation will propose and an
alternative approach to it.
D:
What you will discuss in Moscow.
K:
Exactly.
D:
So I will await your call. You will call me around midday.
K:
Midday, so don't leave your telephone.
D:
(Laughs) OK, Henry.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
5:05 p.m. - 4/25/73
D:
Hello.
K:
Anatol.
D:
While we were discussing with you the Strategic Arms Limitation I
receive a document for you Brezhnev send for the President to you.
He has some ideas of his own about what kind of document. Could
I drop it by for 5 or 6 minutes?
K:
Right. Now I am with some people. Can you come at 5:45?
D:
5:45 - the usual place?
K:
Right.
D:
So at 15 minutes before 6 I will be there. He has some ideas what
kind of document it would be so you can look it over and then discuss it.
K:
I thought you people couldn't make up your mind unless you got a
document from us. OK, Anatol. See you at 5:45.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
10:00 a.m. - 4/26/73
K:
Hello.
D:
Hello, Henry.
K:
Tell Smirnov that he cannot destroy the SS-9s yet until we.
D:
(Laughs) Well, I think you are quite right. He just thinking what kind
ofshow to arrange for you. We have in Moscow some subs there
the bottom. Whether they could go there or not.
K:
The SS-9s.
D:
Not only the SS-9s, but something like a Poseidon or Moscow
K:
Oh, that's a good idea.
D:
I think it's good, of course, why not to have because Moscow
(just came out of the Caribbean.)
K:
How about an SS-9 in Red Square?
D:
You see we have too many people there, we don't want to scare them.
Why should we? But we could organize a parade on the Moscow
it's a rather big
as you know so there will be let's say, how
many I should say according to the Treaty and everyone will be staying
in the line receiving parade. So you will be receiving parade, all right?
K:
That's great.
D:
Well, Henry, I receive now this about I have to check with them on
Monday. On Monday they are going to publish but I would like to check
with you. Is it all right on Monday your noon hour, 11 'clock or you
prefer
K:
That's fine. Noon or well
D:
If you prefer 10 it is no problem.
K:
No, no, basically, can I call you in a few minutes about it ?
Eleven or twelve.
D:
OK, there is no problem, but you tell me because they want to publish
simultaneously.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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2
K:
Right.
D:
And it will be like this: Dr. Kissinger's visit to the Soviet Union -
we are going to publish but I would like to check with you if you have
any - approximately I mean.
K:
Yeh.
D:
In accordance with agreement Dr. Kissinger according to the desires
of the President of the United States will arrive in Moscow on May 4th
for the occasions of meeting on matters of mutual interest for the
Soviet Union and United States.
K:
Right.
D:
This is what we will publish in our papers.
K:
Oh, and we won't say for how long.
D:
No, because that we won't say. You would like to
K:
No, that's fine.
D:
Then afterwards when you are leaving it will be published in our press too
K:
Right. Can we say exit visas have already been granted?
D:
Well, well, well, I'm not so sure. Maybe Brezhnev would like to
keep you there as a hostage until he will come with you back. You see.
K:
That's what I'm afraid of.
D:
No, I prefer not to put it really in a Communique because why should
we make already a concession to you beforehand. You will behave
accordingly if you will have a free exit visa, but if you haven't then
maybe we can persuade you to do something interesting. All right?
K:
All right.
D:
Well, who is going to come with you, you give me a list today or
tomorrow who will accompany you.
K:
Yeh.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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3
D:
Those and what do you have besides
to see or points
of interest and living quarters because they would like to know there.
K:
I leave it up to you. I've never been in the Russian countryside.
You know you once mentioned.
D:
I see, OK,
K:
It may be a little early.
D:
From the point of view of weather it's not yet spring. There could
be snow and mist there but if it's nice we can organize. Or we could
organize something at the theater.
K:
I like ballet.
D:
Ballet. OK. But if it is good weather we could organize a trip in
the countryside.
K:
Yeh.
D:
Well if you have something in mind let me know.
K:
If I do I'll let you know.
D:
You will call me back about this Monday timing?
K:
Yes within a couple of hours.
D:
OK and Henry, could we maybe raise on this draft of principles maybe
to discuss tomorrow or Saturday.
K:
I won't be here on Saturday myself.
D:
I see, but tomorrow you will be here.
K:
I just said Saturday so that I could break your heart when I disappeared.
D:
Well you' re doing that too. So could we maybe meet tomorrow just
because Gromyko would like to know your reactions on this.
K:
I will do my best. I will do my utmost.
D:
So I let you go. Bye. Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin
4/26/73 3:00 p.m.
AD:
12:00, Henry.
HK:
Twelve o'clock, we will make the announcement.
AD:
If I am right, this coming Sunday it will be already summertime--
HK:
Yeh, so it will be 8:00 in the evening for you--
AD:
No, I think 7:00
HK:
Oh 7:00 in the evening. Yeh, and can you send over the text that you
have in mind for us?
AD:
Okay, no problem.
NK:
And secondly, I have given instructions to substitute maneuvers for
movements--and if there is any trouble let me know.
AD:
I understand. Okay. So they know now?
HK
They know. You know our great bureaucracy, but basically they know.
AD:
What about, Henry, tomorrow. Could you give the jist on the reaction
on this.
HK:
Yes, I'll do my best.
AD:
Just to maybe--so you will give me tomorrow what will be more convenien
--I mean hour for you. The first or second part of the day ?
HK:
The first part of the day--towards the end of the morning.
to
AD:
Okay. Of course, Sckrieliv asked me/say this--that's why I even
sacrificed my participation in the meeting
HK:
Wx
What do you mean--
AD:
We have a planning meeting two days after--
HK:
This your central committee ?
AD:
No, no. We have today I had a telegram yesterday to have a meeting
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Page 2
today of our central committee.
HK:
Yeh, of the central committee.
AD:
Yeh, ah huh. Today.
HK:
I'm going to be a candidate member.
AD:
I already promised so I will send the Secretary General to approve
your candidacy.
HK:
I have already--that's the quid pro quo.
That and one of those cars.
AD:
(laughing) All right. Of course, when you became a candidate or a
member at this time, of course, you could be titled not only the car
but we give you a man, all right?
HK:
Of course, it would be a new departure.
AD:
Exactly. I think it would be quite nice.
HK:
I wouldn't bxex give you any trouble because I could come to meetings
and I wouldn't understand what anyone was saying.
AD:
Well, well, after you accept in Russian what I am telling you about--I
mean it changes totally in English, when Gromyko tex asks you to change
in the first paragraph--I wouldn't be surprised when one of these days
he'll just stand up and make his speech in Russian.
HK:
Well, all I want is the privileges, I don't want any of the responsibility.
AD:
I understand. Henry, when you were last time with the President, how
far where you from the President, when you went there was a
HK:
We went to the conservatory
AD:
I know, but how long--you don't remember
HK:
About 45 minutes.
AD:
It was probably the former Kruschev place
HK:
Yeh it was the former Kruschev place, because the President remembere
it -- he was there with Kruschev.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Page 3
HK:
That was lovely.
AD:
This time of year is the beginning of Spring in Moscow. - - sometimes
it is really good and sometimes it still snow.
HK:
Okay, good.
AD:
Good, tomorrow I will await your call.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Dr. Kissinger
10:47 m.
April 27, 1973
D:
Hello, Henry.
K:
Anatole
D:
How are you?
K:
I have another proposal to make to Smirnov.
D:
All right. [Laughter] You do keep him in suspense really.
K:
Because if he would like to.-if he doesn't know exactly how to dispose of
the SS-9.
D:
Yeah what's your proposal.
K:
He could load some of them on the grain ships that are coming back empty.
And we'll be glad to dispose of them for him.
D:
But do you have a large enough
?
K:
Well
D:
I'm not so sure about it.
K:
I gave you so many good ideas. I told you to put them on submarines and
you never accepted that.
D:
Well, I think he is still thinking. He never refused by the way. He has
not refused he has just begin to think and he continues to think it over. So
he never flatly refused as you know. So who knows, maybe it will be a big
surprise for you when he makes his contra-proposal.
K:
Do you want to come around 11:45, 12:00 o'clock?
D:
12:00 o'clock, OK.
K:
I'll have about 40 minutes.
D:
OK or 15 minutes before 12.
K:
Good.
D:
Usual place.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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Я
- 2 -
K:
Map room.
D:
Map room. At 15 before 12 I will be.
K:
Good, excellent.
D:
Ok, bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
9:48 a. , April 30, 1973
K:
Hello.
D:
Hello, Henry. Welcome back!
K:
Thank you, Anatol.
D:
Well, I receive a telegram from Gromyko. He asked me rather urgently
to come back so tomorrow I am leaving.
K:
Oh, you are?
D:
Yes. Today I received four drafts of agreement (laughter). One is
on peaceful use of atomic energy. The other one is draft in general terms
on contacts, exchanges and cooperation. The third one about world ocean
exploration and the fourth one is on transportation. And I was told
that is coming on agriculture. Really, my first impression there is
nothing really very difficult in them but would you like me to send you
right now before we leave or when I will be at 3 o'clock to bring them?
There is nothing really special excitement there. But it's in connection
with Brezhnev
K:
Why don't you bring them along at --
D:
Okay.
K:
Let's say 3:30, incidentally, for the meeting.
D:
Okay, 3:30.
K:
Yes.
D:
I will be there. This is the new developments -- You remember there
was earlier
K:
Oh, yes, I remember very well.
D:
Mat ters from Brezhnev. And he was counting on them -- rather naming
them.
K:
Oh, yes, I remember very well.
D:
So this is what it's about. So today I would like you first to look
once again about, if you don't mind, you know, the general
just
to check what we have -- that there will be no misunderstanding where
we stand now. Okay?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Ambassador Dobrynin
2
9:48 a. m., April 30, 1973
K:
Right.
D:
Just to look through what we have. And then SALT --
K:
Did they give you an answer?
D:
On SALT?
K:
Yeah. Oh, no, I'll give you the material on SALT, yes.
D:
Yes, you owe me other material. So we have a second discussion
about the SALT. And then I give you this paper. And we will look
through some protocol thing. I would like to collect my mind through
talking with you what possibilities just to tell Brezhnev on certain
kinds of things.
K:
Okay, good.
D:
Okay?
K:
Good.
D:
If President could write some letter
it would be very
nice but maybe tomorrow. I am leaving tomorrow around 5 o'clock.
K:
I'll have it for you before you leave.
D:
Okay, Henry.
K:
Today is not the ideal day.
D:
(laughter) Oh, all right, I understand. So 3:30 today, the usual place.
K:
Right.
D:
Thank you very much, Henry. Bye, bye.
K:
Bye.
