Ask the Scholar
Page 136 of 136
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
General Haig
11/10/70
(tape)
K: A1, we've got big affairs of state on our minds. Can you find out
what the goddamn dress is before we have a conniption.
H: I have, sir. I've just talked to Ambassador Watson. He said they
have not made a decision. It's one of two alternatives and he should be
prepared for both and I gave this to Dwight. One is business suit and
the other is a swallowtail coat. Xgex
K: Sans pantaloon (laughter)?
H: I told them to get that one ready.
K: Okay, now, will you get these guys to start turning now he screams
that he wants it on Friday -- the lunch.
H: Well, goddamn!
K: Look, this is what happens when everybody talks to e verybody else.
He had a conniption when I said it Saturday.
H: Well, that's awfully strange because
K: A1, I just got through talking to him. He called me. I've got it on
a tape if you want to hear it.
H: No, I believe that.
K: In fact, he wants to know within 15 minutes whether the Mexicans
can make it.
H: Alright, okay.
K: Can you get that done?
H: Right.
K: And it is to be in the family dining room in the Residence not in the
State Room and meet in the Oval Room. You know in the oval family room.
And he wants it on Friday.
H: Okay, alright, I will do this right away. Goddamn
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
11/10/70
-2-
K: A1, it isn't the first time that you - he's got something to do. He
wants McBride fired. When the two-year terms up put him on the list
but lets go easy on it. He's a decent guy.
H: Alright, sir.
K: Okay? Alright I will be in if I ever get him off the phone. Rogers is
pouting and I don't know about what.
H; I took care of the other. I told Dwight Bob was in the other room AND
K: That's okay.
H: Okay.
feg
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President (Tape)
11/10/70
K: Mr. President, I just talked to Bill and I understand you had to
P: Yeah, Yeah, I called him just to let him know that I wanted.
and
he said that he would go with any staff, which is good.
K: Right, excellent.
P: I told him a security man. Now! I am just sitting here and I haven't
told Haldeman yet but I am not going to have the goddamned Secret Service
sitting in that pew with me. Now that's not done by any other Government
and I'm not going to have
K: I think you are absolutely right.
P: If they are, I am firing the Secret Service. Now they have ruined
every rally picture with that and they are not going to do it here.
K: Well, I think you are absolutely right, Mr. President and also at the
Adenaur funeral they were so conspicuous that they became the laughing
stock.
P: At the Adenaur funeral I know, I know. When we went over there
they had 18 Secret Service all over the place. I am giving the orders
right now these son-of-a-bitches are not going to be there.
K: Right.
P: Thatsright. They aren't sons-of-bitches but they think law orders
them but by God in that French Cathedral we are either going to be safe
in it or they are going to blow it up one of the two. That's all there
is to it. Ne a/r/e/ So that's set and with Rogers I told him his security
man should go just for obvious reasons but he is not going to take any-
body else. The question of taking the Assistant Secretary was not
raised at all.
talk
K. Excellent. I've had a dog with him. He's neutral about Bruce,
slightly against it.
P: He's against it and I think maybe he is right on the ground that it might
look like bringing Vietnam into it. Let's pass it, don't you think so?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/President
-2-
K: Well, I think Bruce is such a senior and distinguished diplomat but it
P: The only thing is that I don't think we really need the extra person and
I just feel myself that when we get in I will have a chance -- I want to see
Bruce. When I get in we will have a nice midnight snack with him before
going to bed.
K: I don't see that there is any reason to open overrule the Secretary on
a thing like this.
P: No, no, no. I understand his concern on it. I have a little bit of the
same feeling as to whether
K: The only problem -- the only thing is you could have ECHEVERRIA
in Key Biscayne on Friday if you wanted to go back down for the weekend.
P: No, I don't want to come back here. We are going to
have it in Washington. I want him up there.
K: Good, right.
P: And I want him Friday, noon.
K: You want it Friday now?
P: If it can be, yes.
K: Right, okay.
P: Because, we would come back on Thursday -- now I assume everything
can be done Thursday -- the funeral, and if Pompidou sees us it will be
in the afternoon, right?
K: That's right. He will see you for 15 minutes.
P: And then that's all we want. I will put in my call on Pompidou and
then out we'll go and go right to the airport and off we will go.
K: They might have a reception for heads of state but you could go to that
for a half an hour and still if you left as late as 7:00 you would still be in
by.
P: Yes, 7:00 does it fine. You still get in by plenty of time. But, I would
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/President
-3-
like to get the luncheon over with and tell him Friday.
K: Okay, Mr. President.
P: And we again know that in order to have it in the proper sense we will
have it upstairs in the upstairs oval room as a reception.
K: Oh, that will be. very nice.
P: The upstairs dining room so that they have the feeling that it is in
the home.
K: That it is a family lunch.
P: You can tell them that we will have it in the family quarters in the
White House.
K: Right.
P: So that he feels that he got a special treatment -- family quarters of
the White House will be the deal. Now, who is going to call him? Are
you going to have Meyer call him?
K: We've got that in train now. I think Meyer is calling him now.
P: I want McBride fired, you know. I don't want him fired before this
visit, but he is to go.
K: Right.
P: The Ambassador down there.
K: Right.
P: I've got another man I want to put in that position. But put him on
the list of those that have to go and I want you to be sure to get the list.
Have you got your list to Haldeman yet of people who ought to go? I
don't mean at the Assistant Secretary level I mean at the Ambassadorial
level.
K: No, I haven't. I've got an Assistant Secretary -- I think Meyer ought
to go.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/President
-4-
P: I agree.
K: I have a record of what he did on Chile which is unbelieveable.
P: So, I think on the luncheon that's what we will do and I'll call
Mrs. Nixon and And inform her. Now, wait a minute. Can you find out
from the damn Mexicans whether they are going to come Friday or not
so that I can let her know because I don't want to turn her on and turn
her off on this.
K: I will let you know right away.
P: Who calls?
K: I will call the Ambassador and get an answer.
P: Tell them I want to know and I have to know in ten minutes.
K: Okay, Mr. President
P: He can call the President and just tell him we want to shift it one day
to the White House. We will fly him up and fly him back.
K: Right, Mr. President. We will get it done.
P: Okay, Henry.
feg
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
November 10, 1970
jlj
K: How are you?
Y: I am all right thank you, and you?
K: I am fine.
Y: I have come back to my office from the private meeting with my friend
about three hours ago which lasted for about 3/4 of an hour. Based on the
conversation I had with you last night, of your time, you can imagine what
and how I have talked to him.
K: Of course.
Y: He knew the climate now being created in your place. My friend showed
me the cable from our permanent representative.
K: Did it confirm what I had told you?
Y: Exactly. And the cable also states the detailed conversation held between
the two experts expressing the grave concern of our own expert. Our own
representative.
K: Yes, I know.
Y: And that confirmed precisely what you told me. Now, I had a really serious
conversation with my friend. Let me tell you the following points. I myself
fear that you yourself may no longer believe what I am going to tell you now.
K: No, No, I believe everything you are going to tell me.
Y: But this is exactly what my friend has just told me.
K: Right. No, I have no doubt in you at all.
Y: And I still believe my friend really means it and my friend really, honestly
means it. Now, my friend has already given a firm instruction to Mr. M. to
present to you our concrete counter proposal within 48 hours. The position paper,
so-called position paper, last Monday was sent by Mr. M. to our representative
without the knowledge of my own friend. It is apparently aimed at the political
tactics for home consumption for our own industry at home. So my friend asks
you not to take it seriously as it is not our counter proposal. Now, my friend
just indicated to me what he told me last Thursday when I met with him for an
hour last time and then I told you, that is he will honor his commitment to your
friend. Today he looked relaxed and sounded optimistic for the prospects of
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
reaching an agreement in time. In his mind he seems to have made up his own
mind and made his own decision knowing that will cost him heavy political
price at home. The question is the timing. And I warned him the timing was
very very short. He says that there is a Japanese way of getting things done
as far as our domestic political situation goes.
K: Of course.
Y: But at the end he himself is prepared to pay the necessary political price
for an agreement in time which I very strongly pleaded for. So I beg you that
would you be good enough to be patient for a few more days and I would like
you to tell or ask Mr. Flanigan, your assistant, to take the same attitude.
K: Right.
Y: I believe that you will be going away tomorrow, tomorrow morning.
K: Yes, we are going away.
Y: Mr. A. will be there too.
K: Oh yes.
Y: But he doesn't know in detail and this particular matter is being handled
smoothly without delay in his absence. That my friend told me.
K: Yes, well we have no intention of raising this issue.
Y: Pardon.
K: We will not discuss the issue when we see Mr. A, of course.
Y: Please not. And there is no need of that and without Mr. A. my friend
told me that things would go very smoothly.
K: Oh, is he the problem?
Y: No, No, he is not a problem at all. But he suddenly had to be away and
even in his absence there will be no difficulty of
K: I understand.
Y: We can go ahead with this arrangement as I just told you.
K: Yes, well we will not discuss it with him in where we are going.
Y: You are quite right and there is no need and I think it better not to discuss
nor does it matter to him. You know, at the end of our conversation my friend
just mentioned this without and still, as our side is concerned, is no problem
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
in making necessary arrangements. So I don't know what to say more than
this.
K: No, well I think this is fine. And I will know what to do. And we can
do nothing anyway until the weekend because we won't be back.
Y: When would you be back?
K: Friday.
Y: Friday of your time.
K: Or Thursday night.
Y: Thursday night or Friday morning. I see. And in the meantime I hope
that your own expert - I can really imagine how outrageous he would have been.
K: Well, you see the trouble with our experts are reaching the point where
they prefer legislation to an agreement. So they are relaxed. For political
reasons we would be better off without an agreement.
Y: That's right.
K: And that is apparently what yourpeople don't understand.
Y: Ya, I
K: So we will relax and we will wait until we hear from you.
Y: Yes.
K: It's all right- but there are personal feelings that I described to you yesterday.
Y: I beg your pardon.
K: There are those feelings of - you know - that I described to you yesterday.
But there is no point in repeating those.
Y: You are quite right. I would like you to be a little more patient.
K: No, we will be patient. We will be patient until the end of this week.
Y: Yes, until you have our concrete counter proposal which
I told my friend must be
and bound to each agreement very quickly.
And my friend himself is not an expert. He has understood this matter much
better than he used to.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4-
K: We have all learned a lot.
Y: He is going to do something definite.
K: I appreciate this and I appreciate the attitude you have taken throughout
and I hope to see you soon.
Y: I would like to - of course I will be getting in touch with you again, but
as soon as you have
K: Incidentally if you have something urgent you can call my Washington
number, they are always connected with me.
Y: Oh, I see. Otherwise I will get in touch with you and get to know the
action of your to our forthcoming proposal.
K: Excellent.
Y: Goodby for now.
K: Goodby and I hope to see you soon. And I appreciate what you have
done.
Y: Thank you.
K: Goodby.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telcon
Ron Ziegler
November 10, 1970, a.m.
Z: Henry. You have it?
K: No. You get the statement in about two minutes. It's being typed now
and will come right down to you.
Z: Well, I'd rather have it dictated.
K: Well, it will be dictated to you.
Z: Who from.
K: I will get it dictated to you immediately. I just want to make sure of
one thing. They have given you Kissingex the text of the letter to Pompidou.
Z: I'm not going to.
I would never do anything with anything unless I
checked it with you.
K: Good. Because you might have misunderstood. Because that should
reach there before you can release it.
Z: Oh, sure.
K: And release that around noon.
Z: Yeah. Or at the 11:00 or 11:30 briefing.
K: Good. But you will have the statement within five minutes.
Z: Who should we get it from? Julie?
K: No. Get it from Hyland who is in the Situation Room.
Z: OK. Now, I have also. Maybe you can help me
given Julie a series
of questions that I'll be asked.. No. 1: When was the President notified?
I'm going to say early this morning by Henry Kissinger.
K: Good Correct.
Z: Alright, now. How was Henry Kissinger notified?
K: By the Situation Room.
Z: And how were they notified? DX From the French Government, or did we
get it from the wires?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telcon - Ziegler
-2-
K: We got it over the wires. From our Embassy.
Z: From our Embassy. OK, then we can say the President was informed
early this morning by HAK. What time? Well, shortly after dawn.
K: Right.
Z: Now. Will the President meet with Pompidou while he is in Paris?
K: Well you have to leave a little open - in fact he may not go.
Z: Oh, I thought you wanted me to announce it.
K: Well, he will go but the ceremonies only. We can't find anything out from
the god damn Frenchmen whether they'll let any heads of state come. Well
yes, you can certaink he will certainly pay a courtesy call on Pompodou.
Z: OK. Well now you say there's a question whether he will go. Shall I
still announce it.
K: Yeah.
Z: Will he meet with the Paris delegation & while he's there?
K: No. I don't think so, anyway.
Z: We'd better leave that loose, you know?
K: Well, no, you'd better say no. Say he's just going to the funeral. It
wouldn't be appropriate for him to work while he's there.
Z: Yeah, OK. When does he go? Tomorrow night?
K: Tomorrow, late afternoon, or night. We are working that out now.
Z: OK. We'd have to overnight there then, I guess.
K: Well, unless we fly at night and come back the next late afternoon.
We'd better get a hold on some hotel rooms.
Z: Yes, I know. That's what we'll have to begin to move on fairly soon.
K: Right. OK Ron. Thank you.
ms
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
General Haig
11/10/70 (tape)
K: Has this gone down to
H: Yes, sir, it has gone. The letter has gone, the message has gone to
Paris notifying that the President is coming.
K: And the letter to Pompidou?
H: Yes, the letter on the hotline.
K: Okay, now get all of that over to Ted Eliot after I have talked to Rogers.
H: All right, sir.
K: I've got a call in to him. He is on the way in to the office.
H: Dwight called and said that they definitely want to postpone Echeverria
by one day.
K: I know, I have just talked to the President.
H: So we will have to get that started.
K: I am always glad we are doing internal Chapining and Zieglering.
H: No, no (laughter). I've always
K: I've never seen anything like this.
H: I'm only trying to tell you what to tell Rogers.
K: Right. But that will be in Washington then.
H: Yes.
K: Is he going back to Key Biscayne?
H: No, he said Washington.
K: I know, but is he going back after the lunch.
H: Oh, I don't know sir. I haven't gotten
I will check it.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
General Haig
-2-
K: Okay.
H: You know that there are a lot of questions that are going to come up.
K: He will not see members of the delegation. What, is Ziegler bugging
you again?
H: No.
K: I think it would be much better if we could sleep in Paris. We will all
be dead if.
H: That's what I thought. There is a question of whether you leave late
tomorrow night and travel all night and then spend the night there Thursday
and come back early Friday morning.
K: That's insane. That makes Friday insanity. It's a &x nine hour flight
back.
H: Right. So now you have that problem or you have the problem of
K: With whom are you associating this one
H: Nobody you. I am asking you. You said
K: My feeling is and not only my feeling his request is that we leave about
five or six o'clock on Thursday. That would get us in here at 9:00 and
give us a night's sleep.
H: Right.
K: That's the thing we should do. Then the only question is do we fly over-
night or do we arrive in time to get some
well, actually there is no
good way of arriving because if we leave at 5:00 plus six. No, we either
leave in the morning. We either leave tomorrow morning or we will be
flying at night.
H: That's right, sir. That is the problem.
K: Well, why don't you have Chapin put that to him? If we leave at 12:00
if we leave as late as 11:00 we will still make it in time to get some sleep
there.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
-3-
H: If you left at 11:00 tomorrow morning
K: We'd be in there about 7:00, now wait a minute. We'd be in -- it's a
six hour flight -- we'd be in at 5:00 it would be 11:00.
H: 11:00 at night.
K: Yes, but that is alright.
H: It's not really that late for you.
K: Yes, so there we could get some sleep. I think that is the thing to do.
H: I think it is the best way.
K: Or, even if we left at Noon.
H: Right.
K: Why don't you work it on that basis? Otherwise we will have to fly at
night but even then we are better off coming back in the afternoon because
otherwise the next day will be brutal.
H: That's *** exactly Aright. You either do it all brutally
K: You gain nothing by sleeping overnight in Paris except kill yourself
again Friday.
Wednesday night
H: You have your choice sleeping there/or travelling. That's the only choice
you have. You have to return Thursday afternoon to make Friday manageable.
K: Right.
H: I was just offering the two options.
H: Yes, but tell them on the whole it is better to go Wednesday morning.
Okay, fine. Let's see now. He wants Rogers to come along -- if he wants
to. He doesn't want a delegation of Senators.
H: Alright. He does not.
K: Right, but I don't think that's necessary.
H: NO.
K: Okay, fine. Thank you.
feg
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telcon (Tape)
Bill Hyland
November 10, 1970; a. m.
(Began in mid-sentence)
K:
stands. Just where the hell we are now. Are you telling me
that Ziegler is going to release a letter to Pompidou before we even send it?
H:
No, no.
K: Then why did he ask to have it. Just explain to me the reasoning that
makes our Press Secretary more important than Pompidou.
H: We just simply wanted to send him the change, so that he'd have the
same text we had.
K: OK, well all right. Now, I'm counting on the fact that this text is on
the machine. Now. Is that correct? We are not horsing around once more.
H: The text to Pompidou is going out now.
K: Now. OK.
H: We also have a message to Madame De Gaulle that should go too, just
as a matter of courtesy.
K: What we have to have now is the statement.
H: OK
K: The next thing we have to have is the
Have we informed them that we
are coming?
H: Not yet.
K: Why not? How about that two-line sentence?
H: OK. Here's a message to
K: I'm not mad at you. I'm mad at our spending four hours spinning wheels
and not having it. You did the best you could.
H: Here's the message I would send to Pompidou. The second message.
"It is my intention to attend the memorial service for General DeGaulle. I am
instruct ing Ambassador Watson to contact your staff to make whatever arrange -
ments are necessary. " And we could add a sentence saying, "Accept again,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telcon - Hyland - 11/10 (Contd)
-2-
Mr. President, the deepest sympathy
"
K: Yes. Can we make the beginning just a little warmer? Say, "I
would like to use this means to let you know that it is my intention", or
something.
H: Yes. "I would like to inform you personally "
K: Yes. "That it is my intention.
11
H:
11
it is my intention to attend the memorial service for General De Gaulle. "
K: Right.
H: OK. And I will send that now.
K: All right. Now, let's get the god damn statement once more, at the
point where id it stopped why don't you put in something like, "He
provided inspiration to an age always in danger of being overwhelmed
by the commonplace
"
H:
"always in danger of being overwhelmed by the commonplace. "
K: And then what do you have? Let's use one or two of your sentences.
H: I have this. "His passing was not only a loss for the French nation, but
for all.
"
K: "And therefore his passing was not only a loss for the French nation, but
for all mankind."
H: "but for all mankind. 11 We could stop at that point.
K: Right. Stop at this.
H: Do you want to say, "All Americans salute his memory" or just end it there.
K: Just stop at this point.
H: OK
K: OK. Now read the whole thing again.
H: Let me make sure I've got your sentence
K: (Repeated above sentence.) Now read the whole thing again.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Hyland
- 3 -
H: The passing of General Charles De Gaulle reminds us of the qualities
that make men and nations great. His was the quality of character that
enables men to surmount all obstacles, to call up reserves of courage,
to turn adversity into triumph. His was the quality of vision that could see
the grand sweep of history at a time when others focused only on the events
of the moment.
K: When others focused on the events. Leave out "only".
H: On the events of the moment. His was the quality of fortitude to translate
that vision into reality.
K: Take that out.
H: OK. He provided inspiration to an age always in danger of being over-
whelmed by the commonplace and therefore his passing is not only a loss
for France but for all mankind. Period
K: Yes. That's not much. But it will do. At least we've got the puking
stuff out.
H: We will go with that then?
K: Right.
H: And we'll send this to Ziegler and hell.
K: Now if I am any judge of Ziegler, he's going to release the letter to
Pompidou before it's even there.
H: OK. We'll call him and make sure ixtx he gives it some time, so it will
at least be in France. OK?
K: Right. OK.
H: And we're sending the second message to Pompidou informing thenx him
that the President's coming.
K: Right. Now, how are we going to send the letter to Pompidou. We might
as well send it.
H: Both on the Hot Line.
K: OK.
H: That's the fastest way. So we can go with both of them.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Hyland Telcon
-4- -
K: OK. But go, will you. And don't clear with anyone internally now.
Just get the god damn thing out.
H: OK, and then we'll
K: Above all, don't clear with Ziegler.
H: No, no.
K: We're not run by him yet.
H: OK. We'll just inform him that these two messages have gone.
K: That is right, and give a time when he can release them. He can release
the public statement immediately. Let's at least give Pompidou two hours.
But it's probably too late.
H: OK
K: Goodbye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
11/10/70 (tape)
K: Bill, how are you? I was trying to reach you and you were in transit
and then you
R: The President called me and I was talking to him.
K: Right. Well, you probably know then that he would like you to be on
the delegation, if you felt like going, which is what I was calling you about
to make sure so that I can announce it.
R: Fine.
K: The Echeverria thing -- we will try to move till Saturday.
R: He said Friday -- Saturday?
K: Well, they keep going back and forth. A minute ago he said Friday
but now a minute ago they called up and said Saturday.
R: Well, just let us know. It doesn't make any difference to us - - whichever
is better. I think on that one we better check it out so we are sure we don't
get some other conflict.
K: Right, I think we ought to do essentially what they want.
R: Right.
K: And I think we ought to come right back from Paris, don't you.
R: Yeah.
(There was no more on the tape)
feg
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
General Haig
11/10/70 (tape)
H: Right, sir.
K: He is now worried about clothes. Can you get all the details from the
French Embassy?
H: Right, sir.
K: From our Embassy in France. And, Echeverria, you know hot-shot
Haldeman again thinks it is great TV over there and he ought to stay as
long as possible.
H: Yes, they are talking about an extra day.
K: No, he's got to get the hell out of there.
H: That's my own view.
K: We will be the laughing stock of Europe.
H: Sure. Alright, sir, I think it is much neater to go in.
K: It's not much neater, it's the only possible thing to do.
H: Fine, I am with the same view.
K: You just tell Haldeman, now, for Christ's sake this isn't selling soap.
H: That's right. In and out formally do his job and get out.
K: You should be there only for the funeral -- anything else is going to
detract from it.
H: Alright.
K: And to do it with dignity. I mean what is he going to do on Friday if
he stays there?
H: What Dwight said was that they would try to get a meeting with Pompidou
which, of course, is stupid with all these heads of state in there it's just
not the time for that.
K: They can get a meeting with Pompidou anyway for a half an hour
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
-2-
H: On the day.
K: On the day.
H: Sure.
K: He won't have it any other way.
H: Right.
K: You should have a 20 minute he can leave as late as 7:00 and still
get in here at 10:00
H: Right. Now, he is thinking of coming back this afternoon.
K: That's okay.
H: And leaving from Washington tomorrow morning about 10:00 or 11:00.
K: That's fine.
H: Alright, now, is Rogers going.
K: I can't get the son-of-a-bitch to a telephone. He's probably sulking away
over there.
H: Alright, they don't want Mrs. Rogers if.
K: No wives are going -- I've already explained that to all of them. Why
do they always go through everything five more times?
H: In case it came up, I didn't know
K: Above all, will you tell Haldeman not to jazz the goddamned thing up.
H: Alright, sir
K: And that the only thing to do at a State funeral is to go in and out. That
if he lingers at all it will look wrong.
H: Yes, I will, I will get that word down right away.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
-3-
H
K: The only thing that would be considered is to call on Madame deGaulle
at Colombey
, but that's a three or four-hour car trip both
ways.
H: And I think the interment is simultaneous with the memorial.
K: Yes, but he could go out there after the memorial service, you see.
But don't even suggest it, will you because by the time these hot-shots get
through with this, I shudder to think what they will do.
H: Like the great train robbery.
K: And we mustn't turn it into something ludicrous. Don't you think?
H: Well, that's my view. I agree with everything you say. I think it is
just not appropriate and it's a funeral and that's it.
K: Well, why don't we set Echeverria for Friday or Saturday, either way,
that's what he just said.
H: Okay, I've got Arnie right here and he's got the message prepared on
that.
K: But, can somebody check with our Embassy in Paris we've got to
stop that Middle East meeting for this morning, what do you think.
H: I think you better, Henry -- - it's just too much.
K: And tell them we may schedule it tomorrow morning or this afternoon.
But I want to meet with that Harvard group -- okay, fine.
feg
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
11/10/70 (tape)
K: Mr. President.
P: Did you find out and I need to know this soon because we have to leave
tomorrow morning, I've got to know whether to go back to Washington to
get my stuff together, but or whether to have it sent here the question
is have you fond found out whether, what the dress is for this affair?
K: No, we are checking into that. The French are at this moment in
total chaos no one can reach anybody. But we are working on that,
Mr. President.
P:
My
inclination is to dress formally. In other words, I think he would that's
just the way he would do it. In other words I would tend to wear a morning
coat.
K: I think that is probably right.
P: But I want Watson to know that so they don't get any ideas that
while the goddamned Africans will come in their T - shirts or the funny
things that they wear, I want to know what the custom is. My inclination
would be to wear a morning coat or at least a club coat but I need to know
right away what the situation is.
K: We are checking into that right now, Mr. President. One other thing,
I don't know whether you want to bother with that, the choices of going
would be to leave
P: I just talked to Haldeman about it. We are going to go tomorrow
morning.
K: Good, I think that is right.
P: I'm not going to go and fly all night in the airplane and my inclination
on the Mexican dinner is to have it Saturday SO that we can have a chance
to rest a day in Paris. Well, if we don't rest we can come back a day
and get rested whatever we want to do.
K: Right. Actually the way the time works it's best to come back and
rest a day here. But, either way, Mr. President.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/President
-2-
P: Incidentally, my inclination would be to go over and get in around
midnight which would be basically 6:00 our time -- we wouldn't want to
sleep get in around midnight and do the drill. Call on Pompidou, if
he wants to be called on.
K: I'm sure he will. No question about that.
P: Say hello to the widow if she wants to be called on.
K: Well, she will be in Colombey.
P: Oh, that's right. This is a memorial service.
K: The best thing probably would be to leave that evening because if you
stay.
P: That's right you get caught in stuff.
K: You willhave to do something else or
P: Leave that evening and then come back. The Mexican thing then can
really be put on either time because I don't really give a damn. You know
what I am going to talk to him about anyway. Has anybody been in touch
with him?
K: Yes, we are doing that right now.
P: I put a call in to Bill just to be sure.
K: I have a call in, he is on his way to the office, in his car and I have
left word to call -- that's the first thing he will do when he gets in.
P: I think probably it will be easier since I am here for me to come up
there rather than have all of you fly down here but I guess you could all
fly down here, too.
K: We can certainly do it, which ever way is easiest for you.
P: It's 8-1/2 hours from here, the flight times so in a sense it is really
easier to fly up there.
K: It's 6-1/2 from here.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/President
-3-
P: No, from here it is 8-1/2 and 6-1/2 from Washington.
K: That's right, that's what I meant it's 6-1/2 from Washington and
8-1/2 from Key Biscayne.
P: It's an hour and half longer, SO going from Washington really saves
some time -- I mean it doesn't lose all the time that you would think.
K: That's right, but which ever is more convenient.
P: Well, I don't gain much from sticking around here.
K: You could probably leave in the morning, Mr. President and still
-- if we leave as late as noon here, we'd still be in Paris by midnight so
if you were to leave Key Biscayne at 9:00 in the morning, we could
connect with you at 11:00 at Andrews.
P: Yeah, that's be my inclination to go up tonight.
K: Yes, that's another possibility.
P: Alright, find out what the clothes are.
K: I will get that for you immediately.
P: Watson, I assume, can work that out.
K: No question, Mr. President.
P: But let's really keep it 14 tight if there is any feeling about who goes
on this thing -- I mean where everybody sits -- let's not insist that we have
eight people walk in. I'll go in alone if that's necessary. Remember, deGaulle
did it at Eisenhower's funeral.
K: DeGaulle came alone to both Kennedy and Eisenhower, Mr. President,
and I think when you and the Secretary of State go that's a much as should
go.
P: What I mean, if you come in the whole damn
the damn Africans come
in with a whole damn delegation of 80 people, that just ruins the whole thing.
K: Exactly.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/President
-4-
P: I just think we ought to walk in
K: I think it should be you alone or at most with Bill.
P: Yeah, well he will understand. They will probably have a policemen
place for Secretaries of State probably a place for heads of state.
K: Certainly, they will not seat you together.
P: Yeah, they didn't do that when he was here -- they didn't seat Secretaries
of State with heads of State at the Eisenhower funeral.
K: That's correct.
P: This is just a memorial, hugh?
K: Just a memorial service, Mr. President. But the service, I am sure,
is essentially the same. It is just that the casket isn't there.
P: It will be a high Mass, I suppose -- that's what they do.
K: I would think, yes.
P: I went to one once. Alright.
K: Right, Mr. President, I will keep you informed.
feg
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/ Bill Hyland
November 10, 1970
K:
Hello, Bill.
H:
Yeah
K:
Have you got that message off to Pompidou?
H:
Yeah, it just went down with the change you made to Key Biscayne, do
you want to send
K:
The message to Pompidou is to go this second, what the hell is it going
to Key Biscayne for?
H:
Well, Ziegler wanted to check since we made a change in it and added
your statement about greatness.
K:
But gentlemen, are we going to get something to Pompidou or not or are
we going to spin our wheels only with each other.
H:
Okay, we're sending it now on the hot line.
K:
Okay, now read me that other goddamm thing again, will you. The
passing of General Charles De Gaulle reminds us of the qualities that
make men and nations great. His was the quality of character that
enabled men to surmount all obstacles, to call up reserves of courage, to
turn adversity into triumph. His was the quality of vision that could see
the grand sweep of history at a time when others focused only on the events
of the moment
[end of tape]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
November 10, 1970
K:
I just talked to Watson, the goddamm French, of course, are all
unreachable.
H:
Uh-huh.
K:
In a highly civilized and organized country. But he strongly recommends
that we come to the memorial service on Thursday.
H:
Right.
K:
And uh, that will have to be it then.
H:
Yeah, I think he would have to leave probably tomorrow night with the
12 hours clock time, 13 clock hours. Uh, then he would certainly want
to
K:
Now look, let's not worry about the goddamm nitpicks, whether he leaves
tomorrow night or at noon or when.
H:
Well, I'm thinking in terms of Echeverria and what will have to be done
there.
K:
Well he certainly can't need to make a lunch on Thursday.
H:
No, absolutely.
K:
We can switch it to Friday in Washington.
H:
Right.
K:
But Watson thinks we ought to announce it right away and also put it on
the hot line to Pompidou.
H:
All right.
K:
Now have we got a message to Pompidou?
H:
Yes, a letter.
K:
Well, have we got it, is it ready?
H:
Yes it's all ready.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
November 10, 1970
K:
Now do you think these great brains we've got could possibly get these
4 sentences of a public statement finished?
H:
Yes.
K:
After 3 hours of work?
H:
Well, this is this goddamm speech writer exercise we go through, they
all think they are going to make the history books by what they write.
K:
Yes, but the point that I'm making is I don't care about the feelings
of other elements of the bureaucracy, I care about results.
H:
Well, of course, but you
K:
What would it do if we had a decent statement, nothing. They would
scream and yell.
H:
Yeah.
K:
Has this gone back to the speech writer now?
H:
No, absolutely not, absolutely not, he's had his crack.
K:
Hell, I can do it in 5 minutes if you would just send somebody out to
the house with the stupid thing, I just can't do it in my head without
having the text in front of me. Well, all right now, I'm going to call
the President and just confirm it again and then please let's have the
goddamm statement ready and then let Ziegler be ready to go and say
we are going so that we don't follow every African state in our action.
H:
Well no, that's the important thing
K:
I don't care about the public statement, no one will count that, but I
want to be among the first to announce that we're going.
H:
Yeah. Well, he's standing by for that decision.
K:
A1, we've got to hook it to something. The best thing would be if we
could send on the hot line a statement to Pompidou, a letter to Pompidou
in which we announce it.
H:
All right, we have a letter, we'll add a
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
November 10, 1970
K:
Now would somebody please add a sentence to that.
H:
Right.
K:
And I'll call the President.
H:
Okay.
K:
Oh hello, A1, could somebody call the garage and tell them that, to keep
my car standing by?
H:
Right, will do.
K:
Good, Bye.
[End of Tape]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Watson
November 10, 1970
W:
Hello
K:
Hello
W:
Yes Henry.
K:
How are you?
W:
I'm all right, it's very hard to get any information. One thing I
do know is that no one is going to go to that country funeral.
K:
Right.
W:
But it sounds now, I'd like to recommend that the President
announce there that he will attend the Nortredame services at
11:00 on Thursday.
K:
Right.
Jobert
W:
I tried to get the protocol, I tried to get Joe Behr and the foreign
office and it's impossible to get anybody. And now I just heard on
the radio that some of the African countries have announced they
are coming and I think the greatest nation in the world would be,
in my judgment, be rightto have the President announce he's coming
and maybe send a message over the hot line to President Pompidou.
K:
That he is coming.
W:
Yeah.
K:
All right, all right.
W:
I've been trying to think my way through it Henry and try to say
what are the negatives and even though
K:
No, he wants to come, if any Head of State comes, he'll come.
W:
Well, the German Embassy, I just called them and they are recommend
ing that both the Chancellor and President come. The Ivory Coast and
Madagascar have announced they are coming and I've heard nothing
from our other people but my inclination and those of my associates,
my almost conviction is that there are gonna be a lot of people
announcing they're coming.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Watson
November 11, 1970
K:
Right, we better get out a
W:
We'd better get on the ball.
K:
Okay.
W:
That's my only feeling, I didn't mean to put it that way.
K:
No, No, I think you are absolutely right. I'll call the President
immediately.
W:
All right sir.
K:
We'll announce it, should we, you can assume that we will announce it,
we'll get word to you concurrently.
W:
All right, wonderful, I'll be right here in the office.
K:
Right, thank you.
W:
Thank you, Bye.
K:
Bye.
[End of Tape]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/Hyland/Haig
November 10, 1970
K:
Hello
H:
The public statement. The passing of General Charles De Gaulle reminds
us of the qualities that make men and nations great, his was the quality
of character that enables men to surmount the greatest obstacles, to call
up reserves of courage to turn.
K:
I told you I don't want to turn defeat into victory.
H:
And to call up reserves of courage period.
K:
No, no, there was another sentence that I wanted, Oh Jesus. Look you
dropped the wrong clause.
H:
Oh. I thought you wanted to refuse to recognize defeat.
K:
Oh, all right, to turn defeat into victory, I think it's an ungracious thing
to say.
H:
Oh.
K:
You don't want to remind the French of a defeat.
H:
Okay, to call up reserves of courage to achieve victory.
K:
Oh God, if you think that 4 hours we've spent on this crude.
H:
You want to go on?
K:
Read that sentence again, now we're going to get it done now.
H:
His was the quality of character that enabled men to surmount the
greatest obstacles, to call up reserves of courage to achieve victory.
K:
To turn adversity into triumph or something like that.
H:
To turn adversity into triumph. His was the quality of vision that could
see the grand sweep.
K:
Oh Jesus.
H:
At a time when others
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland
November 10, 1970
K:
How about God is love and Gentlemen, please wash your hands before
leaving this room?
H:
I thought you wanted this Safrie stuff.
K:
No, go ahead.
H;
His was the quality of vision that could see the grand sweep of history
at a time when others focused only on the events of the moment. His was
the quality afforded to translate that vision into reality. His passing
is not only a loss for
K:
Oh, what?
H:
His passing is not only a loss for the French nation but for all nations.
K:
That all?
H:
No, one more sentence.
K:
That is not what I wanted, please type the goddamm thing up, send it
out to my house and I'm going to write it, there was three sentences I
gave you all. I'm sorry to be so impatient but if we knew at 4:15 and
we come up with some sophomoric stuff it's really awful. I'm not
blaming you Bill, it's just unbelievable that with a speech writer staff
we do nothing better than that. Can't we say something to the effect, as
what I said to you before, at this moment, when what this period needs
above, what we need above is something to lift us above ourselves, what
he stood for was not something that was an inspiration to France alone
and his passing therefore is not only a void for his country because in
a deep sense he belonged to all of us, something like that, something that
shows just an ounce of thought, that couldn't have been written by a
sophomore doing a term paper. I mean this could be written by a senior
doing a term paper.
H:
What he stood for was not an inspiration for France alone. At this
moment what we need is something
K:
No, no, nevermind, I'll write it, I'll call you, read the other sentence.
H:
That's it.
K:
Read the other paragraph, I mean read the other letter.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland
November 10, 1970
K:
God Almighty.
H:
The Pompidou, to Pompidou. I was deeply shocked and grieved at the
passing of General De Gaulle. This country knew General De Gaulle
as a steadfast ally in war and a true friend in peace. France's loss is
our loss, the people of France and you, Mr. President, have the
heartfelt sympathy of all Americans in your hour of mourning.
K:
That's a steadfast friend in peace. Can we put in a sentence saying
greatest knows no national boundaries?
H:
Yeah, we can say France's loss is our
K:
Greatness.
H:
Greatness knows no national boundaries
K:
No, not bulk, France's greatness knows no national boundaries and
therefore
H:
France's loss is our loss.
K:
France's loss is a loss of mankind.
H:
Greatness knows no national boundaries, therefore, France's loss is the
loss of mankind.
K:
Okay, fine. You let that one go.
Haig:
Are you going to add a sentence about being at the
K:
I think we should do that a separate message.
Haig:
All right sir, fine.
H:
A separate message from the President.
K:
From the President but if we could reduce the clearances of that to 386
people so that we can get it out by this evening, I'd appreciate it. Send
the message on the hot line saying I beg to inform you that, whatever
one says, that I'm planning to attend the memorial service at Nortredame
whenever it is, on Thursday. When is it? Is that the 12th? November 12.
My ambassador will be in touch with your officials to make the detailed
arrangement. Okay, read that crude again of the other stuff, will you?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland/Gen. Haig
November 10, 1970
Hy:
All right. The passing of General De Gaulle reminds us of the qualities
that make men and nations great. His was the quality of character that
enabled men to surmount the greatest obstacles, to call up reserves of
K:
You can't use great in two different sentences. All obstacles
Hy:
to surmount all obstacles, to call up reserves of courage, to turn
adversity into triumph. His was the quality of vision that could see the
grand sweep of history at a time when others focused only on the events
of the moment. His was the quality of fortitude to translate that vision
into reality. Now at this point we fall off.
K:
Then go ahead. Then what would you have?
Hy:
Then I have his passing is not only a loss for the French nation but for
all nations. He was not only an inspiration to France but
to the
world for what men can achieve through faith and courage. All Americans
will salute this great [warrior's ?] passing.
K:
Well, let me try two sentences, I'll call you back.
[End of Tape]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/Ron Ziegler
November 10, 1970
K:
Hello
Z:
Hello, Henry.
K:
Ron, how are you?
Z:
Good.
K:
Uh, Ron, we are gonna have this statement in about ten minutes.
Z:
Okay.
K:
But what we would like is to announce that we are going to the memorial
service.
Z:
Well, good. Reuther is already on the air with it, I hope nobody up there
has talked to him.
K:
Who?
Z:
Dan Reuther is already on the air with the fact that he is going to the
funeral, I wonder where he got
K:
Well, that has to be wrong, because I'm the only one that could talk to
him.
Z:
That's what I thought, he has to be guessing.
K:
But the fact of the matter is that, uh, there is a memorial service in
Nortredame Thursday at 11:00. You can say the President plans to
attend and we will have further details and I would like it out fairly soon.
Z:
Yeah.
K:
So that we don't follow every African country with the announcement.
Right,
Z:
/Okay. What I'd like to do is issue the statement and the announcement
at the same time.
K:
The only trouble with that is that it may mean that 20 African countries
get their announcements out first.
Z:
Well, see the real pressure I'm getting from everywhere is just a simple
remark like I'm sorry he's dead.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Mr. Kissinger/Ron Ziegler
November 10, 1970
K:
Well, uh, you'll get it in 5 minutes, unfortunately we have six speech
writers, 10 staff members
Z:
I know what problems you're faced with.
K:
And, I'm writing it right now.
Z:
Okay, I have a gal standing by who will take the dictation from one of
Haig's gals or one of your gals.
K:
Right.
Z:
Then do we have to check it with the President or
K:
No, no, I'll talk to him, it's okay.
Z:
So I don't have to, once I get it from you, I can go with it?
K:
Right.
Z:
Okay.
K:
Bye.
Z:
We'll see you.
[End of Tape]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Lucet
11-10-70 (Tape)
K: Hello
L: Hello
K: Hello, Charles, I need not tell you what we all feel at this moment.
L: Thank you, Henry.
K: And I wanted you to know also on behalf of the President that we are
all thinking of you and, of course, the President would like to go to Paris
and pay whatever respects he can.
L: And then to do what?
K: And to pay whatever respects are appropriate, As soon as you have
made arrangements -- I don't know whether the memorial service will
be only for
L: But you know, Henry, I was just learn this news during the night
and I am just reading now
where he says
he wants to be buried
K: Yes, my understanding is there is a memorial service at Notre Dame
but it may only be again a local affair.
L: Oh, yes, that I don't know yet. But then it was very, very kind of
you to call me.
K: This is not at the moment our principal problem so if you will,
as soon as you know anything, keep in mind that we, out of friendship
and admiration of course, want to do whatever we can do
.
L: Yes, so I am going to call Paris as soon as it is possible and get in
touch with you.
K: Would you do that, Charles and also you know if you need any facilities
here if we can help you with communications or anything else you call
on my office, we are at your disposal.
L: Thank you very much. Because you have already been in touch with
Paris?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Lucet
11/10/70
-2-
K: I have been in touch with our Ambassador.
