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TELECON (Tape
Mr. Kissinger/Pat Buchanan (?)
April 3, 1971
K:
I can't even get you to come to my office anymore.
B:
No, I was called to a higher authority.
K:
Listen, now. If you are going to take that attitude, you haven't got
your priorities straight, as the Peaceniks would say.
B:
Listen, the President wants us to get together. I've come down and
dug up this
K:
He wants to go over the conclusions and wants me to look at what some
of you other guys said.
B:
Right; I'm getting that together and I'll bring it on out to you in about.
How far away are you?
K:
Where are you now?
B:
I am at the compound. You got me up, if you must know the truth,
and I haven't eaten breakfast or shaved yet. How about coming
What is
it 10:00?
B:
Yeah.
K:
How about 10:45?
B:
Okay; we'll see you then. All right.
K:
And it's five minutes drive.
B:
Okay, fine.
K:
Good.
B:
We'll see you then. Take it easy.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Telecon (Tape)
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
April 3, 1971
K:
Hello, Mel.
L:
How are you?
K:
Okay; how are you?
L:
Ve ry good. Say, did you get that memorandum all right.
K:
I did. Thank you, and the President has got it and is studying it.
L:
Very good. Now, I kind of held that in line with what I thought you
were working on.
K:
That's right.
L:
And didn't go overboard at all on it.
K:
Well, it's more than the military want, of course.
L:
Well, yeah, but the military
hell, they would want to bring it down
to about 8, 000, but they've always been about 20%.
Their recommendation
has been 20% below the President's always. So it's about the same as you would
expect. So I don't think we are too far offf.
K:
Well the President has got it right in front of him now.
L:
Do you need any more material?
K:
No, I think, Mel, that this gives us
Frankly, I don't know what he is
going to pick and whether he is coming in on which of these three choices. But
or what length of time.
L:
The situation is such that he's got to at least go 12, 500, and he could go
a little more if he really wants to, Henry.
K:
Yeah, well that's what your recommendation is.
L:
Yeah; well, I can see we could even go up to 15, 000 if he really feels
he has to.
K:
Well, I don't think that that's his mood. But I'll tell him that.
L:
If he really feels he has to, I can give him one that's a little more than that
but I just didn't think I'd put it in there because I thought these were, you know,
reasonable things. But if he wants one worked out for a little more, I'll work one
out for him.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird (Tape)
April 3, 1971
- 2 -
K:
Well, I think we better not, Mel, for the time-being. If we need it,
I know we can get it and I'll ask for it.
L:
Yeah. I thought that would be a better way to handle it.
K:
I think that's the more
that's the fairer way of handling it, and there's
less danger of anything leaking and so forth. Not that this will leak either.
L:
There's one thing, Henry. I wonder if you or the President -- now that
he's in this -- shouldn't read the Pearce Commission Report which I've put a
clamp of secrecy on.
K:
Oh, yes.
L:
Because sooner or later, that thing will.
you know, we are keeping it
now classified on the basis that it would prejudice.
might prejudice the
judicial process. Now there are some people who have read it and I think you
should know that.
K:
Like who?
L:
Eddie Hébert.
K:
Yeah.
L:
He read it, and Stennis has read parts of it. The parts on the sex offenses,
sodomy and rape. I wouldn't let them use those in the prosecution, but they are
in that report.
K:
Well, let me check with Ehrlichman what he thinks we should do on that.
I know somebody at the White House ought to read it.
L:
Somebody ought to read that God-damned report, Henry. But I don't want
to get that thing so circulated. We've got to handle it very carefully because I'm
going to try to keep that bottled up for another 12 months. There' be a great
demand to make that public. You know, McCrade(?) who is Rockefeller's counsel
is going to take the President on on this thing.
K:
But he's no longer Rockefeller's counsel. Is he still?
L.
Yeah.
K:
But why the hell should he do it?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird (Tape)
April 3, 1971
- 3 -
L:
Well, he was the Counsel for the Pearce Commission.
K:
Let me talk to Rockefeller and see whether I can get him shut up a bit.
What do you think?
L:
I think he's been talking a little bit to much, I think, to some of our friends
on the New York Times and some other places; and I just hate to have this whole
damn thing surfaced because
you know, these guys all think the President
is going too far in this thing.
K:
Well, so far, he's just on the line, I think. If he had gone one step further
he'd be dead.
L:
Well, if Ehrlichman wouldn't have had that backgrounder, we'd have been
a lot better off and if they'd have gone just with the statement, because Latimer
now is going to use that backgrounder.
K:
On what grounds?
L:
On the grounds that the President is going to use some unfortunate thing
in non-legal review and so forth, and so on. We've got to be damn careful about
this, Henry. You know, I'm not an old woman about it, or anything
K:
No, I was on your side with it. I didn't think it was a good idea for us to
get into it if we could avoid it.
L:
I thought we could have handled a lot of these things XXXXXXX quietly, but
you know, sometimes these things make a plus for 24 hours, but you've got to be
damned careful, Henry.
K:
Well, Mel, let me
L:
You know, I'm worried about this more than anybody else, and I just think
we've got to be very careful.
K:
Well, let me see what I can do about.
what I can find out about getting
somebody to look at this report. I've
I frankly don't want to do it myself.
XXXX I don't want to get into that review process.
L:
I think it's better if you don't, but somebody ought to. I don't even think
Bill should read it. Bill thought maybe he should read it.
K:
Who, Rogers?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird (Tape)
April 3, 1971
- 4 -
L:
Yeah, and I said, "Bill, you shouldn't read it. 11
K:
No; Bill ought to stay out of it, too. It's a loser.
L:
But I think some body should read it so that they know what.
and we can
keep
you know, the press is after it. We will not give it to them. I'll just
stand firm on that.
K:
Okay, Mel. Good.
L:
Are there any other problems.
K:
No; none that I.. Will you keep an eye on whether there are any significant
North Vietnamese offensives that we may be hit with in the next week or so so that
the President doesn't say anything that will get us into trouble?
L:
Yeah. Well, they are being very quiet right now.
K:
That's what it looks like. What are our casualties going to be this week?
L:
Well, they' be about 83.
K:
That's including those 33?
L:
We don't have all of them in there, but we have about half of them in.
K:
Yeah. But they should start dropping now, shouldn't they?
L:
Well, I hope so. The only trouble is we've got about.
we've got those
missing in Laos that we haven't gotten fully reported yet because we haven't gotten
their bodies.
K:
Yeah, yeah.
L:
If you'll look on your report this morning, you'll see that we have the
number that is still our missing, and those
most of those will be dead.
K:
Okay, Mel. Those are the only things we've got now.
L:
Okay. That report on the casualties won't come out until Thursday
morning.
K:
Right.
L:
Okay, Henry.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird (Tape)
April 3, 1971
- 5 -
K:
I will keep you posted.
L:
You think the material on the report is all you need -- the report I sent
out to you? You don't need anymore today?
K:
I don't think so, Mel. I think that really
It's a first-class piece of
work -- very, very thoughtful.
L:
Well, if you need some more material or anything, let me know.
K:
I don't think so, Mel. I'll let you know just as soon as I know anymore.
He is secluded and working away.
L:
Very good.
K:
Thank you, Mel. Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELECON (Tape)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
Brought in 4/4/71
P:
Hello, Henry.
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Let me cover a couple of things. First, I just talked to Buchanan and
my main concern now is to get some more thoughts on the concluding part
on which, you know, you sent a memorandum in. We've got really three
different ideas here, all of which may or may not be worthwhile. You know,
Safire had his
Buchanan's got some ideas; you've got some; and I have some,
too. Buchanan pulled some of them together. So, I've asked him to come over
doesn't he
as soon as he's in the office. Why XXXXXXX/jus sit down and talk with you about
it and have you just look over
First of all, we have perhaps our major
problem
Let me put it this way. The major problem is to get it tight get
it down so that it isn't too long. At the present time, it'll run
It's got to
be no more than 4 or 5 minutes of that concluding part, you see, or otherwise
you lose them, if you just go on and on and on.
K:
Right. Absolutely.
P:
So, I am taking.
On the other part of it, I'm getting it honed down now
the first part. It's moving along all right. But this part is actually the most
important and the most difficult, so Buchanan as you will note in the stuff that
he pulled together, he's got much of the material you suggested, and he's got a
little of the Safire, some of my own
I put in some, for example, about the
American soldier. That's the way to handle the Calley thing not that we are
talking about Calley, but you've got to say something about the 2-1/2 million
Americans
K:
Absolutely.
P:
That we can be proud of them. But it's too long at this point. But what I
would like for you to do is just sit down and look at it as editor and then put him
back to the drawing board to
you know, stuff that should be in and out and how
we can tighten it. I would say I wouldn't expect anything for about three hours so
if that sounds all right to you, we'll do it. That's where I really need the help
is on the conclusion.
K:
Is he coming over to my.
Well, I'll get in touch with him, Mr. President.
P:
I don't know where he is actually. I just talked to him on the phone. I
think he's still at his apartment.
K:
Well, I'll find him.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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The President/Mr. Kissinger
Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)
- 2 -
P:
He'll be at the office.
K:
I'll be over there.
P:
He'll either come to your house or there. It doesn't make any difference.
You can work any place.
K:
Right.
P:
Fine; fine. There are a couple of other things I want to ask about.
What is -- with regard to that
I notice in the Los Angeles Times that village
they tore up
Foize had a pretty good piece on that, didn't he, about where
did you see it -- on the atrocity
K:
I haven't seen it yet, Mr. President.
P:
That was a pretty bad thing, wasn't it?
K:
Yes. They killed about 100 people
You mean the North Vietnamese
attack on that village.
P:
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
But that was their atrocity.
K:
That was absolutely
And it's typical.
P:
It's typical. Hell, it's
at least somebody I don't know whether
the television ever used it -- the difficulty is
I may get this in some place
that the difficulty is that in this war we always see what we have done. We never
see what they have done.
K:
Exactly.
P:
Well, anyway, it's a tough one. Now, the second thing is
K:
And there's one other big difference. For them terror has been
I
don't know whether you would want to say that because this isn't a speech.
but
it is a fact that for them, terror has been a regular part of the strategy. In our
case, it has been a abberation when it's happened.
P:
Exactly. Oh, I know. It's so hard to get into that I'm afraid we can't
I'll do that with the editors. You know what you come down to. They would be
giving Calley a medal. We give him a trial.
K:
That's right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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The President/Mr. Kissinger
Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)
- 3 -
P:
That's
the difference between the two. Let me ask you one other
thing. What is the
I noticed here that one wire report or something out about
the North Vietnamese attacking in some area
What I'm just thinking is that
is there something going on right now that may hit before we go on on Wednesday?
K:
Well, of course, they know your date, and they can always attack something.
There's no major campaign going on. They attacked a fire base in the highlands
last week, and overran part of it and then either were driven off or left while
P:
That actually was what this story is about.
K:
But they had very heavy casualties.
P:
That's right. In fact, they said 1500 casualties and only 2 Americans
were killed in the whole damn thing.
K:
That's right. Well, the Americans concern 700 casualties, but nevertheless.
I mean 700 North Vietnamese. Still they took very heavy casualties.
spasm
P:
I really think your judgment with regard to the
theory
is
right. As a matter of fact, Henry, when you look back on what they were doing
in Cambodia. Those were little spasms when they started to cut roads and raise
hell.
K:
That's right.
P:
You know, after the sanctuary operation, they were rushing in. They
didn't have a hell of a lot of staying power. They couldn't stay any place they
went.
K:
That's exactly right. And here, where they think they have the
psychological momentum.
P:
You see, my point is that I don't want to be
just have lack of credibility
when I speak fairly confidently.
K:
Well, I think you are quite safe, Mr. President. I have been telling all
the newsmen and television guys. We cannot prevent.
we cannot predict whether
they' do a high point now and then, or a series of high points, and they have
always the choice between putting more into a high point and then having less
protracted war. But we are talking about an average rate and on that I know you
are going to stand.
P:
Right. I'm confident about it, as you know, but what I'm concerned about,
Henry, is only that the TV the night you go on -- or at any extent
Well,
anyway, understand I'm just
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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The President/Mr. Kissinger
Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)
- 4 -
K:
Right. No, I don't think.
Well, it's just hard to say whether they
are going to make a big attack the night you go on.
P:
No, no, no. It isn't that. I meant whether there is any big attack they
can sustain. It doesn't look like that.
K:
No, it doesn't
P:
If we had had something, then I would want to hedge pretty strongly in
the speech.
K:
It doesn't look that way now, but we will watch that very carefully.
P:
But as far as
You see, I haven't been reading the reports this
week. As far as that's concerned, the level of activity apparently has not
been too
K:
It's been actually dropping except for this attack on the firebase. It's
been dropping in the Lam Son area.
P:
Right. And the ARVN apparently is doing a little attacking of its own.
K:
That's right. The ARVN, of course, except for the units that were in
Lam Son, is unaffected by this. And we have a long cable in from Bunker about
all the psychological measures.they are taking.
P:
What's he say?
K:
They are having rallys all over the country. The TV is playing it in a
certain way, and they have a sense, he claims, of great accomplishment. And
it's interesting that the opposition parties the Buddhists have XXXXX passed
a resolution supporting their armed forces and taking pride ;in the cross-border
operations.
P:
You know, it's a funny thing about patriotism. Even South Vietnamese
sometimes don't like to see their boys lose. And if we get a little of that going
there, Henry, we've got a lot going with us, haven't we?
K:
That's absolutely right. And I think that's involved in this country, too.
P:
We
hope
so,
yeah.
The one point I think
If I could just say -- I didn't
mention this to Buchanan -- but when you are talking to
him.
I feel that the
important thing here is not just to make this blood, sweat and tears. You understand.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)
- 5 -
I think that people have had so much of that, you know. You've got to grin
and bear it.
K:
No, they've got to have some hope, too.
P:
There's got to be
It must have lift, and we've got to speak with
confidence and so forth and therefore the negatives with regard to 'well, even
though
this
means
a
defeat.
I mean I'm inclined to think that we ought to
in terms of tone, it should be more one of 'well, we are coming to the end.
Confident. You know what I mean. Just.
They've just got to be reassured.
The American people right now, you know, are in sort of a psychological
depression and the reason they are in that depression, Henry, is this God-damned
television.
K:
That's right.
P:
It's just been pounding them night after night. It is just shameful.
Look what it does to people. No wonder it depresses them. So what we have
to do is to cheer them up a little. I have rewritten the beginning in a very
I mean
you don't have to look at any of that. I don't want anybody to waste
any time on the meat and potatoes -- I'll take care of that, until I get it done
in the way I want to say it, and then it's the conclusion where we need some
good extra thinking. But the beginning, rather than just starting out, you know,
'well, I'm going to announce.
I'm announcing tonight.
1
I'm going to start
right out probably in something like this. "Over the past several weeks, you
have heard a number of discouraging reports on TV, radio and in your newspapers
on the situation in Southeast Asia. I think the time has come for me, as
President and as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, to put these reports
in perspective -- to lay out all the pertinent facts before you -- and to let you
judge for yourself as to the success of our policy. I'm glad to be able to begin
my report with some good news. On May 1st. 11 You see what I mean.
Start right out that way. You don't just start out and say, well, in the old way
'I'm announcing tonight a new withdrawal. I think the people -- you disarm
them immediately by saying 'look, you've been hearing a lot of stuff, but now
I just want to tell you, tain't all that bad'. See.
K:
And I would put in.
I would perhaps go a little further and not just say,
"It's not that bad. 11 I'd say, "In fact, (something like) we believe that the events
this year have been a plus" or something like this.
P:
I've got that in later.
K:
"And as a result, we can increase
" to show some relationship
between what has happened.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)
- 6 -
P:
Oh, that's all in. It's not the first paragraph. Then I go into the
open item after I get through with Laos. I just make (train going by --
unintelligible) And it's because of that
because of Cambodia, etc., that
we are able to do what we are doing. Oh, well, don't worry. That's all in
there because it's true.
K:
Right.
P:
Don't even think about that part of it. Just think about the last part.
In other words, the concluding thoughts and think in terms of the stuff you
prepared which you will note a lot of it is in what Buchanan's put together.
He
just
sort
of
and it was my suggestion.
scissors and paste. He put
in your stuff, some that he had, a little of Safire's, an idea that I had on the
armed forces, but it runs twice as long as it should, and also it doesn't have
any structure. But you sit down and talk and put him back and see what he
can come up with. In the meantime, I'll probably end up writing most of it
myself, but.
K:
But it may be a help.
P:
It's always a help to get some phrases and some ideas as to what should
be left in and what should be left out.
K:
Well, I'll call him this minute.
P:
No, no, no. There's no hurry. He'll be ready and you can have at it.
Be sure to sit outside today. That's the place to work.
K:
Well, I've got a great porch so I'll probably sit there.
P:
I have the general feeling that what we are really at at this time with
the doves running off.
you know, the Calley thing, of course, got some of the
hawks even saying let's get the hell out.
is that it's like always -- the last of
a war. As I've often said, the darkest month of the Civil War was August of
1964, and the brightest was September. So what the hell. But nevertheless,
this isn't that kind of war. But the point is that at this time the country is in
sort of that kind of a funk, and this isn't going to pull them out of it. All it is
going to do is to sort of say, well, we'll just give them a little more chance.
That's about all we are doing, see.
K:
Well, but that may be all that is needed.
P:
Maybe. And, also, it could be that the over-reaction of the doves and
of the media and so forth may now be compensated for. If the reactions you are
getting from some of your press guys are at all reflectors in what they do or
write, they'll begin to compensate a bit, you know. They don't like to be out
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)
- 7 -
just being completely wrong. Correct?
K:
Absolutely. And they have this uneasy feeling that there's something
going on in the country. This I think is excellent.
P:
You really feel that, do you?
K:
Oh, yes.
P:
Of course, some of them are trying to interpret that as being really
just war weariness.
K:
Well, but it's
P:
But they don't really believe that.
K:
They know it's the war weariness of the hawks who'd really like to win.
P:
Yeah. And that worries them, huh?
K:
And that worries them.
P:
I know you said it worried Hubbard. Is there anybody else that it
worries?
K:
Well, all the newsmen I saw Friday afternoon, for example. Deacon(?)
for example.
P:
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
K:
The TV guys yesterday. And I have found.
I haven't seen today's
papers yet, but the play of the news is no longer quite as negative in a subtle
way.
P:
Isn't it, really?
K:
No, no. They gloating are beginning now to report some of the achievements on
Laos and the hysterical/tone is out of it to a considerable extent.
P:
The gloating over the defeat.
K:
Over what they considered the defeat.
P:
Huh -- really?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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The President/Mr. Kissinger
Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)
- 8 -
K:
Yes.
P:
Well, you watch it. I'm deliberately isolating myself from those
day-to-day reports because I must -- if I get involved in that, I will not do
the thing effectively. I think it's very important for me to be absolutely
above it, detached from it, and just plow right ahead.
K:
I think that's right.
P:
These damn reports
That's the purpose of those really. As much
as anything else those guys are trying to get me.
K:
Well, that's the
P:
Wouldn't it really kill them if they knew I don't read them.
K:
It already kills them that you are so serene. Everyone keeps asking me.
P:
Really?
K:
About 80% come in and say, "Now tell me the truth. Is the President
really SO calm? or is he nervous?" I said I've never seen him waver in any
of these periods.
P:
That burns them up, doesn't it?
K:
You know, they are used to Johnson rooting around and beating his
breast.
P:
I saw Kennedy the day after the Bay of Pigs and, boy, I tell you. If ever
I had seen a guy who had lost his cool, that was one.
K:
Oh, God, yes.
P:
And that was, of course, crap. Nothing to that.
K:
Well, that was a one-shot operation.
P:
Well, it was easy to handle, too.
K:
From which it was easy to recover.
P:
Just announce going to the moon. That's all. Well, anyway, if the
serenity bugs them, they'l get bugged with that because we've just got to plow
right ahead on that score. Well, we've done that all along, of course. I think
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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The President/Mr. Kissinger
Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)
- 9 -
that bugged them in the November 3rd period and in the Cambodia period,
too.
K:
It bugged them, for example
Now, this is sort of taken for granted
P:
There isn't one student of a Harvard professor that could stand up to
me for five minutes in a debate.
K:
That's what they don't like about you.
P:
There's not one of them that could stand up for one of those press
conferences without a note. 'Cause they don't teach that anymore.
K:
Exactly. And also the way you have everything organized. You know
when you can say to Howard K. Smith, "The following are the three points --
1, 2, 3 in grammatical sentences.
P:
That's right. There's not one of their students who could do that. And
none of them could.
K:
Well, none of them could because they don't teach them anymore to be
that disciplined in their thinking.
0.
The other thing, though.
The point I didn't make to Bob is the difference
of the press with Johnson than with me is that they were willing to tear Johnson
to shreds but a little leery for a reason because they knew the alternative.
Johnson was not necessarily one of theirs, but Nixon.
or
a
Republican.
But
now,
you see, they are willing to tear me to shreds without (unintelligible) is that they
know that the alternative to me is one of theirs, see. Therefore, that's why they
are going all out for
Haldeman didn't understand that -- the fact that.
K:
Well, and what they do to you that they didn't do to Johnson is this constant
nagging away at every little thing on top of the big things [Tape ran out]
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TELCON (TAPE)
Pat Buchanan/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971
K:
Pat.
B:
Yeah.
K:
The President asked me to check with you what you thought of the
new draft.
B:
Geez, I just took it back to my office and locked it up.
K:
You haven't read it yet?
B:
No.
K:
Okay. He just wants to make damn sure you don't show it to anyone
also.
B:
Oh, don't worry about that. I locked it up myself.
K:
Okay, fine.
B:
Okay.
K:
Good.
B:
Don't worry.
K:
No, no, but that isn't the main thing; he wanted to get your quick
reaction.
B:
Okay, well, tell him I haven't read it yet. I'll come in early and
do the news summary and give it a reading and get it over to him.
K:
Right. Now, remember, Pat, at this stage of the game confidence
is more important than perfection.
B:
Okay, fine, okay.
K:
You know, if you have a violent objection, you should make it.
B:
You mean to the speech.
K:
Yeah but I mean, the main thing he's got to get now is confidence.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Pat Buchanan/Mr. Kissinger
April 5, 1971 -- 9:15 p.m
B:
Right, right. I agree with you fully, especially after getting back
to reading some of these news reports. This is a bad atmosphere
around here.
K:
Exactly and you know everyone is going to be beating away at him to
cave.
B:
Yeah.
K:
Okay?
B:
Righteo.
K:
Thank you.
B:
Take it easy.
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TELCON (TAPE)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971
K:
Mr. President
P:
Yeah.
K:
I've just talked to Pat and he actually hasn't read it yet, he locked
it up in his safe and he was at home.
P:
Oh, yeah -- fine, well, that's okay.
K:
But I'm positive what he will think.
P:
Okay.
a chance to change
.
K:
Right.
P:
Pretty hard to tell
.
K:
Well, I think that's right.
P:
Cause I don't want it to get around and have the staff start nitpicking
me.
K:
They all want you to score a homerun by giving in to what they think
are the pressures and I don't think it can be done that way. I think if
we get ahead of the game, then we can play the peace situation.
P:
Well, there's no homerun to be scored because there's not -- really
nothing more that we can do.
K:
No. Anything more we do, we might just as well leave.
P:
as much as the traffic can
bear.
K:
And mar e.
P:
A little more.
K:
A little more.
P:
probably as much as we can possibly
.
I will just play it pretty cool and sort of nonchalantly.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 2
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971
K:
Right, Mr. President.
P:
.
K:
Oh, no; no, no.
P:
.
K:
No, and I'll go the way you suggested. I'll just give them the
impression that you might be leaning their way.
P:
Well, not too much.
K:
No.
P:
Not leaning their way.
K:
Oh, but I mean that you were listening to it.
P:
That I had listened to everything, that I've got to make my decision
they have been hearing from all the fellows here, of course, that have
been bombarded by
They are both fine newsmen, of course, but their story on Calley --
aren't we to blame, you know. Good, God, I mean -- this business
of aren't we to blame
shouldn't Americans
consider
responsible for these atrocities
.
K:
It's a rough mood.
P:
It's rough, yeah. Also it was kind of rough if you remember when we
went into Cambodia and it's rough -- it's tougher now, a year later,
but all right.
K:
On the other hand one knows what is right and --
P:
That's what we are doing and I'm not going allow
people running people and so forth and force them to do something
force them to believe
pitiful -- you know, it makes
Look kids, we're sorry for all this -- you know, I mean
K:
Yes.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 3
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p. m., April 5, 1971
P:
They wouldn't -- I know that most
but a hell of a lot is on the line here.
K:
For our future as a country and as a people.