wgh
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Page data
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"Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)"
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"ocrText": "TELCON (San Clemente)\nAmb. Dobrynin/Kissinger\n8:37 a. m. - 4/2/73\nK:\nHello.\nD:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nAnatol, how are you?\nD:\nWell, you are an early bird.\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nD:\n(Laughs) Well, I understand you have a busy day today. Only two\nthings - first, I receive from my boss the answer in connection with\nour last two talks.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nOne is that he is prepared to receive you in Moscow between May 4 to\nMay 7. This is exactly what you mentioned.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nBecause you gave me 4th or 20th.\nK:\nOh, is that what I said?\nD:\nYes.\nK:\nThat's fine.\nD:\nYou mentioned two possibilities: the 4th you said, 4th or 5th or 20th.\nK:\nAll right, from the 4th to the 7th, right.\nD:\nFrom 4th to the 7th and he said that you could devote all the three or\nfour days entirely to the talks or maybe 2 or 3 and then it give you a\nchance to break.\nK:\nGood. That's very nice.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nD:\nSecond, I mentioned about the possibility of your talks to the trans-\nAtlantic, you know with your other Prime. Minister.\nK:\nOh yes.\nD:\nQuite frankly he said he is concerned that maybe it is better to postpone\nall this consultation until you will be in Moscow and then it will be easy\nto handle it because he is a little concerned and the President thought\nso himself that he is mentioning about the leak before.\nK:\nYou mean the consultation about that piece of paper you gave me?\nD:\nYes, yes, with those, you remember.\nK:\nYeh, I understand.\nD:\nYes, well he said maybe - he just returned the concern that you want\nto express that there shouldn't be any leak, you understand?\nK:\nYou're talking now about the matter that affects MFN?\nD:\nNo, no, no, I'm speaking about the paper you promised to give me today.\nK:\nOh, I see, I see. Right.\nD:\nYou remember?\nK:\nOh yes, I understand.\nD:\nSo he put it this way as he said I remember that the President and Dr.\nKissinger himself express\nK:\nNo, no, we will not have any discussions until he and I discuss this.\nD:\nFor the time being you stop it, yeh?\nK:\nThat's right. What I mentioned to you on Friday were just some general\nconsiderations they gave us. It was not related to any text.\nD:\nOh, I see, but that's why he was saying maybe because you ask me\nhow, because you express before that it could be dangerous about the leaks.\nYou understand.\nK:\nYeh, we'll make sure.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nD:\nOK, so it is better. Of course he mentioned about - this of course\nis No. 1. He feels that when you will be back here in Washington\nto continue to discuss some other things but this of course is the\nprimary one. I mention that you will give me today.\nK:\nExactly. By the end of the day.\nD:\nAs to exactly the date for the President I hope to receive it within\ntwo or three days.\nK:\nExcellent.\nD:\nSo this is a message to make it short because it was a long one but\nI make it short.\nK:\nIs it an oral message that you can leave with us?\nD:\nNo, he just send me a telegram telling me what I have to say so I just\nsum up it.\nK:\nBut you didn't give me an answer yet on other things.\nD:\nOn the MFN matter.\nK:\nNo, the MFN matter whether I can mention that?\nD:\nYes, this I'm expecting because I send only yesterday really so I\nprobably receive by the end of today or tomorrow and I will give you\na call back on this because this is all I'm telling you today in connection\nwith our discussion on another paper.\nK:\nExactly, I understand.\nD:\nOnly it's the particularsone. As to this one I will give you immediately\ncall back when I receive.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nAs for the paper, when do you expect me to get it?\nK:\nOh, you see I'm busy with Thieu this morning. I will call you this\nafternoon and let you know, but before the end of the day. By midnight\nas I promised you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nD:\nThrough Kennedy, yes?\nK:\nThrough Kennedy.\nD:\nOK, I think it's quite all right. Well, this is all I really would like\nto mention to you and have a nice day.\nK:\nGood. Thank you. Bye.\nD:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon - San Clemente\nApril 2, 1973 - 1825\nMr. Kissinger - Dobrynin\nHAK: Anatole?\nDobrynin: Hello Henry, how are you?\nHAK: I'm OK. I just wanted to tell you that I am sending you a draft.\nDobrynin: I already have it.\nHAK: Good.\nDobrynin: Well, do you have any additional comment?\nHAK: No.\nDobrynin: You see, at first glance - I just looked for two minutes at\nthis one and Article I is a complete disappointment to me quite frankly,\nbecause it really changed from what even you mentioned to me on Monday -\non Friday - excuse me. On Friday, it was only a question of order of\ntwo paragraphs, with whom should we deal would be the last one.\nHAK: Yes, but we have turned it around.\nDobrynin: Yes, you turned it around, that's true, but you changed the\nsecond or third (?) axticlexxfxthxix paragraph of this article completely.\nHAK: Well, not completely. We added one clause.\nDobrynin: Yes, but you create conditions - its worse really than word what\nyou have me on Friday. Could we just change as you gave me on Friday but\njust change the places, within the first paragraph.\nHAK: Well no, one of these clauses we really need or we will have an\nabsolute uproar.\nDobrynin: Well, its your organization (?) I mean\nHAK: No, No, boxthxx but the turning around\nDobrynin: Only, I have hear what you gave me on the 30th, on Friday.\nHAK: I know.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nDobrynin: So the one thing on article I which I think is more or less all\nright is the development of our exchanges. It was just to change two\nparagraphs in Article I.\nHAK: Yes, but I told you that then the President wanted to go over this\nand modify\nXXXX I unfortunately don't have it here with me. XXX\nZzczizz I'm calling you from home because I didn't think that you\nwould already have it. I just wanted to tell you it was coming.\nDobrynin: Yes, I have it. Now in Moscow it will look like a step back from\nwhat we already discussed two weeks ago. I am perfectly sure of this\nreaction because its from the text from your declaration which was a\nhalf a year ago. You made a suggestion, we accept first, really your\nparagraph Article I and then we make suggestion to make it look more\nbilateral. So you gave me on Friday which looks your version but to me\nit looks more or less further development but only I rather have some\ndoubts because you changed the paragraphs because it begins with the short\none and then information (?). But now as you gave it, it really is quite a\ndevelopment from what we gave. You just come back, cross everything\nwe discussed and come back to the declaration which we had in October\nof last year. I'm sure Mr.\nand my boss will ask me directly\nwhat happened. Now it is exactly the text of the declaration.\nHAK: Well no, it adds one phrase from the declaration, and the rest is\nfrom the rest of the paragraph.\nDobrynin: No you see its again a question of to create conditions in conduct\nof policy all this kind of thing\nwe accepted your paragraph as you\ngave us really and then we just want to make it more clear that it should be\nwithin not only general but bilateral kinds of things too. It was along those\nlines and what you gave us looks to me like a really good XXXiXX XXpXXX\nworking paper on Friday, but now it looks again as if we are back where we\nwere\nHAK: Well no. That's certainly not true because the first sentence was not\nin the declaration.\nDobrynin: No, no, I mean the first paragraph, because now you change it.\nHAK: The first paragraph was not in the\nDobrynin: I understand, I'm speaking about the second paragraph in article I.\nHAK: The second paragraph in Article I contains only one clause that is new\nor even slightly new.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nDobrynin: No, it isn't new, it's a rather old one.\nHAK: That's what I mean, that you hadn't seen on Friday.\nDobrynin: Yes, it's different from Firday.\nHAK: That is the only one that's different. All the rest is the same.\nDobrynin: Yes, I agree with you.\nHAK: I mean all the other points we put in Article 51 and I think in the\npreamble we put back most of your language.\nDobrynin: Even by the end of the article you remember there\nwas a proposal made about\nHAK: That we have our questions about.\nDobrynin: Yes, I understand. So this one would be discussed further but\nthis is really Article I.\nand really this second paragraph of Article I\nWhy couldn't you take it as it was on Friday.\nHAK: Because frankly because the British attach enormous importance\nto that one sentence. Now they haven't seen this draft at all.\nDobrynin: ???\nHAK: Well, because they always tell usbecause this is the one clause if\nwe ever do this. This is the one clause to which they have always attached\nimportance. And it therefore would make it a lot easier to sell it if the\nBritish would join us.\nDobrynin: But really this is\nI understand your point but this is the point\nwhich really Brezhnev today tries to convey to the President.\nHAK: Well, we haven't discussed that particular formulation with them.\nDobrynin: Well, that's why you really should. That's why I called you\ntoday in the morning first we have to discuss between us and then\nanalyze so to speak, and then afterwards you could explain you own\nxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx allies view\nHAK: But we have totally disregarded it. If we had taken a substantial\nview of that and added to it, that's one thing. If we totally reject their view,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 4\nI mean everything else in Article I they have never seen. You see what\nmy point is.\nDobrynin: I see your point, but there is another point you see.\nHAK: Well, when I see Mr. Brezhnev I will tell him that you said that\nyou saw his point. And I'm sure he will be very pleased.\nDobrynin: He was rather impressed that we were moving forward but\nnak now its backward\nHAK: Well then the only thing I can do is to ask you to wait 24 hours so\nthat I can discuss it with the President after Thieu leave tomorrow. I\nknow what hell is going to break loose in NATO even with this draft.\nDobrynin: I think you can handle it.\nHAK: No, we cannot handle it easily. We have no support at all.\nDobrynin: But we are asking you\nHAK: I know but that is the one I told you right away on Friday afternoon\nnot to send.\nDobrynin: I didn't send it. I wasn't specifically complaining\nHAK: Because the difficulty that arises\nCobrynin: And I am now glad that I didn't sent it because otherwise it\nwas quite a shock to Moscow. Now I'm really glad that I didn't send it.\nIt was a temptation, but then I decided to follow your advice not to send it.\nHAK: Well, after all, Anatole, all we are adding is one little clause.\nDobrynin: It's not a little clause. It's rather a clause - well you know the\npoint we discussed several times. Well, if you feel better to wait 24 hours\nHAK: Let me wait 24 hours and discuss it with the President tomorrow\nafternoon.\nDobrynin: OK, I will not discuss anything.\nHAK: I will call you tomorrow afternoon Anatole.\nDobrynin: You will call me tomorrow afternoon?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 5 -\nHAK: Thieu leaves here at 1:30, that's 4:30 your time. But then I have\nto have about an hour or two with the Presidant, so I'll call you around\n8:00 or 9:00 your time.\nDobrynin: OK, it's quite alright. I will await your call.\nAnd I will hold until then . - you will give me the final opinion of the\nPresident. I do really ask you and the President to look into this\nmatter again and look as close as possible to your present version\nbut with the change of paragraphs.\nHAK: OK, good.\nDobrynin: Try your best. It is better for you not to spend the time with\nBrezhnev on this paragraph.there but to finish it here.\nHAK: No, I like theatrical performances.\nDobrynin: Well, I am sure you will have enough other performances,\non other subjects. I'll await your call tomorrow.\nHAK: Right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon - San Clemente\nApril 3 - 1830 E19737\nDobrynin - HAK\nHAK: Anatole, how are you?\nDobrynin: How are you? You have a rather sad voice. Does it mean\nthat you are disappointed or what is it?\nHAK: No, I had to run up the stairs to get to my telephone.\nDobrynin: Oh, I see.\nHAK: And I am too old for so much exertions.\nDobrynin: Oh, come on, you are much younger than I am.\nHAK: Yes, but I am in much worse shape. I have lost too many\nnegotiations.\nDobrynin: Well, you have to lost at this one, then it will be better for you\nbecause otherwise it will be difficult for you.\nHAK: About what we discussed yesterday, Here is what the President said.\nHe would like to submit the document as it is.\nDobrynin: As you gave it yesterday?\nHAK: On the other hand, he will look with great sympathy at counter-\nproposals from Mr. Brezhnev. But he feels that he must at least submit\nit - that one phrase.\nDobrynin: But this phrase is three times repeated (?) now. This phrase\nappears in three about - in the preamble, in article I and in article II. So\nit's not just one phrase, it's three times.\nHAK: Well, I can tell you that we will be very receptive to deleting it from\narticle I. I mean I tell you that on an informal basis.\nDobrynin: I will\n?\nit as it is.\nHAK: Yes, I would\n?\nit as it is.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nHAK: But I will tell you informally that there is a good chance of\ngetting it deleted from article I. So to have it substantially back to\nwhat it was.\nDobrynin: Was this why\n???\nHAK: Well, in the preamble will we have to have it.\nDobrynin: This is rather ???, as you mentioned. All right?\nHAK: Right.\nDobrynin: Then second, you agree your President left Article IV\n??? It is the same reason you mentioned to me and the same explanation\ngiven to article * IV - now its article V ???\nHAK: Yes, well on Article V on that we feel somewhat more strongly\nbut again we are really willing to listen to your counter proposal.\nDobrynin: But you made it already. This was yesterday.\nHAK: Well, but we want you to consider it again.\nDobrynin: All right, if its this kind of thing. Because practically, from\nwhat you propose to use ??? Article 51 over ??\nHAK: No, we accepted\nDobrynin: There are two things - ???\nHAK: Well, no and in the preamble we restored all of your language\nfrom the preamble.\nDobrynin: ???\nHAK: Well I think that what we now have is Article V\nDobrynin: XXX Henry, let me put it this way, I understand it now that\nyou don't want to argue because of certain practical things. It's all right.\nHAK: Well, tell them that we want this is not a way to prevent it coming\nto a conclusion. We really want to bring it to a conclusion. And I may\nhave a chance to talk to the President. I frankly did not focus on the new\nArticle V today with him. I may have word for you on that tomorrow or\nthe day after.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nDobrynin: Well, I will put it this way. On article I you are prepared to\ngo closer to what we propose to do, yes?\nHAK: That is correct.\nDobrynin: But in the preamble you prefer to ???\nHAK: Well, you noticed we put into the preamble that phrase xxjxx about\nthird countries which you had in Article III.\nDobrynin: Yes, but we still don't understand why you took it off from\narticle III.\nHAK: Because it really belongs more in the preamble than in - you don't\nput an explanatory sentence into an article.\nDobrynin: Well, I think it is more precise and more clear for the third\ncountry to know because in the preamble it sound rather XXXXXXMXXX\nen passent but there it is more precise. You still don't want to put it\nback in one way or another.\nHAK: Well, I think it fits better into the preamble. WXMXXXXXXXXXXXX\nDobrynin: Well I really have no choice but to tell it - there is nothing\nelse really. When will you be back.\nHAK: I will be back Monday and I am sure you will be back with agreement\nto every word we gave you.\nDobrynin: Well you will have a lot of things to do in Moscow on the same\ntext.\nHAK: Anatole, we have never failed to complete an agreement and we will\nnot fail this time. We will not fail this early in the Administration and this\nlate in our relationship. But we have to go through some steps and you have\nto go through some.\nDobrynin: I understand. All right.\nHAK: Particularly when we have to discuss the history of this at some point.\nDobrynin: I understand. All right. Well, Henry I have an answer to a\nquestion you asked me. You remember that don't you. Well, this is\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\na\nthis particular question ???? and wxbx the White House may refer to it\nto the members of the congress.\nHAK: Oh, all right.\nDobrynin: ??? and you other point ???\nHAK: Well I can't do anything about it till I getback.