L: Did he say there would be a memorial at Notre Dame?
K: He said the funeral service at Cholombey and that is indeed private
and he said there will be a memorial service concurrently at Notre Dame
which will be attended by ministers of the Government but he
L: No foreign dignitaries?
K; Well, he didn't know that.
L: Yes. So that is what I am going to check right away.
K: If you could check that right away. But, in addition, if you would
let your President know we, of course, will send him a formal message.
L:
a formal message?
K: No, we are sending a formal message within a matter of hours but
if you could let them know that on a very personal basis level how grieved
the President is and how we are feel that this is not a loss for France
alone but for the whole world.
L: Thank you very much, Henry. Thank you SO much. I will call Paris
and call you back as soon asI can.
K: Good, Charles. Goodbye.
L: You are so kind and I am deeply moved.
K: Goodbye.
feg
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Conference Call
Mr. Kissinger, General Haig
Kevin Donoghue, Situation Room
Bill Hyland - 11-10-70 (Tape)
K: Hello.
H: Uh, Henry? Alright, Kevin is ready to read this and I have Hyland
and myself on. Kevin, do you want to read the statement again.
D: Yes, sir. "A giant of our times has fallen. The passing of General
DeGaulle reminds us of the qualities that make men and nations great.
His was the quality of character that enables men to surmount the greatest
obstacles, refuse to recognize defeat and call off personal reserves with
courage that turn defeat into victory. 11
K: Leave out personal for one thing.
D: Pardon me, sir.
K: Leave out the word "personal" just reserves with courage.
D: Yes, sir.
K: Is Saffire there?
D: No, he is not.
K: Okay, go ahead.
D: "His was the quality of vision that could see the grand sweep of history
at a time when most men focus only on the events of the day. Because
Charles de Gaulle had his vision of history and because he had the
determination to turn his own vision into reality he could act in a way
that changed the course of the history of his nation and the world. I
xah shall never forget the hours spent with him over the years and
the opportunity.
"
K: Hold on a second, I think that is the French Ambassador. I will
call you right back.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Continued
-2-
H: Hello
K: That was the French Ambassador.
H: Okay. Ready?
K: Who is this?
H: This is Haig, Kevin and Hyland.
K: Go ahead.
D: "I shall never forget the hours spent with him over the years and
the opportunity he gave me to share his vision and gain his counsel.
All Americans will remember the powerful. 11
K: I would take out his "I's" what he does isn't so important right
now. I think that is too self-serving.
H: Okay.
K: While we are at it, let's take that first platitudinous sentence out --
"A giant of our times has fallen. 11
H: I agree. Fine
K: Is that you Safire?
H&D: No, Safire is not here.
D: Now, I have stricken "I" -- how shall we replace it, with "we" or
K: No, just leave out those two sentences.
D: Okay, fine. "All Americans will remember the powerful presence
of this man of tall stature and towering integrity. 11
K: Jesus!
D: who showed the world how one man with a dream and a drive
could make and abiding difference. General de Gaulle a living legend
in his own time will be an enduring inspiration to future generations of
men who honor patriotism and cherish freedom and who value the luster
of a leader who came to be a simple symbol of the greatness of his nation.
K: Oh, Jesus!
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Continued
-3- -
XXXXXXX
H: That's awful.
K: Jesus
D; Tht's Hyland saying that.
?: "legend" is terrible.
K: Well, there is no platitude except God is love that's i/out of it.
Leave out the last two sentences, tool. Now, can you say something
simple like, something to the effect that of course the we grieve for
the people of France but it isn't a loss for France alone because at
a time that has exexxxxeded never needed inspiration and greatness
more, he symbolized it and therefore his loss is not the loss of
France alone because he belonged as well to all of us -- something
like that. Something simple.
H: Right, sir.
K: I hold no particular brief for these words, but something
along these lines that doesn't use that fantastic rhetoric.
H: Oh, boy!
K: This man can't be imbellished by these platitudes. Bill, can you
try a few sentences like that at the end and.
Hyland: Yeah.
K: And take at the patronizing quality.
Hyland: I, yeah, yeah.
K: And let Ziegler scream, goddammit. What are people going to say
that he missed his goddamned deadline by 15 minutes. They know we
are not throwing our hat in the air.
Hyland: Could I read you what I wrote -- or do you care?
K: I don't care but go ahead. Read me in the best Sonnenfeldt tradition.
Hyland; No, I thought.
K: You know I don't care, go ahead.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Continued
-4-
Hyland: That you would say that we mourn the passing or something
like that but then say, "France's darkest hour this courageous soldier
took up the cross of Lorraine and bore it for the people of France.
Charles deGaulle was not only a soldier of France -- he was a states- -
man of vision. A vision of greatness
K: Wait a minute, now, may I make a suggestion to you, Bill. When
you say a soldier of France but a statesman of vision that means no
soldier of France has any vision.
Hyland: "Was not only a soldier of France was also a statesman of
vision. 11
K: Go ahead.
XXXXXXX
Hyland: Well.
K: Was not only a soldier, otherwise it sounds as if the
of
the French soldier never had vision.
Hyland: Okay. A vision of greatness which sustained the French nation
in war and peace. And Charles deGaulle was apatriot who sought no
higher goal than to serve his country. We salute his memory and
mourn his passing.
K: Yeah, well, I like the first two sentences. I think the point to get
across is that here was a great man -- two or three points I think we
ought to get across. One is that in our age he reminds us what one can
do with inspiration and faith and courage and therefore he transcended
all odds and all difficulties and this is a quality that is not peculiar
that is not only necessary for France but for the whole world -- something
like that. It shouldn't the testimony shouldn't be simply to a great
French parochial leader.
Hyland: Yeah, I see what you mean.
K: See what I maan. But I like the tone of yours a hell of a lot better.
Hyland. Well, okay, let us
K: The only thing is
Hyland: We will see if we can blend Saffire
K: Take a few of these Safireisms, cut it down.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Continued
-5-
K: Al? What do you think.
H: Yes, Sir. No, that's what I would do. I would take Safire's first
paragraph -- the first sentence out. And then maybe his second and
then pick up
K: Well, since I don't have the goddamned thing in front of me that
doesn't tell me anything. Read me the first paragraph.
H: Leave the first
K: Well, read it to me.
D; Okay. "The passing of General deGaulle reminds us of the qualities
that make men and nations great. His was the quality of character
that enables men to surmound the greatest obstacles, to refuse to
recognize defeat and call off reserves with courage that turn defeat
into victory. His was the quality of vision that could see the grand
sweep of history at a time when most men focused only on the events
of the day. Because Charles deGaulle had his vision of history and
because he had the determination to turn his own vision into reality
he could act in a way that changed the course of the history of his
nation and the world.7'
K: Well, that word history appears about 25 times. Okay, what else?
D: All Americans will remember the powerful presence of this man
of tall stature and towering integrity who showed the world
"
K: You can't say tall stature for Christ sake.
Hyland: Can't we go right at that point to this last one about
K: Absolutely
Hyland: His loss is not the loss of France but
K: With a few sentences but let's clean up that paragraph a little bit, too.
First of all, the first sentence -- read me that new first sentence
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
WOXXX
Continued
-6-
D: All Americans will remember the powerful presence of this man
K: No, no, go back to the beginning of the statement.
D: The passing of General deGaulle reminds us of qualities that make
men and nations great. His was the quality of character that enables
men to surmount the greatest obstacles, to refuse to recognize defeat
and call off reserves with courage that turn defeat into victory.
K: Leave out to refuse to recognize defeat.
D: HIs was the quality of vision that could see the grand sweep of
history at a time when most men focused only on the events of the day.
Because Charles deGaulle had his vision of history and because he
had the determination to turn his own vision into reality he could act
in a way that changed the course
K: That sentence goes, too.
Hyland: We can fix that up.
K: You can't fix it up, just take the goddamned thing out and put in what
I just gave you.
Hyland: Alright.
K: But then don't put anything out until you read it to me again.
Hyland: Yes.
K: I don't care what Ziegler says, Al.
H: Alright.
K: He is not my boss.
H: Oh, no, that's alright.
K: And if he has to wait a half an hour he's got to wait a half an hour.
We are not going to make laughing stocks of the world out of us, with a
pompous statement. All we need is five or six sentences.
H: That's what I thought in the first place.
Hyland: Okay, let us do another draft.
K: Do a quick draft, will you? Good. Thank you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
? November 10, 1970 (TAPE)
K:
Hello.
R:
Hi, Henry.
K:
I don't know whether you have seen those two cables from Bruce.
R:
I heard about them. They are on the way out here. I was in
New York, and I just got back.
K:
The second one is particularly interesting, I think. I don't
know whether.
You know, they seem to have anticipated we'd do
something like this, and send a man to the delegation suggesting that
maybe they didn't have the date straight. So I think there won't be
any problem now about shifting it.
R:
Doesn't he object to the business about not going?
K:
Yeah. Now the first one is his strong objection to his not going
on Thursday, and I
R:
I think we should respect his views then.
K:
That is exactly my view, Bill. It's not a big enough point, and
we need his support, so my suggestion is, if the President's in Walker's
Key, we'll wait till Monday and let him go ahead then.
R:
I think so, too. We don't have to
K:
I'll see if he gets back on Monday. I don't think this is something
we ought to do on the communications to Walker's Key.
R:
No, I don't either.
K:
But I am sure he'd go along with us. You know, he was fairly
definite, but I think when he hears the whole story, I'm confident if
you and I agree on it he'll go along.
R:
Well, fine. Why don't, in the meantime, I send a cable to Bruce
saying that we appreciate his views very much and will give sympathetic
consideration to them and will be back in touch with him on Monday. How
about that?
K:
I think that's right. The way to proceed. But the other one is
just interesting. It requires no action, but it suggests that there'll
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
November 10, 1970 (TAPE)
- 2 -
probably be no problem about shifting the date.
R:
Good. I had a very interesting discussions with Riad and Eban
in New York.
K:
Riad wanted me to come up there. He got a message to me and
I didn't do it.
R:
I think there is a possibility of pulling something off here.
K:
You do?
R:
Uh huh.
K:
Of what?
R:
Well, I think they're going to
I think Israel will eventually
agree to negotiations within a month or so.
K:
I think that's probably right.
R:
And then I think there's just a chance that we'll be able to
work out a settlement.
K:
Oh, really!
R:
Well, when I say just a chance, you know, it's three to one,
but I think it's possible. Egypt, I think, really wants a settlement.
I had a very interesting talk with Riad, and he said, "Look, we've
decided we need peace and we've got to take care of our own people
and spend our money for their welfare.
K:
Well, it's hard to imagine this group playing a pan Arab role.
R:
I know. Well, I don't want to be too optimistic but I was quite
encouraged.
K:
Wonderful.
R:
Okay, Henry, thank you.
K:
Good, Bill.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
# 3am tape
Telcon
The President
November 12, 1970; a.m.
cio77
K: I just wanted to let you know where everything stood. We're releasing
a statement and we've sent over the hot line a letter to Pompidou. There's
a memorial service at 11 o'clock on Thursday and Watson has strongly
recommended that you go.
P: Where is it going to be?
K: At Notre Dame in Paris.
P: Yeah, OK. We'll go.
K: And I think we ought to announce that fairly quickly because otherwise
50 African nations are going to get ahead of us and it will be announced.
P: Yeah. Now I don't want a delegation.
K: All right.
P: As we know it takes an enormous number of people and I don't want a
bunch of jerks going with me.
K: Right.
P: Or did you have other views?
K: No.
P: In other words, I don't want any god damn Senators and Congressmen
that I'll have to talk to on the way. I'll use the time to work, see.
K: Yeak Right.
P: And my view is I would just go and we just won't say much about it.
K: All right. Should we take the Secretary of State?
P: Oh, yes, if he wants to go. I think he should go, and I think you should go,
Box perhaps, and I. But I don't think
Haldeman shaild go .
K: Right.
P: On the other hand. On the Mexican, just ask him if he can do the luncheon
on Friday in Washington. And we'll fly our plane to fly him up.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telcon - The President
- 2 -
K: All right. Do you think Friday, or should we try for Saturday? I'm just
concerned that you might be pretty tired.
P: I don't give a damn about being tired. It's just a luncheon, you know, so
since it's a luncheon I wouldn't mind doing it Friday. If he wants to do it
Saturday, that's fine.
K: Good. You might want to call on Pompidou briefly and they might have a
reception as you did for heads of state. So you might not be able to leave
until the late afternoon.
P: Yes, but of course as you know, with the time break you get back here around..
K: You would be back.
P: If you left at 5:00 you'd be back by 8:00. Because you get a 6 hour time
break. So you don't have really much of a problem that way. I guess you
could do it Friday without a problem.
K: Alright. We'll offer him Friday. And we'll offer to fly him up in the plane.
P: Yes, and have it in Washington. Now, what is the situation with regard to
women? I don't think
K: No, I don't think any ladies should go.
P: Yeah, not with the French. They wouldn't.
K: That's not customary.
P: Yes, and I noticed when De Gaulle came. Wait a minute. Did he bring his
wife?
K: No. For neither funeral. And no other head of state brought his wife.
P: Yes, fine. Alright, well now let's you call, uh. Be sure you call Bill.
K: I have a call to him right now.
P: Yes, and say I want to go. And say we should be very limited. I do not want
Congressional people because I don't want them on my hands.
K: Absolutely.
P: Anyway, there's not gonna be room. You know what I mean. About 100
African nations, all those jackasses will be there, and so I think we ought to go,
and if I go, that's enough.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telcon - The President
-3- -
K: If you go, and the Secretary of State goes, that is as much
P: And is you go, because of good reasons, and I, uh.
K: Yes, but I'd go as your staff man, anyway, so
P: Yes, that's right. I can go - I don't want to fly over there alone. And
that's, uh,
as well as Rogers himself. That's a long flight, so I might
take
K: There's no problem about you taking staff members, Mr. President, if
they're not part of your official
P: I was going to say, I could take Ehrlichman and Shultz along, but let's
don't raise that question yet. You just call Bill and tell him what the score
is, but I don't want anything about sensitivity with the god damn Mexicans
to stop this. They'll understand this.
K: Oh, of course, Mr. President. There's no problem.
P: They particularly would.
K: No, they fully understand that, and we'll handle that.
P: Oh, and don't suggest he go with me.
K: Echeverria?
P: Yeah.
K: Oh, no.
P: No. I've got to go by myself. And I'll fly up to Washington today or
tomorrow.
K: Tomorrow is actually time enough.
P: And we'll get going. OK?
K: Right, Mr. President.
P: Fine, fine. And you can call me back on Bill. I actually think Bill ought
to go, don't you?
K: I think it would be nice.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telcon - The President
- 4 -
P: And that would be the delegation that way. And, let's don't get into
Hildebrand and people like that. I don't think we need to.
K: No. This should not be a working thing. Now, Ziegler pretends to ask
me whether you will meet with the Paris delegation while you are there.
P: No, sir. Never.
K: Absolutely. I agree completely. I don't think it should have any connotation
that you are using De Gaulle's
P: I would have no objection though to naming Bruce as one of the members of
the delegation.
K: That woufld be nice.
P: Because he's the former Ambassador to Paris. How would that be?
K: That is a very nice
P: That way, I would have a chance to chat with him you see, privately, but
under no circumstances do I go rushing - oh, that would be horrible to do
business when a man's died.
K: No, that would be totally inappropriate.
P: Now, let's think about Bruce. But wouldn't that be alright?
K: I think that would be a very nice gesture.
P: Or does that look like we're making medicine?
K: Well, we don't know, of course, how many people they can put into Notre Dame.
P: Yes, they can limit it to me and Rogers.
K: That's it, certainly.
P: But Bruce would be the only one. I'm not going to go back and pick up Bohlen
and a lot of other Ambassadors.
K: Absolutely not.
P: All right, would you do that?
K: *****docit I'll work it out with Bill.
P: What else is new on the diplomatic front? Anything? The Generals got out,
I see.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telcon - The President
- 5 -
K: Yes, the Generals were released yesterday as Dobrynin told us. And we
put out a rather friendly statement last night about it.
PR When are you going to start your chats with him about agenda?
K: I thought next week, or whenever you say.
P: Sure. When do you think they want to have the talks' about it?
K: He's already asked me when they are ready.
P: Yes. I noticed from reading the news
I mean, from reading your
diplomatic things that they are dragging their feet on SALT quite
now.
Do you think maybe that's because they're waiting for us?
K: No. Actually in SALT they are moving not in an extremely pace, but
they're moving. They're revealing their position in a little more detail.
P: The other thing is that when do you think Dobrynin wants to talk about
releasing the Summit thing?
K: I think we can schedule that for almost any time. Early next year. I think
the way to start it is to begin talking agenda and have it XIX emerge out of
that.
P: Well, let me say this. It accured to me that I don't want them to think;
and I want the record to show/that we were panting to have it released just
because of an election. So I think that maybe you ought to have a meeting
with him on the agenda items and say, now look, on this release of the time,
and so forth, let's determine now when it's gonna be. As far as we're
concerned there's no strain for us. Don't let them think we want to delay
the release of the time and use that as a gimmick.
K: Right. Exactly.
P: See my point. I don't think it makes that much difference. A good bluff,
but that's about all.
K: Well, it will be a substantial.
P: Yeah, it will be a story from there on, but I just (END OF TAPE)
ms
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Freeman
November 21, 1970
K:
Hello John.
Yes Henry.
K:
Sorry to bother you at such an unearthly hour but a number of things
happening we didn't want you to read in the newspapers.
Right.
K:
We are right now conducting some pretty massive air attacks in
North Vietnam.
Yes.
K:
In the panhandle area which we -- which are technically in response to
the shootdown of American planes but for your information primarily
designed to hit some of the supplies they have piled there for their very
large high infiltration that is going on at this moment.
Yes.
K:
Hanoi has just announced and we wanted you we are not notifying any
other foreign government and indeed I am doing this with of course the
approval of the President but no one else knows I'm telling you this.
Secondly, you should also know that for the Prime Minister's own
information that this is was done at this particular time as a cover
for a commando raid where we were trying to free some American
prisoners in a camp that we had identified.
Um-huh.
K:
And that raid unfortunately failed because the camp had been vacated
just recently. The raid itself went off as planned but the prisoners had
left.
What very bad luck.
K:
It was like a -- it was actually a brillantly done plan. It worked just as
it should but all our commandos got away.
And was that yesterday?
K:
That was yesterday evening. Now that has not yet come out. It was just
to give the whole picture to the Prime Minister. We will dribble that
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Amb.
November 21, 1970
K:
second fact out sometime during the course of the day tomorrow.
Yes.
K:
Hanoi claims that Haiphong and the belt north of -- in that area --
there's a beeping sound from this phone -- Hello --
Yes, I got it myself.
K:
Right.
Oh yes, I got it then.
K:
Yeah. That is being attacked, that is not true, all the bombing is south
of the 19th parallel.
Yes.
K:
But there was air activity in that northern area in order to detract
to deflect the radar from the commando raid.
Yeah.
K:
But it did not drop any ordnance. (long pause) -- Hello.
Yes.
K:
Well, that is the situation.
Well, that's -- I'm grateful to be told all that, um-huh.
K:
And you will keep it to the narrowest channels and protect me also here
in town.
Of course, I will. Indeed, yes. And most of this will be out in today's
newspapers
K:
The air attacks but not the extent.
No, no. Okay, I'm gratefully indeed to be told, thank you very much.
K:
And not the reasoning and the other operation we will hold for a bit.
I quite understand.
K:
Right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/ Amb.
November 21, 1970
Thanks very much.
K:
Right, Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
(tape) 11/21/70; 1:45 a. m.
K: Hello.
R: Hello, Henry.
K: Bill, sorry to bother you. Radio Hanoi has announced that some air
attacks are going on but they seem to be including one that has wounded
American prisoners -- that has produced casualties at an American
prisoner camp. Now, what they øseem to be reporting, the area that
they are reporting is not where the air strikes are going on
they are reporting Haiphong, and the province where that other operation
went on. So, what Defense wants to do is to come out with the agreed
statement on the protective reaction part and then the question is should
they say anything about the other operation. Before I agreed to anything,
I wanted to get your judgment.
R: I am inclined to think not but that's one of my off-hand reactions.
How do you feel about it.
K: Well, my first reaction was exactly the same as yours Øh/reflection,/
My first reaction was just to say, "Yes, there are protective reaction
strikes going on against installations, etc. 11 none of them in the area
they are mentioning or none north of the 19 parallel whatever the thing
is. On reflection, the only other thing we could add to it so that we are
not accused of creating a credibility gap is just a sentence saying
in addition there was a commando raid on a prisoner of war what we
had reason to believe was an American prisoner of war camp north of
that area and we found the camp vacated with no American prisoners
there.
R: Did we get a full report on it. Was it alright -- no one was hurt?
K: We know that there were no Americans there and that it had been
empty for several months is what the report says that we've got. So it
makes you wonder about that goddamned it's like that camp they had,
you remember, two years ago.
R: Underground
K: Yeah.
R: How is Hanoi reporting the prisoners business?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
K: Hanoi is reporting -- V latch I don't have the flash here but in effect
they are reporting that waves (?) of American planes have started attacking
at 2:30 Hanoi time, which is, of course, the other operation. And that
we hit an area from Haiphong to that province where that camp is located.
And they are, of course, reporting the f
operations and that as
a result of this there was an attack also on the prisoner camp leading
to the casualties of American prisoners.
R: Well I think under those circumstances it probably is alright to add
this sentence. That leaves open the question of casualties to American
prisoners though, doesn't it?
K: Yeah. I think we should say we know there were no American
prisoner camp in those areas -- well, that's a little strong because we
don't really know that.
R: Yeah.
K: The areas they mentioned we didn't bomb. Some of this may have
been just complete confusion on their part as to what did go on.
R: Yeah. I am inclined, I think, to leave it out. We certainly don't
want to leave open the question of whether American prisoners have been
killed. I am afraid if we just mention the fact we made an attack on a
prison camp and say nothing about American casualties -- how does the
sentence read that you thought maybe we should use?
K: We should say there was a commando raid make that other statement
a protective reaction -- and say all of this south of the 19th parallel, on
missile installations and associated equipment and then say in the area
north of the 19th parallel there was we conducted a commando raid
by a small team against a suspected prisoner of war camp for the purpose
of saving American prisoners. The camp had been vacated several weeks --
we found that the camp had been vacated several weeks previously. All
members of the commando team returned safely and there were no
casualties either on the ground or something like that.
R: Do we know it was vacated two or three months ago?
K: That's what the report said that we got -- that it looked as if it had
been uninhabited for several months.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- -3-
R: I thought they told us they had seen a lot of activity there from the air.
K: Dammit they told us -- when I got the briefing they told us that they
had been moving people in. Had gone from 60 to 90 and that's what they
told you.
R: Yeah, they told us that there was some recent activity there.
K: Well.
R: It makes us look awful silly if we say we conducted a commando raid
and the camp had been vacated two or three months ago.
K: Well, we don't have to say anything. We can just say this didn't
happen. I mean we can just say nothing -- no air attacks took place
north of the 19th parallel.
R: Yeah.
K: Our concern is that if any of these guys blab when they come back --
afterall, there are sixty people involved.
R: Yeah, Oh, it will be known in the camp -- we can't avoid that. Can't
we say that the camp had been vacated but there were no casualties.
K: Certainly. We found that the camp had been vacated and there were
no casualties. We don't have to say how long ago.
R: I think maybe that's the way to do it. I suppose we might as well say
it first rather than have it dragged out of us tomorrow.
K: That's the argument for it. Also, it would put us in a position of
killing the notion that we attacked any of our PW camps by aircraft.
R: Right. Okay. I think that's fine.
K: Okay, Bill, maybe we will have a merry weekend.
R: I'll say. Okay, Henry.
feg
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (tape)
Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida
7:30 m., November 23, 1970 (?)
Y:
Hello.
K:
Hello. How are you?
Y:
I'm all right, thank you. And you?
K:
Okay. You want to know what happened.
Y:
Yes, please.
K:
Well, your representative came in today and presented something
that is closer to what we want, but he said that was his own idea and
what did we think of it. So, we said he should check with Tokyo and if
they could say it is their idea, then we'll give him our answer.
Y:
Oh, I see.
K:
So, that's where we stand.
Y:
Could you tell me how close it was?
K:
Well, he gave a formula for a growth of 3% which is higher than,
of course, what we had said, but which, perhaps with a lot of persuasion,
I could get Mr. Flanigan to accept.
Y:
What does the situation include?
K:
Yes, but then he didn't really seem to accept the idea of groups.
He seems now to want no groups and just categories.
Y:
Oh, I see.
K:
So, we are now completely confused again. I think he only wants
12 categories and no groups.
Y:
Oh, I see -- 12 categories, and no groups. That must be really
his own idea.
K:
Well, I tell you, if you can come back with six groups and those
17 categories, I think we could probably accept your growth rate.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (tape)
Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida
12:00 a. m., November 24, 1970
K:
Hello.
Y:
Hello.
K:
How are you?
Y:
I'm all right, thank you, and I'm sorry to disturb you at this
late hour.
K:
That's all right.
Y:
I would like to explain to you the present situation here for your
own information. My friend has just had another special meeting with
his top advisors on the subject. My friend is determined more the than ever
to have an agreement and, as a matter of fact, wanted to make a final identica
political decision today. However, I'll be very frank and suggest
Mr. M.
.
K:
Hold on a second. Go ahead.
Y:
Mr. M in the way undesirably made a plea to use him for about
6 hours or so to devise a new formula using the framework of our basic
policy.
K:
Of whose basic policy?
Y
:
Which I already explained to you earlier. And so the new
instructions are going to be sent to our representative later today of
our time.
K:
Right.
Y:
I do not know the technical details of the new formula yet but I;11
probably let you know something more about it as soon as I have it. We
do hope that your expert will consider it. Mr. M is now apparently raising
the question
to my friend. If my friend was to make a political
decision to have an agreement which is acceptable to you, Mr. M feels
he cannot bear the responsibility of implementing it effectively as long
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
the
as/subject is called voluntary
Now the political climate
here as I see it as an outside observer is
so serious that his
getting
friend might resign. I don't know.
K: That who might resign? Who might resign, M?
Y: Yes, Mr. M might resign.
should
K: Well maybe we
forget the whole thing. We didn't want to start
it again.
well
Y: Just let me finish. It may/lead to a political crisis to my friend but my
friend still does wish to have an agreement at an earliest occasion out of
his firm conviction that this will serve the long range national interests
of both countries. So in any case,
there is another expert meeting
tomorrow of your time.
K: Yes.
Y: So would you please let me know your
reaction to our get new
instructions which I do not know at all. I fear that they may not
to your expert
justice
but if you can give a final try then my friend will
probably make a political decision. On that occasion my friend feels that
he will ask your friend through you political consideration by your friend
SO that
as well,
we could have an agreement.
I don't know.
K: Well, I want to talk to my friend tomorrow. / We don't want to undermine
your friend's position and if it doesn't work out we should just forget it.
Y: But my friend does wish to have an agreement and for instance let me
POI our time
be very frank with you that he yesterday,
,
I told you this
morning how
I told you this morning,
of your time. I had. I met
him and had a long talk twice over the phone.
He expressed his personal regret for such a delay in making the agreement
get
as
he meant to
it much earlier
when
he visited your place about a month ago. Read that press communique but
due to the extremely difficult and highly technical nakixx nature of the program
and the very limited scope of what he and his
gentlemen can do to impose
voluntary
regulations
on
the industry. Which is true
necessary at home but outside all that he does wish to have an agreement
and so he hasn't given up his hope yet at all but in order to give Mr. M
(this is a very personal conversation between you and I) give him one
more chance with a time limit of 6 hours.
K: OK well we could talk after our experts have met and then let's see
where we stand.
Y: Don't raise this matter to your friend yet because then your friend may
worry about this. This is a very honest and frank conversation between you
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
and I.
K: I appreciate this and we will see where we stand in another - tomorrow
at this time.
Y: Yes please. I am very anxious to have your reaction of your expert
to our new formula.
K: Very nice to talk to you again and we will talk tomorrow.
Y: Yes please
K: Good night and thank you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida
1:00 a. m., November 24, 1970
- 2 -
Y:
Yes.
K:
That is, 3%
Y:
3%?
K:
Yes.
Y:
Within the group?
K:
Yes. You know, I can't be absolutely sure, but I think there would
be a chance.
Y:
Fine, fine. I think we're much better to stick to our original
conversation which is the official stance now approved by my friend
with his two top aides. As I told you, I am absolutely certain and
correct in saying this. So, if we could stick to the last conversation
I had with you, our original official proposal of six groups over 17 items
and if you could give us 3% of shift within a group.
K:
Well, I will do my best. I can't guarantee it, but at least, they
didn't reject it completely. I proposed it today on the basis of our
conversation
Y:
That's right.
K:
recognizing your friend's particular problem and, of course,
our people are extremely reluctant, but I think we can. I'm giving
you my impression that if you accept six groups and 17 categories, and
one of the other three is an essential. I don't know which it is.
Y:
I beg your pardon -- what
K:
Of the remaining three categories, we must have one under
some formula. I don't know which of the three.
Y:
I see, but one item.
K:
Yes.
Y:
So that will be 18 items.
K:
Yes.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida
1:00 a. m., November 24, 1970
- 3 -
Y:
I see. All right. You have to have one more item.
K:
That's right.
Y:
So, six groups over 18 items.
K:
Right.
Y:
And would you think you could perceive your exports to accept
3% shift?
K:
I think so. You know, I hope so. But if you show some
flexibility, I think I can.
Y:
Yes, yes. Then, I would immediately get in touch with my
friend. He's really anxious and.
K:
Well, you can tell him I will undertake to get.
I think I can
get the three per cent.
Y:
I see. And, you are really not an expert nor I am, but this
3% shift is within a group.
K:
That's right.
Y:
If there is another shift between groups
K:
Yes, I don't know what the rule there is.
Y:
And also the question of the carry-in and the carry-over, and
we had some idea of 5% for this shift on the carry-in/carry-over. Also,
the growth rate; that is, about 5% which is in substance very similar
to your growth formula. I was told by our top expert that this could be
acceptable to you basically. The real question is the shift percentage
within a group. And your expert, Mr. Flanigan, suggested to our
representative 1%
K:
That's right.
Y:
So, if you could allow us 3%, I think this would be a tremendous
help. The very strong argument - -- for instance, Mr. M is putting to
my friend is that if we go ahead with this proposal of yours, then it
would be a cutback of our shipment. Not the gradual, ordinary growth,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursúant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida
1:00 a. m., November 24, 1970
- 4 -
but the cutback in absolute terms of shift-backs. That is his main
argument, and this then tells you that could not force our industry
to accept.
K:
But I think we can probably deal with that.
Y:
So, my own friend -- he is not an expert either. All he needs
is now political help from you.
K:
Well, I have done what I could today.
Y:
So that we could dramatize and propagandize that we have reached
an agreement as a result of the
in good faith, the mutual conditions.
K:
Well, will you call me tomorrow morning.
-
Y:
Yes, certainly. What time could I call you?
K:
Around 8:30 my time.
Y:
Around 8:30 of your time? At your office?
K:
Yes.
Y:
And would you please
I know you are extremely presently
busy -- the schedule you have, but since now.
K:
Yes, I will do the best I can.
Y:
Could it hurry so that in the way this states, in the light of our
forthcoming Diet session, before that session my friend and all his
advisors agree that we must settle the matter. Otherwise, there is
not much purpose of reaching any agreement from our point of view.
So would you please give your time the proper priority to this matter?
K:
I will. Okay, I'll hear from you at 8:30.
Y:
Yes, and please, even though it is a private proposal of our
representative, which it is purely of his own -- I'm certain of that.
K:
All right, fine. I will then wait to hear from you tomorrow
morning.
Y:
That's right.
K:
Good. Good night.
Y:
Good night and thank you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (tape)
Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida
Late evening, November 24, 1970
Y:
I'm sorry to disturb you. Have you
K:
Well, I've had a very preliminary talk and we haven't had
a final talk yet which we'll have in the morning. But I can tell you
what my recommendation is going to be. I think we should break
off the negotiations. It isn't worth it. I don't think this is an
acceptable proposal and I don't think we want to undermine the
domestic position of your friend any further. I don't see
I don't
the proposal does us any good, and it won't do him any good.
Y:
Yes, I understand that this is your recommendation, but also
I'm thinking of the prestige of your friend.
K:
Well, that's all right now, but this proposal won't help the
prestige of my friend, and the alternative proposal is going to over-
throw your friend, so there isn't any sense in it.
Y:
Yes.
K:
So I think.
Well, I will see, maybe my colleagues believe
we should accept your proposal. I think it's a mistake but.
Y:
I am going to see my friend probably for the very, very final
decision whether we should, from our side, make major concessions
to meet your needs on how you feel. At any rate, I share your feeling
to break off with minimum
.
K:
I think at this point all the negotiations do is irritate both sides
and weaken the domestic position of both sides.
Y:
That's right.
K:
And I don't see any sense in it, myself, any more. So I'm
going to see, maybe, if my colleagues would accept it (which I doubt)
but that still is not going to help my friend any.
Y:
That's right.
K:
If they objected, it would be to have an excuse to do something
about the trade bill for the wrong reasons. But I will decide that
tomorrow and why don't you call me at the end of the morning tomorrow.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida
- 2 -
Y:
Yes, and also before you make a decision and make a
recommendation to your own friend. Could we have the final
decision
K:
My problem is also quite honestly, I'm spending too much of
my time on this problem now. I have so many things to do.
Y:
I'm sure you do.
K:
But we can try to talk about 9:15. Will you call me at 9:15?
Y:
9:15 tomorrow morning?
K:
Yes.
the last time
Y:
And/I must apologize to you, but tomorrow morning of your
time, I'll be very much on time 9:15 and, too, we discuss this matter
for the last conversation. Please hold not your
matter
to your friend.
K:
Yes, but I'm seeing my friend about 9:30.
Y:
You meet your friend at 9:30?
K:
Yes. Okay.
Y:
I'm sorry but would it not be possible if we are to make the
final proposal along the lines we discussed; that is, you had suggested
a 3% shifting within a group
K:
Yeah, and 5% among groups.
Y:
That's right.
K:
Yeah, that's all right. But you can't accept that.
Y:
My friend may decide
K:
But if he accepts it and then it's a result that his whole Cabinet
resigns -- which is what your representative said to us today -- we
don't want that.
Y:
I will meet my friend and discuss it.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida
- 3 -
K:
You see, we have no interest in the political demise of
your friend.
Y:
No, that's true; certainly, my friend is really in a plight
but still.
K:
Because you don't really need it from my friend's prestige
point of view at this moment so badly anymore. I mean, if you
want the trade bill killed, you need it.
Y:
Yes, and also my friend believes that if you could.
if we
accept, we could have an agreement future now and if you could do away
with the trade bill, that would suit the/interests of both countries.
That is why my friend is very anxious to have an agreement.
K:
Right, well, you call me at 9:15 tomorrow morning.
Y:
All right, I'll do that.
K:
And I'll talk to you then.
Y:
Yes, fine.
K:
Nice to talk to you.
Y:
Good-bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON
(tape)
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger
Late evening, November 24, 1970
L:
Henry.
K:
Mel, how are you?
L:
Say, I think with we better go ahead. Dave, after he talked with
you, got in touch/ADM Murphy in my office, and on Dave's call,
Murphy went ahead and alerted these people, so I think we can't do
anything about it now, so we might as well forget about it.
K:
That's good. Now, Mel, if you think we ought to bring them
all up here, let's bring them all up.
L:
I think that probably it's good to stretch this thing out for a
few days. I felt that we had today, we've got tomorrow with two
hearings up on the Hill, and I figured we'd keep the thing going for
a week or 10 days. I think that this is a good thing to gameplan over
a longer period of time and not use everything up right away. I think
it's good to keep the POW thing going for a little while, and that's why
I've had Henken and Baroody over in my office lay out a regular game-
plan of things to do.
K:
Yeah, well, you got the President so steamed up now, he just
pre-empted you. That's really what it came down to.
L:
Well, that's all right with me. It's all for the good of the
Administration, but I think on these things it's always well to plan
these public affairs things, and not just off the back of our head. We
can get longer sustained
K:
Well, tomorrow's hearings, though, are the supplemental.
They are not on this, are they?
L:
Those hearings will only be on this, Henry.
K:
Really?
L:
Whenever I go up there on the Hill now for the next week.
K:
But didn't you already have the Foreign Relations Committee
going crazy today? You were terrific.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger
- 2 -
L:
Well, it was a long hearing.
K:
Well, you were terrific. Even Aiken , whom I saw
who
was at that Ky dinner was full of admiration.
L:
Well, that's good.
K:
And, you know, he started out being negative.
L:
Yeah, well, I think we got.
I wish you could have seen the
confrontation I had with Kennedy this morning, though.
K:
I understand you really took him to the cleaners.
L:
And that was one of the best.
I really enjoyed that, you know.
K:
Tell me, Mel, you are up before what Committees tomorrow?
L:
Appropriations Committee in the morning, and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee in the afternoon.
K:
Well, we might as well, if you can't help being raped, you might
as well enjoy it. So we better schedule this thing for about 5:00 in the
afternoon, don't you think?
L:
Yeah, that'd be good.
K:
So that you can leave?
L:
I'm trying to do my homework tonight. I'm working on all these
supplemental requests and the Israeli thing and all these packages. I
know I'm not going to get a damned question about them, but I still have
to study it.
K:
You don't think you are going to get a question about.
L:
I don't think I'll get a question, but I still have to study the
damned stuff tonight.
K:
Besides, no matter what they ask you -- if I'm any judge of you --
you'll get in that POW thing anyhow.
IL:
Well, no, I'll let them do that.
K:
Well, I'm sure it's going to work that way anyhow. You haven't
been wrong yet on these things.
L:
Well, take care. The good thing is that in the House, they
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger
- 3 -
don't have television, so you don't get the damned thing you had today.
That's kind of lousy with an unfriendly committee.
n
:
You did marvelously.
L:
I tell you, the only way I'll ever appear before Fulbright is
in public because if you let him control it, and you let him come out
and say what went on, then you get screwed.
K:
Hell, you had them on the defensive. Everyone of these guys
led with the statement that they really were in favor of the objective
and of the operation, and then they started making little nitpicks. You
can't win that way.
L:
You know, we've been calling these gals and mothers all over
the country.
K:
And apparently they've been speaking on television.
L.
They've been coming through great, Henry. And we got all the
national organizations lined up now -- you know, out making statements
and when you hear from the people in the countryside, this will be good.
K:
Well, Reagan called and, of course you'd expect that, but he's
been blasting Fulbright. I told him to go on after Kennedy, too. Your
instinct was absolutely right. By the time we are through, that's going
to be a great plus.
L:
Yeah, I think so. They were giving us the business on the
intelligence a little bit today.
K:
Yeah, but you made.
I saw that great line of yours where
you said we haven't got cameras here that can see through roofs.
L:
But I did try to tell them what great intelligence we had to be
able to penetrate that sophisticated air defense system and to know
exactly where every building and where the locks were. You know,
this was pretty good. Well, we kind of turned that into a plus, too.
K:
Okay, Mel. It's a pleasure to work with you.
L:
Take care. Good night.
K:
Good night.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (Tape)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 2, 1970
P:
Hello, Henry,
K:
Mr. President.
P:
How was your game at Philadelphia?
K:
That was a great game. You know, the teams aren't all that
good, but when they are evenly matched, you can't tell the difference.
P:
No, that's right. I saw most of it on television.
K:
It was an exciting game.
P:
Oh, yes, yes; it sure was, and I think the best thing the Navy
did was to go for that 2 points which gave them a psychological
advantage.
K:
Exactly.
P:
If they hadn't made it, it wouldn't have made any difference
anyway. What was the thing at half-time they had -- I didn't see it,
but they apparently had something
11
:
They had something on the prisoners. They had a brief ceremony
for the prisoners and Admiral Moorer made a rather pointed little
speech in which he said, 'Most Americans welcomed the bravery of
these men. 1 Hugh Scott was on the train going up there with me, and
- you know, he's an opportunist- but he said that Muskie and Kennedy
are all on the wrong side of that issue, and they are pulling back like
crazy.
P:
He said they are pulling back?
K:
Yeah.
P:
Very interesting.
K:
And he's attacking which is another sign that it must be pretty
safe.
P:
Well, did the audience react?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
- 2 -
K:
Oh, yes, very strongly.
P:
That crowd is not necessarily
It's a football crowd.
K:
It was very strongly.
P:
When they brought the prisoner thing in?
K:
A tremendous ovation. And I've talked to five of these wives
whom Admiral Zumwalt had on the train going up with him. These
are really moving ladies.
P:
Oh, boy, yeah.
K:
I said to one of these girls -- some of them don't even know
if their husband is alive or not -- you know, what is really moving
is that you don't bring any pressure on us to just end the war so that
you get your husbands back. They said that would be denying everything
he believes in, and we'd be betraying him if we did that.
P:
Boy, aren't they something!
K:
Then, when you see these cheap little bastards
P:
Yeah, well, the cheap ones like the Muskies and the Teddy
Kennedys
K:
And the Fulbrights
P:
and the silly little columnists and so forth -- the Sevareids
and the rest. Good God, I mean.
You know, Henry, it's no credit
to them that they begin to sort of crawl off that position when public
opinion
K:
Not at all.
P:
The bastards -- that shows they have no principle at all. That's
not a good reason to crawl off it. If they believe it was a mistake and
this and that, they should stick to it.
K:
Of course, it shows only that they
P:
It's very interesting, though, that they did that at the game. I
wonder how that was arranged. I suppose they just up and decided to do it.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
- 3 -
K:
That's right; they had the two officers there and the two
one of the enlisted men.