P:
Yeah, you've got to put that on the line -- that it doesn't turn out
to be
and be able to say all right, choose the other
way, that's the whole
.
K:
That's right.
P:
If you can do that, we did it just for you.
K:
Exactly.
P:
The whole line.
K:
But I still can't believe it will come to that.
P:
No, I don't think so either but
.
I like the reaction of some of them
after the Howard K. Smith thing -- Hatfields
basically a pretty weak-kneed bunch.
K:
Oh, that is our tragedy, Mr. President.
P:
Yeah.
K:
That every battle you've had to fight alone.
P:
Well, we've got some battlers, we've got a few of our Southerners
in the Senate. There is Jerry Ford, like a rock.
K:
Yeah.
P:
And to his credit Tiger
, Griffin and a few Southerners stand up --
a few like Ford and Scott
last week
.
K:
That was amazing.
P:
After he reads the News magazine
shift it around.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 4
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p. m., April 5, 1971
tuned
/
K:
Well, he's got his ear pretty closely to the ground. I don't think
the news magazines affect the public, they affect the intellectuals.
P:
They affect the politicians
So that's the way it will be. Fine, Henry, thank you.
K:
Right.
Further conversation -- 10:15 p.m.
K:
Mr. President
taking a
P:
Oh, Henry, I was just / look at the Star tonight and Boggs
K:
On Hoover
P:
K:
Goddammit.
P:
K:
Yes.
P:
K:
Right.
P:
What I'd like you to do
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 5
The President/Mr. Kissinger
10:15 p.m., April 5, 1971
K:
To call whom?
P:
Johnson -- President Johnson.
K:
President Johnson, yes.
P:
K:
Right.
P:
K:
Right.
P:
K:
Yes.
P:
K:
Not at all, I'll do it this minute.
P:
K:
Right.
P:
K:
I'll do it this minute, Mr. President.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON (TAPE)
President Johnson/Mr. Kissinger
April 5, 1971
K:
Mr. President, we just came back from San Clemente. The
President wanted me to call you before he gave his speech on
Wednesday to tell you that no matter what you read in the newspaper
and that's just for your information, he has no intention of
stampeding out of Vietnam and of throwing away of what so many
brave men have suffered for and he thought you should particularly
know that.
J:
Well, I'm glad to hear it.
K:
And that no matter what the pressures are on us, we will keep
up some withdrawals but it won't be what the newspapers keep saying.
J:
Well, it's good, Henry, glad to hear it. What speech -- giving one
tonight?
K:
Wednesday night. I'll call you on Wednesday, he's still playing with
some of the figures and we're still talking to Thieu about it but it's
going to be within the range of things we've done before.
J:
Well, don't worry about me, just go on and do what you think you
ought to do and I'll be for it. I hope you come down to the Library
opening.
K:
Definitely, Mr. President.
J:
I sure do -- I particularly want you to be here.
K:
Well, Mr. President, I wouldn't miss it. I've already we're
coming down with two airplanes as a matter of fact but I have already
asked the President to put me on the list and he's agreed.
J:
I don't want you to get out of the government any sooner than you have
to but when you do, I want you to come down here and teach our people
some of the things you know at the school of public affairs.
K:
Well, you're very generous, Mr. President.
J:
No, I'm not generous, I just want to do something for my people.
K:
Mr. President, there was one other matter that the President wanted
me to raise with you. HaleBoggs made a very sharp attack on Hoover
today apparently, I haven't seen it myself. And he wondered whether
anything could be done to quiet him down a little bit.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 2
President Johnson/Mr. Kissinger
April 5, 1971
J:
I hope so, I'm surprised -- I talked to him yesterday, he didn't say
a word about it.
K:
Cause he's actually a great patriot but he sometimes gets a little
enthusiastic.
J:
Well, liberal pressures I guess. That damn school of yours - - - yall
close Harvard for a while, we'd get along better.
K:
Oh God, I mean -- (laughter) I'm getting some of what you people
were exposed to for 4 years now. They are suddenly discovering
villainess in my character that were well hidden for many years.
J:
Tell the President I will do anything in the world that I can because I
think he's been a good public servant and I'll do everything I can -- I
don't know but I called Hale -- had a long talk with him yesterday and
I'm surprised.
K:
Right, Mr. President. I will be calling you on Wednesday.
J:
Thank you. Don't take any of your time on me because you've already
got me.
K:
Well, no, but you --
J:
Very thankful that you are in the Government.
K:
Well, you are very generous, Mr. President, and it's a privilege
to be working with you even if it's infrequent.
J:
I appreciate all the President's trying to do and you are not going to
have any problem out of me.
K:
We know that, we are calling you out of respect for what you've done.
J:
Well, thank you, Henry.
K:
Right. Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON (TAPE)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971
K:
Hello, Mr. President.
P:
Hello, Henry. Well, since you've gotten back have you been
infected yet with the Washington virus?
K:
Not yet, Mr. President. I think we are on the right course. I have
read the speech over and I think it is very strong now.
P:
It's a pretty good speech, I think.
K:
I think it's an excellent speech.
P:
It's got a lot of
Let me just say that I think it's important.
I told Rose to tell Buchanan and you the same thing - both you and
Buchanan say you don't know what the hell's going to be in it.
K:
Right. Well, I haven't even shown it to Haig.
P:
It's very important that you do that for the reason that I might
change it. And second, I think it's just as well to know that
because I know that we get the usual staff jitters and from the Congress
saying to do this and that.
K:
Yes.
P:
But I understand all this. They are all wobbling around and hell,
I'm just not going to let them think they affected me one way or the other.
K:
Absolutely, Mr. President.
P:
I know the point is the fellows all think they can tell me things
I don't know but I'm aware of those things, I know them more deeply than
they do.
K:
Well, John Scali called this evening and he had a number of hot ideas
but you know that is a centrum of all the people who just leave the news field.
P:
Um-humm.
K:
They want to do it the other way -- in the traditional way.
P:
What is his idea?
K:
Well, he doesn't have a concrete idea, he just wants some sort of
smashing announcement that would defuse everything.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 2
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971
P:
Now, what the hell would we do; you mean like announce we are going
to get out tomorrow or
K:
Well, he doesn't have -- he admits he doesn't know what it is.
P:
Can't be done.
K:
And it can't be done. I think -
P:
November 3 just
respect just like that. November 3
because basically I mean -- we will listen to him later but the point
is at this point we can not just do something that you know isn't going
to wash.
K:
I talked to Garment and he said he's become totally convinced that if
we appeal to the Doves, we will be destroyed.
P:
How?
K:
And he said he read the World Report, he had to give a speech at the
Federal City Club, he thinks your foreign policy holds together and its
got a good philosophical foundation and we should fight for it.
P:
Yeah.
K:
And that coming from him since his instincts are the other way is
particularly interesting I think.
P:
Well, we're not going to go -- we'll play, once we get something to
play with, Henry
Dobrynin or anything like that, we'll let go of
John Scalli, and by God we will broker the hell out of them.
K:
Oh, yeah, but then we do it to destroy the Doves.
P:
But not for the purpose of catering to them, cause I mean you can
confuse them. Bull will not work.
K:
I agree completely.
P:
I know, for example, I mean John
you know has raised the
credibility problem
.
He was doing it you know
just to
.
Well, John, I said -- and he wasn't trying
to advocate a change but he said there is a problem. Hell, I know, there
is a problem but it's not what we done, it's what they have created.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 3
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971
K:
That's right.
P:
I mean what the hell have we done? The only stupid thing we've
actually done -- look at Laos. The only stupid thing -- that goddamn
blackout which I didn't order.
K:
On the contrary which we thought would end within 24 hours. If it
had ended within 24 hours, no one would have paid any attention to
it. No, Abrams in this whole operation has been a disaster. He's
got great credit but he has not been good on this.
P:
Well, anyway the point is that having happened -- while it is true,
if you read the polls and everything else, there is a credibility about
us and I believe there is a lack of confidence in the conduct of the war
and so forth but that is no reason to cave and just state it out there
the best we can and hope for the best.
K:
It is the only --
P:
If we start simpering around and catering to these bastards, hell,
they will just eat us alive. Garment sees that doesn't he?
K:
Absolutely. In fact, he came to this conclusion entirely by himself
and as you can imagine against his first instincts.
P:
Well, when you are talking tomorrow to the staff or some of the
seniors, I wouldn't take alarm where your're concerned but you
occur to be a little Dovish and say, gee whiz -- you know, I; oh, I
don't know what he's going to do -- I mean he's done what he's done,
he did before, he's thinking about it himself and he's going to make
his own decision and I can't predict as always.
K:
All right, absolutely.
P:
I'd just keep guessing and if they wail and go around; say, now look,
wail all you want but he's the guy that's going to do this and that I've
considered all the reviews and all the rest -- I mean Shultz, Ehrlichman,
McGregor, Rumsfeld, Finch and all the rest of them, they don't know
a goddamn thing about this.
K:
Exactly.
P:
Or what it's about.
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Page 4
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971
K:
And they don't know what we will be hit with if this whole thing comes
apart.
P:
They don't know a thing about foreign policy; they are only concerned
about peace at any price, really. Cause they see -- all they are
concerned about is revenue sharing, the environment and all that
crap which doesn't amount to anything.
K:
They want to take off the immediate pressure, this is their overriding
concern.
P:
immediate pressure.
K:
And that I don't believe can be done. I mean it can't be done their way
because once you accept the premises of McGovern, you are fighting
on his ground and it wouldn't be in character.
P:
Oh, that's right.
K:
There is one thing, Mr. President, there are two sentences we ought
to add because there is the cynical comment that Doves are now making,
especially McGovern, that we are substituting Asian for American
casualties and increasing the bombing. We can do it in two sentences --
One, where you speak about reduction in American deaths, you can say
and South Vietnamese casualties have also dropped by I think 50%, I'll
get you the exact figures.
P:
And why don't we say that our -- then put in and we 've reduced our
bombing by so much.
K:
And the bombing within South Vietnam has been reduced by 90%,
Mr. President.
P:
Well, rather than getting into too many figures, just say that we have
reduced our bombing by 30% or something like that. You know, whatever
the figure is for Southeast Asia -- I don't have to get into set wording,
South Vietnam, Laos --
K:
But the significance of the 90% is that in the populated areas our bombing
has decreased by 90%. The area we are now bombing is the unpopulated
area.
P:
I know that but I don't have time to explain --
K:
No, I'll get you the right figures.
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Page 5
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971
P:
All we need is just get some figure that makes the point. We can
at least try to get that across.
K:
Right. So two sentences is what I would recommend in that place.
P:
And also the South Vietnamese casualties.
K:
The South Vietnamese casualties, I'm getting the exact figure.
P:
Even with Laos?
K:
Even with Laos.
P:
We can say that even with the heavy casualties they took in Laos.
K:
Right.
P:
Oh, of course, these goddamn Doves think just one thing. They eat
you alive, they take one thing and then go after another one and hell,
I've determined to just see it through and the hell with them.
K:
It's the only --
P:
If it fails, it fails.
K:
Well, it's a heroic posture, Mr. President.
P:
Well, hell, believe it or not, there is no other course for the country.
These people -- I mean, that's why our domestic side while I'm
interested in their views, why they're irrelevant, they don't know what
the hell they are talking about.
K:
That's right.
P:
I mean, on the other hand, I must say that they are so terribly obsessed
with listening to television, reading all of our critics -- the New York
Times, the Washington Post and of course, I must the Alsop piece
probably disturbs them but they read all that and they say, well now
just a minute, is this true; have we overstated anything, haven't we
really kept our promises, you see that's the point.
K:
That's right.
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Page 6
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971
P:
I constantly get back to the fact that I don't think our own people
know enough how to defend us.
K:
That's right, that's right. They are astonished by some of these things
or by what we have accomplished. I mean, we've kept our promises,
P:
we will have taken out several hundred thousand, 2/3 of our forces.
P:
They get the impression -- they read the critics and they get the
impression that dammit we are lying, that we are covering up, that
there are more losses
and so forth and goddammit, we've told
the truth about everything.
K:
Incidentally, we have a very
[End of tape]
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TELECON (Tape)
Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger
April 5, 1971
H:
[Beginning of tape]
that rises out of a memo from Garment on a
broad-based thing of what the President's long-range issues are for 1972
and all this stuff. Len made the point in it that there's a
Let me read you
a little bit of this. "There's a contradiction between a sustained effort to
make the President popular and the President's determination to do what he
believes he must do in very tough times. In short, it is hard for popular
government to be 'popular' and an all-things-to-all-men strategy blurs and
distracts from the President's specific strengthsand
achievements. 11 And he's got some backup on that.
K:
I agree with that.
H:
I know you do. Then in another section, he says "If the principles
that I believe in were applied to next week's Vietnam statement, it would
mean that he would not cater to the withdrawal syndrome by increasing the
rate of withdrawal. If there's a strategic reason or justification for doing
so, fine. If not, he shouldn't. It is out of character for him to do so. It
will seem reactive and defensive and, in the long run, will hurt rather than
help. He would not say his course is the unpopular one and that he, in fact,
has an option that would be pôpular. By his lights, he really doesn't have such
an option, and it rings false to say so. He would, however, be very clear
about what he is doing and his determination to continue to adhere to his stated
withdrawal program. He would discuss in general and compassionate terms the
conflict between the number of things people want and what, in fact, realistically
be done in a given period of time, and how fully he appreciates the sense of
frustration. All of this would be brief and factual. There should not be any
expectation that people can be persuaded to be cheered or convinced by statistics
or by reasoned argument. There should be conveyed an underlying sense of a
willingness to let the political chips fall where they may. 11
K:
I agree with him.
H:
"In all of this, I am not stating any absolutes; I am trying to say that
the architecture of the President's personality and policies should not be con-
cealed by odds and ends, by an excessive effort to be what he isn't, doesn't want
to be, and in sofar as I am concerned, shouldn't try to be. " Now, in the context
of that, the President raises the question of whether maybe we shouldn't leave
the withdrawal rate at 12, 500.
K:
No, I think he can go to what he is planning. It is less than almost
everyone is speculating on, so it doesn't look that he is pandering to anyone.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger
April 5, 1971 (Tape)
- 2 -
On the basis of his best analysis
but he should not make a big deal of the
rate. He should just matter-of-factly say, "I have made my studies and I
have come to this conclusion. But I do feel very strongly that we have to
change the architecture of the speech.
H:
That's what he is doing.
K:
I know. I gave him some pages today for which I hold no brief which
in effect.
you know, he'll make his announcement and all that, but instead.
of going through the litany again of what he found and where we are which he
can do in three or four minutes. He should positi vely make clear why it is
that, however close
that we are close to the goal, but still have to take
the slightly harder route rather than the softer one. And challenge the people
and say, "I know am asking a difficult thing, but I know the American people
have never failed us, " or something like that.
H:
Now that's the sense of what Garment is saying.
K:
That's right.
H:
Yeah.
K:
But I don't think he needs to go back down.
H:
Okay. My argument.
He raises in the context of the Garment thing
was that what he is doing is perfectly consistent with Garment because Garment
says if there is a strategic reason or justification for increasing the rate, fine.
There is a reason for increasing the rate a little bit, which is the success of
Laos.
K:
Look, Bob
H:
I think he's got to do it in order to prove the success of Laos.
K:
Our analysis indicates XXXX if our analysis is worth anything that
they can't launch a big attack before next February. By next February, we
would have taken out the number we are talking about now anyhow even at the
other rate. So, all we are doing is capitalizing a bit on Laos.
H:
And we should because the people need to be reassured that there was
some validity to Laos.
K:
Look, so there's the difference between what we are doing and what we
is one month. Exactly, it's a one month.
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Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger
April 5, 1971 (?Tape)
- 3 -
H:
Because it's a question of whether you withdraw 100, 000 by December 1st
or by December 31st.
K:
Exactly. And you and I know that anybody.
you promise to withdraw
by December 31st will be out by December 15th. So I think this is the least
we can do -- I think it's a responsible figure. It's also the most that
Thieu can stand, incidentally. I think if he announced a bigger figure, Saigon
could collapse which is what the hot-shots don't recognize.
H:
Some of them would just as soon he would.
K:
Well, I mean our guys.
H:
Yeah.
K:
Our opponents certainly would. But I think if he makes a fighting speech
if then he is driven out, at least no one will ever doubt where he stood, and when
the bad effects become evident next year, he can run against those who forced
him out. While if he, is, in effect, saying 'I agree with all of you; I just don't
have the nerve to go quite as fast as you want to. I So I agree with Garment.
H:
Okay.
K:
But I would stick at my rate.
H:
He got caught up for, for, you know, just thinking, 'I wonder if we should
just leave the rate right where it is, and let them screw you. This is where it's
going to be. 1
K:
I think we can afford this increase.
H:
Well, it's a small increase, but it's symbolically significant because
it confirms that our program is working.
K:
Exactly.
H:
And that you do need to do.
K:
Exactly. I think we can.
H:
And you are not making any sacrifice to do it.
K:
Well, you are taking a risk. But we've taken
H:
But it's the same risk.
You take the same risk if you waited one month
longer.
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Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger
April 5, 1971 (Tape)
- 4 -
K:
That's right. And if he'd take
Well, that's assuming if its a
straight line, of course -- what he could do is announce a year's thing and
take out less by January 1st.
H:
Well, that's not what he was talking about, though. What he was saying
was to change it.
to leave it at 100, 000 but say by the end of the year.
K:
Oh, no; that's ridiculous.
H:
That doesn't accomplish a thing.
K:
That is senseless. I think he should change the architecture of the
speech and go through the litany of what was achieved which I gave him as the
only text, and compress that and use something like the arguments that I handed
him today.
H:
He read this and then he called you. He was going to have you come in
and read it. And they said no, I'm not going to do that anyway. We should leave
it at
it right where it is and he dropped/that. And then he just called a minute ago
and said to try to reach you over the weekend and ask you what you thought about
it.
K:
Where the hell does he think I am?
H:
I don't know. He knew you had left.
K:
I left the office, but he knows I'm at home, doesn't he?
H:
I don't know.
K:
Well, do you want to make sure he knows I'm in San Clemente.
H:
He's off with Bebe now.
K:
Okay.
H:
Let's leave him lay.
K:
Is he going up to Los Angeles tonight?
H:
I don't think so. I hope not.
K:
Okay, fine. Well, I think he's doing exactly the right thing.
H:
Right. Okay. Good.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON (TAPE)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
11:45 p.m., April 7, 1971
Brought in April 9, 1971
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Hello, Henry.
K:
I called Mrs. Taylor
P:
Yeah, good.
K:
And she said she was honored and proud.
P:
Did she hear it?
K:
Oh, yes, and she was so overwhelmed that her sons had the privilege
of being mentioned by the President of the United States.
P:
She will stick with us.
K:
Oh, she --
P:
All the way.
K:
Oh, she will be -- she was so proud and so overwhelmed.
P:
Good, good, good.
K:
And she said she just hopes they will all be worthy of their father; it
was really very moving to talk with her.
P:
Good. Well, they are great people. I'm glad you called her.
K:
Well, there's still a healthy element in this country.
P:
Well, we've done it now, Henry; we've done everything we can.
K:
Mr. President, if that speech can't do it, nothing can.
P:
I talked to Haldeman and told him -- I said, you know you haven't heard
from Rumsfeld and you haven't heard from Finch and you haven't heard
from -- well, McGregor was disappointed because we didn't announce
a bigger withdrawal.
K:
It's so silly, you know; if you had jacked it up by a 1,000 you might have
brought down Thieu and all it would have meant was 8, 000 difference.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 2
The President/Mr. Kissinger
11:45 p. m., April 7, 1971
Brought in April 9, 1971
P:
Be that as it may, don't blame them, but my point is we now know and
you go to the staff meeting tomorrow and just listen and find out where
everybody stands, you know.
K:
Right.
P:
And crap, they may not want to see where they stand. If they have got
the guts, we want to know now, right?
K:
Exactly, Mr President.
P:
Cause we have done everything we can, Henry; there's no more that
can be done.
K:
You have done everything that can be done; I think if it holds - this is
a jolt to Hanoi that you haven't buckled again and I think the only thing
that can defeat us now is the homefront. I'm really quite optimistic
about negotiations -- I mean, they attacked that Fire Base again today - -
P:
Oh.
K:
And they lost 250 men, and their troops just aren't that much good
anymore.
P:
And we held the base.
K:
And we held the base.
P:
Good, Well, we will fight it off.
K:
I haven't seen any negative reaction yet.
P:
Oh, they will go after the business about being too emotional and all
that crap.
K:
Yeah, but remember, Mr President
P:
We are talking to the people; I don't give a shit about --
K:
The New York Times the day after your November 3rd speech, Reston
nearly had a heart attack.
P:
Yeah.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 3
The President/Mr. Kissinger
11:45 p.m., April 7, 1971
Brought in April 9, 1971
K:
And this won't have that same impact.
P:
Oh, well, he '11 have a heart attack about this because of the emotional
so forth and so on; that's all right.
K:
It doesn't make any difference -- Ellsworth Bunker out there is closer
to where we sit.
P:
And he was pleased.
K:
Oh, and this -- he must have sent that cable within minutes of hearing
the end of the speech because by the time they coded and uncoded, a
couple of hours go usually.
P:
Well --
K:
Well, it was a --
P:
At the staff meeting you just watch; don't say much.
K:
Oh, no, I won't.
P:
Just let it come, smoke them out. They will be whining around, let
them whimper and whine and we'll find out who's who.
K:
It was a privilege --
P:
They have got to, by God, if this staff can't stand up, the hell with them.
K:
Well, your key members -- -
P:
Connally was all for it, right now he's all for it. He was out at his
dinner tonight but he said he was all 100% for it.
K:
Right. Well, he told me that already this afternoon.
P:
Before we did it but also after he heard it, he felt the same way.
K:
The same way, marvelous; well, he's a strong man. Well, then your
key people in the White House were sturdy in this, Mr. President.
P:
Oh, sure, of course.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 4
The President/Mr. Kissinger
11:45 p. m., April 7, 1971
Brought in April 9, 1971
K:
Haldeman was like a rock as always and Ehrlichman was - - -
P:
Ehrlichman was like a rock.
K:
He's been good through this.
P:
He's had a hell of a lot of heat; he really stood up.
K:
That's right and he stood up.
P:
More than he did before.
K:
That's right, and he stood up at the staff meetings so he's been good.
P:
But tomorrow -- are you going to have a staff meeting tomorrow?
K:
Sure, we'll have a staff meeting tomorrow.
P:
Just listen
try to smoke them out; okay,
Henry.
K:
Right, Mr. President, and again it was a privilege to have been -- - -
P:
K:
No, it was one of the most --
P:
The people will never know how much time I spent on this speech.
K:
Well, Mr. President, no one could have faked this one, no one could
have read somebody else's words here; if you didn't feel every word
of this, this couldn't have come off.
P:
Mrs. Taylor was really pleased.
K:
Oh, she was a little bit overwhelmed, she had never been called by an
Assistant to the President, she had never been mentioned obviously
on television but she said she was honored and proud. I put it on the
basis that I wanted her to know the President felt sorry -- I said you had
asked me to call and that you felt sorry that you couldn't have warned
her ahead of time but I'm sure she understood why I asked her
permission; that you felt it so important and she said it was an honor
and a privilege and we just hope we '11 be worthy of him.
P:
Good, that's just what we want to hear.
K:
Exactly.
P:
Okay, Henry.
K: Goodnight, Mr. President.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON (TAPE)
Senator Mansfield/Mr. Kissinger
April 13, 1971
K:
Hello
M:
Hello, Henry, how are you?
K:
Senator, how are you?
M:
Fine, thank you.
K:
The President asked me to call you on a very confidential basis to
let you know that he is going to announce tomorrow a series of
measures easing certain restrictions on Communist China.
M:
Good.
K:
Specifically that we will let Chinese give visas to Communist
Chinese and then to a number of technical measures which are
important to them such as selling oil to Chinese ships except those
going to North Vietnam.
M:
Good.
K:
Easing currency restrictions and drawing up a list of goods in which
trades will be -- in which export licenses will be granted and after
that list is drawn up, we will then permit importation of Chinese
goods.
M:
That sounds in the right direction, Henry.
K:
We also are announcing after this series of steps is completed we
will review them and consider a new set of steps.
M:
Good, good.
K:
We are trying to keep it low-key, Senator, because we don't want to
have the Russians right up a wall.
M:
No, I understand.
K:
So we are not going -- of course, we can't control the press but we
are not going to make an enormous fanfare over it but it of course
will be noticed.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON (TAPE)
Senator Mansfield, Mr. Kissinger
April 13, 1971
M:
You know, Henry, the President suggested about a year ago or so
ago that I -- if I could, I'd go to China.
K:
Well, he mentioned that to me again last week and --
M:
I was going to mention it to him again.