\nDobrynin: OK, because there is some explanation of all the things we can\nprepare for you but everything is\nHAK: Well, let us discuss it on Monday or Tuesday when I return. And\nthen we will agree on a precise strategy also.\nDobrynin: OK, because I have\nHAK: And for your information I have already told the Israeli Ambassador\nthat we would take the gravest view if the Israelis did not help us.\nAnd he said if we can give him anything at all that gives him an excuse to\nintervene, he would look at it very favorably.\nDobrynin: Well, our position is of course its up to you to do the\nHAK: No. no, we will do it. I just have to have your authority. You don't\nhave to do a thing.\nDobrynin: I understand.\n$6$ HAK: We will do it, I just have to have your authority. We would take\na communication from you that you authorize us to use. Your not dealing\nwith them, you are dealing with us.\nDobrynin: Yes, because we dont' recognize ?. on this occasion\nHAK: Frankly, neither do we.\nDobrynin: I understand. You remember you asked me about what about\n???\nHAK: Can you give that to me on a sheet of paper too, xtokex like the other one.\nDobrynin: OK. Could I wait until you come home.\nHAK: Of course.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nDobrynin: ???\nHAK: You can do either one. I don't think I should until I can do it\npersonally.\nDobrynin: OK, I will give it to you when you come back in a form just\nfor your information. Now I think you and the President have enough\n???\nHAK: We will certainly use an absolutely maximum effort.\nDobrynin: Now you have a very serious level to do this.\nHAK: Well, I don't see how we can ask for more.\nDobrynin: Ok Henry, for the time being you don't have anything new.\nHAK: See you seon.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon - San Clemente\nApril 6, 1973 - 12:37\nAmb. Dobrynin-HAK\nDobrynin: Hello, Henry, how are you?\nHAK: I am doing fine.\nDobrynin: I'm sure you are doing fine. How long are you going to stay\nthere?\nHAK: I'll be back Monday. Three things. One, Semyenov keeps making\nthese long speeches in Geneva and that keeps generating a lot of activity\nhere and I wonder whether until you and I have had a chance to talk we\ncouldn't slow him down a little bit.\nDobryhnin: You see, I received all the telegrams but last one - last one\nI guess was yesterday but I am receiving them regularly and you remember\nyou asked this question but I didn't want to bother you back because you\nwere already in California. I read his telegram dealing with this particular\nquestion, when they have a meeting, two of them, together. And is was\nquite a discussion from both ways, in connection with the summit.\nJohnson was doing what Mr. Semyenov was writing to Moscow that he\nwas interesting but he, let me put it this way, it is a long telegram, but\nhe said that he had an ttraction ** but to press\nbecause of the importance within it one or two months we have to come\nto an agreement.\nHAK: Johnson said that?\nDobrynin: Along those lines as it was\nHAK: It's inconceivable.\nDobrynin: But the differences between them that Semyenov was rather\nsayinglet's find it this time and leave it to agreements sort of ZZZZZX00\nmaybe egging you to find out within one or two months and the Johnson\nposition was no I have instructions to press as full as possible agreement\nand not to divert attention to some separate agreement on separate\nquestions. So that was the basic differences as Mr. Semenyov a\nsummed up discussions with him. It was not on the plenary session.\nHAK: Johnson has no such instructions.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nDobrynin: Well, he said it twice. It was in two telegrams saying\nthat you said that well we had to do as full as possible and not to go\nHAK: Oxxxxx Oh no, as full as possible, those are his instructions but\nhe has no instructions to raise the summit.\nDobrynin: Oh no. In this connection, he didn't press this specifically.\nBut he put it within these two months ???? use the word summit but the\ntiming which he has given which is by Semenyov he looks at this implication\nabout the summit. He didn't use the word summit - no. Johnson did not\nuse the word summit. But he (Change of Tape)\nHAK:\nproposal to you.\nDobrynin: OK, So I will then just - you think its useful just to send a\ntelegram saying that they play down this discussion.\nHAK: He's made a very long statement now and let him not go beyond that\nnow.\nDobrynin: Yesterday they made\nHAK: Semenyov - I think two or three days ago.\nDobrynin: Maybe yesterday. The latest I have which was on the third.\nHAK: Mes, that's the one.\nDobrynin: XIXX XXX XXXX XXX XXXXX But ??? its official\nrather ? a meeting but then by then he said ? talks with Mr. Johnson\nit was a very detailed and long on which I am referring now. So they\ncontinue to do so. OK. Well, I will put it\nHAK: Yes, but he shouldn't make\nhe should stop talking about the\nsummit - that would be the most important bhing.\nDobrynin: OK, I will do it. And you will give it around two weeks.\nHAK: OK. Now, let me see. You never sent me that other paper on the\nJewish question.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nxx 3\nDobrynin: Well, but yousaid when you come back.\nHAK: OK, fine.\nDobrynin: I could give it today to Kennedy if you like but the question\nis is it worthwhile\nHAK: No, give it to me when we come bakk.\nAnd then we can plan exactly\nwhat to do.\nDobrynin: When do you prefer.\nHAK: Monday or Tuesday.\nDobryhin: Will you wilsgive me a call?\nHAK: I'll give you a call tomorrow morning. Now the third thing you\nstill haven't goa a date proposal. &\nDobrynin: Yes, we do not. As I said both Brezhnev and Gromyko are\npuzzled by the latest draft you gave them. So that particular draft I\ndidn't receive any telegram from them at all. So I am just enjoying quiet\nwithin these three days. Not a single one did I received.\nHAK: Because the President is a little puzzled by first, you've made the\nrather urgent proposal at the meeting and then we get no reply to what's\nafterall a fairly simple technical matter.\nDobrynin: When I give you the last time answer it was a I received from\nMoscow say just tell you it will be very soon for - during the last three\ndays I didn't have anything.\nHAK: I mean we're in no particular hurry. We don't even mind shifting it\nif you want to do that.\nDobrynin: I understand. I hope I will have it one way or another but thex\nif you like me to mention to them the possibility of\n?\nI will send it to.\nHAK: Well, its up to you. I mean y9u made the proposal, we have no reason\nto propose shifting it. And we are prepared to continue - if it keeps going\nvery much longer than we have to consider where we stand. But right now\nanother week is not a decisive matter.\nDobrynin: Well, I think this is exactly the point. So I think we\nshould as vet ta 11c about it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nXXXXXX X\nHAK: So I don't think we should talk about it.\nDobrynin: So as of the time being this is were it stands. They owe you\nanswer. On this I am too standing. I will just mentione to them that\nthe President and you are expecting the answer. They should understand.\nFor me it would be a matter to make this proposals involves shifting or\nno shifting because they know the situation and they have to make.\nI\nthink they will come and say .yes. ??? But I don't know what ???\nthey give them. I am just using jokingly that this proposal was three\nways and complete silence. What is going to be done, I don't know yet,\nbut this is\nNAK: Well, they areprobably in the caususes.\nDobrynin: No, they don't like to go this time of year to their caucuses.\nHAK: No, they probably think it all settled and they are going to accppt it.\nDobrynin: Well, this is my impression. So maybe they are trying to find\nthe nicest way to accept it. Not all of them but part of it. But I am sure\nthat next week\nHAK: But, you know you told them with what attitude we are going to go\nat it.\nDobrynin: No, I mentioned it. Otherwise it was really definitely a step\nback to the 6 months which you discussed.\nHAK: Oh no, no.\nDobrynin: Because I looked at the text of the declaration. You managed\nto put it NXX in article I. You put it the same in article II. Then you put\nit even in Paxxix Article III I guess. Not to speak about the preamble.\nSo it's rather many things to do.\nHAK: Well, let's see what they are coming back with.\nDobrynin: That's why I'm keeping quiet. Let them. look it over and then.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nHAK: I read somewhere that you are being recalled.\nDobrynin: There is something in UPI. Well ? minister is going on\nHAK: I hope we get some advance warning because I - so that we can\nleave together.\nDobrynin: Well, in this particular story it goes after the visit.\nSo in this case there is nothing to fear - both of us.\nHAK: Well, I'm torn, because on the one hand I would like you to have\nan even wider field of activity. On the other, you are almost ireplacable,\nhere in Washington.\nDobrynin: I have, by the way, information about the talks with Madame\nBinh in Moscow. She was in Moscow for about a week. She met with\nBrezhnev, with some others so I received information but I there are\nthings I don't want to tell by telephone. But when you get back.\nHAK: Well, we will get gxrx together on Monday on no later than Tuesday.\nDobrynin: Well, you name the day and its quite alright with me.\nHAK: Good, maybe breakfast on Tuesday.\nDobrynin: I have to look - I have my best friend, the Romanian Ambassador.\nHAK: You have breakfast with him?\nDobrynin: Yes, he invite me. Well, we will organize something. Well,\nlet's do it Tuesday, how about lunch.\nHAK; No, lunch I don't think I can do on Tuesday. But let me see what I have.\nDobrynin: Maybe on Monday. Or I will try to switch it - then we'll have lunch\nall right.\nHAK: No, I could do breakfast on Tuesday.\nDobrynin: What time?\nHAK: Oh, about 8:15\nDobrynin: Make it then 8:30\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nHAK: 8:30 for breakfast.\nDobrynin: Yes, I think this will be all right. So I will drop in to you.\nHAK: To the MAP Room.\nDobrynin: Map Room, 8:30, Tuesday. I will be there and you will have\nat least an hour I guess.\nHAK: Oh, I have an hour and a half. I'll be back on Monday. I'll\nprobably talk to you on the telephone.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n11:27 a. m. - 4/9/73\nD:\nYes.\nK:\nAnatol.\nD:\nOhyes, hello Henry.\nK:\nI just wanted to report back in.\nD:\n(Laughs) Well, it is my impression you are back definitely.\nK:\nWhy should it be your impression that I am back definitely ?\nD:\nWell I saw already the President - who he is going to receive and so on\nso I gather that you should be involved one way or another. Because\nthe schedule I look through. They publish it.\nK:\nI see. I thought you put your wire tap on me again.\nD:\nNo, no. You now have an easy life, Henry, going to the sunny California,\nFlorida - really you're not very busy, my impression. So tomorrow we\nsee each other.\nK:\nWe have breakfast tomorrow and we can discuss things then. I've had a\ngood chance to talk to the President yesterday about that agreement.\nD:\nOh, you mean the Agreement. I receive it today a telegram from my boss.\nIt's really - I will tell you, it's rather lengthy and he - well, well, you\nwill listen to it - the major reason is he had a feeling we were very close\nbut he feels we have separated from what we started. And he really\nasks some questions and so on.\nK:\nLet's take a look at it tomorrow.\nD:\nYeh, tomorrow then.\nK:\nBecause uh\nD:\nMy impression is he is now he doesn't know where to go from now.\nK:\nHas he made any specific proposals or is he going back to his original\ndraft?\nD:\nNo, he says you go back to the point from where you began. This is his\nimpression. From the very beginning he gets the impression after talking\nwith you - my talk with you - that well they are moving. And it starts to\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nroll, but then your last draft was of course of such a nature and your economic\nproposals, everything, he thought too it was exactly where it was a year\nago.\nK:\nWell, that's a little exaggerated because\nD:\nI'm telling you generally. He didn't use a year ago but he said that -\nwell, if you like I can read you some and some tomorrow I put in\nif you like it. You have more time?\nK:\nWell, how long is it?\nD:\nIt's two pages.\nK:\nDoes he propose anything particular?\nD:\nNothing, he is rather asking the President his ideas\nhe just ask him because it's his impression that you throw everything\nback so he sounds rather puzzled but at the same time very understanding\non this important question. So he didn't propose any specific proposal\nbecause he took really your proposal as you remember at the very be-\nginning and he make some suggestions on your proposal. And then what\nreally happened, you gave us .which was\nreally on the last proposal\non which we operated. So this way it's rather emotional I should say\noutgrowth.\nK:\nWell, that's a little exaggerated though because all we did was to put\ninto that first Article one clause.\nD:\nLet's go over it tomorrow more precisely because really\nK:\nYes, let's look at it more precisely tomorrow.\nD:\nYeh, tomorrow. And Henry, on a personal basis,\nwould\nlike you if possible to work if necessary during this week on a more\nextensive basis because by Sunday it looks as though I will go home.\nK:\nOh, god, really?\nD:\nYeh, because Brezhnev would like to discuss with me various things,\nreally. But I am telling you now because you should be prepared that\nmaybe by Sunday I would like you to have some special consultation.\nFor me, so to speak, to be ready to go. I could wait - maybe for a week\nI will go but this is\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nK:\nMay I make a suggestion to you Anatol?\nD:\nYeh.\nK:\nUnless it's geared to some event in Moscow, I have the British coming\nover next week some time.\nD:\nOh, I don't like this at all.\nK:\nBut not on this. They are coming over on MBFR.\nD:\nThey ask me to come home in connection with this documents.\nK:\nOh, well then we don't have to necessarily\nD:\nNo, no really he ask me to come with a document and I think he rather\nwould like to read you where he stands now.\nK:\nAll right. You and I will work on this this week.\nD:\nYeh, I think it is better way. All right?\nK:\nNow in the meantime could you keep Semyenov (?) under control. The\nthing has become totally unmanageable here. Let me read you a sentence -\nthat's really why I called you.\nD:\nWell, I send\na telegram quite frankly. Before I did not\nmention anything but yesterday I send telegram to stop his exercises.\nK:\nI've told Johnson to relax, that you and I were going to talk but that\nI told Johnson he should not raise summit talks.\nD:\nI understand.\nK:\nLet me read you what he replied: He said, \"You can tell Dobrynin that\nI do not know who is kidding whom, but there's not a meeting here that\npasses in which Semyenov as well as individual members of his staff\ndo not push clearly the urgency of getting something ready for the Summit.\nAs you know I have not, and I will not mention what might be negotiated\nfor a Summit meeting. \"\nD:\nNo, yesterday I send a telegram in this sense.\nK:\nI will show you the telegram tomorrow.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nD:\nThat's all right but I know that he doesn't have any instruction, on this\nI know for sure.\nK:\nHe probably wants to get the order.\nD:\nNo, I think he - he knows that when he left that there was an idea that\nin June we'll be meeting so keeping in view this one - as you know, as\none of the objects to discuss so he tried to produce some results. But\nhe didn't have, I know for sure, his instructions because I read it.\nK:\nI tell you what we should do this week, Anatol. We should talk on a\nthinking out loud basis what we should try to manage on this treaty.\nD:\nThis is exactly, really.\nK:\nAnd then we must have some latitude to manage it with our Allies. That's -\nusually when we have discussed on a thinking out loud basis it's come out\nthat way.\nD:\nYeh. You see, with the Allies we have the same problem that you have.\nAnd after all really, the really beginnings when the President was in\nMoscow there was discussion with our le aders. Even at that time there\nwas some concern as though we didn't have it and it was our impression\nthat you didn't have it. Some maybe say something but nobody said\nanything against. After all, a leading country has a right to say something\nor do something. It is good for them and for their Allies. They don't\ngo in to deceive them so why should they be concerned about what some-\nbody said and so on, I mean.\nK:\nAnatol, what we should do tomorrow is to have a preliminary talk\ngoing through it carefully.\nD:\nThe two texts, yeh.\nK:\nThen we meet again later this week. At least once and probably twice.\nAnd then if you go back on Sunday - what about the date though?\nD:\nWell, up to now I don't have anything really.\nK:\nThat frankly is beginning to irritate the President.\nD:\nI understand.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nK:\nYou know as far as we're concerned\nhave to\nD:\nNo, no, Henry, I understand your feelings and you/understand mine too.