P:
They did? And they presented them and then what happened?
I missed the half-time ceremony.
K:
There was another tremendous ovation.
P:
And they introduced them, huh?
K:
Yes.
P:
How did they introduce them?
K:
These were the men who made the daring raid, and there was
a standing ovation, wild cheering -- it was very.
P:
Well, that's good, because about 25, 000, 000 people heard it
on TV.
K:
That's right, and because they saw the Seese fellow(?).
P:
That ought to drive the critics wild. The New York Times
Mughx
had
to put a little piece on the front page talking about who had planned it
and so forth and so on, as if we were trying to exploit the God-damned
thing. That's all right. Let them.
People want to cheer.
K:
They are going to nitpick us; they are trying to create a credibility
gap about the ordnance that was expended. I've asked Moorer to give us
a list of everything that was expended north of the 19th parallel which
is so trivial. Laird didn't handle it very well; that's the one thing.
P:
What did he do -- leave it more to the
The point that I have
always pursued was they were diversionary movements, but actually
that there was nothing done of any significance.
K:
That's exactly right but first they said nothing and then they said
some ordnance was expended. Well some ordnance doesn't mean anything,
they should have said 3 Shrike missiles, which is all that was expended.
And two noise maker bombs. Well, we're going to get the list and we
are going to make them put it out tomorrow and that's going to end it. It's
not a big deal.
P:
No, no, no. As far as the people are concerned, they would just
as soon you'd bomb the whole damm place.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
- 4 -
K:
Exactly, they don't care where
P:
But I would -- don't let them have any credibility, say now look
since you've raised so much question that it was primarily for the purpose
of the diversion. Well, I'll tell you it's interesting to note -- you take a
look at the New York Times and the Washington Post today. The Times
is getting off of it in its news coverage. The Post is trying to make
something of it but they' re just desperate as hell that's all because you
know the credibility and all that crap.
K:
And the Post is just an organ of the Democratic community.
P:
Sure, sure. Well, but also they are just absolutely finatical on
this subject and on anything that is done but on the ordnance thing I'd just
say well now here's the facts
K:
That's right.
P:
Have it done at Defense though not at the White House.
K:
Oh, no Defense, we should stay out of it. entirely.
P:
Let them just take care of it.
K:
That's right. One thing that I thought Bruce ought to do at the
meeting on Thursday in addition to what we had already planned to say,
he should say that it is bad enough that you don't release the prisoners
but there is no excuse whatever for not giving the list of prisoners and
I hereby call on you at least put these wives out of their misery, you know
something like that. It's inhumane, this is behaving like the Nazis did
in World War II.
P:
Good, use exactly that phrase.
K:
Because that's what the Nazis did with Soviet prisoners, they
wouldn't release their names.
P:
Is that right?
K:
Yeah.
P:
Well, why don't you just use that. I think we have got to get a
hell of a lot rougher you know. Lodge used to make these pleading little
noises about prisoners over there and that didn't do any good.
K:
Yeah.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
- 5 -
P:
Now let's try the other thing.
K:
I must say once you meet those wives, which I hadn't done before
you really get a different
P:
You're damm right. Those wives were something, well were some
of them -- were they the ones that were at the White House that day?
K:
Two of them were at the White House.
P:
They certainly approved of it didn't they?
K:
Every one of these five approved of it.
P:
Yeah, all the way.
K:
Then they hadn't heard from their husbands in three years and
they said we don't know how but we know they know it now and that's the
best thing you could have done and we believe
P:
That must have been an interesting experience going up on the
train with all the boys and everything.
K:
Oh, it was very moving. I did it to -- I accepted it to please the
military but I really tremendously enjoyed it.
P:
Well, I'll tell you this has had a very dramatic effect as you were
saying yesterday on the military, the morale and everything and that's
worth it, just like Cambodia gave it a shot in the arm, this is giving it
a shot in the arm.
K:
No question.
P:
These people need it.
K:
I got a kick out of -- I think it was the New York Times today, they
said just as a matter of fact, they said Cambodia got the President a
year to implement his withdrawal program and now he is looking for
something else to give him another year. You know as if this were a
matter of course, as if they hadn't been screaming against it when it
happened.
P:
Of course we are in this position now too where we got the enemy
just bamboozled as to what's going to happen because on the one hand
Rogers in court testifies that we don't plan to escalate and haven't and
Laird says we might, well that's find, let them think both. The point is
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
- 6 -
P:
(cont'd) that we are -- Rogers says that for domestic consumption
and we're going to say the other for theirs but I want Bruce to make no
damm bones about it when he gets up there.
K:
No question.
P:
He's got to take the line that we've got other options, you know
what I mean. And look here, how long are we going to sit here and talk.
He's got to really -- I think we have leave him start laying the groundwork
for a break-off of the negotiations if necessary.
K:
I do too.
P:
Cause you see, it's a lot different from last year. If we had
broke them off last year, people would have still thought there was hope
but at this point the time -- every day that goes on, the incentive for us
to negotiate goes down.
K:
That's right.
P:
Hell fire, If we're going to get out anyway, what the hell we got
to negotiate about?
K:
That's right. And what they are asking of us is ridiculous, to get
out we don't need to negotiate and to impose a communist government, let
them do that if they can do it.
P:
What significance do you attach to the German action on Autobahn?
K:
That was -- did -- you see the German Bundestag is still CDU
controlled and they were going to have some committee meetings in Berlin
and this is their way of showing
P:
Oh, I see.
K:
the pressure. This is a retaliation for -- but this proves what
they can do anytime, with or without an agreement.
P:
Typical of what they're up to.
K:
An agreement won't stop this sort of bureaucratic harassment
because they're using the pretext of checking the papers very carefully,
they are not stopping the traffic, just checking the papers.
P:
Yeah, yeah.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
- 7 -
K:
I mean it shows really how -- that these negotiations are missing
the essential point, that the Germans are pressing for.
P:
It's interesting, getting back to your thing that Scott -- Scott
is a bell-weather; that's for sure; he never moves on anything unless it's
popular.
K:
That's right.
P:
And he felt those other guys were trying to climb back?
K:
Oh, yes and he also says -- I haven't checked it -- that he's
making statements every day attacking them.
P:
Good, Good. Urge him; egg him on. I hope you did.
K:
Oh, yeah. Brezhnev made a speech yesterday in which he
attacked our bombing.
P:
The bombing?
K:
And the raid.
2"
On what ground did he attack it?
K:
On the ground that we are claiming rights in the sovereign
space of another country and that the Soviet Union will give all fraternal
assistance.
P:
well, that's not unusual, is it? Haven't they been saying that
all along? They have to, don't they?
K:
They have to do something like that. What was most interesting
in the speech, thought, was he praised the Europeans to the sky and
said that the detente in Europe was proceeding. So they are clearly
trying to drive a wedge between us and the Europeans, and what I had
mentioned to you earlier that we may be the ones that pay for the
European detente policy, including the Oft-Politik(?)
P:
Yeah. Because basically if they can get Europe without help
from us, they don't have to do anything for us. They can get it by
themselves.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
- 8 -
K:
They can cover their rear in Europe. The nuclear stalemate
guarantees that we can't do anything to them in a nuclear field.
P:
They can turn around and handle the Chinese
K:
That's right. I think that's their basic strategy now.
P:
Yeah; they've got to be doing a lot of thinking about these things.
You'll find some more of.
he'll give you a little more guidance when
you talk to Dobrynin on that. Listen to him; see what he has to say.
They are now playing a waiting game; we'll play a waiting game, too.
That's all there is to it.
K:
Well, there's another week. That lunch isn't until the 7th.
P:
Okay, Henry, fine.
K:
Right, Mr. President.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger
December 2, 1970 (at home)
Y: Hello, I should like to convey the following message to you from my
friend. He has expressed his deep personal appreciation to you for what
you have done for him.
K: Right
Y: He is most grateful to you for the amount of interest and effort you have
SO far put in for common cause not only on this particular issue but on the
epic making achievements of last year.
K: Right
Y: So while he understands and appreciates why you felt you'd better get
away from this issue all together from now on and leave the matter to the
hands of our experts my friend would 1- should very much like to ask you
what the development and if possible and necessary to continue to guide this
difficult issue toward an early agreement. In this sense my friend would
like to ask you to keep this channel open and when and if necessary may have
to ask for your advice and intervention. From not technical but political
standpoint. And in the meanwhile your expert has got in touch with our
expert and we now have the cable from our of your proposal.
K: Right
two
Y: Under the firm and fresh order given by my friend our/top aides are
working very hard at this very moment in order to draft a revised and
perhaps the last comprehensive counter-proposal of ours to be sent to our
expert hopefully tomorrow of our time and based on this our counter-
proposal we do hope that this would prove to be good enough toward the
successful negotiation by breaking the deadlock.
K: Yes, well. I will keep an eye on it and I will certainly - I certainly
believe in the friendship of our people two countries and I will always do what
I can to promote it.
to tell
Y: I would likenyou to do that. My friend specifically called me and asked me
to convey that this is the message that I have just given to you.
K: Yes
Y: He appreciates your position very well and he on our side do his utmost
and his two top aides arennow really working very hard and we will be able to propose
a revised comprehensive not on categories butxxxxx all as I think comprehensive
counter proposal.
K: Yes, although it has nothing to do with what we discussed last weekend now.
Well, frankly I don't want to get into it. anymore because I will let the experts -
whatever is agreeable with them is fine with me.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
Y.
Yes, I am still convinced that what we discussed is the best way but
^
in the light of the strong opposition of one of our top aides my
friend had to change his stance in the light of how to implement the agreement
we have got - but in any case I am doing still my utmost within very limited
influence I can
K: No, I understand your position and this is all very understandable. And
Y: I don't want to take even a minute of your very precious time but what
we discussed Sunday was one time almost the final proposal by my friend and
it
was taken up by his top aides and discussed intensively and he couldn't
persuade one of his aides who is in charge of this entire matter SO I was not
able to make that idea as official counter proposal.
K: No, No. I understand that. And that is why I think that since that top
aide is the determining man anyway that he should do the negotiation.
Y: That's right. You are absolutely right. I think your idea is right that the
two experts should work out the acceptable. - You see I am now giving my
own advice to my friend, that our expert in your place WXX should be given
more authority or discretion, what you might call it, the discreti authority
to be with
K: Your expert?
Y: For negotiations. (K: Yes ) And appointly The will get from/fresh the
instructions to be sent to him shortly. Tomorrow our time I hope.
K: Right.
Y: In any case I want to thank you very much.
K: I appreciate your phone call and I hope to see you when you come to the
United States.
Y: Please accept the message from my friend. It is not my own. It has
nothing to do with me but my friend's message to you personally.
K: I appreciate that.
Y: Thank you and I hope that I will be able to talk with you again for successful
agreement on this issue.
K: certainly.
Y: I haven't given up my hope yet. I would never do that.
K: No you mustn't but one XXXXXXX has to know when to stop something that isn't
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- -3-
going anywhere. And we have to decide that soon.
Y: Right. Very shortly, I know that.
K: Right. OK I appreciate your courtesy in calling me and give my
best regards to your friend.
Y: Certainly I will do that.
K: Right. Goodby.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Kissinger/The President
(tape)
December 9, 1970 8:45 p.m.
jlj
K: Mr. President
P: The thing that concerns me about this thing you sent over on Cambodia
was Moorer's, it seems to me, lame excuse that they did not have any
intelligence because the weather has been bad. I don't think they are trying
to do a good enough job in trying to get the intelligence over there. You
understand what I mean?
K: Yes I do.
P: There are other methods of getting intelligence than simply flying.
They've got the methods of the Cambodians to talk to and a hell of a lot of
other people and I don't think they have done enough there. The second
thing is as I have put on here now I want you to get ahold of Moorer tonight
and I want a plan where every goddamn thing that can fly goes into Cambodia
and hits every target that is open.
K: Right
P: That's to be done tomorrow. Tomorrow. Is that clear?
K: That is right.
P: I want this done. Now that is one thing that can turn this around some.
They are running these goddamn milk runs in order to get the air medal. You
know what they are doing Henry. It's horrible what the Air Force is doing.
They aren't doing anything at all worth a damn.
K: They are not imaginative.
P: Well, their not only not imaginative but they are just running these things -
bombing jungles. You know that. They have got to go in there and I mean
really go in. I don't want the gunships, I want the helicopter ships. I want
everything that can fly to go in there and crack the hell out of them. There is
no limitation on mileage and there is no limitation on budget. Is that clear?
K: Right, Mr. President.
P: Now that he's got to understand. Now the second thing on this drill and
I want you to tell both Bill and Mel that this is what I have decided to do.
We will go forward on it on the basis, and we will do it - we're not going to
do it on the basis of an open end commitment but on the basis that you are
going to fly in supplies - airlift supplies to a place and so you airlift a hell
of a lot of troops with it too. Now there must be absolute security on it. It
should be supplies. In other words the troops go in with their supplies - so what.
The South Vietnamese have to - the troops have to unload them don't they?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
K: Right.
P: And I think that should be
K: No, that is a very ingeneous formula.
P: The point is that Bill understands that. We have been airlifting supplies
into Phnom Penh haven't we?
K: Yes. No, Bill actually - That's right - Bill made that point and actually
P: Airlifting supplies to me is the thing. We are airlifting supplies and sure
there are some troops but I don't want any numbers out. I don't want anything
like that. I don't want any plan out and I don't want the air force bragging
about it and I don't want a goddamn thing said.
K: Well Mr. President. Actually with this airlift we don't have to do anything
for 48 hours on the troops. They have to go ahead - the whole thing wasn't
really planned to go before the 11th or 12th.
P: All right.
K: They just felt that if there was no chance of it going we shouldn't get
the Vietnamese all cranked up.
P: Get 'em ready. Get 'em ready and do it. And I think the main thing is
if the Vietnamese are ready to go in there and they think they are going to
have - Can they give them a real bloody nose and
K: That's what they think and that's what Abrams seems to think.
P: If Abrams strongly recommends it we will do it.
K: Right.
P: We will take the heat on it. I'll do it but it is on the basis of the airlift
thing and that's all and they have got to remember that there is absolute
security on this, having in mind that we have a situation here which is political,
which is going to be with us until about the 23rd and then that is over.
Then we either have the damn supplemental or we don't have it.
K: Exactly.
P: So we don't want them to screw that up. And if they can delay it a week
then fine but the point is that I see no objection to it if it doesn't screw up the
supplemental. We've got to do the things that are necessary to see that this
doesn't
But there is absolutely - they are not even to submit to me any
plan that requres the use of American ground forces. Under any circumstances
whatever!!!! Is that clear?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
K: Absolutely, Right.
P: It is not going to be done.
K: No, there is no
P: And I am not going to keep it open at the press conference. There is not
going to be done. It isn't what we want to do at this point. Don't expect to
have to answer it but if I do I am not going to keep anything open. I am simply
going to say that we don't have any such plans.
K: Well that
P: Don't even - Understand. It isn't the question we can't play these
Mickey Mouse games right now. We have got
K: No, No. I agree with it!
P: We have got to get down to the real thing that matters and the thing that
matters is not to have a big debate about whether- If we don't get this supplement
through - See we have got to make a commitment on that Henry or there is no
chance on the supplemental. You don't understand what it means unless we
make an absolute commitment that no American ground forces are going to
be used in Cambodia you will never get the supplemental. That's why
K: I have no problem with that.
P: That's the problem. Well, I have left it open up to this point, but I can't
now because the supplemental's up there see. So we will nail it and say the
purpose of the supplemental is only to help the Cambodians defend themselves.
K: Right
P: That's all.
K: No, I was certain that we were not going to use any American ground forces
P: I know. We have always been certain of that but we were keeping it open in
order to keep the enemy off balance over it. But right now we have another
enemy here to fight. And that is a group of legislators who will not support
us unless they have an absolute commitment.
K: Well, your instinct on those things has always been right.
P: We have to do what is necessary to go it and it is a long shot and that's the
way it is. The point of the matter is - oh Goddammit Abrams can do more and
that damned Air Force can do more about hitting Cambodia with their bombing
attacks. There is something wrong here. I don't know what it is.
K: I'll get that laid on.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4-
P: What the hell are they doing?
K: I'll get that laid on immediately.
P: The whole goddamn Air Force over there farting around doing nothing
and I have watched that stuff and they aren't doing a thing. I mean they
get one or two trucks a day and fly 800 sorties and get 1500 air medals.
You know that's all it is. It's awful.
K: Yep, Yep.
P: It is a disgraceful performance and they are going to get off their ass
and start doing something on it. I want gunships in there. That means
armed helicopters, DC-3s, anything else that will destroy personnel that
can fly. I want it done! Get them off their ass and get them to work now.
K: Well we will get it done immediately Mr. President.
P: What is needed here is they need a little drive out there. I don't know
what the hell is the matter with them. What are they doing?
K: The problem Mr. President
P: You know we talk about this Cambodia thing and I am not going to have
another crisis on Cambodia hit us in the face like it did last year. That again
was a case of them not being on top of things. By God we are not going to
let this happen this time.
K: The problem is Mr. President the Air Force is designed to fight an air
battle again$ the Soviet Union. They are not designed for this war and that is
the - in fact they are not designed for any war we are likely to have to fight.
P: That's right. There isn't going to be any air battle against the Soviet
Union as you well know.
K: Exactly, I agree completely.
P: The difficulty is that they need some TBFs and a hell of a lot of SBDs and
things like that could go in and knock the hell out of them. Bazookas - anything.
That's what they need. A world war II Air Force would definitely make the
North Vietnamese
K: That is unfortunately true.
P: And we do not have a World War II Air Force.
K: That is unfortunately
P: And they should be told this. Now goddamit maybe they have some stuff
over here than can do that. I want that examined tomorrow and I mean on an
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-5-
urgency basis. I am disappointed in the fact that their jets and the rest -
and get those goddamned jet pilots the hell over to Taiwan and get somebody
else out there that can fight them. You understand?
K: Of course and I will move on that immediately.
P: Look. Get some conventional prop airplanes over there fast. And those
prop airplanes whatever they are. We've got a lot of prop airplanes left.
I have seen them on the runways. The National Guard's got them. I want
them to give me a report by tomorrow - not tomorrow but Saturday morning
every prop plane that could be made air worthy for the purpose of fighting
the kind of battle we need to fight there. I want the goddamn planes over
there. You understand?
K: I will get that report
P: Get it out of there. Get it out of the Air National Guard and everything
else. Shake up this air force and tell them exactly that I have reached the
conclusion that they are designed to fight only the Soviets and they are not
doing worth a damn here and it's time we are going to start doing different.
K: I will get that report for you by first thing Saturday.
P: But tomorrow
K: And I will get the bombing campaign laid on for tomorrow.
P: I want them to hit theyrything. I want them to use the big planes, the
small planes, everything/that will help out here and let's start giving them
a little shock. There must be something we can do. Let L. Abrams, he's
to take personal charge and dismiss the Air Force commander if necessary
over there. And I want Haig to look into this when he is over there.
K: Absolutely.
P: We have got to do a better job because we are just coming to the crunch.
Right now there is a chance to win this goddamn war and that's probably
what we are going to have to do because we are not going to do anything at
the conference table. But we aren't going to win it with the people - the kind
of assholes come in here like today saying well now there is a crisis in
Cambodia. Hell, I have been asking about it for the last two weeks you know
and you said no there isn't one.
K: Well, because
P: So we learn it today, right?
K: That"s what they told me. I asked them every day. I sent backchannels.
for three months I have been bugging them about that column that is now being
attacked. And so has Haig. Mr. President, On Houdek I think the best answer
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-6-
to give is I am satisfied that the relevant information was not given to the
White House and I have set up procedures that this cannot happen again.
Because the relevant information was not given to the White House.
P: The relevant information was not given. OK I will just say that.
The relevant information was not given to the White House. And I am satisfied.
K: I am satisfied that the relevant information was not given to the White
House and I have ordered - set up procedures that this cannot happen again.
And that is exactly the fact as it is.
P: You can't blame him. I don't blame Houdek at all. You don't fire a person
K: Hell, he didn't even understand what he was being told.
P: He just tried to piss off on us and he ought to take the responsibility
himself.
K: They shouldn't have put it in their report. That was outrageous.
P: Well, why don't we put something - as I say the report should be
hitting them for what they did on
let me ask you this. Have we ordered
a court marshall?
K: Volpe promised us a report tonight or tomorrow morning.
P: Is there going to be one or not?
K: He said he was moving towards a court marshall. But I will get you
a report on that
P: I don't want to have a long report Henry. I don't want
one sentence.
K: Yes or no?
That's right.
P:/ Is there going to be one or not. If there is one then I can after all defer
all questions. I have to. If there is not going to be one then I'll have to go
into some detail on the damn thing. I want a court marshall. I think the
Commandant up there should be court marshalled. Let's find out what the
hell he did.
K: You will have the answer on that by noon.
P: That's right. Just say there is or there isn't. And no fooling around.
But let me tell you on this business on Cambodia - I want somthing done tonight.
I don't want any screwing around and I want that Air Force to make its study
immediately of anything in conventional World War II type craft that can be
used over there. I am disappointed in what they have been doing. I want a new
plan. I want it fast and let's get going. Also, the XXXXXX program for the
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-7-
South Vietnamese to make the ground attack is laid on, it's approved as of
today. Have it go the first time it gets dry enough to go. Now get going on
these things and don't let them delay so long. I think that the trouble is we
are so busy over here - we got so many things. We worry about the Chilean
elections and we worry about whether or not there is going to be a vote on
Guinea and all that bull and the only thing that really matters at this point
is this and I just want everybody to clear their minds of all this other crap.
Let the State Department handle that. I don't give a goddamn what happens
in those other places now - there is nothing we can do about it anyway. But
this does matter and I just think that we have made a mistake here. We haven't
put enough emphasis on it and let's start putting the emphasis in there where
it matters.
K: Exactly.
P: Forget all that other crap.
K: Right. And I will get after Moorer this minute.
P: And those are the only reports I want to see from now on. For the
next two months I don't want to see anything about Chile, I don't want to
see anything about Biafra. I don't want to see anything about Guinea. I
don't want to see anything about all the other crap. Doesn't make any
difference right now. The Pakistan elections; there's not a goddamn thing
we can do about any of those things. You understand?
K: Right.
P: Right now Henry we have got to concentrate on what can make or break
us and none of those things will. And that's what we have got to
We've
got to get more of a sense of direction here. A direction and urgency and
priority or otherwise the whole thing will go down the drain. Some of these
other things just don't matter.
K: Right.
P: They don't matter. You put it right to them. I really want some action
now. OK.
K: Right Mr. President I will get it done immediately.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig (tape) (General Haig extremely difficult to hear)
December 9, 1970 8:50 p.m.
jlj
H: Yes sir.
K: I just had a call from our friend. First, he wants to know by noon tomorrow
whether the Coast Guard is going to be court marshalled because if they are
going to be court marshalled he can avoid all questions.
H: No they're not.
K: Why not?
H: I understand that they have decided that there was no criminal culpability
involved.
K: Well, what are they going to do - reprimand them?
H: Yes. KgtxXXXXXXXXX They' 11 use administrative
you
K: Well XX better get a written report from Volpe by 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning. Can you get that?
H: (Can't hear)
K: Two, he wants a massive bombing campaign in Cambodia. He doesn't
want to hear anything. It's an order, it's to be done. Anything that flys on
anything that moves. You got that?
H: (Couldn't hear but sounded like Haig laughing.)
to find out, he wants
K: Thirdly, now hold on to your hat. He wants/an inventory of every prop
plane that's suitable for operations out there. He wants a report on it by
Saturday morning, for possible movement out there.
H: For close air support.
K: Yes. That's actually not a bad idea. Fourthly, he's now gung ho on the
operation. Have you got Moorer yet?
H: Yes, I talked with him.
K: Is he happier?
H: Much. I didn't go too far.
K: No, but did you tell him I talked to the President?
H: Yes, I did. I told him
Completely unintalligible)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2- -
K: Right. Including that great idea of making them all troop supplies.
H: Yes.
K: OK
H: They are quite concerned about it because all the plans they are doing
involved the same problem. / Reat unintellijible)
K: What, if they can't airlift them with Americans?
H: Unintelligible
K: We will get our brains beaten out.
H: unintellizible
K: I am not eager to do this operation.
H: I'm not either, because I'm not sure
K: Can we at least get a massive bombing attack into this area?
H: Yes.
K: How about B-52s?
H: I talked to
.
K: What does he think?
H: He said the real problem is weather
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- -3-
K: Weather doesn't affect B- - 52s.
H: Oh no, no.
K: Let him lay some in there. OK?
H: OK.
K. Thank you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (Tape)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
New, alec 9, 1970 (?)
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Yeah, Henry.
K:
I thought you might like to know that the supplemental has
passed the House 249 to 102 or some overwhelming vote like that
in its entirety. And the air operations have all been ordered.
P:
Good. Well, the supplemental, you see, is a House action
to be expected. That shows you though that they reflect the country.
K:
Exactly.
P:
That God-damned Senate is just the lame-duck in it now.
K:
But still the speed of their action indicates that there's more
support in the country than you would believe reading the NY TIMES
and the WASHINGTON POST.
P:
Oh, Christ, there's no support from them. It's just awful.
Let me say this. I repeat again, if that comes down here with Israel
in it and the others in it, I'm going to veto it. That is going to be
the best thing that could ever happen in this country. I'll lose every
Jewish vote; I'll lose the 5% of INGA(?); but that's all right. I'm
going to show up this God-damned thing for what it is.
K:
That's right.
P:
It's hypocrisy. I'll veto the bill if it comes. I'll veto the bill --
that I've determined in my own mind. People think I don't mean
it. I do. It's going to come here with Cambodia in it, and the others
in it. If it comes with Israel alone and Cambodia denutted, I veto it!
K:
Well, the House has voted the whole thing -- every last dollar
of it.
P:
That's what it should do.
K:
And now it's entirely up to Fulbright.
P:
Right. Good news. Thank you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (Tape)
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
Wed Dec 9,1970 9, (?)
R:
Hello, Henry.
K:
Bill, how are you?
R:
I thought you'd be interested to know that the supplemental
passed the House like 249 to 102.
K:
Isn't that terrific!
R:
I don't think I can ever remember anything going through
that quickly except, you know, a wartime measure. It really is a
hell of a tribute to the Administration.
K:
Well, it's a tribute also to the testimony and to the way we've
all pulled together. I can't say "we"; I haven't done anything.
R:
Well, everybody has worked very well. You know, Dave Abshire
in our Department is absolutely great.
K:
He's been really a find.
R:
Yeah, he's terrific. He's up there now and he is just great;
he's got everything all planned. Well, anyway, I think the President will
be very pleased. That's something to get a billion-dollar supplemental
through with Cambodia.
K:
That's terrific. You think the Senate is
R:
Well, I think we've got a chance now. It's going to put pressure
on them. The Appropriations Committee is marking up the bill now,
so it's all up to Fulbright, and he's under a hell of a lot of pressure.
K:
Isn't that terrific. That is amazing.
R:
We played it exactly right. We had a fast hearing in the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and almost a simulaneous hearing with Passman,
and we got a 25-6 vote in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. With
all those Democrats, they could only muster 6 votes.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 2 -
K:
Now, that is amazing. When one thinks where we were in
May on Cambodia.
R:
I know it; and this is really quite a lot of money when you look
at it. I have been going over it carefully today and when you really
were talking about $185 million in military assistance, and $70 million
in economic assistance
K:
That's right, and then some P.L. 480 money.
R:
That's quite a lot of money.
K:
Hell, when you testified in May, if you had said that we'll be
spending $286 million in Fiscal Year 1971, they would have ridden you
out of town.
R:
They would have gone right through the roof. Well, we'll see
what happens. It does suggest, I think, we ought to be a little careful
on this other operation. I must say it's tempting to just lay into the
South Vietnamese.
K:
Well, we are not going to do anything until tomorrow afternoon
I mean we won't do it then either, but there won't be any decisions made
until after your testimony. We've asked Moorer to scrub the operation
a little more to see whether they could get Americans out of there -- or
reduce American participation to the absolute minimum.
R:
Even if you could have the follow-up supply planes manned by
South Vietnamese or something of that kind.
In other words, a one-shot
operation just to land them I think probably would be reasonably safe.
But if we're called upon to give them continuing support, it's a little
tougher.
K:
Well, I think also that with the President having a Press Conference
ahead of him, he should really not be asked to make the final decision
if it's at all avoidable until afterwards. So I'm going to try to canvass
the people and then we'll get everybody together if it's still considered
desirable.
R:
Good; okay, Henry.
K:
Okay; thank you. Good-bye
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (Tape)
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
K:
Hello.
R:
Henry.
K:
Bill.
R:
I have just talked to General Haig and I have got a little memo
here
K:
Good.
R:
For the President giving a kind of a little preliminary
assessment.
K:
All right, what's your assessment?
R:
Well, first of all Gomulka and his close people are out entirely
so they seem to be the scapegoats of the whole affair.
K:
Yeah, but that's what we know from television already.
R:
Yeah, but what has come in its place seems to be a pretty modally
collection of different factions
K:
Yeah.
R:
We have hard liners like Mochar (spelled phonetically) being
promoted.
K:
Mochar is the fellow that was in conflict with them on this
anti-Semitic thing a few years ago.
R:
Yeah, yeah, right and he has been promoted to full member on
the Politburo but on the other hand most of Gearicks' (spelled phonetically)
people have come up so it looks like it is mainly get rid of Gomulka and
the old gang.
K:
Yeah, but who is Gearick? What is Gearick's position?
R:
I think he stands pretty well in the middle, he is pragmatic and
K:
Yeah, but you don't expect the President to understand when you
say middle that he knows what the middle of the Polish Communist Party
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 2 -
R:
His reputation is as a good administrator, very pragmatic, pretty
nationalistic, he spent most of his early life abroad.
K:
Where?
R:
In France and Belgium, he didn't come back to Poland until '48.
K:
Well, what does it mean for the internal structure?
R:
Internally it should help to keep
to bring things even more
under control.
K:
Yeah, but you've got to be concrete, what way? Are they going
to cancel the price rises?
R:
No, Gearick is hinting that there will be a rise in wages and they
will re-examine the plan.
K:
And what will that do to the economy?
R:
Well, it will just postpone the equal day for another year or two.
I mean, the price rises were essential to any realistic reform.
K:
Why?
R:
If they ever were going to get away from subsidizing the hell out
of agriculture, they had to bring prices in line with costs but now if they
raise wages, this will just mean more inflation, no structural changes will
probably come about so they
it is just a postponement but
K:
Could Gearick go the way of Dubcek?
R:
No, no, no, he's politically far more conservative than orthodox
than Dubcek.
K:
Would you have said that about Dubcek the day he came in?
R:
Well, I think Dubcek would just simply not known at all but
Gearick is
I mean he's been pretty prominent for the last
K:
All right, what do you think it means in foreign policy?
R:
I think they will just have to slowdown considerably on Ostpolitik.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7
x
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 3 -
K:
The Russians?
R:
I think the Russians and the Poles. They won't repudiate the
treaty but the Poles I don't think are going to press on with Bonn at all.
Well, not at all, but very slowly.
K:
But, why?
just
R:
Because of the internal situation, it is / too shaky for them
[End of tape]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (Tape)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
K:
I thought you might like to know, Mr. President, that the top
four leaders of the Polish Communist Party including Gomulka have
resigned.
P:
Humph.
K:
And that the man who's taking over we have generally thought of
as a traditionalist
P:
Um-huh.
K:
He has said that all reforms now have to be carried out by
consulting the workers' interest. Now a number of things to be said,
everyone would have thought Dubcek was a traditionalist when he came
P:
He became a tough son-of-a-bitch.
K:
And he became a very liberal Communist.
P:
(laughter) I know.
K:
Yeah. But whatever it is -- what it may mean it that they will
cancel the price rises. Our guess on Friday was that if he came in he'd
cancel the price rises which would look like a liberal like a move to
placate the workers.
P:
Yeah.
K:
But which would buy them more trouble later on.
P:
Yeah. Well, it of course has an enormous effect in world opinion,
don't you think? If they
K:
And I think it has a tremendous effect on the Communists.
P:
That's what I mean.
K:
Because here they are, they try to loosen ties a little bit, they
are doing it loosening things a little bit, they are using -- they are
doing it with the Germans and nevertheless the system can't stand even
that little strain.
P:
Um-hum.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
- 2 -
K:
Which shouldn't even be a strain.
P:
Yeah. Think it's good news don't you?
K:
Oh, I think it's good news. I think what it means
P:
Even Gomulka.
K:
Even Gomulka -- what I think it means at a minimum is that they
are internal -- that they will be much more cautious now in their policies.
I think it will mean a slowdown of their playing with the Germans but above
all I think
I wouldn't be surprised if it meant that the Soviets decide
that the taunt with the Germans is too dangerous and they had better get
a little closer to us. As a tactical maneuver, I don't think it will change
their basic orientation.
P:
You mean it will put the Soviets -- them to have a little pressure
to come closer to us you mean?
K:
I think it puts a little pressure on the Soviets to come -- it will
either mean that they will tighten up all the way across the board and
new
pursue a transition policy towards everybody but I think if they want to
taunt in the West they are more likely to seek it with us now than with the
Germans.
P:
Yeah.
K:
Because we are less of a threat to them in Eastern Europe.
P:
Well, that's good, good, well.
K:
But in any event whatever it does to us, I think
...
P:
It will give a little break.
K:
They will be more absorbed in their own affairs for a while now.
P:
This will shake the Soviet leaders don't you think?
K:
Oh, yes. It shows them that really they don't have the basis
P:
They just know their system doesn't have any support.
K:
That's right. It will make
...
P:
Be sure that the State Department doesn't give any condoning of
this damn thing, you know what I mean, I just want to be sure that there
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
- 3 -
P:
(cont'd) is no weak shrub that we think, you know what I mean?
K:
Oh, yes. I think what we should say is that this shows how
fragile these governments are and
P:
That's what they should say. Let State say a few things, make
them say that, see what I mean.
K:
And that there is no basic solution until Eastern Europe is
re-integrated with the Western Europeans, something like that ought
to be said.
Well
P:
Right, right. if any of the State guys get out of line on this,
I'm really going to raise hell because boy they want to -- they '11 just think
this is terrible you know because it affects Ostpolitik -- it will worry that
damn Barr won't it?
K:
Well, as I told you the other day, he said which we got from
intelligence sources that if this goes much further, that's the end of
Ostpolitik.
P:
Right. Well, okay.
K:
Well, at any rate, I thought you might like to know this. I think
it's good news.
P:
Very interesting. Okay Henry, thank you.
K:
Right, Mr. President.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Tape)
Mr. Kissinger/The President
December 19, 1970
K:
I think it would be very helpful.
P:
Although I'll tell Moorer and I'll tell Moorer he's not to tell
Laird. Now, let's start playing the game rough.
K:
I think, Mr. President, it is another example because they only
had a force of about 3, 000 there and Haig said that if we had put
in helicopter gunships which hadn't been authorized
P:
I would have authorized them
K:
Well, it would have been really like shooting pigeons but as it
was, it was a slaughter. And even if the figure is exaggerated,
I don't know how they count a 1, 000 from the air, the fact is that
the town that they took has been evacuated and has been retaken
and that the pressure in that area has stopped.
P:
Yeah, the AP is out writing a story everyday that Cambodia
is about to fall.
K:
That's right and
P:
We've got to
K:
Well, Laird, he liked very much - he didn't give me I didn't
have a chance to talk to him about the press yet. But I thought
you might like to know that because that operation had succeeded.
P:
?
K:
Right, Mr. President
P:
K:
Well, because, Mr. President, when you gave that order we
immediately called Pursley
P:
He tried to countermand.
K:
Instead, well, he did it in the clever bureaucratic way, he sent
out a request for further information. Well, that way it would have
gone on for 4 days, then the next day, you called me again and I
just called Moorer directly and I said the hell with the further
information, do it -- anything that flies and if you hit water buffaloes,
just drop it.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Tape)
Mr. Kissinger/The President
December 19, 1970
P:
Right.
K:
And that's how it got done.
P:
And it helped.
K:
It broke the back of that particular enemy offensive. I told you
right away, it wasn't a major thing, one way or the other but if
we stiffle it in the beginning
P:
Psychologically it helped.
K:
Psychologically it helps the Cambodians immensely and it helps
with our own press, that's the point of it here. And it keeps the
North Vietnamese loose until we start the other operation
P:
?
K:
And then when the one after that comes, they will really be
racked up.
P:
K:
Oh, no. Well, if we didn't do it with 550, 000, why should they
think we'll do it now.
P:
K:
Well, Godley is all for it. Right Mr. President.
P:
All right.
K:
Right, bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Tape)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 19, 1970 -- 5:30
K:
Mr. President
P:
Henry, I was going to ask you -- anything new on Warsaw?
K:
It seems to be -- the riots seem to have subsided, the reports we get
is of great tension; some factories still occupied by workers but no
actual riots in the street.
P:
I bet it was a lot rougher on the Presidents case.
K:
Oh, we have conversations of that little bastard, Babr
P:
Yeah, yeah.
K:
and he says well if this goes on another day or two, that's the
end of Ostpolitik. So strangely enough they see it the same way that
I do. He is a bastard.
see it like we do now.
P:
Thank God the British didn't want to get involved. You know the one
great thing that we have to remember here, you realize if we had
Wilson here, he would be pushing Brandt rather than trying to hold
K:
Oh, yeah. Oh, of course and he would be pushing you to go to -- for
him to go to Moscow.
P:
Yeah, he'd be going. I was thinking one thing we ought to do as soon
as Al gets a day of rest we ought -- I ought to get a first-hand report
from him.
K:
Absolutely, he'll be ready Monday for you.
P:
Fine, well we will sit down and just
K:
I had a brief discussion with him today.
P:
How's he feeling?
K:
He's feeling fine. He's quite optimistic. He thinks that we can he
says Thieu was really actually very upset by that 40, 000 withdrawal
we made this year in violation f our promise to him which wasn't done
by you.
P:
Yeah.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Tape)
- 2 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 19, 1970 -- 5:30
K:
and it just created but this is just a temporary problem. But
basically he is very optimistic about the situation. He says in South
Vietnam, as somebody who has been there three years ago, we are
within an eyelash of victory.
P:
The thing about Thieu though we have to really shape him up in this
respect. We have to go all the way for much further action
there is no question at this point. He's got to -- he must recognize --
our military, Henry, play a double game out there, a lot of them they
want to stay you know
K:
Right.
P:
Of course we want them to stay as long as is necessary but some
of them just want to stay period. They encourage him in this and say
well, you can't do it boys, we've got to stay. Well, because you know,
this is their last war and they know it.
K:
Well, his problem is the election in October. That's, I think, what he's
got in his mind and he would like to keep things as settled as he possibly
can but actually Haig had a very, very good conversation with him and
they are planning and it's all set. One thing, Mr. President, Laird
is going out there early January and I think you may have to tell him
before he goes what we are thinking of because otherwise it will surface
out there and he'll try to kill it.
P:
You tell him what we're thinking, you know.
K:
I don't mean in terms of withdrawals, I mean in terms of operations.
P:
Oh, I know. But in terms of the operation -- well, we'll just tell him
about the operationand tell him to Keep it guiet.
K:
He's pretty good once he knows it's irrevocable. That's not the sort
of thing he usually leaks. Well, let me -- I will be the
P:
I agree, I agree. We've got to get everybody
but I'm not
going to surface it with State until
K:
With State, I wouldn't -- you don't need to do it with State until about a
week
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (Tape)
- 3 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 19, 1970 -- 5:30
P:
It's a military operation.
K:
That's right. Now Haig discussed it with Godley, our Ambassador in
Laos
P:
What did he say?
K:
He's enthusiastic.
P:
Well, now can Godley get
Souvanna to ask for it and cooperate?
K:
He thinks he can get full cooperation from Souvanna.
P:
Well, that will make a tremendous difference.
K: Yeah.
P: Yeah.
K:
Well, that part of it
...
P:
Godley is enthusiastic.
K:
Godley, according
...
P:
That's one man -- I mean I -- we all make mistakes, I underestimated
him, I thought
...
K:
I did too, Mr. President.
P:
But you know, you were right -- the thing about it is that he
thought that's what I wanted to hear.
1
K:
That's right.
P:
But he's a loyal man and when he found out it was the other way, he
has become -- what do they call him, General Godley?
K:
Yeah, Marshal Godley.
P: Yeah.
K:
No, he's become good and Haig thinks ...
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Tape)
- 4 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 19, 1970 -- 5:30
P:
He's really very good, tough as hell.
K:
Oh, he's tough and he's been very effective but Haig thinks we can --
that both of those operations we are thinking of, particularly the second
one, may have an almost decisive impact.
P:
Well, you know it's about time to rip them up, finish them off.
K:
And if it works, then it ought to do in the northern two course Corps what
the other operation did in the southern two and if that's the case, it
will be a year and a half.
P:
Sell the whole thing in terms of accelerating the withdrawals
K:
Exactly.
P:
Accelerate the withdrawal, it will be hard. do you want to fight it,
you want to stick it -- keep our guys out? We've got them on heropesnow.
K:
I think we do and they don't know how to start an attack on you and they
haven't really -- and I must say based on my discussions at Harvard,
not that they will vote for you or anything like this, but they just don't have
any convictions behind their position anymore and
P:
Well, the interesting thing -- amusing to me they are trying to blow
life into that fellow Gardeners common cause now and they are trying
to blow life -- you know the reaction to the Scranton Commission and
Goodell thud
...
K:
Exactly.
P:
...
the universitives didn't blow up, they didn't participate in the
campaign. They are sure of -- Harris comes out in the pools showing
that we are weak -- that's temporary, that will change, you know what
I mean.
K:
That's right.