K:
And as far as we are concerned, you have our strong support anytime
you think it's appropriate.
M:
Well, good, because I wouldn't do it without his approval.
K:
Well, you will have his strong support. We think this may be a very
useful thing to consider.
M:
We will look into it.
K:
Good, and this announcement won't be made until 11:00 tomorrow
and we won't notify any other members of Congress until tomorrow
morning.
M:
Good enough, Henry.
K:
Right.
M:
Okay, Henry, thank you very much.
K:
Nice to talk to you.
M:
Good to talk to you.
K:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON (TAPE)
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
April 13, 1971
K:
Al, I talked to the President. He wants MacGregor to do this calling.
H:
All right, sir.
K:
And he wants him to add Mahon and Griffin to the list.
H:
Mahon and Griffin, okay.
K:
And Ford and Scott. He also wants him to add Aiken but I just think
State is going to have a heart attack.
H:
Oh, boy. On Aiken, they will.
K:
Well, what do you think, I'll just ignore it.
H:
Yeah,
K:
That's rubbing salt into the wounds.
H:
You know they called back.
K:
Yeah.
H:
And they said we feel that if you want to low-key this that it should
be done over here at the Department.
K:
They are something. But did you tell them MacGregor is going to
do it, not I.
H:
No, I said the President had put a hold on it. I never mentioned
you in the first place, I said the President. Then I will tell them
in the morning that he has asked MacGregor to do it. No sense in
getting him worked up tonight.
K:
Yeah, Okay. They are something, imagine last week you couldn't
get them to say a word.
H:
That's right, that's exactly right.
K:
Okay. I wouldn't tell MacGregor anything tonight, he will leak it
all over the place. Why don't you tell him to come in at 8:00, that
the President wants him to call some Congressmen and you are getting
the stuff typed up for him.
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Page 2
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
April 13, 1971
H:
All right, okay.
K:
Don't you think?
H:
You ought to alert him.
K:
Or should I do it?
H:
Unless you want to, I think you will get more out of it, if you do it.
K:
Okay, fine.
H:
Okay.
K:
Right.
H:
Right, sir.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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TELCON (TAPE)
Mr. Kissinger/Clark MacGregor
April 13, 1971
M:
Henry, Clark.
K:
Clark, how are you?
M:
Fine, thank you.
K:
Clark, we are doing something tomorrow on which I think you will
basically approve of -- in fact, which I know you will approve of
and which we thought you might be the man to call some of the
leading Congressmen and Senators on in a low-key way, we don't
want to make a big splash with it.
M:
Yeah.
K:
But we thought you might agree to call Ford, Mahon, Griffin and
Scott. And I am having Haig type out for you what the thing is.
M:
Fine.
K:
And if you could by at 8:00.
M:
Sure.
K:
So that you can be the bearer of some good news occasionally.
M:
Good, good, I will, I'll be in your office at 8 o'clock, Henry.
K:
Good, Clark. If you would be willing to do it, it would be helpful
and I think it would help you.
M:
Happy to.
K:
Good, Clark.
M:
Thank you.
K:
Right.
M:
Bye.
K:
Bye.
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TELCON (TAPE)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
8:00 p.m., April 13, 1971
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Yeah, Henry.
K:
I just wanted to mention a number of relatively minor things to you.
P:
Yeah.
K:
One is the South Vietnamese are launching another one of these raid
type operations tonight.
P:
Good.
K:
This time it's a more sizable one. There is a big sweep inside
South Vietnam.
P:
Good.
K:
And then they are going to land some battalions in Base Area 611.
P:
Um-humm.
K:
And I think it is very useful to tie down the North Vietnamese.
P:
Good. Is it well-programmed, well-supported?
K:
It looks well-programmed and well-supported, Mr. President, and I've
called Moorer to say that we don't want any significant American
losses in helicopters and so forth.
P:
Right, right.
K:
Secondly, I talked today to Vorontsov from the Soviet Embassy.
P:
Right.
K:
The reason was that there is a meeting between Rush and Abrasimov --
P:
Yes.
K:
On Berlin and I just wanted to make sure that they didn't blow -- that
they understood which way the channels were going.
P:
Yes. He understood that?
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Page 2
The President/Mr. Kissinger
April 13, 1971, 8:00 p.m.
K:
Oh, yeah, he understood it and he said that Dobrynin was coming
back Sunday with new instructions and that we should take the
Brezhnev speech very seriously and he was slobbering all over me.
P:
Good. We'll see Sunday what he told
.
K:
And then I did something which was a little unorthodox, I told him
that Dobrynin had given me his phone number in Moscow.
P:
Um-humm.
K:
And I had lost it, so he called me an hour later and said it might
be a nice thing if I called Dobrynin and congratulated him on his
Central Committee membership.
P:
Good, do it.
K:
In fact I did it. And Dobrynin said we '11 have something on that
exchange of letters when I come back.
P:
He said that.
K:
Yeah, but he didn't say what it was.
P:
Yeah.
K:
And he also said he was coming with new instructions.
P:
But not indicating anything on the SALT?
K:
No. Well, he couldn't, Mr. President, on an open telephone.
P:
Oh, it was open telephone, okay.
K:
Yeah, we don't have a secure line -- well, we have the hot line but
I didn't want to use that.
P:
Right.
K:
This was a commercial phone.
P:
Good. How did he sound?
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Page 3
The President/Mr. Kissinger
8:00 p.m., April 13, 1971
K:
Oh, he sounded -- they are going to do something, Mr. President.
And finally, one other thing, I called Mike Mansfield on your behalf
and said you --
P:
Just a second -- hold it. Go ahead.
K:
I called Mike Mansfield and told him that you had asked me to tell
him about what you are announcing tomorrow in strictest confidence.
P:
Right.
K:
And I thought he would appreciate it and he was beside himself,
very statesmanlike.
P:
Was he?
K:
The President has him warm support and congratualtions and he said
now he sees what you were talking about when you were hinting at
China policy and of course he raised again his going there.
P:
Um-humm. Oh, yeah, we have it in mind.
K:
And I thought, Mr. President, that tomorrow morning if you agreed
that perhaps McGregor might call Ford and Albert. That gives
MacGregor a little status and gives him something Dovish to do.
P:
Yeah.
K:
And let State notify the Foreign Relations Committees.
P:
Well, let MacGregor also call Mahon. Mahon is a good man.
K:
That's a good thing.
P:
And let him -- cause he's the best man on that side.
K:
Right.
P:
And let's see -- on our side, Scott.
K:
Scott he should call.
P:
Yeah, he might as well.
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Page 4
The President/Mr. Kissinger
8:00 p.m., April 13, 1971
K:
Maybe Griffin.
P:
Yeah, Scott and Griffin, yeah. And let's see -- anybody else -- - I
think that's enough. State can inform the others. Well, MacGregor
might call Aiken.
K:
He's on the Foreign Relations Committee --
P:
That's all right, let him call Aiken. Let State handle the others.
K:
Okay.
P:
See.
K:
Right.
P:
Give Aiken a little brush, that's a good idea.
K:
Right. Good, Mr. President, I'll get that done immediately.
P:
Fine, okay, Henry.
K:
Right.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Apr.18?
TELCON (TAPE)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
April 14, 1971
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Hello, Henry. I was wondering how the -- have you checked in to see
how they played the Chinese thing today.
K:
Oh, yeah. It was tremendous, it was the lead item on every -- I didn't
see it myself, I was with Bob Griffin, but I talked to Haig.
P:
Yeah.
K:
But he says it has been a tremendous thing on television, it has been
the lead item on every television thing and on --
P:
You mean rather than Vietnam for a change.
K:
(laughter) Yeah, it's gone on, and on and on. And I found it helpful
also with these Michigan Editors.
P:
How did it go with them?
K:
Well, they asked the usual questions about Vietnam and I just said,
look, we know what we are doing and there are always more things
going on and they were very intrigued with China. They asked the
usual questions about Vietnam do we think the South Vietnamese
can stand on their feet? But they were not hostile.
P:
Yeah.
K:
They just had heard so much stuff about the Vietnamese not being
able to make it and so on and so forth.
P:
Yeah. Well, this is one thing we are sure -- well, we are not as
competent about the Vietnamese as some may be; we're a hell of a
lot competent than the press has lead them to believe, you see?
K:
That's right, and these -- many of them were small town newsmen,
Muskegon and Kalamazoo and Flint and stuff like that. And they were
on the whole very eager to -- they weren't asking hostile questions,
they were asking informational questions.
P:
Right.
K:
Because we spent about 1/3 of the time on Vietnam, 1/3 on China and a
1/3 was miscellaneous stuff.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 2
The President/Mr. Kissinger
April 14, 1971
P:
Now on the China thing what we have to realize, Henry, is that in
terms of the American public opinion, it is still against Communist
China you know.
K:
Right.
P:
So we are not making any votes with this.
K:
No, but we are quieting the intellectuals and the newsmen.
P:
The intellectuals will worry, they will worry about something, but
as we know as we move from the October 7 thing, that doesn't mean
that we get much from them, it will just worry them.
K:
That's right.
P:
They will think something else is up and the whole thing has got to
be played in terms of -- how about the Taiwan thing, that's sort of
worrisome, not a damn thing we can do about though is there?
K:
What Taiwan thing?
P:
Well, I mean their concern about what we have said.
K:
Right, but they haven't expressed it yet, have they, I don't think so.
P:
Oh, I think there was something in the paper indicating that Taiwan
was -- [complaining].
K:
Oh, but that's inevitable, they have to say that. And Bob Murphy going
out there I think will -- of course they will be concerned, it is bound
to be a worrisome thing to them.
P:
Well, Henry, the thing is the story change is going to take place, it
has to take place, it better take place when they've got a friend here
rather than when they've got an enemy here.
K:
That's right. No, it's a tragedy that it has to happen to Chiang at the
end of his life but we have to be cold about it.
P:
We have to do what's best for us.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 3
The President/Mr. Kissinger
April 14, 1971
K:
And in the long term it is essential for the values that he represents
that there be continuity in our government here.
P:
Yes, and that he has here an Administration that is not going to just
stand by and let Taiwan go down the drain; we're trying to hold their
position as best we can.
K:
Exactly. For every reason we have got to have a diversion from
Vietnam in this country for a while.
P:
That's the point isn't it, yeah.
K:
And we need it for our game with the Soviets.
P:
Yeah, yeah.
K:
I mean it would be absolutely impossible we would be doing the
Soviets the greatest favor if we rejected this overture and we would
get nothing for it, it would lead to tougher relations between us and
the Soviets, rather than easier.
P:
That's right, that's right. That's what they would like for us to
do, they would like for us to sort of slap the Chinese in the face but
we're not going to. We're not going overboard but we're saying well,
if they open the door, we'll open the door.
K:
That's right. And actually now one would have to expect the Hyades (?)
of a few weeks.
P:
Oh, of course, nothing is going to happen for a while but that's all
right, just let this rest awhile. You know, mutter around about it for
a while.
K:
And of course with some luck, we will get some nibble on the Soviet
front now.
P:
Yes, we might.
K:
Well, it isn't even luck so much, it really logically ought to happen.
P:
Ought to happen logically, that's right. If they are at all logical, it
damn well better or they are a lot more rigid and stupid.
K:
I mean there is nothing new they are going to learn about SALT, they
are either going to move. on that or not. And the other one, the
Summit, we have been kicking around for a year.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 4
The President/Mr. Kissinger
April 14, 1971
P:
I talked to Colson and I told him to -- Dole was in and said that both
Case and Brooke were making speechs on the floor today about it.
Essentially to set a date and all that sort of thing and I said get hold
of Brooke and tell him to keep shut for a month. You know, that's
all you can ask of Brooke.
K:
Right.
P:
And without promising a thing, you see. Just wait a month and then
wait, you know what I mean, you can't expect him to do more than that.
K:
Right. Actually it doesn't make any difference what Case and Brooke
say because they have been saying that for a year.
P:
True, but if we could just get a few of our own to quiet down --
K:
Right.
P:
It's very important and the other thing that I said is to -- got to talk
about this too is that the whole thing that Dole expressed is that the
POW wives, we must not let them go off on a tangent here.
K:
That's why we've got to keep that residual force thing alive.
P:
I know that but I meant they've got to not fight on one of these
withdrawal programs or something like that, you see.
K:
I don't think they will.
P:
Well, don't be too sure. Remember everybody is working on them.
K:
Yeah.
P:
And we've got to watch that as closely as we can.
K:
Well, I am seeing them again in the middle of May and if there are
any danger signs, I'll see them before.
P:
Yeah, but we don't want them to move before then, you think -
K:
Well, but what makes anyone think they are moving?
P:
Well, Dole was concerned about it. You know he sees and hears from
them and so forth and boy, we just don't want these gals who have so
much at stake
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 5
The President/Mr. Kissinger
April 14, 1971
K:
Yeah.
P:
Their husbands and so forth. They just can't throw it down the drain,
just for that.
1
K:
That's right. W e 11, McGovern has been after them, I know that and
I wouldn't be surprised also if Clifford also were.
P:
He's working on them, that's right. Well, let's keep our eyes very
closely peeled on that and in the meantime, we'll work the other thing
as well as we can.
K:
Yeah.
P:
Okay, Henry, thank you.
K:
Right, Mr. President.
Further conversation.
K:
Mr. President.
P:
The thing I forgot to mention was that the DOW went to 9. 32 today
so that's --
K:
Oh, isn't that grand!
P:
Well, it's a good thing. That means that 300 points now, the low, but
also it's now -- it's above what it was when we came into office, it was
9. 30 when we came into office.
K:
Oh, really. I didn't realize that.
P:
That's right. So, it's come a long way and I think you ought to get
your friend Howard Stein --
K:
Yeah, I'm going to call him tomorrow.
P:
Yeah, just say, now look here, Howard, things are moving -- cause
he talks to a lot of people.
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TELCON (TAPE)
Page 6
The President/Mr. Kissinger
April 14, 1971
K:
Oh, yes. I'll call him tomorrow, Mr. President.
P:
Fine, all right.
K:
Right.
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TELECON
Ambassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger
5:35 p.m., April 14, 1971
R:
I've got something from you, you know, to Haig.
K:
I haven't seen Haig since he talked to you so I don't know
what exactly
R:
The idea is that before we
well, he informed us that he
got something about a meeting tomorrow.
K:
Oh, yes, that's right. And I just wanted to know whether you
were going to make a proposal then.
R:
I think this was the idea. And now, I can get it here before.
It might be that it will be possible to postpone the meeting there.
K:
No, you know -- I've got trouble enough advising on our foreign
policy; I can't advise on yours. You know my view.
R:
Yeah. Because I thought it might be a good idea to tell.
I
think though there will be certain changes. I don't know which ones.
K:
Yeah, but as I've been trying to explain to you, I don't much care
what is in the original proposal. I think you are better off making your
changes in the second round rather than in the first. The initial proposal
is of no concern to me as long as you know where you want to go.
R:
Well, I hope that
I don't believe that it will be essential at
the present to decide or at least to know exactly what is the second
(?) BARLEV line .
K:
No; as long as you know to whom you are going to make the move.
R:
Yeah; yeah. Therefore, I think I can -- I'm not sure, but I
think that I can -- bring about a postponing of giving the paper from
tomorrow, let us say, to Monday. And, in the meantime, if you want
to see it, I think.
not full negotiations -- that's just to have your
comments.
K:
It's entirely up to you. Let's see -- what date is this -- the 14th?
R:
It will be 17th or 18th.
K:
Well, I don't know whether you have decided with whom you are
going to settle this, if you are going to settle it at all.
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TELECON
Ambassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger
5:35 p.m., April 14, 1971
-2-
R: Well, I think that in the long run -- Hello, in the long run I believe that
the idea is to take your advice. The question is the substance not. and
when it comes to the substance, I don't believe that
K: Well in that case for a reason which I will explain to you when I see you --
you would be better off presenting it as late as possible, say the 18th.
R: I see.
K: And I will explain that to you when I see you. I don't want to do it on the
telephone.
R: Fine.
K: But I think it is of some consequence.
R: I see. Uh, then, If I will get it I hope that I will be able to see you in
enough time
K: Then you see me and I will talk to you also about the reason why I am
making that suggestion.
R: Fine. Alright, therefore, it might be that tomorrow I will ask to see you
if I'll get the paper.
K: That will be fine. I think there is a lot to be said for waiting until, in fact
Tuesday might be better than Monday. But, it is up to you.
R: I understand. Alright.
K: And if you get the paper on an informal basis
R: Very informal, yeah.
K: I'll be glad to comment on it and then let's see.
R: Fine.
K: Good.
R: Alright.
K: Thank you, I will hear from you tomorrow. Is that breakfast on for Monday?
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TELECON
Ambassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger
5:35 p. m., April 14, 1971
- -3-
R: Yeah, yeah -- for Tuesday.
K: Oh, Tuesday.
R: Tuesday morning, 8:00
K: Alright, fine. Good. Bye.
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XXXR President/Mr. Kissinger
April 18, 1971 jlj/tape
10:45Am
K: Mr. President, Ziegler is out of town and I have talked to Jerry Warren.
He hasn't had a single press question yet. And the line I have tentatively
established subject to your approval is that he was talking about South
Vietnamese capabilities, not any particular plans. And he was just talking
about abstract capabilities.
P: Good. That's very good. Hypoth.
K: Hypothetical things.
P: And not about American activities.
K: That's right. And if that is agreeable, that's what we are going to stick
with.
P: Fine. Laird will probably be asked.
K: No, I got word to Defense already too.
P: How will Laird handle it then?
K: Laird would say he was - essentially the same thing. They haven't had
many queries either.
P: Well what this is Henry. It's the devilish press again just trying to take
one little old word and hypo this thing. I think Henry it is pretty much a
defensive thing on their part. They must really be up the walls. Don't you
think so?
K: Oh, Mr. President. Here they have been going saying everything, that
we are bringing the Chinese in, that Laos would lead to a worsening of the
situation, now they see that they got beaten back from Fire Base 6, military
activity is dropping again just as we said it would and the China thing breaks.
They are just out of their minds.
P: Don't you sense that in talking to them?
K: Qhxlx Oh yeh, they are just completely confused.
P: Now the line they will probably take it seems to me to come back
at it in terms of saying this is really just the Chinese people - I mean that we'll
get along with the American people and that sort of thing but I don't think the
Chicoms - the government - will play it that way. I think the Chicom government
knows that the American people can't do one damn thing for them.
K: They are playing for the big stakes, Mr. President.
P: You think so.
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-2-
K: And I have two books full of initiatives we have taken and if they press us
we will just leak them all out.
P: Oh sure. They try to say that this all happened because of their initiative
and so forth but it is really amusing to me though because while Mike is
honorable these other Democrats are nowxx not - the way they're all
pandering around and trying to run over there to China and so forth.
K: But the problem is they never recommended any of this Mr. President,
they can say whatever they want. This is yours.
P: And neither did the State Department.
K: That's right. The scope of it the State Department was sort of crying
around with XEXXXX recognition and that sort of thing.
P: That's right. They were all talking about what was really what you call
a tactical abstract thing which was really unfeasible.
Osborne
K: I showed -/ askedoxxxxxxx that little note you sent me on February 1st '69
and his mouth really dropped way open.
P: Too bad that wasn't in my handwriting. It was but they copy it off
apparently at that point.
K: It's a tape usually.
P: Oh yes. I may have dictated it. On the tape. But it came on - was
it
to you from RN.
K: Said to Kissinger from the President.
P: That's enough.
K: Oh, they know this isn't a fake.
P: He know's -
K: He knows that we wouldn't fake that.
P: It indicated that we ought to what whax was that one - Was that the first one?
K: Well it said, I want you to explore on a highly confidential basis how we
can improve our relations with Communist China and above all how we can
establish reliable private channels to them.
P: Good.
,ms.President,
K: It couldn't be more explicit You said I want no publicity whatsoever.
P: That must have really killed him.
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- -3 -
K: Oh God, his mouth really dropped about 6 inches.
P: Because I suppose he could see there some of his mythology is knocked
out and when he writes something else -
K: They know damned well that on February 1, 1969 no State Department
had gotten -
P: February '69 no State Department had even talked to me.
K: That's right. This was February 1st 69.
P: Basically 10 days after I took office.
K: 10 days - that's right.
P: That's very interesting.
K: I think on this one. Sure the democrats are going to start yelling now.
They are going to come up with 50 hot gimmicks but we are so far
ahead,
P: What they will come up with now is why don't we admit them to the UN?
Why don't we recognize them and so forth. Well, that's all premature.
debate.
K: Also Mr. President, it helps us with the Russian game.
P: I think so.
K: Because if the Russian's see that the Democrats are more hawk-wild than
you are vis a vis China then -
P: I hadn't thought of that, MXXXXX but it's true.
K: then they have much less of an incentive to bring them in. They already don't
trust them on the Middle East, then with China they also turn out
to be a disaster. So I think - my major worry is that if we get too eager that
the Chinese will start going back into a shell. And that's why the way you have
played it and that's where the democrats could do damage.
P: I sure as hell don't expect to get eager at all with the Chinese.
Unless the Russian thing drops. Then the Chinese may want to be eager and
we will too.
K: That's right.
P: We can't just assume we will wait until 1974.
K: Oh no, oh God no.
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- 4-
P: This is one of those things where I don't believe, I think - I think our
Chinese game Henry should be played exactly as it is being played. Very
cool and aloof and yet the door is open now you ± walk in kids. It's your -
K: Mr. President, I must tell you honestly I believe that we have a 30%
chance even if we played the Russian game, of having a high level Chinese
one next year. That may not have to wait until '74.
P: We want to use it. We want it at the highest level too.
K: That's what I mean. That's not at all excluded.
P: Let me say that the more I think about the envoy thing. If we are going to
go I think we ought to go at the highest level.
K: Well, I think the envoy could prepare for it.
P: It might, but it might take a lot of the zip out of it too. You know what I mea:
Henry. You just can't tell. I don't know if there is anybody we trust to send
over there. That's -
K: That's a bit down the road yet. First we need a reliable channel.
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(tapes brought in 4/19/71)
april 1471 10:30AM [typed 5/7/71
continuation of the President with Mr. Kissinger
jlj]
K: I'll call Ziegler immediately.
P: Well, he will probably have had a query on it. Tell him not to take any
press calls today. Tell the whole office not to take any. This is Sunday and
there are no press calls and just say that he can't be reached. Leave it a
little bit dumb for awhile. Maybe that is the best way to handle it. Maybe
they will wonder - I don't know whether they will nox or not.
K: Let me find out first whether it has made any waves and if it has I will
get it dampened quick.
P: I'll tell you what you do. You better give Ziegler a call to see what the
situation is and you better call me back and we'll have to develop some -
And what about the rest of the news, I have only see that. How did they -
China things go very well?
K: Very good. And I saw last night on television Martin O'Granski had a
panel of newsmen - Sidy and Kilpatrick and
P: His usual group.
K: His usual group and Sidy was just raving on about how your great initiative
and even Carl Rowan had to say some gudgingly favorable things.
P: How did Kilpatrick handle it.
K: Oh, very favorably, strangely enough.
P: He usually does anyway.
K: No he was very favorable. Then they talked about Hoover and there
Kilpatrick was the only one who stood up for him.
P: Well, that's true, that's true. Well I have to stand up for him.
K: That didn't toughxyanx touch you. They didn't attack you on that.
P: Right. Did they use some of the news summary on the news cast and
stuff, from the night before.
K: I frankly did not see the news.
P: But looking at the papers today what did they, did they
K: They are carrying a lot of your stuff in the weeklies.
P: Balance is pretty good is it?
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-2-
K: Very Very good. I mean all of your stuff is exceptionally good.
P: In the weekly news summary you mean.
K: yes. The China story of course if very big and very
favorable to you - everywhere.
P: The thing I feel is this. You will probably see Dobrynin Tuesday, right,
maybe Monday.
K: If he comes back. He comes back either tonight or Wednesday night.
Those are the only two flights they have this week. It's just barely conceivable
that this China thing kept him back a few days for reassessment.
But I will see him either tomorrow or Tuesday -
P: What I was thinking is this. I don't know just quite how it would work.
I would delay your meeting with Bogdan until after you see him.
K: All right.
P: Or have you already set it up.
K: No, No.
P: Let me tell you why. After you see him we may want to play a very differen
game. Let's suppose, for example, running it out - let us suppose that we get
a straight cutoff. You see what I mean. Then instead of diddling around with
this sort of thing we might go immediately to the highest level.
Do you see what I am getting at.
K: Oh yes.
P: I don't mean on the - this time we would have to play that kind of a game
and knowing the Asians the way they operate - well they will go like molasses
on things of this sort. In a moment like this they XXX just might bite for the
whole thing. Do you see what I mean?