\nThey know very well there SO why the delay is I don't know. Probably\nthey are thinking about the\nbecause before I receive your\ndraft they mentioned\nK:\nIf he thinks it's being used as a favor\nwiththese\nwhich\nis\ndone\nto\nhim\nD:\nNo, no.\nK:\nThen I'd say let's just start again much later.\nD:\nNo, I wouldn't go so far as that - Both of our bosses are mature enough\nthat nobody is playing or\nit's a mutual interest. It's very, very\nclear.\nK:\nLook I am optimistic that this will come out with something fairly close\nto what we discussed in your counterdraft.\nD:\nLet's try to do something.\nK:\nBut we have to go through a certain process in getting there.\nD:\nOK, let's try one way to do it because\nnot this\nSummit as I mentioned to you but I didn't go into details because of the\ntelephone but at that time it was in the\nhe wanted to darify\nthe details of this Agreement or if you have some details they are some\nquestions to be discussed. So when he send the\n, it was\nalready when he mentioned to me that\nand\nthen I am telling you to what extent he was\n; everything pressing.\nAnd he thinks only left a few minor things and for you to come on this\n.\nBut now it looks - OK, we will discuss it tomorrow.\nK:\nAnatol, I think we can\nD:\nIt is my impression too.\nK:\nActually\nD:\nI don't know why but the telegram I receive surprise myself. Honestly,\nI warn you jokingly, but it was not joke, I expected that there would be\nsome - remember when I ask you to look at once again, it not because I\ntry to be clever but I knew how it would be this especially - rather\nThere are some other things too, and so this was reaction not completely\nunexpected to me but I think the important thing is for us to sit down and\ndiscuss it. This is my impression.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nK:\nI mean after all if we don't look at it bureaucratically the difference\nbetween this two drafts is not world shaking. I understand there are\nsome points there that you're sensitive to but it doesn't make them\nearth shaking.\nD:\nNo, I understand especially Article I. If you could manage to move\nsome of your - what you wanted - it is my impression. I don't have\nreally an expression on either but I am prepared to because I know\nwhat the thinking in Moscow is.\nK:\nThat's what I'm thinking. Frankly, Anatol, that's my thinking too.\nAnd frankly speaking here as friends, I told you right away I have to\ngo through something with Article I to show that we haven't just\naccepted when this thing surfaces, the first version.\nD:\nNo, I understand. But I think if you could find out very closely on\nparagraph first it would be enough to do everything. Do you understand\nwhat I mean?\nK:\nOh, of course, let's talk about it tomorrow.\nD:\nSo tomorrow is 8:30.\nK:\nAnd as I understand it there's really only one offending clause in para-\ngraph 1.\nD:\nSecond paragraph.\nK:\nSecond paragraph the thing about the conditions that war\nbut it\nis the only one that is really a problem.\nD:\nYes, you look, maybe you'll have a chance to look before tomorrow just\nfor yourself, you look in our paragraph number 1 and I will look at yours\nonce more and then we will try to do something about it tomorrow.\nK:\nExactly, but tell them to cool off in Moscow. You and I have solved\nworse problems.\nD:\nI mention already to them and I mention to you tomorrow - I already send\ntelegram to Brezhnev saying that I have a date with you Tuesday morning.\nSo then I don't send anything today. Until tomorrow.\nK:\nGood, I also have something about the Egyptians to discuss with you.\nD:\nOK. So 8: 30.\nK: Right.\nD: Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n12:54 pm, April 10, 1973\nD:\nHello.\nK:\nAnatol.\nD:\nOh, hello, Henry, how are you.\nK:\nOkay. Two things, one we agree to the Voronsov meeting with\nStoessel, and we'd like to keep it at that level.\nD:\nOkay.\nK:\nWe don't want it at your level and Rush, that creates too much\nconfusion.\nD:\nOkay. Second?\nK:\nAnd you can let Vorontsov get in touch with Stoessel, say after Thursday.\nD:\nAfter Thursday, okay.\nK:\nSecond, I talked to the President and ve will take what you said very\nsdriously.\nD:\nI think this will be very helpful, Henry.\nK:\nAnd you can certainly do something.\nD:\nYeah. Around Thursday--\nK:\nYou can tell him that by the end of the day Thursday, we will do something.\nD:\nIn the text.\nK:\nIn the text, yes.\nD:\nOkay. So I could mention to Brezhnev this one, and say by Thursday\nyou will make a suggestion.\nK:\nThat's right.\nD:\nOkay, thank you very much.\nK:\nNow, thirdly, we hope you will show great restraint what you said to\nthe Egyptians because since we haven't communicated with them yet.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nD:\nOh, no. On this I can give you assurance that nothing will be said.\nK:\nGood, if you could do that--\nD:\nI give you firm assurances. Nothing will be said because when he\nmentions it I always have to make appraise to say or not to say.\nThis one is specific not say, if only in papers for Gromyko and\nBrezhnev. Nobody else knows.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nI am speaking about your own community, so on this I grant you.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nAnd Henry, this is all you said, yeah?\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nabout this European Conference, you know, because\nmany of them, I mean your President, Brezhnev, Pompidou and\nBrandt, involved in their many international activities,\nso we've got to have some sort of schedule, for consideration of\nPresident, Brandt and\n.\nI tell you this for your guidance.\nLet's put it on the calendar of our bosses, so to speak, the following.\nThe first stage - the foreign ministers level. June 27 or 28. For\na meeting period of ten days, what do you think.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nSecond stage: This is\nwork. The middle of July.\nK:\nRight. I understand.\nD:\nand work until the end of September.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nSo it's July, August, September. And the third stage we come to\nis of the highest level. Around October or November, this would be\nschedule for the governments to participate. Roughly speaking.\nK:\nOkay.\nD:\nI tell you this right now for your own but this is what Brezhnev would\nlike, to tell directly to president.\nK:\nI'd appreciate that, we'll appreciate that, and not inconsistent with our\nown thinking.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nD:\nJust to put their minds into some kind of-because maybe they have\nsome changes to make in the approximate--\nK:\nOne other thing I would like to tell you is insofar as you have any\ninfluence on the Poles and Hungarians, we would appreciate it if\nthey would play a somewhat more constructive role in that inter-\nnational commission.\nD:\nWhat.\nK:\nTo investigate any allegation of violation on the communist side, and\nthat's just impossible.\nD:\nOn any of them.\nK:\nPractically any of them.\nD:\nI will mention to--\nK:\nAnd if the result of this is that Canada pulls out at the end of May\nand the whole machinery then collapses at the end of May, that will\nnot be the best circumstance again for June.\nD:\nYeah, I understand. I think us will write the Hungarian Ambassador\nand\nfallen last week or so.\nK:\nThat's right.\nD:\nAnd to give them this\nK:\nThat's right. And we think with your influence it would be constructive.\nD:\nOkay, I will look into it, I will send to Moscow.\nK:\nGood. I have to see your Indian ally now.\nD:\nIt's very impressive what you are going to--oh, Indian, but I do not--\noh, you are seeing him right ngw.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nOn Thursday I will tell you something, but it is my impressions. You\ngive me xxx your Indian talks.\nK:\nMy Indian talks.\nD:\nJust a suggestion. You and I could tell it on my own, nobody ask me,\nbut some reflections which I personally care for your--\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nK:\nHow about giving me a hint now?\nD:\nWell, I can't give you anything special something, otherwise you\nknow everything. So I will try to tell you Thursday.\nK:\nYou keep my interest in stress, would be good guidance for me.\nD:\nI do it Thursday. On Thursday you can call me and--\nK:\nExactly.\nD:\nThank you very much.\nK:\nBye.\nD:\nBye, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n6:10 p. m., April 11, 1973\nD:\nHello.\nK:\nAnatol.\nD:\nHello, Henry. You should work that hard.\nK:\n(laughter)\nD:\nSo I try to just to give you a break. When I call, the girls always\nanswer -- he's at a meeting, he's at a meeting. I was under the\nimpression that you decide everything youself.\nK:\nOf course, but I have to go through the motions of pretending.\nD:\n(laughter) Because always missing. I rather would prefer that he is\nsitting and thinking alone, this is much more becoming. But just\nmeeting and meeting, you shouldn't go that far, Henry.\nK:\nI never --\nD:\nDemocracy is good till you set time limit, as you know.\nK:\nI never think if I can help it.\nD:\n(alughter) I understand. Well, two rather points I would like to\nmention. [I just receive telegram from Gromyko. ] Now our two\nboys in Geneva decided to make a break for a vacation.\nK:\nYes, which is just as well.\nD:\nYeah, I think so. They will be out till -- really out till you arrive in\nMoscow.\nK:\nUntil the 30th is what I thought.\nD:\nNo, they said until the 4th of May.\nK:\nOkay.\nD:\nThat is quite all right. But there is another point -- rather two points\nI really want to mention. First, I receive from Moscow the sayings\nabout our yesterday's talks because Brezhnev personally attaches great\nimportance to these particular talks so he noticed what you tell me when\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n2\n6:10 p. m., April 11, 1973\nD:\n(cont'd) you called me back and he said quite all right; he just\nadvise the President and you will look once again and he hoped that\ntomorrow by the end there will be some reaction on this.\nK:\nWell, we are concentrating on those two paragraphs.\nD:\nYes, I understand.\nK:\nArticle I and II.\nD:\nYes, so this is really what he really --\nK:\nAnd then my suggestion is that the other Article V we leave aside\nfor the time being.\nD:\nI think it's quite all right. AT least when you will be there, you\nmight even want one or two minutes with Brezhnev.\nK:\n(laughter)\nD:\n(laughter) He will not accept it from me but he will accept from you\nwhen you will present it. (laughter) Well, so tomorrow when it will\nbe possible for me to see you? Just making a wild guess -- 5 o'clock?\nK:\nHow about 3 o'clock?\nD:\nOh, that's better. 3 o'clock;better. So the usual place, 3 o'clock.\nK:\nUsual place, 3 o'clock.\nD:\nFine. And now I would like to discuss with you about this state of\nBrezhnev visit here.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nYou see, I would like to know if this is -- things as following: Would\nit be possible when you will be here in Moscow can you discuss with\nBrezhnev all the things. Then to finally fix a concrete date of his\narrival to Washington and --\nK:\nWell, except --\nD:\nJust a minute, just a minute; I will finish and then you will -- And if it\nwould be that during these talks it will be not only finalized this exact\ndate, but at the same time could we publish joint announcement about\nthe date of this visit. And this could be published during your stay or\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n3\n6:10 p.m., April 11, 1973\nD:\n(cont'd) immediately after you leave Moscow, it will be announced.\nAs far as I know, and I have some telegrams explaining for my own\ninformation, the most probable and the most acceptable for both sides\ndate of his visit is that which you proposed -- really June 18th.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nI know this really will be the most --\nK:\nIf we have a question of how to announce it, there's no need -- We can\ndo it the way you suggest, as a result of my visit there.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nI'm sure. I have to check with the President.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nAlthough, you know --\nD:\nIt could be during or when you leave. Then after, the next day or two\ndays.\nK:\nThat's right.\nD:\nIt could be done.\nK:\nBut what we don't want is that I go there -- It will be a little more\ndifficult to go there if we don't have a date fixed just for our own\nbureaucratic reasons.\nD:\nYeah, I understand.\nK:\nBecause\nare going to say what the hell is he doing there?\nD:\nWho?\nK:\nI mean, my colleagues who --\nD:\nColleagues. But you don't know. It's just really most acceptable\nproblem --\nK:\nBut that's all right, we'll settle that.\nD:\nIs it June 18th? So it's --\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified:\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n4\n6:10 p. m., April 11, 1973\nK:\nNo, no; what I mean is it's one thing for me to go to prepare a\nsummit, which I've done before.\nD:\nYeah.\njust\nK:\nIt's another to take a trip there. But let's not worry about that,\nwe can handle that.\nD:\nYeah.\nK:\nThe other thing is if we have a private understanding that it will be\nJune 18th or June 20th or something like that --\nD:\nNow I really understand that the most acceptable for us and for you,\nas I understand, will be June 18th. This is my understanding from\nall telegrams.\nK:\nNo; give or take two or three days, that's all right. But what I cannot\nhave is go there and then --\nD:\nNo, no; I understand.\nK:\nHave it said, oh, now you decide to come in August.\nD:\nOh, no, I understand.\nK:\nYou see what I mean?\nD:\nYes.\nK:\nIf we can agree ahead of time that it will be within a certain ten day\nperiod, then I'm pretty sure we can settle it when I'm in Moscow.\nD:\nI understand. Okay. With this kind of understanding, I will then say --\nBecause as it looks to me, it's really most acceptable but Brezhnev\nwould like to finalize when you will be there. But I understand that\nyou would like to at least have assurances that it is June and then --\nAs it looks to me, it will be June 18th as you propose, really. This is\nbetter than May, really.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nFrom what I receive from different sources, including from highest,\nBecause they have some their own some problems but as I understand\nit will be the most acceptable. I'm telling you because I know from\nwhat telegrams I am receiving.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n5\n6:10 p.m., April 11, 1973\nK:\nWell, I noticed you said in that message about the European Security\nConference you proposed the 28th.\nD:\nThat's for Gromyko going.\nK:\nYeah, for Gromyko.\nD:\nIt's not for Brezhnev.\nin\nK:\nNo, no; for Gromyko but that seemed to me to fit / with the other stuff.\nD:\nYeah, I think this is -- That's why I probably think I have telegram\nfrom Brezhnev and from Gromyko.\nK:\nBecause I want Gromyko on the West Coast. I want to take him to\nsome parties in Beverly Hills.\nD:\n(laughter) You shouldn't spoil him because he is preparing for a\nserious conference and you are trying to spoil him. You know what\nhappened when he was in Paris. Rogers really make quite a move -- his\nwife, him, Mrs. Gromyko to a private club.\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nSo it was four of them. Well, Gromyko usually doesn't go alone. It's\nmost unusual for him to go into a nightclub. So I was so surprised when\nhe told me in Moscow. I asked him, \"Really, you went in a nightclub? II\nHe said, \"Yes, I was there. 11 And then when I saw the other day Rogers\nI asked is it really? He said, yes, I did. And to my surprise, he\naccepted.\nK:\nIt wasn't a nightclub; it was a public restaurant.\nD:\nI don't know; I don't know. He said to me it was like a nightclub but\nnot in a sense of a very advanced I should say but rather in between a\npublic restaurant and a nightclub but I never was there. It's some kind\nof a --\nK:\nAnatol, one evening --\nD:\n(laughter)\nK:\nOne evening when you're all on the West Coast, I'll take you and Gromyko\nto Los Angeles.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n6\n6:10 p. m., April 11, 1973\nD:\n(laughter) Well, if this could be mentioned, I'll definitely agree\nbeforehand. Because I'm sure that Gromyko will think very hard\nbefore making any decisions.\nK:\nIncidentally, I understand you made a very unfriendly comment about\nme to Don Kendall today.\nD:\nUnfriendly?\nK:\nYou said you were sure I would come to the opening of the Bolshoi Ballet\nwith a girl whose first name I don't know.\nD:\n(laughter)\nAh\nIt's a little between but I was in a way joking.\nK:\nIt's true but why should you give away my secrets to an outsider?\nD:\nNo, because you know how it happened? He at least pretended he is\na good friend of yours. I don't know whether he really is or not.\nBut\nsecond,\nwhat\nhe\nsaid\nHe said, \"Do you know what was the last\nname I haven't seen you When you were the last time in a\npicture I think it was a week ago. I couldn't really follow very\nclosely, you are usually ahead of me. There was a picture in a\nmagazine where you were with some girl. He said, \"What was her\nname?