P:
But the main point, as you well know, this whole business is that these
bastards finally learned that they've got to run their schools.
K:
Out of -- out of
...
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Tape)
- 5 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 19, 1970 -- 5:30
P:
They don't react enthusiastically when I say that they have to take
the responsibility because they are a bunch of weaklings, that's
their problem.
K:
That's absolutely right.
P:
But I tell you, it's a hellva lot different now than it was a year ago.
K:
Oh, God -- what if you compare it with the situation right after Cambodia.
Who would have thought that the supplemental would have rolled
through and things like that. And that's an indication of the public
mood.
P:
There's nothing we can do to stir the Polish thing up?
K:
I'm afraid not but still here is another Communist regime that has
had to use troops against its own workers.
P:
Get that out.
K:
Right.
P:
Let's get the real PR effort on that and don't let State, Defense -- The
regime, are they putting out defense of the regime, they hope that
everything -- no violence, I hope not.
K:
I haven't seen anything yet. We had a meeting yesterday and we
P:
In one column, I noticed that the United States, Scalli was being carried
and he's right but I just want to be damn sure that we don't appear
that we're stirring them up but on the other hand, we know that we
don't condone this at all.
K:
We may be impudent, Mr. President, but what these fellows say
depends a lot on what they are told.
P:
Yeah.
K:
If they are told this is another indication of a workers' revolution in
a Communist regime, some of them will say it and that's what we
ought to get out.
P:
Get that out and around through the bureaucracy tomorrow, will you?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Tape)
- 6 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 19, 1970 -- 5:30
K:
Absolutely
P:
Fine
K:
In fact, I'll do it
...
P:
This is the President's view, will you do that?
K:
Yeah, I'll do it immediately.
P:
All right, Henry, good. Well, take off and tell Haig we'll see him --
we won't both him tomorrow, okay.
K:
Right, Mr. President.
P:
Set aside at least an hour, you and I and he, just the three, don't you
think?
K:
I think that would be good just for the first crack at it so that you
get it first hand.
P:
Right but then I think we ought to expose him to a couple of others.
K:
Right.
P:
We'll bring everybody along on this other operation. Laird, Laird --
look he knows very well that the whole ball would go up if what resulted
in our policies lose in 72 in Vietnam, he doesn't want that.
K:
Right. I wouldn't get State in until Laird gets back.
P:
No.
K:
I think a good way of handling it is to tell Laird what you want.
P:
Yeah.
K:
...
and then he can help sell it when he gets back on the basis of his
trip.
P:
That's right, good. And then get him a little credit.
K:
Right.
P:
In this one, we don't care about credit, we just want it done.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Tape)
- 7 -
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 19, 1970 -- 5:30
K: Exactly.
P:
And we'll let Laird be the mastermind.
K:
Well -- right, right, right.
P:
Providing that it works. All I want now is to have something work.
K:
Well, this ought to work. I've looked at this concept and it really
looks good.
P:
Good, okay Henry.
K:
Right, Mr. President
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger 2 -
K:
No, no, but believe me, that isn't what he
He had no such
thought, and there is no possible way
R:
I know, but the point is, Henry, he's got to wise up for Christ's
sake. He can't go around and talk to those four gossips and tell them
what he thinks without them telling everybody. Christ, I heard Dewey
at the party the other night. He was telling me he's delighted this
is just what we need. I said, well, for Christ's sake
K:
What is what we need?
R:
Well, what Acheson is saying. In other words, if the President
tells those four fellows what's on his mind, if he sorts of lets his hair
down and thinks they are going to keep it to themselves, he's as naive
as Eisenhower. Jesus Christ, they're the biggest gossips you can find.
They're bigger than Maxine Cheshire. They'll tell everybody that they
see and they would all like to be Secretary of State. In fact, they think
they are. Jack McCloy is pushing his law firm, too. He's telling all
his God-damned clients, and he's got the Arabs coming into his office
as if he's running the God-damned government.
K:
But you know how it happened, Bill. It wasn't that he had wanted
to tell them what he thought. You know how he is. When people talk
to him this way, he has a tendency to fall into the mood. This was not
intended as anything except a hand-holding session which he does maybe
two or three times a year with these guys, and it's taken on because of
Acheson's public popping off
R:
Well, McCloy is telling everybody, too. When the Arabs now
come to this country, they stop in to see him in his law office.
K:
But he hasn't even talked to McCloy about the Arabs
R:
That doesn't make any difference at all.
K:
in a year.
R:
He's got them all thinking. What I'm saying is that each one of
these
Now, Dewey is a little bit different. He said to me the other
night he said, 'I'm not even sure what the hell we're doing. 1 He said,
'Henry has given me a lot of papers to look over on things, and I read
them over. I'm not sure
I
He was talking about IndoChina in this
case. We have to figure out what the hell kind of mischief we can get
into, not through design but through inadvertence.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 3 -
K:
You are absolutely right. I agree with you, Bill.
We have to be more
R:
Discreet about things. I would have absolutely no objection
if the President decides, 'Look it, I want to get four old guys in here
and use them for purposes of sounding off and pretending that I'm
washing my hands of it. That's all right. I'm perfectly prepared
to play by any gameplan.
K:
No, but that isn't what it was, and you know it isn't.
R:
No, but that's what I'm saying. That's why.
K:
That's how it's coming out.
R:
I don't get annoyed at/whatever the President decides, after
he reflects on it, if he decided to follow a course of action, I am prepared
to give full support even though I at times may not agree, but it seems
to me that's my role. I should do that. On the other hand, I get madder
than hell when, by inadvertence, we stumble into things that really.
It just makes it
K:
Well, I agree with that part of it. I think there are two parts
of it. One is that these guys have been totally indiscreet about a
conversation which really was designed to give McCloy a chance to
say we shouldn't withdraw our troops. Secondly, the Germans, of
course, are playing a deliberate game now of pretending that we are
keeping them from an agreement and shifting their problems to us.
Now, they are not all that innocent in this thing, either. Ehmke
was popping off around town here in October at a time that we were
keeping them from a Berlin agreement, at a time when there wasn't
the slightest excuse that we were dragging our fight. In fact there
is no excuse for it now.
R:
I'm sure that's true, and.
K:
But we still shouldn't give them the excuse.
R:
There, again, I know.
I'm not plugging for the Germans.
I don't give a damn if the President wants, Suppose he decides that
we want to oppose. them It's bad to say it publicly.
K:
Well, if we want to oppose them, you are of course, absolutely
right. We shouldn't use Dewey, Acheson and McCloy.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 4 -
R:
Or if we are going to use them, let's use them in a planned
way. Say, look it, here's a good way of talking out of both sides of
our mouths and getting away with it, if that's what he wants to do.
But we
Just because we haven't thought it through, we stumble
into these things. Now you know damn well, if you know McCloy,
what he does. He's got a hell of a big law firm. He's got a hell of
a lot of oil clients. He likes to be in on matters in Europe because
that also helps his law firm. He's getting garrulous as hell and
you know he's going to tell everybody that he sees about it. As far
as the arms control thing, he didn't help himself. In fact, the
President is going to have a greater problem with those people
because they are all sore now. They say, well for Christ's sake,
he sees Dewey, Acheson, McCloy but he won't see his own Committee.
K:
McCloy has been a little tricky about. McCloy, himself, said
that if he saw a small group and he were a part of it, that would take
care of his committee.
R:
Of course, he didn't say that to his committee. Right in front
of his committee is when he came
K:
No, you told me that.
R:
He told me that this had nothing to do with his committee and
it was not a substitute, and that you had urged him to come in to see
the President and this wasn't a substitute at all, and he was sort of
pressed
K:
Hell, I don't like McCloy particularly. I fhink he's one of the
most over-rated men in America.
R:
Well, I think probably in his day he was all right, but
K:
I mean, he talks a lot. I think he's completely outdated as far
as Europe is concerned. He remembers the Germany and the Europe
of the early '50's. You can't push them around like this anymore.
R:
No, and I mean he was
I mean you've got Clay and McCloy
and Acheson all who feel that they have a sort of a pride of ownership
of Berlin which is all right.
K:
But you know it was the President who thought up this group.
He called them all separately. I only learned about it afterwards.
It grew up after some Gridiron dinner when he was talking to Dewey
and he's seen them twice, I think. You remember when he saw them
once before.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 5 -
R:
Dewey is a little more discreet, and I think Dewey is a little
perplexed himself. He said he wasn't sure what the point was; on
the other hand, he said he and cloy were really applauding what
Acheson has been saying -- they said, that's just right; that's what
we ought to do. And I said, well, for Christ's sake, if that's what
we ought to do, it ought to be done by a program -- the result of a
program and not by the result of an accident.
K:
Incidentally, I don't know whether you saw the traffic on some
other stuff. Last week, Ehmke called me up -- you know who he is --
and said that he had missed me on that trip when he was over here
and he was going to be over here and could he see me. So, I said
fine. The next thing I knew he was saying he was coming over
especially to see me. So I told Marty to join me so that it isn't a
White House/Ehmke conversation.
R:
I wonder about these things. Every time Strauss, even if
Marty's there, he goes back and tells everybody that he's got an "in"
and that what we are saying publicly is not what we are saying privately.
He uses you, too, for his own political advantages.
K:
Well, he'll use anybody.
R:
I know it. Well, I think we have two major problems with our
two major allies -- Germany and Japan -- in which we are heading
into a hell of a storm.
K:
Well, I think we ought to wind up the textile negotiations one
way or the other this week.
R:
We've got a major storm buildup in both places, and both of them
are inexcusable. There's no God-damned reason for it. Insofar as
Germany is concerned, nothing has happened up to date that should
cause us to have any concern. Now obviously, things could happen
in the future that would be unfortunate. Obviously, we have to guard
against those, but it seems to me the way to guard against them is try
to be reasonable as hell and say, sure, this is a good direction in which
to move. We've got to watch things, etc., etc.
K:
Well, my personal view on it is this. I agree with your statement.
There's nothing we can do about and we shouldn't try. I think that the
basic direction of German policy, even though Brandt is a decent man
and wants to stay with the West, is going to lead to German nationalism
and is going to give over a period of time the Soviets an increasing voice
there, but that is nothing we can do anything about by Acheson-like
statements.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 6 -
R:
Well, I'm not so sure. I agree with you there's nothing we
can do about what they have done. I mean, how the hell can anybody
take issue with that. I think there's a good deal we can do about the future,
but I don't think this is the way to do it.
K:
Oh, I agree with that.
R:
Taking the case in NATO, there was general agreement among
everyone, including the Germans, that there were pitfalls; we had to
be careful; the Germans vowed in public and in private that they would
not get out of step, etc., etc. Now, obviously, that may be wrong;
obviously, they may be misleading us. But, Christ, we don't want to
be
K:
No, I don't think they'l do it deliberately. Well, I think Bahr
is, of course, totally unreliable. You agree with that. And I think
Scheel is a dope, but that's neither here nor there. I think the basic
trend is going to lead towards a more nationalistic policy, but the
worst thing we can do is behave like a maiden aunt, clucking our tongue
without having a concrete proposal.
R:
And, of course, the building nationalism which is not only growing
in Germany but everywhere -- but particularly in Germany is going
to be more than assisted, and really increased at a real fast tempo if
they can say that the United States is treating Germany as if they are
a God-damned puppet. I mean, here we are trying to do the best we
can to improve our relations with the Soviet Union, and the United States
is talking out of both sides of its mouth. That's what frightens me and,
as you noticed, the Russians are exploiting that now. The Russians
and their propaganda -- if they don't believe what the Americans tell
you publicly because they are lying to you. What they really think is
what they are saying privately, and what they are saying privately is
that you have no right to do anything you want to that helps you. I
mean, if you don't do what they tell you, why they won't like it.
K:
I think we should, in general, applaud detente and specifically
trying to stay out of as much of their internal dispute as we possibly can.
R:
And, three, don't let them do anything.
Don't agree to
anything that we don't think is acceptable.
K:
We shouldn't break the back of the people who worked with us
in Germany for 20 years, but none of this requires Acheson popping off
and none of this requires public posturing. I think the stance you've
taken is the one that I agree with.
R:
You know, we got the NATO allies now in NATO to repeat exactly
our position; that is, our position is I fine, this is good; we think you
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 7 -
ought to move in this direction, but only on the conditions that you,
yourself, have stated. The conditions you've stated are that there
have to be satisfactory solutions to the problem of Berlin, and we all
agree what those solutions should be -- certainly in terms of principles.
There should be free access; there should be communication between
the two parts of Berlin; there should be better postal facilities and better
phone facilities. All these other things by and large are things that
the Russians won't be able to do probably.
K:
On Berlin? Yeah. Well, on Berlin I think there's no disagreement
at all. On Germany, as between you and me, I think that the trends,
simply based on German history and the personalities, are more dangerous
than one can deduce from what they are now saying and doing. But still,
it is beyond our ability to effect by the sort of thing that Acheson is doing.
R:
That's right. But suppose we decide that we should do everything
we can to prevent the trend that you are speaking of
K:
No, I don't think.
R:
Even if we decided to do that, though, the way to do it is to
fasten on to Berlin.
K:
Absolutely.
R:
Because the Russians can't get off that hook; if we keep the
Federal Republic in line, the Federal Republic says there has to be a
satisfactory solution to the problem of Berlin; it has to be a solution
acceptable to the allies. We understand that we can't do anything;
unless there's a satisfactory solution, we won't ratify the treaty
either with Russia or Poland. Unless there is a satisfactory solution,
we won't have a European Security Conference. We all agree what a
satisfactory solution is. NOw the Russians can't accept our satisfactory
solution.
K:
I feel that the policy we have, in fact, been pursuing over the
last year or so is correct.
R:
In the NATO communique
K:
You know, the fact that I think that German [End of tape]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers (New Tape) (believe this is continuation of
Mr. Kissinger
previous tape)
where all it took was for the United States to frown and
K:
/ everyone would jump to attention.
I mean supposing Brandt came to Acheson and said, 'All right, what
do you want me to do? What would he tell him?
R:
I asked McCloy the other day -- he said that he was afraid
that the developments of Ostpolitik would prevent a peace treaty being
signed. I said, 'Well, now let me ask you now. Do you seriously
think that a peace treaty can be signed? Can we reach a peace?'
He said, "Well, no." I said, well, what's your point then. You know,
a peace treaty is out of the question.
K:
And, you know, so what? Supposing there isn't that much glory
in a peace treaty for us to sign. He says the Germans are making peace
with the Russians without us. Well, you know, so what?
R:
You know, that's what
Dean Rusk was there. He said to
McCloy, "So what, suppose they make a peace treaty we like. What's
wrong with it? If they make one we don't like, there's a hell of a lot
wrong with it. "
K:
Yeah, but if they do something we don't like, they can do it
in the form of a lot of other things other than what is called a peace
treaty. They are going to/ be the first victims of an unfavorable peace
treaty, not we.
R:
Of course. And, as a matter of fact, if we decide that they are
moving in a direction we don't like or moving in a way which is wrong,
we probably by our actions can have the government thrown out.
K:
Well, why don't we do this, Bill. We have two problems:
(1) we have the German one -- let me put that aside for one second.
(2) we have the problem of these four garrulous old men. I think the
way to handle that is to let you know ahead of time when the President
is thinking of calling them, and that way, we avoid any impression --
and I will do that.
R:
I think if we go into it again, I'd better be there because at the
end of the meeting I would like to say to them, if he is going to have them
(I think he should quit seeing them) but if he should, I think then we
should say to them, 'It is understood that this is not for the purpose
of having you make statements after you leave. Obviously, if you go
to the White House, then you come out and have a press conference and
say a lot of things, people think you are authorized to say them.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 2 -
K:
Well, the thought that they might make statements that was
probably naive for the press -- it didn't occur to anybody, so it was
always understood that these were private meetings. But I see no
reason in the world why we can't do it on this basis. (A) They should
be kept
R:
Why does the President announce these things to the press
anyway? Why doesn't he just go ahead and have the meeting. He sees
some people without telling the press and other times, he does it.
K:
Frankly, what must have happened there -- I had nothing to
do with that part of it. Ziegler must have come walking into the office
and he must have just run through his list with him. But
R:
I sometimes think he gets sort of carried away with how much
news he's going to make that day.
K:
Well, the whole news policy is something that, if it were my
business, I would express some views on, but I think this watching
every day's news summary drives one crazy, and is fruitless.
R:
I think so, too.
K:
Because things disappear. Three days later, no one knows
what one was so excited about.
R:
Right. And whether you are in the paper every day or not
In the first place, the President is bound to get a lot of attention, and
secondly, you don't gain anything by trying to get a little more coverage.
K:
Now, on the German policy, I think we should just
My own
view is that we shouldn't protest too much one way or the other. We
should just say there's a general agreement -- the details we don't get
into, or something like that. And on Berlin, play it the way we are
doing it.
R:
Yeah, I think so. So far, the way we've played it in Berlin is
good. We've gotten the Russians confused as hell and I don't think
anything is going to happen between now and their parting Congress.
K:
And I'll be damned though if I understand what the Germans are
saying that we are holding up in Berlin. There has never been a
proposition that we could accept or that they have asked us to accept.
R:
I don't know if they are saying that, have they said that?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 3 -
K:
Well, no, they are not saying it as a government. Ehmke said
it when he was over here or so Joe Kraft claimed but Kraft is such a
son-of-a-bitch that you can't tell what
whether he made it up or
whether Ehmke really told him that.
R:
Kraft just says things like that to get us to respond to find out
what our answer would be if they said it.
K:
Yeah, yeah.
R:
That's his technique.
K:
But if he
I think basically on Berlin there is no problem.
There oughtn't to be a problem.
R:
I don't think there is.
K:
On the basic Ostpolitik, I think that's an artificial crisis, they
are not doing anything now.
R:
That's right. It is true that there may be a crisis.
K:
But then I think
I agree with you, we ought to decide it, you
ought to announce it. Certainly you don't want to use Acheson to popping
off all over the place to set our German policy.
R:
Well, Henry, if we decide this -- to have a policy to try to
announce public policy and at the same time we want to express some
reservations privately, let's figure out the best way to express them
privately. Just that simple, how do we want to do it? Sure as hell we
don't want to do it with Acheson, McCloy, Dewey and Clay.
K:
Yeah. No, it turned out unfortunately.
R:
We also have a hell of a problem in Japan.
K:
Well, what do you think we should do, I am so sick of this thing.
Everybody and his grandmother has gotten into that act. I thought last
May we had it nearly solved when Kendall got into it, then it was happily
forgotten. I don't know why Sato started the negotiations again if it is
going to cause so much trouble, we didn't want it.
R:
Yeah, well, I think the thing to do
...
K:
Excuse me (another phone ringing)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 4 -
K:
Hello.
R:
You've got to go.
K:
In a minute.
R:
Well, I think that probably there is nothing to do this next week
or so, I think if it doesn't work out, I'd like to have the President ask
me to work with Flanigan. I think I can
in the case of Okinawa, I
worked out some language that got us off the Congressional hook pretty
well and satisfied Sato and I think it's possible here again. I think
someone like Peter does a hell of a good job -- I think he's much better
than Stans but I still think that if we are fairly close to an agreement,
and I talked to him on the phone last night, I have a feeling that there are
ways that I can figure out to do it that
K:
Oh, well, if you are willing to do it, why don't we give it until
the middle of the week and if then early next week it isn't at an agreement
R:
I think probably
I got a letter
a cable from Aichi asking
me to take part in it, he is very concerned and their government as
you know is afraid they are going to be thrown out. Now maybe there
is nothing we can do but I am perfectly prepared to do it to see if we
can't work out some middle ground, we are fairly close to an agreement.
K:
We are fairly close and during the week the Japanese asked two
or three things of us which you know I don't understand the issue well
enough but which seemed to me from a political point of view but the
textile industry won't yield now. Our people think that if the textile
people don't accept it, it isn't worth having.
R:
Yeah. Well, anyway I
If you remember we had almost the
same tie-up, a different way of course, with Okinawa about how we had
submitted to the Congress and how they had submitted to the
and so forth and we had worked out some language which
K:
No, I think Bill, I agree. Why don't we do this, if by Christmas
they haven't come to a solution, I will recommend to the President that
we will shift it to you.
R:
I wouldn't
Let's be sure so that Peter doesn't
K:
No, no, Peter can work with you.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
- 5 -
R:
That's right. Just in effect say that this is getting to be you
know damn near crisis and that in view of that, that I should take an
active role with Peter in it and have Aichi probably too I think because
he's upset as hell, naturally. I think maybe I could have
...
although
politically I wouldn't have any weight with the textile people, I think they'd
be a little more impressed if I said, for example, you know this could
...
K:
You're in a much better position to make the political case to
them
R:
That's right.
K:
and appeal to the national interest than Peter whom they have
to look at as one of theirs.
R:
That's exactly right. And also I could assure them if they were
on the verge of getting damage that I could assure them that the President
would act and I didn;t want to tie him down in express terms because if
we tied him down that way it would be unacceptable to the Japanese
Government, they couldn't stand it. Well
K:
Well, let's do that if it doesn't get solved by Thursday.
R:
Yeah, okay.
K:
And I don't think it will.
R:
Yeah, I don't think so.
(laughter)
K:
Okay.
R:
Okay Henry.
K:
Right.
R:
Right, bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (Tape)
Mr. Kissinger /Bill Hyland
December 21, 1970 -- Page 1
H:
Really gave him considerable leeway.
K:
But why couldn't you reason that this was just their mistake, that
if they hadn't done that, it would have been a good thing to do.
H:
Oh, I don't think that Gierek for the new regime opposes the treaty
but I think they may oppose the whole spirit behind cooperation
with Bonn and being at odds with the East Germans and others.
I can't say for sure
K:
Okay, now look here's what I want you to do in this memo for the
President. First, explain briefly what it does in internal politics.
Secondly, what it means in bloc politics, you know greater voice
for the East Germans
H:
Right, right.
K:
and thirdly, what it does in East-West politics.
H:
Yeah, okay.
K:
Now, do you agree with my assessment, which incidently I just
was playing the devil's advocate, I agree with you.
H:
Oh, (laughter)
K:
I mean I can't judge the domestic politics but I agree with you on
the other -- on the Ostpolitik.
H:
Well, Ulbricht is going to -- this is a windfall for Ulbricht -- he
is going to blame a great deal of it on Ostpolitik and
K:
I agree with this. Now, the next thing I wonder is this, I think the
Russians may decide is either to toughen up their line generally
slightly towardsthe whole West or they may decide that they need
some detente in the West and it is safer to do it with us than with
the Germans.
H:
Yeah, I think the latter is more likely.
K:
Do you agree with that?
H:
Yeah, I think they will have to cool it with the Germans and end it
up with us.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland
December 21, 1970 page 2
K:
You think that's right.
H:
That would be my guess, yeah.
K:
Okay, will you put that in the memo.
H:
Yeah, yeah, we can put it in.
K:
You know just say it's speculation, just do a page and a half or so.
H:
One thing I would like to stick in the memo that I have in the draft is
that the Russians it's not clear at all whether the Russians were
even consulted on this and they may be somewhat nervous over Gierek
because he simply is not well-known to them.
K:
Put that in, that goes into Bloc politics.
H:
Yeah, yeah. And the other thing is of course we don't really know how
the people are gonna take it, sometimes when a regime shows this kind
of weakness and instability
K:
I think that's exactly right. It gets worse.
H:
It gets worse because the people could think they can get even more.
K:
That's right.
H:
So I would like to have something to say that.
K:
No, I agree but just what you need is a section that says this is what
happened and section two, this is what it means inside Poland domestically.
H:
Right.
K:
Thirdly, this is what it means inside Poland foreign policy. Third, this
is what it means to internal Bloc politics. Fourthly, this is what it means
for-the Soviet Union and especially for Soviet foreign policy.
H:
Okay.
K:
Now can you do that, that's about - but don't make it much more than 2
pages.
H:
No, no, okay.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland
December 21, 1970 -- page 3
K:
And can you get it over to the President tonight.
H:
Well, do you want me to does someone come in and take a look at
it or what?
K:
Well, have you got it finished?
H:
Just about, I want to make some
K:
Well, why don't you read it to me when -- well make the revisions
and call me and read it to me.
H:
Okay, will you be there for some time or not?
K:
Another hour.
H:
Okay, I'll do it easily by then.
K:
Okay.
H:
Okay, I'll call you back and read you what I have.
K:
Good and let's get a CIA assessment.
H:
We've already asked CIA and I&R to do a joint piece for early in the
morning.
K:
Good.
H:
Because there is stuff coming in, Gearick has made this speech and
I've seen a summary of it.
K:
What did it say?
H:
Well, he had promised wage increase to some workers and that he
would re-examine the plan and then he pledged a loyalty and good
relations with the Russians.
K:
Right.
H:
Which is about the minimum that could happen.
K:
Put that in the memo though.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland
December 21, 1970 -- page 4
H:
Yeah, I will. Well, I'll call you back then with - - and tell you what's
in the memorandum.
K:
Right.
H:
All right, thank you.
K:
And just begin it by saying I wanted you to have this preliminary memo
but I think speed is almost more important than anything else.
H:
All right. Fine.
K:
Good, thank you.
H:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland
December 21, 1970 -- Page 1
H:
The memo
K:
Yeah.
H:
I've already talked to CIA and State INR.
K:
Yeah, but I just want to make sure it goes now.
H:
Yeah, well I have it.
K:
Okay.
H:
I have a draft.
K:
Yeah but now look are we gonna -- how many hours will it take to
get it typed.
H:
The girl's right here, she should be able to do it in about 1/2 hour.
K:
Okay, it's got to be there before 8:00.
H:
Okay, I can get it there easily by 8:00 if someone knows where to
take it.
K:
Give it to the usher to take to the President immediately with a
red tag.
H:
Okay, okay.
K:
Put it in an envelope -- in a yellow folder with a note
from me.
H:
Okay.
K:
But it's got to be there before 8:00.
H:
Okay, fine, Well, do you want me to read it to you?
Yeah, quickly.
/
K:
How long is it?
H:
Well, it will be about 2 pages.
K:
Okay, go ahead read it.
H:
Okay. First sentence (tape went blank).
(END OF TAPE)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Hoped 28
TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
Tape --
Y:
We are somewhat confused. Would you kindly explain the situation on
your side.
K:
Yeah.
Y:
How should we proceed from now on?
K:
Well, the situation on our side is that we can not sell your proposal to
our industry.
Y:
I see.
K:
They simply will not have any of it and there's no point in our making
an agreement since the point of the agreement, the political point, was
to please the industry.
Y:
Uh-huh.
K:
You understand there's no point in making one that they don't like.
Y:
That's right.
K:
Now we will see early in the New Year whether we can come up with
some compromise that they will like which I then should -- you may tell
me whether I should give it to you or Oshiba (spelled phonetically)
Y:
Um-huh
K:
But frankly I am rather sick of this whole enterprise and I just as soon
not have too much to do with it anymore.
Y:
Yes I can personally see how you feel.
K:
And I have to tell you honestly I was outraged when the Chief Editorial
writer of the Washington Post was received by your Mr. M
Y:
Yes.
K:
And was told by him that we were trying to dictate terms as if this were
the Battleship Missouri on the textile agreement.
Y:
That's right, was that told by Mr. M?
K:
That's right, this was told to Mr. M by
Y:
Yes, yes, the chief editorial writer was here a few days ago.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Page 2
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
Tape --
K:
Yeah.
Y:
Did he write any story?
K:
No because he is an old friend of mine and I didn't tell him the truth
but I told him that it wouldn't be fair. But he may still write it, he
just came back three days ago.
Y:
I see. That was really too bad, that was really too bad.
K:
But I don't, you know he may yet write it, that's a minor point, I just
don't see where we can.go from here. We will try early in the New Year
to see whether there is some way we can reformulate what you have put
to us in that telephone conversation.
Y:
That's right.
K:
And if we can, I will come back to you or which would be better to give
it to you or to give it to your man here?
Y:
If it is too troublesome on you personally, then best through your expert
to his counterpart in your place
K:
All right.
Y:
in order to avoid any misunderstanding.
K:
All right.
Y:
What if I told you on December 17th from our time over the telephone
exactly the position of my own friend and is very firm and what Mr. M
says this is the final I mean the definite position and if you need some
modification on certain specific points, I will press very hard on my own
friend in order to meet your need. As you can appreciate on our side,
my friend is also in an extremely difficult position
K:
Oh, yes.
Y:
and he hasn't got much room
K:
That's why I wonder whether it mightn't be best just to forget the whole
thing.
Y:
Yes, I think I think you are wise not to go further for the right one.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Page 3
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
Tape --
K:
You remember I didn't want to start it again.
Y:
Precisely, precisely but my friend felt he's not an expert and he felt
a sense of obligation to your friend, wanted to do something and he
felt the agreement would be much better than legislation from both sides,
that was what he felt.
K:
Yeah.
Y:
And he made up his mind to go ahead with the negotiations on the
assumption that we could quickly reach an agreement.
K:
Yeah.
Y:
That you were correct and right but from now on uh uh -- still I personally
if possible at all would very much like to see an agreement.
K:
Well, I will have to see if we can reformulate your proposition.
Y:
Yes.
K:
And see whether we can put it -- you see our trouble is we have already
gone beyond what our industry likes.
Y:
That's right, that's right.
K:
So we just -- we have no maneuvering room left.
Y:
That's right and the same, exactly the same position on our side.
K:
Oh, yes, it's a very -- it's too bad. It's very much too bad.
Y:
Personally I'm sorry to take so much of your time but I personally feel
if you could succeed and go ahead with the legislation and succeed in doing
so perhaps that might be best for both of us.
K:
Might be better.
Y:
That is my personal feeling.
K:
Yeah
Y:
Do you feel that way?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Page 4
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
Tape --
K:
Well, I am beginning to think that way but
Y:
But since we have come all that way and as I recall you said in October
from that meeting you took a calculated risk in making that first
communique with a view to reach an agreement to the open negotiations.
K:
Well, I thought I could count on the assurances.
Y:
So did I.
K:
It is very damaging to my friend to have made promises now twice but
that's neither here nor there, if it can't be done we also don't want to
weaken the position of your friend.
Y:
That's right, that's right so if there is still some hope of reaching an
agreement, then I would certainly do my very best to press very hard
on my own friend to modify some of the specific points
???
and on your side I'm afraid we will have to ask you to try to reformulate
what I told you over the telephone.
K:
Yeah, I understand.
Y:
So that -- we will try to reach an agreement.
K:
Well, I will try to -- I will be back to you early in January.
Y:
Early in January.
K:
Right.
Y:
Fine, in the meanwhile and this is a technical question, as we understand
on the 30th of December two experts having lunch.
K:
Yes.
Y:
Our expert invited yours for lunch. Should we -- should my friend tell
our expert about the substance of what I told you over the phone so that
over the lunch they could discuss on substance or should we make it just
a social engagement.
K:
Well then it will leak if he tells it to your expert.
Y:
That's right, that's right.
K:
Well, let me check with Mr. F and I'll let you know.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Page 5
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
Tape --
Y:
I see and uh uh we are suffering heavily from the question of decrease,
so if it is better to hold it
K:
I will let you know.
Y:
Then perhaps we had better keep it until I hear something from you
early next month.
K:
Right, I will be in touch with you about it.
Y:
Fine.
K:
Okay.
Y:
I am sorry to disturb you but
K:
No, no disturbance and I will talk to you soon.
Y:
I would very much like to get out of this very difficult situation on
both sides since the prestige of your friend and mine.
K:
Yeah, this is why I think you people should keep quiet in making
unfriendly comments about what we are doing in these negotiations.
Y:
Exactly so would you mind if I tell my own friend about Mr. M's recent
comment.
K:
No, not at all.
Y:
And keep him quiet.
K:
I would appreciate it if you could.
Y:
All right, I will do that.
K:
All right.
Y:
Would you mind just repeating again what Mr. M told the editor?
K:
He said that what we were doing in the textile negotiations was like
trying to make you come to the Battleship Missouri and you would never
accept that humiliation.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Page 6
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
Tape --
Y:
I see. That's too bad, too bad. He should never have said that, never
said it. We will see to it that he keeps quiet and behaves himself.
K:
All right. Well, we have the same problem on our side sometimes.
Y:
Yes. The reason we are somewhat confused was Mr. S's comment for
substan
but during our understanding of the situation so
K:
Which comment?
Y:
I hope to hear from you again and until then because this question
of decrease of what I called you would be held here with my own friend.
K:
Good.
Y:
And our expert in your place does not know the precise
K:
No, my expert does know.
Y:
At this moment he doesn't know the precise
K:
No, our expert knows, yours doesn't.
Y:
I see, all right.
K:
Our expert is fully familiar with it.
Y:
I see, all right so then in that case in order to keep this line of
communication absolutely confidential perhaps we have to do something
about it. So, would you kindly
K:
I will let you know next week whether you should instruct your expert.
Y:
Yes and in that case, would you please take into account that this
might be leaked on our side unfortunately.
K:
Right, good.
Y:
Thank you very much and I hope to hear from you soon.
K:
Yes, we will be in touch with each other.
Y:
Thank you very much.
K:
Goodbye.
Y:
Goodbye.
[End of Tape]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (Tape)
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
K:
Hello. Bill?
R:
Hi, Henry. How are you? I want to talk to you about this
German situation. Were you in there when the President talked to
Dewey and McCloy?
K:
Oh, yeah.
R:
Well, did he tell them to [let me get everybody off the phone
here -- just a second, I've got my grandchildren here and they're on
the phone, I think. Hold on. ] Did he indicate to them he wanted
them to sort of sound off.
K:
Absolutely, definitely, totally not ! It had absolutely.
You
know, you have heard him on what he thinks of Ostpolitik, and he may
have made a few remarks to that effect. I'll let you see the notes.
I've got them. As I told you, the purpose of the meeting -- the primary
purpose was to avoid a meeting with the Arms Control group and to
give McCloy a chance to sound off. Most of what McCloy said had
nothing to do with Brandt, but had to do with something that we had
already done; namely, not withdraw troops. Two-thirds was the speech
he always makes. Then he made a few comments about Brandt. Then
Acheson made what he's now said to every newspaper. The President
made a few general remarks, and then they talked also about other
things. But the purpose of the meeting was in no sense
It was
a total accident that it came about at that time.
R:
Well, it's causing a hell of a lot of problems. We are running
into a real head-on struggle with it with the Germans because they
just think we are lying to them. I guess you saw the article in the
TIMES this morning.
K:
Yeah, but they have sent us a cable saying they've been trying
to kill that. Have you seen that?
R:
No, but whether they were or weren't, the fact is that this is
how they think. And Acheson, instead of keeping
, he said
it again in the paper. He reasserted what he said.
K:
Yeah, well, that's inexcusable.