K: Right.
P: So rather than wasting anything with telling Chou-en-lai that we would
like to have * Mansfield and Scott received and the rest. Let's just
wait.
K: I think that is a good idea.
P: Now he is our best contact isn't he, the Bogdan?
K: We would have to think about that.
P: I was thinking -
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-3-
K: Bogdan is better than Pakistan right now.
P: What I was thinking was - well - are we sure of that?
K: Yes.
P: What I was thinking of was how secure are their lines?
K: They always send a messanger.
P: OK, that's fine. I was going to say if they will send a messanger that's
good. They will send a messanger to Bucharest?
K: Right.
P: Good. Otherwise we could send somebody to Bucharest.
K: Another way of doing it is when I go txx talk to the North Vietnamese
I talk to the Chinese Ambassador in Paris.
P: Yes.
K: And get it set up that way.
P: You see what I am getting at. We may as well play our little games. So
just forget what I told you to do about Bogdan right nox now, OK.
K: Right, Mr. President.
P: I don't think it is going to play that way. I think that the Russians -
K: No, No they are going to come.
P: They are going to come. But you know what I mean is if we now have got
- we are playing for very high stakes and we have very little time left and we
can't diddle around., with the Russians or with anybody else. OK
K: Right Mr. President
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Mr. Kissinger/Jerry Warren (HAK asked for Ron Ziegler)
April 18, 1971
jlj
K: Hello Jerry, the President is having conniptions about this Goddamn
Abrams quote. Are you getting a lot of press queries?
W: I haven't gotten any yet.
K: OK, well just play it very cool. Just say that that was purely - that we
are planning nothing of the scale of - how can you play it to keep it down?
W: Well, wasn't he talking about their capability? Rather than what they
were going to do? I don't know if that is the case or now. Maybe уххих he
wasn't.
K: Well, he said it isn't ruled out.
W: Isn't ruled out. But he didn't say that we were planning such a thing.
K: Well, but there may be raids in there you see.
W: Can we play it that what he was not ruling out that we - was the type of
cross border operations that we had prior to the Laos incursion.
K: No, it's going to be larger than that. Can we just say he was talking
about capabilitjes and not about any massive new -
I don't want to give away so much.
W: I know it. The way I read it was that he was talking about capabilities.
He couldn't rule out because the South Vietnamese have the capability of
going in there? On a limited basis.
K: Whak XXx Why don't you put it that way. Just say he was talking about
capabilities. He was not projecting any specific plans.
W: (writing) he wasn't projecting any specific plans.
K: And otherwise shift everything to Defense.
W: OK
K: And will you tell Defense to low key it too?
W: I am on my way down to the office now. I'll be over to the church services.
That's where they will start to hit us.
K: Well just play it cool and don't say any more than that.
And will you make sure that Defense does the same?
W: You bet. Sure.
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Mr. Kissinger/Adm. Moorer
[typed 5/7/71 - jlj]
TELECON april 18, 1971
K: Tom, OK. Where are you?
M: I'm at home.
K: Oh, Tom, I don't know whether Haig got to you.
M: Yes he did.
K: But the President was having absolute fits about that Abrams thing.
M: You mean what's in the paper this morning.
K: Yeh. Now my problem is - you know they have all gone through hell
for a few weeks and we finally got Vietnam off the front pages and we don't
want to get it there again if we can avoid it.
M: Right.
K: On the other hand we want these operations to go forward. And you
know what is going to happen if this draws too much flack and we give a
directive to Laird to cool it, how he will interpret it.
M: Yeh.
K: Now I don't know what possessed Abrams to tell you the truth. I mean
when I read the Post account he actually walked up to these newsmen.
M: Yeh, that is what it said. I mean after having been
K: After having been clear of them.
M: That's the way they presented it but I don't know if that is actually what
happened or not. Yeh, I don't know why he did that either other than of
course this is more the idea - get across the idea that the South Vietnamese
are still there active.
K: But the demonstrations are coming up this week. I think at this stage
1
of the game as long as people think we know what we are doing, it isn't in
our interest to get a big debate started as long as we continue doing what
we are doing.
M: I couldn't agree with you more.
K: Don't you think?
M: Of course. Well I will get the word out there to him. I guess the damage
is done now although I think that the least said about it the better right now
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-2-
K: But can't we keep them - it also mentioned somebody, the 101st
Airborne - can't they just shut up for awhile out there?
M: I will get that word out. Don't worry.
K: Because believe me we're doing our best to try to keep operations going.
M: I will get that through to everybody, Henry. [everyone's asleep] now
but I will see that they get it first thing in the morning. Their morning.
K: OK. Not to stop what they are doing. Just to stop talking.
M: Absolutely, I understand.
K: Tom, have a good Sunday.
M: Right. They'll get the word. Tell the President that they will get
the word.
K: Right. Oh Tom, Zumwalt was over the other day on a few - on a social
call. And there were a few Navy things he raised which I told him to take up
with you too. And I just want you to know that he said he would. It wasn't
- it was just he had been very nice to me so I had him over for lunch. It
wasn't anything official.
M: All right. I'll see him tomorrow.
K: Right
M: Thank you. Good by
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELECON (Tape)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
April 18, 1971
K:
Mr. President.
P:
Henry, are you in New York or here.
K:
No, I'm here.
P:
What's new? Anything this morning?
K:
Nothing of very great consequence. In fact, there's nothing really
going on The Chinese keep needling the Russians where they put indications
that they were easing their terms and diploma tic relations with us, half
implying that maybe Taiwan wasn't a complete obstacle.
P:
Yeah, I saw that.
K:
And in Vietnam, activity is light at the moment. Abrams made an
injudicious comment. Somebody asked him whether that.
P:
Yeah, I saw that. I was wondering.
K:
But basically they tricked him into it. They said, 'Is it possible that
this drive will go into Laos. 1 Well, actually, they are under strict orders,
Mr. President, there will not be any of these horror stories coming out because
we won't use many helicopters. And it has the advantage of tying down the
North Vietnamese.
P:
Yeah, I know. That's true, but the orders have got to go out there that
I want Abrams and Bunker to pipe down.
K:
Well, I called Laird.
P:
The thing is that this is what the press is trying to do. They want a story.
It doesn't make any difference what he does. I don't care if he goes in and bombs
the hell out of them, but don't say it. The press wants to put Vietnam back on the
front pages. This one little story, God-damn it, is in two papers on the front page.
Right.
K:
That's right. I talked to Laird about it an hour ago.
P:
Did he understand it.
K:
Oh, yeah. And he's getting
he said he'd get right on the phone with
Abrams and, you know, when we wanted him to talk, he didn't and now
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr. Kissinger
April 18, 1971
- 2 -
P:
Well, he didn't
K:
But he didn't really do anything.
P:
He just got sucked into it. Some God-damned newspaper guy wanted to
get a story to the effect we were going back in Laos, because the news guys
out there are dying. Laos is over and the South Vietnamese hold the hill and
now they are moving around and they are having their award ceremony. And
I think they are just trying to suck poor old Abrams into
...
He just feels so
compelled to be so God-damned honest all the time. Why doesn't he just shut
up.
K:
That's right.
P:
He should just say, Jesus Christ, do what I say. Don't comment on
that sort of thing, dodge it.
K:
That's what I told Laird. I said there is no law against saying
"no comment". I don't speculate on operation or anything like that, instead
of if he says I don't rule it out, and by the time they get through writing
it, theyre back in. Although, if one reads the actual stories, they are not
written in a particularly inflammatory way.
P:
Yes, but Henry, most of them will see the little blip on television
generally that says that we may go back into Laos. You must understand
that it doesn't make any difference what the actual story says--it's what
hits at that minute when people see on television.
K:
You are absolutely right.
P:
What that see on television that says the Al Abrams in Laos--when
everybody was beginning to calm down about Laos they get all stirr ed up
again. I don't every mind people getting stirred up if we are going to do
something, but goddamn it, I don't what to do it
K:
Besides, he has had his shot. This is the time now when the military
gains on that are not going to be that crucial. T
P:
There aren't any more left to play, as he well knows.
K:
Well, I think he will get the point.
P:
If Ziegler gets anything on that--he can't say "No comment". If he
does it will build up the Abrahms story, but if he simply says there are no
plans Don't get the impression that by Abrahms saying a silly thing like
this that that is going to hold down the North Vietnamese. It isn't.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The President/Mr , Kissinger
April 18, 1971
- 3 -
P:
He should nail the thing down- - (Ziegler)
K:
They are going to go over with raids, but there are no plans of anything
of that scale before.
P:
What I mean't was that it is important to get across that there is
no large scale operations in Laos are planned. See, they only have two
weeks left to do it anyway.
K:
I will work something out along those lines Mr. President, and check
it with you.
P:
Just get it down to a and you don't have tocheck with me--just cool
it down--what I mean is that I don't want Ziegler to make another story out
of it. Sayas little as he possibly can without making another story out of it.
(End of Tape)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (TAPE)
Mr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman
Brought in April 19, 1971
April
K:
Bob, I've just had several talks with our leader and while I admire
him in adversity, good things tend to go to his head.
H:
What's got to him now?
K:
Well, he had Colson and Dole in to tell them to tell Brooke and Case
not to to shut up for a month, things might happen about speechs
on deadlines. Now, first of all I consider Colson an idiot. You know
he may be great at organizing these groups but the less he knows, the
better off we are.
H:
He doesn't know anything.
K:
Well, you know secondly, what does it hurt us if Brooke says we
should set a deadline, he's been saying that for years.
H:
I don't know, I was with Dole when he was in there and Dole told him
that Brooke had come out with that. The President started in on Dole
on just try to get your guys to cool it for a while and they should just
turn it off because they don't know what we are doing.
K:
Yeah, but I really think we ought to keep things quiet now, let them
hit us for a month, I don't give a damn.
H:
Well, maybe you don't but it isn't going to help us any.
K:
No, but nothing is going to matter as much as what we are playing
with the Soviets.
H:
That's right.
K:
And if they find that we are counting on the thing too much, we are
never going to get it.
H:
He isn't in any way implying that that's what they are counting on.
K:
Yeah, but even that other play we are making.
H:
He hasn't given them any clues on any of that. The impression if I
were Dole in there on that would be that just that he has a lot of
things in mind.
K:
Well, I think our biggest weakness is that in order to get a week's
respite, we mortgage ourselves a month or two from now.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (TAPE)
Page 2
Mr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman
Brought in April 19, 1971
H:
Could be.
K:
And I just think we are not badly positioned now, if we can just ride
it out for a bit all the guys, the more guys that are out of the
woodwork
H:
Yeah, except we have had a week with no problems because the
Senate's been home but I think he's concerned about what's going
to hit when the Senate gets back.
K:
Yeah. Well, I don't doubt that but -
H:
The key would be that we have got to tread a terrible track on with
our people is the ABM fight.
K:
Yeah, but that he set up rather nicely. That he has arranged won't
come to a vote until August.
H:
Well, he hasn't arranged it, he couldn't anyway. But the problem
is our people are all set to go on an all out fight and he has got to
make them think they've got to do it.
K:
Oh, yeah, they've got to do it.
H:
Well, yeah, except they can't get into the thing of starting to trade
stuff off. If they start giving things away like judgeships and contracts
and things like that, we're paying a price we don't need to pay.
K:
Oh, yes, we need it anyway. Even in case of an agreement, we need
that vote. Listen, you people have a totally wrong conception of what
that agreement is about.
H:
Well,
H:
Okay, but if you get the agreement, you will get the vote.
K:
Yeah, well, I don't want to handle the strategy with you but that we will
know by the end of next week, Bob, anyway.
H:
Yeah. All I am saying is they were talking this morning about -- you
know Finch was rattling around about starting to put up the goodie
packages and stuff, and they don't need to do that at this point. They
don't need to do for a couple of months, then we know where we stand.
We shouldn't do it anyway, I mean it's a ridiculous time to start buying
people off now.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (TAPE)
Page 3
Mr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman
Brought in April 19, 1971
K:
That's right. Well, just as long as they don't think anything is
happening.
H:
That's the point.
K:
As long as they don't think anything is happening, that's all I want.
H:
We've got to stay with the line that we have to have it for SALT.
K:
Right.
H:
Cause that's the line we used before.
K:
Right.
H:
And we've got to keep pushing hard that we've got to have it.
K:
Right. I know but he's so elated right now that he drops little nuggets
of hints.
H:
Yeah, I know.
K:
To which I may be more sensitive knowing it.
H:
I think you are because I was listening -- I was worried when he got
started with Dole today ---
K:
No, no; well, all I know is what he told me and he may have made it
sound more mysterious to me than he did to him.
H:
Could be. He's all excited cause the Dow-Jones is back up now, did
he tell you that?
K:
Yeah, oh, God, yeah. Yeah.
H:
Well, that's kind of a big thing for him.
K:
Oh, look, he --
H:
He really went through the wringer on that damn stock market and
now it's back -- it's above where it was when he came in.
K:
He's been a cold-blooded gambler.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (TAPE)
Page 4
Mr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman
Brought in April 19, 1971
H:
He's had a rough two years, he's had to sweat that one out.
K:
Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Well, Bob, we'll know in another month,
we may be having it way higher than that if some of these other
things work.
H:
You know, we've kept saying all along, we got to get a good brea k
now and then and we just may.
K:
Well, if we get one more, then the others are bound to come.
H:
You didn't get any clues from your friend when you called him and
congratulated him, he wouldn't say anything on the phone.
K:
Oh, I had the clue that -- yeah, no, he said he was coming with some
new instructions.
H:
Did he?
K:
Oh, yeah. Oh, he was very effusive, oh, yes.
H:
Was he?
K:
Oh, yes.
H:
Huh. God, it really would be fun if some of that falls together.
K:
Well, if it falls, part of it could fall next week.
H:
Yeah.
K:
God, we'd have those guys.
H:
Wouldn't that be something.
K:
Well, it would take another week to get the paperwork done.
H:
Yeah.
K:
(laughter) Jesus Christ, and announce it on May Day.
H:
(laughter).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (TAPE)
Page 5
Mr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman
Brought in April 19, 1971
K:
What is he planning about Pendleton, is he going out there?
H:
Yeah. He is going to go out on the 30th.
K:
Good. Well, I'll be out there on vacation then, I hope.
H:
Well, we'll pick you up.
K:
Yeah.
H:
We're not going to come back till the 5th.
K:
Oh, good, well, then I'll come back with you. I'll stay over in Palm
Springs.
H:
H:
You can extend your stay.
K:
Yeah, I was going to go on the 27th and stay till the 6th.
H:
Oh, you were going to stay till the 6th anyway.
K:
Yeah.
H:
Okay.
K:
Okay.
H:
See you out there.
K:
It's actually a waste of good California time to go to Palm Springs
when I could be in -- well, I guess I won't work but if I get bored,
I'll come over to you.
H:
Stay over in Palm Springs a while longer.
K:
Okay.
H:
Okay.
K:
Good, Bob.
H:
Right-o.
K:
Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (TAPE)
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
10:00 a.m., April 18, 1971
K:
Al.
H:
Yes, sir.
K:
I just talked to Laird, he called me about -- that they are using
B-52s on that Pich Nil Pass.
H:
Yes, he gave authority, they haven't approved anything.
K:
Dammit! Hold on, it's the other line, hold on.
(Continued Conversation )
K:
That was Mel again. Now what he says is they will be getting an
ASW exercise in the North Sea and they are not moving into the
Baltic until early May.
H:
Early May, that's right.
K:
Well, that's fine, let's just keep it going.
H:
Right. And it's the Carrier 4.
K:
Yeah, that's fine, let's keep that going and if anything happens when
he's back, we --
H:
Can adjust.
K:
We adjust and if nothing happens, we want to get tough anyway.
Hi
That's right. The other one will be out on the 23rd they tell me,
it's 3 for five days.
K:
But 3, that's not -- they were supposed to put 4 in, the Bastards.
H:
Yeah. Well, what happened on this -- the reason I was fuzzy is this
happened while I was in Vietnam, when you had that exchange of papers.
K:
But I -- 3 is what they've always had in there.
H:
No, no. They normally send two, Henry.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN08-08/2150 PerLtr.6/19/202 6/19/2012
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
By NARA, Date 10/28/2014
DECLASSIFIED
OF4]
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (TAPE)
Page 2
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig.
April 18, 1971 -- 10:00 a.m.
K:
Oh, really.
H:
Yeah, you had them to up it one. The other one you wanted them to
loiter longer and Kennedy conveyed that to them.
K:
And did they do that?
H:
Well, they tried to get the Helsinki thing.
K:
Yeah.
H:
And they wouldn't accept them there and that's why they went to
State. That part of it is what caused the State thing. And now they
are not going there, they are going to Kiel.
K:
That's all right.
H:
And they have a paper they are sending over with the details but
it hasn't gotten here.
K:
But what I But are they going deeper in exit (?) than Kiel?
H:
Oh, I think so, yes. I think they are going in fairly deep.
K:
The thing is to let them exercise now. By the first of May, we will
know what our friend has brought.
H:
Exactly.
K:
If he brings something, they will just go to Kiel and come out.
If he brings nothing, they won't -- they will go all the way. 1
H:
That's right.
K:
But just keep watching it.
H:
That's right.
K:
Isn't that right?
H:
Yeah, that's the way to do it, I think, and as I say we have the
whole thing but it hasn't left there yet. First they said they sent
it to us, and then he called me back and said that it hadn't left yet.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determine d to be declassified. ; P,2 4
TELCON (TAPE)
Page 3
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig.
10:00 a. m., April 18, 1971
K:
Oh, they are a bunch of goddamn crooks.
H:
The other thing in Pich Nil is nothing but authority, they have to
come back in and give them a target now.
K:
No, he seems to have given -- approved it. Or maybe he's got it
screwed up.
H:
He's got it screwed up. I just talked to Dan Murphy, he said all he
did -- they have the authority, you know, but he --
K:
I also told him to tell Abrams to keep quiet now for a while.
H:
Yeah, yeah.
K:
That guy really -- I think he's just out of control.
H:
His training is so rotten, it's just terrible.
K:
Well, now what bothers me is he is fighting now a heroic battle for
military superiority out there while we are holding on by our teeth.
H:
Yeah, yeah, he had his chance.
K:
I just know we would still be in Laos if it hadn't been for that
goddamn -- well, now we would be out or we would be on the way
out.
H:
Yeah.
K:
But the China thing has taken us a little off the hook except that it
would have helped us militarily enormously.
H:
That's right.
K:
That goddamn thing was just beginning to pay off.
H:
Yeah, yeah.
K:
Okay, fine.
H:
All right, sir.
K:
I noticed the Times is again hacking away on Vietnam.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. P. 3 OF
4
TELCON (TAPE)
Page 4
Mr. Kissinger/General Haig
April 18, 1971 -- 10:00 a. m.
H:
It is. Yeah, yeah.
K:
That's all right. If we get any of the other things done, they are
going to be on their knees.
H:
Yeah. Well, I think it has been very helpful -- this would have been
a murderous week without it.
K:
Yeah. They don't even know how to tackle that one because they never
recommended this.
H:
No, that's right.
K:
Although they are going to leap frog us soon.
H:
Yeah.
K:
They are going to come up with 100 hot ideas.
H:
That's right.
K:
Don't you think?
H:
I'm sure of it.
K:
Although I'd rather like it if the Democrats hit a very hard pro-Chinese
course, it would give the Russians an incentive with us.
H:
That's right.
K:
Okay.
H:
That's the way it will turn too. Okay, sir.
K:
Right, bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON (TAPE)
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
10:00 a. m., April 18, 1971
L:
Henry.
K:
Yes, Mel.
L:
That movement into the Baltic takes place early in May.
K:
Okay.
L:
But they will be operating in the North Sea on an ASW mission.
Now what it -- the task force is made up of 4 destroyers and an
ASW carrier.
K:
That's great, that's what we want.
L:
And they will be operating this month in the North Sea, ASW exercises
and so forth, then they will move in the Baltic on the -- early in May.
K:
That's terrific. I wouldn't worry about that, if there are any changes,
I will be in touch with you.
L:
Yeah, let me know so I can back up from it if there are any.
K:
Right, but I am up to -- just continue it as it is.
L:
Yeah, okay. And we'll get together this week, there are a couple
of things we ought to talk over there, not time urgent but --
K:
You and I,or the President too.
L:
Well, maybe it would be all right for him on the use of air power
North that I want to talk about a little bit.
K:
Maybe you and I should talk about it first. I will definitely set up a
meeting --
L:
Yeah, all right.
K:
Between you and the President anyway, regardless.
L:
Yeah, fine.
K:
Okay.
L:
We'll talk about that, but it isn't time urgent right now.
K:
Good.
L:
All right.