\" I said, \"I really don't know all the names of Henry's girls\nSO I'm not so sure whether he knows himself. 11 In this connection, he\nsaid, \"And I was intending to invite him with one of those girls. \" So\nI said, well, I don't know whether he knows and this is how it happened\non the discussion.\nK:\n(laughter)\nD:\nAnd by the way, he mentioned that he came to me about his discussion --\nHe said that I have not had a chance it so happened to discuss with you\nthis ideas about\nbut I intend to raise it with you. Because\nhe asked me.\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nAnd he said, don't you know what don't I know what it might you?\nI said frankly, I never discuss; I don't know really. You will have to\ncheck with him but I\nK:\nYeah, I haven't formed a clear opinion on it yet.\nD:\nNo, no; but there is nothing really to form. There will be --\nK:\nI have nothing against it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n7\n6:10 p. m., April 11, 1973\nD:\nYes, I haven't seen anything specific really here to be mentioned.\nK:\nOkay, Anatol, I must run.\nD:\nOkay. So we will be tomorrow meeting and this as I understand you\nat least to have a --\nK:\nYour first and second paragraphs.\nD:\nYes, it is clear.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nOkay, till tomorrow 3 o'clock.\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nBye, bye.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n5:45 pm, April 12, 1973\nK:\nAnatol!\nD:\nYes, hello Henry.\nK:\nOn our discussions, I've talked to the President and he feels\nwe shouldn't say between them that really leaves the impression\nthat nuclear war with other countries is all right.\nD:\nBut this is in the beginning in general. What was in our discussion\nwith you at the very beginning it was first the global policy of our\ntwo countries.\nK:\nBut at any rate he would like to think about that further.\nD:\nFurther?\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nBecause this is what brings back to what we discussed, because\nyou remember when I gave you what was a general escape phkASE form\nbut he gave it to you in American international- you said the\nsecond paragraph within Article 2, just to make it between us.\nThis is a general statement but at the same time it will be just\nbetween us.\nK:\nWhy don't you transmit this as it is and we'll still have until\nSunday to see whether we can change I'll have another talk\nwith the President.\nD:\nWell fine, because up til now everything was all right, but our\nmajor point was, you remember, in the last and Brezhnev\nagain said the main idea is\ngoing to do it but in a\ngeneral sense. That's why this was main idea, just want to\nsettle, general policy of their object of their policy, everything\nbut in the second paragraph or the third Article, just\nto make it your this is policy, but not in general\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nBecause on this\nin the last one I discussed withl\nyou the day before yesterday, you can read it ina draft which I\ngave you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon/page 2\nK:\nNo, no, I see it.\nD:\nYes, and the second\nib on your draft on the\nyou make an exclamation by article 1 which we gave it to you. It\nwas specifically saying that the decisive part of the document is\nof course the object in mind but\nthe language I concur.\nIt covers much of the matters of relation between our two CO untries\nbut rather\nthe global approach is questionable in relation\nto the war. We are prepared for ?accept of Article 1 in general\nthe language proposed by your side, with the understanding, however,\nthat this group approach\nwith the appropriate measure\nof mutual relations which you developed--\nK:\nWell, let me raise that again.\nD:\nYes, because it was specific question. It doesn't change very much\nand this is exactly as written in the declaration.\nK:\nNo, between them isn't in the declaration.\nD:\nBut substantively it is, in a general thing. By the way, when he\npropose to you remember, you now say USA in\nmajor\nimportance to prevent but you don't really accept this one, but\ndoesn't matter, because you took it basically from the declaration.\nExactly what they wrote in the--\nK:\nExcept for the phrase \"Between them\".\nD:\nHuh. No, they don't have it here, yes. As measure of impor tance\nI will give it to you. Unfortunately Brezhnev is going to say \"utmost\nimportance, you simply are saying to the utmost, I don't see any\ndifference, but\nK:\nWell I think to the utmost is stronger than\n.\nD:\nYeah, yes I agree with you. Of course, another they do their utmost\nto\nconfrontation. In the second phrase, Number one\nbasically support. So we have both, measure of importance and\nto the utmost. But I don't see any specifically difference. But as a\nsecond\nK:\nI will transmit that interpretation to the President.\nspecifically\nD:\nYes, because strategically it was mentioned in message which I gave\nyou.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nK:\nOkay. Now with respect to the 2nd paragraph, Article, we propose\nto follow and the two parties agreed. In accordance with Article 1\nD:\nJust a minute - in accordance\nK:\nWith Article 1 and to realize it's objectives.\nD:\nTo realize?\nK:\nYes, and to achieve it's objectives to proceed from the\n.\nD:\nIn accordance with Article 1 and to their allies.\nK:\nYes, it's objectives.\nD:\nOh, their objectives. It is practically the same as it was but it is\nmore--\nK:\nWell, it's a little stronger.\nD:\nYeah. All right, but on this\nK:\nI will go back to the President on the other one.\nD:\nCouldn't you give me the answer really.\nK:\nI will try.\nD:\nBecause this really very important, but I will give the language to\nBrezhnev today and then you will cover everything. Otherwise\nit will look a little--again a general statement.\nK:\nOkay. Well let me\nD:\nOkay, I will wait Henry.\nK:\nOkay.\nD:\nBye, bye.\nK;\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n6:35 pm, April 12, 1973\nD:\nHello.\nK:\nAnatol!\nD:\nYes, Henry.\nK:\nUnfortunately the President has a reception at the White House and\nI have to leave for a White House Photographers dinner now.\nD\nD:\nMaybe later. I will call then tomorrow or late in the night really\nbecause I feel it--\nK:\nWell, I think you'd betterhold it until tomorrow.\nD:\nWell I can wait until tomorrow maybe.\nK:\nI just can't do it with the President on the telephone at night.\nD:\nI understand. But when I call--really I. will not send this now\nit covers everything and, you with your impressions, Anatol will\nsay this is most clear and so on. I would better wait then until;\ntomorrow.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nAll right.\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nUntil tomorrow, and you will call me tomorrow morning, yeah.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nAnd you, it's not my business, but you have to look towards discussion\nof Cambodia, and you look about at statements of general/on this matter.\nK:\nI've seen it. He will hear from us.\nD:\nToo strong, he condemns, and unjustifiable\non U.S. government.\nWell, so I will wait until tomorrow.\nK:\nRight. Bye.\nD:\nBye, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n8:41 a.m. - 4/13/73\nK:\nHello.\nD:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nYes, Anatol.\nD:\nHow are you? You call me already but I was upstairs. Yesterday I'\ncalled you when I ran in again a letter the day before to\nthis\nArticle 1, and when I look through I really miss one\nword you put\nhere. Basically the question \"thereby\". This is completely of course\nunnecessary. Remember to avoid\nK:\nI know, I know it very well.\nD:\nYes, because in the text of the declaration -- basic intervals -- I\njust quote: \"Therefore we will do the utmost to avoid military\nconfrontation and to prevent outbreak of nuclear war''. Four sentences\njust saying about the situation capable of\n.\nThis is exactly\nfrom the declaration. You've got \"thereby\".\nK:\nYou want to improve the declaration.\nD:\nto have it as good or better as the declaration, but not to make\nit worse.\nK:\nWell that makes it worse.\nD:\nOf course it is. It makes a difference for some kind of nuclear war\nis some kind of condition\nwhat they have to do--\nconfrontation\nnucleatr war point, but not to\nsay this and \"thereby\". What you suggest to do\n( static on tape makes it impossible\nto translate)\nthan the basic principle.\nK:\nWhy is it worse, that's what I don't understand.\nD:\nNo, no, ;no, because he just said what kind of\nshould be done.\nAnd \"thereby\", \"thereby\" as if it is some kind of condition to be met\nbefore--this kind of thing. Just enumerate it, this, this and this.\nWhy should we put it \"thereby\"\nK:\nBecause we constantly try to improve matters.\nD:\nI understand.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nD:\nit is better to improve. As it is because, I'm sure\nstrong objection. That's why I told you yesterday when I begin\nto translate in Russian, in Russian it sounds really very strong. When\ni look through I miss it, but when I gave another glance I saw it. Call me\nback this evening about 7:00.\nK:\nK:\nWell I have to call you back later today anyway.\nD:\nOkay, so I would like you to look into this two points mentioned.\nAnd Henry, I just want to\nbut we can do next week it's not important.\nK:\nRight, no, no, you never mislead me.\nD:\nThis really not important, I don't want to quite frankly.\nThis is rather important to have a\nthis particular Article\nK:\nAll right, I understand.\nD:\nWell, please, call me back when\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nOkay.\nK:\nOkay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified:\nTELCON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n4/13/73\n4:18 p.m.\nHK:\nAnatol?\nAD:\nHello, Henry.\nHK:\nI can only conclude that you have the telphone in the wrong place.\nAD:\nWhy in the wrong place?\nHK:\nBecause it takes so long to get to it.\nAD:\nIt seems to it is in my bedroom, you know.\nHK:\nNo, no that's all right. Look here is our suggestion now. Im sorry\nit has been such a busy day for everybody and that it took so long.\nAD:\nYeh.\nHK:\nWe will move the'thereby\" -have you got it in front of you\nAD:\nYes, yes I ha ve it.\nHK:\nIf we say it this way capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation\nof their relations, and therefore to avoid military confrontation, which\nis exactly what we have in the text in the principle--\nAD:\nAccording to this consideration and therefore and thereby\nHK:\nNo, leave out thereby\nAD:\nAnd after their relations, what do you propose?\nHK:\nYou say exacerbation of their relations and therefore to avoid military\nconfrontation--exactly from the principle\nAD:\nand exclude--\nHK:\nExclude the outbreak of nuclear war and here is how we would propose\nto say that what you want to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war\nbetween each other and between either party and third countries.\nBetween each other is better in English- but if you want--\nAD:\nI understand\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\nHK:\nAnd between either party and third countries.\nAD:\nAnd between either party and third countries.\nMy first reaction on this will be this way. If you really insist on\nthis third countries maybe we will have to look down to put it down\nin other paragraph because here as I understand the main idea of\nGromyko and Brezhnev was first Article I--the use of the danger\nof nuclear war, second which we were trying to tell you let's make\nwhat concerns us, and then maybe make the comment on third\ncountries maybe some other place.\nHK:\nWell we don't say exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between each\nother -that's fine, we accept that now and between either party and\nthird countries\nAD:\nAnd bet ween either party and\nHK:\nthird countries.\nAD:\nHm huh.\nHK:\ntherefore- - we can drop if you accept the other, that is not so --\nAD:\nI understand. Well, I have to check this one really Henry, because\nthis is the only objection I have because it doesn't make it very clear\non the second part to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between\nthemselves and between either party and third countries.\nAD:\nI think for the time being, Iet us leave as you propose it. But I will\noff \"therefore\" just to make just as forceable at least to the depth\nthat you discussed before.\nHK:\nRight.\nAD:\nLet us put it this way- - As you gave it there is no change except the\nthereby, yes?\nHK:\nYes\nAD:\nAnd then the nuclear war between themselves and either party\nHK:\nBetween either party and third oountries\nAD:\nYes, yes and third countries\nHK:\nRight\nAD:\nOkay I will make an adjustment-\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nHK:\nWe really are making an effort Anatol, I know it is difficult.\nAD:\nI understand, I understand. So I will leave it for the time being\nand we will check with them.\nHK:\nOkay.\nAD:\nAs for the second we already discussed it--\nHK:\nJust read me the beginning of the second one so that we are sure we\nhave the same text--Article II\nAD:\nTwo parties agree in accordance with Article I andto realize these\nobjectives\nHK:\nto proceed--\nAD:\nYes, to proceed andso on.\nHK:\nI think this is an improvement\nAD:\nI think it is, the more I think about -- what is really the explanation\nHK:\nMy explanation is that if countries say you are making it possible to use\nnuclear weapons agains t third countries, we say no the same restraints\nwe jput against ourselves, wexhavexeithex vis-a-vis the Russians we\nput on ourselves vis-a-vis others.\nAD:\nNo between ourselves but between our and other countries\nHK:\nThat's right\nAD:\nYeh, I understand well it is explainable at least--okay Henry, I will\ntell right now because they asked about it\nHK:\nGood\nAD:\nAnd I will call you back. Thank you very much.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n1:55 p.m. - 4/14/73\nD:\nHello.\nK:\nAnatol.\nD:\nOh yes, hello Henry, how are you?\nK:\nHow are you?\nD:\nThank you. I heard you were quite a hit yesterday.\nK:\nOh, you had your man there.\nD:\nOf course I have to watch you.\nK:\nPolyakov was there.\nD:\nYes, how you behave, that's why he came to me and said what was the\ncase and I said just dinner - why don't you go because he's a new man\nand he came and he doesn't know what kind of society it is.\nK:\nI think it was a good idea.\nD:\nYeh, yeh, he like it very much.\nK:\nDid he tell you what I did?\nD:\nYes, he told me about some of the things you said.\nK:\nDid he tell you about the intelligence report I read?\nD:\nNo, no, he didn't mention it. Because I was rather busy.\nK:\nI made a parody of an intelligence report - I'll let you read it.\nD:\nAll right, I would like it. Do you have a text of your remarks?\nK:\nYeh, just for you. I mean I don't want to have it circulating.\nD:\nNo, no, no, definitely just with me only. You have sometimes quite\na points.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nK:\nAnatol, two things. First, when are you leaving ?\nD:\nI have not yet quite idea, quite frankly, because Gromyko mentioned\nto me that you have to be prepared to go within next day but up to now\nI didn't receive\nK:\nWell, I just wondered whether you and your wife want to come over, if\nyou're still here Monday, to get your picture taken in the garden.\nD:\nOh, Monday would be very nice. What time?\nK:\nOh, let's say 11:30.\nD:\nBut I do not want to interfere with the President sitting there and so.\nK:\nNo.\nD:\nI do not really in any way.\nK:\nNo, it's just a friendly visit.\nD:\nOh, I think that is right, but I mean with my girls.\nK:\nOf course, everybody.\nD:\nThere will be three of us, really, and you.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nOK, I will call you on Monday morning.\nK:\nWe may change it by half an hour or so.\nD:\nI understand. Now on the\nthat day, I will give them\ntomorrow, but in this hour let's stick to the month, OK.\nK:\nGood. Now the next thing is on Article II of the thing we discussed,\nthat reference to not encouraging third countries - if this causes you\nany great difficulty we can discuss it in the same category as Article V.\nD:\nAbout the third countries, yes?\nK:\nNot in Article I.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nD:\nNo, I understand, where it says about encouragement in connection\nwith the regional forces.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nYou see in that second paragraph when you remember Gromyko said\nit was taken exactly from our principles, I really didn't know why he\nsaid it because it was just from point of view of editing.\nK:\nWe can handle - no, I'm not talking about the second paragraph, I'm\ntalking about Article II.\nD:\nYes, I understand.\nK:\nNot the second paragraph of Article I.\nD:\nNo, no, I understand you are speaking about Article II in connection\nwith the forces. Not to use force.\nK:\nYeh, that's right.\nD:\nIn this connection. I remember this but I think that there was a\nin Article I but you just, you remember, he just picked up the word\nfrom the principles. But you mixed it up in the translation it looks\na bit different. It was really nothing at all.\nK:\nThat's right.