R:
You know, if the President wants to create a crisis with the German
government.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page data
- Page
- 136
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- document
- Media ID
- a768ded4afea0185
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 498694067
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "498694067",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694067",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "November 1970-December 1970",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694067",
"collections": [
"National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
"Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 136,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "498694067",
"label": "November 1970-December 1970",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694067"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "498694067",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694067",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "November 1970-December 1970",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694067",
"collections": [
"National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
"Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 136,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694067",
"naId": 498694067,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 136,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "document",
"url": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-29-02.pdf",
"mediaId": "a768ded4afea0185",
"ocrText": "Telecon\nMr. Kissinger\nGeneral Haig\n11/10/70\n(tape)\nK: A1, we've got big affairs of state on our minds. Can you find out\nwhat the goddamn dress is before we have a conniption.\nH: I have, sir. I've just talked to Ambassador Watson. He said they\nhave not made a decision. It's one of two alternatives and he should be\nprepared for both and I gave this to Dwight. One is business suit and\nthe other is a swallowtail coat. Xgex\nK: Sans pantaloon (laughter)?\nH: I told them to get that one ready.\nK: Okay, now, will you get these guys to start turning now he screams\nthat he wants it on Friday -- the lunch.\nH: Well, goddamn!\nK: Look, this is what happens when everybody talks to e verybody else.\nHe had a conniption when I said it Saturday.\nH: Well, that's awfully strange because\nK: A1, I just got through talking to him. He called me. I've got it on\na tape if you want to hear it.\nH: No, I believe that.\nK: In fact, he wants to know within 15 minutes whether the Mexicans\ncan make it.\nH: Alright, okay.\nK: Can you get that done?\nH: Right.\nK: And it is to be in the family dining room in the Residence not in the\nState Room and meet in the Oval Room. You know in the oval family room.\nAnd he wants it on Friday.\nH: Okay, alright, I will do this right away. Goddamn\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\n11/10/70\n-2-\nK: A1, it isn't the first time that you - he's got something to do. He\nwants McBride fired. When the two-year terms up put him on the list\nbut lets go easy on it. He's a decent guy.\nH: Alright, sir.\nK: Okay? Alright I will be in if I ever get him off the phone. Rogers is\npouting and I don't know about what.\nH; I took care of the other. I told Dwight Bob was in the other room AND\nK: That's okay.\nH: Okay.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nThe President (Tape)\n11/10/70\nK: Mr. President, I just talked to Bill and I understand you had to\nP: Yeah, Yeah, I called him just to let him know that I wanted.\nand\nhe said that he would go with any staff, which is good.\nK: Right, excellent.\nP: I told him a security man. Now! I am just sitting here and I haven't\ntold Haldeman yet but I am not going to have the goddamned Secret Service\nsitting in that pew with me. Now that's not done by any other Government\nand I'm not going to have\nK: I think you are absolutely right.\nP: If they are, I am firing the Secret Service. Now they have ruined\nevery rally picture with that and they are not going to do it here.\nK: Well, I think you are absolutely right, Mr. President and also at the\nAdenaur funeral they were so conspicuous that they became the laughing\nstock.\nP: At the Adenaur funeral I know, I know. When we went over there\nthey had 18 Secret Service all over the place. I am giving the orders\nright now these son-of-a-bitches are not going to be there.\nK: Right.\nP: Thatsright. They aren't sons-of-bitches but they think law orders\nthem but by God in that French Cathedral we are either going to be safe\nin it or they are going to blow it up one of the two. That's all there\nis to it. Ne a/r/e/ So that's set and with Rogers I told him his security\nman should go just for obvious reasons but he is not going to take any-\nbody else. The question of taking the Assistant Secretary was not\nraised at all.\ntalk\nK. Excellent. I've had a dog with him. He's neutral about Bruce,\nslightly against it.\nP: He's against it and I think maybe he is right on the ground that it might\nlook like bringing Vietnam into it. Let's pass it, don't you think so?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/President\n-2-\nK: Well, I think Bruce is such a senior and distinguished diplomat but it\nP: The only thing is that I don't think we really need the extra person and\nI just feel myself that when we get in I will have a chance -- I want to see\nBruce. When I get in we will have a nice midnight snack with him before\ngoing to bed.\nK: I don't see that there is any reason to open overrule the Secretary on\na thing like this.\nP: No, no, no. I understand his concern on it. I have a little bit of the\nsame feeling as to whether\nK: The only problem -- the only thing is you could have ECHEVERRIA\nin Key Biscayne on Friday if you wanted to go back down for the weekend.\nP: No, I don't want to come back here. We are going to\nhave it in Washington. I want him up there.\nK: Good, right.\nP: And I want him Friday, noon.\nK: You want it Friday now?\nP: If it can be, yes.\nK: Right, okay.\nP: Because, we would come back on Thursday -- now I assume everything\ncan be done Thursday -- the funeral, and if Pompidou sees us it will be\nin the afternoon, right?\nK: That's right. He will see you for 15 minutes.\nP: And then that's all we want. I will put in my call on Pompidou and\nthen out we'll go and go right to the airport and off we will go.\nK: They might have a reception for heads of state but you could go to that\nfor a half an hour and still if you left as late as 7:00 you would still be in\nby.\nP: Yes, 7:00 does it fine. You still get in by plenty of time. But, I would\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/President\n-3-\nlike to get the luncheon over with and tell him Friday.\nK: Okay, Mr. President.\nP: And we again know that in order to have it in the proper sense we will\nhave it upstairs in the upstairs oval room as a reception.\nK: Oh, that will be. very nice.\nP: The upstairs dining room so that they have the feeling that it is in\nthe home.\nK: That it is a family lunch.\nP: You can tell them that we will have it in the family quarters in the\nWhite House.\nK: Right.\nP: So that he feels that he got a special treatment -- family quarters of\nthe White House will be the deal. Now, who is going to call him? Are\nyou going to have Meyer call him?\nK: We've got that in train now. I think Meyer is calling him now.\nP: I want McBride fired, you know. I don't want him fired before this\nvisit, but he is to go.\nK: Right.\nP: The Ambassador down there.\nK: Right.\nP: I've got another man I want to put in that position. But put him on\nthe list of those that have to go and I want you to be sure to get the list.\nHave you got your list to Haldeman yet of people who ought to go? I\ndon't mean at the Assistant Secretary level I mean at the Ambassadorial\nlevel.\nK: No, I haven't. I've got an Assistant Secretary -- I think Meyer ought\nto go.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/President\n-4-\nP: I agree.\nK: I have a record of what he did on Chile which is unbelieveable.\nP: So, I think on the luncheon that's what we will do and I'll call\nMrs. Nixon and And inform her. Now, wait a minute. Can you find out\nfrom the damn Mexicans whether they are going to come Friday or not\nso that I can let her know because I don't want to turn her on and turn\nher off on this.\nK: I will let you know right away.\nP: Who calls?\nK: I will call the Ambassador and get an answer.\nP: Tell them I want to know and I have to know in ten minutes.\nK: Okay, Mr. President\nP: He can call the President and just tell him we want to shift it one day\nto the White House. We will fly him up and fly him back.\nK: Right, Mr. President. We will get it done.\nP: Okay, Henry.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida\nNovember 10, 1970\njlj\nK: How are you?\nY: I am all right thank you, and you?\nK: I am fine.\nY: I have come back to my office from the private meeting with my friend\nabout three hours ago which lasted for about 3/4 of an hour. Based on the\nconversation I had with you last night, of your time, you can imagine what\nand how I have talked to him.\nK: Of course.\nY: He knew the climate now being created in your place. My friend showed\nme the cable from our permanent representative.\nK: Did it confirm what I had told you?\nY: Exactly. And the cable also states the detailed conversation held between\nthe two experts expressing the grave concern of our own expert. Our own\nrepresentative.\nK: Yes, I know.\nY: And that confirmed precisely what you told me. Now, I had a really serious\nconversation with my friend. Let me tell you the following points. I myself\nfear that you yourself may no longer believe what I am going to tell you now.\nK: No, No, I believe everything you are going to tell me.\nY: But this is exactly what my friend has just told me.\nK: Right. No, I have no doubt in you at all.\nY: And I still believe my friend really means it and my friend really, honestly\nmeans it. Now, my friend has already given a firm instruction to Mr. M. to\npresent to you our concrete counter proposal within 48 hours. The position paper,\nso-called position paper, last Monday was sent by Mr. M. to our representative\nwithout the knowledge of my own friend. It is apparently aimed at the political\ntactics for home consumption for our own industry at home. So my friend asks\nyou not to take it seriously as it is not our counter proposal. Now, my friend\njust indicated to me what he told me last Thursday when I met with him for an\nhour last time and then I told you, that is he will honor his commitment to your\nfriend. Today he looked relaxed and sounded optimistic for the prospects of\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nreaching an agreement in time. In his mind he seems to have made up his own\nmind and made his own decision knowing that will cost him heavy political\nprice at home. The question is the timing. And I warned him the timing was\nvery very short. He says that there is a Japanese way of getting things done\nas far as our domestic political situation goes.\nK: Of course.\nY: But at the end he himself is prepared to pay the necessary political price\nfor an agreement in time which I very strongly pleaded for. So I beg you that\nwould you be good enough to be patient for a few more days and I would like\nyou to tell or ask Mr. Flanigan, your assistant, to take the same attitude.\nK: Right.\nY: I believe that you will be going away tomorrow, tomorrow morning.\nK: Yes, we are going away.\nY: Mr. A. will be there too.\nK: Oh yes.\nY: But he doesn't know in detail and this particular matter is being handled\nsmoothly without delay in his absence. That my friend told me.\nK: Yes, well we have no intention of raising this issue.\nY: Pardon.\nK: We will not discuss the issue when we see Mr. A, of course.\nY: Please not. And there is no need of that and without Mr. A. my friend\ntold me that things would go very smoothly.\nK: Oh, is he the problem?\nY: No, No, he is not a problem at all. But he suddenly had to be away and\neven in his absence there will be no difficulty of\nK: I understand.\nY: We can go ahead with this arrangement as I just told you.\nK: Yes, well we will not discuss it with him in where we are going.\nY: You are quite right and there is no need and I think it better not to discuss\nnor does it matter to him. You know, at the end of our conversation my friend\njust mentioned this without and still, as our side is concerned, is no problem\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nin making necessary arrangements. So I don't know what to say more than\nthis.\nK: No, well I think this is fine. And I will know what to do. And we can\ndo nothing anyway until the weekend because we won't be back.\nY: When would you be back?\nK: Friday.\nY: Friday of your time.\nK: Or Thursday night.\nY: Thursday night or Friday morning. I see. And in the meantime I hope\nthat your own expert - I can really imagine how outrageous he would have been.\nK: Well, you see the trouble with our experts are reaching the point where\nthey prefer legislation to an agreement. So they are relaxed. For political\nreasons we would be better off without an agreement.\nY: That's right.\nK: And that is apparently what yourpeople don't understand.\nY: Ya, I\nK: So we will relax and we will wait until we hear from you.\nY: Yes.\nK: It's all right- but there are personal feelings that I described to you yesterday.\nY: I beg your pardon.\nK: There are those feelings of - you know - that I described to you yesterday.\nBut there is no point in repeating those.\nY: You are quite right. I would like you to be a little more patient.\nK: No, we will be patient. We will be patient until the end of this week.\nY: Yes, until you have our concrete counter proposal which\nI told my friend must be\nand bound to each agreement very quickly.\nAnd my friend himself is not an expert. He has understood this matter much\nbetter than he used to.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\nK: We have all learned a lot.\nY: He is going to do something definite.\nK: I appreciate this and I appreciate the attitude you have taken throughout\nand I hope to see you soon.\nY: I would like to - of course I will be getting in touch with you again, but\nas soon as you have\nK: Incidentally if you have something urgent you can call my Washington\nnumber, they are always connected with me.\nY: Oh, I see. Otherwise I will get in touch with you and get to know the\naction of your to our forthcoming proposal.\nK: Excellent.\nY: Goodby for now.\nK: Goodby and I hope to see you soon. And I appreciate what you have\ndone.\nY: Thank you.\nK: Goodby.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nRon Ziegler\nNovember 10, 1970, a.m.\nZ: Henry. You have it?\nK: No. You get the statement in about two minutes. It's being typed now\nand will come right down to you.\nZ: Well, I'd rather have it dictated.\nK: Well, it will be dictated to you.\nZ: Who from.\nK: I will get it dictated to you immediately. I just want to make sure of\none thing. They have given you Kissingex the text of the letter to Pompidou.\nZ: I'm not going to.\nI would never do anything with anything unless I\nchecked it with you.\nK: Good. Because you might have misunderstood. Because that should\nreach there before you can release it.\nZ: Oh, sure.\nK: And release that around noon.\nZ: Yeah. Or at the 11:00 or 11:30 briefing.\nK: Good. But you will have the statement within five minutes.\nZ: Who should we get it from? Julie?\nK: No. Get it from Hyland who is in the Situation Room.\nZ: OK. Now, I have also. Maybe you can help me\ngiven Julie a series\nof questions that I'll be asked.. No. 1: When was the President notified?\nI'm going to say early this morning by Henry Kissinger.\nK: Good Correct.\nZ: Alright, now. How was Henry Kissinger notified?\nK: By the Situation Room.\nZ: And how were they notified? DX From the French Government, or did we\nget it from the wires?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon - Ziegler\n-2-\nK: We got it over the wires. From our Embassy.\nZ: From our Embassy. OK, then we can say the President was informed\nearly this morning by HAK. What time? Well, shortly after dawn.\nK: Right.\nZ: Now. Will the President meet with Pompidou while he is in Paris?\nK: Well you have to leave a little open - in fact he may not go.\nZ: Oh, I thought you wanted me to announce it.\nK: Well, he will go but the ceremonies only. We can't find anything out from\nthe god damn Frenchmen whether they'll let any heads of state come. Well\nyes, you can certaink he will certainly pay a courtesy call on Pompodou.\nZ: OK. Well now you say there's a question whether he will go. Shall I\nstill announce it.\nK: Yeah.\nZ: Will he meet with the Paris delegation & while he's there?\nK: No. I don't think so, anyway.\nZ: We'd better leave that loose, you know?\nK: Well, no, you'd better say no. Say he's just going to the funeral. It\nwouldn't be appropriate for him to work while he's there.\nZ: Yeah, OK. When does he go? Tomorrow night?\nK: Tomorrow, late afternoon, or night. We are working that out now.\nZ: OK. We'd have to overnight there then, I guess.\nK: Well, unless we fly at night and come back the next late afternoon.\nWe'd better get a hold on some hotel rooms.\nZ: Yes, I know. That's what we'll have to begin to move on fairly soon.\nK: Right. OK Ron. Thank you.\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nGeneral Haig\n11/10/70 (tape)\nK: Has this gone down to\nH: Yes, sir, it has gone. The letter has gone, the message has gone to\nParis notifying that the President is coming.\nK: And the letter to Pompidou?\nH: Yes, the letter on the hotline.\nK: Okay, now get all of that over to Ted Eliot after I have talked to Rogers.\nH: All right, sir.\nK: I've got a call in to him. He is on the way in to the office.\nH: Dwight called and said that they definitely want to postpone Echeverria\nby one day.\nK: I know, I have just talked to the President.\nH: So we will have to get that started.\nK: I am always glad we are doing internal Chapining and Zieglering.\nH: No, no (laughter). I've always\nK: I've never seen anything like this.\nH: I'm only trying to tell you what to tell Rogers.\nK: Right. But that will be in Washington then.\nH: Yes.\nK: Is he going back to Key Biscayne?\nH: No, he said Washington.\nK: I know, but is he going back after the lunch.\nH: Oh, I don't know sir. I haven't gotten\nI will check it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nGeneral Haig\n-2-\nK: Okay.\nH: You know that there are a lot of questions that are going to come up.\nK: He will not see members of the delegation. What, is Ziegler bugging\nyou again?\nH: No.\nK: I think it would be much better if we could sleep in Paris. We will all\nbe dead if.\nH: That's what I thought. There is a question of whether you leave late\ntomorrow night and travel all night and then spend the night there Thursday\nand come back early Friday morning.\nK: That's insane. That makes Friday insanity. It's a &x nine hour flight\nback.\nH: Right. So now you have that problem or you have the problem of\nK: With whom are you associating this one\nH: Nobody you. I am asking you. You said\nK: My feeling is and not only my feeling his request is that we leave about\nfive or six o'clock on Thursday. That would get us in here at 9:00 and\ngive us a night's sleep.\nH: Right.\nK: That's the thing we should do. Then the only question is do we fly over-\nnight or do we arrive in time to get some\nwell, actually there is no\ngood way of arriving because if we leave at 5:00 plus six. No, we either\nleave in the morning. We either leave tomorrow morning or we will be\nflying at night.\nH: That's right, sir. That is the problem.\nK: Well, why don't you have Chapin put that to him? If we leave at 12:00\nif we leave as late as 11:00 we will still make it in time to get some sleep\nthere.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\n-3-\nH: If you left at 11:00 tomorrow morning\nK: We'd be in there about 7:00, now wait a minute. We'd be in -- it's a\nsix hour flight -- we'd be in at 5:00 it would be 11:00.\nH: 11:00 at night.\nK: Yes, but that is alright.\nH: It's not really that late for you.\nK: Yes, so there we could get some sleep. I think that is the thing to do.\nH: I think it is the best way.\nK: Or, even if we left at Noon.\nH: Right.\nK: Why don't you work it on that basis? Otherwise we will have to fly at\nnight but even then we are better off coming back in the afternoon because\notherwise the next day will be brutal.\nH: That's *** exactly Aright. You either do it all brutally\nK: You gain nothing by sleeping overnight in Paris except kill yourself\nagain Friday.\nWednesday night\nH: You have your choice sleeping there/or travelling. That's the only choice\nyou have. You have to return Thursday afternoon to make Friday manageable.\nK: Right.\nH: I was just offering the two options.\nH: Yes, but tell them on the whole it is better to go Wednesday morning.\nOkay, fine. Let's see now. He wants Rogers to come along -- if he wants\nto. He doesn't want a delegation of Senators.\nH: Alright. He does not.\nK: Right, but I don't think that's necessary.\nH: NO.\nK: Okay, fine. Thank you.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon (Tape)\nBill Hyland\nNovember 10, 1970; a. m.\n(Began in mid-sentence)\nK:\nstands. Just where the hell we are now. Are you telling me\nthat Ziegler is going to release a letter to Pompidou before we even send it?\nH:\nNo, no.\nK: Then why did he ask to have it. Just explain to me the reasoning that\nmakes our Press Secretary more important than Pompidou.\nH: We just simply wanted to send him the change, so that he'd have the\nsame text we had.\nK: OK, well all right. Now, I'm counting on the fact that this text is on\nthe machine. Now. Is that correct? We are not horsing around once more.\nH: The text to Pompidou is going out now.\nK: Now. OK.\nH: We also have a message to Madame De Gaulle that should go too, just\nas a matter of courtesy.\nK: What we have to have now is the statement.\nH: OK\nK: The next thing we have to have is the\nHave we informed them that we\nare coming?\nH: Not yet.\nK: Why not? How about that two-line sentence?\nH: OK. Here's a message to\nK: I'm not mad at you. I'm mad at our spending four hours spinning wheels\nand not having it. You did the best you could.\nH: Here's the message I would send to Pompidou. The second message.\n\"It is my intention to attend the memorial service for General DeGaulle. I am\ninstruct ing Ambassador Watson to contact your staff to make whatever arrange -\nments are necessary. \" And we could add a sentence saying, \"Accept again,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon - Hyland - 11/10 (Contd)\n-2-\nMr. President, the deepest sympathy\n\"\nK: Yes. Can we make the beginning just a little warmer? Say, \"I\nwould like to use this means to let you know that it is my intention\", or\nsomething.\nH: Yes. \"I would like to inform you personally \"\nK: Yes. \"That it is my intention.\n11\nH:\n11\nit is my intention to attend the memorial service for General De Gaulle. \"\nK: Right.\nH: OK. And I will send that now.\nK: All right. Now, let's get the god damn statement once more, at the\npoint where id it stopped why don't you put in something like, \"He\nprovided inspiration to an age always in danger of being overwhelmed\nby the commonplace\n\"\nH:\n\"always in danger of being overwhelmed by the commonplace. \"\nK: And then what do you have? Let's use one or two of your sentences.\nH: I have this. \"His passing was not only a loss for the French nation, but\nfor all.\n\"\nK: \"And therefore his passing was not only a loss for the French nation, but\nfor all mankind.\"\nH: \"but for all mankind. 11 We could stop at that point.\nK: Right. Stop at this.\nH: Do you want to say, \"All Americans salute his memory\" or just end it there.\nK: Just stop at this point.\nH: OK\nK: OK. Now read the whole thing again.\nH: Let me make sure I've got your sentence\nK: (Repeated above sentence.) Now read the whole thing again.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHyland\n- 3 -\nH: The passing of General Charles De Gaulle reminds us of the qualities\nthat make men and nations great. His was the quality of character that\nenables men to surmount all obstacles, to call up reserves of courage,\nto turn adversity into triumph. His was the quality of vision that could see\nthe grand sweep of history at a time when others focused only on the events\nof the moment.\nK: When others focused on the events. Leave out \"only\".\nH: On the events of the moment. His was the quality of fortitude to translate\nthat vision into reality.\nK: Take that out.\nH: OK. He provided inspiration to an age always in danger of being over-\nwhelmed by the commonplace and therefore his passing is not only a loss\nfor France but for all mankind. Period\nK: Yes. That's not much. But it will do. At least we've got the puking\nstuff out.\nH: We will go with that then?\nK: Right.\nH: And we'll send this to Ziegler and hell.\nK: Now if I am any judge of Ziegler, he's going to release the letter to\nPompidou before it's even there.\nH: OK. We'll call him and make sure ixtx he gives it some time, so it will\nat least be in France. OK?\nK: Right. OK.\nH: And we're sending the second message to Pompidou informing thenx him\nthat the President's coming.\nK: Right. Now, how are we going to send the letter to Pompidou. We might\nas well send it.\nH: Both on the Hot Line.\nK: OK.\nH: That's the fastest way. So we can go with both of them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHyland Telcon\n-4- -\nK: OK. But go, will you. And don't clear with anyone internally now.\nJust get the god damn thing out.\nH: OK, and then we'll\nK: Above all, don't clear with Ziegler.\nH: No, no.\nK: We're not run by him yet.\nH: OK. We'll just inform him that these two messages have gone.\nK: That is right, and give a time when he can release them. He can release\nthe public statement immediately. Let's at least give Pompidou two hours.\nBut it's probably too late.\nH: OK\nK: Goodbye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nSecretary Rogers\n11/10/70 (tape)\nK: Bill, how are you? I was trying to reach you and you were in transit\nand then you\nR: The President called me and I was talking to him.\nK: Right. Well, you probably know then that he would like you to be on\nthe delegation, if you felt like going, which is what I was calling you about\nto make sure so that I can announce it.\nR: Fine.\nK: The Echeverria thing -- we will try to move till Saturday.\nR: He said Friday -- Saturday?\nK: Well, they keep going back and forth. A minute ago he said Friday\nbut now a minute ago they called up and said Saturday.\nR: Well, just let us know. It doesn't make any difference to us - - whichever\nis better. I think on that one we better check it out so we are sure we don't\nget some other conflict.\nK: Right, I think we ought to do essentially what they want.\nR: Right.\nK: And I think we ought to come right back from Paris, don't you.\nR: Yeah.\n(There was no more on the tape)\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nGeneral Haig\n11/10/70 (tape)\nH: Right, sir.\nK: He is now worried about clothes. Can you get all the details from the\nFrench Embassy?\nH: Right, sir.\nK: From our Embassy in France. And, Echeverria, you know hot-shot\nHaldeman again thinks it is great TV over there and he ought to stay as\nlong as possible.\nH: Yes, they are talking about an extra day.\nK: No, he's got to get the hell out of there.\nH: That's my own view.\nK: We will be the laughing stock of Europe.\nH: Sure. Alright, sir, I think it is much neater to go in.\nK: It's not much neater, it's the only possible thing to do.\nH: Fine, I am with the same view.\nK: You just tell Haldeman, now, for Christ's sake this isn't selling soap.\nH: That's right. In and out formally do his job and get out.\nK: You should be there only for the funeral -- anything else is going to\ndetract from it.\nH: Alright.\nK: And to do it with dignity. I mean what is he going to do on Friday if\nhe stays there?\nH: What Dwight said was that they would try to get a meeting with Pompidou\nwhich, of course, is stupid with all these heads of state in there it's just\nnot the time for that.\nK: They can get a meeting with Pompidou anyway for a half an hour\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\n-2-\nH: On the day.\nK: On the day.\nH: Sure.\nK: He won't have it any other way.\nH: Right.\nK: You should have a 20 minute he can leave as late as 7:00 and still\nget in here at 10:00\nH: Right. Now, he is thinking of coming back this afternoon.\nK: That's okay.\nH: And leaving from Washington tomorrow morning about 10:00 or 11:00.\nK: That's fine.\nH: Alright, now, is Rogers going.\nK: I can't get the son-of-a-bitch to a telephone. He's probably sulking away\nover there.\nH: Alright, they don't want Mrs. Rogers if.\nK: No wives are going -- I've already explained that to all of them. Why\ndo they always go through everything five more times?\nH: In case it came up, I didn't know\nK: Above all, will you tell Haldeman not to jazz the goddamned thing up.\nH: Alright, sir\nK: And that the only thing to do at a State funeral is to go in and out. That\nif he lingers at all it will look wrong.\nH: Yes, I will, I will get that word down right away.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\n-3-\nH\nK: The only thing that would be considered is to call on Madame deGaulle\nat Colombey\n, but that's a three or four-hour car trip both\nways.\nH: And I think the interment is simultaneous with the memorial.\nK: Yes, but he could go out there after the memorial service, you see.\nBut don't even suggest it, will you because by the time these hot-shots get\nthrough with this, I shudder to think what they will do.\nH: Like the great train robbery.\nK: And we mustn't turn it into something ludicrous. Don't you think?\nH: Well, that's my view. I agree with everything you say. I think it is\njust not appropriate and it's a funeral and that's it.\nK: Well, why don't we set Echeverria for Friday or Saturday, either way,\nthat's what he just said.\nH: Okay, I've got Arnie right here and he's got the message prepared on\nthat.\nK: But, can somebody check with our Embassy in Paris we've got to\nstop that Middle East meeting for this morning, what do you think.\nH: I think you better, Henry -- - it's just too much.\nK: And tell them we may schedule it tomorrow morning or this afternoon.\nBut I want to meet with that Harvard group -- okay, fine.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nThe President\n11/10/70 (tape)\nK: Mr. President.\nP: Did you find out and I need to know this soon because we have to leave\ntomorrow morning, I've got to know whether to go back to Washington to\nget my stuff together, but or whether to have it sent here the question\nis have you fond found out whether, what the dress is for this affair?\nK: No, we are checking into that. The French are at this moment in\ntotal chaos no one can reach anybody. But we are working on that,\nMr. President.\nP:\nMy\ninclination is to dress formally. In other words, I think he would that's\njust the way he would do it. In other words I would tend to wear a morning\ncoat.\nK: I think that is probably right.\nP: But I want Watson to know that so they don't get any ideas that\nwhile the goddamned Africans will come in their T - shirts or the funny\nthings that they wear, I want to know what the custom is. My inclination\nwould be to wear a morning coat or at least a club coat but I need to know\nright away what the situation is.\nK: We are checking into that right now, Mr. President. One other thing,\nI don't know whether you want to bother with that, the choices of going\nwould be to leave\nP: I just talked to Haldeman about it. We are going to go tomorrow\nmorning.\nK: Good, I think that is right.\nP: I'm not going to go and fly all night in the airplane and my inclination\non the Mexican dinner is to have it Saturday SO that we can have a chance\nto rest a day in Paris. Well, if we don't rest we can come back a day\nand get rested whatever we want to do.\nK: Right. Actually the way the time works it's best to come back and\nrest a day here. But, either way, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/President\n-2-\nP: Incidentally, my inclination would be to go over and get in around\nmidnight which would be basically 6:00 our time -- we wouldn't want to\nsleep get in around midnight and do the drill. Call on Pompidou, if\nhe wants to be called on.\nK: I'm sure he will. No question about that.\nP: Say hello to the widow if she wants to be called on.\nK: Well, she will be in Colombey.\nP: Oh, that's right. This is a memorial service.\nK: The best thing probably would be to leave that evening because if you\nstay.\nP: That's right you get caught in stuff.\nK: You willhave to do something else or\nP: Leave that evening and then come back. The Mexican thing then can\nreally be put on either time because I don't really give a damn. You know\nwhat I am going to talk to him about anyway. Has anybody been in touch\nwith him?\nK: Yes, we are doing that right now.\nP: I put a call in to Bill just to be sure.\nK: I have a call in, he is on his way to the office, in his car and I have\nleft word to call -- that's the first thing he will do when he gets in.\nP: I think probably it will be easier since I am here for me to come up\nthere rather than have all of you fly down here but I guess you could all\nfly down here, too.\nK: We can certainly do it, which ever way is easiest for you.\nP: It's 8-1/2 hours from here, the flight times so in a sense it is really\neasier to fly up there.\nK: It's 6-1/2 from here.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/President\n-3-\nP: No, from here it is 8-1/2 and 6-1/2 from Washington.\nK: That's right, that's what I meant it's 6-1/2 from Washington and\n8-1/2 from Key Biscayne.\nP: It's an hour and half longer, SO going from Washington really saves\nsome time -- I mean it doesn't lose all the time that you would think.\nK: That's right, but which ever is more convenient.\nP: Well, I don't gain much from sticking around here.\nK: You could probably leave in the morning, Mr. President and still\n-- if we leave as late as noon here, we'd still be in Paris by midnight so\nif you were to leave Key Biscayne at 9:00 in the morning, we could\nconnect with you at 11:00 at Andrews.\nP: Yeah, that's be my inclination to go up tonight.\nK: Yes, that's another possibility.\nP: Alright, find out what the clothes are.\nK: I will get that for you immediately.\nP: Watson, I assume, can work that out.\nK: No question, Mr. President.\nP: But let's really keep it 14 tight if there is any feeling about who goes\non this thing -- I mean where everybody sits -- let's not insist that we have\neight people walk in. I'll go in alone if that's necessary. Remember, deGaulle\ndid it at Eisenhower's funeral.\nK: DeGaulle came alone to both Kennedy and Eisenhower, Mr. President,\nand I think when you and the Secretary of State go that's a much as should\ngo.\nP: What I mean, if you come in the whole damn\nthe damn Africans come\nin with a whole damn delegation of 80 people, that just ruins the whole thing.\nK: Exactly.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger/President\n-4-\nP: I just think we ought to walk in\nK: I think it should be you alone or at most with Bill.\nP: Yeah, well he will understand. They will probably have a policemen\nplace for Secretaries of State probably a place for heads of state.\nK: Certainly, they will not seat you together.\nP: Yeah, they didn't do that when he was here -- they didn't seat Secretaries\nof State with heads of State at the Eisenhower funeral.\nK: That's correct.\nP: This is just a memorial, hugh?\nK: Just a memorial service, Mr. President. But the service, I am sure,\nis essentially the same. It is just that the casket isn't there.\nP: It will be a high Mass, I suppose -- that's what they do.\nK: I would think, yes.\nP: I went to one once. Alright.\nK: Right, Mr. President, I will keep you informed.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/ Bill Hyland\nNovember 10, 1970\nK:\nHello, Bill.\nH:\nYeah\nK:\nHave you got that message off to Pompidou?\nH:\nYeah, it just went down with the change you made to Key Biscayne, do\nyou want to send\nK:\nThe message to Pompidou is to go this second, what the hell is it going\nto Key Biscayne for?\nH:\nWell, Ziegler wanted to check since we made a change in it and added\nyour statement about greatness.\nK:\nBut gentlemen, are we going to get something to Pompidou or not or are\nwe going to spin our wheels only with each other.\nH:\nOkay, we're sending it now on the hot line.\nK:\nOkay, now read me that other goddamm thing again, will you. The\npassing of General Charles De Gaulle reminds us of the qualities that\nmake men and nations great. His was the quality of character that\nenabled men to surmount all obstacles, to call up reserves of courage, to\nturn adversity into triumph. His was the quality of vision that could see\nthe grand sweep of history at a time when others focused only on the events\nof the moment\n[end of tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\nNovember 10, 1970\nK:\nI just talked to Watson, the goddamm French, of course, are all\nunreachable.\nH:\nUh-huh.\nK:\nIn a highly civilized and organized country. But he strongly recommends\nthat we come to the memorial service on Thursday.\nH:\nRight.\nK:\nAnd uh, that will have to be it then.\nH:\nYeah, I think he would have to leave probably tomorrow night with the\n12 hours clock time, 13 clock hours. Uh, then he would certainly want\nto\nK:\nNow look, let's not worry about the goddamm nitpicks, whether he leaves\ntomorrow night or at noon or when.\nH:\nWell, I'm thinking in terms of Echeverria and what will have to be done\nthere.\nK:\nWell he certainly can't need to make a lunch on Thursday.\nH:\nNo, absolutely.\nK:\nWe can switch it to Friday in Washington.\nH:\nRight.\nK:\nBut Watson thinks we ought to announce it right away and also put it on\nthe hot line to Pompidou.\nH:\nAll right.\nK:\nNow have we got a message to Pompidou?\nH:\nYes, a letter.\nK:\nWell, have we got it, is it ready?\nH:\nYes it's all ready.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\nNovember 10, 1970\nK:\nNow do you think these great brains we've got could possibly get these\n4 sentences of a public statement finished?\nH:\nYes.\nK:\nAfter 3 hours of work?\nH:\nWell, this is this goddamm speech writer exercise we go through, they\nall think they are going to make the history books by what they write.\nK:\nYes, but the point that I'm making is I don't care about the feelings\nof other elements of the bureaucracy, I care about results.\nH:\nWell, of course, but you\nK:\nWhat would it do if we had a decent statement, nothing. They would\nscream and yell.\nH:\nYeah.\nK:\nHas this gone back to the speech writer now?\nH:\nNo, absolutely not, absolutely not, he's had his crack.\nK:\nHell, I can do it in 5 minutes if you would just send somebody out to\nthe house with the stupid thing, I just can't do it in my head without\nhaving the text in front of me. Well, all right now, I'm going to call\nthe President and just confirm it again and then please let's have the\ngoddamm statement ready and then let Ziegler be ready to go and say\nwe are going so that we don't follow every African state in our action.\nH:\nWell no, that's the important thing\nK:\nI don't care about the public statement, no one will count that, but I\nwant to be among the first to announce that we're going.\nH:\nYeah. Well, he's standing by for that decision.\nK:\nA1, we've got to hook it to something. The best thing would be if we\ncould send on the hot line a statement to Pompidou, a letter to Pompidou\nin which we announce it.\nH:\nAll right, we have a letter, we'll add a\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\nNovember 10, 1970\nK:\nNow would somebody please add a sentence to that.\nH:\nRight.\nK:\nAnd I'll call the President.\nH:\nOkay.\nK:\nOh hello, A1, could somebody call the garage and tell them that, to keep\nmy car standing by?\nH:\nRight, will do.\nK:\nGood, Bye.\n[End of Tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Amb. Watson\nNovember 10, 1970\nW:\nHello\nK:\nHello\nW:\nYes Henry.\nK:\nHow are you?\nW:\nI'm all right, it's very hard to get any information. One thing I\ndo know is that no one is going to go to that country funeral.\nK:\nRight.\nW:\nBut it sounds now, I'd like to recommend that the President\nannounce there that he will attend the Nortredame services at\n11:00 on Thursday.\nK:\nRight.\nJobert\nW:\nI tried to get the protocol, I tried to get Joe Behr and the foreign\noffice and it's impossible to get anybody. And now I just heard on\nthe radio that some of the African countries have announced they\nare coming and I think the greatest nation in the world would be,\nin my judgment, be rightto have the President announce he's coming\nand maybe send a message over the hot line to President Pompidou.\nK:\nThat he is coming.\nW:\nYeah.\nK:\nAll right, all right.\nW:\nI've been trying to think my way through it Henry and try to say\nwhat are the negatives and even though\nK:\nNo, he wants to come, if any Head of State comes, he'll come.\nW:\nWell, the German Embassy, I just called them and they are recommend\ning that both the Chancellor and President come. The Ivory Coast and\nMadagascar have announced they are coming and I've heard nothing\nfrom our other people but my inclination and those of my associates,\nmy almost conviction is that there are gonna be a lot of people\nannouncing they're coming.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Amb. Watson\nNovember 11, 1970\nK:\nRight, we better get out a\nW:\nWe'd better get on the ball.\nK:\nOkay.\nW:\nThat's my only feeling, I didn't mean to put it that way.\nK:\nNo, No, I think you are absolutely right. I'll call the President\nimmediately.\nW:\nAll right sir.\nK:\nWe'll announce it, should we, you can assume that we will announce it,\nwe'll get word to you concurrently.\nW:\nAll right, wonderful, I'll be right here in the office.\nK:\nRight, thank you.\nW:\nThank you, Bye.\nK:\nBye.\n[End of Tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Hyland/Haig\nNovember 10, 1970\nK:\nHello\nH:\nThe public statement. The passing of General Charles De Gaulle reminds\nus of the qualities that make men and nations great, his was the quality\nof character that enables men to surmount the greatest obstacles, to call\nup reserves of courage to turn.\nK:\nI told you I don't want to turn defeat into victory.\nH:\nAnd to call up reserves of courage period.\nK:\nNo, no, there was another sentence that I wanted, Oh Jesus. Look you\ndropped the wrong clause.\nH:\nOh. I thought you wanted to refuse to recognize defeat.\nK:\nOh, all right, to turn defeat into victory, I think it's an ungracious thing\nto say.\nH:\nOh.\nK:\nYou don't want to remind the French of a defeat.\nH:\nOkay, to call up reserves of courage to achieve victory.\nK:\nOh God, if you think that 4 hours we've spent on this crude.\nH:\nYou want to go on?\nK:\nRead that sentence again, now we're going to get it done now.\nH:\nHis was the quality of character that enabled men to surmount the\ngreatest obstacles, to call up reserves of courage to achieve victory.\nK:\nTo turn adversity into triumph or something like that.\nH:\nTo turn adversity into triumph. His was the quality of vision that could\nsee the grand sweep.\nK:\nOh Jesus.\nH:\nAt a time when others\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland\nNovember 10, 1970\nK:\nHow about God is love and Gentlemen, please wash your hands before\nleaving this room?\nH:\nI thought you wanted this Safrie stuff.\nK:\nNo, go ahead.\nH;\nHis was the quality of vision that could see the grand sweep of history\nat a time when others focused only on the events of the moment. His was\nthe quality afforded to translate that vision into reality. His passing\nis not only a loss for\nK:\nOh, what?\nH:\nHis passing is not only a loss for the French nation but for all nations.\nK:\nThat all?\nH:\nNo, one more sentence.\nK:\nThat is not what I wanted, please type the goddamm thing up, send it\nout to my house and I'm going to write it, there was three sentences I\ngave you all. I'm sorry to be so impatient but if we knew at 4:15 and\nwe come up with some sophomoric stuff it's really awful. I'm not\nblaming you Bill, it's just unbelievable that with a speech writer staff\nwe do nothing better than that. Can't we say something to the effect, as\nwhat I said to you before, at this moment, when what this period needs\nabove, what we need above is something to lift us above ourselves, what\nhe stood for was not something that was an inspiration to France alone\nand his passing therefore is not only a void for his country because in\na deep sense he belonged to all of us, something like that, something that\nshows just an ounce of thought, that couldn't have been written by a\nsophomore doing a term paper. I mean this could be written by a senior\ndoing a term paper.\nH:\nWhat he stood for was not an inspiration for France alone. At this\nmoment what we need is something\nK:\nNo, no, nevermind, I'll write it, I'll call you, read the other sentence.\nH:\nThat's it.\nK:\nRead the other paragraph, I mean read the other letter.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland\nNovember 10, 1970\nK:\nGod Almighty.\nH:\nThe Pompidou, to Pompidou. I was deeply shocked and grieved at the\npassing of General De Gaulle. This country knew General De Gaulle\nas a steadfast ally in war and a true friend in peace. France's loss is\nour loss, the people of France and you, Mr. President, have the\nheartfelt sympathy of all Americans in your hour of mourning.\nK:\nThat's a steadfast friend in peace. Can we put in a sentence saying\ngreatest knows no national boundaries?\nH:\nYeah, we can say France's loss is our\nK:\nGreatness.\nH:\nGreatness knows no national boundaries\nK:\nNo, not bulk, France's greatness knows no national boundaries and\ntherefore\nH:\nFrance's loss is our loss.\nK:\nFrance's loss is a loss of mankind.\nH:\nGreatness knows no national boundaries, therefore, France's loss is the\nloss of mankind.\nK:\nOkay, fine. You let that one go.\nHaig:\nAre you going to add a sentence about being at the\nK:\nI think we should do that a separate message.\nHaig:\nAll right sir, fine.\nH:\nA separate message from the President.\nK:\nFrom the President but if we could reduce the clearances of that to 386\npeople so that we can get it out by this evening, I'd appreciate it. Send\nthe message on the hot line saying I beg to inform you that, whatever\none says, that I'm planning to attend the memorial service at Nortredame\nwhenever it is, on Thursday. When is it? Is that the 12th? November 12.\nMy ambassador will be in touch with your officials to make the detailed\narrangement. Okay, read that crude again of the other stuff, will you?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland/Gen. Haig\nNovember 10, 1970\nHy:\nAll right. The passing of General De Gaulle reminds us of the qualities\nthat make men and nations great. His was the quality of character that\nenabled men to surmount the greatest obstacles, to call up reserves of\nK:\nYou can't use great in two different sentences. All obstacles\nHy:\nto surmount all obstacles, to call up reserves of courage, to turn\nadversity into triumph. His was the quality of vision that could see the\ngrand sweep of history at a time when others focused only on the events\nof the moment. His was the quality of fortitude to translate that vision\ninto reality. Now at this point we fall off.\nK:\nThen go ahead. Then what would you have?\nHy:\nThen I have his passing is not only a loss for the French nation but for\nall nations. He was not only an inspiration to France but\nto the\nworld for what men can achieve through faith and courage. All Americans\nwill salute this great [warrior's ?] passing.\nK:\nWell, let me try two sentences, I'll call you back.\n[End of Tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Ron Ziegler\nNovember 10, 1970\nK:\nHello\nZ:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nRon, how are you?\nZ:\nGood.\nK:\nUh, Ron, we are gonna have this statement in about ten minutes.\nZ:\nOkay.\nK:\nBut what we would like is to announce that we are going to the memorial\nservice.\nZ:\nWell, good. Reuther is already on the air with it, I hope nobody up there\nhas talked to him.\nK:\nWho?\nZ:\nDan Reuther is already on the air with the fact that he is going to the\nfuneral, I wonder where he got\nK:\nWell, that has to be wrong, because I'm the only one that could talk to\nhim.\nZ:\nThat's what I thought, he has to be guessing.\nK:\nBut the fact of the matter is that, uh, there is a memorial service in\nNortredame Thursday at 11:00. You can say the President plans to\nattend and we will have further details and I would like it out fairly soon.\nZ:\nYeah.\nK:\nSo that we don't follow every African country with the announcement.\nRight,\nZ:\n/Okay. What I'd like to do is issue the statement and the announcement\nat the same time.\nK:\nThe only trouble with that is that it may mean that 20 African countries\nget their announcements out first.\nZ:\nWell, see the real pressure I'm getting from everywhere is just a simple\nremark like I'm sorry he's dead.