K: Bye.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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"ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nTelcon\nHAK and Alexander Halg C4 ip.)\n4/8/71\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-8/21\nDECLASSIFIED Per Ltr. 6/19/2012\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transcripts Telephone Conversations\n29\nFOLDER TITLE\nHome April 1971\n5\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon PresidentiaMLibdaryn and returned non-historical material.\nDECLASSIFIED\nA RCHTIMS document has been reviewed pursuant DN Executive Order 13526 and has beendetermined to be declassified.\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nY\nTeken\nHAK and Alexender Halg C4 pp.)\n4/18/71\nB\nMANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN08-8/2 21\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transcripts Telephone Conversations\n29\nFOLDER TITLE\nHome April 1971 5\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nGPO:1989-235-084/00024\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n1\nTelcon\nHAK and Alexander Halg C4 pp.)\n4/18/71\nB\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transcripts Telephone Conversations\n29\nFOLDER TITLE\nHome April 1971\n5\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nS.GPO;1989-235-084/00024\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nTELECON (Tape\nMr. Kissinger/Pat Buchanan (?)\nApril 3, 1971\nK:\nI can't even get you to come to my office anymore.\nB:\nNo, I was called to a higher authority.\nK:\nListen, now. If you are going to take that attitude, you haven't got\nyour priorities straight, as the Peaceniks would say.\nB:\nListen, the President wants us to get together. I've come down and\ndug up this\nK:\nHe wants to go over the conclusions and wants me to look at what some\nof you other guys said.\nB:\nRight; I'm getting that together and I'll bring it on out to you in about.\nHow far away are you?\nK:\nWhere are you now?\nB:\nI am at the compound. You got me up, if you must know the truth,\nand I haven't eaten breakfast or shaved yet. How about coming\nWhat is\nit 10:00?\nB:\nYeah.\nK:\nHow about 10:45?\nB:\nOkay; we'll see you then. All right.\nK:\nAnd it's five minutes drive.\nB:\nOkay, fine.\nK:\nGood.\nB:\nWe'll see you then. Take it easy.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon (Tape)\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird\nApril 3, 1971\nK:\nHello, Mel.\nL:\nHow are you?\nK:\nOkay; how are you?\nL:\nVe ry good. Say, did you get that memorandum all right.\nK:\nI did. Thank you, and the President has got it and is studying it.\nL:\nVery good. Now, I kind of held that in line with what I thought you\nwere working on.\nK:\nThat's right.\nL:\nAnd didn't go overboard at all on it.\nK:\nWell, it's more than the military want, of course.\nL:\nWell, yeah, but the military\nhell, they would want to bring it down\nto about 8, 000, but they've always been about 20%.\nTheir recommendation\nhas been 20% below the President's always. So it's about the same as you would\nexpect. So I don't think we are too far offf.\nK:\nWell the President has got it right in front of him now.\nL:\nDo you need any more material?\nK:\nNo, I think, Mel, that this gives us\nFrankly, I don't know what he is\ngoing to pick and whether he is coming in on which of these three choices. But\nor what length of time.\nL:\nThe situation is such that he's got to at least go 12, 500, and he could go\na little more if he really wants to, Henry.\nK:\nYeah, well that's what your recommendation is.\nL:\nYeah; well, I can see we could even go up to 15, 000 if he really feels\nhe has to.\nK:\nWell, I don't think that that's his mood. But I'll tell him that.\nL:\nIf he really feels he has to, I can give him one that's a little more than that\nbut I just didn't think I'd put it in there because I thought these were, you know,\nreasonable things. But if he wants one worked out for a little more, I'll work one\nout for him.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird (Tape)\nApril 3, 1971\n- 2 -\nK:\nWell, I think we better not, Mel, for the time-being. If we need it,\nI know we can get it and I'll ask for it.\nL:\nYeah. I thought that would be a better way to handle it.\nK:\nI think that's the more\nthat's the fairer way of handling it, and there's\nless danger of anything leaking and so forth. Not that this will leak either.\nL:\nThere's one thing, Henry. I wonder if you or the President -- now that\nhe's in this -- shouldn't read the Pearce Commission Report which I've put a\nclamp of secrecy on.\nK:\nOh, yes.\nL:\nBecause sooner or later, that thing will.\nyou know, we are keeping it\nnow classified on the basis that it would prejudice.\nmight prejudice the\njudicial process. Now there are some people who have read it and I think you\nshould know that.\nK:\nLike who?\nL:\nEddie Hébert.\nK:\nYeah.\nL:\nHe read it, and Stennis has read parts of it. The parts on the sex offenses,\nsodomy and rape. I wouldn't let them use those in the prosecution, but they are\nin that report.\nK:\nWell, let me check with Ehrlichman what he thinks we should do on that.\nI know somebody at the White House ought to read it.\nL:\nSomebody ought to read that God-damned report, Henry. But I don't want\nto get that thing so circulated. We've got to handle it very carefully because I'm\ngoing to try to keep that bottled up for another 12 months. There' be a great\ndemand to make that public. You know, McCrade(?) who is Rockefeller's counsel\nis going to take the President on on this thing.\nK:\nBut he's no longer Rockefeller's counsel. Is he still?\nL.\nYeah.\nK:\nBut why the hell should he do it?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird (Tape)\nApril 3, 1971\n- 3 -\nL:\nWell, he was the Counsel for the Pearce Commission.\nK:\nLet me talk to Rockefeller and see whether I can get him shut up a bit.\nWhat do you think?\nL:\nI think he's been talking a little bit to much, I think, to some of our friends\non the New York Times and some other places; and I just hate to have this whole\ndamn thing surfaced because\nyou know, these guys all think the President\nis going too far in this thing.\nK:\nWell, so far, he's just on the line, I think. If he had gone one step further\nhe'd be dead.\nL:\nWell, if Ehrlichman wouldn't have had that backgrounder, we'd have been\na lot better off and if they'd have gone just with the statement, because Latimer\nnow is going to use that backgrounder.\nK:\nOn what grounds?\nL:\nOn the grounds that the President is going to use some unfortunate thing\nin non-legal review and so forth, and so on. We've got to be damn careful about\nthis, Henry. You know, I'm not an old woman about it, or anything\nK:\nNo, I was on your side with it. I didn't think it was a good idea for us to\nget into it if we could avoid it.\nL:\nI thought we could have handled a lot of these things XXXXXXX quietly, but\nyou know, sometimes these things make a plus for 24 hours, but you've got to be\ndamned careful, Henry.\nK:\nWell, Mel, let me\nL:\nYou know, I'm worried about this more than anybody else, and I just think\nwe've got to be very careful.\nK:\nWell, let me see what I can do about.\nwhat I can find out about getting\nsomebody to look at this report. I've\nI frankly don't want to do it myself.\nXXXX I don't want to get into that review process.\nL:\nI think it's better if you don't, but somebody ought to. I don't even think\nBill should read it. Bill thought maybe he should read it.\nK:\nWho, Rogers?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird (Tape)\nApril 3, 1971\n- 4 -\nL:\nYeah, and I said, \"Bill, you shouldn't read it. 11\nK:\nNo; Bill ought to stay out of it, too. It's a loser.\nL:\nBut I think some body should read it so that they know what.\nand we can\nkeep\nyou know, the press is after it. We will not give it to them. I'll just\nstand firm on that.\nK:\nOkay, Mel. Good.\nL:\nAre there any other problems.\nK:\nNo; none that I.. Will you keep an eye on whether there are any significant\nNorth Vietnamese offensives that we may be hit with in the next week or so so that\nthe President doesn't say anything that will get us into trouble?\nL:\nYeah. Well, they are being very quiet right now.\nK:\nThat's what it looks like. What are our casualties going to be this week?\nL:\nWell, they' be about 83.\nK:\nThat's including those 33?\nL:\nWe don't have all of them in there, but we have about half of them in.\nK:\nYeah. But they should start dropping now, shouldn't they?\nL:\nWell, I hope so. The only trouble is we've got about.\nwe've got those\nmissing in Laos that we haven't gotten fully reported yet because we haven't gotten\ntheir bodies.\nK:\nYeah, yeah.\nL:\nIf you'll look on your report this morning, you'll see that we have the\nnumber that is still our missing, and those\nmost of those will be dead.\nK:\nOkay, Mel. Those are the only things we've got now.\nL:\nOkay. That report on the casualties won't come out until Thursday\nmorning.\nK:\nRight.\nL:\nOkay, Henry.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird (Tape)\nApril 3, 1971\n- 5 -\nK:\nI will keep you posted.\nL:\nYou think the material on the report is all you need -- the report I sent\nout to you? You don't need anymore today?\nK:\nI don't think so, Mel. I think that really\nIt's a first-class piece of\nwork -- very, very thoughtful.\nL:\nWell, if you need some more material or anything, let me know.\nK:\nI don't think so, Mel. I'll let you know just as soon as I know anymore.\nHe is secluded and working away.\nL:\nVery good.\nK:\nThank you, Mel. Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in 4/4/71\nP:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nLet me cover a couple of things. First, I just talked to Buchanan and\nmy main concern now is to get some more thoughts on the concluding part\non which, you know, you sent a memorandum in. We've got really three\ndifferent ideas here, all of which may or may not be worthwhile. You know,\nSafire had his\nBuchanan's got some ideas; you've got some; and I have some,\ntoo. Buchanan pulled some of them together. So, I've asked him to come over\ndoesn't he\nas soon as he's in the office. Why XXXXXXX/jus sit down and talk with you about\nit and have you just look over\nFirst of all, we have perhaps our major\nproblem\nLet me put it this way. The major problem is to get it tight get\nit down so that it isn't too long. At the present time, it'll run\nIt's got to\nbe no more than 4 or 5 minutes of that concluding part, you see, or otherwise\nyou lose them, if you just go on and on and on.\nK:\nRight. Absolutely.\nP:\nSo, I am taking.\nOn the other part of it, I'm getting it honed down now\nthe first part. It's moving along all right. But this part is actually the most\nimportant and the most difficult, so Buchanan as you will note in the stuff that\nhe pulled together, he's got much of the material you suggested, and he's got a\nlittle of the Safire, some of my own\nI put in some, for example, about the\nAmerican soldier. That's the way to handle the Calley thing not that we are\ntalking about Calley, but you've got to say something about the 2-1/2 million\nAmericans\nK:\nAbsolutely.\nP:\nThat we can be proud of them. But it's too long at this point. But what I\nwould like for you to do is just sit down and look at it as editor and then put him\nback to the drawing board to\nyou know, stuff that should be in and out and how\nwe can tighten it. I would say I wouldn't expect anything for about three hours so\nif that sounds all right to you, we'll do it. That's where I really need the help\nis on the conclusion.\nK:\nIs he coming over to my.\nWell, I'll get in touch with him, Mr. President.\nP:\nI don't know where he is actually. I just talked to him on the phone. I\nthink he's still at his apartment.\nK:\nWell, I'll find him.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in 4/4/71 (Tape)\n- 2 -\nP:\nHe'll be at the office.\nK:\nI'll be over there.\nP:\nHe'll either come to your house or there. It doesn't make any difference.\nYou can work any place.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nFine; fine. There are a couple of other things I want to ask about.\nWhat is -- with regard to that\nI notice in the Los Angeles Times that village\nthey tore up\nFoize had a pretty good piece on that, didn't he, about where\ndid you see it -- on the atrocity\nK:\nI haven't seen it yet, Mr. President.\nP:\nThat was a pretty bad thing, wasn't it?\nK:\nYes. They killed about 100 people\nYou mean the North Vietnamese\nattack on that village.\nP:\nYeah, yeah, yeah.\nBut that was their atrocity.\nK:\nThat was absolutely\nAnd it's typical.\nP:\nIt's typical. Hell, it's\nat least somebody I don't know whether\nthe television ever used it -- the difficulty is\nI may get this in some place\nthat the difficulty is that in this war we always see what we have done. We never\nsee what they have done.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nWell, anyway, it's a tough one. Now, the second thing is\nK:\nAnd there's one other big difference. For them terror has been\nI\ndon't know whether you would want to say that because this isn't a speech.\nbut\nit is a fact that for them, terror has been a regular part of the strategy. In our\ncase, it has been a abberation when it's happened.\nP:\nExactly. Oh, I know. It's so hard to get into that I'm afraid we can't\nI'll do that with the editors. You know what you come down to. They would be\ngiving Calley a medal. We give him a trial.\nK:\nThat's right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in 4/4/71 (Tape)\n- 3 -\nP:\nThat's\nthe difference between the two. Let me ask you one other\nthing. What is the\nI noticed here that one wire report or something out about\nthe North Vietnamese attacking in some area\nWhat I'm just thinking is that\nis there something going on right now that may hit before we go on on Wednesday?\nK:\nWell, of course, they know your date, and they can always attack something.\nThere's no major campaign going on. They attacked a fire base in the highlands\nlast week, and overran part of it and then either were driven off or left while\nP:\nThat actually was what this story is about.\nK:\nBut they had very heavy casualties.\nP:\nThat's right. In fact, they said 1500 casualties and only 2 Americans\nwere killed in the whole damn thing.\nK:\nThat's right. Well, the Americans concern 700 casualties, but nevertheless.\nI mean 700 North Vietnamese. Still they took very heavy casualties.\nspasm\nP:\nI really think your judgment with regard to the\ntheory\nis\nright. As a matter of fact, Henry, when you look back on what they were doing\nin Cambodia. Those were little spasms when they started to cut roads and raise\nhell.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nYou know, after the sanctuary operation, they were rushing in. They\ndidn't have a hell of a lot of staying power. They couldn't stay any place they\nwent.\nK:\nThat's exactly right. And here, where they think they have the\npsychological momentum.\nP:\nYou see, my point is that I don't want to be\njust have lack of credibility\nwhen I speak fairly confidently.\nK:\nWell, I think you are quite safe, Mr. President. I have been telling all\nthe newsmen and television guys. We cannot prevent.\nwe cannot predict whether\nthey' do a high point now and then, or a series of high points, and they have\nalways the choice between putting more into a high point and then having less\nprotracted war. But we are talking about an average rate and on that I know you\nare going to stand.\nP:\nRight. I'm confident about it, as you know, but what I'm concerned about,\nHenry, is only that the TV the night you go on -- or at any extent\nWell,\nanyway, understand I'm just\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in 4/4/71 (Tape)\n- 4 -\nK:\nRight. No, I don't think.\nWell, it's just hard to say whether they\nare going to make a big attack the night you go on.\nP:\nNo, no, no. It isn't that. I meant whether there is any big attack they\ncan sustain. It doesn't look like that.\nK:\nNo, it doesn't\nP:\nIf we had had something, then I would want to hedge pretty strongly in\nthe speech.\nK:\nIt doesn't look that way now, but we will watch that very carefully.\nP:\nBut as far as\nYou see, I haven't been reading the reports this\nweek. As far as that's concerned, the level of activity apparently has not\nbeen too\nK:\nIt's been actually dropping except for this attack on the firebase. It's\nbeen dropping in the Lam Son area.\nP:\nRight. And the ARVN apparently is doing a little attacking of its own.\nK:\nThat's right. The ARVN, of course, except for the units that were in\nLam Son, is unaffected by this. And we have a long cable in from Bunker about\nall the psychological measures.they are taking.\nP:\nWhat's he say?\nK:\nThey are having rallys all over the country. The TV is playing it in a\ncertain way, and they have a sense, he claims, of great accomplishment. And\nit's interesting that the opposition parties the Buddhists have XXXXX passed\na resolution supporting their armed forces and taking pride ;in the cross-border\noperations.\nP:\nYou know, it's a funny thing about patriotism. Even South Vietnamese\nsometimes don't like to see their boys lose. And if we get a little of that going\nthere, Henry, we've got a lot going with us, haven't we?\nK:\nThat's absolutely right. And I think that's involved in this country, too.\nP:\nWe\nhope\nso,\nyeah.\nThe one point I think\nIf I could just say -- I didn't\nmention this to Buchanan -- but when you are talking to\nhim.\nI feel that the\nimportant thing here is not just to make this blood, sweat and tears. You understand.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in 4/4/71 (Tape)\n- 5 -\nI think that people have had so much of that, you know. You've got to grin\nand bear it.\nK:\nNo, they've got to have some hope, too.\nP:\nThere's got to be\nIt must have lift, and we've got to speak with\nconfidence and so forth and therefore the negatives with regard to 'well, even\nthough\nthis\nmeans\na\ndefeat.\nI mean I'm inclined to think that we ought to\nin terms of tone, it should be more one of 'well, we are coming to the end.\nConfident. You know what I mean. Just.\nThey've just got to be reassured.\nThe American people right now, you know, are in sort of a psychological\ndepression and the reason they are in that depression, Henry, is this God-damned\ntelevision.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nIt's just been pounding them night after night. It is just shameful.\nLook what it does to people. No wonder it depresses them. So what we have\nto do is to cheer them up a little. I have rewritten the beginning in a very\nI mean\nyou don't have to look at any of that. I don't want anybody to waste\nany time on the meat and potatoes -- I'll take care of that, until I get it done\nin the way I want to say it, and then it's the conclusion where we need some\ngood extra thinking. But the beginning, rather than just starting out, you know,\n'well, I'm going to announce.\nI'm announcing tonight.\n1\nI'm going to start\nright out probably in something like this. \"Over the past several weeks, you\nhave heard a number of discouraging reports on TV, radio and in your newspapers\non the situation in Southeast Asia. I think the time has come for me, as\nPresident and as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, to put these reports\nin perspective -- to lay out all the pertinent facts before you -- and to let you\njudge for yourself as to the success of our policy. I'm glad to be able to begin\nmy report with some good news. On May 1st. 11 You see what I mean.\nStart right out that way. You don't just start out and say, well, in the old way\n'I'm announcing tonight a new withdrawal. I think the people -- you disarm\nthem immediately by saying 'look, you've been hearing a lot of stuff, but now\nI just want to tell you, tain't all that bad'. See.\nK:\nAnd I would put in.\nI would perhaps go a little further and not just say,\n\"It's not that bad. 11 I'd say, \"In fact, (something like) we believe that the events\nthis year have been a plus\" or something like this.\nP:\nI've got that in later.\nK:\n\"And as a result, we can increase\n\" to show some relationship\nbetween what has happened.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in 4/4/71 (Tape)\n- 6 -\nP:\nOh, that's all in. It's not the first paragraph. Then I go into the\nopen item after I get through with Laos. I just make (train going by --\nunintelligible) And it's because of that\nbecause of Cambodia, etc., that\nwe are able to do what we are doing. Oh, well, don't worry. That's all in\nthere because it's true.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nDon't even think about that part of it. Just think about the last part.\nIn other words, the concluding thoughts and think in terms of the stuff you\nprepared which you will note a lot of it is in what Buchanan's put together.\nHe\njust\nsort\nof\nand it was my suggestion.\nscissors and paste. He put\nin your stuff, some that he had, a little of Safire's, an idea that I had on the\narmed forces, but it runs twice as long as it should, and also it doesn't have\nany structure. But you sit down and talk and put him back and see what he\ncan come up with. In the meantime, I'll probably end up writing most of it\nmyself, but.\nK:\nBut it may be a help.\nP:\nIt's always a help to get some phrases and some ideas as to what should\nbe left in and what should be left out.\nK:\nWell, I'll call him this minute.\nP:\nNo, no, no. There's no hurry. He'll be ready and you can have at it.\nBe sure to sit outside today. That's the place to work.\nK:\nWell, I've got a great porch so I'll probably sit there.\nP:\nI have the general feeling that what we are really at at this time with\nthe doves running off.\nyou know, the Calley thing, of course, got some of the\nhawks even saying let's get the hell out.\nis that it's like always -- the last of\na war. As I've often said, the darkest month of the Civil War was August of\n1964, and the brightest was September. So what the hell. But nevertheless,\nthis isn't that kind of war. But the point is that at this time the country is in\nsort of that kind of a funk, and this isn't going to pull them out of it. All it is\ngoing to do is to sort of say, well, we'll just give them a little more chance.\nThat's about all we are doing, see.\nK:\nWell, but that may be all that is needed.\nP:\nMaybe. And, also, it could be that the over-reaction of the doves and\nof the media and so forth may now be compensated for. If the reactions you are\ngetting from some of your press guys are at all reflectors in what they do or\nwrite, they'll begin to compensate a bit, you know. They don't like to be out\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in 4/4/71 (Tape)\n- 7 -\njust being completely wrong. Correct?\nK:\nAbsolutely. And they have this uneasy feeling that there's something\ngoing on in the country. This I think is excellent.\nP:\nYou really feel that, do you?\nK:\nOh, yes.\nP:\nOf course, some of them are trying to interpret that as being really\njust war weariness.\nK:\nWell, but it's\nP:\nBut they don't really believe that.\nK:\nThey know it's the war weariness of the hawks who'd really like to win.\nP:\nYeah. And that worries them, huh?\nK:\nAnd that worries them.\nP:\nI know you said it worried Hubbard. Is there anybody else that it\nworries?\nK:\nWell, all the newsmen I saw Friday afternoon, for example. Deacon(?)\nfor example.\nP:\nThe St. Louis Post-Dispatch.\nK:\nThe TV guys yesterday. And I have found.\nI haven't seen today's\npapers yet, but the play of the news is no longer quite as negative in a subtle\nway.\nP:\nIsn't it, really?\nK:\nNo, no. They gloating are beginning now to report some of the achievements on\nLaos and the hysterical/tone is out of it to a considerable extent.\nP:\nThe gloating over the defeat.\nK:\nOver what they considered the defeat.\nP:\nHuh -- really?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in 4/4/71 (Tape)\n- 8 -\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nWell, you watch it. I'm deliberately isolating myself from those\nday-to-day reports because I must -- if I get involved in that, I will not do\nthe thing effectively. I think it's very important for me to be absolutely\nabove it, detached from it, and just plow right ahead.\nK:\nI think that's right.\nP:\nThese damn reports\nThat's the purpose of those really. As much\nas anything else those guys are trying to get me.\nK:\nWell, that's the\nP:\nWouldn't it really kill them if they knew I don't read them.\nK:\nIt already kills them that you are so serene. Everyone keeps asking me.\nP:\nReally?\nK:\nAbout 80% come in and say, \"Now tell me the truth. Is the President\nreally SO calm? or is he nervous?\" I said I've never seen him waver in any\nof these periods.\nP:\nThat burns them up, doesn't it?\nK:\nYou know, they are used to Johnson rooting around and beating his\nbreast.\nP:\nI saw Kennedy the day after the Bay of Pigs and, boy, I tell you. If ever\nI had seen a guy who had lost his cool, that was one.\nK:\nOh, God, yes.\nP:\nAnd that was, of course, crap. Nothing to that.\nK:\nWell, that was a one-shot operation.\nP:\nWell, it was easy to handle, too.\nK:\nFrom which it was easy to recover.\nP:\nJust announce going to the moon. That's all. Well, anyway, if the\nserenity bugs them, they'l get bugged with that because we've just got to plow\nright ahead on that score. Well, we've done that all along, of course. I think\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in 4/4/71 (Tape)\n- 9 -\nthat bugged them in the November 3rd period and in the Cambodia period,\ntoo.\nK:\nIt bugged them, for example\nNow, this is sort of taken for granted\nP:\nThere isn't one student of a Harvard professor that could stand up to\nme for five minutes in a debate.\nK:\nThat's what they don't like about you.\nP:\nThere's not one of them that could stand up for one of those press\nconferences without a note. 'Cause they don't teach that anymore.\nK:\nExactly. And also the way you have everything organized. You know\nwhen you can say to Howard K. Smith, \"The following are the three points --\n1, 2, 3 in grammatical sentences.\nP:\nThat's right. There's not one of their students who could do that. And\nnone of them could.\nK:\nWell, none of them could because they don't teach them anymore to be\nthat disciplined in their thinking.\n0.\nThe other thing, though.\nThe point I didn't make to Bob is the difference\nof the press with Johnson than with me is that they were willing to tear Johnson\nto shreds but a little leery for a reason because they knew the alternative.\nJohnson was not necessarily one of theirs, but Nixon.\nor\na\nRepublican.\nBut\nnow,\nyou see, they are willing to tear me to shreds without (unintelligible) is that they\nknow that the alternative to me is one of theirs, see. Therefore, that's why they\nare going all out for\nHaldeman didn't understand that -- the fact that.\nK:\nWell, and what they do to you that they didn't do to Johnson is this constant\nnagging away at every little thing on top of the big things [Tape ran out]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPat Buchanan/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971\nK:\nPat.\nB:\nYeah.\nK:\nThe President asked me to check with you what you thought of the\nnew draft.\nB:\nGeez, I just took it back to my office and locked it up.\nK:\nYou haven't read it yet?\nB:\nNo.\nK:\nOkay. He just wants to make damn sure you don't show it to anyone\nalso.\nB:\nOh, don't worry about that. I locked it up myself.\nK:\nOkay, fine.\nB:\nOkay.\nK:\nGood.\nB:\nDon't worry.\nK:\nNo, no, but that isn't the main thing; he wanted to get your quick\nreaction.\nB:\nOkay, well, tell him I haven't read it yet. I'll come in early and\ndo the news summary and give it a reading and get it over to him.\nK:\nRight. Now, remember, Pat, at this stage of the game confidence\nis more important than perfection.\nB:\nOkay, fine, okay.\nK:\nYou know, if you have a violent objection, you should make it.\nB:\nYou mean to the speech.\nK:\nYeah but I mean, the main thing he's got to get now is confidence.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPat Buchanan/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 5, 1971 -- 9:15 p.m\nB:\nRight, right. I agree with you fully, especially after getting back\nto reading some of these news reports. This is a bad atmosphere\naround here.\nK:\nExactly and you know everyone is going to be beating away at him to\ncave.\nB:\nYeah.\nK:\nOkay?\nB:\nRighteo.\nK:\nThank you.\nB:\nTake it easy.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971\nK:\nMr. President\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nI've just talked to Pat and he actually hasn't read it yet, he locked\nit up in his safe and he was at home.