\nD:\nSo this way I am rather surprised why you change it. And then when\nyou add something new, there is a kind of meaning, but you change\nhalf a paragraph in a way this is definitely only interesting so to speak.\nSo probably for doing it one way or another.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nIt appears - you see I don't know whether Gromyko will give me\nan assignment or not because now it's still tomorrow and he say to\nbe ready on the 4th - he may even delay my visit until the end of\nmonth in order to come before you. I don't know but you see the\ntelegram I have he says to prepare to go on a short notice immediately\nto Moscow for consultation. Until now he don't mention when I go.\nSo, Henry, I just wanted you to know I receive telegram from him\nbut\nto Monday. He raised a rather\nquestion\nto the President to note - it's about his State visit. It was signed in\nMoscow. You know a signed letter, it was signed and several documents\nwere signed - so Brezhnev ask the President in a sense, but there is a\nquestion of Most Favored Nation - Brezhnev understands it has some kind\nof problems and he asks what the President is doing. From the other side\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nD: (con't) we gave you what you want\n.\nWhat he is asking now -\nhe is asking to you and the President if you could give him his ideas\nor his thoughts on this question what does he think about the\ntiming of all this things to happen. You ask him - what he thinks\nthis question of Most Favored Nation will be discussed in Congress\nand will be finalized. The opinion of the President, of course it's\nnot a firm obligation but if you could find out from the President\nfor Brezhnev's own private information. And a second - what kind\nof an agreements does the President think can be done during\nBrezhnev's visit in the economic fields.\nK:\nI agree with you.\nD:\nSo this is questions he ask me.\nK:\nI will have to let you know on Monday or Tuesday. Monday.\nD:\nMonday, ok?\nK:\nI'll let you know on Monday the answer to both of these questions.\nD:\nYes, this is all just personal - his ideas what a general timetable\ncould be and second what other documents or agreements could be\non trade during his (Brezhnev's) visit. You are pressured very\nmuch, the President of course is under no obligation but his personal\nideas about this.\nK:\nWe are prepared to proceed on something.\nD:\nYes, you ask his own ideas - what is it because he doesn't know exactly\nK:\nI will let you know definitely. Right. Now finally, Anatol, as long\nas I have you on the phone. I'm sure you've already reported the\nextreme gravity with which we look at the Indochina situation.\nD:\nOf course you made it be.\nK:\nBut I really want your leadership not to be surprised - I mean we're\nnot doing anything this weekend.\nD:\nWhat do you surprised?\nK:\nI'm not - but we are very seriously concerned and we are not going to\nlet an agreement be broken.\nwithin three months of signing it in\nsuch a brutal flagrant way.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nD:\nDo you mean Vietnam or Cambodia?\nK:\nBoth.\nD:\nHave you ever received a reply from\nK:\nNo, we've never received a reply.\nD:\nAbout anything from Le Duc Tho?\nK:\nNo, never received a reply.\nD:\nHe hasn't answered yet?\nK:\nNO.\nD:\nWell, I've already mentioned to you - to the President your concern\nK:\nBut I've just had a meeting with the President. He is really - it doesn't\nmean he will do something in the next three days.\nD:\nNo, I understand. This is really - I understand but you have to under-\nstand one point because you know in this case do you really feel it's\nnecessary to help. I would propose it\nfor us to convey\nanything because we understand the situation but they know that you can\ntransmit to Moscow.\nK:\nThat's all that needs to be done. I wouldn't make no a separate demarche\non it. I wouldn't make a separate message. It's more urgent than it\nwas Thursday.\nD:\nI already made it very clear.\nK:\nIn that case, that can stay at that. There's nothing new since Thursday.\nI wouldn't allow them another weekend. Also there may be some wild\nboars that may survive if you did.\nD:\n(Laughs) Well, it's'a consideration. I never thought of it this way but\nprobably you're right. Monday I will be in touch with you. Please\ncheck with the President about his ideas. OK, Henry, thank you very much\nBye. Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n9:50 am, April 16, 1973\nK:\nHello.\nD:\nHello Henry. How are you. Thank 708 you very much for your\nspeech. Do you mind if I send it to Brezhnev?\nK:\nIf he doesn't take it seriously.\nD:\nNo, he '11 understand jokes. Because I like it very much. It's a\ndifferent kind of approach. (Laughter) This I think is one of your\nbest. He has a sense of humor.\nK:\nBy all means, send it to himwith my personal compliments.\nD:\nOkay. Nowomwould like to tell you several things right now which I\nreceived Xxxxx answers for you. First about your trip, Brezhnev\nsaid it's quite right -- not fourth but sixth.\nK:\nGood, thankyou.\narms limitation\nD:\nThen of course we are prepared to discuss and\nfor this purpose if necessary to add one or two days.\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nThen of course here Brezhnev mentions - this time you and he will\nkeep mutual promise that you will go definitely to Leningrad.\nK:\nI will go to Leningrad?\nD:\nYes. He thought you should go there.\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nSo please keep in mind about this one. This is everything about your\ntrip on the sixth. Now about articles we discuss, the text.\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nThis is Groynyko - in the second, he have two remarks as of now--\none is about article - -now why we discuss with you, but he feels\nits better to delete it.\nK:\nAll right, I'll take that up with the President.\nD:\nOkay, this is one. And the second part he mention is Article 1.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nOf course he doesn't like what you add, but for the time being I\ncan understand, he is thinging -- maybe he will accept it.\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nBut he says not he asked me to raise with you one question only\nin that--in connection with Article 1C 1. You remember in the second\nparagraph in this Article 1,1ⁿᵉ says-accordingly they will do their\nutmost to prevent the developmant of situations.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nIt is English, not Russian, He prefers to say: \"Accordingly they\nwill do everything to prevent\" not \"their utmost\".\nK:\nWill you tell him I will accept his English change if he will accept\na few Russian changes for me.\nD:\nWhat Russian changes?\nK:\nI have a few Russian words that I'd like in the text.\nD:\nWhat Russian words. (Laughter) I prefer the English best really.\nK:\nNo, I'm just kidding. Look Anatol, I think that's possible. Let me\njust look at it.\nD:\nIf you could please look at it, and call me back then, would you please.\nK:\nCause my first reaciton is not negative. I think you won't\nunderstand this but tell Gromyko my first reaction is not negative, he\nwill understand. It's a double negative.\nD:\nWell because I don't know really but it may be better, I don't know.\nK:\nIt's a little stronger to say do everything to the utmost, but let me\nlook at it.\nD:\nI think it basically means the same. But he likes to put it this way.\nHe didn't mention any other changes in this Article 1.\nK:\nNo, no, Anatol, we don't have any real expectations that your Secretary\nGeneral will let me off that easily when I get there.\n(Laughter)\nAs long as we are speaking.\nD:\nNow it is only one question then, please look at it and I think we can\nget\nK:\nThat would be great progress.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nD:\nYes. Could you give me answer on this?\nK:\nDefinitely.\nD:\nOkay. I guess you remember about this trade business. I now have\na telegram, you promised to look into it.\nK:\nI'll have an answer I hope by the end of the day or the first thing\nin the morning.\nD:\nThis is fine. Because now I have his telegram. He mentions now\nthat this Moscow meetng it has been done not a little in this area of\npresent economy as well as many others, but it is a question now\nhe is raising--you then naturally would like to look--not a great\neconomic one in this connection what is the status now of mutual\ngrant\nbecause about imports which are being\nin order to pass on his decision and from\nour side as B\nhas pointed this out himself he tried\nto get everything possible becuase\nand now\nat the same time he would like to know when is that opinion of the\nPresident, the situation is going to be positively stopped. He wants\nto know what's in the mind of the President. When he gets expression\nof the President this question could be posibly solved, and second it\nis important to know what the decision in trade and economic field\ncould be take at the forthcoming meeting between him and President\nNixon in order to make it on a high level so to speak.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nSo the questions One, what President thinking about time table of the\nMoscow session, and what other economic and business could be\ndiscussed.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nSo, I think we cover basically all, now about Fhotograph Could\nthey--\nK:\nYes, can we do it at a quarter to three.\nD:\nQuarter to three, the sun will be in the right position because we\nqould like to have the White House a little bit dark. All right.\nK:\nLet me cleck it out and I'll call you right back, with the photographer.\nD:\nYes, he knows better. So you call me back then.\nK:\nRight. Bye.\nD:\nByebye\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTel Con\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n6:20 pm, April 17, 1973\nK:\nAnatol!\nD:\nYes. Hello Henry.\nK:\nI'm sending over a paper to you of some ideas on economic things.\nD:\nRight now?\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nIt's very good because really it's better for him, Brezhnev, it would\nlike to have a more clear picture.\nK:\nIt's not very precise but at least it may give you some ideas.\nD:\nSome ideas, all right.\nK:\nI'll send it right over.\nD:\nOkay.\nK:\nNow, on this draft, I just an running out of ideas. If you prefer to\nsay assert a maximum effort?\nD:\nThey will do everything necessary, maybe?\nK:\nWell \"everthing necessary'is then a total commitment.\nD:\nI think it is not really, it's a preventative development, of situation\ncapable, incidentally commitment on such a very nature, did you not,\nlaughingly. So he propose everything to do, or as second but I think\nit is a very clumsy English, he gave a second but I didn't really propose\nit to you. Second, I translate from Russian, in English I don't like plenty\nbut--they will add: \"so as to prevent\" or they add in such a way as\nto prevent-- is it better for you.\nK:\nNo.\nD:\nHe gave me two possibilities. First, everything or all.\nK:\nCan I call you around 11:00 tonight?\nD:\nYou let me answer--my impression they are going to have a meeting\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nof Central Committee and Brezhnev will have some answers, that is\nmy impression.\nK:\nI will send you that economic thing now.\nD:\nOkay, but I definitely will until 11:00, that is no problem, it doesn't\nmatter.\nK:\nOkay, I'll call you tonight.\nD:\nTonight, but of course I want to send it today.\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nWe'll do whatever you say, we'll do \"everything\", if not--everything\nyou may imply, possible, everything.\nK:\nHow about exert the maximum effort?\nD:\nI think you done gave better we will do maximum to prevent--maximum\nwhat? You couldn't say maximum, no!\nK:\nNo, that's like everything.\nD:\nYeah, maximum effort, this is not really as it stands here, it doesn't\nreally--no--\nK:\nI don't know why he's wanting to change it, it's perfectly--\nD:\nNo, I don't have no idea really, when you maybe in Moscow you may\ndiscuss with him, for me I think utmost\nuntil\nK:\nWell, we could leave it open/&xxthe time when I'm in Moscow ifworse\ncomes to worse.\nD:\nWell, but he would like to have it now, because it will be a session of\ntheir--he willprobably make it a further plan so to speak, in this case\nK:\nOkay, let me see what I can do.\nD:\nHe pressed me to get this one, tkey didn't have a question except for\nthis one, you can make it clear when you will be there and continue it,\nbut here he would like to have it because in Russian as he translate it\n--I translate it differently, but he translate it in a said it's rather weak.\nPossibility, in Russian it does not sound really, I like rather well, but\nto translate in Russian, you will say they will do everything to prevent--\nbut it's really everything necessary. But the utmost you translate in\nEnglish, but in Russian it's saying everything possible, so when it is\npossible it's a question he doesn't like. He doesn't like the possible\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nin his translation. I said it's not necessary everything to sound\nbut he said it's definitely possible, and possible give you a - - who is\ngoing just possible, and there's quite an argument.\nK:\nWell, who's gonna touch necessary.\nD:\nWell, too, I look up all the matter, I just trying to - saying you propose\nthis one, I'm not proposing really, but--I don't know what suggestion\nbetter to make it. He ask me too to suggest, but he said one,\nK:\neverything to prevent, second they will act in such a way as to prevent,\nX:\nand for these two possibilities, I don't have any other here.\nK:\nOkay.\nD:\nSo, you will call me after 11:00.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nOkay, I will wait. Bye, bye.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n11:25 p.m. - 4/17/73\nD:\nHello.\nK:\nAnatol.\nD:\nHow are you?\nK:\nOK.\nD:\nNow I think could be\nafter a nice dinner.\nK:\nOf course.\nD:\nWas Frank Sinatra all right?\nK:\nHe was excellent - outstanding.\nD:\nI like him very much, really.\nK:\nHave you ever met him?\nD:\nI met him on occasion once.\nK:\nOh yeh, you met him at a dinner I gave.\nD:\nYes, yes, and a dinner twice - the time at Para mount you know.\nK:\nAnatol, on that thing we were discussing, I just haven't had a chance\nfor a full discussion with the President, but I think personally this:\nIf we leave that one phrase open - you know the phrase ''do their utmost\nor everything possible\" - and the other idea of Gromyko is to say\n\"act so as to\".\nD:\nHis other idea is to say - yes, \"act so as to prevent\" or \"in such a way\nas to prevent\"\nK:\nWell, that too, is possible and I think we should say - you should tell\nBrezhnev that we will do our really best to work something out along\nthese lines\neither \"act so as to\" or \"everything that is necessary\"\nor something like that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nD:\nBut couldn't I tell \"everything necessary\"? I really.\nK:\nI just cannot make it firm tonight.\nD:\nYou couldn't yet?\nK:\nNo, but I can tell you that there is a very good chance that we will\nfind some formula that - you know - \"do the utmost\" isn't bad in\nEnglish.\nD:\nThat's my impression too.\nK:\nNo, no, I understand your point, but if you tell Gromyko that we will\ntake it very seriously.\nD:\nCould I just tell him as of now you are thinking of' everything necessary\"\nand in this proposal of second 11 will act in such a way to prevent\"\nK:\nYes, but I cannot make an absolutely firm commitment on it.\nD:\nI understand. Could you make it tomorrow, then I will save what you\nare thinking for tomorrow.\nK:\nWell, I will try but we have a lot of other things here right now.\nD:\nI understand, but you would rather next week\nK:\nWhen will it be next week?\nD:\nI think the beginning of next week.\nK:\nYeh, why don't you give me til Thursday.\nD:\nThursday. It would be best tomorrow because on Thursday we usually\nhave a\nK:\nYeh, well let me try to call you tomorrow on it.\nD:\nTomorrow.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nBut really Henry, I have never pressed on you but please try to do it\ntomorrow.\nK:\nOK. Fine. Good.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n6:28 p.m. - 4/19/73\nK:\nHello.\nD:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nHow are you?\nD:\nWell, how are you? I miss you for several hours I haven't chance\nto speak with you.\nK:\nI'm glad you liked these pictures.\nD:\nOh, I really do like them. My wife and I we thank you very, very\nmuch. Really they are wonderful! Did you see them?\nK:\nYes, I saw them. I thought they were really great - they turned out\nextraordinarily well.\nD:\nOh, very well. They are beauties. And I like - you are standing very\nK:\nI thought that came out very well.\nD:\nYes, so I am really thankful and please send him my best or I will\ncall him myself.\nK:\nHe can make as many copies as you want.\nD:\nThank you very much. It's really very nice and it's a nice present.\nReal nice.\nK:\nOh, not at all.\nD:\nYes, thank you. Henry, have you seen the paper?\nK:\nI have been out of the office all day, I've just looked at it. Let me\nread it again and call you back.\nD:\nOK.\nK:\nI'll call you back.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n7:50 p.m. - 4/19/73\nD:\nYes.