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Mr. Kissinger/General Haig/Secretary Rogers
- 6 -
K.
I think that's the only thing, myself, that can be done -- that they
can
do.
I
think the realistic occasion for American intervention will
arise when. if the Soviets were to intervene one way or the other.
And we would have to be prepared to be very tough in warning them off.
There
is a corollary to this move. Within the area, I think it can be handled
with a lot of excitement, but I think it can be handled.
R:
Well, it's lawfully damned difficult to make these judgments. That
certainly would be my judgment and I think it's the judgment of those over
here. Well, the trouble with that is, so everybody confident that the
King could handle the Fedayeen and apparently can't. Leaving Syria out,
we can't handle them in Amman 'cause that seems
K:
I was never so confident of that one.
R:
Most people were, though.
K:
Yeah, I know/most people were, though.
R:
I didn't hear anybody express any real reservations.
K.
Well, I was. after the first few days! reports, I also saw that he
could. But, be that as it may, if the Israelis can't handle the Arabs, they
can't be bailed out by us. We won't have enough forces to bail them out.
We only have one decision. But since all of our policy has been based on
the assumption that the military balance hadn't turned against them and
that they were still superior
that I don't think is going to happen.
R: In our weighing it, we werethinking about it in terms of Egypt and
Jordan. I don't know as we were thinking about it in terms of Syria and
Iraq, but, you know, I never heard anybody express any doubt about it
including the Israelis. They've always thought they could.
K:
And they repeated that again. And we checked yesterday with Moorer
at the meetings. He thinks
but that's, of course, subject to the same
theories (queries?) that you've put before. They also thought they probably
could handle the Fedayeen.
R:
Well, I think the question probably in my mind now is the time problem,
XXXXXXX whether we have to give them an answer SO soon if they aren't actually
going to invade. If this cryptic message is incorrect and they aren't going
to actually invade until sometime tomorrow morning in other words, if
we have 24 hours, I wonder why they need SO much advance. I can see how
they can sort of get ready with it, but I don't see why they have to know for
sure. Because the information we had was to the effect that [End of tape]
[NLN 05-03/7: P. 6 of 6
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"ocrText": "Mr. Kissinger/General Haig/Secretary Rogers\n- 6 -\nK.\nI think that's the only thing, myself, that can be done -- that they\ncan\ndo.\nI\nthink the realistic occasion for American intervention will\narise when. if the Soviets were to intervene one way or the other.\nAnd we would have to be prepared to be very tough in warning them off.\nThere\nis a corollary to this move. Within the area, I think it can be handled\nwith a lot of excitement, but I think it can be handled.\nR:\nWell, it's lawfully damned difficult to make these judgments. That\ncertainly would be my judgment and I think it's the judgment of those over\nhere. Well, the trouble with that is, so everybody confident that the\nKing could handle the Fedayeen and apparently can't. Leaving Syria out,\nwe can't handle them in Amman 'cause that seems\nK:\nI was never so confident of that one.\nR:\nMost people were, though.\nK:\nYeah, I know/most people were, though.\nR:\nI didn't hear anybody express any real reservations.\nK.\nWell, I was. after the first few days! reports, I also saw that he\ncould. But, be that as it may, if the Israelis can't handle the Arabs, they\ncan't be bailed out by us. We won't have enough forces to bail them out.\nWe only have one decision. But since all of our policy has been based on\nthe assumption that the military balance hadn't turned against them and\nthat they were still superior\nthat I don't think is going to happen.\nR: In our weighing it, we werethinking about it in terms of Egypt and\nJordan. I don't know as we were thinking about it in terms of Syria and\nIraq, but, you know, I never heard anybody express any doubt about it\nincluding the Israelis. They've always thought they could.\nK:\nAnd they repeated that again. And we checked yesterday with Moorer\nat the meetings. He thinks\nbut that's, of course, subject to the same\ntheories (queries?) that you've put before. They also thought they probably\ncould handle the Fedayeen.\nR:\nWell, I think the question probably in my mind now is the time problem,\nXXXXXXX whether we have to give them an answer SO soon if they aren't actually\ngoing to invade. If this cryptic message is incorrect and they aren't going\nto actually invade until sometime tomorrow morning in other words, if\nwe have 24 hours, I wonder why they need SO much advance. I can see how\nthey can sort of get ready with it, but I don't see why they have to know for\nsure. Because the information we had was to the effect that [End of tape]\n[NLN 05-03/7: P. 6 of 6"
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