\nP:\nOh, yeah -- fine, well, that's okay.\nK:\nBut I'm positive what he will think.\nP:\nOkay.\na chance to change\n.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nPretty hard to tell\n.\nK:\nWell, I think that's right.\nP:\nCause I don't want it to get around and have the staff start nitpicking\nme.\nK:\nThey all want you to score a homerun by giving in to what they think\nare the pressures and I don't think it can be done that way. I think if\nwe get ahead of the game, then we can play the peace situation.\nP:\nWell, there's no homerun to be scored because there's not -- really\nnothing more that we can do.\nK:\nNo. Anything more we do, we might just as well leave.\nP:\nas much as the traffic can\nbear.\nK:\nAnd mar e.\nP:\nA little more.\nK:\nA little more.\nP:\nprobably as much as we can possibly\n.\nI will just play it pretty cool and sort of nonchalantly.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 2\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nP:\n.\nK:\nOh, no; no, no.\nP:\n.\nK:\nNo, and I'll go the way you suggested. I'll just give them the\nimpression that you might be leaning their way.\nP:\nWell, not too much.\nK:\nNo.\nP:\nNot leaning their way.\nK:\nOh, but I mean that you were listening to it.\nP:\nThat I had listened to everything, that I've got to make my decision\nthey have been hearing from all the fellows here, of course, that have\nbeen bombarded by\nThey are both fine newsmen, of course, but their story on Calley --\naren't we to blame, you know. Good, God, I mean -- this business\nof aren't we to blame\nshouldn't Americans\nconsider\nresponsible for these atrocities\n.\nK:\nIt's a rough mood.\nP:\nIt's rough, yeah. Also it was kind of rough if you remember when we\nwent into Cambodia and it's rough -- it's tougher now, a year later,\nbut all right.\nK:\nOn the other hand one knows what is right and --\nP:\nThat's what we are doing and I'm not going allow\npeople running people and so forth and force them to do something\nforce them to believe\npitiful -- you know, it makes\nLook kids, we're sorry for all this -- you know, I mean\nK:\nYes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 3\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p. m., April 5, 1971\nP:\nThey wouldn't -- I know that most\nbut a hell of a lot is on the line here.\nK:\nFor our future as a country and as a people.\nP:\nYeah, you've got to put that on the line -- that it doesn't turn out\nto be\nand be able to say all right, choose the other\nway, that's the whole\n.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nIf you can do that, we did it just for you.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nThe whole line.\nK:\nBut I still can't believe it will come to that.\nP:\nNo, I don't think so either but\n.\nI like the reaction of some of them\nafter the Howard K. Smith thing -- Hatfields\nbasically a pretty weak-kneed bunch.\nK:\nOh, that is our tragedy, Mr. President.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nThat every battle you've had to fight alone.\nP:\nWell, we've got some battlers, we've got a few of our Southerners\nin the Senate. There is Jerry Ford, like a rock.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nAnd to his credit Tiger\n, Griffin and a few Southerners stand up --\na few like Ford and Scott\nlast week\n.\nK:\nThat was amazing.\nP:\nAfter he reads the News magazine\nshift it around.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 4\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p. m., April 5, 1971\ntuned\n/\nK:\nWell, he's got his ear pretty closely to the ground. I don't think\nthe news magazines affect the public, they affect the intellectuals.\nP:\nThey affect the politicians\nSo that's the way it will be. Fine, Henry, thank you.\nK:\nRight.\nFurther conversation -- 10:15 p.m.\nK:\nMr. President\ntaking a\nP:\nOh, Henry, I was just / look at the Star tonight and Boggs\nK:\nOn Hoover\nP:\nK:\nGoddammit.\nP:\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nWhat I'd like you to do\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 5\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n10:15 p.m., April 5, 1971\nK:\nTo call whom?\nP:\nJohnson -- President Johnson.\nK:\nPresident Johnson, yes.\nP:\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nK:\nNot at all, I'll do it this minute.\nP:\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nK:\nI'll do it this minute, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPresident Johnson/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 5, 1971\nK:\nMr. President, we just came back from San Clemente. The\nPresident wanted me to call you before he gave his speech on\nWednesday to tell you that no matter what you read in the newspaper\nand that's just for your information, he has no intention of\nstampeding out of Vietnam and of throwing away of what so many\nbrave men have suffered for and he thought you should particularly\nknow that.\nJ:\nWell, I'm glad to hear it.\nK:\nAnd that no matter what the pressures are on us, we will keep\nup some withdrawals but it won't be what the newspapers keep saying.\nJ:\nWell, it's good, Henry, glad to hear it. What speech -- giving one\ntonight?\nK:\nWednesday night. I'll call you on Wednesday, he's still playing with\nsome of the figures and we're still talking to Thieu about it but it's\ngoing to be within the range of things we've done before.\nJ:\nWell, don't worry about me, just go on and do what you think you\nought to do and I'll be for it. I hope you come down to the Library\nopening.\nK:\nDefinitely, Mr. President.\nJ:\nI sure do -- I particularly want you to be here.\nK:\nWell, Mr. President, I wouldn't miss it. I've already we're\ncoming down with two airplanes as a matter of fact but I have already\nasked the President to put me on the list and he's agreed.\nJ:\nI don't want you to get out of the government any sooner than you have\nto but when you do, I want you to come down here and teach our people\nsome of the things you know at the school of public affairs.\nK:\nWell, you're very generous, Mr. President.\nJ:\nNo, I'm not generous, I just want to do something for my people.\nK:\nMr. President, there was one other matter that the President wanted\nme to raise with you. HaleBoggs made a very sharp attack on Hoover\ntoday apparently, I haven't seen it myself. And he wondered whether\nanything could be done to quiet him down a little bit.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 2\nPresident Johnson/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 5, 1971\nJ:\nI hope so, I'm surprised -- I talked to him yesterday, he didn't say\na word about it.\nK:\nCause he's actually a great patriot but he sometimes gets a little\nenthusiastic.\nJ:\nWell, liberal pressures I guess. That damn school of yours - - - yall\nclose Harvard for a while, we'd get along better.\nK:\nOh God, I mean -- (laughter) I'm getting some of what you people\nwere exposed to for 4 years now. They are suddenly discovering\nvillainess in my character that were well hidden for many years.\nJ:\nTell the President I will do anything in the world that I can because I\nthink he's been a good public servant and I'll do everything I can -- I\ndon't know but I called Hale -- had a long talk with him yesterday and\nI'm surprised.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President. I will be calling you on Wednesday.\nJ:\nThank you. Don't take any of your time on me because you've already\ngot me.\nK:\nWell, no, but you --\nJ:\nVery thankful that you are in the Government.\nK:\nWell, you are very generous, Mr. President, and it's a privilege\nto be working with you even if it's infrequent.\nJ:\nI appreciate all the President's trying to do and you are not going to\nhave any problem out of me.\nK:\nWe know that, we are calling you out of respect for what you've done.\nJ:\nWell, thank you, Henry.\nK:\nRight. Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971\nK:\nHello, Mr. President.\nP:\nHello, Henry. Well, since you've gotten back have you been\ninfected yet with the Washington virus?\nK:\nNot yet, Mr. President. I think we are on the right course. I have\nread the speech over and I think it is very strong now.\nP:\nIt's a pretty good speech, I think.\nK:\nI think it's an excellent speech.\nP:\nIt's got a lot of\nLet me just say that I think it's important.\nI told Rose to tell Buchanan and you the same thing - both you and\nBuchanan say you don't know what the hell's going to be in it.\nK:\nRight. Well, I haven't even shown it to Haig.\nP:\nIt's very important that you do that for the reason that I might\nchange it. And second, I think it's just as well to know that\nbecause I know that we get the usual staff jitters and from the Congress\nsaying to do this and that.\nK:\nYes.\nP:\nBut I understand all this. They are all wobbling around and hell,\nI'm just not going to let them think they affected me one way or the other.\nK:\nAbsolutely, Mr. President.\nP:\nI know the point is the fellows all think they can tell me things\nI don't know but I'm aware of those things, I know them more deeply than\nthey do.\nK:\nWell, John Scali called this evening and he had a number of hot ideas\nbut you know that is a centrum of all the people who just leave the news field.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nThey want to do it the other way -- in the traditional way.\nP:\nWhat is his idea?\nK:\nWell, he doesn't have a concrete idea, he just wants some sort of\nsmashing announcement that would defuse everything.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 2\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971\nP:\nNow, what the hell would we do; you mean like announce we are going\nto get out tomorrow or\nK:\nWell, he doesn't have -- he admits he doesn't know what it is.\nP:\nCan't be done.\nK:\nAnd it can't be done. I think -\nP:\nNovember 3 just\nrespect just like that. November 3\nbecause basically I mean -- we will listen to him later but the point\nis at this point we can not just do something that you know isn't going\nto wash.\nK:\nI talked to Garment and he said he's become totally convinced that if\nwe appeal to the Doves, we will be destroyed.\nP:\nHow?\nK:\nAnd he said he read the World Report, he had to give a speech at the\nFederal City Club, he thinks your foreign policy holds together and its\ngot a good philosophical foundation and we should fight for it.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nAnd that coming from him since his instincts are the other way is\nparticularly interesting I think.\nP:\nWell, we're not going to go -- we'll play, once we get something to\nplay with, Henry\nDobrynin or anything like that, we'll let go of\nJohn Scalli, and by God we will broker the hell out of them.\nK:\nOh, yeah, but then we do it to destroy the Doves.\nP:\nBut not for the purpose of catering to them, cause I mean you can\nconfuse them. Bull will not work.\nK:\nI agree completely.\nP:\nI know, for example, I mean John\nyou know has raised the\ncredibility problem\n.\nHe was doing it you know\njust to\n.\nWell, John, I said -- and he wasn't trying\nto advocate a change but he said there is a problem. Hell, I know, there\nis a problem but it's not what we done, it's what they have created.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 3\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nI mean what the hell have we done? The only stupid thing we've\nactually done -- look at Laos. The only stupid thing -- that goddamn\nblackout which I didn't order.\nK:\nOn the contrary which we thought would end within 24 hours. If it\nhad ended within 24 hours, no one would have paid any attention to\nit. No, Abrams in this whole operation has been a disaster. He's\ngot great credit but he has not been good on this.\nP:\nWell, anyway the point is that having happened -- while it is true,\nif you read the polls and everything else, there is a credibility about\nus and I believe there is a lack of confidence in the conduct of the war\nand so forth but that is no reason to cave and just state it out there\nthe best we can and hope for the best.\nK:\nIt is the only --\nP:\nIf we start simpering around and catering to these bastards, hell,\nthey will just eat us alive. Garment sees that doesn't he?\nK:\nAbsolutely. In fact, he came to this conclusion entirely by himself\nand as you can imagine against his first instincts.\nP:\nWell, when you are talking tomorrow to the staff or some of the\nseniors, I wouldn't take alarm where your're concerned but you\noccur to be a little Dovish and say, gee whiz -- you know, I; oh, I\ndon't know what he's going to do -- I mean he's done what he's done,\nhe did before, he's thinking about it himself and he's going to make\nhis own decision and I can't predict as always.\nK:\nAll right, absolutely.\nP:\nI'd just keep guessing and if they wail and go around; say, now look,\nwail all you want but he's the guy that's going to do this and that I've\nconsidered all the reviews and all the rest -- I mean Shultz, Ehrlichman,\nMcGregor, Rumsfeld, Finch and all the rest of them, they don't know\na goddamn thing about this.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nOr what it's about.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 4\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971\nK:\nAnd they don't know what we will be hit with if this whole thing comes\napart.\nP:\nThey don't know a thing about foreign policy; they are only concerned\nabout peace at any price, really. Cause they see -- all they are\nconcerned about is revenue sharing, the environment and all that\ncrap which doesn't amount to anything.\nK:\nThey want to take off the immediate pressure, this is their overriding\nconcern.\nP:\nimmediate pressure.\nK:\nAnd that I don't believe can be done. I mean it can't be done their way\nbecause once you accept the premises of McGovern, you are fighting\non his ground and it wouldn't be in character.\nP:\nOh, that's right.\nK:\nThere is one thing, Mr. President, there are two sentences we ought\nto add because there is the cynical comment that Doves are now making,\nespecially McGovern, that we are substituting Asian for American\ncasualties and increasing the bombing. We can do it in two sentences --\nOne, where you speak about reduction in American deaths, you can say\nand South Vietnamese casualties have also dropped by I think 50%, I'll\nget you the exact figures.\nP:\nAnd why don't we say that our -- then put in and we 've reduced our\nbombing by so much.\nK:\nAnd the bombing within South Vietnam has been reduced by 90%,\nMr. President.\nP:\nWell, rather than getting into too many figures, just say that we have\nreduced our bombing by 30% or something like that. You know, whatever\nthe figure is for Southeast Asia -- I don't have to get into set wording,\nSouth Vietnam, Laos --\nK:\nBut the significance of the 90% is that in the populated areas our bombing\nhas decreased by 90%. The area we are now bombing is the unpopulated\narea.\nP:\nI know that but I don't have time to explain --\nK:\nNo, I'll get you the right figures.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 5\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971\nP:\nAll we need is just get some figure that makes the point. We can\nat least try to get that across.\nK:\nRight. So two sentences is what I would recommend in that place.\nP:\nAnd also the South Vietnamese casualties.\nK:\nThe South Vietnamese casualties, I'm getting the exact figure.\nP:\nEven with Laos?\nK:\nEven with Laos.\nP:\nWe can say that even with the heavy casualties they took in Laos.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nOh, of course, these goddamn Doves think just one thing. They eat\nyou alive, they take one thing and then go after another one and hell,\nI've determined to just see it through and the hell with them.\nK:\nIt's the only --\nP:\nIf it fails, it fails.\nK:\nWell, it's a heroic posture, Mr. President.\nP:\nWell, hell, believe it or not, there is no other course for the country.\nThese people -- I mean, that's why our domestic side while I'm\ninterested in their views, why they're irrelevant, they don't know what\nthe hell they are talking about.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nI mean, on the other hand, I must say that they are so terribly obsessed\nwith listening to television, reading all of our critics -- the New York\nTimes, the Washington Post and of course, I must the Alsop piece\nprobably disturbs them but they read all that and they say, well now\njust a minute, is this true; have we overstated anything, haven't we\nreally kept our promises, you see that's the point.\nK:\nThat's right.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 6\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971\nP:\nI constantly get back to the fact that I don't think our own people\nknow enough how to defend us.\nK:\nThat's right, that's right. They are astonished by some of these things\nor by what we have accomplished. I mean, we've kept our promises,\nP:\nwe will have taken out several hundred thousand, 2/3 of our forces.\nP:\nThey get the impression -- they read the critics and they get the\nimpression that dammit we are lying, that we are covering up, that\nthere are more losses\nand so forth and goddammit, we've told\nthe truth about everything.\nK:\nIncidentally, we have a very\n[End of tape]\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nMr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 5, 1971\nH:\n[Beginning of tape]\nthat rises out of a memo from Garment on a\nbroad-based thing of what the President's long-range issues are for 1972\nand all this stuff. Len made the point in it that there's a\nLet me read you\na little bit of this. \"There's a contradiction between a sustained effort to\nmake the President popular and the President's determination to do what he\nbelieves he must do in very tough times. In short, it is hard for popular\ngovernment to be 'popular' and an all-things-to-all-men strategy blurs and\ndistracts from the President's specific strengthsand\nachievements. 11 And he's got some backup on that.\nK:\nI agree with that.\nH:\nI know you do. Then in another section, he says \"If the principles\nthat I believe in were applied to next week's Vietnam statement, it would\nmean that he would not cater to the withdrawal syndrome by increasing the\nrate of withdrawal. If there's a strategic reason or justification for doing\nso, fine. If not, he shouldn't. It is out of character for him to do so. It\nwill seem reactive and defensive and, in the long run, will hurt rather than\nhelp. He would not say his course is the unpopular one and that he, in fact,\nhas an option that would be pôpular. By his lights, he really doesn't have such\nan option, and it rings false to say so. He would, however, be very clear\nabout what he is doing and his determination to continue to adhere to his stated\nwithdrawal program. He would discuss in general and compassionate terms the\nconflict between the number of things people want and what, in fact, realistically\nbe done in a given period of time, and how fully he appreciates the sense of\nfrustration. All of this would be brief and factual. There should not be any\nexpectation that people can be persuaded to be cheered or convinced by statistics\nor by reasoned argument. There should be conveyed an underlying sense of a\nwillingness to let the political chips fall where they may. 11\nK:\nI agree with him.\nH:\n\"In all of this, I am not stating any absolutes; I am trying to say that\nthe architecture of the President's personality and policies should not be con-\ncealed by odds and ends, by an excessive effort to be what he isn't, doesn't want\nto be, and in sofar as I am concerned, shouldn't try to be. \" Now, in the context\nof that, the President raises the question of whether maybe we shouldn't leave\nthe withdrawal rate at 12, 500.\nK:\nNo, I think he can go to what he is planning. It is less than almost\neveryone is speculating on, so it doesn't look that he is pandering to anyone.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 5, 1971 (Tape)\n- 2 -\nOn the basis of his best analysis\nbut he should not make a big deal of the\nrate. He should just matter-of-factly say, \"I have made my studies and I\nhave come to this conclusion. But I do feel very strongly that we have to\nchange the architecture of the speech.\nH:\nThat's what he is doing.\nK:\nI know. I gave him some pages today for which I hold no brief which\nin effect.\nyou know, he'll make his announcement and all that, but instead.\nof going through the litany again of what he found and where we are which he\ncan do in three or four minutes. He should positi vely make clear why it is\nthat, however close\nthat we are close to the goal, but still have to take\nthe slightly harder route rather than the softer one. And challenge the people\nand say, \"I know am asking a difficult thing, but I know the American people\nhave never failed us, \" or something like that.\nH:\nNow that's the sense of what Garment is saying.\nK:\nThat's right.\nH:\nYeah.\nK:\nBut I don't think he needs to go back down.\nH:\nOkay. My argument.\nHe raises in the context of the Garment thing\nwas that what he is doing is perfectly consistent with Garment because Garment\nsays if there is a strategic reason or justification for increasing the rate, fine.\nThere is a reason for increasing the rate a little bit, which is the success of\nLaos.\nK:\nLook, Bob\nH:\nI think he's got to do it in order to prove the success of Laos.\nK:\nOur analysis indicates XXXX if our analysis is worth anything that\nthey can't launch a big attack before next February. By next February, we\nwould have taken out the number we are talking about now anyhow even at the\nother rate. So, all we are doing is capitalizing a bit on Laos.\nH:\nAnd we should because the people need to be reassured that there was\nsome validity to Laos.\nK:\nLook, so there's the difference between what we are doing and what we\nis one month. Exactly, it's a one month.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 5, 1971 (?Tape)\n- 3 -\nH:\nBecause it's a question of whether you withdraw 100, 000 by December 1st\nor by December 31st.\nK:\nExactly. And you and I know that anybody.\nyou promise to withdraw\nby December 31st will be out by December 15th. So I think this is the least\nwe can do -- I think it's a responsible figure. It's also the most that\nThieu can stand, incidentally. I think if he announced a bigger figure, Saigon\ncould collapse which is what the hot-shots don't recognize.\nH:\nSome of them would just as soon he would.\nK:\nWell, I mean our guys.\nH:\nYeah.\nK:\nOur opponents certainly would. But I think if he makes a fighting speech\nif then he is driven out, at least no one will ever doubt where he stood, and when\nthe bad effects become evident next year, he can run against those who forced\nhim out. While if he, is, in effect, saying 'I agree with all of you; I just don't\nhave the nerve to go quite as fast as you want to. I So I agree with Garment.\nH:\nOkay.\nK:\nBut I would stick at my rate.\nH:\nHe got caught up for, for, you know, just thinking, 'I wonder if we should\njust leave the rate right where it is, and let them screw you. This is where it's\ngoing to be. 1\nK:\nI think we can afford this increase.\nH:\nWell, it's a small increase, but it's symbolically significant because\nit confirms that our program is working.\nK:\nExactly.\nH:\nAnd that you do need to do.\nK:\nExactly. I think we can.\nH:\nAnd you are not making any sacrifice to do it.\nK:\nWell, you are taking a risk. But we've taken\nH:\nBut it's the same risk.\nYou take the same risk if you waited one month\nlonger.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 5, 1971 (Tape)\n- 4 -\nK:\nThat's right. And if he'd take\nWell, that's assuming if its a\nstraight line, of course -- what he could do is announce a year's thing and\ntake out less by January 1st.\nH:\nWell, that's not what he was talking about, though. What he was saying\nwas to change it.\nto leave it at 100, 000 but say by the end of the year.\nK:\nOh, no; that's ridiculous.\nH:\nThat doesn't accomplish a thing.\nK:\nThat is senseless. I think he should change the architecture of the\nspeech and go through the litany of what was achieved which I gave him as the\nonly text, and compress that and use something like the arguments that I handed\nhim today.\nH:\nHe read this and then he called you. He was going to have you come in\nand read it. And they said no, I'm not going to do that anyway. We should leave\nit at\nit right where it is and he dropped/that. And then he just called a minute ago\nand said to try to reach you over the weekend and ask you what you thought about\nit.\nK:\nWhere the hell does he think I am?\nH:\nI don't know. He knew you had left.\nK:\nI left the office, but he knows I'm at home, doesn't he?\nH:\nI don't know.\nK:\nWell, do you want to make sure he knows I'm in San Clemente.\nH:\nHe's off with Bebe now.\nK:\nOkay.\nH:\nLet's leave him lay.\nK:\nIs he going up to Los Angeles tonight?\nH:\nI don't think so. I hope not.\nK:\nOkay, fine. Well, I think he's doing exactly the right thing.\nH:\nRight. Okay. Good.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n11:45 p.m., April 7, 1971\nBrought in April 9, 1971\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHello, Henry.\nK:\nI called Mrs. Taylor\nP:\nYeah, good.\nK:\nAnd she said she was honored and proud.\nP:\nDid she hear it?\nK:\nOh, yes, and she was so overwhelmed that her sons had the privilege\nof being mentioned by the President of the United States.\nP:\nShe will stick with us.\nK:\nOh, she --\nP:\nAll the way.\nK:\nOh, she will be -- she was so proud and so overwhelmed.\nP:\nGood, good, good.\nK:\nAnd she said she just hopes they will all be worthy of their father; it\nwas really very moving to talk with her.\nP:\nGood. Well, they are great people. I'm glad you called her.\nK:\nWell, there's still a healthy element in this country.\nP:\nWell, we've done it now, Henry; we've done everything we can.\nK:\nMr. President, if that speech can't do it, nothing can.\nP:\nI talked to Haldeman and told him -- I said, you know you haven't heard\nfrom Rumsfeld and you haven't heard from Finch and you haven't heard\nfrom -- well, McGregor was disappointed because we didn't announce\na bigger withdrawal.\nK:\nIt's so silly, you know; if you had jacked it up by a 1,000 you might have\nbrought down Thieu and all it would have meant was 8, 000 difference.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 2\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n11:45 p. m., April 7, 1971\nBrought in April 9, 1971\nP:\nBe that as it may, don't blame them, but my point is we now know and\nyou go to the staff meeting tomorrow and just listen and find out where\neverybody stands, you know.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nAnd crap, they may not want to see where they stand. If they have got\nthe guts, we want to know now, right?\nK:\nExactly, Mr President.\nP:\nCause we have done everything we can, Henry; there's no more that\ncan be done.\nK:\nYou have done everything that can be done; I think if it holds - this is\na jolt to Hanoi that you haven't buckled again and I think the only thing\nthat can defeat us now is the homefront. I'm really quite optimistic\nabout negotiations -- I mean, they attacked that Fire Base again today - -\nP:\nOh.\nK:\nAnd they lost 250 men, and their troops just aren't that much good\nanymore.\nP:\nAnd we held the base.\nK:\nAnd we held the base.\nP:\nGood, Well, we will fight it off.\nK:\nI haven't seen any negative reaction yet.\nP:\nOh, they will go after the business about being too emotional and all\nthat crap.\nK:\nYeah, but remember, Mr President\nP:\nWe are talking to the people; I don't give a shit about --\nK:\nThe New York Times the day after your November 3rd speech, Reston\nnearly had a heart attack.\nP:\nYeah.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 3\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n11:45 p.m., April 7, 1971\nBrought in April 9, 1971\nK:\nAnd this won't have that same impact.\nP:\nOh, well, he '11 have a heart attack about this because of the emotional\nso forth and so on; that's all right.\nK:\nIt doesn't make any difference -- Ellsworth Bunker out there is closer\nto where we sit.\nP:\nAnd he was pleased.\nK:\nOh, and this -- he must have sent that cable within minutes of hearing\nthe end of the speech because by the time they coded and uncoded, a\ncouple of hours go usually.\nP:\nWell --\nK:\nWell, it was a --\nP:\nAt the staff meeting you just watch; don't say much.\nK:\nOh, no, I won't.\nP:\nJust let it come, smoke them out. They will be whining around, let\nthem whimper and whine and we'll find out who's who.\nK:\nIt was a privilege --\nP:\nThey have got to, by God, if this staff can't stand up, the hell with them.