\nK:\nAnatol.\nD:\nHello, Henry, I thought you are in Florida already.\nK:\nNo, no, I'm not going to Florida.\nD:\nYou are not.\nK:\nNo.\nD:\nOh, how you manage that? (Laughs)\nK:\nIt's the only time I can get serious work done.\nD:\n(Laughs) During this vacation period.\nK:\nYeh. All right. On that note you sent me, frankly I'm going to check\nour intelligence people to see whether there's anything like that which\nis authorized going on. And if it is I'll stop it. But if you can give me\nsome more facts, it would really be a big help.\nD:\nI will check with Moscow.\nK:\nIf they can give me license plates of cars or any make or anything\nat all.\nD:\nI will check with Moscow. I do not have a checklist - only what I sent\nto you.\nK:\nBecause in the abstract - you know I don't know - I am making inquiries\nand it will take about 24 hours to find out\nD:\nWell, 24 hours doesn't make any difference, really.\nK:\nOr 48 hours.\nto find out whether\nD:\nI think it is really a matter of\nK:\nSee I am not yet aware of anything like that being done. I cannot say that\nsome madman isn't doing this - you're sure it's American.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nD:\nIt definitely says it is Americans.\nK:\nAll right. Now look, if it's Americans that are in any official it will\nbe stopped, you can give them the assurance immediately.\nD:\nI understand. OK.\nK:\nAnd you can say I'm starting the most urgent investigation. It would\nhelp us if you could give us some facts.\nD:\nOK.\nK:\nYou can tell Moscow now that if it's in any way officially connected\nit will be stopped.\nD:\nOK.\nI will. Henry, what about this 5% you owe me?\nK:\nWhat 5% ?\nD:\nYou said to me yesterday about this\n95% is spent.\nK:\nWell, it's now 97%.\nD:\n(Laughs) Tomorrow is going to go to 97 1/2%.\nK:\nI am much more concerned with Brezhnev's position than you.\nD:\nI'm not concerned about his position at all.\nK:\nThat's right because I want to build him up. Let him beat it out of me.\nD:\n(Laughs) No, it's much better to have a friendly conversation than to\ngive you beating. You don't deserve beating, do you?\nK:\nLet him yell and scream at me.\nD:\nWell, I think\na point where he may yell and scream.\nK:\nHe's going to do it anyway. I'll let you know tomorrow. afternoon.\nD:\nTomorrow afternoon, OK. Before the President is going to Florida.\nK:\nYeh. Now the only other thing I'm going to tell you, Anatol, is that\nif I arrive in Moscow and I find a stone statue to you in a park I know\nyou've taken advantage of me.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nD:\nOh, no.\nK:\nParticularly if it has Article I engraved in the bottom.\nD:\nWell, I'm prepared to standhalf an hour to maintain the difference\nin the\nof the stone. (Laughs) Monument. Until tomorrow.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nTomorrow then you will tell me about it.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nOK, because Gromyko still asks me. He says please ask him so I\nknow. This is the only issues I press on you. I didn't press on any\nother issue, that's all.\nK:\nOK.\nD:\nBut this is the only paragraph and Gromyko wants to know.\nK:\nYeh, but that's no help to me because if I'm any judge of Brezhnev\nhe'll have plenty to press on me when I get there.\nD:\n(Laughs) But they are not really big issues.\nK:\nFond as I am of him.\nD:\nBy the way I read in the press that Italian Prime Minister has a new\nwonderful plan on the Middle East. What is up to?\nK:\nThat Anatol is about as correct as the letter Khruschev wrote to\nPhan Farney (sp. ?)\nOK. We will compare that plan to Khruschev's\nletter and see whether there's any correspondence.\nD:\nI understand. But this stands because you said about\nand\nso on so now I speak to XXXX Moscow that you are staying until the 10th.\nSo it's tenth.\nhasn't changed anything plus, minus.\nK:\nI haven't heard anything yet.\nD:\nso I understand that you will stay until the 10th.\nK:\nThat's right - I will leave on the 9th.\nD:\nOK, Henry, so I will call you tomorrow or you call me when you have\nan answer on this. OK?\nK: Right.\nD: OK, Bye. Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n9:35 a.m., April 22, 1973\nK:\nAnatol, you just can't stay away from me.\nD:\nOf course not. I just received a telegram from Gromyko. Brezhnev\nwould like to inform the President just for his information that this\nagreement reached with Brandt that Brezhnev will visit West Germany\nbeginning from 18th to 22nd of May.\nK:\nAll right. 18th to the 22nd of May. We won't do any bombing in Germany\nduring that period.\nD:\nI hope you will not. And your speech will be encouraging (laughter). I\nmean, Iknow tomorrow you are going to make a speech\nK:\nFrankly, it doesn't affect anything in East-West relations. Almost\nentirely addressed to internal Western relations.\nD:\nInternal? Yeah, I understand, relations. Well, I think after all we have\nthe Year of Europe. haven't we?\nK:\nThat's what it's about. It explains the Year of Europe.\nD:\nBecause I think\nfor your ideas because they are just waiting,\nwaiting and they would like to know exactly. So your speech will make\nit clearer for opening the way for the Year of Europe. Yes?\nK:\nWell, I am now in the process of placing the verbs. I've got everything\nelse written.\nD:\n(laughter) All right.\nK:\nBasically I don't see anything in that speech that affects the Soviet\nposition at all.\nD:\nI think you are wise to\nK:\nI mean, it's basically a speech that we will maintain our friendship\nwith Europe even though we are determined to continue on East-West\nrelaxation.\nD:\nI think the knowledge -- Seriously, I think Brandt is going to go there\nin their own way but in that direction so it couldn't be American\n.\nK:\nIt's not a controversial speech.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified:\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n2\nD:\nYes.\nK:\nParticularly, as it will take them three or four days to understand what\nI've said.\nD:\n(laughter) Well, this is the point. That is why it's like a\nwhen you give something like a mind. You make tick, tick, tick and\nnobody knows what it's up to.\nwhat he really meant. But I\nthink it will give some excitement in its chanceries of the foreign offices\nand prime ministers. Why not for a change?\nK:\nExactly.\nD:\nBecause sometimes they became too fat.\nK:\nExactly. Good. So from the 18th to the -- Will he travel around Germany?\nYes, I know he will travel.\nD:\nWell, they give me only this. Because just the agreement was reached\nabout the date so this I mean, to tell the others.\nK:\nNow, Anatol, I've told the President that there is an agreement that\naround the 18th of June he will come here.\nD:\nAlong those lines, I said that finally they were going to tell you while\nyou will be in Moscow but\nK:\nNot whether, only when.\nD:\nYes, when it will begun but the date will be discussed and fixed during\nyour visit.\nK:\nYeah. But my point is I'm going on the assumption, not that it's on 18th,\nbut I will not arrive in Moscow and then be faced with a proposal for a\nvery much different date.\nD:\nNo, I do not have this kind of information at all, which could lead to the\nconclusion you just mentioned. All the information I have makes me\nrather believe it will be the 18th.\nK:\nRight. Well, that's all right.\nD:\nYes, but they agree the date, plus or minus\nK:\nNo, that's fine plus or minue two or three days.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n3\nD:\nYes, yes. I am under these assumptions.\nK:\nNow, one other thing, Anatol, we are thinking of - I was wondering -- It\nhadn't occurred to us when we spoke before whether Brezhnev would like\nto go to Detroit and see some automobile factories.\nD:\nI will check with him. Maybe.\nK:\nWe have no interest in it.\nD:\nNo, no, I understand perfectly well.\nK:\nKnowing his interest in motor cars.\nD:\nNo, no, I understand. Henry, I'm just thinking aloud on my own - you\nhave to understand e idea if maybe he would like to go -- he didn't mention\nto me but suggestion of my own for him -- from L.A. then he has to go\nback across again, maybe to go to Alaska through Pacific.\nK:\nOf course.\nD:\nYou not have any objection?\nK:\nNo problem whatsoever.\nD:\nBecause I am just thinking maybe it then could be proposed -- he might\nlike it but I don't know.\nK:\nNo, if he wants to go to Alaska, that might actually be a rather nice\ngesture.\nD:\nI don't know maybe he'd rather --\nK:\nOr you can overfly Alaska. You can probably make it to Siberia from\nL.A. without stopping.\nD:\nI will check.\nK:\nOr he can go to Hawaii and go --\nD:\nI understand.\nK:\nIt's entirely up to him.\nD:\nI will check with him. Because when I go to Moscow, I would like to\nsuggest it to him because he might be excited about around the globe by\nflying, so to speak. But I don't know. But I just simply would like to\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n4\nD:\n(continued) check it with you just in this case. He did not propose it.\nNobody propose me this.\nK:\nYou let us know whether he goes to Peking.\nD:\nNo, this\nK:\nBecause we have to have the head of our Liaison Office at the airport.\nD:\nBut Mr. Bruce will be there on the 1st of May on the Day of Proletarian\nSolidarity.\nK:\nNo, no.\nD:\nHe will not be.\nK:\nHe'll be there about the 14th.\nD:\nI thought he would be just --\nK:\nNo, he's leaving here on the 7th and then he's going to Hong Kong and\nthen on the 14th which I think is a Monday.\nD:\nI didn't count it properly.\nK:\nBut the present plan is that he'll be there on the 14th.\nD:\nI see. No, I thought that he may come onthe 1st of May as I mentioned\nfor proletarian solidarity.\nK:\nNo, we'll miss it this year.\nD:\nI think it would be a good idea. (laughter) What was reaction of Israel\nby the way?\nK:\nTo our abstention?\nD:\nNo, no, not abstention. I understand what their reaction was. But you\nsaid that you spoke with the Ambassador about this\nK:\nOh, oh, well, I told the Ambassador that we would take very serious\nmeasures if they obstructed the MFN. And between you and me, even\ngoing to airplane deliveries.\nD:\nThat you mentioned him directly this waY?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n5\nK:\nYeah. I mean, don't publish this.\nD:\nNo, Henry. But did you ever see anything published which we discuss\nwith you?\nK:\nNo.\nD:\nI don't know anything we have.\nK\nNo, but I mean, we were very tough. And if you could see the reaction\nof the Jewish leaders, I think that it was not uninfluenced by them.\nD:\nAll right, Henry.\nK:\nWe will push it through, Anatol.\nD:\nIt was my impression though because many Senators, which I spoke before\nof, simply mentioned to me about they need some really --\nK:\nMaybe when I am in Russia, we can think of a few minor cosmetic\nthings.\nD:\nYeah. It could be.\nK:\nBut we will keep it going. We have just started.\nD:\nYeah. No, I understand. My impression now --\nK:\nNo, I'm very optimistic now.\nD:\nThis is my impression too. Okay, Henry.\nK:\nGood, Anatol.\nD:\nBye, bye.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelCon\nAmb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n6:25 pm, April 24, 1973\nK:\nAnatol.\nD:\nHello Henry. That was a good speech you gave yesterday.\nK:\nabout the European Security Conference.\nD:\nIt think it was quite a speech in general. It was large scale\nspeech. You make a quite good presentation.\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nHenry, why I call you. When exactly did you say you were\ngoing to leave. Is it at night you are going on the 4th.\nK:\nNight of the 3rd and arrive the night of the 4th. Or later\nwould be better for me. I can arrive the night of the 5th.\nD:\nOf the 5th! ! But first it was 4th, and now 5th -\nK:\nI'll have to leave the night of the 3rd.\nD:\nHow exactly. - I would like to make this point and this was my\nK:\nJust make sure that Antonov meets me at the airport.\nD:\nHe will be very much proud if you expect him to do that.\nK:\nMaybe we can leave earlier than midnight.\nD:\nNo problem. 8:00 or 9:00 is better.\nK:\nLet me find out. We will plan on arriving in Moscow around\n8:00.\nD:\nOkay, you just give me schedule of your Air Force.\nK:\nHow about your navigator?\nD:\nWe will check with him.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nK:\nWe can also pick him up in Europe.\nD:\nWhat place? Where?\nK:\nWe will be stopping ah an American Air Force Base. We will\ntell you where he should go.\nD:\nPlease send short memo on your recommendations, it is better.\nIn Moscow there is four day holiday, that's why I am checking.\nSo please check on this one.\nCan you talk about\nK:\nIt was very helpful.\nD:\nIt was good idea.\nK:\nI went out to Walter Reed to talk to Stennis. He signed the\nJackson amendment but told me he won't vote for it. We will\nwin this one.\nD:\nOkay, Henry, ;so tomorrow we will be in touch.\nK:\nWhen are you going to announce it?\nD:\nWithin two days, it\nK:\nMaybe Friday will be good.\nD:\nFriday or at the latest Monday.\nK:\nFriday will be better than Thursday.\nD:\nOkay, so we will be in touch.\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nOkay, Henry, bye bye.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n9:31 a.m. - 4/25/73\nD:\nHello.\nK:\nAnatol.\nD:\nHello, Henry, how are you?\nK:\nOK.\nD:\nHenry, go ahead. I would like to ask you for myself one question about\nthis SALT business. Are you going to give any consideration because\nto be discussed in Moscow?\nK:\nYes, I will let you have some papers no later than next Monday but\nprobably Friday or Saturday.\nD:\nYeh, because they need it - Brezhnev to look at.\nK:\nWell, I'm bringing a Russian text with signature lines on.\nD:\n(Laughs) Well, exactly as you proposed on the first article - remember\nyou said you would like to have - you would bring an English text for\nBrezhnev to sign. He doesn't know English very well. He'll have to\nbe with Americans more often.\nK:\nAnatol, I want to remind you - you're going to ask for a week's postponement\naren't you.\nD:\nOn what?\nK:\nOf the resumption of the Geneva thing.\nD:\nWell, if necessary, yeh.\nK:\nHadn't we agreed that you would ask for - so that I don't have to give\ninstructions to my group.\nD:\nOh, you won't ask them to make a formal proposal.\nK:\nThat you need another week and you want to resume on the 11th.\nD:\nOK, I will do it - no problem. But we do it through the official channel.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nK:\nOh yes, do it through the official cha nnel.\nD:\nOr I could tell you and\nK:\nNo, do it through the official channel. It's better.\nD:\nI will do today. I will do it. No problem.\nK:\nAnd I will give you a proposal at the end of this week.\nD:\nOn this subject?\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nOK, I think it will help because really\nK:\nI will give you two variations. One is that SS-9s have to be destroyed\nin the first year and the other is that half of the SS-9s and half of the\nSS-11s should be destroyed in the first year.\nD:\nI thought only the SS-11 but not the 9.\nK:\nI'm just showing you my flexibility.\nD:\n(Laughs) You're quite flexible, as a rule Henry.\nK:\nI thought I might give Smirnov a heart attack before I get there.\nD:\nThat's why I'd rather prevent his heart attack before you arrive - not\nwhen you are there - it's much more dangerous.\nK:\nNow do you want to ride with me?\nD:\nI have to check with Moscow yet because there was an idea to have a\nmeeting of our Central Committee but for some reason they postpone\nit so probably I will come now within the time that you're coming\nbecause they send me a message already to come to Moscow to attend\nthis Central Committee meeting but up to now nothing.\nK:\nNow, Anatol, you can't elect me to the Central Committee - I hope you\nrealize it. It would look bad in America.\nD:\nWhy ? You couldn't be elected President by the way.\nK:\nIn America, I know.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nD:\nWell, we could make you candidate, all right?\nK:\nA candidate member of the Central Committee.\nD:\nYes, this is a different kind of thing.\nfor you so to speak.\nK:\nNo, only if I get one of these\nwhich I like so much.\nD:\nOh well, maybe we have to do something. By the way Henry, you\npromised me to think it over about some ideas for some gifts and so\non, do you have any?\nK:\nNO.\nD:\nYou have to think longer.\nK:\nThe President has been occupied with domestic matters.\nD:\n(Laughs) So I guess.\nK:\nYou wouldn't like to let me read your reports about this situation.\nD:\nQuite frankly I've played it down because\nbut I like the\nZorza article. On the surface he try to be nice to the White House\nbut he is trying to give some ideas to some of my people at home.\nYou remember yesterday's article. Did you get a chance to read it?\nK:\nWhose article?\nD:\nVictor Zorza.\nK:\nOH, Zorza, yes. I don't know who talks to him, I never see him. Who\ndo you think talks to him?\nD:\nNo, nobody from our side. Nobody from the Soviet Union and only the\nday before yesterday there was an article about him in our Pravda and\nK:\nHe's very clever.\nD:\nI know he is but he puts his ideas this way and this way. The idea, if\nyou read it, was this way that it's the time to put the White House - to\ntry to get compassion because it is difficult. But at the same time during\nthe whole article tries to put in\nK:\nYeh. Yeh. Yeh.