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger/Ron Ziegler\nNovember 10, 1970\nK:\nWell, uh, you'll get it in 5 minutes, unfortunately we have six speech\nwriters, 10 staff members\nZ:\nI know what problems you're faced with.\nK:\nAnd, I'm writing it right now.\nZ:\nOkay, I have a gal standing by who will take the dictation from one of\nHaig's gals or one of your gals.\nK:\nRight.\nZ:\nThen do we have to check it with the President or\nK:\nNo, no, I'll talk to him, it's okay.\nZ:\nSo I don't have to, once I get it from you, I can go with it?\nK:\nRight.\nZ:\nOkay.\nK:\nBye.\nZ:\nWe'll see you.\n[End of Tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nAmbassador Lucet\n11-10-70 (Tape)\nK: Hello\nL: Hello\nK: Hello, Charles, I need not tell you what we all feel at this moment.\nL: Thank you, Henry.\nK: And I wanted you to know also on behalf of the President that we are\nall thinking of you and, of course, the President would like to go to Paris\nand pay whatever respects he can.\nL: And then to do what?\nK: And to pay whatever respects are appropriate, As soon as you have\nmade arrangements -- I don't know whether the memorial service will\nbe only for\nL: But you know, Henry, I was just learn this news during the night\nand I am just reading now\nwhere he says\nhe wants to be buried\nK: Yes, my understanding is there is a memorial service at Notre Dame\nbut it may only be again a local affair.\nL: Oh, yes, that I don't know yet. But then it was very, very kind of\nyou to call me.\nK: This is not at the moment our principal problem so if you will,\nas soon as you know anything, keep in mind that we, out of friendship\nand admiration of course, want to do whatever we can do\n.\nL: Yes, so I am going to call Paris as soon as it is possible and get in\ntouch with you.\nK: Would you do that, Charles and also you know if you need any facilities\nhere if we can help you with communications or anything else you call\non my office, we are at your disposal.\nL: Thank you very much. Because you have already been in touch with\nParis?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nAmbassador Lucet\n11/10/70\n-2-\nK: I have been in touch with our Ambassador.\nL: Did he say there would be a memorial at Notre Dame?\nK: He said the funeral service at Cholombey and that is indeed private\nand he said there will be a memorial service concurrently at Notre Dame\nwhich will be attended by ministers of the Government but he\nL: No foreign dignitaries?\nK; Well, he didn't know that.\nL: Yes. So that is what I am going to check right away.\nK: If you could check that right away. But, in addition, if you would\nlet your President know we, of course, will send him a formal message.\nL:\na formal message?\nK: No, we are sending a formal message within a matter of hours but\nif you could let them know that on a very personal basis level how grieved\nthe President is and how we are feel that this is not a loss for France\nalone but for the whole world.\nL: Thank you very much, Henry. Thank you SO much. I will call Paris\nand call you back as soon asI can.\nK: Good, Charles. Goodbye.\nL: You are so kind and I am deeply moved.\nK: Goodbye.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nConference Call\nMr. Kissinger, General Haig\nKevin Donoghue, Situation Room\nBill Hyland - 11-10-70 (Tape)\nK: Hello.\nH: Uh, Henry? Alright, Kevin is ready to read this and I have Hyland\nand myself on. Kevin, do you want to read the statement again.\nD: Yes, sir. \"A giant of our times has fallen. The passing of General\nDeGaulle reminds us of the qualities that make men and nations great.\nHis was the quality of character that enables men to surmount the greatest\nobstacles, refuse to recognize defeat and call off personal reserves with\ncourage that turn defeat into victory. 11\nK: Leave out personal for one thing.\nD: Pardon me, sir.\nK: Leave out the word \"personal\" just reserves with courage.\nD: Yes, sir.\nK: Is Saffire there?\nD: No, he is not.\nK: Okay, go ahead.\nD: \"His was the quality of vision that could see the grand sweep of history\nat a time when most men focus only on the events of the day. Because\nCharles de Gaulle had his vision of history and because he had the\ndetermination to turn his own vision into reality he could act in a way\nthat changed the course of the history of his nation and the world. I\nxah shall never forget the hours spent with him over the years and\nthe opportunity.\n\"\nK: Hold on a second, I think that is the French Ambassador. I will\ncall you right back.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nContinued\n-2-\nH: Hello\nK: That was the French Ambassador.\nH: Okay. Ready?\nK: Who is this?\nH: This is Haig, Kevin and Hyland.\nK: Go ahead.\nD: \"I shall never forget the hours spent with him over the years and\nthe opportunity he gave me to share his vision and gain his counsel.\nAll Americans will remember the powerful. 11\nK: I would take out his \"I's\" what he does isn't so important right\nnow. I think that is too self-serving.\nH: Okay.\nK: While we are at it, let's take that first platitudinous sentence out --\n\"A giant of our times has fallen. 11\nH: I agree. Fine\nK: Is that you Safire?\nH&D: No, Safire is not here.\nD: Now, I have stricken \"I\" -- how shall we replace it, with \"we\" or\nK: No, just leave out those two sentences.\nD: Okay, fine. \"All Americans will remember the powerful presence\nof this man of tall stature and towering integrity. 11\nK: Jesus!\nD: who showed the world how one man with a dream and a drive\ncould make and abiding difference. General de Gaulle a living legend\nin his own time will be an enduring inspiration to future generations of\nmen who honor patriotism and cherish freedom and who value the luster\nof a leader who came to be a simple symbol of the greatness of his nation.\nK: Oh, Jesus!\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nContinued\n-3- -\nXXXXXXX\nH: That's awful.\nK: Jesus\nD; Tht's Hyland saying that.\n?: \"legend\" is terrible.\nK: Well, there is no platitude except God is love that's i/out of it.\nLeave out the last two sentences, tool. Now, can you say something\nsimple like, something to the effect that of course the we grieve for\nthe people of France but it isn't a loss for France alone because at\na time that has exexxxxeded never needed inspiration and greatness\nmore, he symbolized it and therefore his loss is not the loss of\nFrance alone because he belonged as well to all of us -- something\nlike that. Something simple.\nH: Right, sir.\nK: I hold no particular brief for these words, but something\nalong these lines that doesn't use that fantastic rhetoric.\nH: Oh, boy!\nK: This man can't be imbellished by these platitudes. Bill, can you\ntry a few sentences like that at the end and.\nHyland: Yeah.\nK: And take at the patronizing quality.\nHyland: I, yeah, yeah.\nK: And let Ziegler scream, goddammit. What are people going to say\nthat he missed his goddamned deadline by 15 minutes. They know we\nare not throwing our hat in the air.\nHyland: Could I read you what I wrote -- or do you care?\nK: I don't care but go ahead. Read me in the best Sonnenfeldt tradition.\nHyland; No, I thought.\nK: You know I don't care, go ahead.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nContinued\n-4-\nHyland: That you would say that we mourn the passing or something\nlike that but then say, \"France's darkest hour this courageous soldier\ntook up the cross of Lorraine and bore it for the people of France.\nCharles deGaulle was not only a soldier of France -- he was a states- -\nman of vision. A vision of greatness\nK: Wait a minute, now, may I make a suggestion to you, Bill. When\nyou say a soldier of France but a statesman of vision that means no\nsoldier of France has any vision.\nHyland: \"Was not only a soldier of France was also a statesman of\nvision. 11\nK: Go ahead.\nXXXXXXX\nHyland: Well.\nK: Was not only a soldier, otherwise it sounds as if the\nof\nthe French soldier never had vision.\nHyland: Okay. A vision of greatness which sustained the French nation\nin war and peace. And Charles deGaulle was apatriot who sought no\nhigher goal than to serve his country. We salute his memory and\nmourn his passing.\nK: Yeah, well, I like the first two sentences. I think the point to get\nacross is that here was a great man -- two or three points I think we\nought to get across. One is that in our age he reminds us what one can\ndo with inspiration and faith and courage and therefore he transcended\nall odds and all difficulties and this is a quality that is not peculiar\nthat is not only necessary for France but for the whole world -- something\nlike that. It shouldn't the testimony shouldn't be simply to a great\nFrench parochial leader.\nHyland: Yeah, I see what you mean.\nK: See what I maan. But I like the tone of yours a hell of a lot better.\nHyland. Well, okay, let us\nK: The only thing is\nHyland: We will see if we can blend Saffire\nK: Take a few of these Safireisms, cut it down.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nContinued\n-5-\nK: Al? What do you think.\nH: Yes, Sir. No, that's what I would do. I would take Safire's first\nparagraph -- the first sentence out. And then maybe his second and\nthen pick up\nK: Well, since I don't have the goddamned thing in front of me that\ndoesn't tell me anything. Read me the first paragraph.\nH: Leave the first\nK: Well, read it to me.\nD; Okay. \"The passing of General deGaulle reminds us of the qualities\nthat make men and nations great. His was the quality of character\nthat enables men to surmound the greatest obstacles, to refuse to\nrecognize defeat and call off reserves with courage that turn defeat\ninto victory. His was the quality of vision that could see the grand\nsweep of history at a time when most men focused only on the events\nof the day. Because Charles deGaulle had his vision of history and\nbecause he had the determination to turn his own vision into reality\nhe could act in a way that changed the course of the history of his\nnation and the world.7'\nK: Well, that word history appears about 25 times. Okay, what else?\nD: All Americans will remember the powerful presence of this man\nof tall stature and towering integrity who showed the world\n\"\nK: You can't say tall stature for Christ sake.\nHyland: Can't we go right at that point to this last one about\nK: Absolutely\nHyland: His loss is not the loss of France but\nK: With a few sentences but let's clean up that paragraph a little bit, too.\nFirst of all, the first sentence -- read me that new first sentence\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nWOXXX\nContinued\n-6-\nD: All Americans will remember the powerful presence of this man\nK: No, no, go back to the beginning of the statement.\nD: The passing of General deGaulle reminds us of qualities that make\nmen and nations great. His was the quality of character that enables\nmen to surmount the greatest obstacles, to refuse to recognize defeat\nand call off reserves with courage that turn defeat into victory.\nK: Leave out to refuse to recognize defeat.\nD: HIs was the quality of vision that could see the grand sweep of\nhistory at a time when most men focused only on the events of the day.\nBecause Charles deGaulle had his vision of history and because he\nhad the determination to turn his own vision into reality he could act\nin a way that changed the course\nK: That sentence goes, too.\nHyland: We can fix that up.\nK: You can't fix it up, just take the goddamned thing out and put in what\nI just gave you.\nHyland: Alright.\nK: But then don't put anything out until you read it to me again.\nHyland: Yes.\nK: I don't care what Ziegler says, Al.\nH: Alright.\nK: He is not my boss.\nH: Oh, no, that's alright.\nK: And if he has to wait a half an hour he's got to wait a half an hour.\nWe are not going to make laughing stocks of the world out of us, with a\npompous statement. All we need is five or six sentences.\nH: That's what I thought in the first place.\nHyland: Okay, let us do another draft.\nK: Do a quick draft, will you? Good. Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n? November 10, 1970 (TAPE)\nK:\nHello.\nR:\nHi, Henry.\nK:\nI don't know whether you have seen those two cables from Bruce.\nR:\nI heard about them. They are on the way out here. I was in\nNew York, and I just got back.\nK:\nThe second one is particularly interesting, I think. I don't\nknow whether.\nYou know, they seem to have anticipated we'd do\nsomething like this, and send a man to the delegation suggesting that\nmaybe they didn't have the date straight. So I think there won't be\nany problem now about shifting it.\nR:\nDoesn't he object to the business about not going?\nK:\nYeah. Now the first one is his strong objection to his not going\non Thursday, and I\nR:\nI think we should respect his views then.\nK:\nThat is exactly my view, Bill. It's not a big enough point, and\nwe need his support, so my suggestion is, if the President's in Walker's\nKey, we'll wait till Monday and let him go ahead then.\nR:\nI think so, too. We don't have to\nK:\nI'll see if he gets back on Monday. I don't think this is something\nwe ought to do on the communications to Walker's Key.\nR:\nNo, I don't either.\nK:\nBut I am sure he'd go along with us. You know, he was fairly\ndefinite, but I think when he hears the whole story, I'm confident if\nyou and I agree on it he'll go along.\nR:\nWell, fine. Why don't, in the meantime, I send a cable to Bruce\nsaying that we appreciate his views very much and will give sympathetic\nconsideration to them and will be back in touch with him on Monday. How\nabout that?\nK:\nI think that's right. The way to proceed. But the other one is\njust interesting. It requires no action, but it suggests that there'll\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\nNovember 10, 1970 (TAPE)\n- 2 -\nprobably be no problem about shifting the date.\nR:\nGood. I had a very interesting discussions with Riad and Eban\nin New York.\nK:\nRiad wanted me to come up there. He got a message to me and\nI didn't do it.\nR:\nI think there is a possibility of pulling something off here.\nK:\nYou do?\nR:\nUh huh.\nK:\nOf what?\nR:\nWell, I think they're going to\nI think Israel will eventually\nagree to negotiations within a month or so.\nK:\nI think that's probably right.\nR:\nAnd then I think there's just a chance that we'll be able to\nwork out a settlement.\nK:\nOh, really!\nR:\nWell, when I say just a chance, you know, it's three to one,\nbut I think it's possible. Egypt, I think, really wants a settlement.\nI had a very interesting talk with Riad, and he said, \"Look, we've\ndecided we need peace and we've got to take care of our own people\nand spend our money for their welfare.\nK:\nWell, it's hard to imagine this group playing a pan Arab role.\nR:\nI know. Well, I don't want to be too optimistic but I was quite\nencouraged.\nK:\nWonderful.\nR:\nOkay, Henry, thank you.\nK:\nGood, Bill.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n# 3am tape\nTelcon\nThe President\nNovember 12, 1970; a.m.\ncio77\nK: I just wanted to let you know where everything stood. We're releasing\na statement and we've sent over the hot line a letter to Pompidou. There's\na memorial service at 11 o'clock on Thursday and Watson has strongly\nrecommended that you go.\nP: Where is it going to be?\nK: At Notre Dame in Paris.\nP: Yeah, OK. We'll go.\nK: And I think we ought to announce that fairly quickly because otherwise\n50 African nations are going to get ahead of us and it will be announced.\nP: Yeah. Now I don't want a delegation.\nK: All right.\nP: As we know it takes an enormous number of people and I don't want a\nbunch of jerks going with me.\nK: Right.\nP: Or did you have other views?\nK: No.\nP: In other words, I don't want any god damn Senators and Congressmen\nthat I'll have to talk to on the way. I'll use the time to work, see.\nK: Yeak Right.\nP: And my view is I would just go and we just won't say much about it.\nK: All right. Should we take the Secretary of State?\nP: Oh, yes, if he wants to go. I think he should go, and I think you should go,\nBox perhaps, and I. But I don't think\nHaldeman shaild go .\nK: Right.\nP: On the other hand. On the Mexican, just ask him if he can do the luncheon\non Friday in Washington. And we'll fly our plane to fly him up.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon - The President\n- 2 -\nK: All right. Do you think Friday, or should we try for Saturday? I'm just\nconcerned that you might be pretty tired.\nP: I don't give a damn about being tired. It's just a luncheon, you know, so\nsince it's a luncheon I wouldn't mind doing it Friday. If he wants to do it\nSaturday, that's fine.\nK: Good. You might want to call on Pompidou briefly and they might have a\nreception as you did for heads of state. So you might not be able to leave\nuntil the late afternoon.\nP: Yes, but of course as you know, with the time break you get back here around..\nK: You would be back.\nP: If you left at 5:00 you'd be back by 8:00. Because you get a 6 hour time\nbreak. So you don't have really much of a problem that way. I guess you\ncould do it Friday without a problem.\nK: Alright. We'll offer him Friday. And we'll offer to fly him up in the plane.\nP: Yes, and have it in Washington. Now, what is the situation with regard to\nwomen? I don't think\nK: No, I don't think any ladies should go.\nP: Yeah, not with the French. They wouldn't.\nK: That's not customary.\nP: Yes, and I noticed when De Gaulle came. Wait a minute. Did he bring his\nwife?\nK: No. For neither funeral. And no other head of state brought his wife.\nP: Yes, fine. Alright, well now let's you call, uh. Be sure you call Bill.\nK: I have a call to him right now.\nP: Yes, and say I want to go. And say we should be very limited. I do not want\nCongressional people because I don't want them on my hands.\nK: Absolutely.\nP: Anyway, there's not gonna be room. You know what I mean. About 100\nAfrican nations, all those jackasses will be there, and so I think we ought to go,\nand if I go, that's enough.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon - The President\n-3- -\nK: If you go, and the Secretary of State goes, that is as much\nP: And is you go, because of good reasons, and I, uh.\nK: Yes, but I'd go as your staff man, anyway, so\nP: Yes, that's right. I can go - I don't want to fly over there alone. And\nthat's, uh,\nas well as Rogers himself. That's a long flight, so I might\ntake\nK: There's no problem about you taking staff members, Mr. President, if\nthey're not part of your official\nP: I was going to say, I could take Ehrlichman and Shultz along, but let's\ndon't raise that question yet. You just call Bill and tell him what the score\nis, but I don't want anything about sensitivity with the god damn Mexicans\nto stop this. They'll understand this.\nK: Oh, of course, Mr. President. There's no problem.\nP: They particularly would.\nK: No, they fully understand that, and we'll handle that.\nP: Oh, and don't suggest he go with me.\nK: Echeverria?\nP: Yeah.\nK: Oh, no.\nP: No. I've got to go by myself. And I'll fly up to Washington today or\ntomorrow.\nK: Tomorrow is actually time enough.\nP: And we'll get going. OK?\nK: Right, Mr. President.\nP: Fine, fine. And you can call me back on Bill. I actually think Bill ought\nto go, don't you?\nK: I think it would be nice.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon - The President\n- 4 -\nP: And that would be the delegation that way. And, let's don't get into\nHildebrand and people like that. I don't think we need to.\nK: No. This should not be a working thing. Now, Ziegler pretends to ask\nme whether you will meet with the Paris delegation while you are there.\nP: No, sir. Never.\nK: Absolutely. I agree completely. I don't think it should have any connotation\nthat you are using De Gaulle's\nP: I would have no objection though to naming Bruce as one of the members of\nthe delegation.\nK: That woufld be nice.\nP: Because he's the former Ambassador to Paris. How would that be?\nK: That is a very nice\nP: That way, I would have a chance to chat with him you see, privately, but\nunder no circumstances do I go rushing - oh, that would be horrible to do\nbusiness when a man's died.\nK: No, that would be totally inappropriate.\nP: Now, let's think about Bruce. But wouldn't that be alright?\nK: I think that would be a very nice gesture.\nP: Or does that look like we're making medicine?\nK: Well, we don't know, of course, how many people they can put into Notre Dame.\nP: Yes, they can limit it to me and Rogers.\nK: That's it, certainly.\nP: But Bruce would be the only one. I'm not going to go back and pick up Bohlen\nand a lot of other Ambassadors.\nK: Absolutely not.\nP: All right, would you do that?\nK: *****docit I'll work it out with Bill.\nP: What else is new on the diplomatic front? Anything? The Generals got out,\nI see.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon - The President\n- 5 -\nK: Yes, the Generals were released yesterday as Dobrynin told us. And we\nput out a rather friendly statement last night about it.\nPR When are you going to start your chats with him about agenda?\nK: I thought next week, or whenever you say.\nP: Sure. When do you think they want to have the talks' about it?\nK: He's already asked me when they are ready.\nP: Yes. I noticed from reading the news\nI mean, from reading your\ndiplomatic things that they are dragging their feet on SALT quite\nnow.\nDo you think maybe that's because they're waiting for us?\nK: No. Actually in SALT they are moving not in an extremely pace, but\nthey're moving. They're revealing their position in a little more detail.\nP: The other thing is that when do you think Dobrynin wants to talk about\nreleasing the Summit thing?\nK: I think we can schedule that for almost any time. Early next year. I think\nthe way to start it is to begin talking agenda and have it XIX emerge out of\nthat.\nP: Well, let me say this. It accured to me that I don't want them to think;\nand I want the record to show/that we were panting to have it released just\nbecause of an election. So I think that maybe you ought to have a meeting\nwith him on the agenda items and say, now look, on this release of the time,\nand so forth, let's determine now when it's gonna be. As far as we're\nconcerned there's no strain for us. Don't let them think we want to delay\nthe release of the time and use that as a gimmick.\nK: Right. Exactly.\nP: See my point. I don't think it makes that much difference. A good bluff,\nbut that's about all.\nK: Well, it will be a substantial.\nP: Yeah, it will be a story from there on, but I just (END OF TAPE)\nms\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Amb. Freeman\nNovember 21, 1970\nK:\nHello John.\nYes Henry.\nK:\nSorry to bother you at such an unearthly hour but a number of things\nhappening we didn't want you to read in the newspapers.\nRight.\nK:\nWe are right now conducting some pretty massive air attacks in\nNorth Vietnam.\nYes.\nK:\nIn the panhandle area which we -- which are technically in response to\nthe shootdown of American planes but for your information primarily\ndesigned to hit some of the supplies they have piled there for their very\nlarge high infiltration that is going on at this moment.\nYes.\nK:\nHanoi has just announced and we wanted you we are not notifying any\nother foreign government and indeed I am doing this with of course the\napproval of the President but no one else knows I'm telling you this.\nSecondly, you should also know that for the Prime Minister's own\ninformation that this is was done at this particular time as a cover\nfor a commando raid where we were trying to free some American\nprisoners in a camp that we had identified.\nUm-huh.\nK:\nAnd that raid unfortunately failed because the camp had been vacated\njust recently. The raid itself went off as planned but the prisoners had\nleft.\nWhat very bad luck.\nK:\nIt was like a -- it was actually a brillantly done plan. It worked just as\nit should but all our commandos got away.\nAnd was that yesterday?\nK:\nThat was yesterday evening. Now that has not yet come out. It was just\nto give the whole picture to the Prime Minister. We will dribble that\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Amb.\nNovember 21, 1970\nK:\nsecond fact out sometime during the course of the day tomorrow.\nYes.\nK:\nHanoi claims that Haiphong and the belt north of -- in that area --\nthere's a beeping sound from this phone -- Hello --\nYes, I got it myself.\nK:\nRight.\nOh yes, I got it then.\nK:\nYeah. That is being attacked, that is not true, all the bombing is south\nof the 19th parallel.\nYes.\nK:\nBut there was air activity in that northern area in order to detract\nto deflect the radar from the commando raid.\nYeah.\nK:\nBut it did not drop any ordnance. (long pause) -- Hello.\nYes.\nK:\nWell, that is the situation.\nWell, that's -- I'm grateful to be told all that, um-huh.\nK:\nAnd you will keep it to the narrowest channels and protect me also here\nin town.\nOf course, I will. Indeed, yes. And most of this will be out in today's\nnewspapers\nK:\nThe air attacks but not the extent.\nNo, no. Okay, I'm gratefully indeed to be told, thank you very much.\nK:\nAnd not the reasoning and the other operation we will hold for a bit.\nI quite understand.\nK:\nRight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/ Amb.\nNovember 21, 1970\nThanks very much.\nK:\nRight, Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMr. Kissinger\nSecretary Rogers\n(tape) 11/21/70; 1:45 a. m.\nK: Hello.\nR: Hello, Henry.\nK: Bill, sorry to bother you. Radio Hanoi has announced that some air\nattacks are going on but they seem to be including one that has wounded\nAmerican prisoners -- that has produced casualties at an American\nprisoner camp. Now, what they øseem to be reporting, the area that\nthey are reporting is not where the air strikes are going on\nthey are reporting Haiphong, and the province where that other operation\nwent on. So, what Defense wants to do is to come out with the agreed\nstatement on the protective reaction part and then the question is should\nthey say anything about the other operation. Before I agreed to anything,\nI wanted to get your judgment.\nR: I am inclined to think not but that's one of my off-hand reactions.\nHow do you feel about it.\nK: Well, my first reaction was exactly the same as yours Øh/reflection,/\nMy first reaction was just to say, \"Yes, there are protective reaction\nstrikes going on against installations, etc. 11 none of them in the area\nthey are mentioning or none north of the 19 parallel whatever the thing\nis. On reflection, the only other thing we could add to it so that we are\nnot accused of creating a credibility gap is just a sentence saying\nin addition there was a commando raid on a prisoner of war what we\nhad reason to believe was an American prisoner of war camp north of\nthat area and we found the camp vacated with no American prisoners\nthere.\nR: Did we get a full report on it. Was it alright -- no one was hurt?\nK: We know that there were no Americans there and that it had been\nempty for several months is what the report says that we've got. So it\nmakes you wonder about that goddamned it's like that camp they had,\nyou remember, two years ago.\nR: Underground\nK: Yeah.\nR: How is Hanoi reporting the prisoners business?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: Hanoi is reporting -- V latch I don't have the flash here but in effect\nthey are reporting that waves (?) of American planes have started attacking\nat 2:30 Hanoi time, which is, of course, the other operation. And that\nwe hit an area from Haiphong to that province where that camp is located.\nAnd they are, of course, reporting the f\noperations and that as\na result of this there was an attack also on the prisoner camp leading\nto the casualties of American prisoners.\nR: Well I think under those circumstances it probably is alright to add\nthis sentence. That leaves open the question of casualties to American\nprisoners though, doesn't it?\nK: Yeah. I think we should say we know there were no American\nprisoner camp in those areas -- well, that's a little strong because we\ndon't really know that.\nR: Yeah.\nK: The areas they mentioned we didn't bomb. Some of this may have\nbeen just complete confusion on their part as to what did go on.\nR: Yeah. I am inclined, I think, to leave it out. We certainly don't\nwant to leave open the question of whether American prisoners have been\nkilled. I am afraid if we just mention the fact we made an attack on a\nprison camp and say nothing about American casualties -- how does the\nsentence read that you thought maybe we should use?\nK: We should say there was a commando raid make that other statement\na protective reaction -- and say all of this south of the 19th parallel, on\nmissile installations and associated equipment and then say in the area\nnorth of the 19th parallel there was we conducted a commando raid\nby a small team against a suspected prisoner of war camp for the purpose\nof saving American prisoners. The camp had been vacated several weeks --\nwe found that the camp had been vacated several weeks previously. All\nmembers of the commando team returned safely and there were no\ncasualties either on the ground or something like that.\nR: Do we know it was vacated two or three months ago?\nK: That's what the report said that we got -- that it looked as if it had\nbeen uninhabited for several months.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- -3-\nR: I thought they told us they had seen a lot of activity there from the air.\nK: Dammit they told us -- when I got the briefing they told us that they\nhad been moving people in. Had gone from 60 to 90 and that's what they\ntold you.\nR: Yeah, they told us that there was some recent activity there.\nK: Well.\nR: It makes us look awful silly if we say we conducted a commando raid\nand the camp had been vacated two or three months ago.\nK: Well, we don't have to say anything. We can just say this didn't\nhappen. I mean we can just say nothing -- no air attacks took place\nnorth of the 19th parallel.\nR: Yeah.\nK: Our concern is that if any of these guys blab when they come back --\nafterall, there are sixty people involved.\nR: Yeah, Oh, it will be known in the camp -- we can't avoid that. Can't\nwe say that the camp had been vacated but there were no casualties.\nK: Certainly. We found that the camp had been vacated and there were\nno casualties. We don't have to say how long ago.\nR: I think maybe that's the way to do it. I suppose we might as well say\nit first rather than have it dragged out of us tomorrow.\nK: That's the argument for it. Also, it would put us in a position of\nkilling the notion that we attacked any of our PW camps by aircraft.\nR: Right. Okay. I think that's fine.\nK: Okay, Bill, maybe we will have a merry weekend.\nR: I'll say. Okay, Henry.\nfeg\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (tape)\nMr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida\n7:30 m., November 23, 1970 (?)\nY:\nHello.\nK:\nHello. How are you?\nY:\nI'm all right, thank you. And you?\nK:\nOkay. You want to know what happened.\nY:\nYes, please.\nK:\nWell, your representative came in today and presented something\nthat is closer to what we want, but he said that was his own idea and\nwhat did we think of it. So, we said he should check with Tokyo and if\nthey could say it is their idea, then we'll give him our answer.\nY:\nOh, I see.\nK:\nSo, that's where we stand.\nY:\nCould you tell me how close it was?\nK:\nWell, he gave a formula for a growth of 3% which is higher than,\nof course, what we had said, but which, perhaps with a lot of persuasion,\nI could get Mr. Flanigan to accept.\nY:\nWhat does the situation include?\nK:\nYes, but then he didn't really seem to accept the idea of groups.\nHe seems now to want no groups and just categories.\nY:\nOh, I see.\nK:\nSo, we are now completely confused again. I think he only wants\n12 categories and no groups.\nY:\nOh, I see -- 12 categories, and no groups. That must be really\nhis own idea.\nK:\nWell, I tell you, if you can come back with six groups and those\n17 categories, I think we could probably accept your growth rate.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (tape)\nMr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida\n12:00 a. m., November 24, 1970\nK:\nHello.\nY:\nHello.\nK:\nHow are you?\nY:\nI'm all right, thank you, and I'm sorry to disturb you at this\nlate hour.\nK:\nThat's all right.\nY:\nI would like to explain to you the present situation here for your\nown information. My friend has just had another special meeting with\nhis top advisors on the subject. My friend is determined more the than ever\nto have an agreement and, as a matter of fact, wanted to make a final identica\npolitical decision today. However, I'll be very frank and suggest\nMr. M.\n.\nK:\nHold on a second. Go ahead.\nY:\nMr. M in the way undesirably made a plea to use him for about\n6 hours or so to devise a new formula using the framework of our basic\npolicy.\nK:\nOf whose basic policy?\nY\n:\nWhich I already explained to you earlier. And so the new\ninstructions are going to be sent to our representative later today of\nour time.\nK:\nRight.\nY:\nI do not know the technical details of the new formula yet but I;11\nprobably let you know something more about it as soon as I have it. We\ndo hope that your expert will consider it. Mr. M is now apparently raising\nthe question\nto my friend. If my friend was to make a political\ndecision to have an agreement which is acceptable to you, Mr. M feels\nhe cannot bear the responsibility of implementing it effectively as long\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nthe\nas/subject is called voluntary\nNow the political climate\nhere as I see it as an outside observer is\nso serious that his\ngetting\nfriend might resign. I don't know.\nK: That who might resign? Who might resign, M?\nY: Yes, Mr. M might resign.\nshould\nK: Well maybe we\nforget the whole thing. We didn't want to start\nit again.\nwell\nY: Just let me finish. It may/lead to a political crisis to my friend but my\nfriend still does wish to have an agreement at an earliest occasion out of\nhis firm conviction that this will serve the long range national interests\nof both countries. So in any case,\nthere is another expert meeting\ntomorrow of your time.\nK: Yes.\nY: So would you please let me know your\nreaction to our get new\ninstructions which I do not know at all. I fear that they may not\nto your expert\njustice\nbut if you can give a final try then my friend will\nprobably make a political decision. On that occasion my friend feels that\nhe will ask your friend through you political consideration by your friend\nSO that\nas well,\nwe could have an agreement.\nI don't know.\nK: Well, I want to talk to my friend tomorrow. / We don't want to undermine\nyour friend's position and if it doesn't work out we should just forget it.\nY: But my friend does wish to have an agreement and for instance let me\nPOI our time\nbe very frank with you that he yesterday,\n,\nI told you this\nmorning how\nI told you this morning,\nof your time. I had. I met\nhim and had a long talk twice over the phone.\nHe expressed his personal regret for such a delay in making the agreement\nget\nas\nhe meant to\nit much earlier\nwhen\nhe visited your place about a month ago. Read that press communique but\ndue to the extremely difficult and highly technical nakixx nature of the program\nand the very limited scope of what he and his\ngentlemen can do to impose\nvoluntary\nregulations\non\nthe industry. Which is true\nnecessary at home but outside all that he does wish to have an agreement\nand so he hasn't given up his hope yet at all but in order to give Mr. M\n(this is a very personal conversation between you and I) give him one\nmore chance with a time limit of 6 hours.\nK: OK well we could talk after our experts have met and then let's see\nwhere we stand.\nY: Don't raise this matter to your friend yet because then your friend may\nworry about this. This is a very honest and frank conversation between you\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nand I.\nK: I appreciate this and we will see where we stand in another - tomorrow\nat this time.\nY: Yes please. I am very anxious to have your reaction of your expert\nto our new formula.\nK: Very nice to talk to you again and we will talk tomorrow.\nY: Yes please\nK: Good night and thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida\n1:00 a. m., November 24, 1970\n- 2 -\nY:\nYes.\nK:\nThat is, 3%\nY:\n3%?\nK:\nYes.\nY:\nWithin the group?\nK:\nYes. You know, I can't be absolutely sure, but I think there would\nbe a chance.\nY:\nFine, fine. I think we're much better to stick to our original\nconversation which is the official stance now approved by my friend\nwith his two top aides. As I told you, I am absolutely certain and\ncorrect in saying this. So, if we could stick to the last conversation\nI had with you, our original official proposal of six groups over 17 items\nand if you could give us 3% of shift within a group.\nK:\nWell, I will do my best. I can't guarantee it, but at least, they\ndidn't reject it completely. I proposed it today on the basis of our\nconversation\nY:\nThat's right.\nK:\nrecognizing your friend's particular problem and, of course,\nour people are extremely reluctant, but I think we can. I'm giving\nyou my impression that if you accept six groups and 17 categories, and\none of the other three is an essential. I don't know which it is.\nY:\nI beg your pardon -- what\nK:\nOf the remaining three categories, we must have one under\nsome formula. I don't know which of the three.\nY:\nI see, but one item.\nK:\nYes.\nY:\nSo that will be 18 items.\nK:\nYes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida\n1:00 a. m., November 24, 1970\n- 3 -\nY:\nI see. All right. You have to have one more item.\nK:\nThat's right.\nY:\nSo, six groups over 18 items.\nK:\nRight.\nY:\nAnd would you think you could perceive your exports to accept\n3% shift?\nK:\nI think so. You know, I hope so. But if you show some\nflexibility, I think I can.\nY:\nYes, yes. Then, I would immediately get in touch with my\nfriend. He's really anxious and.\nK:\nWell, you can tell him I will undertake to get.\nI think I can\nget the three per cent.\nY:\nI see. And, you are really not an expert nor I am, but this\n3% shift is within a group.\nK:\nThat's right.\nY:\nIf there is another shift between groups\nK:\nYes, I don't know what the rule there is.\nY:\nAnd also the question of the carry-in and the carry-over, and\nwe had some idea of 5% for this shift on the carry-in/carry-over. Also,\nthe growth rate; that is, about 5% which is in substance very similar\nto your growth formula. I was told by our top expert that this could be\nacceptable to you basically. The real question is the shift percentage\nwithin a group. And your expert, Mr. Flanigan, suggested to our\nrepresentative 1%\nK:\nThat's right.\nY:\nSo, if you could allow us 3%, I think this would be a tremendous\nhelp. The very strong argument - -- for instance, Mr. M is putting to\nmy friend is that if we go ahead with this proposal of yours, then it\nwould be a cutback of our shipment. Not the gradual, ordinary growth,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursúant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida\n1:00 a. m., November 24, 1970\n- 4 -\nbut the cutback in absolute terms of shift-backs. That is his main\nargument, and this then tells you that could not force our industry\nto accept.\nK:\nBut I think we can probably deal with that.\nY:\nSo, my own friend -- he is not an expert either. All he needs\nis now political help from you.\nK:\nWell, I have done what I could today.\nY:\nSo that we could dramatize and propagandize that we have reached\nan agreement as a result of the\nin good faith, the mutual conditions.\nK:\nWell, will you call me tomorrow morning.\n-\nY:\nYes, certainly. What time could I call you?\nK:\nAround 8:30 my time.\nY:\nAround 8:30 of your time? At your office?\nK:\nYes.\nY:\nAnd would you please\nI know you are extremely presently\nbusy -- the schedule you have, but since now.\nK:\nYes, I will do the best I can.\nY:\nCould it hurry so that in the way this states, in the light of our\nforthcoming Diet session, before that session my friend and all his\nadvisors agree that we must settle the matter. Otherwise, there is\nnot much purpose of reaching any agreement from our point of view.\nSo would you please give your time the proper priority to this matter?\nK:\nI will. Okay, I'll hear from you at 8:30.\nY:\nYes, and please, even though it is a private proposal of our\nrepresentative, which it is purely of his own -- I'm certain of that.\nK:\nAll right, fine. I will then wait to hear from you tomorrow\nmorning.\nY:\nThat's right.\nK:\nGood. Good night.\nY:\nGood night and thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (tape)\nMr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida\nLate evening, November 24, 1970\nY:\nI'm sorry to disturb you. Have you\nK:\nWell, I've had a very preliminary talk and we haven't had\na final talk yet which we'll have in the morning. But I can tell you\nwhat my recommendation is going to be. I think we should break\noff the negotiations. It isn't worth it. I don't think this is an\nacceptable proposal and I don't think we want to undermine the\ndomestic position of your friend any further. I don't see\nI don't\nthe proposal does us any good, and it won't do him any good.\nY:\nYes, I understand that this is your recommendation, but also\nI'm thinking of the prestige of your friend.\nK:\nWell, that's all right now, but this proposal won't help the\nprestige of my friend, and the alternative proposal is going to over-\nthrow your friend, so there isn't any sense in it.\nY:\nYes.\nK:\nSo I think.\nWell, I will see, maybe my colleagues believe\nwe should accept your proposal. I think it's a mistake but.\nY:\nI am going to see my friend probably for the very, very final\ndecision whether we should, from our side, make major concessions\nto meet your needs on how you feel. At any rate, I share your feeling\nto break off with minimum\n.\nK:\nI think at this point all the negotiations do is irritate both sides\nand weaken the domestic position of both sides.\nY:\nThat's right.\nK:\nAnd I don't see any sense in it, myself, any more. So I'm\ngoing to see, maybe, if my colleagues would accept it (which I doubt)\nbut that still is not going to help my friend any.\nY:\nThat's right.\nK:\nIf they objected, it would be to have an excuse to do something\nabout the trade bill for the wrong reasons. But I will decide that\ntomorrow and why don't you call me at the end of the morning tomorrow.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida\n- 2 -\nY:\nYes, and also before you make a decision and make a\nrecommendation to your own friend. Could we have the final\ndecision\nK:\nMy problem is also quite honestly, I'm spending too much of\nmy time on this problem now. I have so many things to do.\nY:\nI'm sure you do.\nK:\nBut we can try to talk about 9:15. Will you call me at 9:15?\nY:\n9:15 tomorrow morning?\nK:\nYes.\nthe last time\nY:\nAnd/I must apologize to you, but tomorrow morning of your\ntime, I'll be very much on time 9:15 and, too, we discuss this matter\nfor the last conversation. Please hold not your\nmatter\nto your friend.\nK:\nYes, but I'm seeing my friend about 9:30.\nY:\nYou meet your friend at 9:30?\nK:\nYes. Okay.\nY:\nI'm sorry but would it not be possible if we are to make the\nfinal proposal along the lines we discussed; that is, you had suggested\na 3% shifting within a group\nK:\nYeah, and 5% among groups.\nY:\nThat's right.\nK:\nYeah, that's all right. But you can't accept that.\nY:\nMy friend may decide\nK:\nBut if he accepts it and then it's a result that his whole Cabinet\nresigns -- which is what your representative said to us today -- we\ndon't want that.\nY:\nI will meet my friend and discuss it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida\n- 3 -\nK:\nYou see, we have no interest in the political demise of\nyour friend.\nY:\nNo, that's true; certainly, my friend is really in a plight\nbut still.\nK:\nBecause you don't really need it from my friend's prestige\npoint of view at this moment so badly anymore. I mean, if you\nwant the trade bill killed, you need it.\nY:\nYes, and also my friend believes that if you could.\nif we\naccept, we could have an agreement future now and if you could do away\nwith the trade bill, that would suit the/interests of both countries.\nThat is why my friend is very anxious to have an agreement.\nK:\nRight, well, you call me at 9:15 tomorrow morning.\nY:\nAll right, I'll do that.\nK:\nAnd I'll talk to you then.\nY:\nYes, fine.\nK:\nNice to talk to you.\nY:\nGood-bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\n(tape)\nSecretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger\nLate evening, November 24, 1970\nL:\nHenry.\nK:\nMel, how are you?\nL:\nSay, I think with we better go ahead. Dave, after he talked with\nyou, got in touch/ADM Murphy in my office, and on Dave's call,\nMurphy went ahead and alerted these people, so I think we can't do\nanything about it now, so we might as well forget about it.\nK:\nThat's good. Now, Mel, if you think we ought to bring them\nall up here, let's bring them all up.\nL:\nI think that probably it's good to stretch this thing out for a\nfew days. I felt that we had today, we've got tomorrow with two\nhearings up on the Hill, and I figured we'd keep the thing going for\na week or 10 days. I think that this is a good thing to gameplan over\na longer period of time and not use everything up right away. I think\nit's good to keep the POW thing going for a little while, and that's why\nI've had Henken and Baroody over in my office lay out a regular game-\nplan of things to do.\nK:\nYeah, well, you got the President so steamed up now, he just\npre-empted you. That's really what it came down to.\nL:\nWell, that's all right with me. It's all for the good of the\nAdministration, but I think on these things it's always well to plan\nthese public affairs things, and not just off the back of our head. We\ncan get longer sustained\nK:\nWell, tomorrow's hearings, though, are the supplemental.\nThey are not on this, are they?\nL:\nThose hearings will only be on this, Henry.\nK:\nReally?\nL:\nWhenever I go up there on the Hill now for the next week.\nK:\nBut didn't you already have the Foreign Relations Committee\ngoing crazy today? You were terrific.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger\n- 2 -\nL:\nWell, it was a long hearing.\nK:\nWell, you were terrific. Even Aiken , whom I saw\nwho\nwas at that Ky dinner was full of admiration.\nL:\nWell, that's good.\nK:\nAnd, you know, he started out being negative.\nL:\nYeah, well, I think we got.\nI wish you could have seen the\nconfrontation I had with Kennedy this morning, though.\nK:\nI understand you really took him to the cleaners.\nL:\nAnd that was one of the best.\nI really enjoyed that, you know.\nK:\nTell me, Mel, you are up before what Committees tomorrow?\nL:\nAppropriations Committee in the morning, and the House Foreign\nAffairs Committee in the afternoon.\nK:\nWell, we might as well, if you can't help being raped, you might\nas well enjoy it. So we better schedule this thing for about 5:00 in the\nafternoon, don't you think?\nL:\nYeah, that'd be good.\nK:\nSo that you can leave?\nL:\nI'm trying to do my homework tonight. I'm working on all these\nsupplemental requests and the Israeli thing and all these packages. I\nknow I'm not going to get a damned question about them, but I still have\nto study it.\nK:\nYou don't think you are going to get a question about.\nL:\nI don't think I'll get a question, but I still have to study the\ndamned stuff tonight.\nK:\nBesides, no matter what they ask you -- if I'm any judge of you --\nyou'll get in that POW thing anyhow.\nIL:\nWell, no, I'll let them do that.\nK:\nWell, I'm sure it's going to work that way anyhow. You haven't\nbeen wrong yet on these things.\nL:\nWell, take care. The good thing is that in the House, they\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger\n- 3 -\ndon't have television, so you don't get the damned thing you had today.\nThat's kind of lousy with an unfriendly committee.\nn\n:\nYou did marvelously.\nL:\nI tell you, the only way I'll ever appear before Fulbright is\nin public because if you let him control it, and you let him come out\nand say what went on, then you get screwed.\nK:\nHell, you had them on the defensive. Everyone of these guys\nled with the statement that they really were in favor of the objective\nand of the operation, and then they started making little nitpicks. You\ncan't win that way.\nL:\nYou know, we've been calling these gals and mothers all over\nthe country.\nK:\nAnd apparently they've been speaking on television.\nL.\nThey've been coming through great, Henry. And we got all the\nnational organizations lined up now -- you know, out making statements\nand when you hear from the people in the countryside, this will be good.\nK:\nWell, Reagan called and, of course you'd expect that, but he's\nbeen blasting Fulbright. I told him to go on after Kennedy, too. Your\ninstinct was absolutely right. By the time we are through, that's going\nto be a great plus.\nL:\nYeah, I think so. They were giving us the business on the\nintelligence a little bit today.\nK:\nYeah, but you made.\nI saw that great line of yours where\nyou said we haven't got cameras here that can see through roofs.