\nK:\nWell, your key members -- -\nP:\nConnally was all for it, right now he's all for it. He was out at his\ndinner tonight but he said he was all 100% for it.\nK:\nRight. Well, he told me that already this afternoon.\nP:\nBefore we did it but also after he heard it, he felt the same way.\nK:\nThe same way, marvelous; well, he's a strong man. Well, then your\nkey people in the White House were sturdy in this, Mr. President.\nP:\nOh, sure, of course.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 4\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n11:45 p. m., April 7, 1971\nBrought in April 9, 1971\nK:\nHaldeman was like a rock as always and Ehrlichman was - - -\nP:\nEhrlichman was like a rock.\nK:\nHe's been good through this.\nP:\nHe's had a hell of a lot of heat; he really stood up.\nK:\nThat's right and he stood up.\nP:\nMore than he did before.\nK:\nThat's right, and he stood up at the staff meetings so he's been good.\nP:\nBut tomorrow -- are you going to have a staff meeting tomorrow?\nK:\nSure, we'll have a staff meeting tomorrow.\nP:\nJust listen\ntry to smoke them out; okay,\nHenry.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President, and again it was a privilege to have been -- - -\nP:\nK:\nNo, it was one of the most --\nP:\nThe people will never know how much time I spent on this speech.\nK:\nWell, Mr. President, no one could have faked this one, no one could\nhave read somebody else's words here; if you didn't feel every word\nof this, this couldn't have come off.\nP:\nMrs. Taylor was really pleased.\nK:\nOh, she was a little bit overwhelmed, she had never been called by an\nAssistant to the President, she had never been mentioned obviously\non television but she said she was honored and proud. I put it on the\nbasis that I wanted her to know the President felt sorry -- I said you had\nasked me to call and that you felt sorry that you couldn't have warned\nher ahead of time but I'm sure she understood why I asked her\npermission; that you felt it so important and she said it was an honor\nand a privilege and we just hope we '11 be worthy of him.\nP:\nGood, that's just what we want to hear.\nK:\nExactly.\nP:\nOkay, Henry.\nK: Goodnight, Mr. President.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nSenator Mansfield/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 13, 1971\nK:\nHello\nM:\nHello, Henry, how are you?\nK:\nSenator, how are you?\nM:\nFine, thank you.\nK:\nThe President asked me to call you on a very confidential basis to\nlet you know that he is going to announce tomorrow a series of\nmeasures easing certain restrictions on Communist China.\nM:\nGood.\nK:\nSpecifically that we will let Chinese give visas to Communist\nChinese and then to a number of technical measures which are\nimportant to them such as selling oil to Chinese ships except those\ngoing to North Vietnam.\nM:\nGood.\nK:\nEasing currency restrictions and drawing up a list of goods in which\ntrades will be -- in which export licenses will be granted and after\nthat list is drawn up, we will then permit importation of Chinese\ngoods.\nM:\nThat sounds in the right direction, Henry.\nK:\nWe also are announcing after this series of steps is completed we\nwill review them and consider a new set of steps.\nM:\nGood, good.\nK:\nWe are trying to keep it low-key, Senator, because we don't want to\nhave the Russians right up a wall.\nM:\nNo, I understand.\nK:\nSo we are not going -- of course, we can't control the press but we\nare not going to make an enormous fanfare over it but it of course\nwill be noticed.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nSenator Mansfield, Mr. Kissinger\nApril 13, 1971\nM:\nYou know, Henry, the President suggested about a year ago or so\nago that I -- if I could, I'd go to China.\nK:\nWell, he mentioned that to me again last week and --\nM:\nI was going to mention it to him again.\nK:\nAnd as far as we are concerned, you have our strong support anytime\nyou think it's appropriate.\nM:\nWell, good, because I wouldn't do it without his approval.\nK:\nWell, you will have his strong support. We think this may be a very\nuseful thing to consider.\nM:\nWe will look into it.\nK:\nGood, and this announcement won't be made until 11:00 tomorrow\nand we won't notify any other members of Congress until tomorrow\nmorning.\nM:\nGood enough, Henry.\nK:\nRight.\nM:\nOkay, Henry, thank you very much.\nK:\nNice to talk to you.\nM:\nGood to talk to you.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\nApril 13, 1971\nK:\nAl, I talked to the President. He wants MacGregor to do this calling.\nH:\nAll right, sir.\nK:\nAnd he wants him to add Mahon and Griffin to the list.\nH:\nMahon and Griffin, okay.\nK:\nAnd Ford and Scott. He also wants him to add Aiken but I just think\nState is going to have a heart attack.\nH:\nOh, boy. On Aiken, they will.\nK:\nWell, what do you think, I'll just ignore it.\nH:\nYeah,\nK:\nThat's rubbing salt into the wounds.\nH:\nYou know they called back.\nK:\nYeah.\nH:\nAnd they said we feel that if you want to low-key this that it should\nbe done over here at the Department.\nK:\nThey are something. But did you tell them MacGregor is going to\ndo it, not I.\nH:\nNo, I said the President had put a hold on it. I never mentioned\nyou in the first place, I said the President. Then I will tell them\nin the morning that he has asked MacGregor to do it. No sense in\ngetting him worked up tonight.\nK:\nYeah, Okay. They are something, imagine last week you couldn't\nget them to say a word.\nH:\nThat's right, that's exactly right.\nK:\nOkay. I wouldn't tell MacGregor anything tonight, he will leak it\nall over the place. Why don't you tell him to come in at 8:00, that\nthe President wants him to call some Congressmen and you are getting\nthe stuff typed up for him.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 2\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\nApril 13, 1971\nH:\nAll right, okay.\nK:\nDon't you think?\nH:\nYou ought to alert him.\nK:\nOr should I do it?\nH:\nUnless you want to, I think you will get more out of it, if you do it.\nK:\nOkay, fine.\nH:\nOkay.\nK:\nRight.\nH:\nRight, sir.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nMr. Kissinger/Clark MacGregor\nApril 13, 1971\nM:\nHenry, Clark.\nK:\nClark, how are you?\nM:\nFine, thank you.\nK:\nClark, we are doing something tomorrow on which I think you will\nbasically approve of -- in fact, which I know you will approve of\nand which we thought you might be the man to call some of the\nleading Congressmen and Senators on in a low-key way, we don't\nwant to make a big splash with it.\nM:\nYeah.\nK:\nBut we thought you might agree to call Ford, Mahon, Griffin and\nScott. And I am having Haig type out for you what the thing is.\nM:\nFine.\nK:\nAnd if you could by at 8:00.\nM:\nSure.\nK:\nSo that you can be the bearer of some good news occasionally.\nM:\nGood, good, I will, I'll be in your office at 8 o'clock, Henry.\nK:\nGood, Clark. If you would be willing to do it, it would be helpful\nand I think it would help you.\nM:\nHappy to.\nK:\nGood, Clark.\nM:\nThank you.\nK:\nRight.\nM:\nBye.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n8:00 p.m., April 13, 1971\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nYeah, Henry.\nK:\nI just wanted to mention a number of relatively minor things to you.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nOne is the South Vietnamese are launching another one of these raid\ntype operations tonight.\nP:\nGood.\nK:\nThis time it's a more sizable one. There is a big sweep inside\nSouth Vietnam.\nP:\nGood.\nK:\nAnd then they are going to land some battalions in Base Area 611.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nAnd I think it is very useful to tie down the North Vietnamese.\nP:\nGood. Is it well-programmed, well-supported?\nK:\nIt looks well-programmed and well-supported, Mr. President, and I've\ncalled Moorer to say that we don't want any significant American\nlosses in helicopters and so forth.\nP:\nRight, right.\nK:\nSecondly, I talked today to Vorontsov from the Soviet Embassy.\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nThe reason was that there is a meeting between Rush and Abrasimov --\nP:\nYes.\nK:\nOn Berlin and I just wanted to make sure that they didn't blow -- that\nthey understood which way the channels were going.\nP:\nYes. He understood that?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 2\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 13, 1971, 8:00 p.m.\nK:\nOh, yeah, he understood it and he said that Dobrynin was coming\nback Sunday with new instructions and that we should take the\nBrezhnev speech very seriously and he was slobbering all over me.\nP:\nGood. We'll see Sunday what he told\n.\nK:\nAnd then I did something which was a little unorthodox, I told him\nthat Dobrynin had given me his phone number in Moscow.\nP:\nUm-humm.\nK:\nAnd I had lost it, so he called me an hour later and said it might\nbe a nice thing if I called Dobrynin and congratulated him on his\nCentral Committee membership.\nP:\nGood, do it.\nK:\nIn fact I did it. And Dobrynin said we '11 have something on that\nexchange of letters when I come back.\nP:\nHe said that.\nK:\nYeah, but he didn't say what it was.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nAnd he also said he was coming with new instructions.\nP:\nBut not indicating anything on the SALT?\nK:\nNo. Well, he couldn't, Mr. President, on an open telephone.\nP:\nOh, it was open telephone, okay.\nK:\nYeah, we don't have a secure line -- well, we have the hot line but\nI didn't want to use that.\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nThis was a commercial phone.\nP:\nGood. How did he sound?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 3\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n8:00 p.m., April 13, 1971\nK:\nOh, he sounded -- they are going to do something, Mr. President.\nAnd finally, one other thing, I called Mike Mansfield on your behalf\nand said you --\nP:\nJust a second -- hold it. Go ahead.\nK:\nI called Mike Mansfield and told him that you had asked me to tell\nhim about what you are announcing tomorrow in strictest confidence.\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nAnd I thought he would appreciate it and he was beside himself,\nvery statesmanlike.\nP:\nWas he?\nK:\nThe President has him warm support and congratualtions and he said\nnow he sees what you were talking about when you were hinting at\nChina policy and of course he raised again his going there.\nP:\nUm-humm. Oh, yeah, we have it in mind.\nK:\nAnd I thought, Mr. President, that tomorrow morning if you agreed\nthat perhaps McGregor might call Ford and Albert. That gives\nMacGregor a little status and gives him something Dovish to do.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nAnd let State notify the Foreign Relations Committees.\nP:\nWell, let MacGregor also call Mahon. Mahon is a good man.\nK:\nThat's a good thing.\nP:\nAnd let him -- cause he's the best man on that side.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nAnd let's see -- on our side, Scott.\nK:\nScott he should call.\nP:\nYeah, he might as well.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 4\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\n8:00 p.m., April 13, 1971\nK:\nMaybe Griffin.\nP:\nYeah, Scott and Griffin, yeah. And let's see -- anybody else -- - I\nthink that's enough. State can inform the others. Well, MacGregor\nmight call Aiken.\nK:\nHe's on the Foreign Relations Committee --\nP:\nThat's all right, let him call Aiken. Let State handle the others.\nK:\nOkay.\nP:\nSee.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nGive Aiken a little brush, that's a good idea.\nK:\nRight. Good, Mr. President, I'll get that done immediately.\nP:\nFine, okay, Henry.\nK:\nRight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nApr.18?\nTELCON (TAPE)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 14, 1971\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHello, Henry. I was wondering how the -- have you checked in to see\nhow they played the Chinese thing today.\nK:\nOh, yeah. It was tremendous, it was the lead item on every -- I didn't\nsee it myself, I was with Bob Griffin, but I talked to Haig.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nBut he says it has been a tremendous thing on television, it has been\nthe lead item on every television thing and on --\nP:\nYou mean rather than Vietnam for a change.\nK:\n(laughter) Yeah, it's gone on, and on and on. And I found it helpful\nalso with these Michigan Editors.\nP:\nHow did it go with them?\nK:\nWell, they asked the usual questions about Vietnam and I just said,\nlook, we know what we are doing and there are always more things\ngoing on and they were very intrigued with China. They asked the\nusual questions about Vietnam do we think the South Vietnamese\ncan stand on their feet? But they were not hostile.\nP:\nYeah.\nK:\nThey just had heard so much stuff about the Vietnamese not being\nable to make it and so on and so forth.\nP:\nYeah. Well, this is one thing we are sure -- well, we are not as\ncompetent about the Vietnamese as some may be; we're a hell of a\nlot competent than the press has lead them to believe, you see?\nK:\nThat's right, and these -- many of them were small town newsmen,\nMuskegon and Kalamazoo and Flint and stuff like that. And they were\non the whole very eager to -- they weren't asking hostile questions,\nthey were asking informational questions.\nP:\nRight.\nK:\nBecause we spent about 1/3 of the time on Vietnam, 1/3 on China and a\n1/3 was miscellaneous stuff.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 2\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 14, 1971\nP:\nNow on the China thing what we have to realize, Henry, is that in\nterms of the American public opinion, it is still against Communist\nChina you know.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nSo we are not making any votes with this.\nK:\nNo, but we are quieting the intellectuals and the newsmen.\nP:\nThe intellectuals will worry, they will worry about something, but\nas we know as we move from the October 7 thing, that doesn't mean\nthat we get much from them, it will just worry them.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nThey will think something else is up and the whole thing has got to\nbe played in terms of -- how about the Taiwan thing, that's sort of\nworrisome, not a damn thing we can do about though is there?\nK:\nWhat Taiwan thing?\nP:\nWell, I mean their concern about what we have said.\nK:\nRight, but they haven't expressed it yet, have they, I don't think so.\nP:\nOh, I think there was something in the paper indicating that Taiwan\nwas -- [complaining].\nK:\nOh, but that's inevitable, they have to say that. And Bob Murphy going\nout there I think will -- of course they will be concerned, it is bound\nto be a worrisome thing to them.\nP:\nWell, Henry, the thing is the story change is going to take place, it\nhas to take place, it better take place when they've got a friend here\nrather than when they've got an enemy here.\nK:\nThat's right. No, it's a tragedy that it has to happen to Chiang at the\nend of his life but we have to be cold about it.\nP:\nWe have to do what's best for us.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 3\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 14, 1971\nK:\nAnd in the long term it is essential for the values that he represents\nthat there be continuity in our government here.\nP:\nYes, and that he has here an Administration that is not going to just\nstand by and let Taiwan go down the drain; we're trying to hold their\nposition as best we can.\nK:\nExactly. For every reason we have got to have a diversion from\nVietnam in this country for a while.\nP:\nThat's the point isn't it, yeah.\nK:\nAnd we need it for our game with the Soviets.\nP:\nYeah, yeah.\nK:\nI mean it would be absolutely impossible we would be doing the\nSoviets the greatest favor if we rejected this overture and we would\nget nothing for it, it would lead to tougher relations between us and\nthe Soviets, rather than easier.\nP:\nThat's right, that's right. That's what they would like for us to\ndo, they would like for us to sort of slap the Chinese in the face but\nwe're not going to. We're not going overboard but we're saying well,\nif they open the door, we'll open the door.\nK:\nThat's right. And actually now one would have to expect the Hyades (?)\nof a few weeks.\nP:\nOh, of course, nothing is going to happen for a while but that's all\nright, just let this rest awhile. You know, mutter around about it for\na while.\nK:\nAnd of course with some luck, we will get some nibble on the Soviet\nfront now.\nP:\nYes, we might.\nK:\nWell, it isn't even luck so much, it really logically ought to happen.\nP:\nOught to happen logically, that's right. If they are at all logical, it\ndamn well better or they are a lot more rigid and stupid.\nK:\nI mean there is nothing new they are going to learn about SALT, they\nare either going to move. on that or not. And the other one, the\nSummit, we have been kicking around for a year.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 4\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 14, 1971\nP:\nI talked to Colson and I told him to -- Dole was in and said that both\nCase and Brooke were making speechs on the floor today about it.\nEssentially to set a date and all that sort of thing and I said get hold\nof Brooke and tell him to keep shut for a month. You know, that's\nall you can ask of Brooke.\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nAnd without promising a thing, you see. Just wait a month and then\nwait, you know what I mean, you can't expect him to do more than that.\nK:\nRight. Actually it doesn't make any difference what Case and Brooke\nsay because they have been saying that for a year.\nP:\nTrue, but if we could just get a few of our own to quiet down --\nK:\nRight.\nP:\nIt's very important and the other thing that I said is to -- got to talk\nabout this too is that the whole thing that Dole expressed is that the\nPOW wives, we must not let them go off on a tangent here.\nK:\nThat's why we've got to keep that residual force thing alive.\nP:\nI know that but I meant they've got to not fight on one of these\nwithdrawal programs or something like that, you see.\nK:\nI don't think they will.\nP:\nWell, don't be too sure. Remember everybody is working on them.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nAnd we've got to watch that as closely as we can.\nK:\nWell, I am seeing them again in the middle of May and if there are\nany danger signs, I'll see them before.\nP:\nYeah, but we don't want them to move before then, you think -\nK:\nWell, but what makes anyone think they are moving?\nP:\nWell, Dole was concerned about it. You know he sees and hears from\nthem and so forth and boy, we just don't want these gals who have so\nmuch at stake\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 5\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 14, 1971\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nTheir husbands and so forth. They just can't throw it down the drain,\njust for that.\n1\nK:\nThat's right. W e 11, McGovern has been after them, I know that and\nI wouldn't be surprised also if Clifford also were.\nP:\nHe's working on them, that's right. Well, let's keep our eyes very\nclosely peeled on that and in the meantime, we'll work the other thing\nas well as we can.\nK:\nYeah.\nP:\nOkay, Henry, thank you.\nK:\nRight, Mr. President.\nFurther conversation.\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nThe thing I forgot to mention was that the DOW went to 9. 32 today\nso that's --\nK:\nOh, isn't that grand!\nP:\nWell, it's a good thing. That means that 300 points now, the low, but\nalso it's now -- it's above what it was when we came into office, it was\n9. 30 when we came into office.\nK:\nOh, really. I didn't realize that.\nP:\nThat's right. So, it's come a long way and I think you ought to get\nyour friend Howard Stein --\nK:\nYeah, I'm going to call him tomorrow.\nP:\nYeah, just say, now look here, Howard, things are moving -- cause\nhe talks to a lot of people.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 6\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 14, 1971\nK:\nOh, yes. I'll call him tomorrow, Mr. President.\nP:\nFine, all right.\nK:\nRight.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger\n5:35 p.m., April 14, 1971\nR:\nI've got something from you, you know, to Haig.\nK:\nI haven't seen Haig since he talked to you so I don't know\nwhat exactly\nR:\nThe idea is that before we\nwell, he informed us that he\ngot something about a meeting tomorrow.\nK:\nOh, yes, that's right. And I just wanted to know whether you\nwere going to make a proposal then.\nR:\nI think this was the idea. And now, I can get it here before.\nIt might be that it will be possible to postpone the meeting there.\nK:\nNo, you know -- I've got trouble enough advising on our foreign\npolicy; I can't advise on yours. You know my view.\nR:\nYeah. Because I thought it might be a good idea to tell.\nI\nthink though there will be certain changes. I don't know which ones.\nK:\nYeah, but as I've been trying to explain to you, I don't much care\nwhat is in the original proposal. I think you are better off making your\nchanges in the second round rather than in the first. The initial proposal\nis of no concern to me as long as you know where you want to go.\nR:\nWell, I hope that\nI don't believe that it will be essential at\nthe present to decide or at least to know exactly what is the second\n(?) BARLEV line .\nK:\nNo; as long as you know to whom you are going to make the move.\nR:\nYeah; yeah. Therefore, I think I can -- I'm not sure, but I\nthink that I can -- bring about a postponing of giving the paper from\ntomorrow, let us say, to Monday. And, in the meantime, if you want\nto see it, I think.\nnot full negotiations -- that's just to have your\ncomments.\nK:\nIt's entirely up to you. Let's see -- what date is this -- the 14th?\nR:\nIt will be 17th or 18th.\nK:\nWell, I don't know whether you have decided with whom you are\ngoing to settle this, if you are going to settle it at all.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger\n5:35 p.m., April 14, 1971\n-2-\nR: Well, I think that in the long run -- Hello, in the long run I believe that\nthe idea is to take your advice. The question is the substance not. and\nwhen it comes to the substance, I don't believe that\nK: Well in that case for a reason which I will explain to you when I see you --\nyou would be better off presenting it as late as possible, say the 18th.\nR: I see.\nK: And I will explain that to you when I see you. I don't want to do it on the\ntelephone.\nR: Fine.\nK: But I think it is of some consequence.\nR: I see. Uh, then, If I will get it I hope that I will be able to see you in\nenough time\nK: Then you see me and I will talk to you also about the reason why I am\nmaking that suggestion.\nR: Fine. Alright, therefore, it might be that tomorrow I will ask to see you\nif I'll get the paper.\nK: That will be fine. I think there is a lot to be said for waiting until, in fact\nTuesday might be better than Monday. But, it is up to you.\nR: I understand. Alright.\nK: And if you get the paper on an informal basis\nR: Very informal, yeah.\nK: I'll be glad to comment on it and then let's see.\nR: Fine.\nK: Good.\nR: Alright.\nK: Thank you, I will hear from you tomorrow. Is that breakfast on for Monday?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger\n5:35 p. m., April 14, 1971\n- -3-\nR: Yeah, yeah -- for Tuesday.\nK: Oh, Tuesday.\nR: Tuesday morning, 8:00\nK: Alright, fine. Good. Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nXXXR President/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 18, 1971 jlj/tape\n10:45Am\nK: Mr. President, Ziegler is out of town and I have talked to Jerry Warren.\nHe hasn't had a single press question yet. And the line I have tentatively\nestablished subject to your approval is that he was talking about South\nVietnamese capabilities, not any particular plans. And he was just talking\nabout abstract capabilities.\nP: Good. That's very good. Hypoth.\nK: Hypothetical things.\nP: And not about American activities.\nK: That's right. And if that is agreeable, that's what we are going to stick\nwith.\nP: Fine. Laird will probably be asked.\nK: No, I got word to Defense already too.\nP: How will Laird handle it then?\nK: Laird would say he was - essentially the same thing. They haven't had\nmany queries either.\nP: Well what this is Henry. It's the devilish press again just trying to take\none little old word and hypo this thing. I think Henry it is pretty much a\ndefensive thing on their part. They must really be up the walls. Don't you\nthink so?\nK: Oh, Mr. President. Here they have been going saying everything, that\nwe are bringing the Chinese in, that Laos would lead to a worsening of the\nsituation, now they see that they got beaten back from Fire Base 6, military\nactivity is dropping again just as we said it would and the China thing breaks.\nThey are just out of their minds.\nP: Don't you sense that in talking to them?\nK: Qhxlx Oh yeh, they are just completely confused.\nP: Now the line they will probably take it seems to me to come back\nat it in terms of saying this is really just the Chinese people - I mean that we'll\nget along with the American people and that sort of thing but I don't think the\nChicoms - the government - will play it that way. I think the Chicom government\nknows that the American people can't do one damn thing for them.\nK: They are playing for the big stakes, Mr. President.\nP: You think so.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: And I have two books full of initiatives we have taken and if they press us\nwe will just leak them all out.\nP: Oh sure. They try to say that this all happened because of their initiative\nand so forth but it is really amusing to me though because while Mike is\nhonorable these other Democrats are nowxx not - the way they're all\npandering around and trying to run over there to China and so forth.\nK: But the problem is they never recommended any of this Mr. President,\nthey can say whatever they want. This is yours.\nP: And neither did the State Department.\nK: That's right. The scope of it the State Department was sort of crying\naround with XEXXXX recognition and that sort of thing.\nP: That's right. They were all talking about what was really what you call\na tactical abstract thing which was really unfeasible.\nOsborne\nK: I showed -/ askedoxxxxxxx that little note you sent me on February 1st '69\nand his mouth really dropped way open.\nP: Too bad that wasn't in my handwriting. It was but they copy it off\napparently at that point.\nK: It's a tape usually.\nP: Oh yes. I may have dictated it. On the tape. But it came on - was\nit\nto you from RN.\nK: Said to Kissinger from the President.\nP: That's enough.\nK: Oh, they know this isn't a fake.\nP: He know's -\nK: He knows that we wouldn't fake that.\nP: It indicated that we ought to what whax was that one - Was that the first one?\nK: Well it said, I want you to explore on a highly confidential basis how we\ncan improve our relations with Communist China and above all how we can\nestablish reliable private channels to them.\nP: Good.\n,ms.President,\nK: It couldn't be more explicit You said I want no publicity whatsoever.\nP: That must have really killed him.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- -3 -\nK: Oh God, his mouth really dropped about 6 inches.\nP: Because I suppose he could see there some of his mythology is knocked\nout and when he writes something else -\nK: They know damned well that on February 1, 1969 no State Department\nhad gotten -\nP: February '69 no State Department had even talked to me.\nK: That's right. This was February 1st 69.\nP: Basically 10 days after I took office.\nK: 10 days - that's right.\nP: That's very interesting.\nK: I think on this one. Sure the democrats are going to start yelling now.\nThey are going to come up with 50 hot gimmicks but we are so far\nahead,\nP: What they will come up with now is why don't we admit them to the UN?\nWhy don't we recognize them and so forth. Well, that's all premature.\ndebate.\nK: Also Mr. President, it helps us with the Russian game.\nP: I think so.\nK: Because if the Russian's see that the Democrats are more hawk-wild than\nyou are vis a vis China then -\nP: I hadn't thought of that, MXXXXX but it's true.\nK: then they have much less of an incentive to bring them in. They already don't\ntrust them on the Middle East, then with China they also turn out\nto be a disaster. So I think - my major worry is that if we get too eager that\nthe Chinese will start going back into a shell. And that's why the way you have\nplayed it and that's where the democrats could do damage.