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nD:\nWell, it's rediculous, it's stupid.\nK:\nBut the thing is now, about your your navigators, we can pick them\nup in Copenhagen or in London whichever you prefer.\nD:\nOkay, I will tell them what is better. I think for them is doesn't make\ndifference really, but I check with them.\nK:\nI will plaln to arrive around 6:00 or 7:00 in the evening.\nD:\nSix or seven in the evening on the 4th.\nK:\nOn the 4th.\nD:\nOkay. You will go from here.\nK:\nI will go from here, I leave here around midnight, and I think that\ngets me in around six or seven at night.\nD:\nYeah, I think it will, but no time you left it was 1:30.\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nAnd you arrived around 11:00.\nK:\nWell, the schedule they showed me is if I leave at 1: 30 I get in at 8:00.\nD:\nOh, I see, they gave you the schedule.\nK:\nYes, they gave me the schedule.\nD:\nThey know better then.\nK:\nLet's not worry about--\nD:\nI mean approximately.\nK:\nI don't want to leave after midnight, it's too tiring. So I leave here at\nmidnight and whenever that gets me in.\nD:\nIt is better to know when you are there or not, so I put it this way six\nor eight, okay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nK:\nYeah.\nD:\nOkay, this is fair enough. What else we have on our schedule, you\nwill be\n-\nK:\nWe are announcing today that we are meeting the Northvietnamese,\nthat I'm sending Sullivan over to meet the NVM on the 27th.\nD:\nWhere, in Paris?\nK:\nIn Paris.\nD:\nWhy not you and Le Duc Tho?\nK:\nBecause he isn't ready to meet until May 16.\nD:\nWhy, what happened with him?\nK:\nWell because they must have some politburo meeting. So I will meet\nhim on the 16th in Paris.\nD:\nOkay, and this -- when Sullivan will be there, tomorrow?\nK:\nSullivan will be there Friday.\nD:\nAnd\nhere or in Paris.\nK:\nIn Paris.\nD:\nWhere will you be on the 10th, what you going to do between then and 16th.\nK:\nI'll come back here.\nD:\nBut is M P. A youk ? standing by.\nK:\nWell, I may see him after I see the North Vietnamese.\nD:\nDo you think it will be encouraging for him.\nK:\nWell, I tell you, you think my nerøves can stand both of them.\nD:\nThat's why I am asking you how it can be (laughter) might be good idea.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nK:\nI want to come back here in the present situation, quite honestly.\nNow Anatol, one other thing. I won't be confronted with anything\nunexpected in Moscow.\nD:\nNot to my knowledge, and my knowledge is around say 98 percent.\nK:\nOkay, well, because I don't think this is a good time--\nD:\nNo, no, no, why should you. Well I may look over my program to see\nagain if he may have some ideas--\nK:\nOh, no, no strategic thing.\nD:\nNo, no, no. This I give you with 98 percent.\nK:\nIn M oscow you operate on a 101 percent.\nD:\nThere is nothing specific else. I look about the response on your speech\nit's very good in general except France.\nK:\nWell, has there been an official French reaction.\nD:\nNo, they just have same. By the way when is Pompidou arriving here.\nK:\nPompidou hasn't been finally set, but it will be the end of May.\nD:\nThe President is going to be very busy I should say.\nK:\nHe'll be very busy.\nD:\nPompidou coming here or stopping in Candda.\nK:\nHe will almost certainly not come here, but where we will meet has\nnot been definitely decided yet.\nD:\nBrandt, Pompidou, Brezhnev, well it should be quite an interesting\nsituation.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nI'm sure you feel like a fish in the water.\nK:\nI will not be inactive, to quote Gromyko, but he can go much better\ndouble negatives.\nD:\nOn ;double negatives he is quite a master.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7\nK:\nOn double negatives he is the world's champion.\nD:\nI think now you really know these words, you are doing it quite naturally.\nK:\nNo, I'm an amateur. Well tell Gromyko I will look forward personally\nto seeing him.\nWe are planning to leave now on the 9th.\nD:\nFrom Leningrad or Moscow.\nK:\nYeah. During the afternoon or evening.\nD:\nI understand.\nK:\nOkay\nD:\nOkay\nK:\nGood\nD:\nBye bye Henry, if I hear something I will call you.\nK:\nGood, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n10:36 a.m. - 4/25/73\nD:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nHow did you know it was me? It might have been my secretary.\nD:\nWhen your secretary calls it has a special ring.\nK:\nOh, I see. Anatol, hold off with asking for a delay. It may be\nbureaucratically easier if we let our people table some sort of decision.\nD:\nOK. I am just sitting and writing a telegram now. You want me to\nhold off?\nK:\nHold off a couple of hours before you send it.\nD:\nOK, I will await your call.\nK:\nIt may be better to let the delegation meet and we will table some sort\nof proposal and then it give us a better opportunity to have a base from\nwhich to compromise.\nD:\nI understand, but in this case you will tell them to give your proposal.\nK:\nI will give you in any event what our delegation will propose and an\nalternative approach to it.\nD:\nWhat you will discuss in Moscow.\nK:\nExactly.\nD:\nSo I will await your call. You will call me around midday.\nK:\nMidday, so don't leave your telephone.\nD:\n(Laughs) OK, Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n5:05 p.m. - 4/25/73\nD:\nHello.\nK:\nAnatol.\nD:\nWhile we were discussing with you the Strategic Arms Limitation I\nreceive a document for you Brezhnev send for the President to you.\nHe has some ideas of his own about what kind of document. Could\nI drop it by for 5 or 6 minutes?\nK:\nRight. Now I am with some people. Can you come at 5:45?\nD:\n5:45 - the usual place?\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nSo at 15 minutes before 6 I will be there. He has some ideas what\nkind of document it would be so you can look it over and then discuss it.\nK:\nI thought you people couldn't make up your mind unless you got a\ndocument from us. OK, Anatol. See you at 5:45.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDobrynin/Kissinger\n10:00 a.m. - 4/26/73\nK:\nHello.\nD:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nTell Smirnov that he cannot destroy the SS-9s yet until we.\nD:\n(Laughs) Well, I think you are quite right. He just thinking what kind\nofshow to arrange for you. We have in Moscow some subs there\nthe bottom. Whether they could go there or not.\nK:\nThe SS-9s.\nD:\nNot only the SS-9s, but something like a Poseidon or Moscow\nK:\nOh, that's a good idea.\nD:\nI think it's good, of course, why not to have because Moscow\n(just came out of the Caribbean.)\nK:\nHow about an SS-9 in Red Square?\nD:\nYou see we have too many people there, we don't want to scare them.\nWhy should we? But we could organize a parade on the Moscow\nit's a rather big\nas you know so there will be let's say, how\nmany I should say according to the Treaty and everyone will be staying\nin the line receiving parade. So you will be receiving parade, all right?\nK:\nThat's great.\nD:\nWell, Henry, I receive now this about I have to check with them on\nMonday. On Monday they are going to publish but I would like to check\nwith you. Is it all right on Monday your noon hour, 11 'clock or you\nprefer\nK:\nThat's fine. Noon or well\nD:\nIf you prefer 10 it is no problem.\nK:\nNo, no, basically, can I call you in a few minutes about it ?\nEleven or twelve.\nD:\nOK, there is no problem, but you tell me because they want to publish\nsimultaneously.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nAnd it will be like this: Dr. Kissinger's visit to the Soviet Union -\nwe are going to publish but I would like to check with you if you have\nany - approximately I mean.\nK:\nYeh.\nD:\nIn accordance with agreement Dr. Kissinger according to the desires\nof the President of the United States will arrive in Moscow on May 4th\nfor the occasions of meeting on matters of mutual interest for the\nSoviet Union and United States.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nThis is what we will publish in our papers.\nK:\nOh, and we won't say for how long.\nD:\nNo, because that we won't say. You would like to\nK:\nNo, that's fine.\nD:\nThen afterwards when you are leaving it will be published in our press too\nK:\nRight. Can we say exit visas have already been granted?\nD:\nWell, well, well, I'm not so sure. Maybe Brezhnev would like to\nkeep you there as a hostage until he will come with you back. You see.\nK:\nThat's what I'm afraid of.\nD:\nNo, I prefer not to put it really in a Communique because why should\nwe make already a concession to you beforehand. You will behave\naccordingly if you will have a free exit visa, but if you haven't then\nmaybe we can persuade you to do something interesting. All right?\nK:\nAll right.\nD:\nWell, who is going to come with you, you give me a list today or\ntomorrow who will accompany you.\nK:\nYeh.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nD:\nThose and what do you have besides\nto see or points\nof interest and living quarters because they would like to know there.\nK:\nI leave it up to you. I've never been in the Russian countryside.\nYou know you once mentioned.\nD:\nI see, OK,\nK:\nIt may be a little early.\nD:\nFrom the point of view of weather it's not yet spring. There could\nbe snow and mist there but if it's nice we can organize. Or we could\norganize something at the theater.\nK:\nI like ballet.\nD:\nBallet. OK. But if it is good weather we could organize a trip in\nthe countryside.\nK:\nYeh.\nD:\nWell if you have something in mind let me know.\nK:\nIf I do I'll let you know.\nD:\nYou will call me back about this Monday timing?\nK:\nYes within a couple of hours.\nD:\nOK and Henry, could we maybe raise on this draft of principles maybe\nto discuss tomorrow or Saturday.\nK:\nI won't be here on Saturday myself.\nD:\nI see, but tomorrow you will be here.\nK:\nI just said Saturday so that I could break your heart when I disappeared.\nD:\nWell you' re doing that too. So could we maybe meet tomorrow just\nbecause Gromyko would like to know your reactions on this.\nK:\nI will do my best. I will do my utmost.\nD:\nSo I let you go. Bye. Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin\n4/26/73 3:00 p.m.\nAD:\n12:00, Henry.\nHK:\nTwelve o'clock, we will make the announcement.\nAD:\nIf I am right, this coming Sunday it will be already summertime--\nHK:\nYeh, so it will be 8:00 in the evening for you--\nAD:\nNo, I think 7:00\nHK:\nOh 7:00 in the evening. Yeh, and can you send over the text that you\nhave in mind for us?\nAD:\nOkay, no problem.\nNK:\nAnd secondly, I have given instructions to substitute maneuvers for\nmovements--and if there is any trouble let me know.\nAD:\nI understand. Okay. So they know now?\nHK\nThey know. You know our great bureaucracy, but basically they know.\nAD:\nWhat about, Henry, tomorrow. Could you give the jist on the reaction\non this.\nHK:\nYes, I'll do my best.\nAD:\nJust to maybe--so you will give me tomorrow what will be more convenien\n--I mean hour for you. The first or second part of the day ?\nHK:\nThe first part of the day--towards the end of the morning.\nto\nAD:\nOkay. Of course, Sckrieliv asked me/say this--that's why I even\nsacrificed my participation in the meeting\nHK:\nWx\nWhat do you mean--\nAD:\nWe have a planning meeting two days after--\nHK:\nThis your central committee ?\nAD:\nNo, no. We have today I had a telegram yesterday to have a meeting\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 2\ntoday of our central committee.\nHK:\nYeh, of the central committee.\nAD:\nYeh, ah huh. Today.\nHK:\nI'm going to be a candidate member.\nAD:\nI already promised so I will send the Secretary General to approve\nyour candidacy.\nHK:\nI have already--that's the quid pro quo.\nThat and one of those cars.\nAD:\n(laughing) All right. Of course, when you became a candidate or a\nmember at this time, of course, you could be titled not only the car\nbut we give you a man, all right?\nHK:\nOf course, it would be a new departure.\nAD:\nExactly. I think it would be quite nice.\nHK:\nI wouldn't bxex give you any trouble because I could come to meetings\nand I wouldn't understand what anyone was saying.\nAD:\nWell, well, after you accept in Russian what I am telling you about--I\nmean it changes totally in English, when Gromyko tex asks you to change\nin the first paragraph--I wouldn't be surprised when one of these days\nhe'll just stand up and make his speech in Russian.\nHK:\nWell, all I want is the privileges, I don't want any of the responsibility.\nAD:\nI understand. Henry, when you were last time with the President, how\nfar where you from the President, when you went there was a\nHK:\nWe went to the conservatory\nAD:\nI know, but how long--you don't remember\nHK:\nAbout 45 minutes.\nAD:\nIt was probably the former Kruschev place\nHK:\nYeh it was the former Kruschev place, because the President remembere\nit -- he was there with Kruschev.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nPage 3\nHK:\nThat was lovely.\nAD:\nThis time of year is the beginning of Spring in Moscow. - - sometimes\nit is really good and sometimes it still snow.\nHK:\nOkay, good.\nAD:\nGood, tomorrow I will await your call.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Dr. Kissinger\n10:47 m.\nApril 27, 1973\nD:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nAnatole\nD:\nHow are you?\nK:\nI have another proposal to make to Smirnov.\nD:\nAll right. [Laughter] You do keep him in suspense really.\nK:\nBecause if he would like to.-if he doesn't know exactly how to dispose of\nthe SS-9.\nD:\nYeah what's your proposal.\nK:\nHe could load some of them on the grain ships that are coming back empty.\nAnd we'll be glad to dispose of them for him.\nD:\nBut do you have a large enough\n?\nK:\nWell\nD:\nI'm not so sure about it.\nK:\nI gave you so many good ideas. I told you to put them on submarines and\nyou never accepted that.\nD:\nWell, I think he is still thinking. He never refused by the way. He has\nnot refused he has just begin to think and he continues to think it over. So\nhe never flatly refused as you know. So who knows, maybe it will be a big\nsurprise for you when he makes his contra-proposal.\nK:\nDo you want to come around 11:45, 12:00 o'clock?\nD:\n12:00 o'clock, OK.\nK:\nI'll have about 40 minutes.\nD:\nOK or 15 minutes before 12.\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nUsual place.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nЯ\n- 2 -\nK:\nMap room.\nD:\nMap room. At 15 before 12 I will be.\nK:\nGood, excellent.\nD:\nOk, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmbassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger\n9:48 a. , April 30, 1973\nK:\nHello.\nD:\nHello, Henry. Welcome back!\nK:\nThank you, Anatol.\nD:\nWell, I receive a telegram from Gromyko. He asked me rather urgently\nto come back so tomorrow I am leaving.\nK:\nOh, you are?\nD:\nYes. Today I received four drafts of agreement (laughter). One is\non peaceful use of atomic energy. The other one is draft in general terms\non contacts, exchanges and cooperation. The third one about world ocean\nexploration and the fourth one is on transportation. And I was told\nthat is coming on agriculture. Really, my first impression there is\nnothing really very difficult in them but would you like me to send you\nright now before we leave or when I will be at 3 o'clock to bring them?\nThere is nothing really special excitement there. But it's in connection\nwith Brezhnev\nK:\nWhy don't you bring them along at --\nD:\nOkay.\nK:\nLet's say 3:30, incidentally, for the meeting.\nD:\nOkay, 3:30.\nK:\nYes.\nD:\nI will be there. This is the new developments -- You remember there\nwas earlier\nK:\nOh, yes, I remember very well.\nD:\nMat ters from Brezhnev. And he was counting on them -- rather naming\nthem.\nK:\nOh, yes, I remember very well.\nD:\nSo this is what it's about. So today I would like you first to look\nonce again about, if you don't mind, you know, the general\njust\nto check what we have -- that there will be no misunderstanding where\nwe stand now. Okay?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmbassador Dobrynin\n2\n9:48 a. m., April 30, 1973\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nJust to look through what we have. And then SALT --\nK:\nDid they give you an answer?\nD:\nOn SALT?\nK:\nYeah. Oh, no, I'll give you the material on SALT, yes.\nD:\nYes, you owe me other material. So we have a second discussion\nabout the SALT. And then I give you this paper. And we will look\nthrough some protocol thing. I would like to collect my mind through\ntalking with you what possibilities just to tell Brezhnev on certain\nkinds of things.\nK:\nOkay, good.\nD:\nOkay?\nK:\nGood.\nD:\nIf President could write some letter\nit would be very\nnice but maybe tomorrow. I am leaving tomorrow around 5 o'clock.\nK:\nI'll have it for you before you leave.\nD:\nOkay, Henry.\nK:\nToday is not the ideal day.\nD:\n(laughter) Oh, all right, I understand. So 3:30 today, the usual place.\nK:\nRight.\nD:\nThank you very much, Henry. Bye, bye.\nK:\nBye.\nwgh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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