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General Haig/Amb. Dobrynin
2
D:
But I think understanding between us on this is very important.
But they are very angry because they consider that you created all
these things by reasons we don't know -- we don't want to discuss it
but artificial crisis, why? And when you compare it with the even
human crisis, it is really -- excuse me -- but it is going beyond
any comparison. Because why? It's only one detail I would like to
mention, we are [constantly] in touch with Henry on all the matters,
big and small.
H:
Yes.
D:
Every hour on the hour. But what happened in the night? When I
give this letter, it was as the President said: I determined he
answered firm. It's quite all right. The usual procedure is through
the confidential channel. But until we received letter, Henry didn't
mention a single word that you are going to put this on an alert.
It's the easiest way
just to call and say to Ambassador: Look
here, the President feels very strongly SO if you really going to persist
sorry - - well, you may use any language you like, tough or no tough
or diplomatic -- but we will be forced to do it. Then I will be in touch
with Moscow; Brezhnev will answer and then it's natural.
H:
Yeah.
D:
But you were holding for 5 hours -- Henry and Scowcroft calling me
and they say a reply, wait a reply, then I will receive a reply. Reply
was well firm, right, President said. But he didn't even mention about
this alert. We find out on the radio, by the way.
H:
Yeah.
D:
But for me, it looks really it was not real. Because if you really were
concerned, I am sure you will first be in touch with Brezhnev to find
out what's going on, if it's real. But you were not really concerned so
it was the easiest way to make up an air raid without telling us. So I am
a littlebit, quite frankly, I'm telling you without anger, without
specific emotions, but I'm really feel sorry about this episode because
it damaged very much of what was done, by what reason we don't know
really. It was SO good trip of Henry to Moscow. Brezhnev spend with
him so many hours that the President never spends with Gromyko, by
the way. And it looked SO it was quite all right. But then he created
this
crisis that you are real and we are just weaker partners
standing looking against braver United States. Really, we have our
people too around Moscow. Of course, he looks differently.
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"ocrText": "General Haig/Amb. Dobrynin\n2\nD:\nBut I think understanding between us on this is very important.\nBut they are very angry because they consider that you created all\nthese things by reasons we don't know -- we don't want to discuss it\nbut artificial crisis, why? And when you compare it with the even\nhuman crisis, it is really -- excuse me -- but it is going beyond\nany comparison. Because why? It's only one detail I would like to\nmention, we are [constantly] in touch with Henry on all the matters,\nbig and small.\nH:\nYes.\nD:\nEvery hour on the hour. But what happened in the night? When I\ngive this letter, it was as the President said: I determined he\nanswered firm. It's quite all right. The usual procedure is through\nthe confidential channel. But until we received letter, Henry didn't\nmention a single word that you are going to put this on an alert.\nIt's the easiest way\njust to call and say to Ambassador: Look\nhere, the President feels very strongly SO if you really going to persist\nsorry - - well, you may use any language you like, tough or no tough\nor diplomatic -- but we will be forced to do it. Then I will be in touch\nwith Moscow; Brezhnev will answer and then it's natural.\nH:\nYeah.\nD:\nBut you were holding for 5 hours -- Henry and Scowcroft calling me\nand they say a reply, wait a reply, then I will receive a reply. Reply\nwas well firm, right, President said. But he didn't even mention about\nthis alert. We find out on the radio, by the way.\nH:\nYeah.\nD:\nBut for me, it looks really it was not real. Because if you really were\nconcerned, I am sure you will first be in touch with Brezhnev to find\nout what's going on, if it's real. But you were not really concerned so\nit was the easiest way to make up an air raid without telling us. So I am\na littlebit, quite frankly, I'm telling you without anger, without\nspecific emotions, but I'm really feel sorry about this episode because\nit damaged very much of what was done, by what reason we don't know\nreally. It was SO good trip of Henry to Moscow. Brezhnev spend with\nhim so many hours that the President never spends with Gromyko, by\nthe way. And it looked SO it was quite all right. But then he created\nthis\ncrisis that you are real and we are just weaker partners\nstanding looking against braver United States. Really, we have our\npeople too around Moscow. Of course, he looks differently."
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