\nP: I sure as hell don't expect to get eager at all with the Chinese.\nUnless the Russian thing drops. Then the Chinese may want to be eager and\nwe will too.\nK: That's right.\nP: We can't just assume we will wait until 1974.\nK: Oh no, oh God no.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 4-\nP: This is one of those things where I don't believe, I think - I think our\nChinese game Henry should be played exactly as it is being played. Very\ncool and aloof and yet the door is open now you ± walk in kids. It's your -\nK: Mr. President, I must tell you honestly I believe that we have a 30%\nchance even if we played the Russian game, of having a high level Chinese\none next year. That may not have to wait until '74.\nP: We want to use it. We want it at the highest level too.\nK: That's what I mean. That's not at all excluded.\nP: Let me say that the more I think about the envoy thing. If we are going to\ngo I think we ought to go at the highest level.\nK: Well, I think the envoy could prepare for it.\nP: It might, but it might take a lot of the zip out of it too. You know what I mea:\nHenry. You just can't tell. I don't know if there is anybody we trust to send\nover there. That's -\nK: That's a bit down the road yet. First we need a reliable channel.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n(tapes brought in 4/19/71)\napril 1471 10:30AM [typed 5/7/71\ncontinuation of the President with Mr. Kissinger\njlj]\nK: I'll call Ziegler immediately.\nP: Well, he will probably have had a query on it. Tell him not to take any\npress calls today. Tell the whole office not to take any. This is Sunday and\nthere are no press calls and just say that he can't be reached. Leave it a\nlittle bit dumb for awhile. Maybe that is the best way to handle it. Maybe\nthey will wonder - I don't know whether they will nox or not.\nK: Let me find out first whether it has made any waves and if it has I will\nget it dampened quick.\nP: I'll tell you what you do. You better give Ziegler a call to see what the\nsituation is and you better call me back and we'll have to develop some -\nAnd what about the rest of the news, I have only see that. How did they -\nChina things go very well?\nK: Very good. And I saw last night on television Martin O'Granski had a\npanel of newsmen - Sidy and Kilpatrick and\nP: His usual group.\nK: His usual group and Sidy was just raving on about how your great initiative\nand even Carl Rowan had to say some gudgingly favorable things.\nP: How did Kilpatrick handle it.\nK: Oh, very favorably, strangely enough.\nP: He usually does anyway.\nK: No he was very favorable. Then they talked about Hoover and there\nKilpatrick was the only one who stood up for him.\nP: Well, that's true, that's true. Well I have to stand up for him.\nK: That didn't toughxyanx touch you. They didn't attack you on that.\nP: Right. Did they use some of the news summary on the news cast and\nstuff, from the night before.\nK: I frankly did not see the news.\nP: But looking at the papers today what did they, did they\nK: They are carrying a lot of your stuff in the weeklies.\nP: Balance is pretty good is it?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: Very Very good. I mean all of your stuff is exceptionally good.\nP: In the weekly news summary you mean.\nK: yes. The China story of course if very big and very\nfavorable to you - everywhere.\nP: The thing I feel is this. You will probably see Dobrynin Tuesday, right,\nmaybe Monday.\nK: If he comes back. He comes back either tonight or Wednesday night.\nThose are the only two flights they have this week. It's just barely conceivable\nthat this China thing kept him back a few days for reassessment.\nBut I will see him either tomorrow or Tuesday -\nP: What I was thinking is this. I don't know just quite how it would work.\nI would delay your meeting with Bogdan until after you see him.\nK: All right.\nP: Or have you already set it up.\nK: No, No.\nP: Let me tell you why. After you see him we may want to play a very differen\ngame. Let's suppose, for example, running it out - let us suppose that we get\na straight cutoff. You see what I mean. Then instead of diddling around with\nthis sort of thing we might go immediately to the highest level.\nDo you see what I am getting at.\nK: Oh yes.\nP: I don't mean on the - this time we would have to play that kind of a game\nand knowing the Asians the way they operate - well they will go like molasses\non things of this sort. In a moment like this they XXX just might bite for the\nwhole thing. Do you see what I mean?\nK: Right.\nP: So rather than wasting anything with telling Chou-en-lai that we would\nlike to have * Mansfield and Scott received and the rest. Let's just\nwait.\nK: I think that is a good idea.\nP: Now he is our best contact isn't he, the Bogdan?\nK: We would have to think about that.\nP: I was thinking -\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nK: Bogdan is better than Pakistan right now.\nP: What I was thinking was - well - are we sure of that?\nK: Yes.\nP: What I was thinking of was how secure are their lines?\nK: They always send a messanger.\nP: OK, that's fine. I was going to say if they will send a messanger that's\ngood. They will send a messanger to Bucharest?\nK: Right.\nP: Good. Otherwise we could send somebody to Bucharest.\nK: Another way of doing it is when I go txx talk to the North Vietnamese\nI talk to the Chinese Ambassador in Paris.\nP: Yes.\nK: And get it set up that way.\nP: You see what I am getting at. We may as well play our little games. So\njust forget what I told you to do about Bogdan right nox now, OK.\nK: Right, Mr. President.\nP: I don't think it is going to play that way. I think that the Russians -\nK: No, No they are going to come.\nP: They are going to come. But you know what I mean is if we now have got\n- we are playing for very high stakes and we have very little time left and we\ncan't diddle around., with the Russians or with anybody else. OK\nK: Right Mr. President\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Jerry Warren (HAK asked for Ron Ziegler)\nApril 18, 1971\njlj\nK: Hello Jerry, the President is having conniptions about this Goddamn\nAbrams quote. Are you getting a lot of press queries?\nW: I haven't gotten any yet.\nK: OK, well just play it very cool. Just say that that was purely - that we\nare planning nothing of the scale of - how can you play it to keep it down?\nW: Well, wasn't he talking about their capability? Rather than what they\nwere going to do? I don't know if that is the case or now. Maybe уххих he\nwasn't.\nK: Well, he said it isn't ruled out.\nW: Isn't ruled out. But he didn't say that we were planning such a thing.\nK: Well, but there may be raids in there you see.\nW: Can we play it that what he was not ruling out that we - was the type of\ncross border operations that we had prior to the Laos incursion.\nK: No, it's going to be larger than that. Can we just say he was talking\nabout capabilitjes and not about any massive new -\nI don't want to give away so much.\nW: I know it. The way I read it was that he was talking about capabilities.\nHe couldn't rule out because the South Vietnamese have the capability of\ngoing in there? On a limited basis.\nK: Whak XXx Why don't you put it that way. Just say he was talking about\ncapabilities. He was not projecting any specific plans.\nW: (writing) he wasn't projecting any specific plans.\nK: And otherwise shift everything to Defense.\nW: OK\nK: And will you tell Defense to low key it too?\nW: I am on my way down to the office now. I'll be over to the church services.\nThat's where they will start to hit us.\nK: Well just play it cool and don't say any more than that.\nAnd will you make sure that Defense does the same?\nW: You bet. Sure.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMr. Kissinger/Adm. Moorer\n[typed 5/7/71 - jlj]\nTELECON april 18, 1971\nK: Tom, OK. Where are you?\nM: I'm at home.\nK: Oh, Tom, I don't know whether Haig got to you.\nM: Yes he did.\nK: But the President was having absolute fits about that Abrams thing.\nM: You mean what's in the paper this morning.\nK: Yeh. Now my problem is - you know they have all gone through hell\nfor a few weeks and we finally got Vietnam off the front pages and we don't\nwant to get it there again if we can avoid it.\nM: Right.\nK: On the other hand we want these operations to go forward. And you\nknow what is going to happen if this draws too much flack and we give a\ndirective to Laird to cool it, how he will interpret it.\nM: Yeh.\nK: Now I don't know what possessed Abrams to tell you the truth. I mean\nwhen I read the Post account he actually walked up to these newsmen.\nM: Yeh, that is what it said. I mean after having been\nK: After having been clear of them.\nM: That's the way they presented it but I don't know if that is actually what\nhappened or not. Yeh, I don't know why he did that either other than of\ncourse this is more the idea - get across the idea that the South Vietnamese\nare still there active.\nK: But the demonstrations are coming up this week. I think at this stage\n1\nof the game as long as people think we know what we are doing, it isn't in\nour interest to get a big debate started as long as we continue doing what\nwe are doing.\nM: I couldn't agree with you more.\nK: Don't you think?\nM: Of course. Well I will get the word out there to him. I guess the damage\nis done now although I think that the least said about it the better right now\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: But can't we keep them - it also mentioned somebody, the 101st\nAirborne - can't they just shut up for awhile out there?\nM: I will get that word out. Don't worry.\nK: Because believe me we're doing our best to try to keep operations going.\nM: I will get that through to everybody, Henry. [everyone's asleep] now\nbut I will see that they get it first thing in the morning. Their morning.\nK: OK. Not to stop what they are doing. Just to stop talking.\nM: Absolutely, I understand.\nK: Tom, have a good Sunday.\nM: Right. They'll get the word. Tell the President that they will get\nthe word.\nK: Right. Oh Tom, Zumwalt was over the other day on a few - on a social\ncall. And there were a few Navy things he raised which I told him to take up\nwith you too. And I just want you to know that he said he would. It wasn't\n- it was just he had been very nice to me so I had him over for lunch. It\nwasn't anything official.\nM: All right. I'll see him tomorrow.\nK: Right\nM: Thank you. Good by\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON (Tape)\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 18, 1971\nK:\nMr. President.\nP:\nHenry, are you in New York or here.\nK:\nNo, I'm here.\nP:\nWhat's new? Anything this morning?\nK:\nNothing of very great consequence. In fact, there's nothing really\ngoing on The Chinese keep needling the Russians where they put indications\nthat they were easing their terms and diploma tic relations with us, half\nimplying that maybe Taiwan wasn't a complete obstacle.\nP:\nYeah, I saw that.\nK:\nAnd in Vietnam, activity is light at the moment. Abrams made an\ninjudicious comment. Somebody asked him whether that.\nP:\nYeah, I saw that. I was wondering.\nK:\nBut basically they tricked him into it. They said, 'Is it possible that\nthis drive will go into Laos. 1 Well, actually, they are under strict orders,\nMr. President, there will not be any of these horror stories coming out because\nwe won't use many helicopters. And it has the advantage of tying down the\nNorth Vietnamese.\nP:\nYeah, I know. That's true, but the orders have got to go out there that\nI want Abrams and Bunker to pipe down.\nK:\nWell, I called Laird.\nP:\nThe thing is that this is what the press is trying to do. They want a story.\nIt doesn't make any difference what he does. I don't care if he goes in and bombs\nthe hell out of them, but don't say it. The press wants to put Vietnam back on the\nfront pages. This one little story, God-damn it, is in two papers on the front page.\nRight.\nK:\nThat's right. I talked to Laird about it an hour ago.\nP:\nDid he understand it.\nK:\nOh, yeah. And he's getting\nhe said he'd get right on the phone with\nAbrams and, you know, when we wanted him to talk, he didn't and now\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr. Kissinger\nApril 18, 1971\n- 2 -\nP:\nWell, he didn't\nK:\nBut he didn't really do anything.\nP:\nHe just got sucked into it. Some God-damned newspaper guy wanted to\nget a story to the effect we were going back in Laos, because the news guys\nout there are dying. Laos is over and the South Vietnamese hold the hill and\nnow they are moving around and they are having their award ceremony. And\nI think they are just trying to suck poor old Abrams into\n...\nHe just feels so\ncompelled to be so God-damned honest all the time. Why doesn't he just shut\nup.\nK:\nThat's right.\nP:\nHe should just say, Jesus Christ, do what I say. Don't comment on\nthat sort of thing, dodge it.\nK:\nThat's what I told Laird. I said there is no law against saying\n\"no comment\". I don't speculate on operation or anything like that, instead\nof if he says I don't rule it out, and by the time they get through writing\nit, theyre back in. Although, if one reads the actual stories, they are not\nwritten in a particularly inflammatory way.\nP:\nYes, but Henry, most of them will see the little blip on television\ngenerally that says that we may go back into Laos. You must understand\nthat it doesn't make any difference what the actual story says--it's what\nhits at that minute when people see on television.\nK:\nYou are absolutely right.\nP:\nWhat that see on television that says the Al Abrams in Laos--when\neverybody was beginning to calm down about Laos they get all stirr ed up\nagain. I don't every mind people getting stirred up if we are going to do\nsomething, but goddamn it, I don't what to do it\nK:\nBesides, he has had his shot. This is the time now when the military\ngains on that are not going to be that crucial. T\nP:\nThere aren't any more left to play, as he well knows.\nK:\nWell, I think he will get the point.\nP:\nIf Ziegler gets anything on that--he can't say \"No comment\". If he\ndoes it will build up the Abrahms story, but if he simply says there are no\nplans Don't get the impression that by Abrahms saying a silly thing like\nthis that that is going to hold down the North Vietnamese. It isn't.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThe President/Mr , Kissinger\nApril 18, 1971\n- 3 -\nP:\nHe should nail the thing down- - (Ziegler)\nK:\nThey are going to go over with raids, but there are no plans of anything\nof that scale before.\nP:\nWhat I mean't was that it is important to get across that there is\nno large scale operations in Laos are planned. See, they only have two\nweeks left to do it anyway.\nK:\nI will work something out along those lines Mr. President, and check\nit with you.\nP:\nJust get it down to a and you don't have tocheck with me--just cool\nit down--what I mean is that I don't want Ziegler to make another story out\nof it. Sayas little as he possibly can without making another story out of it.\n(End of Tape)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nMr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman\nBrought in April 19, 1971\nApril\nK:\nBob, I've just had several talks with our leader and while I admire\nhim in adversity, good things tend to go to his head.\nH:\nWhat's got to him now?\nK:\nWell, he had Colson and Dole in to tell them to tell Brooke and Case\nnot to to shut up for a month, things might happen about speechs\non deadlines. Now, first of all I consider Colson an idiot. You know\nhe may be great at organizing these groups but the less he knows, the\nbetter off we are.\nH:\nHe doesn't know anything.\nK:\nWell, you know secondly, what does it hurt us if Brooke says we\nshould set a deadline, he's been saying that for years.\nH:\nI don't know, I was with Dole when he was in there and Dole told him\nthat Brooke had come out with that. The President started in on Dole\non just try to get your guys to cool it for a while and they should just\nturn it off because they don't know what we are doing.\nK:\nYeah, but I really think we ought to keep things quiet now, let them\nhit us for a month, I don't give a damn.\nH:\nWell, maybe you don't but it isn't going to help us any.\nK:\nNo, but nothing is going to matter as much as what we are playing\nwith the Soviets.\nH:\nThat's right.\nK:\nAnd if they find that we are counting on the thing too much, we are\nnever going to get it.\nH:\nHe isn't in any way implying that that's what they are counting on.\nK:\nYeah, but even that other play we are making.\nH:\nHe hasn't given them any clues on any of that. The impression if I\nwere Dole in there on that would be that just that he has a lot of\nthings in mind.\nK:\nWell, I think our biggest weakness is that in order to get a week's\nrespite, we mortgage ourselves a month or two from now.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 2\nMr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman\nBrought in April 19, 1971\nH:\nCould be.\nK:\nAnd I just think we are not badly positioned now, if we can just ride\nit out for a bit all the guys, the more guys that are out of the\nwoodwork\nH:\nYeah, except we have had a week with no problems because the\nSenate's been home but I think he's concerned about what's going\nto hit when the Senate gets back.\nK:\nYeah. Well, I don't doubt that but -\nH:\nThe key would be that we have got to tread a terrible track on with\nour people is the ABM fight.\nK:\nYeah, but that he set up rather nicely. That he has arranged won't\ncome to a vote until August.\nH:\nWell, he hasn't arranged it, he couldn't anyway. But the problem\nis our people are all set to go on an all out fight and he has got to\nmake them think they've got to do it.\nK:\nOh, yeah, they've got to do it.\nH:\nWell, yeah, except they can't get into the thing of starting to trade\nstuff off. If they start giving things away like judgeships and contracts\nand things like that, we're paying a price we don't need to pay.\nK:\nOh, yes, we need it anyway. Even in case of an agreement, we need\nthat vote. Listen, you people have a totally wrong conception of what\nthat agreement is about.\nH:\nWell,\nH:\nOkay, but if you get the agreement, you will get the vote.\nK:\nYeah, well, I don't want to handle the strategy with you but that we will\nknow by the end of next week, Bob, anyway.\nH:\nYeah. All I am saying is they were talking this morning about -- you\nknow Finch was rattling around about starting to put up the goodie\npackages and stuff, and they don't need to do that at this point. They\ndon't need to do for a couple of months, then we know where we stand.\nWe shouldn't do it anyway, I mean it's a ridiculous time to start buying\npeople off now.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 3\nMr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman\nBrought in April 19, 1971\nK:\nThat's right. Well, just as long as they don't think anything is\nhappening.\nH:\nThat's the point.\nK:\nAs long as they don't think anything is happening, that's all I want.\nH:\nWe've got to stay with the line that we have to have it for SALT.\nK:\nRight.\nH:\nCause that's the line we used before.\nK:\nRight.\nH:\nAnd we've got to keep pushing hard that we've got to have it.\nK:\nRight. I know but he's so elated right now that he drops little nuggets\nof hints.\nH:\nYeah, I know.\nK:\nTo which I may be more sensitive knowing it.\nH:\nI think you are because I was listening -- I was worried when he got\nstarted with Dole today ---\nK:\nNo, no; well, all I know is what he told me and he may have made it\nsound more mysterious to me than he did to him.\nH:\nCould be. He's all excited cause the Dow-Jones is back up now, did\nhe tell you that?\nK:\nYeah, oh, God, yeah. Yeah.\nH:\nWell, that's kind of a big thing for him.\nK:\nOh, look, he --\nH:\nHe really went through the wringer on that damn stock market and\nnow it's back -- it's above where it was when he came in.\nK:\nHe's been a cold-blooded gambler.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 4\nMr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman\nBrought in April 19, 1971\nH:\nHe's had a rough two years, he's had to sweat that one out.\nK:\nOh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Well, Bob, we'll know in another month,\nwe may be having it way higher than that if some of these other\nthings work.\nH:\nYou know, we've kept saying all along, we got to get a good brea k\nnow and then and we just may.\nK:\nWell, if we get one more, then the others are bound to come.\nH:\nYou didn't get any clues from your friend when you called him and\ncongratulated him, he wouldn't say anything on the phone.\nK:\nOh, I had the clue that -- yeah, no, he said he was coming with some\nnew instructions.\nH:\nDid he?\nK:\nOh, yeah. Oh, he was very effusive, oh, yes.\nH:\nWas he?\nK:\nOh, yes.\nH:\nHuh. God, it really would be fun if some of that falls together.\nK:\nWell, if it falls, part of it could fall next week.\nH:\nYeah.\nK:\nGod, we'd have those guys.\nH:\nWouldn't that be something.\nK:\nWell, it would take another week to get the paperwork done.\nH:\nYeah.\nK:\n(laughter) Jesus Christ, and announce it on May Day.\nH:\n(laughter).\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 5\nMr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman\nBrought in April 19, 1971\nK:\nWhat is he planning about Pendleton, is he going out there?\nH:\nYeah. He is going to go out on the 30th.\nK:\nGood. Well, I'll be out there on vacation then, I hope.\nH:\nWell, we'll pick you up.\nK:\nYeah.\nH:\nWe're not going to come back till the 5th.\nK:\nOh, good, well, then I'll come back with you. I'll stay over in Palm\nSprings.\nH:\nH:\nYou can extend your stay.\nK:\nYeah, I was going to go on the 27th and stay till the 6th.\nH:\nOh, you were going to stay till the 6th anyway.\nK:\nYeah.\nH:\nOkay.\nK:\nOkay.\nH:\nSee you out there.\nK:\nIt's actually a waste of good California time to go to Palm Springs\nwhen I could be in -- well, I guess I won't work but if I get bored,\nI'll come over to you.\nH:\nStay over in Palm Springs a while longer.\nK:\nOkay.\nH:\nOkay.\nK:\nGood, Bob.\nH:\nRight-o.\nK:\nBye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\n10:00 a.m., April 18, 1971\nK:\nAl.\nH:\nYes, sir.\nK:\nI just talked to Laird, he called me about -- that they are using\nB-52s on that Pich Nil Pass.\nH:\nYes, he gave authority, they haven't approved anything.\nK:\nDammit! Hold on, it's the other line, hold on.\n(Continued Conversation )\nK:\nThat was Mel again. Now what he says is they will be getting an\nASW exercise in the North Sea and they are not moving into the\nBaltic until early May.\nH:\nEarly May, that's right.\nK:\nWell, that's fine, let's just keep it going.\nH:\nRight. And it's the Carrier 4.\nK:\nYeah, that's fine, let's keep that going and if anything happens when\nhe's back, we --\nH:\nCan adjust.\nK:\nWe adjust and if nothing happens, we want to get tough anyway.\nHi\nThat's right. The other one will be out on the 23rd they tell me,\nit's 3 for five days.\nK:\nBut 3, that's not -- they were supposed to put 4 in, the Bastards.\nH:\nYeah. Well, what happened on this -- the reason I was fuzzy is this\nhappened while I was in Vietnam, when you had that exchange of papers.\nK:\nBut I -- 3 is what they've always had in there.\nH:\nNo, no. They normally send two, Henry.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN08-08/2150 PerLtr.6/19/202 6/19/2012\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nBy NARA, Date 10/28/2014\nDECLASSIFIED\nOF4]\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 2\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig.\nApril 18, 1971 -- 10:00 a.m.\nK:\nOh, really.\nH:\nYeah, you had them to up it one. The other one you wanted them to\nloiter longer and Kennedy conveyed that to them.\nK:\nAnd did they do that?\nH:\nWell, they tried to get the Helsinki thing.\nK:\nYeah.\nH:\nAnd they wouldn't accept them there and that's why they went to\nState. That part of it is what caused the State thing. And now they\nare not going there, they are going to Kiel.\nK:\nThat's all right.\nH:\nAnd they have a paper they are sending over with the details but\nit hasn't gotten here.\nK:\nBut what I But are they going deeper in exit (?) than Kiel?\nH:\nOh, I think so, yes. I think they are going in fairly deep.\nK:\nThe thing is to let them exercise now. By the first of May, we will\nknow what our friend has brought.\nH:\nExactly.\nK:\nIf he brings something, they will just go to Kiel and come out.\nIf he brings nothing, they won't -- they will go all the way. 1\nH:\nThat's right.\nK:\nBut just keep watching it.\nH:\nThat's right.\nK:\nIsn't that right?\nH:\nYeah, that's the way to do it, I think, and as I say we have the\nwhole thing but it hasn't left there yet. First they said they sent\nit to us, and then he called me back and said that it hadn't left yet.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determine d to be declassified. ; P,2 4\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 3\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig.\n10:00 a. m., April 18, 1971\nK:\nOh, they are a bunch of goddamn crooks.\nH:\nThe other thing in Pich Nil is nothing but authority, they have to\ncome back in and give them a target now.\nK:\nNo, he seems to have given -- approved it. Or maybe he's got it\nscrewed up.\nH:\nHe's got it screwed up. I just talked to Dan Murphy, he said all he\ndid -- they have the authority, you know, but he --\nK:\nI also told him to tell Abrams to keep quiet now for a while.\nH:\nYeah, yeah.\nK:\nThat guy really -- I think he's just out of control.\nH:\nHis training is so rotten, it's just terrible.\nK:\nWell, now what bothers me is he is fighting now a heroic battle for\nmilitary superiority out there while we are holding on by our teeth.\nH:\nYeah, yeah, he had his chance.\nK:\nI just know we would still be in Laos if it hadn't been for that\ngoddamn -- well, now we would be out or we would be on the way\nout.\nH:\nYeah.\nK:\nBut the China thing has taken us a little off the hook except that it\nwould have helped us militarily enormously.\nH:\nThat's right.\nK:\nThat goddamn thing was just beginning to pay off.\nH:\nYeah, yeah.\nK:\nOkay, fine.\nH:\nAll right, sir.\nK:\nI noticed the Times is again hacking away on Vietnam.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. P. 3 OF\n4\nTELCON (TAPE)\nPage 4\nMr. Kissinger/General Haig\nApril 18, 1971 -- 10:00 a. m.\nH:\nIt is. Yeah, yeah.\nK:\nThat's all right. If we get any of the other things done, they are\ngoing to be on their knees.\nH:\nYeah. Well, I think it has been very helpful -- this would have been\na murderous week without it.\nK:\nYeah. They don't even know how to tackle that one because they never\nrecommended this.\nH:\nNo, that's right.\nK:\nAlthough they are going to leap frog us soon.\nH:\nYeah.\nK:\nThey are going to come up with 100 hot ideas.\nH:\nThat's right.\nK:\nDon't you think?\nH:\nI'm sure of it.\nK:\nAlthough I'd rather like it if the Democrats hit a very hard pro-Chinese\ncourse, it would give the Russians an incentive with us.\nH:\nThat's right.\nK:\nOkay.\nH:\nThat's the way it will turn too. Okay, sir.\nK:\nRight, bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON (TAPE)\nMr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird\n10:00 a. m., April 18, 1971\nL:\nHenry.\nK:\nYes, Mel.\nL:\nThat movement into the Baltic takes place early in May.\nK:\nOkay.\nL:\nBut they will be operating in the North Sea on an ASW mission.\nNow what it -- the task force is made up of 4 destroyers and an\nASW carrier.\nK:\nThat's great, that's what we want.\nL:\nAnd they will be operating this month in the North Sea, ASW exercises\nand so forth, then they will move in the Baltic on the -- early in May.\nK:\nThat's terrific. I wouldn't worry about that, if there are any changes,\nI will be in touch with you.\nL:\nYeah, let me know so I can back up from it if there are any.\nK:\nRight, but I am up to -- just continue it as it is.\nL:\nYeah, okay. And we'll get together this week, there are a couple\nof things we ought to talk over there, not time urgent but --\nK:\nYou and I,or the President too.\nL:\nWell, maybe it would be all right for him on the use of air power\nNorth that I want to talk about a little bit.\nK:\nMaybe you and I should talk about it first. I will definitely set up a\nmeeting --\nL:\nYeah, all right.\nK:\nBetween you and the President anyway, regardless.\nL:\nYeah, fine.\nK:\nOkay.\nL:\nWe'll talk about that, but it isn't time urgent right now.\nK:\nGood.\nL:\nAll right.\nK: Bye.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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