Ask the Scholar

Page 92 of 107
I can add historical knowledge about this page.

Page image

Page 92

OCR

General Haig/Amb. Dobrynin 2 D: But I think understanding between us on this is very important. But they are very angry because they consider that you created all these things by reasons we don't know -- we don't want to discuss it but artificial crisis, why? And when you compare it with the even human crisis, it is really -- excuse me -- but it is going beyond any comparison. Because why? It's only one detail I would like to mention, we are [constantly] in touch with Henry on all the matters, big and small. H: Yes. D: Every hour on the hour. But what happened in the night? When I give this letter, it was as the President said: I determined he answered firm. It's quite all right. The usual procedure is through the confidential channel. But until we received letter, Henry didn't mention a single word that you are going to put this on an alert. It's the easiest way just to call and say to Ambassador: Look here, the President feels very strongly SO if you really going to persist sorry - - well, you may use any language you like, tough or no tough or diplomatic -- but we will be forced to do it. Then I will be in touch with Moscow; Brezhnev will answer and then it's natural. H: Yeah. D: But you were holding for 5 hours -- Henry and Scowcroft calling me and they say a reply, wait a reply, then I will receive a reply. Reply was well firm, right, President said. But he didn't even mention about this alert. We find out on the radio, by the way. H: Yeah. D: But for me, it looks really it was not real. Because if you really were concerned, I am sure you will first be in touch with Brezhnev to find out what's going on, if it's real. But you were not really concerned so it was the easiest way to make up an air raid without telling us. So I am a littlebit, quite frankly, I'm telling you without anger, without specific emotions, but I'm really feel sorry about this episode because it damaged very much of what was done, by what reason we don't know really. It was SO good trip of Henry to Moscow. Brezhnev spend with him so many hours that the President never spends with Gromyko, by the way. And it looked SO it was quite all right. But then he created this crisis that you are real and we are just weaker partners standing looking against braver United States. Really, we have our people too around Moscow. Of course, he looks differently.

Page data

Page
92
Source index
0
Type
photo
Media ID
cbb3c74fd34075ae
Size
unknown

Document data

ID
498694063
Core
doc
Type
document
DTO data
{
    "id": "498694063",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694063",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "October 1973",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694063",
    "collections": [
        "National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
        "Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-001.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-001.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-001.jpg",
    "imageCount": 107,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

Context sent to Scholar

Document identity
{
    "localId": "498694063",
    "label": "October 1973",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694063"
}
Document source metadata
{
    "id": "498694063",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694063",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "October 1973",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694063",
    "collections": [
        "National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
        "Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-001.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-001.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-001.jpg",
    "imageCount": 107,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694063",
    "naId": 498694063,
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
    "seq": 92,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-092.jpg",
    "mediaId": "cbb3c74fd34075ae",
    "ocrText": "General Haig/Amb. Dobrynin\n2\nD:\nBut I think understanding between us on this is very important.\nBut they are very angry because they consider that you created all\nthese things by reasons we don't know -- we don't want to discuss it\nbut artificial crisis, why? And when you compare it with the even\nhuman crisis, it is really -- excuse me -- but it is going beyond\nany comparison. Because why? It's only one detail I would like to\nmention, we are [constantly] in touch with Henry on all the matters,\nbig and small.\nH:\nYes.\nD:\nEvery hour on the hour. But what happened in the night? When I\ngive this letter, it was as the President said: I determined he\nanswered firm. It's quite all right. The usual procedure is through\nthe confidential channel. But until we received letter, Henry didn't\nmention a single word that you are going to put this on an alert.\nIt's the easiest way\njust to call and say to Ambassador: Look\nhere, the President feels very strongly SO if you really going to persist\nsorry - - well, you may use any language you like, tough or no tough\nor diplomatic -- but we will be forced to do it. Then I will be in touch\nwith Moscow; Brezhnev will answer and then it's natural.\nH:\nYeah.\nD:\nBut you were holding for 5 hours -- Henry and Scowcroft calling me\nand they say a reply, wait a reply, then I will receive a reply. Reply\nwas well firm, right, President said. But he didn't even mention about\nthis alert. We find out on the radio, by the way.\nH:\nYeah.\nD:\nBut for me, it looks really it was not real. Because if you really were\nconcerned, I am sure you will first be in touch with Brezhnev to find\nout what's going on, if it's real. But you were not really concerned so\nit was the easiest way to make up an air raid without telling us. So I am\na littlebit, quite frankly, I'm telling you without anger, without\nspecific emotions, but I'm really feel sorry about this episode because\nit damaged very much of what was done, by what reason we don't know\nreally. It was SO good trip of Henry to Moscow. Brezhnev spend with\nhim so many hours that the President never spends with Gromyko, by\nthe way. And it looked SO it was quite all right. But then he created\nthis\ncrisis that you are real and we are just weaker partners\nstanding looking against braver United States. Really, we have our\npeople too around Moscow. Of course, he looks differently."
}