\nL:\nBut I did try to tell them what great intelligence we had to be\nable to penetrate that sophisticated air defense system and to know\nexactly where every building and where the locks were. You know,\nthis was pretty good. Well, we kind of turned that into a plus, too.\nK:\nOkay, Mel. It's a pleasure to work with you.\nL:\nTake care. Good night.\nK:\nGood night.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 2, 1970\nP:\nHello, Henry,\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHow was your game at Philadelphia?\nK:\nThat was a great game. You know, the teams aren't all that\ngood, but when they are evenly matched, you can't tell the difference.\nP:\nNo, that's right. I saw most of it on television.\nK:\nIt was an exciting game.\nP:\nOh, yes, yes; it sure was, and I think the best thing the Navy\ndid was to go for that 2 points which gave them a psychological\nadvantage.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nIf they hadn't made it, it wouldn't have made any difference\nanyway. What was the thing at half-time they had -- I didn't see it,\nbut they apparently had something\n11\n:\nThey had something on the prisoners. They had a brief ceremony\nfor the prisoners and Admiral Moorer made a rather pointed little\nspeech in which he said, 'Most Americans welcomed the bravery of\nthese men. 1 Hugh Scott was on the train going up there with me, and\n- you know, he's an opportunist- but he said that Muskie and Kennedy\nare all on the wrong side of that issue, and they are pulling back like\ncrazy.\nP:\nHe said they are pulling back?\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nVery interesting.\nK:\nAnd he's attacking which is another sign that it must be pretty\nsafe.\nP:\nWell, did the audience react?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 2 -\nK:\nOh, yes, very strongly.\nP:\nThat crowd is not necessarily\nIt's a football crowd.\nK:\nIt was very strongly.\nP:\nWhen they brought the prisoner thing in?\nK:\nA tremendous ovation. And I've talked to five of these wives\nwhom Admiral Zumwalt had on the train going up with him. These\nare really moving ladies.\nP:\nOh, boy, yeah.\nK:\nI said to one of these girls -- some of them don't even know\nif their husband is alive or not -- you know, what is really moving\nis that you don't bring any pressure on us to just end the war so that\nyou get your husbands back. They said that would be denying everything\nhe believes in, and we'd be betraying him if we did that.\nP:\nBoy, aren't they something!\nK:\nThen, when you see these cheap little bastards\nP:\nYeah, well, the cheap ones like the Muskies and the Teddy\nKennedys\nK:\nAnd the Fulbrights\nP:\nand the silly little columnists and so forth -- the Sevareids\nand the rest. Good God, I mean.\nYou know, Henry, it's no credit\nto them that they begin to sort of crawl off that position when public\nopinion\nK:\nNot at all.\nP:\nThe bastards -- that shows they have no principle at all. That's\nnot a good reason to crawl off it. If they believe it was a mistake and\nthis and that, they should stick to it.\nK:\nOf course, it shows only that they\nP:\nIt's very interesting, though, that they did that at the game. I\nwonder how that was arranged. I suppose they just up and decided to do it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 3 -\nK:\nThat's right; they had the two officers there and the two\none of the enlisted men.\nP:\nThey did? And they presented them and then what happened?\nI missed the half-time ceremony.\nK:\nThere was another tremendous ovation.\nP:\nAnd they introduced them, huh?\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nHow did they introduce them?\nK:\nThese were the men who made the daring raid, and there was\na standing ovation, wild cheering -- it was very.\nP:\nWell, that's good, because about 25, 000, 000 people heard it\non TV.\nK:\nThat's right, and because they saw the Seese fellow(?).\nP:\nThat ought to drive the critics wild. The New York Times\nMughx\nhad\nto put a little piece on the front page talking about who had planned it\nand so forth and so on, as if we were trying to exploit the God-damned\nthing. That's all right. Let them.\nPeople want to cheer.\nK:\nThey are going to nitpick us; they are trying to create a credibility\ngap about the ordnance that was expended. I've asked Moorer to give us\na list of everything that was expended north of the 19th parallel which\nis so trivial. Laird didn't handle it very well; that's the one thing.\nP:\nWhat did he do -- leave it more to the\nThe point that I have\nalways pursued was they were diversionary movements, but actually\nthat there was nothing done of any significance.\nK:\nThat's exactly right but first they said nothing and then they said\nsome ordnance was expended. Well some ordnance doesn't mean anything,\nthey should have said 3 Shrike missiles, which is all that was expended.\nAnd two noise maker bombs. Well, we're going to get the list and we\nare going to make them put it out tomorrow and that's going to end it. It's\nnot a big deal.\nP:\nNo, no, no. As far as the people are concerned, they would just\nas soon you'd bomb the whole damm place.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 4 -\nK:\nExactly, they don't care where\nP:\nBut I would -- don't let them have any credibility, say now look\nsince you've raised so much question that it was primarily for the purpose\nof the diversion. Well, I'll tell you it's interesting to note -- you take a\nlook at the New York Times and the Washington Post today. The Times\nis getting off of it in its news coverage. The Post is trying to make\nsomething of it but they' re just desperate as hell that's all because you\nknow the credibility and all that crap.\nK:\nAnd the Post is just an organ of the Democratic community.\nP:\nSure, sure. Well, but also they are just absolutely finatical on\nthis subject and on anything that is done but on the ordnance thing I'd just\nsay well now here's the facts\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nHave it done at Defense though not at the White House.\nK:\nOh, no Defense, we should stay out of it. entirely.\nP:\nLet them just take care of it.\nK:\nThat's right. One thing that I thought Bruce ought to do at the\nmeeting on Thursday in addition to what we had already planned to say,\nhe should say that it is bad enough that you don't release the prisoners\nbut there is no excuse whatever for not giving the list of prisoners and\nI hereby call on you at least put these wives out of their misery, you know\nsomething like that. It's inhumane, this is behaving like the Nazis did\nin World War II.\nP:\nGood, use exactly that phrase.\nK:\nBecause that's what the Nazis did with Soviet prisoners, they\nwouldn't release their names.\nP:\nIs that right?\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nWell, why don't you just use that. I think we have got to get a\nhell of a lot rougher you know. Lodge used to make these pleading little\nnoises about prisoners over there and that didn't do any good.\nK:\nYeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 5 -\nP:\nNow let's try the other thing.\nK:\nI must say once you meet those wives, which I hadn't done before\nyou really get a different\nP:\nYou're damm right. Those wives were something, well were some\nof them -- were they the ones that were at the White House that day?\nK:\nTwo of them were at the White House.\nP:\nThey certainly approved of it didn't they?\nK:\nEvery one of these five approved of it.\nP:\nYeah, all the way.\nK:\nThen they hadn't heard from their husbands in three years and\nthey said we don't know how but we know they know it now and that's the\nbest thing you could have done and we believe\nP:\nThat must have been an interesting experience going up on the\ntrain with all the boys and everything.\nK:\nOh, it was very moving. I did it to -- I accepted it to please the\nmilitary but I really tremendously enjoyed it.\nP:\nWell, I'll tell you this has had a very dramatic effect as you were\nsaying yesterday on the military, the morale and everything and that's\nworth it, just like Cambodia gave it a shot in the arm, this is giving it\na shot in the arm.\nK:\nNo question.\nP:\nThese people need it.\nK:\nI got a kick out of -- I think it was the New York Times today, they\nsaid just as a matter of fact, they said Cambodia got the President a\nyear to implement his withdrawal program and now he is looking for\nsomething else to give him another year. You know as if this were a\nmatter of course, as if they hadn't been screaming against it when it\nhappened.\nP:\nOf course we are in this position now too where we got the enemy\njust bamboozled as to what's going to happen because on the one hand\nRogers in court testifies that we don't plan to escalate and haven't and\nLaird says we might, well that's find, let them think both. The point is\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 6 -\nP:\n(cont'd) that we are -- Rogers says that for domestic consumption\nand we're going to say the other for theirs but I want Bruce to make no\ndamm bones about it when he gets up there.\nK:\nNo question.\nP:\nHe's got to take the line that we've got other options, you know\nwhat I mean. And look here, how long are we going to sit here and talk.\nHe's got to really -- I think we have leave him start laying the groundwork\nfor a break-off of the negotiations if necessary.\nK:\nI do too.\nP:\nCause you see, it's a lot different from last year. If we had\nbroke them off last year, people would have still thought there was hope\nbut at this point the time -- every day that goes on, the incentive for us\nto negotiate goes down.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nHell fire, If we're going to get out anyway, what the hell we got\nto negotiate about?\nK:\nThat's right. And what they are asking of us is ridiculous, to get\nout we don't need to negotiate and to impose a communist government, let\nthem do that if they can do it.\nP:\nWhat significance do you attach to the German action on Autobahn?\nK:\nThat was -- did -- you see the German Bundestag is still CDU\ncontrolled and they were going to have some committee meetings in Berlin\nand this is their way of showing\nP:\nOh, I see.\nK:\nthe pressure. This is a retaliation for -- but this proves what\nthey can do anytime, with or without an agreement.\nP:\nTypical of what they're up to.\nK:\nAn agreement won't stop this sort of bureaucratic harassment\nbecause they're using the pretext of checking the papers very carefully,\nthey are not stopping the traffic, just checking the papers.\nP:\nYeah, yeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 7 -\nK:\nI mean it shows really how -- that these negotiations are missing\nthe essential point, that the Germans are pressing for.\nP:\nIt's interesting, getting back to your thing that Scott -- Scott\nis a bell-weather; that's for sure; he never moves on anything unless it's\npopular.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nAnd he felt those other guys were trying to climb back?\nK:\nOh, yes and he also says -- I haven't checked it -- that he's\nmaking statements every day attacking them.\nP:\nGood, Good. Urge him; egg him on. I hope you did.\nK:\nOh, yeah. Brezhnev made a speech yesterday in which he\nattacked our bombing.\nP:\nThe bombing?\nK:\nAnd the raid.\n2\"\nOn what ground did he attack it?\nK:\nOn the ground that we are claiming rights in the sovereign\nspace of another country and that the Soviet Union will give all fraternal\nassistance.\nP:\nwell, that's not unusual, is it? Haven't they been saying that\nall along? They have to, don't they?\nK:\nThey have to do something like that. What was most interesting\nin the speech, thought, was he praised the Europeans to the sky and\nsaid that the detente in Europe was proceeding. So they are clearly\ntrying to drive a wedge between us and the Europeans, and what I had\nmentioned to you earlier that we may be the ones that pay for the\nEuropean detente policy, including the Oft-Politik(?)\nP:\nYeah. Because basically if they can get Europe without help\nfrom us, they don't have to do anything for us. They can get it by\nthemselves.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 8 -\nK:\nThey can cover their rear in Europe. The nuclear stalemate\nguarantees that we can't do anything to them in a nuclear field.\nP:\nThey can turn around and handle the Chinese\nK:\nThat's right. I think that's their basic strategy now.\nP:\nYeah; they've got to be doing a lot of thinking about these things.\nYou'll find some more of.\nhe'll give you a little more guidance when\nyou talk to Dobrynin on that. Listen to him; see what he has to say.\nThey are now playing a waiting game; we'll play a waiting game, too.\nThat's all there is to it.\nK:\nWell, there's another week. That lunch isn't until the 7th.\nP:\nOkay, Henry, fine.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 2, 1970 (at home)\nY: Hello, I should like to convey the following message to you from my\nfriend. He has expressed his deep personal appreciation to you for what\nyou have done for him.\nK: Right\nY: He is most grateful to you for the amount of interest and effort you have\nSO far put in for common cause not only on this particular issue but on the\nepic making achievements of last year.\nK: Right\nY: So while he understands and appreciates why you felt you'd better get\naway from this issue all together from now on and leave the matter to the\nhands of our experts my friend would 1- should very much like to ask you\nwhat the development and if possible and necessary to continue to guide this\ndifficult issue toward an early agreement. In this sense my friend would\nlike to ask you to keep this channel open and when and if necessary may have\nto ask for your advice and intervention. From not technical but political\nstandpoint. And in the meanwhile your expert has got in touch with our\nexpert and we now have the cable from our of your proposal.\nK: Right\ntwo\nY: Under the firm and fresh order given by my friend our/top aides are\nworking very hard at this very moment in order to draft a revised and\nperhaps the last comprehensive counter-proposal of ours to be sent to our\nexpert hopefully tomorrow of our time and based on this our counter-\nproposal we do hope that this would prove to be good enough toward the\nsuccessful negotiation by breaking the deadlock.\nK: Yes, well. I will keep an eye on it and I will certainly - I certainly\nbelieve in the friendship of our people two countries and I will always do what\nI can to promote it.\nto tell\nY: I would likenyou to do that. My friend specifically called me and asked me\nto convey that this is the message that I have just given to you.\nK: Yes\nY: He appreciates your position very well and he on our side do his utmost\nand his two top aides arennow really working very hard and we will be able to propose\na revised comprehensive not on categories butxxxxx all as I think comprehensive\ncounter proposal.\nK: Yes, although it has nothing to do with what we discussed last weekend now.\nWell, frankly I don't want to get into it. anymore because I will let the experts -\nwhatever is agreeable with them is fine with me.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nY.\nYes, I am still convinced that what we discussed is the best way but\n^\nin the light of the strong opposition of one of our top aides my\nfriend had to change his stance in the light of how to implement the agreement\nwe have got - but in any case I am doing still my utmost within very limited\ninfluence I can\nK: No, I understand your position and this is all very understandable. And\nY: I don't want to take even a minute of your very precious time but what\nwe discussed Sunday was one time almost the final proposal by my friend and\nit\nwas taken up by his top aides and discussed intensively and he couldn't\npersuade one of his aides who is in charge of this entire matter SO I was not\nable to make that idea as official counter proposal.\nK: No, No. I understand that. And that is why I think that since that top\naide is the determining man anyway that he should do the negotiation.\nY: That's right. You are absolutely right. I think your idea is right that the\ntwo experts should work out the acceptable. - You see I am now giving my\nown advice to my friend, that our expert in your place WXX should be given\nmore authority or discretion, what you might call it, the discreti authority\nto be with\nK: Your expert?\nY: For negotiations. (K: Yes ) And appointly The will get from/fresh the\ninstructions to be sent to him shortly. Tomorrow our time I hope.\nK: Right.\nY: In any case I want to thank you very much.\nK: I appreciate your phone call and I hope to see you when you come to the\nUnited States.\nY: Please accept the message from my friend. It is not my own. It has\nnothing to do with me but my friend's message to you personally.\nK: I appreciate that.\nY: Thank you and I hope that I will be able to talk with you again for successful\nagreement on this issue.\nK: certainly.\nY: I haven't given up my hope yet. I would never do that.\nK: No you mustn't but one XXXXXXX has to know when to stop something that isn't\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- -3-\ngoing anywhere. And we have to decide that soon.\nY: Right. Very shortly, I know that.\nK: Right. OK I appreciate your courtesy in calling me and give my\nbest regards to your friend.\nY: Certainly I will do that.\nK: Right. Goodby.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/The President\n(tape)\nDecember 9, 1970 8:45 p.m.\njlj\nK: Mr. President\nP: The thing that concerns me about this thing you sent over on Cambodia\nwas Moorer's, it seems to me, lame excuse that they did not have any\nintelligence because the weather has been bad. I don't think they are trying\nto do a good enough job in trying to get the intelligence over there. You\nunderstand what I mean?\nK: Yes I do.\nP: There are other methods of getting intelligence than simply flying.\nThey've got the methods of the Cambodians to talk to and a hell of a lot of\nother people and I don't think they have done enough there. The second\nthing is as I have put on here now I want you to get ahold of Moorer tonight\nand I want a plan where every goddamn thing that can fly goes into Cambodia\nand hits every target that is open.\nK: Right\nP: That's to be done tomorrow. Tomorrow. Is that clear?\nK: That is right.\nP: I want this done. Now that is one thing that can turn this around some.\nThey are running these goddamn milk runs in order to get the air medal. You\nknow what they are doing Henry. It's horrible what the Air Force is doing.\nThey aren't doing anything at all worth a damn.\nK: They are not imaginative.\nP: Well, their not only not imaginative but they are just running these things -\nbombing jungles. You know that. They have got to go in there and I mean\nreally go in. I don't want the gunships, I want the helicopter ships. I want\neverything that can fly to go in there and crack the hell out of them. There is\nno limitation on mileage and there is no limitation on budget. Is that clear?\nK: Right, Mr. President.\nP: Now that he's got to understand. Now the second thing on this drill and\nI want you to tell both Bill and Mel that this is what I have decided to do.\nWe will go forward on it on the basis, and we will do it - we're not going to\ndo it on the basis of an open end commitment but on the basis that you are\ngoing to fly in supplies - airlift supplies to a place and so you airlift a hell\nof a lot of troops with it too. Now there must be absolute security on it. It\nshould be supplies. In other words the troops go in with their supplies - so what.\nThe South Vietnamese have to - the troops have to unload them don't they?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: Right.\nP: And I think that should be\nK: No, that is a very ingeneous formula.\nP: The point is that Bill understands that. We have been airlifting supplies\ninto Phnom Penh haven't we?\nK: Yes. No, Bill actually - That's right - Bill made that point and actually\nP: Airlifting supplies to me is the thing. We are airlifting supplies and sure\nthere are some troops but I don't want any numbers out. I don't want anything\nlike that. I don't want any plan out and I don't want the air force bragging\nabout it and I don't want a goddamn thing said.\nK: Well Mr. President. Actually with this airlift we don't have to do anything\nfor 48 hours on the troops. They have to go ahead - the whole thing wasn't\nreally planned to go before the 11th or 12th.\nP: All right.\nK: They just felt that if there was no chance of it going we shouldn't get\nthe Vietnamese all cranked up.\nP: Get 'em ready. Get 'em ready and do it. And I think the main thing is\nif the Vietnamese are ready to go in there and they think they are going to\nhave - Can they give them a real bloody nose and\nK: That's what they think and that's what Abrams seems to think.\nP: If Abrams strongly recommends it we will do it.\nK: Right.\nP: We will take the heat on it. I'll do it but it is on the basis of the airlift\nthing and that's all and they have got to remember that there is absolute\nsecurity on this, having in mind that we have a situation here which is political,\nwhich is going to be with us until about the 23rd and then that is over.\nThen we either have the damn supplemental or we don't have it.\nK: Exactly.\nP: So we don't want them to screw that up. And if they can delay it a week\nthen fine but the point is that I see no objection to it if it doesn't screw up the\nsupplemental. We've got to do the things that are necessary to see that this\ndoesn't\nBut there is absolutely - they are not even to submit to me any\nplan that requres the use of American ground forces. Under any circumstances\nwhatever!!!! Is that clear?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nK: Absolutely, Right.\nP: It is not going to be done.\nK: No, there is no\nP: And I am not going to keep it open at the press conference. There is not\ngoing to be done. It isn't what we want to do at this point. Don't expect to\nhave to answer it but if I do I am not going to keep anything open. I am simply\ngoing to say that we don't have any such plans.\nK: Well that\nP: Don't even - Understand. It isn't the question we can't play these\nMickey Mouse games right now. We have got\nK: No, No. I agree with it!\nP: We have got to get down to the real thing that matters and the thing that\nmatters is not to have a big debate about whether- If we don't get this supplement\nthrough - See we have got to make a commitment on that Henry or there is no\nchance on the supplemental. You don't understand what it means unless we\nmake an absolute commitment that no American ground forces are going to\nbe used in Cambodia you will never get the supplemental. That's why\nK: I have no problem with that.\nP: That's the problem. Well, I have left it open up to this point, but I can't\nnow because the supplemental's up there see. So we will nail it and say the\npurpose of the supplemental is only to help the Cambodians defend themselves.\nK: Right\nP: That's all.\nK: No, I was certain that we were not going to use any American ground forces\nP: I know. We have always been certain of that but we were keeping it open in\norder to keep the enemy off balance over it. But right now we have another\nenemy here to fight. And that is a group of legislators who will not support\nus unless they have an absolute commitment.\nK: Well, your instinct on those things has always been right.\nP: We have to do what is necessary to go it and it is a long shot and that's the\nway it is. The point of the matter is - oh Goddammit Abrams can do more and\nthat damned Air Force can do more about hitting Cambodia with their bombing\nattacks. There is something wrong here. I don't know what it is.\nK: I'll get that laid on.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\nP: What the hell are they doing?\nK: I'll get that laid on immediately.\nP: The whole goddamn Air Force over there farting around doing nothing\nand I have watched that stuff and they aren't doing a thing. I mean they\nget one or two trucks a day and fly 800 sorties and get 1500 air medals.\nYou know that's all it is. It's awful.\nK: Yep, Yep.\nP: It is a disgraceful performance and they are going to get off their ass\nand start doing something on it. I want gunships in there. That means\narmed helicopters, DC-3s, anything else that will destroy personnel that\ncan fly. I want it done! Get them off their ass and get them to work now.\nK: Well we will get it done immediately Mr. President.\nP: What is needed here is they need a little drive out there. I don't know\nwhat the hell is the matter with them. What are they doing?\nK: The problem Mr. President\nP: You know we talk about this Cambodia thing and I am not going to have\nanother crisis on Cambodia hit us in the face like it did last year. That again\nwas a case of them not being on top of things. By God we are not going to\nlet this happen this time.\nK: The problem is Mr. President the Air Force is designed to fight an air\nbattle again$ the Soviet Union. They are not designed for this war and that is\nthe - in fact they are not designed for any war we are likely to have to fight.\nP: That's right. There isn't going to be any air battle against the Soviet\nUnion as you well know.\nK: Exactly, I agree completely.\nP: The difficulty is that they need some TBFs and a hell of a lot of SBDs and\nthings like that could go in and knock the hell out of them. Bazookas - anything.\nThat's what they need. A world war II Air Force would definitely make the\nNorth Vietnamese\nK: That is unfortunately true.\nP: And we do not have a World War II Air Force.\nK: That is unfortunately\nP: And they should be told this. Now goddamit maybe they have some stuff\nover here than can do that. I want that examined tomorrow and I mean on an\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-5-\nurgency basis. I am disappointed in the fact that their jets and the rest -\nand get those goddamned jet pilots the hell over to Taiwan and get somebody\nelse out there that can fight them. You understand?\nK: Of course and I will move on that immediately.\nP: Look. Get some conventional prop airplanes over there fast. And those\nprop airplanes whatever they are. We've got a lot of prop airplanes left.\nI have seen them on the runways. The National Guard's got them. I want\nthem to give me a report by tomorrow - not tomorrow but Saturday morning\nevery prop plane that could be made air worthy for the purpose of fighting\nthe kind of battle we need to fight there. I want the goddamn planes over\nthere. You understand?\nK: I will get that report\nP: Get it out of there. Get it out of the Air National Guard and everything\nelse. Shake up this air force and tell them exactly that I have reached the\nconclusion that they are designed to fight only the Soviets and they are not\ndoing worth a damn here and it's time we are going to start doing different.\nK: I will get that report for you by first thing Saturday.\nP: But tomorrow\nK: And I will get the bombing campaign laid on for tomorrow.\nP: I want them to hit theyrything. I want them to use the big planes, the\nsmall planes, everything/that will help out here and let's start giving them\na little shock. There must be something we can do. Let L. Abrams, he's\nto take personal charge and dismiss the Air Force commander if necessary\nover there. And I want Haig to look into this when he is over there.\nK: Absolutely.\nP: We have got to do a better job because we are just coming to the crunch.\nRight now there is a chance to win this goddamn war and that's probably\nwhat we are going to have to do because we are not going to do anything at\nthe conference table. But we aren't going to win it with the people - the kind\nof assholes come in here like today saying well now there is a crisis in\nCambodia. Hell, I have been asking about it for the last two weeks you know\nand you said no there isn't one.\nK: Well, because\nP: So we learn it today, right?\nK: That\"s what they told me. I asked them every day. I sent backchannels.\nfor three months I have been bugging them about that column that is now being\nattacked. And so has Haig. Mr. President, On Houdek I think the best answer\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-6-\nto give is I am satisfied that the relevant information was not given to the\nWhite House and I have set up procedures that this cannot happen again.\nBecause the relevant information was not given to the White House.\nP: The relevant information was not given. OK I will just say that.\nThe relevant information was not given to the White House. And I am satisfied.\nK: I am satisfied that the relevant information was not given to the White\nHouse and I have ordered - set up procedures that this cannot happen again.\nAnd that is exactly the fact as it is.\nP: You can't blame him. I don't blame Houdek at all. You don't fire a person\nK: Hell, he didn't even understand what he was being told.\nP: He just tried to piss off on us and he ought to take the responsibility\nhimself.\nK: They shouldn't have put it in their report. That was outrageous.\nP: Well, why don't we put something - as I say the report should be\nhitting them for what they did on\nlet me ask you this. Have we ordered\na court marshall?\nK: Volpe promised us a report tonight or tomorrow morning.\nP: Is there going to be one or not?\nK: He said he was moving towards a court marshall. But I will get you\na report on that\nP: I don't want to have a long report Henry. I don't want\none sentence.\nK: Yes or no?\nThat's right.\nP:/ Is there going to be one or not. If there is one then I can after all defer\nall questions. I have to. If there is not going to be one then I'll have to go\ninto some detail on the damn thing. I want a court marshall. I think the\nCommandant up there should be court marshalled. Let's find out what the\nhell he did.\nK: You will have the answer on that by noon.\nP: That's right. Just say there is or there isn't. And no fooling around.\nBut let me tell you on this business on Cambodia - I want somthing done tonight.\nI don't want any screwing around and I want that Air Force to make its study\nimmediately of anything in conventional World War II type craft that can be\nused over there. I am disappointed in what they have been doing. I want a new\nplan. I want it fast and let's get going. Also, the XXXXXX program for the\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-7-\nSouth Vietnamese to make the ground attack is laid on, it's approved as of\ntoday. Have it go the first time it gets dry enough to go. Now get going on\nthese things and don't let them delay so long. I think that the trouble is we\nare so busy over here - we got so many things. We worry about the Chilean\nelections and we worry about whether or not there is going to be a vote on\nGuinea and all that bull and the only thing that really matters at this point\nis this and I just want everybody to clear their minds of all this other crap.\nLet the State Department handle that. I don't give a goddamn what happens\nin those other places now - there is nothing we can do about it anyway. But\nthis does matter and I just think that we have made a mistake here. We haven't\nput enough emphasis on it and let's start putting the emphasis in there where\nit matters.\nK: Exactly.\nP: Forget all that other crap.\nK: Right. And I will get after Moorer this minute.\nP: And those are the only reports I want to see from now on. For the\nnext two months I don't want to see anything about Chile, I don't want to\nsee anything about Biafra. I don't want to see anything about Guinea. I\ndon't want to see anything about all the other crap. Doesn't make any\ndifference right now. The Pakistan elections; there's not a goddamn thing\nwe can do about any of those things. You understand?\nK: Right.\nP: Right now Henry we have got to concentrate on what can make or break\nus and none of those things will. And that's what we have got to\nWe've\ngot to get more of a sense of direction here. A direction and urgency and\npriority or otherwise the whole thing will go down the drain. Some of these\nother things just don't matter.\nK: Right.\nP: They don't matter. You put it right to them. I really want some action\nnow. OK.\nK: Right Mr. President I will get it done immediately.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig (tape) (General Haig extremely difficult to hear)\nDecember 9, 1970 8:50 p.m.\njlj\nH: Yes sir.\nK: I just had a call from our friend. First, he wants to know by noon tomorrow\nwhether the Coast Guard is going to be court marshalled because if they are\ngoing to be court marshalled he can avoid all questions.\nH: No they're not.\nK: Why not?\nH: I understand that they have decided that there was no criminal culpability\ninvolved.\nK: Well, what are they going to do - reprimand them?\nH: Yes. KgtxXXXXXXXXX They' 11 use administrative\nyou\nK: Well XX better get a written report from Volpe by 10 o'clock tomorrow\nmorning. Can you get that?\nH: (Can't hear)\nK: Two, he wants a massive bombing campaign in Cambodia. He doesn't\nwant to hear anything. It's an order, it's to be done. Anything that flys on\nanything that moves. You got that?\nH: (Couldn't hear but sounded like Haig laughing.)\nto find out, he wants\nK: Thirdly, now hold on to your hat. He wants/an inventory of every prop\nplane that's suitable for operations out there. He wants a report on it by\nSaturday morning, for possible movement out there.\nH: For close air support.\nK: Yes. That's actually not a bad idea. Fourthly, he's now gung ho on the\noperation. Have you got Moorer yet?\nH: Yes, I talked with him.\nK: Is he happier?\nH: Much. I didn't go too far.\nK: No, but did you tell him I talked to the President?\nH: Yes, I did. I told him\nCompletely unintalligible)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2- -\nK: Right. Including that great idea of making them all troop supplies.\nH: Yes.\nK: OK\nH: They are quite concerned about it because all the plans they are doing\ninvolved the same problem. / Reat unintellijible)\nK: What, if they can't airlift them with Americans?\nH: Unintelligible\nK: We will get our brains beaten out.\nH: unintellizible\nK: I am not eager to do this operation.\nH: I'm not either, because I'm not sure\nK: Can we at least get a massive bombing attack into this area?\nH: Yes.\nK: How about B-52s?\nH: I talked to\n.\nK: What does he think?\nH: He said the real problem is weather\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- -3-\nK: Weather doesn't affect B- - 52s.\nH: Oh no, no.\nK: Let him lay some in there. OK?\nH: OK.\nK. Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nNew, alec 9, 1970 (?)\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nYeah, Henry.\nK:\nI thought you might like to know that the supplemental has\npassed the House 249 to 102 or some overwhelming vote like that\nin its entirety. And the air operations have all been ordered.\nP:\nGood. Well, the supplemental, you see, is a House action\nto be expected. That shows you though that they reflect the country.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nThat God-damned Senate is just the lame-duck in it now.\nK:\nBut still the speed of their action indicates that there's more\nsupport in the country than you would believe reading the NY TIMES\nand the WASHINGTON POST.\nP:\nOh, Christ, there's no support from them. It's just awful.\nLet me say this. I repeat again, if that comes down here with Israel\nin it and the others in it, I'm going to veto it. That is going to be\nthe best thing that could ever happen in this country. I'll lose every\nJewish vote; I'll lose the 5% of INGA(?); but that's all right. I'm\ngoing to show up this God-damned thing for what it is.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nIt's hypocrisy. I'll veto the bill if it comes. I'll veto the bill --\nthat I've determined in my own mind. People think I don't mean\nit. I do. It's going to come here with Cambodia in it, and the others\nin it. If it comes with Israel alone and Cambodia denutted, I veto it!\nK:\nWell, the House has voted the whole thing -- every last dollar\nof it.\nP:\nThat's what it should do.\nK:\nAnd now it's entirely up to Fulbright.\nP:\nRight. Good news. Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\nWed Dec 9,1970 9, (?)\nR:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nBill, how are you?\nR:\nI thought you'd be interested to know that the supplemental\npassed the House like 249 to 102.\nK:\nIsn't that terrific!\nR:\nI don't think I can ever remember anything going through\nthat quickly except, you know, a wartime measure. It really is a\nhell of a tribute to the Administration.\nK:\nWell, it's a tribute also to the testimony and to the way we've\nall pulled together. I can't say \"we\"; I haven't done anything.\nR:\nWell, everybody has worked very well. You know, Dave Abshire\nin our Department is absolutely great.\nK:\nHe's been really a find.\nR:\nYeah, he's terrific. He's up there now and he is just great;\nhe's got everything all planned. Well, anyway, I think the President will\nbe very pleased. That's something to get a billion-dollar supplemental\nthrough with Cambodia.\nK:\nThat's terrific. You think the Senate is\nR:\nWell, I think we've got a chance now. It's going to put pressure\non them. The Appropriations Committee is marking up the bill now,\nso it's all up to Fulbright, and he's under a hell of a lot of pressure.\nK:\nIsn't that terrific. That is amazing.\nR:\nWe played it exactly right. We had a fast hearing in the House\nForeign Affairs Committee and almost a simulaneous hearing with Passman,\nand we got a 25-6 vote in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. With\nall those Democrats, they could only muster 6 votes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 2 -\nK:\nNow, that is amazing. When one thinks where we were in\nMay on Cambodia.\nR:\nI know it; and this is really quite a lot of money when you look\nat it. I have been going over it carefully today and when you really\nwere talking about $185 million in military assistance, and $70 million\nin economic assistance\nK:\nThat's right, and then some P.L. 480 money.\nR:\nThat's quite a lot of money.\nK:\nHell, when you testified in May, if you had said that we'll be\nspending $286 million in Fiscal Year 1971, they would have ridden you\nout of town.\nR:\nThey would have gone right through the roof. Well, we'll see\nwhat happens. It does suggest, I think, we ought to be a little careful\non this other operation. I must say it's tempting to just lay into the\nSouth Vietnamese.\nK:\nWell, we are not going to do anything until tomorrow afternoon\nI mean we won't do it then either, but there won't be any decisions made\nuntil after your testimony. We've asked Moorer to scrub the operation\na little more to see whether they could get Americans out of there -- or\nreduce American participation to the absolute minimum.\nR:\nEven if you could have the follow-up supply planes manned by\nSouth Vietnamese or something of that kind.\nIn other words, a one-shot\noperation just to land them I think probably would be reasonably safe.\nBut if we're called upon to give them continuing support, it's a little\ntougher.\nK:\nWell, I think also that with the President having a Press Conference\nahead of him, he should really not be asked to make the final decision\nif it's at all avoidable until afterwards. So I'm going to try to canvass\nthe people and then we'll get everybody together if it's still considered\ndesirable.\nR:\nGood; okay, Henry.\nK:\nOkay; thank you. Good-bye\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\nK:\nHello.\nR:\nHenry.\nK:\nBill.\nR:\nI have just talked to General Haig and I have got a little memo\nhere\nK:\nGood.\nR:\nFor the President giving a kind of a little preliminary\nassessment.\nK:\nAll right, what's your assessment?\nR:\nWell, first of all Gomulka and his close people are out entirely\nso they seem to be the scapegoats of the whole affair.\nK:\nYeah, but that's what we know from television already.\nR:\nYeah, but what has come in its place seems to be a pretty modally\ncollection of different factions\nK:\nYeah.\nR:\nWe have hard liners like Mochar (spelled phonetically) being\npromoted.\nK:\nMochar is the fellow that was in conflict with them on this\nanti-Semitic thing a few years ago.\nR:\nYeah, yeah, right and he has been promoted to full member on\nthe Politburo but on the other hand most of Gearicks' (spelled phonetically)\npeople have come up so it looks like it is mainly get rid of Gomulka and\nthe old gang.\nK:\nYeah, but who is Gearick? What is Gearick's position?\nR:\nI think he stands pretty well in the middle, he is pragmatic and\nK:\nYeah, but you don't expect the President to understand when you\nsay middle that he knows what the middle of the Polish Communist Party\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 2 -\nR:\nHis reputation is as a good administrator, very pragmatic, pretty\nnationalistic, he spent most of his early life abroad.\nK:\nWhere?\nR:\nIn France and Belgium, he didn't come back to Poland until '48.\nK:\nWell, what does it mean for the internal structure?\nR:\nInternally it should help to keep\nto bring things even more\nunder control.\nK:\nYeah, but you've got to be concrete, what way? Are they going\nto cancel the price rises?\nR:\nNo, Gearick is hinting that there will be a rise in wages and they\nwill re-examine the plan.\nK:\nAnd what will that do to the economy?\nR:\nWell, it will just postpone the equal day for another year or two.\nI mean, the price rises were essential to any realistic reform.\nK:\nWhy?\nR:\nIf they ever were going to get away from subsidizing the hell out\nof agriculture, they had to bring prices in line with costs but now if they\nraise wages, this will just mean more inflation, no structural changes will\nprobably come about so they\nit is just a postponement but\nK:\nCould Gearick go the way of Dubcek?\nR:\nNo, no, no, he's politically far more conservative than orthodox\nthan Dubcek.\nK:\nWould you have said that about Dubcek the day he came in?\nR:\nWell, I think Dubcek would just simply not known at all but\nGearick is\nI mean he's been pretty prominent for the last\nK:\nAll right, what do you think it means in foreign policy?\nR:\nI think they will just have to slowdown considerably on Ostpolitik.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7\nx\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 3 -\nK:\nThe Russians?\nR:\nI think the Russians and the Poles. They won't repudiate the\ntreaty but the Poles I don't think are going to press on with Bonn at all.\nWell, not at all, but very slowly.\nK:\nBut, why?\njust\nR:\nBecause of the internal situation, it is / too shaky for them\n[End of tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nK:\nI thought you might like to know, Mr. President, that the top\nfour leaders of the Polish Communist Party including Gomulka have\nresigned.\nP:\nHumph.\nK:\nAnd that the man who's taking over we have generally thought of\nas a traditionalist\nP:\nUm-huh.\nK:\nHe has said that all reforms now have to be carried out by\nconsulting the workers' interest. Now a number of things to be said,\neveryone would have thought Dubcek was a traditionalist when he came\nP:\nHe became a tough son-of-a-bitch.\nK:\nAnd he became a very liberal Communist.\nP:\n(laughter) I know.\nK:\nYeah. But whatever it is -- what it may mean it that they will\ncancel the price rises. Our guess on Friday was that if he came in he'd\ncancel the price rises which would look like a liberal like a move to\nplacate the workers.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nBut which would buy them more trouble later on.\nP:\nYeah. Well, it of course has an enormous effect in world opinion,\ndon't you think? If they\nK:\nAnd I think it has a tremendous effect on the Communists.\nP:\nThat's what I mean.\nK:\nBecause here they are, they try to loosen ties a little bit, they\nare doing it loosening things a little bit, they are using -- they are\ndoing it with the Germans and nevertheless the system can't stand even\nthat little strain.\nP:\nUm-hum.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 2 -\nK:\nWhich shouldn't even be a strain.\nP:\nYeah. Think it's good news don't you?\nK:\nOh, I think it's good news. I think what it means\nP:\nEven Gomulka.\nK:\nEven Gomulka -- what I think it means at a minimum is that they\nare internal -- that they will be much more cautious now in their policies.\nI think it will mean a slowdown of their playing with the Germans but above\nall I think\nI wouldn't be surprised if it meant that the Soviets decide\nthat the taunt with the Germans is too dangerous and they had better get\na little closer to us. As a tactical maneuver, I don't think it will change\ntheir basic orientation.\nP:\nYou mean it will put the Soviets -- them to have a little pressure\nto come closer to us you mean?\nK:\nI think it puts a little pressure on the Soviets to come -- it will\neither mean that they will tighten up all the way across the board and\nnew\npursue a transition policy towards everybody but I think if they want to\ntaunt in the West they are more likely to seek it with us now than with the\nGermans.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nBecause we are less of a threat to them in Eastern Europe.\nP:\nWell, that's good, good, well.\nK:\nBut in any event whatever it does to us, I think\n...\nP:\nIt will give a little break.\nK:\nThey will be more absorbed in their own affairs for a while now.\nP:\nThis will shake the Soviet leaders don't you think?\nK:\nOh, yes. It shows them that really they don't have the basis\nP:\nThey just know their system doesn't have any support.\nK:\nThat's right. It will make\n...\nP:\nBe sure that the State Department doesn't give any condoning of\nthis damn thing, you know what I mean, I just want to be sure that there\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n- 3 -\nP:\n(cont'd) is no weak shrub that we think, you know what I mean?\nK:\nOh, yes. I think what we should say is that this shows how\nfragile these governments are and\nP:\nThat's what they should say. Let State say a few things, make\nthem say that, see what I mean.\nK:\nAnd that there is no basic solution until Eastern Europe is\nre-integrated with the Western Europeans, something like that ought\nto be said.\nWell\nP:\nRight, right. if any of the State guys get out of line on this,\nI'm really going to raise hell because boy they want to -- they '11 just think\nthis is terrible you know because it affects Ostpolitik -- it will worry that\ndamn Barr won't it?\nK:\nWell, as I told you the other day, he said which we got from\nintelligence sources that if this goes much further, that's the end of\nOstpolitik.\nP:\nRight. Well, okay.\nK:\nWell, at any rate, I thought you might like to know this. I think\nit's good news.\nP:\nVery interesting. Okay Henry, thank you.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Tape)\nMr. Kissinger/The President\nDecember 19, 1970\nK:\nI think it would be very helpful.\nP:\nAlthough I'll tell Moorer and I'll tell Moorer he's not to tell\nLaird. Now, let's start playing the game rough.\nK:\nI think, Mr. President, it is another example because they only\nhad a force of about 3, 000 there and Haig said that if we had put\nin helicopter gunships which hadn't been authorized\nP:\nI would have authorized them\nK:\nWell, it would have been really like shooting pigeons but as it\nwas, it was a slaughter. And even if the figure is exaggerated,\nI don't know how they count a 1, 000 from the air, the fact is that\nthe town that they took has been evacuated and has been retaken\nand that the pressure in that area has stopped.\nP:\nYeah, the AP is out writing a story everyday that Cambodia\nis about to fall.\nK:\nThat's right and\nP:\nWe've got to\nK:\nWell, Laird, he liked very much - he didn't give me I didn't\nhave a chance to talk to him about the press yet. But I thought\nyou might like to know that because that operation had succeeded.\nP:\n?\nK:\nRight, Mr. President\nP:\nK:\nWell, because, Mr. President, when you gave that order we\nimmediately called Pursley\nP:\nHe tried to countermand.\nK:\nInstead, well, he did it in the clever bureaucratic way, he sent\nout a request for further information. Well, that way it would have\ngone on for 4 days, then the next day, you called me again and I\njust called Moorer directly and I said the hell with the further\ninformation, do it -- anything that flies and if you hit water buffaloes,\njust drop it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Tape)\nMr. Kissinger/The President\nDecember 19, 1970\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nAnd that's how it got done.\nP:\nAnd it helped.\nK:\nIt broke the back of that particular enemy offensive. I told you\nright away, it wasn't a major thing, one way or the other but if\nwe stiffle it in the beginning\nP:\nPsychologically it helped.\nK:\nPsychologically it helps the Cambodians immensely and it helps\nwith our own press, that's the point of it here. And it keeps the\nNorth Vietnamese loose until we start the other operation\nP:\n?\nK:\nAnd then when the one after that comes, they will really be\nracked up.\nP:\nK:\nOh, no. Well, if we didn't do it with 550, 000, why should they\nthink we'll do it now.\nP:\nK:\nWell, Godley is all for it. Right Mr. President.\nP:\nAll right.