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TELECON
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
9:50 P. m.
D. Hello.
K. I just talked to Hume. They have been talking to Sadat and Sadat
says they will never accept a straight ceasefire.
D. They discussed directly with Sadat ? I must send a telegram to
Moscow right away
K. I am pressing them and they will call me back in three hours.
D. Both our countries will abstain. Even in this case it is my firm
decision.
K. We will still press the British to.
D. If Sadat even told them so, we will definitely abatain and will
keep our word in this case. If we both abstain it will be of political
significance. What is now the problem? The British are not
decided?
K. The British are reluctant because they think that Sadat will not
agree to it. If Moscow could talk to him.
D. In three hours I will not get an answer unless I go by ordinary
telephone.
K. No, that is too dangerous.
D. I think so. Really, even if he said so.
K. Because the British are afraid of Sadat saying no and going ahead.
D. Maybe we should go with Australia.
K.
That is what we will do. Australia has nothing to lose .
I will be in touch with you in three hours. I will try to do something by
tonight.
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"ocrText": "TELECON\nAmb. Dobrynin/Kissinger\nOctober 13, 1973\n9:50 P. m.\nD. Hello.\nK. I just talked to Hume. They have been talking to Sadat and Sadat\nsays they will never accept a straight ceasefire.\nD. They discussed directly with Sadat ? I must send a telegram to\nMoscow right away\nK. I am pressing them and they will call me back in three hours.\nD. Both our countries will abstain. Even in this case it is my firm\ndecision.\nK. We will still press the British to.\nD. If Sadat even told them so, we will definitely abatain and will\nkeep our word in this case. If we both abstain it will be of political\nsignificance. What is now the problem? The British are not\ndecided?\nK. The British are reluctant because they think that Sadat will not\nagree to it. If Moscow could talk to him.\nD. In three hours I will not get an answer unless I go by ordinary\ntelephone.\nK. No, that is too dangerous.\nD. I think so. Really, even if he said so.\nK. Because the British are afraid of Sadat saying no and going ahead.\nD. Maybe we should go with Australia.\nK.\nThat is what we will do. Australia has nothing to lose .\nI will be in touch with you in three hours. I will try to do something by\ntonight."
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