\nK:\nRight, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Tape)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 19, 1970 -- 5:30\nK:\nMr. President\nP:\nHenry, I was going to ask you -- anything new on Warsaw?\nK:\nIt seems to be -- the riots seem to have subsided, the reports we get\nis of great tension; some factories still occupied by workers but no\nactual riots in the street.\nP:\nI bet it was a lot rougher on the Presidents case.\nK:\nOh, we have conversations of that little bastard, Babr\nP:\nYeah, yeah.\nK:\nand he says well if this goes on another day or two, that's the\nend of Ostpolitik. So strangely enough they see it the same way that\nI do. He is a bastard.\nsee it like we do now.\nP:\nThank God the British didn't want to get involved. You know the one\ngreat thing that we have to remember here, you realize if we had\nWilson here, he would be pushing Brandt rather than trying to hold\nK:\nOh, yeah. Oh, of course and he would be pushing you to go to -- for\nhim to go to Moscow.\nP:\nYeah, he'd be going. I was thinking one thing we ought to do as soon\nas Al gets a day of rest we ought -- I ought to get a first-hand report\nfrom him.\nK:\nAbsolutely, he'll be ready Monday for you.\nP:\nFine, well we will sit down and just\nK:\nI had a brief discussion with him today.\nP:\nHow's he feeling?\nK:\nHe's feeling fine. He's quite optimistic. He thinks that we can he\nsays Thieu was really actually very upset by that 40, 000 withdrawal\nwe made this year in violation f our promise to him which wasn't done\nby you.\nP:\nYeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Tape)\n- 2 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 19, 1970 -- 5:30\nK:\nand it just created but this is just a temporary problem. But\nbasically he is very optimistic about the situation. He says in South\nVietnam, as somebody who has been there three years ago, we are\nwithin an eyelash of victory.\nP:\nThe thing about Thieu though we have to really shape him up in this\nrespect. We have to go all the way for much further action\nthere is no question at this point. He's got to -- he must recognize --\nour military, Henry, play a double game out there, a lot of them they\nwant to stay you know\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nOf course we want them to stay as long as is necessary but some\nof them just want to stay period. They encourage him in this and say\nwell, you can't do it boys, we've got to stay. Well, because you know,\nthis is their last war and they know it.\nK:\nWell, his problem is the election in October. That's, I think, what he's\ngot in his mind and he would like to keep things as settled as he possibly\ncan but actually Haig had a very, very good conversation with him and\nthey are planning and it's all set. One thing, Mr. President, Laird\nis going out there early January and I think you may have to tell him\nbefore he goes what we are thinking of because otherwise it will surface\nout there and he'll try to kill it.\nP:\nYou tell him what we're thinking, you know.\nK:\nI don't mean in terms of withdrawals, I mean in terms of operations.\nP:\nOh, I know. But in terms of the operation -- well, we'll just tell him\nabout the operationand tell him to Keep it guiet.\nK:\nHe's pretty good once he knows it's irrevocable. That's not the sort\nof thing he usually leaks. Well, let me -- I will be the\nP:\nI agree, I agree. We've got to get everybody\nbut I'm not\ngoing to surface it with State until\nK:\nWith State, I wouldn't -- you don't need to do it with State until about a\nweek\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\n- 3 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 19, 1970 -- 5:30\nP:\nIt's a military operation.\nK:\nThat's right. Now Haig discussed it with Godley, our Ambassador in\nLaos\nP:\nWhat did he say?\nK:\nHe's enthusiastic.\nP:\nWell, now can Godley get\nSouvanna to ask for it and cooperate?\nK:\nHe thinks he can get full cooperation from Souvanna.\nP:\nWell, that will make a tremendous difference.\nK: Yeah.\nP: Yeah.\nK:\nWell, that part of it\n...\nP:\nGodley is enthusiastic.\nK:\nGodley, according\n...\nP:\nThat's one man -- I mean I -- we all make mistakes, I underestimated\nhim, I thought\n...\nK:\nI did too, Mr. President.\nP:\nBut you know, you were right -- the thing about it is that he\nthought that's what I wanted to hear.\n1\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nBut he's a loyal man and when he found out it was the other way, he\nhas become -- what do they call him, General Godley?\nK:\nYeah, Marshal Godley.\nP: Yeah.\nK:\nNo, he's become good and Haig thinks ...\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Tape)\n- 4 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 19, 1970 -- 5:30\nP:\nHe's really very good, tough as hell.\nK:\nOh, he's tough and he's been very effective but Haig thinks we can --\nthat both of those operations we are thinking of, particularly the second\none, may have an almost decisive impact.\nP:\nWell, you know it's about time to rip them up, finish them off.\nK:\nAnd if it works, then it ought to do in the northern two course Corps what\nthe other operation did in the southern two and if that's the case, it\nwill be a year and a half.\nP:\nSell the whole thing in terms of accelerating the withdrawals\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nAccelerate the withdrawal, it will be hard. do you want to fight it,\nyou want to stick it -- keep our guys out? We've got them on heropesnow.\nK:\nI think we do and they don't know how to start an attack on you and they\nhaven't really -- and I must say based on my discussions at Harvard,\nnot that they will vote for you or anything like this, but they just don't have\nany convictions behind their position anymore and\nP:\nWell, the interesting thing -- amusing to me they are trying to blow\nlife into that fellow Gardeners common cause now and they are trying\nto blow life -- you know the reaction to the Scranton Commission and\nGoodell thud\n...\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\n...\nthe universitives didn't blow up, they didn't participate in the\ncampaign. They are sure of -- Harris comes out in the pools showing\nthat we are weak -- that's temporary, that will change, you know what\nI mean.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nBut the main point, as you well know, this whole business is that these\nbastards finally learned that they've got to run their schools.\nK:\nOut of -- out of\n...\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Tape)\n- 5 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 19, 1970 -- 5:30\nP:\nThey don't react enthusiastically when I say that they have to take\nthe responsibility because they are a bunch of weaklings, that's\ntheir problem.\nK:\nThat's absolutely right.\nP:\nBut I tell you, it's a hellva lot different now than it was a year ago.\nK:\nOh, God -- what if you compare it with the situation right after Cambodia.\nWho would have thought that the supplemental would have rolled\nthrough and things like that. And that's an indication of the public\nmood.\nP:\nThere's nothing we can do to stir the Polish thing up?\nK:\nI'm afraid not but still here is another Communist regime that has\nhad to use troops against its own workers.\nP:\nGet that out.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nLet's get the real PR effort on that and don't let State, Defense -- The\nregime, are they putting out defense of the regime, they hope that\neverything -- no violence, I hope not.\nK:\nI haven't seen anything yet. We had a meeting yesterday and we\nP:\nIn one column, I noticed that the United States, Scalli was being carried\nand he's right but I just want to be damn sure that we don't appear\nthat we're stirring them up but on the other hand, we know that we\ndon't condone this at all.\nK:\nWe may be impudent, Mr. President, but what these fellows say\ndepends a lot on what they are told.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nIf they are told this is another indication of a workers' revolution in\na Communist regime, some of them will say it and that's what we\nought to get out.\nP:\nGet that out and around through the bureaucracy tomorrow, will you?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Tape)\n- 6 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 19, 1970 -- 5:30\nK:\nAbsolutely\nP:\nFine\nK:\nIn fact, I'll do it\n...\nP:\nThis is the President's view, will you do that?\nK:\nYeah, I'll do it immediately.\nP:\nAll right, Henry, good. Well, take off and tell Haig we'll see him --\nwe won't both him tomorrow, okay.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nP:\nSet aside at least an hour, you and I and he, just the three, don't you\nthink?\nK:\nI think that would be good just for the first crack at it so that you\nget it first hand.\nP:\nRight but then I think we ought to expose him to a couple of others.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nWe'll bring everybody along on this other operation. Laird, Laird --\nlook he knows very well that the whole ball would go up if what resulted\nin our policies lose in 72 in Vietnam, he doesn't want that.\nK:\nRight. I wouldn't get State in until Laird gets back.\nP:\nNo.\nK:\nI think a good way of handling it is to tell Laird what you want.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\n...\nand then he can help sell it when he gets back on the basis of his\ntrip.\nP:\nThat's right, good. And then get him a little credit.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nIn this one, we don't care about credit, we just want it done.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Tape)\n- 7 -\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nDecember 19, 1970 -- 5:30\nK: Exactly.\nP:\nAnd we'll let Laird be the mastermind.\nK:\nWell -- right, right, right.\nP:\nProviding that it works. All I want now is to have something work.\nK:\nWell, this ought to work. I've looked at this concept and it really\nlooks good.\nP:\nGood, okay Henry.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger 2 -\nK:\nNo, no, but believe me, that isn't what he\nHe had no such\nthought, and there is no possible way\nR:\nI know, but the point is, Henry, he's got to wise up for Christ's\nsake. He can't go around and talk to those four gossips and tell them\nwhat he thinks without them telling everybody. Christ, I heard Dewey\nat the party the other night. He was telling me he's delighted this\nis just what we need. I said, well, for Christ's sake\nK:\nWhat is what we need?\nR:\nWell, what Acheson is saying. In other words, if the President\ntells those four fellows what's on his mind, if he sorts of lets his hair\ndown and thinks they are going to keep it to themselves, he's as naive\nas Eisenhower. Jesus Christ, they're the biggest gossips you can find.\nThey're bigger than Maxine Cheshire. They'll tell everybody that they\nsee and they would all like to be Secretary of State. In fact, they think\nthey are. Jack McCloy is pushing his law firm, too. He's telling all\nhis God-damned clients, and he's got the Arabs coming into his office\nas if he's running the God-damned government.\nK:\nBut you know how it happened, Bill. It wasn't that he had wanted\nto tell them what he thought. You know how he is. When people talk\nto him this way, he has a tendency to fall into the mood. This was not\nintended as anything except a hand-holding session which he does maybe\ntwo or three times a year with these guys, and it's taken on because of\nAcheson's public popping off\nR:\nWell, McCloy is telling everybody, too. When the Arabs now\ncome to this country, they stop in to see him in his law office.\nK:\nBut he hasn't even talked to McCloy about the Arabs\nR:\nThat doesn't make any difference at all.\nK:\nin a year.\nR:\nHe's got them all thinking. What I'm saying is that each one of\nthese\nNow, Dewey is a little bit different. He said to me the other\nnight he said, 'I'm not even sure what the hell we're doing. 1 He said,\n'Henry has given me a lot of papers to look over on things, and I read\nthem over. I'm not sure\nI\nHe was talking about IndoChina in this\ncase. We have to figure out what the hell kind of mischief we can get\ninto, not through design but through inadvertence.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 3 -\nK:\nYou are absolutely right. I agree with you, Bill.\nWe have to be more\nR:\nDiscreet about things. I would have absolutely no objection\nif the President decides, 'Look it, I want to get four old guys in here\nand use them for purposes of sounding off and pretending that I'm\nwashing my hands of it. That's all right. I'm perfectly prepared\nto play by any gameplan.\nK:\nNo, but that isn't what it was, and you know it isn't.\nR:\nNo, but that's what I'm saying. That's why.\nK:\nThat's how it's coming out.\nR:\nI don't get annoyed at/whatever the President decides, after\nhe reflects on it, if he decided to follow a course of action, I am prepared\nto give full support even though I at times may not agree, but it seems\nto me that's my role. I should do that. On the other hand, I get madder\nthan hell when, by inadvertence, we stumble into things that really.\nIt just makes it\nK:\nWell, I agree with that part of it. I think there are two parts\nof it. One is that these guys have been totally indiscreet about a\nconversation which really was designed to give McCloy a chance to\nsay we shouldn't withdraw our troops. Secondly, the Germans, of\ncourse, are playing a deliberate game now of pretending that we are\nkeeping them from an agreement and shifting their problems to us.\nNow, they are not all that innocent in this thing, either. Ehmke\nwas popping off around town here in October at a time that we were\nkeeping them from a Berlin agreement, at a time when there wasn't\nthe slightest excuse that we were dragging our fight. In fact there\nis no excuse for it now.\nR:\nI'm sure that's true, and.\nK:\nBut we still shouldn't give them the excuse.\nR:\nThere, again, I know.\nI'm not plugging for the Germans.\nI don't give a damn if the President wants, Suppose he decides that\nwe want to oppose. them It's bad to say it publicly.\nK:\nWell, if we want to oppose them, you are of course, absolutely\nright. We shouldn't use Dewey, Acheson and McCloy.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 4 -\nR:\nOr if we are going to use them, let's use them in a planned\nway. Say, look it, here's a good way of talking out of both sides of\nour mouths and getting away with it, if that's what he wants to do.\nBut we\nJust because we haven't thought it through, we stumble\ninto these things. Now you know damn well, if you know McCloy,\nwhat he does. He's got a hell of a big law firm. He's got a hell of\na lot of oil clients. He likes to be in on matters in Europe because\nthat also helps his law firm. He's getting garrulous as hell and\nyou know he's going to tell everybody that he sees about it. As far\nas the arms control thing, he didn't help himself. In fact, the\nPresident is going to have a greater problem with those people\nbecause they are all sore now. They say, well for Christ's sake,\nhe sees Dewey, Acheson, McCloy but he won't see his own Committee.\nK:\nMcCloy has been a little tricky about. McCloy, himself, said\nthat if he saw a small group and he were a part of it, that would take\ncare of his committee.\nR:\nOf course, he didn't say that to his committee. Right in front\nof his committee is when he came\nK:\nNo, you told me that.\nR:\nHe told me that this had nothing to do with his committee and\nit was not a substitute, and that you had urged him to come in to see\nthe President and this wasn't a substitute at all, and he was sort of\npressed\nK:\nHell, I don't like McCloy particularly. I fhink he's one of the\nmost over-rated men in America.\nR:\nWell, I think probably in his day he was all right, but\nK:\nI mean, he talks a lot. I think he's completely outdated as far\nas Europe is concerned. He remembers the Germany and the Europe\nof the early '50's. You can't push them around like this anymore.\nR:\nNo, and I mean he was\nI mean you've got Clay and McCloy\nand Acheson all who feel that they have a sort of a pride of ownership\nof Berlin which is all right.\nK:\nBut you know it was the President who thought up this group.\nHe called them all separately. I only learned about it afterwards.\nIt grew up after some Gridiron dinner when he was talking to Dewey\nand he's seen them twice, I think. You remember when he saw them\nonce before.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 5 -\nR:\nDewey is a little more discreet, and I think Dewey is a little\nperplexed himself. He said he wasn't sure what the point was; on\nthe other hand, he said he and cloy were really applauding what\nAcheson has been saying -- they said, that's just right; that's what\nwe ought to do. And I said, well, for Christ's sake, if that's what\nwe ought to do, it ought to be done by a program -- the result of a\nprogram and not by the result of an accident.\nK:\nIncidentally, I don't know whether you saw the traffic on some\nother stuff. Last week, Ehmke called me up -- you know who he is --\nand said that he had missed me on that trip when he was over here\nand he was going to be over here and could he see me. So, I said\nfine. The next thing I knew he was saying he was coming over\nespecially to see me. So I told Marty to join me so that it isn't a\nWhite House/Ehmke conversation.\nR:\nI wonder about these things. Every time Strauss, even if\nMarty's there, he goes back and tells everybody that he's got an \"in\"\nand that what we are saying publicly is not what we are saying privately.\nHe uses you, too, for his own political advantages.\nK:\nWell, he'll use anybody.\nR:\nI know it. Well, I think we have two major problems with our\ntwo major allies -- Germany and Japan -- in which we are heading\ninto a hell of a storm.\nK:\nWell, I think we ought to wind up the textile negotiations one\nway or the other this week.\nR:\nWe've got a major storm buildup in both places, and both of them\nare inexcusable. There's no God-damned reason for it. Insofar as\nGermany is concerned, nothing has happened up to date that should\ncause us to have any concern. Now obviously, things could happen\nin the future that would be unfortunate. Obviously, we have to guard\nagainst those, but it seems to me the way to guard against them is try\nto be reasonable as hell and say, sure, this is a good direction in which\nto move. We've got to watch things, etc., etc.\nK:\nWell, my personal view on it is this. I agree with your statement.\nThere's nothing we can do about and we shouldn't try. I think that the\nbasic direction of German policy, even though Brandt is a decent man\nand wants to stay with the West, is going to lead to German nationalism\nand is going to give over a period of time the Soviets an increasing voice\nthere, but that is nothing we can do anything about by Acheson-like\nstatements.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 6 -\nR:\nWell, I'm not so sure. I agree with you there's nothing we\ncan do about what they have done. I mean, how the hell can anybody\ntake issue with that. I think there's a good deal we can do about the future,\nbut I don't think this is the way to do it.\nK:\nOh, I agree with that.\nR:\nTaking the case in NATO, there was general agreement among\neveryone, including the Germans, that there were pitfalls; we had to\nbe careful; the Germans vowed in public and in private that they would\nnot get out of step, etc., etc. Now, obviously, that may be wrong;\nobviously, they may be misleading us. But, Christ, we don't want to\nbe\nK:\nNo, I don't think they'l do it deliberately. Well, I think Bahr\nis, of course, totally unreliable. You agree with that. And I think\nScheel is a dope, but that's neither here nor there. I think the basic\ntrend is going to lead towards a more nationalistic policy, but the\nworst thing we can do is behave like a maiden aunt, clucking our tongue\nwithout having a concrete proposal.\nR:\nAnd, of course, the building nationalism which is not only growing\nin Germany but everywhere -- but particularly in Germany is going\nto be more than assisted, and really increased at a real fast tempo if\nthey can say that the United States is treating Germany as if they are\na God-damned puppet. I mean, here we are trying to do the best we\ncan to improve our relations with the Soviet Union, and the United States\nis talking out of both sides of its mouth. That's what frightens me and,\nas you noticed, the Russians are exploiting that now. The Russians\nand their propaganda -- if they don't believe what the Americans tell\nyou publicly because they are lying to you. What they really think is\nwhat they are saying privately, and what they are saying privately is\nthat you have no right to do anything you want to that helps you. I\nmean, if you don't do what they tell you, why they won't like it.\nK:\nI think we should, in general, applaud detente and specifically\ntrying to stay out of as much of their internal dispute as we possibly can.\nR:\nAnd, three, don't let them do anything.\nDon't agree to\nanything that we don't think is acceptable.\nK:\nWe shouldn't break the back of the people who worked with us\nin Germany for 20 years, but none of this requires Acheson popping off\nand none of this requires public posturing. I think the stance you've\ntaken is the one that I agree with.\nR:\nYou know, we got the NATO allies now in NATO to repeat exactly\nour position; that is, our position is I fine, this is good; we think you\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 7 -\nought to move in this direction, but only on the conditions that you,\nyourself, have stated. The conditions you've stated are that there\nhave to be satisfactory solutions to the problem of Berlin, and we all\nagree what those solutions should be -- certainly in terms of principles.\nThere should be free access; there should be communication between\nthe two parts of Berlin; there should be better postal facilities and better\nphone facilities. All these other things by and large are things that\nthe Russians won't be able to do probably.\nK:\nOn Berlin? Yeah. Well, on Berlin I think there's no disagreement\nat all. On Germany, as between you and me, I think that the trends,\nsimply based on German history and the personalities, are more dangerous\nthan one can deduce from what they are now saying and doing. But still,\nit is beyond our ability to effect by the sort of thing that Acheson is doing.\nR:\nThat's right. But suppose we decide that we should do everything\nwe can to prevent the trend that you are speaking of\nK:\nNo, I don't think.\nR:\nEven if we decided to do that, though, the way to do it is to\nfasten on to Berlin.\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nR:\nBecause the Russians can't get off that hook; if we keep the\nFederal Republic in line, the Federal Republic says there has to be a\nsatisfactory solution to the problem of Berlin; it has to be a solution\nacceptable to the allies. We understand that we can't do anything;\nunless there's a satisfactory solution, we won't ratify the treaty\neither with Russia or Poland. Unless there is a satisfactory solution,\nwe won't have a European Security Conference. We all agree what a\nsatisfactory solution is. NOw the Russians can't accept our satisfactory\nsolution.\nK:\nI feel that the policy we have, in fact, been pursuing over the\nlast year or so is correct.\nR:\nIn the NATO communique\nK:\nYou know, the fact that I think that German [End of tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers (New Tape) (believe this is continuation of\nMr. Kissinger\nprevious tape)\nwhere all it took was for the United States to frown and\nK:\n/ everyone would jump to attention.\nI mean supposing Brandt came to Acheson and said, 'All right, what\ndo you want me to do? What would he tell him?\nR:\nI asked McCloy the other day -- he said that he was afraid\nthat the developments of Ostpolitik would prevent a peace treaty being\nsigned. I said, 'Well, now let me ask you now. Do you seriously\nthink that a peace treaty can be signed? Can we reach a peace?'\nHe said, \"Well, no.\" I said, well, what's your point then. You know,\na peace treaty is out of the question.\nK:\nAnd, you know, so what? Supposing there isn't that much glory\nin a peace treaty for us to sign. He says the Germans are making peace\nwith the Russians without us. Well, you know, so what?\nR:\nYou know, that's what\nDean Rusk was there. He said to\nMcCloy, \"So what, suppose they make a peace treaty we like. What's\nwrong with it? If they make one we don't like, there's a hell of a lot\nwrong with it. \"\nK:\nYeah, but if they do something we don't like, they can do it\nin the form of a lot of other things other than what is called a peace\ntreaty. They are going to/ be the first victims of an unfavorable peace\ntreaty, not we.\nR:\nOf course. And, as a matter of fact, if we decide that they are\nmoving in a direction we don't like or moving in a way which is wrong,\nwe probably by our actions can have the government thrown out.\nK:\nWell, why don't we do this, Bill. We have two problems:\n(1) we have the German one -- let me put that aside for one second.\n(2) we have the problem of these four garrulous old men. I think the\nway to handle that is to let you know ahead of time when the President\nis thinking of calling them, and that way, we avoid any impression --\nand I will do that.\nR:\nI think if we go into it again, I'd better be there because at the\nend of the meeting I would like to say to them, if he is going to have them\n(I think he should quit seeing them) but if he should, I think then we\nshould say to them, 'It is understood that this is not for the purpose\nof having you make statements after you leave. Obviously, if you go\nto the White House, then you come out and have a press conference and\nsay a lot of things, people think you are authorized to say them.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 2 -\nK:\nWell, the thought that they might make statements that was\nprobably naive for the press -- it didn't occur to anybody, so it was\nalways understood that these were private meetings. But I see no\nreason in the world why we can't do it on this basis. (A) They should\nbe kept\nR:\nWhy does the President announce these things to the press\nanyway? Why doesn't he just go ahead and have the meeting. He sees\nsome people without telling the press and other times, he does it.\nK:\nFrankly, what must have happened there -- I had nothing to\ndo with that part of it. Ziegler must have come walking into the office\nand he must have just run through his list with him. But\nR:\nI sometimes think he gets sort of carried away with how much\nnews he's going to make that day.\nK:\nWell, the whole news policy is something that, if it were my\nbusiness, I would express some views on, but I think this watching\nevery day's news summary drives one crazy, and is fruitless.\nR:\nI think so, too.\nK:\nBecause things disappear. Three days later, no one knows\nwhat one was so excited about.\nR:\nRight. And whether you are in the paper every day or not\nIn the first place, the President is bound to get a lot of attention, and\nsecondly, you don't gain anything by trying to get a little more coverage.\nK:\nNow, on the German policy, I think we should just\nMy own\nview is that we shouldn't protest too much one way or the other. We\nshould just say there's a general agreement -- the details we don't get\ninto, or something like that. And on Berlin, play it the way we are\ndoing it.\nR:\nYeah, I think so. So far, the way we've played it in Berlin is\ngood. We've gotten the Russians confused as hell and I don't think\nanything is going to happen between now and their parting Congress.\nK:\nAnd I'll be damned though if I understand what the Germans are\nsaying that we are holding up in Berlin. There has never been a\nproposition that we could accept or that they have asked us to accept.\nR:\nI don't know if they are saying that, have they said that?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 3 -\nK:\nWell, no, they are not saying it as a government. Ehmke said\nit when he was over here or so Joe Kraft claimed but Kraft is such a\nson-of-a-bitch that you can't tell what\nwhether he made it up or\nwhether Ehmke really told him that.\nR:\nKraft just says things like that to get us to respond to find out\nwhat our answer would be if they said it.\nK:\nYeah, yeah.\nR:\nThat's his technique.\nK:\nBut if he\nI think basically on Berlin there is no problem.\nThere oughtn't to be a problem.\nR:\nI don't think there is.\nK:\nOn the basic Ostpolitik, I think that's an artificial crisis, they\nare not doing anything now.\nR:\nThat's right. It is true that there may be a crisis.\nK:\nBut then I think\nI agree with you, we ought to decide it, you\nought to announce it. Certainly you don't want to use Acheson to popping\noff all over the place to set our German policy.\nR:\nWell, Henry, if we decide this -- to have a policy to try to\nannounce public policy and at the same time we want to express some\nreservations privately, let's figure out the best way to express them\nprivately. Just that simple, how do we want to do it? Sure as hell we\ndon't want to do it with Acheson, McCloy, Dewey and Clay.\nK:\nYeah. No, it turned out unfortunately.\nR:\nWe also have a hell of a problem in Japan.\nK:\nWell, what do you think we should do, I am so sick of this thing.\nEverybody and his grandmother has gotten into that act. I thought last\nMay we had it nearly solved when Kendall got into it, then it was happily\nforgotten. I don't know why Sato started the negotiations again if it is\ngoing to cause so much trouble, we didn't want it.\nR:\nYeah, well, I think the thing to do\n...\nK:\nExcuse me (another phone ringing)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 4 -\nK:\nHello.\nR:\nYou've got to go.\nK:\nIn a minute.\nR:\nWell, I think that probably there is nothing to do this next week\nor so, I think if it doesn't work out, I'd like to have the President ask\nme to work with Flanigan. I think I can\nin the case of Okinawa, I\nworked out some language that got us off the Congressional hook pretty\nwell and satisfied Sato and I think it's possible here again. I think\nsomeone like Peter does a hell of a good job -- I think he's much better\nthan Stans but I still think that if we are fairly close to an agreement,\nand I talked to him on the phone last night, I have a feeling that there are\nways that I can figure out to do it that\nK:\nOh, well, if you are willing to do it, why don't we give it until\nthe middle of the week and if then early next week it isn't at an agreement\nR:\nI think probably\nI got a letter\na cable from Aichi asking\nme to take part in it, he is very concerned and their government as\nyou know is afraid they are going to be thrown out. Now maybe there\nis nothing we can do but I am perfectly prepared to do it to see if we\ncan't work out some middle ground, we are fairly close to an agreement.\nK:\nWe are fairly close and during the week the Japanese asked two\nor three things of us which you know I don't understand the issue well\nenough but which seemed to me from a political point of view but the\ntextile industry won't yield now. Our people think that if the textile\npeople don't accept it, it isn't worth having.\nR:\nYeah. Well, anyway I\nIf you remember we had almost the\nsame tie-up, a different way of course, with Okinawa about how we had\nsubmitted to the Congress and how they had submitted to the\nand so forth and we had worked out some language which\nK:\nNo, I think Bill, I agree. Why don't we do this, if by Christmas\nthey haven't come to a solution, I will recommend to the President that\nwe will shift it to you.\nR:\nI wouldn't\nLet's be sure so that Peter doesn't\nK:\nNo, no, Peter can work with you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\n- 5 -\nR:\nThat's right. Just in effect say that this is getting to be you\nknow damn near crisis and that in view of that, that I should take an\nactive role with Peter in it and have Aichi probably too I think because\nhe's upset as hell, naturally. I think maybe I could have\n...\nalthough\npolitically I wouldn't have any weight with the textile people, I think they'd\nbe a little more impressed if I said, for example, you know this could\n...\nK:\nYou're in a much better position to make the political case to\nthem\nR:\nThat's right.\nK:\nand appeal to the national interest than Peter whom they have\nto look at as one of theirs.\nR:\nThat's exactly right. And also I could assure them if they were\non the verge of getting damage that I could assure them that the President\nwould act and I didn;t want to tie him down in express terms because if\nwe tied him down that way it would be unacceptable to the Japanese\nGovernment, they couldn't stand it. Well\nK:\nWell, let's do that if it doesn't get solved by Thursday.\nR:\nYeah, okay.\nK:\nAnd I don't think it will.\nR:\nYeah, I don't think so.\n(laughter)\nK:\nOkay.\nR:\nOkay Henry.\nK:\nRight.\nR:\nRight, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (Tape)\nMr. Kissinger /Bill Hyland\nDecember 21, 1970 -- Page 1\nH:\nReally gave him considerable leeway.\nK:\nBut why couldn't you reason that this was just their mistake, that\nif they hadn't done that, it would have been a good thing to do.\nH:\nOh, I don't think that Gierek for the new regime opposes the treaty\nbut I think they may oppose the whole spirit behind cooperation\nwith Bonn and being at odds with the East Germans and others.\nI can't say for sure\nK:\nOkay, now look here's what I want you to do in this memo for the\nPresident. First, explain briefly what it does in internal politics.\nSecondly, what it means in bloc politics, you know greater voice\nfor the East Germans\nH:\nRight, right.\nK:\nand thirdly, what it does in East-West politics.\nH:\nYeah, okay.\nK:\nNow, do you agree with my assessment, which incidently I just\nwas playing the devil's advocate, I agree with you.\nH:\nOh, (laughter)\nK:\nI mean I can't judge the domestic politics but I agree with you on\nthe other -- on the Ostpolitik.\nH:\nWell, Ulbricht is going to -- this is a windfall for Ulbricht -- he\nis going to blame a great deal of it on Ostpolitik and\nK:\nI agree with this. Now, the next thing I wonder is this, I think the\nRussians may decide is either to toughen up their line generally\nslightly towardsthe whole West or they may decide that they need\nsome detente in the West and it is safer to do it with us than with\nthe Germans.\nH:\nYeah, I think the latter is more likely.\nK:\nDo you agree with that?\nH:\nYeah, I think they will have to cool it with the Germans and end it\nup with us.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland\nDecember 21, 1970 page 2\nK:\nYou think that's right.\nH:\nThat would be my guess, yeah.\nK:\nOkay, will you put that in the memo.\nH:\nYeah, yeah, we can put it in.\nK:\nYou know just say it's speculation, just do a page and a half or so.\nH:\nOne thing I would like to stick in the memo that I have in the draft is\nthat the Russians it's not clear at all whether the Russians were\neven consulted on this and they may be somewhat nervous over Gierek\nbecause he simply is not well-known to them.\nK:\nPut that in, that goes into Bloc politics.\nH:\nYeah, yeah. And the other thing is of course we don't really know how\nthe people are gonna take it, sometimes when a regime shows this kind\nof weakness and instability\nK:\nI think that's exactly right. It gets worse.\nH:\nIt gets worse because the people could think they can get even more.\nK:\nThat's right.\nH:\nSo I would like to have something to say that.\nK:\nNo, I agree but just what you need is a section that says this is what\nhappened and section two, this is what it means inside Poland domestically.\nH:\nRight.\nK:\nThirdly, this is what it means inside Poland foreign policy. Third, this\nis what it means to internal Bloc politics. Fourthly, this is what it means\nfor-the Soviet Union and especially for Soviet foreign policy.\nH:\nOkay.\nK:\nNow can you do that, that's about - but don't make it much more than 2\npages.\nH:\nNo, no, okay.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland\nDecember 21, 1970 -- page 3\nK:\nAnd can you get it over to the President tonight.\nH:\nWell, do you want me to does someone come in and take a look at\nit or what?\nK:\nWell, have you got it finished?\nH:\nJust about, I want to make some\nK:\nWell, why don't you read it to me when -- well make the revisions\nand call me and read it to me.\nH:\nOkay, will you be there for some time or not?\nK:\nAnother hour.\nH:\nOkay, I'll do it easily by then.\nK:\nOkay.\nH:\nOkay, I'll call you back and read you what I have.\nK:\nGood and let's get a CIA assessment.\nH:\nWe've already asked CIA and I&R to do a joint piece for early in the\nmorning.\nK:\nGood.\nH:\nBecause there is stuff coming in, Gearick has made this speech and\nI've seen a summary of it.\nK:\nWhat did it say?\nH:\nWell, he had promised wage increase to some workers and that he\nwould re-examine the plan and then he pledged a loyalty and good\nrelations with the Russians.\nK:\nRight.\nH:\nWhich is about the minimum that could happen.\nK:\nPut that in the memo though.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland\nDecember 21, 1970 -- page 4\nH:\nYeah, I will. Well, I'll call you back then with - - and tell you what's\nin the memorandum.\nK:\nRight.\nH:\nAll right, thank you.\nK:\nAnd just begin it by saying I wanted you to have this preliminary memo\nbut I think speed is almost more important than anything else.\nH:\nAll right. Fine.\nK:\nGood, thank you.\nH:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Bill Hyland\nDecember 21, 1970 -- Page 1\nH:\nThe memo\nK:\nYeah.\nH:\nI've already talked to CIA and State INR.\nK:\nYeah, but I just want to make sure it goes now.\nH:\nYeah, well I have it.\nK:\nOkay.\nH:\nI have a draft.\nK:\nYeah but now look are we gonna -- how many hours will it take to\nget it typed.\nH:\nThe girl's right here, she should be able to do it in about 1/2 hour.\nK:\nOkay, it's got to be there before 8:00.\nH:\nOkay, I can get it there easily by 8:00 if someone knows where to\ntake it.\nK:\nGive it to the usher to take to the President immediately with a\nred tag.\nH:\nOkay, okay.\nK:\nPut it in an envelope -- in a yellow folder with a note\nfrom me.\nH:\nOkay.\nK:\nBut it's got to be there before 8:00.\nH:\nOkay, fine, Well, do you want me to read it to you?\nYeah, quickly.\n/\nK:\nHow long is it?\nH:\nWell, it will be about 2 pages.\nK:\nOkay, go ahead read it.\nH:\nOkay. First sentence (tape went blank).\n(END OF TAPE)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHoped 28\nTELCON\nMr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida\nTape --\nY:\nWe are somewhat confused. Would you kindly explain the situation on\nyour side.\nK:\nYeah.\nY:\nHow should we proceed from now on?\nK:\nWell, the situation on our side is that we can not sell your proposal to\nour industry.\nY:\nI see.\nK:\nThey simply will not have any of it and there's no point in our making\nan agreement since the point of the agreement, the political point, was\nto please the industry.\nY:\nUh-huh.\nK:\nYou understand there's no point in making one that they don't like.\nY:\nThat's right.\nK:\nNow we will see early in the New Year whether we can come up with\nsome compromise that they will like which I then should -- you may tell\nme whether I should give it to you or Oshiba (spelled phonetically)\nY:\nUm-huh\nK:\nBut frankly I am rather sick of this whole enterprise and I just as soon\nnot have too much to do with it anymore.\nY:\nYes I can personally see how you feel.\nK:\nAnd I have to tell you honestly I was outraged when the Chief Editorial\nwriter of the Washington Post was received by your Mr. M\nY:\nYes.\nK:\nAnd was told by him that we were trying to dictate terms as if this were\nthe Battleship Missouri on the textile agreement.\nY:\nThat's right, was that told by Mr. M?\nK:\nThat's right, this was told to Mr. M by\nY:\nYes, yes, the chief editorial writer was here a few days ago.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPage 2\nMr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida\nTape --\nK:\nYeah.\nY:\nDid he write any story?\nK:\nNo because he is an old friend of mine and I didn't tell him the truth\nbut I told him that it wouldn't be fair. But he may still write it, he\njust came back three days ago.\nY:\nI see. That was really too bad, that was really too bad.\nK:\nBut I don't, you know he may yet write it, that's a minor point, I just\ndon't see where we can.go from here. We will try early in the New Year\nto see whether there is some way we can reformulate what you have put\nto us in that telephone conversation.\nY:\nThat's right.\nK:\nAnd if we can, I will come back to you or which would be better to give\nit to you or to give it to your man here?\nY:\nIf it is too troublesome on you personally, then best through your expert\nto his counterpart in your place\nK:\nAll right.\nY:\nin order to avoid any misunderstanding.\nK:\nAll right.\nY:\nWhat if I told you on December 17th from our time over the telephone\nexactly the position of my own friend and is very firm and what Mr. M\nsays this is the final I mean the definite position and if you need some\nmodification on certain specific points, I will press very hard on my own\nfriend in order to meet your need. As you can appreciate on our side,\nmy friend is also in an extremely difficult position\nK:\nOh, yes.\nY:\nand he hasn't got much room\nK:\nThat's why I wonder whether it mightn't be best just to forget the whole\nthing.\nY:\nYes, I think I think you are wise not to go further for the right one.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPage 3\nMr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida\nTape --\nK:\nYou remember I didn't want to start it again.\nY:\nPrecisely, precisely but my friend felt he's not an expert and he felt\na sense of obligation to your friend, wanted to do something and he\nfelt the agreement would be much better than legislation from both sides,\nthat was what he felt.\nK:\nYeah.\nY:\nAnd he made up his mind to go ahead with the negotiations on the\nassumption that we could quickly reach an agreement.\nK:\nYeah.\nY:\nThat you were correct and right but from now on uh uh -- still I personally\nif possible at all would very much like to see an agreement.\nK:\nWell, I will have to see if we can reformulate your proposition.\nY:\nYes.\nK:\nAnd see whether we can put it -- you see our trouble is we have already\ngone beyond what our industry likes.\nY:\nThat's right, that's right.\nK:\nSo we just -- we have no maneuvering room left.\nY:\nThat's right and the same, exactly the same position on our side.\nK:\nOh, yes, it's a very -- it's too bad. It's very much too bad.\nY:\nPersonally I'm sorry to take so much of your time but I personally feel\nif you could succeed and go ahead with the legislation and succeed in doing\nso perhaps that might be best for both of us.\nK:\nMight be better.\nY:\nThat is my personal feeling.\nK:\nYeah\nY:\nDo you feel that way?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPage 4\nMr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida\nTape --\nK:\nWell, I am beginning to think that way but\nY:\nBut since we have come all that way and as I recall you said in October\nfrom that meeting you took a calculated risk in making that first\ncommunique with a view to reach an agreement to the open negotiations.\nK:\nWell, I thought I could count on the assurances.\nY:\nSo did I.\nK:\nIt is very damaging to my friend to have made promises now twice but\nthat's neither here nor there, if it can't be done we also don't want to\nweaken the position of your friend.\nY:\nThat's right, that's right so if there is still some hope of reaching an\nagreement, then I would certainly do my very best to press very hard\non my own friend to modify some of the specific points\n???\nand on your side I'm afraid we will have to ask you to try to reformulate\nwhat I told you over the telephone.\nK:\nYeah, I understand.\nY:\nSo that -- we will try to reach an agreement.\nK:\nWell, I will try to -- I will be back to you early in January.\nY:\nEarly in January.\nK:\nRight.\nY:\nFine, in the meanwhile and this is a technical question, as we understand\non the 30th of December two experts having lunch.\nK:\nYes.\nY:\nOur expert invited yours for lunch. Should we -- should my friend tell\nour expert about the substance of what I told you over the phone so that\nover the lunch they could discuss on substance or should we make it just\na social engagement.\nK:\nWell then it will leak if he tells it to your expert.\nY:\nThat's right, that's right.\nK:\nWell, let me check with Mr. F and I'll let you know.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPage 5\nMr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida\nTape --\nY:\nI see and uh uh we are suffering heavily from the question of decrease,\nso if it is better to hold it\nK:\nI will let you know.\nY:\nThen perhaps we had better keep it until I hear something from you\nearly next month.\nK:\nRight, I will be in touch with you about it.\nY:\nFine.\nK:\nOkay.\nY:\nI am sorry to disturb you but\nK:\nNo, no disturbance and I will talk to you soon.\nY:\nI would very much like to get out of this very difficult situation on\nboth sides since the prestige of your friend and mine.\nK:\nYeah, this is why I think you people should keep quiet in making\nunfriendly comments about what we are doing in these negotiations.\nY:\nExactly so would you mind if I tell my own friend about Mr. M's recent\ncomment.\nK:\nNo, not at all.\nY:\nAnd keep him quiet.\nK:\nI would appreciate it if you could.\nY:\nAll right, I will do that.\nK:\nAll right.\nY:\nWould you mind just repeating again what Mr. M told the editor?\nK:\nHe said that what we were doing in the textile negotiations was like\ntrying to make you come to the Battleship Missouri and you would never\naccept that humiliation.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPage 6\nMr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida\nTape --\nY:\nI see. That's too bad, too bad. He should never have said that, never\nsaid it. We will see to it that he keeps quiet and behaves himself.\nK:\nAll right. Well, we have the same problem on our side sometimes.\nY:\nYes. The reason we are somewhat confused was Mr. S's comment for\nsubstan\nbut during our understanding of the situation so\nK:\nWhich comment?\nY:\nI hope to hear from you again and until then because this question\nof decrease of what I called you would be held here with my own friend.\nK:\nGood.\nY:\nAnd our expert in your place does not know the precise\nK:\nNo, my expert does know.\nY:\nAt this moment he doesn't know the precise\nK:\nNo, our expert knows, yours doesn't.\nY:\nI see, all right.\nK:\nOur expert is fully familiar with it.\nY:\nI see, all right so then in that case in order to keep this line of\ncommunication absolutely confidential perhaps we have to do something\nabout it. So, would you kindly\nK:\nI will let you know next week whether you should instruct your expert.\nY:\nYes and in that case, would you please take into account that this\nmight be leaked on our side unfortunately.\nK:\nRight, good.\nY:\nThank you very much and I hope to hear from you soon.\nK:\nYes, we will be in touch with each other.\nY:\nThank you very much.\nK:\nGoodbye.\nY:\nGoodbye.\n[End of Tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nSecretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger\nK:\nHello. Bill?\nR:\nHi, Henry. How are you? I want to talk to you about this\nGerman situation. Were you in there when the President talked to\nDewey and McCloy?\nK:\nOh, yeah.\nR:\nWell, did he tell them to [let me get everybody off the phone\nhere -- just a second, I've got my grandchildren here and they're on\nthe phone, I think. Hold on. ] Did he indicate to them he wanted\nthem to sort of sound off.\nK:\nAbsolutely, definitely, totally not ! It had absolutely.\nYou\nknow, you have heard him on what he thinks of Ostpolitik, and he may\nhave made a few remarks to that effect. I'll let you see the notes.\nI've got them. As I told you, the purpose of the meeting -- the primary\npurpose was to avoid a meeting with the Arms Control group and to\ngive McCloy a chance to sound off. Most of what McCloy said had\nnothing to do with Brandt, but had to do with something that we had\nalready done; namely, not withdraw troops. Two-thirds was the speech\nhe always makes. Then he made a few comments about Brandt. Then\nAcheson made what he's now said to every newspaper. The President\nmade a few general remarks, and then they talked also about other\nthings. But the purpose of the meeting was in no sense\nIt was\na total accident that it came about at that time.\nR:\nWell, it's causing a hell of a lot of problems. We are running\ninto a real head-on struggle with it with the Germans because they\njust think we are lying to them. I guess you saw the article in the\nTIMES this morning.\nK:\nYeah, but they have sent us a cable saying they've been trying\nto kill that. Have you seen that?\nR:\nNo, but whether they were or weren't, the fact is that this is\nhow they think. And Acheson, instead of keeping\n, he said\nit again in the paper. He reasserted what he said.\nK:\nYeah, well, that's inexcusable.\nR:\nYou know, if the President wants to create a crisis with the German\ngovernment.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}